Advanced Search
JFK Assassination Hearings - H.B. McClain
Deputy Chief Counsel Gary T. Cornwell asks if H.B. McClain heard any shots. McClain says he heard one, gives his location at that time and describes what he saw, which was a flock of pigeons taking off in flight around the schoolbook depository. McClain says he then got the order on the radio to go to Parkland hospital. Cornwell asks McClain about his radio use and channel that day, and McClain states he had no occasion to use it, talk through it. He also states the radio's usual channel is one.
JFK Assassination Hearings - H.B. McClain
Deputy Chief Counsel Gary T Cornwell explains that the three photographic exhibits were taken from a motion picture. Cornwell confirms that H.B. McClain, police motorcyclist on U.S. President John F. Kennedy's motorcade, saw the motion picture yesterday.
August 1, 1994 - Part 3
(14:29:15) Hearing resumes: The CHAIRMAN. We invite the witnesses to come back to the witness table. 69 Let me say to all of you, I know it's been a long morning and it's difficult to be here for that length of time. We're sensitive to that and I think we'll be able to finish up in a reasonable amount of time now that we've resumed. There are a few Senators that have some remaining questions for you, so we'll try to work through those. When we finish, it would be my intention to take a late afternoon lunch break, a half hour or thereabouts. I'll set the time exactly when we finish. When we complete that, we'll have Ms. Hanson in this afternoon, take her statement, and proceed with questions in her instance. Senator Boxer, let me yield to you now. Senator BOXER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me say, since this is my last round, I appreciate the witnesses' candor with us, You have told us what you believe and you've said it straight from the shoulder. We can't expect any more of you than that. I feel very good that you're the kind of people you are. To go back to had little discussion with Mr. Katsanos over this Early Bird, I would just give you-you didn't ask me for this-but just a little bit of my own experience as a reporter. Many times when I was working on a story, the result was it didn't pan out. Sometimes you start on a story, you ask a lot of questions just to get some light in somebody's eye, and the thing never materializes. If somebody repeats certain accusations you make, by way of a question or whatever else, it could really do damage. So I would urge you-and I would address this to Mr. Ryan more than you, because you work for him. That's my understanding. Is that correct? Mr. KATsANos. That is correct. Senator BOXER. Since, presumably, only six people get this, I would just do a little E-mail and mark it confidential if there's something they need to know about. I think a lot of this stuff is just rumor and garbage and I don't think it serves the taxpayers to be spending our money in that way. It reminds me, we all know that it doesn't feel great to wake up in the morning and see a press story. I mean, gosh, we're elected by the people. We don't want to see a bad press story. But if we or our staff spent our waking hours printing up what might be said by the press or what we might read, we wouldn't get our work done. Therefore, I would urge that we give this thing a little burial. That's my suggestion. I nave a question for Mr. Ryan, Ms. Kulka, and Mr. Roelle, and I think it's just a yes or no. I'll start with Mr. Ryan and work down through the three of you. Did Mr. Altman or Ms. Hanson ever ask for details about the content of RTC criminal referrals or the civil investigation of Madison Guaranty? Mr. RYAN. No. Ms. KULKA. No, Senator. Mr. ROELLE. No. Senator BOXER. Did Mr. Altman or Ms. Hanson ever ask for information on the progress of the criminal referrals or on the status of the RTC civil investigation of Madison? Mr. RYAN. Not to me, no. Senator BOXER, Ms. Kulka? 70 Ms. KULKA. No, other than to make sure that it was-the civil investigation was ongoing, that was the only information asked for or received. Senator BOXER. Mr. Roelle? Mr. ROELLE. No. Senator BOXER. Did any White House staff ask you for details about the content of RTC criminal referrals or the civil investigation of Madison Guaranty? Mr. RYAN. No, Senator. Ms. KULKA. No. Mr. ROELLE. No. Senator BOXER. Have any of you been pressured by the White House staff to take certain action on or come to certain conclusions about the Madison Guaranty case, either criminal or civil? Mr. RYAN, No. Ms. KuLKA. No. Mr. ROELLE, No. Senator BOXER. The reason I wanted to ask those questions for the American people, was because I think that when we're looking at the substance of this investigation ' it's important to note Mr Chairman, that none of these witnesses-actually, we have in the case of Ms. Kulka, she's in charge of the lawsuit-but none of them have stated they had any pressure brought upon them, in any way, on either the criminal or the civil side of this investigation. I think it's important for us to ferret where the pressure points were on the RTC. They certain] weren't coming from the White had House, or from Mr. Altman or Ms. Hanson, as we can tell fro these witnesses, who I have no reason to believe were not telling us the truth, nor do I think my Republican friends believe that to be the case. So, here we have witnesses stating very clearly that no pressure was put on them, vis-a-vis the substance of these investigations. As I look at where the pressure points are, maybe we can take the issue of the hiring of Mr. Stephens. He was certainly a con-' controversial appointment, given his record of on-the-record criticisms of this President. I read them myself. They're pretty harsh. He has every right to' make those, but the fact is, this is the man who was hired via Pillsbury. Ms. Kulka, am I correct in asking you, in suggesting that you have stated to the Committee that no pressure was put on you to dismiss Mr. Stephens once be was hired, Is that correct? Ms. KuLKA, That's correct. Senator BOXER. No one asked you to fire Mr. Stephens or in any way change the hiring of Pillsbury? Ms. KULKA. That's correct. Senator BOXER. Is that correct, Mr. Ryan, from your standpoint? Mr. RYAN. That's correct. Senator BOXER. All right. We bad no pressure put on either of these areas. In my, view, there was a lot of talking, too much talking going on, vis-a-vis the Early Bird, within the RTC and you don't even know who leaked a lot of this. As I understand it, Mr. Ryan, you're going to see who's been leaking some of this information. Is that correct? Mr. RYAN. That's correct.
August 4, 1994 - Part 4
(12:00:00)(tape #10089 begins) Is that still in effect? Is there still a response team? Ms. WILLIAMS. No, there is not. Senator CAMPBELL. There is not. It was put together primarily to deal with press concerns? Mr. McLARTY. That is correct. Right after the first of the year, there was quite a bit of interest, press inquiry allegations, many without any kind of factual basis whatsoever about the Whitewater/Madison Guaranty matter, and we simply wanted these coordinated in the White House and that is why I asked Mr. Ickes to take on that responsibility, to assume that responsibility. (12:00:37) Ms. WILLIAMS. Senator Campbell, may I add to that Mr. McLarty generally, as a way of dealing with situations where there is a lot of press interest, will put together White House response teams. This was not an unusual method of working, getting people together. Senator CAMPBELL. That is a normal process and you have done it before? MS. WILLIAMS. On different issues, yes. Senator CAMPBELL. On different things, OK. Mr. McLarty, you apparently ordered your staff, i.e., Mr. Podesta to work with the Treasury people to prepare Roger Altman for the February 24th Senate hearing. The newspapers, at least one account I read, indicated that you did not want them to concentrate solely on Whitewater. Was there anything to that? Mr. MCLARTY. We wanted the hearings to cover the scope that this Committee felt was proper, There was a lot going on and we did not think it was proper for the hearings to be based on a very narrow issue and that to dominate the hearings. The RTC was performing quite well in their activities. This was" to be a regularly scheduled hearing and we wanted it, to be a broad, 321 and full hearing, and not a forum for (12:01:53)(tape #10088 ends) allegations and questions about Whitewater. We did not think that that was the right focus of this meeting. Senator CAMPBELL. Did you have any role in the correction of the record after his testimony? Mr. MCLARTY. I have already testified, Senator, that when the matter was brought to my attention that Mr. Altman's testimony might not be complete, it was recommended to me, when it was brought to my attention, that we work with Treasury to get the record complete if it needed supplementing, and Mr. Podesta followed on that. Senator CAMPBELL. Did you talk to him personally about it? Mr. McLARTY. No, I did not. Senator CAMPBELL. To his staff? Mr. McLARTY. No, I did not, Senator CAMPBELL, Is it normal that your staff would work with any Secretary's staff in developing testimony? Normally they develop their own, do they not? Mr. MCLARTY. I have testified to that earlier, Senator. Normally, a Cabinet Secretary or Deputy Secretary offering testimony will be the primary or accept the primary responsibility for it, but it is not unusual for our Congressional Affairs personnel to be aware of that testimony before various Committees before the House or the Senate. Senator CAMPBELL. Thank you. Now, Maggie, one of the previous witnesses testified that when Mr. Altman stopped by, I believe it was February 3rd, to say that he would not recuse himself, that there were not any questions asked. Nobody seemed particularly surprised. He only stayed there a few seconds and left. Is that your recollection? Ms. WILLIAMS. That is my recollection, sir. Senator CAMPBELL. That is all I need, Mr. Chairman. Thanks. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Campbell. Senator DAmato, your side is next. We have got two Members left to go in the first round here. Do you want to go next, or Senator DAMATO. I would like to, Mr. Chairman, because I want to pursue something that Senator Hatch Senator DODD. Mr. Chairman, would you, just out of curiosity, I mean, when Senators have not had a chance at all, should we not try to accommodate those people who have not had even a first round before any of us go to a second round? Senator DAMATO. Well, let me say that in the division of time, I had suggested earlier that we would have equal time, that we enter into an agreement to do that. The Chairman did not think we could do that. However, he agreed to 7 minutes for each side. And it is now time for our side. Senator DODD. No, I understand that. I just thought of the people that have not had a chance. That is all. Senator DAMATO. Again, we are limited in time scope. It is not out of a lack of deference or consideration for my colleagues, but what will take place is, at the end, we will wind up with us having to ask more and more and more of these questions, I would like to try to get time to raise questions. 322 And I would be happy to yield to my colleague at this time, but then I would like us to start. Senator DODD. Go ahead. Senator DAMATO. I will yield to my colleague. Senator MOSELEY-BRAUN. Thank you, Senator D'Amato, but I think I am prepared to follow the Chairman's judgment in this regard, because of scheduling or whatever it is, that is fine with me. Senator D'AMATO. No, that is quite all right. We do need harmony here and I want to extend it. I am happy to extend the time. The CHAIRMAN. Well, Senator Moseley-Braun appreciates that. She is prepared to wait. Senator D'AMATO. I would, to my colleagues- Senator DODD. Why don't we adjourn the hearing? Senator D'AMATO. Senator Murray? Senator Murray? The CHAIRMAN. Senator Murray, do you want to go now? Senator MURRAY. No, go ahead. The CHAIRMAN. All right. Senator DODD. I am sorry I brought it up. Senator MOSELEY-BRAUN. No, we appreciate it, Senator Dodd, and your point is very well taken and it was very thoughtful and sensitive of you to mention that, but at the same time, I think in the interests of making certain that these hearings go along with the Chairman's direction, I would just as soon wait. The CHAIRMAN. We are looking down at that end of the table. Senator Sasser has not had an opportunity either yet, Senator D'Amato. Senator SASSER. Well, Mr. Chairman, I will be pleased to take advantage of Senator D'Amato's generosity if he wishes to yield to me.
