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August 3, 1994 - Part 3
(12:50:19) Senator MURRAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Murray. 54 Mr. Secretary, there's one other item I want to cover with you and then we may be near finishing, depending upon what Senator D'Amato wants to raise. I want to just quickly review with you the history of this recusal matter with Mr. Altman because it's very important and you were at least involved in aspects of that as it unfolded. Let me tell you what's in our Committee record so that you have a clear frame of reference here. Mr. Altman had a meeting with you and Ms. Hanson on February 1st where he was thinking aloud about what he ought to do and you have expressed the view that that was going to have to be his decision. His testimony-and it's undisputed- is that he had reached the decision, that he was leaning in the direction of recusal, and that that was his state of mind and that he had not made a final decision on that, he was going to sort of weigh that, he was seeking your advice, presumably, and the advice of others. Then he went to the meeting at the White House on the 2nd, the very fateful meeting. He testified last night in the middle of the night that sometime after he left your office and before he got into that meeting at the White House on the 2nd, he actually did make the decision to recuse himself. So he went into the meeting and in the course of the meeting, he declared that intention. Well, now what we have in the way of testimony as to what followed, probably the most useful guidance we have, in addition to what Mr. Altman confirmed last night, are the diary entries of your Chief of Staff, Josh Steiner, because he took- he put notes down based on what he had been told by Mr. Altman after that meeting. Mr. Altman also gave us some of the flavor of that last night. And the bottom line is that Mr. Nussbaum, particularly, didn't like the sound of Mr. Altman's decision to recuse himself, and so, in some manner, he expressed himself forcefully-and you can get the full flavor of it in terms of your Chief of Staff 's diary notes on that and what happened was that it obviously had enough of an impact on Mr. Altman that he decided that he'd better sleep on it, despite the fact that he walked in with the intention of-had made the decision to recuse himself. So he slept on it overnight and the next day decided that he wouldn't recuse himself and apparently on that next day, if my recollection is right, he spoke with you and indicated that he had now reached the judgment that he would not, at least for the time being, recuse himself. Now, that's what the record is. We don't have anybody disputing that chain of events. Now, the feel of that and the look of that, I think, is troubling. Because here you have a fellow going over to the White House, he says he's made up his mind, he goes in, the President's lawyer, in terms of the Institutional Office of the Presidency, his lawyer is there, doesn't like it, really applies some form of pressure-and you should read the words in Josh Steiner's diary in terms of the flavor of what, the intensity of it-and Altman gets turned around here and he changes his mind and then he stays in that status for some period of time. terms of when he decides to Now, there's an end to the story in recuse and how he decides to recuse and so forth. One of the concerns that I have and I think you have to think about as well 55 I mean, I think every senior officer of the Government has to think about this who has any relationship to this and just is a citizen as well-and that's the appropriateness and the propriety of Mr. Nussbaum in that capacity, in effect, trying to strong-arm Mr. Altman out of his decision. Now, I find that troubling. My question to you would be, is that the way things ought to work? Is that a proper action for Mr. Nussbaum to be taking in this situation?
August 2, 1994 - Part 13
(02:00:43) I mean this is here because RTC procedures were not followed. Are my colleagues concerned that a U.S. Congressman published almost in full RTC sequences and notes from an investigator? That it has been identified publicly as Jean Lewis? Are we concerned that in a campaign in 1992 a candidate had an article appear about this issue? And subsequently there were criminal referrals and a U.S. Attorney may have been pressured? Now if that's true Senator GRAMM. Is that a Senator you are talking about? Senator KERRY. No, but I'm saying-no, candidate Clinton, this appeared-this is a matter of fact and it's appeared publicly. Now, if you're in the White House and you know there is somebody in the RTC who has already leaked information about you and you know by virtue of public accounts, at least to the best of your ability to believe them because they're in the newspapers, that a U.S. Attorney might have been pressured just prior an election to try to indict you. All of a sudden you are hearing through these other public sources that the RTC was hell-bent-for-leather to investigate some- thing that happened years ago in Texas or Arkansas or something) would you not, in the norms of political behavior in Washington, have some concern that it be fair, that there be some sort of proc- ess that you don't have this person who was willing