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House Subcommittee Shreddergate Investigation
EPA Director of Waste Programs Enforcement G. Lucero continues testimony at Public Works and Transportation Committee hearing on shredding of public documents carried out by the Environmental Protection Agency; discusses acquisition of shredders due to a request by a separate EPA office wishing to shred sensitive documents not subject to the subpoena, one of which came to be placed in the office of Waste Programs Enforcement. Lucero says there are OWPE documents not subject to the subpoena which are confidential, thus the additional shredder. Lucero points out that a complete set of all the enforcement-sensitive documents subject to subpoena were compiled at great expense to his staff’s time and delivered to the office of Legal and Enforcement Consul, adding that the original documents were then locked away. Committee Chairman U.S. Representative James J. Howard (D-NJ) asks Lucero and EPA Chief of Staff John Daniel if they know the number of documents in question; neither can answer.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 6, 1973
[00.31.16] Senator GURNEY. Weren't you rather surprised that it came back that short? Mr. SLOAN. Yes, sir; that is a pretty large fee. Senator GURNEY. I judge, of course , from what we have learned in the testimony here, that the money was used for the Watergate operation, Mr. SLOAN. Evidently. What happened here, Senator, I think is that I did receive back $112,000 that, went into this safe where the funds were commingled and what I suspect probably happened was that some of those same physical $100 bills were paid out again to Mr. Liddy in either that $63,000, but probably in the later two $12,000's. Senator GURNEY. That was going to be my question. Where do' you think he got the money to return to you? Do you think he got it out of some of those first, payments out his $250,000 budget? Mr. SLOAN. Yes, sir. I think time-wise, I think it must, have been part of the two $12,000 disbursements or distributions I made to him in late May or even early June. Senator GURNEY. By the way, on this fifth amendment advice of Mr. Dean's did you tell the committee about that before? Mr. SLOAN. This committee? Senator GURNEY. Yes. Mr. SLOAN. We told the staff investigators, yes, sir. Senator GURNEY. As a little bit of background, it is my under standing that you worked in the White House before you went to the Committee To Re-Elect the President? Mr. SLOAN. Yes sir that is correct. Senator GURNEY. For whom did you work? Mr. SLOAN. Dwight Chapin. Senator GURNEY. How long? Mr. SLOAN. Two and a half years. Senator GURNEY. And did you know in the White House Haldeman, Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Dean? Mr. SLOAN. Yes, sir, I knew all of them quite well. Senator GURNEY. You knew them. quite well? Mr. SLOAN. Yes, sir. Senator GURNEY. You used to see a, good deal of them? Mr. SLOAN. I would not say I saw them regularly. I was at a different staff level than they were. Most of the work went through somebody else, but I was certainly on a friendly, working-type relationship with them. Senator GURNEY. On the $20,000 payment to Mr. 'Magruder did you seek Mr. Stans' approval on that? Mr, SLOAN. I really do not precisely recall. I think that I accepted that on his own authority, since he was in a position to give blanket authority to other individuals within the campaign. Senator GURNEY. Do you know what he used it for? Mr. SLOAN. I have no direct knowledge. I just by rumor heard that it went to pay for a book by Mr. Victor Laskey. The, reason I am aware of that, is that I was talking to Mr. Vance Shumway, who was a press spokesman for the Committee for the Re-Election of the President. At the time, he had a press inquiry to the effect, that Mr. Laskey had identified the Committee for the Re-Election of the President as the source of money for a book he had written. Mr. Vance Shumway asked me whether that was the $20,000 I had given to Mr. Magruder. I said I did not factually know. Senator GURNEY. What was the book? Mr. SLOAN. I have forgotten the title. Senator GURNEY. Was it used in the campaign? Mr. SLOAN. I think it, was. Senator GURNEY. We have gone over this before, but I am curious. How many people advised you to leave town from time to time? I am just interested in the number and who they are. Mr. SLOAN. I think the only occasion where, I was specifically requested to consider a trip was the occasion of going to California. This was a request by Mr. Parkinson and Mr. 0 O'Brien. Although they said they obviously could not essentially ask me to do it, they said would I consider it. The reason they gave me at, that time was that that they felt they had been lied to by other officials and the Information I was giving them for the first time---- Senator GURNEY. I recall that. I am just, again, interested in names now, not, what has been testified before as to why they told you to leave town. Did others sort of make that suggestion now? Mr. SLOAN. I think only the telephone conversations with Mr. LaRue that night, he emphasized the urgency of my departing. Senator GURNEY. Going back to the $350,000 to the White House through Mr. Strachan, weren't you curious about that, sum of money and what it was going to be used for? Mr. SLOAN, Senator, after having been through essentially 2 years in this Campaign, where there was a very clear separation of a decision as to What money is use for resting with the political campaign, I think my curiosity had really run out by that point, in time. So much money had, in a similar way, been distributed by me without, knowledge was beyond the point of really asking questions. Senator GURNEY. Did you ever hear Mr. Stans, Mr. Magruder, or anybody give any reason for this large disbursement" Mr. SLOAN. No, sir. Senator GURNEY. You testified that you talked to John Dean on many occasions. Mr. SLOAN. Yes, sir. Senator GURNEY. Why was that? He was counsel for the President, he did not have anything to do with the Committee To Re-Elect. did he? Mr. SLOAN. This was essentially after I had left the committee. I am not sure precisely the time--it was at a time-- [00.36.50]