August 2, 1994 - Part 11
(01:10:27) Senator D'AMATO. Let me ask you this. Is it still your testimony now after we've gone through this that the purpose of the February 2 meeting did not include addressing the issue of recusal? Mr. ALTMAN. When I called Mr. McLarty and told him what the purpose of the meeting was, I said it's to discuss the procedure alternatives facing the RTC. That was the day before the meeting. Senator DAMATO. OK Let me give you one other. The CHAIRMAN. Would you just yield at that point for a moment? Senator DAMATO. Yes, sir. The CHAIRMAN. We've covered that a lot of times but wouldn't it be fair to say after the fact, in that meeting recusal was discussed? Mr. ALTMAN. Absolutely, Senator. I'm just saying that I discussed that extemporaneously. The CHAIRMAN. It wasn't your plan to do so. Mr. ALTMAN. No, it wasn't. The CHAIRMAN. But it came up in the meeting and it was a subject of the meeting as the meeting actually happened. Senator GRAMM. It was in his notes. Senator DAMATO. Let him finish, Mr. ALTMAN. As I say, it wasn't the purpose of the meeting, I did bring it up, it did get discussed as you know and along the lines we I 've talked about and so that happened. Senator DAMATO. That's the problem I have. You told people you were going over there to discuss the issue of recusal, Josh Steiner had that impression. Let me tell you what Ben Nye says and Josh Steiner is almost beside himself in his notes when you read them and he said he let them talk you out of it. You were going over there to say that. You told- you discussed the matter with Kulka, ,You discussed the matter with Jean Hanson, you discussed the matter with the Secretary, and then Ben Nye says-he's your as- Question: To your recollection did anyone indicate that the issue of recusal would also be addressed when Mr. Altman contacted the White House. Answer: I believe that it was planned to be discussed. Yet now, Mr. Altman, you've responded to the Committee Chairman with an answer that is contradicted by just about-if you look it and really look at all the people's recollections, that it was certainly intended to go over there to discuss that subject. Are you really saying you didn't intend to discuss the issue of recusal? Honestly to this Committee at this--at 1:15 a.m., after ev- erything has come out, you contend now that when you went over you didn't have on your mind and a purpose and a major se to discuss the issue of recusal and I say major. Senator KERRY. Is this the 2nd or the 3rd? Senator D'AMATO. This is the 2nd, February 2. This is when Bernie up. 546 Mr. ALTMAN. All I'm trying to say, Senator, and I think the record is clear on this, when I called Mr. McLarty and said, is why I'd like to come meet, I didn't bring up recusal. When made that phone call which I think was the day before that wasn't %plan. Senator DAMATO. I didn't ask you what you said to Mr. Me What you told other people and when you set out to go over to meeting, did you intend to bring up the issue of recusal? Mr. ALTMAN. It's my best recollection that I brought it up ex poraneousl,y. I think in my deposition it says that I blurted it That's my best recollection. Senator DAMATO. You blurted it out? Mr. ALTMAN. Yes, I think that's what I said in deposition. Senator DAMATO. These people are all waiting to hear what are saying about that. You really think that they didn't know the statute of limitations was going to end on February 28? And I know the red light is on. If you want me to stop, we'll just come back to it later. Mr. ALTMAN. I do want to say I don't believe, to address myself specifically to Senator Riegle I don't believe that an of the partici- pants in that meeting when I walked in the room thought or knew that recusal was going to be discussed. Senator DAMATO. Let me just put this-here is your talking points prepared for that meeting. Senator GRAMM. For him. Senator DAMATO. Prepared for you, you have asked for these' talking points and it says I've decided that I-look how definite it is. "I have decided that I will recuse myself from the decisionmaking process as interim CEO of the RTC because of my relationship with the President and Mrs. Clinton." I mean you are going to say that. You told this to Ms. Hanson. You told is to Nye. You told this to Steiner. You were going to go over there and do it. Senator KERRY. But as the Senator knows, there were separate talking points that came out of that meeting. Senator GRAMM. This is what he took in. Senator DODD. Can I just on the point The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sarbanes has asked to be recognized and your time is up. Senator D'AMATO. You all are more than generous but if I could conclude in 15 seconds. This is the aspect that troubles me. Even at this time and I conclude by that given these facts, given this 'information, I say I can only come to the conclusion that you absolutely intended to go to that meeting to discuss the issue of recusal and then when asked to correct the record, refused to do it and it was only almost a month later before you finally brought that into play. And I thank my colleagues for being as patient as they have. Mr. ALTMAN. I would like a moment if I could to respond to that The CHAIRMAN. Yes, go ahead.
August 3, 1994 - Part 8
(19:30:24) The CHAIRMAN. We're scheduled to start at 9:30 a.m., and I'm certainly open to starting sooner than that if it's practical for the ,Members here, and I'm happy to talk to people about that. I'm willing to start at an earlier hour. My intention is to get through these panels in the same fashion and manner in which we've been operating up until the present time. senator BOXER. Mr. Chairman, is there a way-if we're going to have-I understand you're going to start the two tonight. The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Senator BOXER. And when everyone is tired, you're going to or you're going to break at a certain time? The CHAIRMAN. No. I'm going to make a judgment as to an hour this evening. We're not going to be able to finish I don't think, without going into the dead of night. I don't think that's a sound course of action. 148 Senator BOXER. Can we fold these two into another panel in the morning rather than have a whole separate panel and throw us off our schedule? Senator MOSELEY-BRAUN. Mr. Chairman, would it he appropriate- can we just break for a minute and discuss this? The CHAIRMAN. I'd be happy to talk to you informally. I don't want to break for that purpose. We've got Members that want to ask questions. We've got witnesses sitting here. Senator DODD. Mr. Chairman, just a suggestion. Is the first panel tomorrow also White House? What about the possibility of then trying to combine, maybe, the two this evening, what they haven't finished, with the first panel. Senator BOXER. That's what I just suggested. Senator DODD. Did you make that suggestion? Senator BOXER. Yes. But it sounded very good when you said it again. [Laughter.] Senator DODD. What? Senator BOXER. It sounded very good when you said it. Senator D'AMATO. I'm willing and I speak for our side, to accomodate--to think we can finish this off, let's get our witnesses sworn in, let's have their opening statements, you save time. Start punctually at 9:00, try to go through them as quickly as possible. If you don't want to do that, why then, let's just keep plowing ahead, Senator BOXER, I'd rather plow ahead. Senator D'AMATO. If you want to plow ahead you're going to he here a long time. Because then I'll tell you what takes place. People do not- they don't have an incentive to say at 9:00 or 9:30 we can be out of here, because we know we're going to be here until 12:00 or 1:00. Senator SARBANES. Why don't we go ahead now? The CHAIRMAN. If I may say so, I'm attempting to reconcile a number of different issues and points of view. I'd like a little latitude on this issue, on this scheduling matter. I think what I'm posing to you is a reasonable way to move this. I'd be happy to talk to people individually. I don't think we're going to solve it in this kind of a group discussion, Right now I'd like to call on the next person waiting to ask questions. Senator SHELBY. You're the Chairman, you make the decision. Senator SARBANES. Mr. Chairman Senator MOSELEY-BRAUN. Mr. Chairman, we'd just like you to withhold judgment until we've had a chance to discuss it a little bit with you, The CHAIRMAN. I will do so. Did you want to go next, Senator D'Amato? Senator D'AMATO. Senator Gramm. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gramm is recognized. Senator GRAMM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Klein, want to go back to your deposition. You were asked in your deposition the following question: "In other words, your understanding was that Mr. Altman was not going to raise the recusal discussion on February 2nd in whatever letter he wrote. And your answer was "that was my understanding " You then go 149 on to say, "I feel reasonably confident that I probably said something to the effect of if he's going to write a letter, 1 don't understand why he doesn't put this recusal point or something to that effect in the letter." Now, is that your recollection of your deposition'? Mr. KLEIN. That's correct, sir. Senator GRAMM. Do you have any further information as to why Mr. Altman did not put the recusal issue in the letter of March the 2nd? Mr. KLEIN. Other than the testimony I heard here yesterday, no, sir. Senator GRAMM. I've tried to look at this in every way. He's writing a letter to clarify the record. You don't have any doubt that when he wrote that letter, he knew that recusal discussions had occurred. He had been in on at least two meetings. There may have been a dozen telephone calls, some of which he was involved in. Your boss had called him directly and said, you didn't mention recusal. You have no doubt whatsoever that he knew about recusal? Mr. KLEIN. Based on the information I had, I don't have any real doubt about that, sir, Senator GRAMM. Well, it seems to me that there is only one inference that this Committee can draw from that. Let me just speak for myself. There's only one inference I can draw from it, and that is that for some reason, which we do not know, and my guess is we'll never know fully, Mr. Altman desperately did not want this Committee to know that this discussion was going on at that point. And that gets me back to this issue: what is the big deal about recusal?
