Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activiti...

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.Caucus Room, Russell Senate Office Building
Year Shot:
1973  (Actual Year)
Tape Master:
Original Film:
[00.08.40-committee room, Sen. ERVIN.] Senator ERVIN. The committee will come to order. Senator MONTOYA. Before, the recess I -was reading you a quotation from a press statement, delivered by 'Mr. Ziegler which appeared in the Post. He stated "A blatant effort at character assassination that I do not, think has been witnessed in the political process for some time" had occurred. What comment do you have to say about that? What do you think about that? Mr. DEAN. Senator, it is hard for me to-what was the date on that again? Senator MONTOYA. That was October 25, 1972. Mr. DEAN. It is hard for me to relate to specifically which story, was reefering to. About the time, as I recall, the Segretti stories were evolving, it had started on October 10. Finally. it reached the point of directly tying in Mr. Haldeman on source stories, and I Can only assume that this is the--- Senator MONTOYA. The reaction to it? Mr. DEAN. The reaction to that story, yes. Senator MONTOYA. On April 18, 1973, in the Washington Post, this statement appeared: "Mr. Ziegler met with reporters and said that all previous White House statements about the bugging were inoperative. Ziegler emphasized the President's statement today is the operative statement." Now can you tell us what motivated Mr. Ziegler to make this statement what transpired prior to the, making of this statement at the White House, if you know ? Mr. DEAN. I believe what transpired as you compare that statement to the chronology of my testimony. you -will see, that that was the weekend that, the Attorney General and Mr. Petersen reported to the President the direction that the grand jury -was headed in and the fact, that I had been to the prosecutors had been revealed and the fact that I had told the prosecutors the, involvement of others in this matter, including those at the White, House. It was as a result of that and the President statement of the 17th when he -went out to explain and further elaborate on the President's statement that he made the inoperative comment. Senator MONTOYA. Then let us get back to Mr. Mitchell with whom YOU felt a father-son relationship, and perhaps justifiably so; what were the reasons for your going to 'Mr. Mitchell's office at the time that Mr. Liddy first, presented his plan, and then subsequently on February 4. -when there was a scaling down of the initial plan? Who sent you there and what was your mission? Mr. DEAN. Well. I was called--it was a meeting called by Mr. Magruder, My secretary informed me of the fact that the meeting had been scheduled. I did not know the substance of the meeting so I called 'Mr. Magruder to ask him what the substance of the meeting Was going to be. and he told me that Mr. Liddy was going to present his intelligence plan at that point. [00.12.47] Senator MONTOYA. Did you have any instructions from 'Mr. Ehrlichman or Mr. Haldeman to attend those, meetings? Mr. DEAN. Well. very early in the preceding year it had been my role to make sure that the reelection committee had a capacity to deal With demonstrators. When I had first talked to Mr. Liddy about his job, I had explained that one of the responsibilities of his job would he to deal with demonstrators in the security system and particularly with regard to the convention. When he was interviewed by Mr. 'Mitchell on November 24. 1 think you will find in the exhibits a copy of the agenda that Mr. Liddy prepared regarding his Job. Therein You will find a one-line in a rather limited agenda that would have something to do -with intelligence. That was discussed at that meeting that he would prepare an intelligence plan for dealing with demonstrators. [00.13.51]