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 29, 1973 (2/2)
Reporter Peter Kaye asks if the hearings didn't end on a plaintive note with the Senators seeming wistful that someone from the White House or the President would step forward to resolve the discrepancies in testimony. Senator Weicker states that it should be the President who chooses his forum to speak, but the President should speak out without being invited or subpoenaed by the Committee. States that he respects the office of the Presidency, and he wants the President to speak out, not simply after Dean's damaging testimony, but "I've wanted him to speak out every day for the last month." Weicker states that the country and the President are best served by Nixon speaking strongly on the matters under investigation. He has said that he wishes the President would "put the committee out of business", and he's sure that that is possible for Nixon to do. He wants the President to act on his own initiative, not simply react to the press or the committee. That said, he is not willing in any way to have the committee dictate the terms, it would be very bad. Kaye asks Weicker for an assessment of former White House Counsel John Dean's testimony and performance under cross-examination. Weicker states that he stood up very well under the committee's examination, but it remains to be seen how his testimony is supported by other witnesses, which must be kept in mind. Dean has had a view of things that not many other people have. Affirms that Dean did well under examination, but in fairness to people implicated by Dean, the other witnesses must be heard.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 28, 1973. Testimony of John Dean.
Senator Sam Ervin (D North Carolina). At the press conference on March 15, 1973, this question was asked, "Mr. President, does your offer to cooperate with the Ervin committee include the possibility that you would allow your aides to testify before his committee? And if it does not, would you be willing to comply with a court order if Ervin went to court to get one that required some testimony from White House aides. The President, In answer to your first part, of the question, the statement that I made yesterday answered that completely, not yesterday, the 12th I think it was, my statement on executive privilege. Members of the White House staff will not appear before a committee of Congress in any formal session." Then skipping "We will furnish information under the proper circumstances. We will consider each matter on a case-by-case basis. With regard to the second point that, is not before us. Let us say, however, that if the Senate feels at this time that this matter of separation of powers where, as I said, this administration has been more forthcoming than any Democratic administration I know of, if the Senate feels that they want a test case, we would welcome it. Perhaps this is the time to have the highest court of this land make a definitive decision with regard to this matter. I am not suggesting that we are asking for it, but I would suggest that if the Members of the Senate, in their wisdom, decide that they want to test this matter in court we will, of course, present our side of the case. And we think that the Supreme Court will uphold, as it always usually has, the great constitutional principle of separation of powers rather than to uphold the Senate." Now was that the bait that the President mentioned in the meeting on the St. Patrick's Day? John Dean. That is correct.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 25, 1973
[00.24.20-The P.R. strategy to counter the ERVIN COMMITTEE] At one point, Haldeman suggested that the reelection committee hire private investigators to dig out information about the Democratic campaigns. I raised the wisdom of this because I thought it was more political surveillance. The matter was left unresolved. There was lengthy discussion of the importance, of the minority Counsel. Mr. Moore related back to some episodes during the McCarthy hearings. Both Ehrlichman and Haldeman felt very strongly about having a minority counsel, who would work with the White House. A- number of suggestions were Made and discussed Ehrlichman thought that Mr. Fred Buzhardt would be an excellent choice. I Was asked to come up with some names for consideration as soon as possible and report back. [00.25.05-THE CRUX OF THE MATTER] It was toward the end of the meeting on Sunday afternoon, February 11, that Ehrlichman raised the bottom line question : would the seven Watergate defendants remain silent through the Senate hearings? I say this, was a bottom line question because the entire strategy was based on this continued silence. I reported that I could not answer the question because I did not know. I said that I understood that they were still demanding more, money, but as we had discussed previously, there -was no more money available. I told both Haldeman and Ehrlichman that I had carried their messages to Mitchell, that this is Something that they would have to take care of--I think the transcript is confused, this is something he should take care of, he, Mitchell, but that they were aware of Mitchell's feelings that this