August 1, 1994 - Part 8
(22:25:01) Ms. HANSON. First, I disagree that this has been-there has been an investigation by the Independent Counsel. There's been an investigate tion by the inspectors General and there has been no finding that this information, the information that was conveyed to the 183 White House on the criminal referrals on the press leaks, was used inappropriately by anybody, no one. In addition, I am sorry that if you-that you think I didn't handle this transcript, and these issues, appropriately. However, I had no expectation, no expectation the letter that was written on March 2, 1994, which was designed for a specific purpose, and the letter that was written on March 3, 1994, that was also designed for a specific purpose, was going to complete, or was intended to complete, the record. My attorneys gave me specific instructions when the Grand Jury subpoenas were served that since I was under, and the conduct was under, investigation-under a criminal investigation, that conversations between the participants involved could be misconstrued by the Independent Counsel. That was a view that was shared by other people who had received subpoenas. I am sorry that the transcript was not supplemented as I expected it to be, but I was not able to participate, and I did the best job I could do. The CHAIRMAN. We have to leave this exchange at that point. Senator Bond. Senator BOND. Mr. Chairman, first, I want to say to the Senator from California that the very perceptive questions she asked were ones that have been bothering me. I have been disturbed, I've listened all day, and I've read the statements, Ms. Hanson, about what happened to that simple little question I asked. You worked on and prepared, with Mr. Altman, an answer on March 2, 1994. That was, as I gathered from the statement, "I appreciate the opportunity to amend the record accordingly." You did not, in that March 2, 1994, letter, feel that you had to correct the major inadequacies in the answer to that question I asked Mr. Altman? Ms. HUNGARIAN. I'm sorry, sir, I don't understand your question. Senator BOND. You participated in writing the letter of March 2, 1994, that Mr. Altman sent to the Chairman. Is that correct? Ms. HANSON. I read the letter of March 2, 1994, yes. Senator BOND. You knew at the time, that when Mr. Altman answered the question I asked, it was not a full and truthful answer, did you not? Ms. HANSON. I believed that Mr. Altman understood the question and responded to it, to the best of his recollection, with respect to RTC contacts. Senator BOND. Are you trying to play lawyer with us, saying because you were in the Treasury, even though you were detailed to the RTC, that he was somehow using that technicality to say that, because you were operating at the direction of the CEO of the RTC but were employed by the Treasury, it didn't apply to you? Ms. HANSON. I understood that I acted in my capacity as General Counsel to the Treasury. Again as I have testified, I didn't recall at that point in time-as I sat here during the hearing, I had only a vague recollection of my conversation, and I did not know what Mr. Altman recalled. The letter of March 2, 1994, was designed, solely, to put the Committee on notice about the two additional meetings in the fall, that were going to appear in the newspaper article the following day. It was not intended to be a complete description of those contacts, or to supplement the record to make it 184 complete and thorough. So, no, sir,
August 1, 1994 - Part 9
(22:30:17)(Tape #10063 ends) it was not intended to be a full description of those contacts. Senator BOND. Ms. Hanson I it does say, "I would appreciate it if you would amend the record accordingly." When Mr. Altman called me that evening, on March 2, 1994, 1 was struck then, as I am struck in your answer now, that the thing that seems to drive YOU to correct the inaccuracies in the testimony to the Congress, was the fact that the truth was going to come out in the newspaper. I would hope there would be a somewhat greater responsibility that you would feel as an attorney, when you have information that makes you aware your client is clearly, actively, and demonstrably misleading Congress, to advise your client to correct the record, or at least indicate that there was a question which would have to be clarified later. I find that to be extremely troubling. Ms. HANSON. Sir, I think you have mischaracterized what I have said and what I did. I have said that that letter was not intended to be a full response to your questions. That letter was sent, as a courtesy, so that the Committee would be aware of those two additional contacts before the article appeared in the paper. What was left still to be done, sir, was to review the whole transcript, and to respond to the questions that we understood were coming. We understood that there were going to be many of them. I fully expected that every single contact, between the RTC, the Treasury, and the White House, on these matters, was going to be fully and completely laid out. However, as I've stated, I received a Grand Jury subpoena and I did not have an opportunity, even to read the transcript, until after the subpoena was served. What I expected to happen didn't happen, when the March 2, 1994, letter was done. During the course of that week I had no expectation that anything, other than what I thought was going to happen, which was a thorough, care ful, orderly review of the record, and correction and completion in answering of questions, was going to occur. I really-and I am I really resent your statement about my professionalism. Senator BoND. Ms. Hanson, if there's anyone who has something to resent-1 feel that you did not deal properly with us. Let me ask you, since you did ask specifically for, and looked at, the tape in which those questions were asked. There were two questions you said you focused on. You didn't need to wait for the transcript. You saw that on the tape. You were there in real life, you saw it on tape, and you still did not feel obliged to tell your client that he should correct his testimony. You didn't need the whole transcript, because the question was raised about the accuracy of the response to the question I addressed to Mr. Altman. You went back and looked at the tape, I believe we gathered from your earlier discussion, and you saw, then and there, did you not, that he misled us, that he did not Ms. HANSON. Sir, as I stated, we looked at the tape on March 1, 1994. Overnight, I created-I worked on those questions and answers and tried to get an understanding in my own mind. We put together a letter, which was not, in my mind, the letter that would have been put together if we had bad more time, and we sent that letter in. By no-I did not expect that to be a full and complete re 185 sponse to your question, sir. That's not what I understood that letter to be.
August 3, 1994 - Part 4
(14:45:26) Mr. LUDWIG. Well, sir, I characterized the way I remember it in my statement and that is that I knew there was press interest and I thought it was appropriate to let them know there was press interest since these were public documents. Senator DAMATO. Just one last question. Why did you call Maggie Williams on January 19th to give her your advice and counsel? Why Maggie Williams? Mr. LUDWIG. I had learned I think from either the newspapers or scuttlebutt or somewhere that she was in charge of the Whitewater matter, and that's why I called her. Senator DAMATO. Somehow you got this perception that she was interested or in charge of it. Did you ever speak to her-prior to your call and your advice, did you ever have occasion to speak to her about Whitewater? Mr. LUDWIG. Not that I recollect, I did try to get her to give her this advice on a couple of occasions. That's reflected in my phone logs which I've provided to the Committee, but to the best of my recollection, I've never spoken to her before or since. Senator D'AMATO. OK, thank you. Mr. Chairman, I don't know whether Senator Bond would like to continue on my time or whether it would be better to move over to the other side so he could have a full Senator BOND. Why don't we allow the other side to go forward. Senator DAMATO. I yield back my time. Senator SARBANES. Mr. Ludwig, this kind of call you made to Maggie Williams, was in what, January the 9-when was that call? Mr. LUDWIG. I believe, Senator, it was January 19, 1994. Senator SARBANES. And what prompted you to make it? Mr. LUDWIG. Well, sir, as I said in my statement, reading the newspapers day after day, there was a constant trickle of information about Whitewater. I thought hard about what I could say about this and it seemed to me that what I could say that was perfectly appropriate was that everything ought to be disclosed if it hadn't already been disclosed. I didn't know whether it had already been disclosed, As Secretary Bentsen testified this morning, he evidently spoke with Mr. Stephanopoulos and said the same thing. I felt the same way as Secretary Bentsen. After having practiced law in Washington for 20 years, it seemed to me that in this kind of a matter the best thing to do is disclose and I felt it was appropriate for me to say that. 68 Senator SARBANES. So you felt, given your experience and perceptions, that you might be helpful by calling them and giving them that advice? Mr. LUDWIG. Yes, sir. Senator SARBANES. You say in your statement that was the third occasion of contact Mr. LUDWIG. Yes, sir, Senator SARBANES [continuing]. "Aside from occasional passing references in the course of other discussions, " and I'd like you to elaborate a little bit on what constitutes "occasional passing references in the course of other discussions." What is that phrase intended to encompass? Mr. LUDWIG. Well, sir, you could not, during that period and I think it's true today, meet with anybody whether it's a relative or somebody here in the Congress or in the White House or the Treasury without somebody saying, oh, look, Altman's on the front page or it's Whitewater again or something of that nature. There were not discussions, not a subsequent exchange of nonpublic information--just a word about newspaper or television reports. Senator SARBANES. So that's intended then to refer to those kinds of references and "passing references" in the course of other conversations? Mr. LUDWIG. Yes, sir. Senator SARBANES. I don't need to parse those words very carefully. Mr. LUDWIG. No, sir. Senator SARBANES. So apparently we have testimony from some of the people in the Counsel's Office that they talked to you, but you're not certain that you talked to them; is that right?