was something that the While House should be concerned about. I said as far as I was concerned, that they would have to take this up with Mitchell themselves in that Mitchell felt it was a matter for the White House. [00.26.13] At this point, Ehrlichman told Mr. Moore-who was hearing all this for the first time-that he, Moore, should go to Mitchell and simply lay it out that it was Mitchell's responsibility to raise the necessary funds for these men. It had been decided at the outset of the first day of the meetings that Moore would go to New York and report to Mitchell on what had been resolved regarding dealing with the Senate hearings, and now Ehrlichman was telling Moore that an important element of his visit with Mitchell would be for him to get Mitchell to raise the necessary future funds for the seven Watergate defendants. The meeting concluded on this item and Moore and I departed to. together. I told him as we walked back to our rooms that I was very distressed that this had come up in his presence, but that he now had a very real idea of the dimensions of the situation. I told him I did not think that be should get involved in carrying Such a, message to Mitchell. Mr. Moore was concerned, but felt that he had an obligation to do what Ehrlichman and Haldeman expected of him, but he did not understand why they thought that he could change Mitchell's mind. Shortly after Moore and I departed, I went to Los Angeles to join my wife at her mother's home and we left for Florida the next morning, February 12,1973. FOLLOWING UP on THE LA COSTA MEETINGS. While in Florida, I received calls from Higby, Moore, Johnson, and others following up on the matters that had been set in motion at the La -Costa meeting. [00.27.45] On February 11, 1 received a call from Johnson, who informed me that he had talked with Senator Baker by telephone. [shot of Sen. BAKER] He told me that he had informed Senator Baker that he would serve as the White House liaison to the Select Committee. Johnson reported that Senator Baker had told him that a personal visit was not necessary, that they could talk when be returned to Washington from Tennessee, Johnson said that, he had discussed the minority counsel position -with Senator Baker, and the Senator said he did not want any official input -from the White House and had already given some thought to the qualifications be was seeking in his minority counsel. [00.28.19-shot of THOMPSON smoking pipe, listening to this account of the colossal arrogance of the White House] Johnson reported that the Senator had 50 names already under consideration and planned to make his selection in the next few days. Johnson told me that he didn't think Senator Baker had ruled out the White House's making some suggestions, but -we would have to move quickly. Mr. Johnson also reported that Senator Baker had told him that the White House should be concerned about the President's posture, vis-a-vis the Senate inquiry. Finally, he reported that Senator Baker had indicated that he and the chairman would be getting together after the recess and would discuss staffing and procedural matters at that time. I Passed this report to Haldeman via, Mr. Higby. On 'February 14, Paul 'O'Brien came to visit me in Florida, He arrived in the evening and we went out, to dinner. Nothing of substance was discussed that evening other than some hand wringing over the general situation. O'Brien came to Florida to get a report from me on what had occurred- at the La Costa meeting. He told Me that Mitchell wanted him, O'Brien. to get my version of the meetings, as well as the report he was getting from Mr. Moore. [00.29.28]
Impeachment Hearings. House Judiciary Committee, July 30, 1974. Cambodia Bombing Article of Impeachment. John Conyers
And so I bring this Article forward not with some trepidation, because it seems to me first of all to have been that matter which underlies all of the Articles that have been voted so far because we have stated time and time again that the reason for Watergate and its coverup, and the incursions into the various agencies and departments of Government was motivated by a necessity that was political. Well, I would like to suggest to you that the reason that that political motivation arose in the first place was the fact of the Vietnam War in which this Cambodian incursion is an incident because this President, unfortunately like the one before him, is to a greater extent a casualty of the Vietnam War. And I would point out to you that we need to state only the matter quite simply. Tapes are not required. It is not necessary that we go beyond the documentation that has been put together by the committee and analyzed. The President unilaterally undertook major military actions against another sovereign nation and then consistently denied that he had done so to both the, Congress and the American people.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee Hearings on Presidential Campaign Activities, May 24, 1973 - Testimony of Gerald Alch
Mr. DASH. Now, this committee has already received evidence, actually just prior to your testimony, that a call, in fact was made and was received by Mr. McCord; and that it originated from Mr. Dean in the White House to Mr. John Caulfield, to Tony Ulasewicz and set the stage for a meeting on the George Washington Parkway between Caulfield and McCord in which Caulfield extended an offer of Executive clemency to McCord "from the highest levels of the White House." That testimony has come before the committee. Mr. ALCH. Yes, sir. Mr. DASH. Did you know of that call or that meeting? Mr. ALCH. I did not.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities May 17,1973 - Testimony of Robert Odle.