August 4, 1994 - Part 11
(22:35:36) He told us that the RTC would have to reach a decision by that date about whether there was a prima facie case of fraud or willful misconduct. He said the RTC would have three options: 1, bring a lawsuit if there was a good faith basis for one; 2, do nothing and let the statute of limitations expire; or 3, seek from potential defendants-including possibly the Clintons-tolling agreements extending the statute of limitations, He indicated that the RTC staff would be in a position to act before February 28, 1994. Mr. Altman said that the RTC investigation was headed by Jack Ryan, the RTC's Deputy Chief Executive Officer, and Ellen Kulka, the RTC's General Counsel. He told us that he had confidence in them and would be inclined to rely on their recommendations. He said they had both recently come from the Office of Thrift Supervision, the OTS. I said that I had heard of Ms. Kulka when she worked for the OTS and that she was one of a group of tough OTS litigators. Mr. Altman then turned to a subject that had not been previously identified as a topic for discussion. He said he was considering recusing himself from the Madison Guaranty investigation. He 471 said he had discussed this with Ms. Hanson and Secretary Bent. sen, and they agreed it would be best. Mr. Altman went on to say, almost in the next breath , that he received ethics advice to the effect that he was not--I repeat not-, legally or ethically required to recuse himself. This meant two things to me- First, that Mr. Altman believed he could act impartially in the Madison Guaranty matter; and second, that Mr. Altman and his ethics advisor believed that his acting in the matter would not raise an appearance of partiality within the meaning of the relevant ethical standards. Notwithstanding this ethics advice, Mr. Altman said he was inclined to recuse himself, Mr. Altman added that he did not believe his recusal would have any effect on the RTC's decisionmaking process, since he expected to follow the recommendations of the RTC staff in any event. I felt that what Mr. Altman had said raised an important policy issue for the Executive Branch. I was concerned that Mr. Altman's recusal might set a bad precedent for the Clinton and future AdministrMy experience as a la' lawyer, the world where I come from, has WY taught me that if a judge has a legal or ethical reason for recusing himself or herself from a matter under adjudication, he or she should promptly do so. But if there is no legal or ethical reason for recusal-and Mr. Altman said that there was no such legal or ethical reason-then that individual should do his or her sworn duty Now, this principle was eloquently expressed by Justice Rehnquist in Laird v. Tatum in 1972 when shortly after he was appointed to the Supreme Court, he was asked to recuse himself from a case. After examining the law carefully and finding he was not legally required to recuse himself, he wrote words which I remembered. That "the duty of a Federal judge to sit when not disqualified is equally as strong as the duty to not sit where disqualified." I believe that the same principle applies to the Executive Branch and regulatory agencies. Public officials should not have the option of avoiding their responsibilities simply because they are difficult, or inconvenient, or because the officials find it personally or politically expedient to step aside. When I testified last week before the House Banking Committee, I made the same point, Since then, the nonpartisan Office of Government Ethics issued a report which supports this position. The OGE wrote [on page 20 of its report]:
August 1, 1994 - Part 5
(17:35:53) Ms. HANSON. I was shown the notes in connection with my testi- mony on these matters, although I do not recall seeing them in Senate deposition, but they're not really legible, sir. The CHAIRMAN. You have to study them. It took me a while, too. As you read them and figure out how that person's handwriting looks, they appear to read, essentially, as Senator Mack has state as far as the names mentioned and so forth. You can see, particu- larly on the second half of the last page, I think it gets a little clearer. Senator MACK. I know those notes are very difficult to make heads or tails of. Senator DAMATO. How about going through them? Senator MACK. I've already read them. The additional points are that President and Mrs. Clinton have been mentioned in other charges as potential witnesses,,the RTC investigation of Madison originated in Kansas City, and the White House had obtained the unlisted telephone numbers of the RTC investigators. Ms. HANsON. I don't believe that's correct. That's-actually, that's not correct to my recollection. It was my understanding, at one point in here, that a reporter had been given the names of all of the investigators who had worked on the criminal referrals and bad contacted the Kansas City office to obtain their telephone numbers, because the numbers were unlisted. Senator MACK. Do you agree with the rest of it, then? Ms. HANSON. Some of this information I don't recall, but it does note here that-there is a reporter mentioned. Senator MACK. I just want to finish one point. The CHAIRMAN. Might I make this suggestion: I want you to do exactly that. We've had a vote start. Maybe, because you haven't had a chance to see this, in the time that we're gone to vote, you can, with the help of staff, figure out what it says and see if it sounds like a logic flow you would have given at that time. You will have that time as we're going to vote. Why don't you finish, Senator Mack. Senator MACK. I'll just make this last point. There was a memo that you addressed to Mr. Altman on September 30 ' 1993, where you had spoken with the Secretary and also with Bernie Nussbaum and Cliff Sloan. You said, "I've asked Bill Roelle to keep me informed," in reading from your memorandum to Mr. Altman. You went on to say, "Is there anything else that you think we should be doing?" In this memo, were you effectively reporting back to Mr. Altman that you did what he told you to do on September 27, 19930 in essence carrying out the task that he bad given you? Ms. HANSON. As I testified, I don't have an independent recollection of preparing that memorandum, but it is this type of-but 113 there is no question in my mind that I did, and it's the type of memorandum that I would write to Senator MACK. That's the memo over there and it does have your initials on it, doesn't it? Ms. HANSON. I'm sorry, I can't see it. Senator GRAMM. Let's just pick it up and bring it over to her. Senator BOXER. Why don't you give her this normal-sized piece of paper? Ms. HANsON. As I testified, this is the type of memorandum I would write to follow up on a task I had done. It was also attached to the RTC Early Bird that made reference to the fact that internal RTC sources ha spoken with the press about multiple criminal referrals. Senator MACK. Do you remember the date of the Early Bird? Ms. HANSON. I believe it was dated the same date. Senator MACK. What date was that? Ms. HANSON. September 30, 1993. Senator MACK. Was that after the meeting at the White House had taken place? Ms. HANSON. That's correct, although, as I indicated, the IG chronology that was released yesterday indicates that reporters were making inquiries as early as September 23, 1993. Senator MACK. Again, my point is that you say you had no knowledge of that? Ms. HANSON. I had a very good idea that I was going to be right, I don't know exactly when it was that the first reporter had this information, but I knew that it was imminent. It could very well have happened by the time that I spoke with Mr. Nussbaum. Senator MACK. But, again, you had. no actual knowledge of that? Ms. HANSON. Correct. The CHAIRMAN. I think what we should now do-the second bells have rung on this vote on the floor, so we have just a few minutes left to go to vote. Why don't we give you an opportunity to review, if you need to, that memo. Perhaps the staff can help you make out the handwriting and, if there are further questions, we can deal with that when we resume. The Committee will stand in recess for about 10 minutes while we go to vote and then we'll resume. (17:41:13) [Recess.] (17:41:18) Commentary of KEN BODE and NINA TOTENBERG
August 2, 1994 - Part 11
(00:25:52) Senator BOXER. Mr. Altman, do you feel it would have been bet'ter if you bad not had that briefing at the White House? Mr. ALTMAN. In hindsight, it should have been done in writing Senator BOXER. In hindsight, it should have been done in writ- ing, just as you did to Members of this Committee, other Senators, and Congresspeople. That's your view at this point? Mr. ALTMAN. Yes, although if any Senator had called me, I would have given him the information right over the phone if I had it. it was generic. Senator BOXER. Mr. Ryan came to Senator DAmato's office and briefed him personally so obviously the RTC was willing to do that. And now that you know all about these other meetings where the criminal referrals were discussed in terms of a press leak you think it would have been better, even though you didn't know about them, that they hadn't taken place at all? Mr. ALTMAN. Yes. We've said that. I agree with it. Senator BOXER. And you think it would have been better if you went with your gut and had recused yourself because in your heart you didn't feel perfectly good about it-and that was a noble thing-you should have gone with it and you agree with that now. Mr. ALTMAN. I should have done that initially. I know it has created a great big uproar and I regret that. I wish I hadn't. But I did recuse myself. Senator BOXER. I understand that. Had you gone with it first, ou agree it would have been better off. So I would just sum UP ere and say, unlike Ms. Hanson, who never admitted she did anything wrong eve you have stated to us very -I believe in an open way maybe my colleagues don't think it's a big deal-you have stated you made some mistakes or you didn't put it in quite that terms. You would have done it a little differently. Mr. ALTMAN. I made some mistakes. I absolutely did. if I could do it all over again, I'd do several things differently. I'd have the February 2 communication in writing. I'd recuse myself right off the bat. Senator BOXER. I appreciate that, Mr. Altman. I think it's a sign of maturity. And I do feel Mr. ALTMAN. I've gotten a lot older over the last 3 or 4 months Senator BOXER, Right, and I think you're going to be a stronger person for it all. Thank you very much. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Faircloth. 533 senator D'AMATO. Mr. Chairman, Senator Faircloth is going to yield 2 minutes to Senator Gramm. Would you yield 2 minutes to Senator Gramm first'? Senator GRAMM. Would the Senator yield just 1 minute? I want to clarify a point of information. Senator FAIRCLOTH. Go ahead. Senator GRAMM. I don't want the record to suggest, Mr. Altman, that you said or implied something that was untrue. When this litany of your achievements was listed, one of the examples given was the hiring of Jay Stephens. Is it not true that you did not hire Jay Stephens that you did not know he was hired, and that you did not even know who he was? Is that not true? Mr. ALTMAN. That's true. Ms. Kulka hired him partly or at least Senator BOXER. I asked if he had any objection and he tried to get him fired. Senator GRAMM. But the point is, Mr. Altman you didn't even know he was hired, so you couldn't have had an objection. Is that not true? Mr. ALTMAN. I think it's a good thing I didn't know he was hired. Those decisions didn't come to me. Senator GRAMM. Would you please answer my question? Is it true that you did not know be was hired, so you couldn't have bad an objection one way or another? Mr. ALTMAN. That's correct. Senator GRAMM. In fact, when it was raised you didn't even know his name; right? Senator BOXER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say the Senator from Texas is not correctly stating what my question was. I asked if he Senator GRAMM. Mr. Chairman, I have the time and if I may claim it. I'd like to ask the reporter to go back and to read Senator Boxer's statement and see if Mr. Altman responded to it. Senator DODD. Mr. Chairman, come on. Senator SARBANES. That's going to take a lot of time to get the reporter to do that and that's not-that's a nice kind of a debating technique, but I think if Senator Gramm has made his point, Senator Boxer made hers, and I think we ought to go ahead Senator GRAMM. I would withdraw it, Mr. Chairman. Let me just pose a yes or no answer. Did you know that Jay Stephens had been hired? Did you know who he was? Did you have any ability, therefore, to stop it, encourage it, or have anything to do about; it until you were told about it by the White House after he was there? Yes or no. Mr. ALTMAN. No. Senator GRAMM. That's all. The CHAIRMAN. I might has just say, the recording person down here done a terrific, job and she was her last night lit, too. She's been here steadily tonight and she's been mentioned and she ought to be recognized for her hard work and we appreciate it.