Samuel Dash. Now, you of your own knowledge or opinion, of your opinion you express how you have that opinion, know on the original shift from White House to the committee how Mr. Magruder came over to the committee? Who appointed the various persons who came over to the committee for the re-election of the president? Robert Odle. My understanding at that point in time was that Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Mitchell had asked Mr. Magruder to assume that position. Samuel Dash. Who appointed Mr. Sloan, to your knowledge? Robert Odle. I believe at that point, Mr. Haldeman asked Mr. Sloan to come over. I can't say sir that I know he appointed him, but my best knowledge at that point was that Mr. Haldeman had asked Mr. Sloan to come to the committee. Samuel Dash. Is it your opinion that Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Haldeman were playing principal roles in selecting the key people for the committee? Robert Odle. Yes.
U.S. House Floor Debate : Simpson-Mazzoli Bill
U.S. House Representative Edward Roybal (D-CA) states Democrats want to delete the language about the study in the Simpson-Mazzoli Bill, which will place the committee in better position to negotiate with Senate. Rep. Daniel Lungren (R-CA) understands but does not see how negotiation takes place when one party believes the other wants to implement a national identification card. They go back and forth on the importance of words and meanings in relation to the debate text in bill, with Roybal referencing similar debate that took place around the issuance of the Social Security card. The original language has been violated since that time and a Social Security card is needed for many more things than just employment.
Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 24, 1974 (1/2)
Cut shot of Paul Duke and Jim Lehrer seated at desk. (DO NOT USE image of Jim Lehrer) Paul Duke announces "gavel-to-gavel" coverage of the hearings with Jim Lehrer, Paul Duke, and PBS system.
Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 24, 1974 (1/2)
DO NOT USE Cut wide view of studio, Paul Duke, Jim Lehrer and projected image of reporter Caroline Lewis at Capitol.
Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 24, 1974 (1/2)
(DO NOT USE images with Jim Lehrer) Caroline Lewis lays out the projected format of the hearings, with expected that Chairman Peter Rodino (D - New Jersey) will give an opening statement, and other members will be recognized in turn, in order of seniority and with alternating Democratic and Republican arguments. Expected that all members will likely take part, on general matters before specific parts of Articles of Impeachment are debated.
Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 24, 1974 (1/2)
DO NOT USE Cut wide view of studio, Paul Duke, Jim Lehrer. Lehrer introduces guest commentator Barbara Tuckman, an author and historian.
Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 24, 1974 (1/2)
(Do not use voice over of Jim Lehrer) Barbara Tuckman, an author and historian.
Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 24, 1974 (1/2)
DO NOT USE Jim Lehrer askswhat she thinks is the significance of the hearings
Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 24, 1974 (1/2)
Barbara Tuckman, an author and historian, Well, I m not given to very dogmatic statements about first, last and never. But I think it is a terribly important opportunity and I have been, as an American citizen, concerned by the tipping of power in the Executive - to the Executive - for so long. Because I am not, I think like most of us, not an advocate of one-man-rule, our democratic system has been, I think - not through evil intent, but through circumstance - tipping way over toward one side in a way that has become dangerous for the outcome of democratic governement.
Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 24, 1974 (1/2)
DO NOT USE Jim Lehrer asks what she will be looking for as an historian in the debate that a layman might not.
Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 24, 1974 (1/2)
DO NOT USE Cut wide view of studio, Paul Duke, Jim Lehrer
Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 30, 1974 (2/2)
Jerome R. Waldie (D - California). Now, in this process, where I am most troubled, and that troublesome aspect has just occurred to me of late in the proceedings. It is difficult to separate Richard Nixon the man, from Richard Nixon, the occupant of the executive branch, whose powers are being limited and hopefully circumscribed. And in this instance particularly it s difficult, because I am a believer in the lesson of the Pentagon Papers and if that lesson bad any message to it at all, it was that the war power as exercised by most modern Presidents has been abused. And it was abused terribly by a President of my own party, the predecessors of this President, in the very areas in which we are examining exercise of this war power by this President. That is in deception and concealment.
Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 30, 1974 (2/2)
Jerome R. Waldie (D - California). Now, if President Johnson's exercise of the war power had not been characterized essentially by the deception and concealment that was revealed in the Pentagon Papers, it is entirely probable that had the country known what truly was the information upon which policy was being made in Southeast Asia that there would have been no way that President Nixon would have, been presented with the tragedy of Vietnam that was presented to him when President Johnson left office. But the fact of the matter is the abuse of the war power by President Johnson in deception and concealment created the problem that President Nixon sought to extricate the country from. But in his exercise of the war power in that extrication process, he too resorted to deception and concealment.
Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 30, 1974 (2/2)
Jerome R. Waldie (D - California). Now, if you are only examining not as Richard Nixon and not as Lyndon Johnson but as the Congress determining whether a redefinition of the power of the Executive and in this particular power the War Power ought to be undertaken, I think you have to conclude that where deception and concealment is utilized in order to acquire support for a war policy, we ought to draw a line and say in the future, as we redefine this power of the Executive, deception and concealment to obtain support from the American People will not be tolerated. And if that is the case, clearly the deception and concealment of this President in this instance designed to obtain support from the American People which would not have been forthcoming perhaps had he in fact reported to them the extent of the bombing of Cambodia is not acceptable.
Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 30, 1974 (2/2)
Jerome R. Waldie (D - California). Now, if you can assume that had the President reported to the American people what he was doing and the reasons for him having done so they would have supported it, then you have to ask yourself this question, why did he not then report it? I personally am inclined to believe they may very well have supported that effort. The President says he did not report it because Prince Sihanouk would not have permitted the bombing to continue if it had been known to the American people. Now, that is deception and concealment. That is an abuse of the war power. And as we redefine the powers of the Executive in the hope that we limit those powers, if there is ever a power that ought to be limited, it is the war power and in this very reasonable and minor area, no President in the future in the exercise of the War Power shall be permitted to resort to deception and concealment in terms of his responsibility and duty and obligation in dealing with the American people. I yield to Mr. Conyers the balance of my time.
Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 30, 1974 (2/2)
Title screen "Impeachment Hearings". Paul Duke introduces debate on the Cambodia Bombing Article of Impeachment.
Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 30, 1974 (2/2)
Don Edwards (D - California). But it is time to send the message to future Presidents and this President about undeclared wars. Congress alone has the power. The President does not have the power and it is an impeachable offense to wage an undeclared war. But since shortly before I came here in 1963, we had the Bay of Pigs which was an American invasion of Cuba, undeclared, clandestine. We had in 1965 the huge escalation in Vietnam. Dominican Republic, the American marines landed, for the last time, I hope, in Latin America, and the last time I hope anywhere, where someone feels that we have to invade a small country to keep our order. And then Cambodia, and the Cambodian incursion and the bombing in 1969 which was a massive deception of the American people. It is common to say that Prince Sihanouk was a part, of the deal, that he had agreed to it. I have never yet seen a statement from Prince Sihanouk to the effect that, this is true. General Wheeler says that at he had intimations or something like that from Prince Sihanouk. The only information I can find is from the Senate hearings back in 1969 quoting Prince Sihanouk at a press conference on March 28, 1969, in Phnom Penh. He said, and I will shorten it: "I wish to reaffirm that I have always been opposed to the bombings that we have no other means than we have been using so far to shoot at the US aircraft." And in the rest of the statement he vehemently and indignantly denies the allegation that he is a part of any agreement for the American to be bombing the country for which he is responsible.