August 9, 1995 - Part 4
(13:10:14) What Vince and I were doing in the White House Counsel's Office were representing him in his official capacity, not his personal capacity. But there are some things, such as filing disclosure forms, creating a blind trust, filing your tax returns which become public. Those are official things for a President but you need your personal files to do that, your bank account, your insurance policy, what real estate you own, so in that area, you need personal files to help him fill an official function. They still remain personal files, They have nothing to do with the transaction of Government business, so you use those files for this official function, and then when the function is over, as it was in July 1993, and unfortunately Vince was also dead in July 1993, You send them back. You send them back to the President and the First Lady, or to their private lawyers, and that's what we did. That's the way I think a sensible lawyer should act. But at no time were we the President's personal lawyers, as Senator Shelby rightly pointed out. I was on the Government payroll, I was a Government lawyer, but my role was representing the President in his official capacity, 1256 Senator MOSELEY-BRAUN. Except that, Mr. Nussbaum, I think one of the problems here is the contradiction. You were making decisions about papers and claiming the privilege which would attend to a personal connection between you and the President and the First Lady, even though you were making those decisions in your official capacity. And so the contradiction and I think the place where we run into the problem is perhaps the answer would have been to have his private, personal counsel there to say, well that piece of paper is my piece of paper and the other piece of paper is your piece of paper, and I claim the privilege for this piece of paper. Mr. NUSSBAUM. That's one possible solution, Senator. Senator MOSELEY-BRAUN. I'm not trying to make this overly bureaucratic, but I Mr. NUSSBAUM. No, no, I understand, and I may not be clear, Senator myself. I may be muddling certain things when I talk to, you, but the President, in his official capacity, has an attorney-client privilege, in his official capacity, also has a work product privilege, and certainly has executive privilege in his official capacity. Now his private papers, I wasn't exercising privilege with respect to those private papers. All I was doing was assuring that they go to him and his private lawyers so they can determine whether or not privilege was being exercised. I was acting as a lawyer should act after a colleague dies in the possession of a client's personal papers. When a client dies, and the rules talk about this, ethical consideration 4.6 of the New York State Code of Professional Responsibility talks about this. It says, after a client dies, excuse me, after a lawyer dies, it's the obligation of other lawyers to see to it that a client's confidence is still protected and his personal papers should basically be sent to the client or to a new lawyer. All I was doing was acting in accordance with the rules that apply to all lawyers, whether they're personal lawyers or Government lawyers. Now I know, Senator, as you've been saying, that sometimes these lines are hard to draw, especially when you're dealing with the President of the United States. But what good lawyers do all the time is try to draw those lines and try to do them the right way. That's what I tried to do in July 1993. And, as I said, I know some of you may disagree, you disagreed with me last year, I said, looking back, I think I did the right thing. I have no regrets. Senator MOSELEY-BRAUN. Well, I would just in closing say that there's an old expression that we're called on sometimes to be the CDLS, and that's the Committee to Draw the Line Somewhere, and it seems to me that the lines in these kinds of situations would be better drawn prospectively, proactively, so that we don't wind UP with another set of multimillion dollar hearings over whether Or not someone properly handled personal versus official versus extra-' neous material in any of the high offices in Government, because there's so many important issues going the public trust and the like that are involved here. We ought to have the sense to, I think, act before these problems crop up again. Mr. NUSSBAUM. I agree with that observation, Senator. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chertoff. Mr. CHERTOFF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 1257 Mr. Nussbaum, I want to move away from the philosophy and back to the facts. We had your testimony a little earlier in which you confirmed for us the fact that it was Ms. Thomases who raised with you, on the 22nd of July, that she understood people had a disagreement or a concern about the manner in which the document review would proceed, and I think once you confirmed that for us, it was very useful then to go back to the record and learn that the three people Ms. Thomases had talked to of consequence in the White House before you were the President, the First Lady, and Maggie Williams. So you can draw an inference from that.
JFK Assassination Hearings - H.B. McClain
Deputy Chief Counsel Gary T Cornwell has H.B. McClain identify the streets shown in the photographs and identify himself in the photographs. Cornwell asks McClain if, based on his proximity to a fellow officer's motorcycle during the motorcade, as revealed in a photo, it was possible he could have heard the order to go to Parkland Hospital from this other officer's radio. McClain says it is possible.
JFK Assassination Hearings - H.B. McClain
Deputy Chief Counsel Gary T. Cornwell asks H.B. McClain about what happened after he received the order to go to the hospital and how long it took him to catch up with the limousine. McClain explains. Cornwell has McClain describe the distinguishing characteristics of his motorcycle.
August 1, 1994 - Part 5
(17:30:47) Senator MACK. As I understand it, even the Justice Department didn't have knowledge of those referrals at that point. Is that right? Ms. HANSON. The Justice Department wasn't going to have to deal with the press inquiries.Senator MACK. That was not my question. My question only concerns timing. On September 29, 1993, the Justice Department did not have the referrals. Correct? Ms. HANSON. Sir, I don't believe so, but I don't know. Senator MACK. Is it your testimony that Mr. Altman knew of, and approved of, your conversation with Mr. Nussbaum on September 29, 1993? Ms. HANSON. Yes, it is. Senator MACK. At that point in time, September 29, 1993, were you aware of any publicity regarding the new criminal referrals? Ms. HANSON. Was I aware of any publicity? I don't know what that means. Articles? I was unaware of any articles. Senator MACK. You didn't have any direct knowledge, at that time, that there was a leak? Ms. HANSON. I had spoken with Mr. Roelle 2 days before. I knew the referrals were on their way to Washington. I understood that they would leak as soon as they arrived. I thought Mr. Roelle was a very pod source of that knowledge. Knowing that, I inquired as to whether or not his view was that these referrals were going to leak. I had no way of knowing whether or not they bad leaked at the actual time I spoke with Mr. Nussbaum. On the other hand, it was very clear from the Early Bird on September 30, 1993, that they had leaked. From the chronology that was just released yesterday from the IGs, it states that on September 23, 1993, Mr. Dudine, the Director of the Office of Investigations of the RTC, had reported that a reporter was getting close to something on the criminal referrals. That was a full week before I spoke with Mr. Senator MACK. But you bad no actual knowledge? Ms. HANSON. But I had a very good source of Senator MACK That was not my question, Ms. Hanson. My question was, at that time, did you have any personal, actual knowledge? Ms. HANSON. I did not. Senator MACK. Did you have a subsequent conversation with Mr. Sloan of the White House Counsel's Office on September 30, 1993? And what was the substance of that conversation? Ms. HANSON. I have been recently shown Mr. Sloan's notes, in fact, I may have first seen them when I spoke with the Committee staff. I don't have an independent recollection of that telephone conversation-of that conversation. I've seen the notes, but I don't have a recollection of that conversation. Senator MACK. We have seen testimony that there was a phone conversation. MS. HANSON. That's my understanding of the testimony. Senator MACK. The phone conversation was between you and Mr. Sloan on September 30, 1993, and it must have been a fairly detailed conversation, because Mr. Sloan's notes indicate that nine criminal referrals in the investigation bad been forwarded to Washington. Ms. HANSON, I'm not saying, sir, that it didn't happen; I'm just ,a . saying I don't remember it. Senator MACK. But you didn't remember. Mr. Sloan, now, has testified he had received this information in a phone conversation with you on September 30, 1993, and he has gone so far as to have extensive notes on that, and notes outlining the nine referrals. Ms. HANSON. Sir, I'm not disputing Mr. Sloan's recollection. I'm just saying I don't recollect it. Senator MACK. In addition to his notes about the nine criminal referrals, Is, he also said there were allegations concerning Mr. Tuck a former Senator J. William Fulbright of Arkansas, and Mr. McDougal I in connection with the RTC. The RTC bad concerns about diversion of funds to Mr. Clinton's 1984 112 campaign, and the campaign was, being examined as a possible conspirator. Does any of this sound new to you? Ms. HANSON. I don't have a copy of the notes in front of me The CHAIRMAN. Here is a set here, can you take them please. Just pass them over to this gentleman. While you study those Ms. Hanson, were those available to you as a reference in your deposition? Were you shown those then, or just quizzed about them?
August 1, 1994 - Part 9
(22:24:35)(Tape #10064) I just do not approve of the way this matter was handled in terms of giving us the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. I also do not approve of using, as an excuse press leaks to discuss very confidential information which I think only fed into the whole cycle of more press leaks and more stories. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Boxer. Senator Bond. Ms. HANSON. Could I respond to that, please? The CHAIRMAN. If you do it briefly, you know-go ahead. (22:25:01) Ms. HANSON. First, I disagree that this has been-there has been an investigation by the Independent Counsel. There's been an investigate tion by the inspectors General and there has been no finding that this information, the information that was conveyed to the 183 White House on the criminal referrals on the press leaks, was used inappropriately by anybody, no one. In addition, I am sorry that if you-that you think I didn't handle this transcript, and these issues, appropriately. However, I had no expectation, no expectation the letter that was written on March 2, 1994, which was designed for a specific purpose, and the letter that was written on March 3, 1994, that was also designed for a specific purpose, was going to complete, or was intended to complete, the record. My attorneys gave me specific instructions when the Grand Jury subpoenas were served that since I was under, and the conduct was under, investigation-under a criminal investigation, that conversations between the participants involved could be misconstrued by the Independent Counsel. That was a view that was shared by other people who had received subpoenas. I am sorry that the transcript was not supplemented as I expected it to be, but I was not able to participate, and I did the best job I could do. The CHAIRMAN. We have to leave this exchange at that point. Senator Bond. Senator BOND. Mr. Chairman, first, I want to say to the Senator from California that the very perceptive questions she asked were ones that have been bothering me. I have been disturbed, I've listened all day, and I've read the statements, Ms. Hanson, about what happened to that simple little question I asked. You worked on and prepared, with Mr. Altman, an answer on March 2, 1994. That was, as I gathered from the statement, "I appreciate the opportunity to amend the record accordingly." You did not, in that March 2, 1994, letter, feel that you had to correct the major inadequacies in the answer to that question I asked Mr. Altman? Ms. HUNGARIAN. I'm sorry, sir, I don't understand your question. Senator BOND. You participated in writing the letter of March 2, 1994, that Mr. Altman sent to the Chairman. Is that correct? Ms. HANSON. I read the letter of March 2, 1994, yes. Senator BOND. You knew at the time, that when Mr. Altman answered the question I asked, it was not a full and truthful answer, did you not? Ms. HANSON. I believed that Mr. Altman understood the question and responded to it, to the best of his recollection, with respect to RTC contacts. Senator BOND. Are you trying to play lawyer with us, saying because you were in the Treasury, even though you were detailed to the RTC, that he was somehow using that technicality to say that, because you were operating at the direction of the CEO of the RTC but were employed by the Treasury, it didn't apply to you? Ms. HANSON. I understood that I acted in my capacity as General Counsel to the Treasury. Again as I have testified, I didn't recall at that point in time-as I sat here during the hearing, I had only a vague recollection of my conversation, and I did not know what Mr. Altman recalled. The letter of March 2, 1994, was designed, solely, to put the Committee on notice about the two additional meetings in the fall, that were going to appear in the newspaper article the following day. It was not intended to be a complete description of those contacts, or to supplement the record to make it 184
August 2, 1994 - Part 2
(11:05:15) Indeed, you didn't draw the wrong lessons. You also, later on, said, "such an incredible city that's been battling with RTC/Madison, wrote 2 pages about what's been going on, suddenly realized, I could be subpoenaed like Packwood's, and the most innocuous comments could be taken out of context." So on that subject, nothing, and you didn't destroy your diary. You left your diary. We have it. I think there is, in all of this, a very refreshing kind of truthfulness, almost innocent observation of the goings on of Washington. It, therefore, troubles me, a little bit, that you now want to dis- tance yourself to a certain degree or try to cast some nuances on it, though I'm not sure that's where you're going. I want to try to explore it a bit. There are five separate references in your two extractions to the subject of recusal. First, you say should RA recuse himself or should he stay involved. You discuss the hurdle and that's between January 24 and February 12. Then later on, between February 13 and 27, so we're spanning the period of about a month here. You then say, for weeks, we have been battling over bow RA should handle the investigation. Initially, we all felt he should recuse himself. Then you have the White House saying it was unacceptable. Then you say, at the hearing, the recusal amazingly did not come up, with a sense of relief that this great topic of recusal didn't come up. Then you say, the next day The New York Times ran a front page story. The heat was on. We spent a tortured day, which has been referred to by Senator Shelby, trying to decide if he should recuse himself Again, recusal is front and center. All of a sudden, despite all of this torture, despite all of these weeks- of discussions, despite all of the pressure, Hal Raines seems to be able le to elicit from Roger Altman what no one else could, which was a quick recusal on the telephone. Again the recusal is sort of front and center. Now, if you go into your preparation of all of the questions with Mr. Altman appearing before this Committee, why are you unwilling to recuse yourself? And he answers the question, or the suggestion was, well, I will not- what is it, play any role in the RTC's eventual decision, I will not be doing so. I will, therefore, have no role in the RTC's decisions on the matter. Next, you should still recuse yourself, why don't you? As I said, I'll have no role in the RTC's decisions on pursuing the claim. 348 These are all, these are not the actual answers; these are suggestions. But most of all Senator, the circumstances are such that I'll not be playing any role. Again, doesn't your relationship with the President and Mrs. Clinton require recusal? Answer, again being proposed, I'll not be playing any role- there., fore, there won't be any appearance of conflict. I am absolutely struggling to understand why it merited being' such a tortured process. Why there was such weeks and weeks of discussion. Why you spent days on this issue, if he isn't going to have any role, if he isn't going to make any decision, if he isn't going to be involved. Then why did it -matter whether he stayed or not? You've said here there were only two reasons for his staying, the precedent and to guarantee impartiality. How do you guarantee impartiality if you're not going to play any role? Mr. STEINER. The second point that you make, how do you guarantee impartiality if you're not going to be involved. I think Mr. Altman had said repeatedly, both to RTC and Treasury staff, that he wanted this case handled in a completely impartial, nonpolitical fashion. That's how you guarantee impartiality. Senator KERRY. I'm not sure if you're not involved and you're not playing any role, you can't know what's going on. TO guarantee impartiality, you have to make a decision. You have to say, no, you can't do that. Don't pursue this or don't pursue that. If you're genuinely leaving the investigation up to Kulka, what on earth was there to remain involved for?
August 2, 1994 - Part 7
(18:36:14)(tape #10071 begins) there had not been something to trigger this flurry of faxes to Bernie Nussbaum about Whitewater. It showed that there Was a very real sensitivity and concern about Whitewater from Something that bad happened that day. Mr. ALTMAN. May I respond to that, Senator? Senator BOND. I didn't ask a question, but I'd be happy to have YOU make a brief comment. 439 440 Mr. ALTMAN. I don't see anything wrong with faxing a press article at any time to anyone Senator BOND. I didn't ask you that. Is it still your testimony that you don't recall having someone search for these articles about Whitewater, you don't remember anything about it, this wasn't your idea, somehow the fax machine just spit out the Whitewater article and sent it to Mr. ALTMAN. That's not my position, Senator. I may well have faxed this to Mr. Nussbaum. Senator BOND. Once in the evening and once in the morning. Mr. ALTMAN. I doubt I would have faxed it twice, but this is a press clip- ping, this is a press article. For the life of me, I can't un- derstand why someone would think faxing a press article to anybody at any time would be wrong. Senator BOND. Let me just go back to the point I was making, Mr. Roelle said he told you on March 23 about the criminal referrals. What you did that evening at 9:04 p.m., an unusual time to be faxing, and again at 8:58 a.m. the next morning, was to fax two different copies of the same article to Mr. Nussbaum reflecting Whitewater concerns of the President. The article dealt with President Clinton's problems. That is corroborating evidence that Mr. Roelle Mr. ALTMAN. No, sir, it isn't. Senator BOND. I didn't ask you for that judgment, Mr. Altman. I'm just saying that for those of us who are trying to determine whether Mr. Roelle is correct in saying he told you about it, these two activities are very consistent with you having been notified by Mr. Roelle. Now, yesterday, Mr Roelle testified that on or about September 23, he was notified of a second set of Madison criminal referrals which named the Clintons. Could you please tell us what Mr. Roelle told you? Mr. ALTMAN. I'd like to go back for a moment, Senator, and just address briefly the other question you raised. Senator BOND. I didn't ask a question. We're running out of time, Mr. Altman. Mr. ALTMAN. I'd just like an opportunity to respond to what you said. Mr. Nussbaum testified before the House under oath and I believe that Mr. Cutler's chronology also goes into this. Mr. Nussbaum, I'm quite sure, testified that he received no information on the criminal referrals from me in March, and I want to stress that. Now, as to this last question Senator BOND. Let me follow up. He did receive from you two faxes relating to the Clinton Whitewater deal. OK your answer to my question. Mr. ALTMAN. Well, I thought the question implied, that, if Mr. Roelle had said to me in March, information about the criminal referrals, and then, if I had sent the faxes, that somehow I would have imparted improper information which I did not Senator BOND. I did not say that Mr Altman. Would you go back to the question. Do you remember 'what Mr. Roelle told you on September 23? Mr. ALTMAN. As I testified here before this Committee on February 24, 1 thought I testified rather clearly, in the fall Mr. Roelle 441 or Ms. Hanson or both advised me that a criminal referral was working its way through the system. They did not tell me what the prospects for making the referral were, in other words, whether it would likely be made or not be made. Nothing was told to me on that. Senator BOND. But you did. I asked you if he told you and you said he did. I believe that was the short answer, Now, yesterday Ms. Hanson testified that you specifically told her to tell Mr. Nussbaum about these referrals. Can you tell us what you recall you told Ms. Hanson?
July 29, 1994 - Part 2
(11:24:54) (Opening of tape #10052) Captain Hume testified, at length in his deposition last week, that the Park Police were unable to do their Job investigating the tragic death of Vincent Foster because the White House wouldn't let them do their job. He went on to testify, and I quote: It became a joke that the Park Police had to wait to get permission from the White House before they could do their job. Clearly, if we are going to go into the manner in which the investigation was conducted, Captain flume should be here. I would hope if we cannot ascertain with definiteness by some time that we would issue the necessary subpoena and also bring in his supervisors, because we were also told that he could be beeped at any time. We have some -" you can get us any time. Any time you want, beep us." So I don 't know whether he's been ordered Senator BOXER. Point of order, Mr. Chairman. I thought we would all be heard and then we would get into these decisions. The CHAIRMAN. We will. Senator DAMATO, I just wanted to make our point of view known, And I've concluded, but I think it's important certainly that we get his boss to find out bow it is and how can we get contact 24 with him particularly when we were told we could get him any time of & day or night, 7 days a week, 24 hours a day, always has a beeper. The CHAIRMAN. I don't want to get us diverted on this. I'd like to make this statement and yield- Senator KERRY. Well, before you do- The CHAIRMAN. No, I want make my statement first. I under- stand you're seeking recognition. Let me make my comment and then if you want to be recognized, I will be happy to recognize you. I want to indicate that we have a sworn deposition from this individual. He will be called to testify beyond today. We're not going to et hung up on that point. So that's not an issue. We'll have him in here for and questions that need to be raised. His supervisor is here today an be can answer questions as well. So I trust that we'll settle that matter. (11:26:56) Senator KERRY. Mr. Chairman, I just want to be recognized on this issue for a minute. The Senator from North Carolina said that the cover- up continues today and there's some impression being left, without adequate factual foundation, that this somehow may be something more than an innocent mistake or something. It's my understanding that while be was supposed to be available that be's on vacation because he didn't get the invitation prior to the time be was going on vacation and that he's available Monday. If be's available Monday and be is indeed, by mistake, legitimately on vacation-I'm not saying it is legitimate-but if that's true, then it's irresponsible to suggest that there's some great .99. cover-up going on and all I'm saying is we ought to be careful of the terminology we use before we understand the circumstances. He is going to testify. We all know he'll come here and we have the capacity to compel him to come here. The CHAIRMAN. He'll be here. Senator KERRY. We shouldn't The CHAIRMAN. He'll appear, Senator Kerry, let me call on make it a mystery that he isn't. as I've just indicated. you for your opening statement. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN F. KERRY Senator KERRY. Mr. Chairman, one thing has become very clear through the discussions and bearings thus far on Whitewater and that is that the American people do not want these proceedings to become a partisan circus. They don't want to see Republicans and Democrats wasting dollars and time scoring points against each other. They want to know the facts. They deserve to know the facts, the truth, and they want to know that we are capable of finding those facts without ourselves violating standards of decency and ethics. I believe thus far, this Committee has done a good job of laying the groundwork for serious examination of this issue. That groundwork has been the most comprehensive to date, benefiting, obviously, from prior work of the Independent Counsel. More than 37 people have been deposed, some for over 3 days at a time. More than 44 deposition days have been crammed into a small period of time with three lawyer teams working each day and sometimes all night. 10,000 document pages have been turned over, reviewed and, despite leaks, there will be information which will be 25 heard here for the first time. I believe that this first stage represents a serious inquiry that will not compromise the work of the Independent Counsel. We've set the stage for competent probative bearings and whether they will be is up to us. While it's inappropriate to draw conclusions fore witnesses have fully testified, we do knoW from depositions the parameters of their testimony. We know what these hearings are about and equally importantly, we know what they are not about Just as we have a responsibility not to dismiss or diminish we also have a responsibility not to exaggerate what may have occurred, or fantasize So an honest appraisal, a nonpartisan appraisal, requires us to make clear that we are not close to a constitutional crisis, to a grand conspiracy, and there is no indication whatsoever, of direct Presidential abuse or involvement. But this is a legitimate inquiry, and there are important questions which deserve to be answered. There are clearly legitimate questions about some individuals who acting on their own in what they deemed to be the interest of the President or themselves--or both-may have exercised questionable judgment. That is mostly what these bearings are about, judgment. There is a world of difference, obviously, between Presidential directives, instructions or actions, and the independent actions of staff outside of the President's involvement, and there is a world of difference between conversation and actions taken or not taken by that staff.
August 1, 1994 - Part 3
(13:50:32) Senator MACK. Mr. Roelle has indicated to us that on two different occasions Roger Altman directed Ms. Hanson with respect to the Madison matters. One, was either on September 24 or 27, 1993 ' you're not positive about the date, but I believe it was September 27, 1993, and the other was on October 6, 1993, when you informed Mr. Altman of the press information. And at that time, he directed Ms. Hanson to inform "Jack, Bernie, and the Secretary," I believe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 63 The CHAMMAN. Senator Dodd. Senator DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don't think I'll need all of the time. Let me thank all four of you for being here. As I said the other day, one probably didn't assume that a year or so ago, you'd be as . iced to recall every conversation, thought, or hypothetical ques-tion in front of a Senate panel. It has been a panel for this purpose, so I want to thank you personally. All of you, have distinguished records and long service, and that should be noted as part of the record. I also want to associate myself with the questions raised by Senator Bryan and the concerns raised about the management issue of asking by statute to fill vacancies with only confirmable people. At that particular time in this Administration, it limited the decision to the Secretary of the Treasury and Mr. Altman, thus placing ourselves in a situation that invites the kind of problems and troubles that the OGE's office has identified, I'm hopeful we'll address that issue, but it's important to note that all of you seem to express the notion that Mr. Altman, as well, was concerned about this and trying to do the best job he could. I think it's important for the record to reflect that. I asked some very pointed questions, at the outset, in my line of questioning this morning, to get to the important questions for you, not hypothetical questions about what you would do if you were private attorneys or, in retrospect, what someone should or shouldn't do under political circumstances, and so forth. The issue for all four of you, but principally Mr. Ryan In and Ms. Kulka, is of what, if anything, happened as a result this information being shared? People have used the words "insider information" suggesting, in effect, that that information bad some impact or effect on the progress of the particular cases. There's a legitimate set of questions that will come to those witnesses about what information was shared and with whom, and we ought to look at that. The second set of questions, in my view, addresses the issue of what, then, was done with that information, and to what extent that information, then, affected or is affecting the progress of the particular case', the Madison case. ~ It seems to me you're in a unique position to answer the latter question, and your opinions regarding the first are certainly worthwhile, but only the witnesses who were involved directly in those conversations are going to shed the kind of light that this Committee needs to have. I want to focus this question, again coming back to the point, what were the implications, what actions either were suggested by the White House or the Treasury Department and what, if anything, did the RTC do with that information, if, in fact, it was shared or given to you? It was pointed out by you, Mr. Roelle, that the reason you keep referrals private is for two reasons. One is to protect the innocent. Their reputations can be ruined if that information gets out. The other reason is to not destroy a case to protect a case in effect. I would ask you whether or not that is true, if that is exactly why the rationale for keeping the referrals private is important? Mr. ROELLE. Yes, sir. 64 Senator DODD. Are you, or any of you here, aware of any evi-dence that the disclosures in this case either by the press or oth-ers, in any way altered the course of the referrals or enabled any-one to gain an unfair advantage? Mr. ROELLE. I am not, sir. Senator DODD. No advantage whatsoever? Mr. ROELLE. I am not aware of it. Senator DODD. Ms. Kulka? Ms. KuLKA. I am not. I have great concern about parts of our investigation- that keep getting released inappropriately and the effect that has on our ability
August 1, 1994 - Part 5
(16:40:15) I now turn to Madison and what I learned, how, from whom, and to whom I imparted that knowledge. Given time constraints, I will not cover every meeting or conversation that I discussed in my deposition before the Committee. Rather, I address the principal contacts regarding Madison in which I was involved. To put this into context, it is important to understand that there were two distinct phases to the RTC's consideration of Madison. First, was the preparation of multiple criminal referrals relating to Madison that I ultimately learned were forwarded to the Justice Department. Second, was the consideration by the RTC of potential civil claims that might be brought against various persons who had had some involvement with Madison From the last few days of September 1993 through the second week of October 1993, the limited discussions in which I participated related to concerns about leaks to the press of the Madison criminal referrals. In December 1993, the passage of the RTC Completion Act revived the previously lapsed statute of limitations for many potential civil cases, including Madison. From mid-January 1994 until the end of February, the limited discussions in which I participated related to the statute of limitations and other procedural matters surrounding possible civil claims relating to Madison. On September 27 1993, RTC Senior Vice President, William Roelle, called to tell me that nine criminal referrals related to Madison were on their way from the RTC in Kansas City to Washington, after which they would be forwarded to the Justice Department. I clearly understood from Mr. Roelle that the referrals and the information about them that Mr. Roelle imparted to me would be leaked to the press when the referrals arrived in Washington, which, in fact, did occur close in time to Mr. Roelle's call to me. Mr. Roelle summarized the referrals and said that President and Mrs. Clinton were mentioned as possible witnesses. I reported this conversation to Mr. Altman who tasked me to advise Bernard Nussbaum, then Counsel to the President of the imminent press leaks. On September 29, 1993, 1 did so after a meeting that both Mr. Nussbaum and I had attended to discuss the Treasurys report on the handling of the Waco situation. A few observations are in order. First, before Mr. Roelle's unsolicited call, I had no prior knowledge of Madison other than a news story that had appeared during the campaign. Second, my task, to alert White House Counsel Nussbaum to imminent press leaks so that he could deal with them intelligently, was entirely appropriate and necessary. The existence and the substance of the criminal referrals was leaked and the Administration did have to deal with the ensuing inquiries. Third, no preferential treatment or benefit was intended for anyone and, as far as I know, no one received preferential treatment. The President and First Lady were not the subject of any proposed governmental action. They were merely possible witnesses. It has been reported that Mr. Altman does not recall tasking me to advise Mr. Nussbaum of what the RTC professional staff believed would be imminent press leaks. In my view, the difference between Mr. Altman's and my recollections on this point is not sig- 98 nificant. If I had thought it was inappropriate to brief Mr. Nuss baum, I would not have done it. I take full responsibility for the decision to do so. What I think is significant is that Mr. Altman and I agree that it was entirely appropriate to brief Mr. NussbauTr, about the expected leaks. When the search was done to locate documents responsive to the Independent Counsel's subpoena, a September 30, 1993, memoran- dum I prepared was found in my secretary's chron files as well as in my own RTC files. That memorandum, addressed to Mr. Altman had attached. to it a document confirming that the referrals had been leaked to the press and re reported that I had spoken with had Nussbaum and Mr. Sloan, bad briefed Secretary Bentsen, and in- quired of Mr. Altman whether there was anything else he thought we should be doing regarding these press leaks. I do not have an independent recollection of writing this memorandum, but I am confident that I prepared it. It bears my initials and is the kind of memorandum I write to report back on matters that I have been tasked to do.
August 1, 1994 - Part 5
(17:15:36) The CHAIRMAN. Because of that statement Ms. HANSON. Looking back at the transcript, I understand why I thought I had lost that opportunity, because he had stated that's all there was to the conversation. I believed, until I had the opportunity to sit down and talk with him in an orderly way, review the transcript with him, and answer not only that, but a number of other questions on the transcript, there was not a way to-certainly it was not appropriate to supplement the record in a piecemeal fashion. That was my view. The CHAIRMAN. We may come back to that. Ms. HANSON. No, on that day we were working on his actual recusal. If you recall. Senator D'AMATO. Wouldn't that be a time to say to him, by the way-- I mean, you work together, you're colleagues together? You did not mention the fact of this you, knew about it, and you said be was so declarative that you didn't want to get up and say, "By the way, you left out the recusal." Ms. HANSON. Let me state again, the responses in the testimony, there were a number of items in the testimony that I knew had to be reviewed and Senator D'AMATO. We'll come back to those. Let me yield to Senator Mack. Senator Mack. Senator D'Amato, my time is up. Senator D'AMATO. Mr. Chairman, I'm going to yield to Senator Mack, but I'd like to say that was February 24, 1994. Did you speak to him about the recusal issue, that he did not put it forth before this Committee the day after the testimony on February 25 1994? Senator MACK. Thank you, Senator D'Amato. Welcome, Ms. Hanson. We appreciate your testimony and the time that you've given to it. I'd like to review this with you chronologically, and touch on some of the things that you mentioned both in your statement today and also in the deposition earlier. Did you ever become aware that in the spring of 1993, Mr. Altman had faxed copies of press articles regarding Madison and Whitewater to Bernie Nussbaum that actually bad appeared 1 year earlier, in March 1992? Ms. HANSON, Is your question whether I knew it in the spring Of 1993? Senator MACK. Did you ever become aware that in the spring of 1993, Mr. Altman had faxed copies? 107 Ms. HANSON. I was recently shown a copy of a fax and I also heard from Mr. Nussbaum's testimony before the House last week that, in initial discussion with him on September 29, 1993, 1 mention= I understood Mr. Altman had given him some information on Madison. I had not independently recollected I had said that to him, but Mr. Altman did give me, at that same time in September, a copy of the same article that, it appears, he had faxed to Mr. Nussbaum in the spring don't I didn't know about it when it was done in the spring, and I recall the conversation with Mr. Nussbaum in the fall. Senator MACK. What you're testifying is that the first time you had knowledge of this was during your September 29, 1993, meeting with Mr. Nussbaum? Ms. HANSON. I'm saying I don't recall at that time-I don't recall, as I sit here now, that at that time I realized that it was the article, The New York Times article, that bad been faxed. I have been shown a faxed copy of that, along with a fax cover sheet recently. Senator MACK. You would have no knowledge that Mr. Altman has a file in which he had kept that? You didn see him take it out of that file? Ms. HANSON. He did take it out-when Mr. Altman gave me a copy of The New York Times article, it was taken out of a file that he ad. Senator MACK. How old an article was that? Ms. HANSON. It was an article that had appeared during the campaign. Senator MACK. Would that be in March 1992? Ms. HANSON. I believe so. Senator MACK. It sounds as if Mr. Altman had a file containing fairly extensive information relative to Madison. Ms. HANSON. I don't know what else was in the file, sir, he gave me a copy of the article. Senator MACK. Drawing your attention back to the fall of 1993. On September 27, 1993, did you have a discussion with Bill Roelle about nine new criminal referrals regarding Madison Guaranty? Ms. HANSON. Yes. Senator MACK. Please tell me about that discussion,
August 2, 1994 - Part 3
(12:35:21) The CHAIRMAN. I want to restore your time, Senator Boxer. Senator BOXER. Thank you. A lot of these phrases in here are te dramatic. As I went through them before, " powerless," "fate- "disaster unfold," "tortured date." You're using language here to indicate your feelings about it, and I respect the fact that you have a lot of feelings because you're not old like we are and you're not numb. And I would repeat, as far as I understand, in your testimony, you re not backing away from the basic facts that you yourself knew firsthand. Mr. STEINER. That's correct, Senator. Senator BOXER. Am I correct? Mr. STEINER. You are. 360 senator BOXER. I thought I was correct on that point. I would like to ask a question to our ethics expert, Mr. Foreman. Would it not be better when a matter comes up that deals with the Presidency and it's very important, and none of us should be holier than thou and say it wouldn't matter to us if we work for the President, be it George Bush, or Ronald Reagan, or Bill Clinton, or anyone else that we wouldn't care about it. Wouldn't it have been better if you, as an ethics officer, had said, since this happened before the President was President, I think it's OK to make one contact, perhaps, to Mr. Nussbaum. I'm not even sure that I think that's correct, but it should have gone straight from there to the President's private counsel, private attorney who would make the comments necessary. Did you ever think about that, that since this was something that happened before the President was President, that all such questions would go not for "no comment" answers, as was indicated earlier because I agree with my colleague, Senator Sasser, and I agree with Mr. Devore, when you say "no comment," that's the worst thing you can say to the press because they'll make a mountain out of a molehill if you say "no comment." But if you refer it to a private attorney who can then say the fact that yes, this matter is proceeding in order, et cetera, and my client did nothing that he or she is ashamed of or whatever. Did you ever think about that notion, of taking this to a private counsel since it was really a private matter that occurred before the President was President? Mr. FOREMAN. Senator, that's a very thoughtful option. As I said, I wasn't aware of the contacts when they occurred last fall. Senator BOXER. But you would consider now, in light of this, that that might be some way to proceed where it is a matter that happened prior to the President becoming President, that it would be better perhaps, or you'll think about it as ethically sounder to refer all of these questions to private counsel? Mr. FOREMAN. That's a very thoughtful option, as I've said, and it makes sense. Senator BOXER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Senator Roth. OPENING COMMENTS OF SENATOR WILLIAM V. ROTH, JR. Senator ROTH. Mr. Foreman, as stated in the RTC's written response to Banking Committee questions for the February 24, 1994 hearing, and I quote: It is the policy of RTC not to disclose criminal referrals or information about their preparation on an institution-specific basis. Mr. Foreman, while you are the Designated Agency Ethics Officer of the Treasury Department and not of the RTC, are you aware of the RTC's policy regarding the confidentiality of criminal referrals. Mr. FOREMAN. Senator, I saw that policy for the first time, to the best of my recollection, in March of this year. Senator ROTH. So you were not aware of it on February 24? Mr. FOREMAN. That's exactly correct, Senator. 361 Senator ROTH, Let me ask you this: As the Treasury's Ethics Officer, wouldn't it be proper procedure for any Treasury official to consult with you to obtain ethical clearance prior to providing confidential information to the White House even if that information comes from the RTC since the Treasury official would be disclosing confidential information? Mr. FOREMAN. Senator, that's certainly something that could be done. There's no requirement that every time some activity hap pens, that someone checks with an ethics lawyer before they do it. Senator ROTH. Wouldn't it be the appropriate procedure if it involves confidential information? Mr. FOREMAN. It would have been a good idea, perhaps, to do so, but there's nothing that requires that it be done in every situation.