to leak, this person who was willing to pressure, then engaged in a hell-bent- 561 for-leather, get-them-at-any-cost effort. Now, I don't know if that's happened. Senator GRAMM. Would you like me to respond to that, I can do it very briefly. The answer is I'd be very concerned, but given I wasn't born yesterday, I'd stay way far away from it. Senator KERRY. I agree with it but let's get there, you see, because what we've heard are a whole set of other kind of conspiracy theories and concepts. I'm not prepared to draw a conclusion et, but I have kind of a basic commonsense streak that tells me that this is not what a lot of people have tried to make it out to be, that some folks may have had some bad judgment Mr. Altman has very candidly said, he should have recused himeself, he should have stepped back, he should have done it in writing, and he should not 'have gone to the meeting and so forth. But it seems to me what you may have here more than some grand conspiracy is a bad job of some damage control based on some paranoia about people in the RTC who might be on a runaway express train. Now, I don't see any evidence of any more than that. And I don't think you can show us a lot of evidence of more than that. Maybe some people in the White House behaved not so well in bow to deal with this, but nobody interfered with it. His recusal didn't affect anything one way or the other. The President signed the statute of limitations that continued this. The White House called Mr. Altman and they said we're concerned about your testimony, It's not out in full. I don't want to draw a conclusion tonight. I think also that it's wrong for you to draw a conclusion tonight. It is appropriate for us to sit reasonably to measure and to judge this, and I just think we ought to do that and we obviously shouldn't do it at 2 a.m. The CHAIRMAN. Well, I think we've bad a good full day and Mr. Altman, let me say to you and your family who's been with you throughout the day, I know it's been taxing but necessary as you well know. You indicated a desire to stay tonight as long as necessary and you've done that. We do have other witnesses to hear from. I would just express a view, before we recess until tomorrow morning, that I do think we need to hear all the evidence. We've got to bear all the witnesses we've got others to come, and in due course, all of us will be called upon to make judgments. When we have all the information, I think that's probably the time to do it. The Committee stands, in recess until 9:30 a.m. tomorrow morning. (02:05:13) [Recess.] [Whereupon, at 2:05 a.m. the hearing was adjouned to reconvene at 9:30 a.m., on Wednesday, August 3, 1994. (02:05:15) Hearings hosts DON BODE and NINA TOTENBERG close out coverage from tv studio) (02:05:44) WETA logo, PBS funding credits
August 4, 1994 - Part 10
(20:40:53) In your view, is that an adequate follow up to the question that I asked, which was who told the White I-louse of the criminal referrals? Mr. PODESTA. Senator, I would have written a different letter. I think that you asked very specific questions. We were concerned about that. We wanted, we wanted that record to be corrected. What I said earlier was that I thought in the context of what was going on that the information that you had requested was out there. I assumed it was in this letter, I think if this letter was the only thing that you had received without context or anything else, I think it's, you know The CHAIRMAN. You think what-I'm sorry, what did you say? I didn't hear that last word. Mr. PODESTA. I think that it would-you'd need to connect the dots, going back to your questions and looking at those two meetings, The CHAIRMAN. But that's not what he asked you, he asked you whether the letter senator BOND. Did that letter answer the question I asked at the February 24th hearing? Mr. PODESTA. I think you have to go back to your questions to understand. Senator BOND. My question was, who advised the White House of the criminal referrals? 438 Mr. PODESTA. And in my view, the responsive answer would have been the meeting on the 29th and Senator BOND. The answer should have been Jean Hanson. If you believe Ms. Hanson, it was Jean Hanson at Mr. Altman's direction, If you believe Mr. Altman, it was Jean Hanson on her own. The problem Mr. PODESTA. Yes. Senator BOND [continuing]. The problem, Mr. Chairman, is that throughout this we were not able to get a straight answer from Mr. Altman. Mr. Podesta was tasked to make sure this was done. I know Mr. Podesta from having worked with him on the Agriculture Committee. He's very thorough. When he says he's going to follow up he normally does, But I have to tell you, Mr. Podesta, that the failure to answer the simple question which I think would have been devastating had it been properly answered, the failure to follow up on this tells me too much about the attitude of Mr. Altman and perhaps the White House. Mr. PODESTA. Well, Senator, I think I answered earlier with regard to the White House which is that we brought this to Mr. Altman's attention. I understood the next day that a letter had been sent and the Chairman had been called. I did not see the text of the letter. The following day there were newspaper stories that noted Ms. Hanson, noted the criminal referrals. I thought this matter had been taken care of. When I finally saw the letter, which was sometime later-I think, now I take your point. Senator BOND. Mr. Podesta, you're better than that. I've seen you follow up and you do better work than that. Senator KERRY. The Senator may also remember that the entire process was interrupted by the Grand Jury on the 5th of March I think it was. The CHAIRMAN. The record should Senator BOND. The dog ate my homework doesn't get it. The CHAIRMAN. The record should be clear that they got the proper information to The Washington Post, that's been the testimony here today. They just didn't get the proper information to us; isn't that correct, Mr. Podesta? Mr. PODESTA. I think that's a fair statement. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Senator DODD. I'm prepared to ask a question but I think Senator Kerry The CHAIRMAN. I think Senator Kerry has been waiting and is next in the line of march here. Senator KERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to use my time to try and clarify where we were earlier, particularly with respect to my friend from New Mexico, and see if he and I can't get a better understanding here. What disturbs me a little bit is that there's a process where some theories are being propounded, and that's fine. It's all fair game. And questions are being asked to support the theory but the questions and the theory are not based on the evidence, on the full evidence, and so you wind up leaving the impression with the public that there's some line or avenue here that is not in fact documented by where we've been. 439
July 20, 1995 - Part 3
(11:55:08) Mr. ROLLA. Basically, they asked me what I could remember. don't believe there were any dates written on the pages. The timeframe, I told them, I believed was post-election, pre-inauguration, and that in one passage I remembered that- and I don't remember word for word. It was obvious that himself and Mrs, Clinton were. 181 close personal friends, a working relationship, were friendly and there was a party-a passage about a party at the Governor's Mansion. There was something else about his daughter leaving the party or something, I believe. Just what 1 could remember. Senator FAIRCLOTH. OK About Foster leaving the party? Mr. ROLLA. No, I think it was his daughter leaving with another friend-going to the party, leaving, I really don't remember. Senator FAIRCLOTH. Mr. Hines, you understood that your Park Police Officers Hume and Markland were having trouble with the White House, and that the White House was preventing them from doing a real investigation. As a result of knowing this, you went to see Tom Collier, Bruce Babbitt's Chief of Staff-, is that right? Mr. HINES. Yes, I did. Senator FAIRCLOTH. You asked his help in getting more cooperation out of the White House for the Park Police; is that correct? Mr. HINES. We told him that we perceived some problems and briefed him on what problems we perceived, and he said that he would look into it. Senator FAIRCLOTH. Are you aware that 2 months later, in September, Mr. Collier hired Webb Hubbell's wife as his special assistant? Mr. Hubbell being one of Mr. Foster's closest friends. Mr. HINES. No, I'm not aware of that, Senator FAIRCLOTH. Did you know that Ms. Hubbell left that job for 11 months, but was allowed to come back to it during the time that Mr. Hubbell was cooperating with the prosecutor? Senator DODD. Mr. Chairman, can I inquire as to the scope of this? The CHAIRMAN. Senator, let's stay within the scope if we can. Senator FAIRCLOTH. Is that out of the scope? The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Senator DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator FAIRCLOTH. Ms. Braun, Mr. Hubbell said that he and Lisa Foster said they searched for a note, did they tell you that? Did they tell you that they did that? Ms. BRAUN. No, sir. Senator FAIRCLOTH. YOU say no? Ms. BRAUN. No, sir. Senator FAIRCLOTH. They did not tell you. Why don't you think they told you that they were looking for a note and couldn't find it? Ms. BRAUN. I had no contact with anybody from the Foster family or Mr. Hubbell after we left there at 11 p.m, that evening. Senator FAIRCLOTH. After all, at that time they did not know for certain that this was a suicide. Wouldn't they have wanted to get information from you as opposed to pushing you out of the way? Ms. BRAUN. I'm not sure I quite understand the frame of your question there, Senator. Senator FAIRCLOTH. I'm sorry. Ms. BRAUN. I don't understand your question, Senator. Senator FAIRCLOTH. I would have thought they would have been trying to get information from you, rather than moving you aside. Ms. BRAUN, I don't know what was going through their heads, Senator. Senator FAIRCLOTH. All right. Thank you. Time's up. 182 The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator. Senator Sarbanes. Senator SARBANES. Senator Boxer. OPENING COMMENTS OF SENATOR BARBARA BOXER Senator BOXER. Thank you very much. Before I turn to the panel of witnesses-and I just want to say welcome and I know this, is not the most pleasant of duties and you are very professional and articulate and very credible-I just want to make a point, and I'd' like to ask the Chairman a question if I could have his attention for a moment. Mr. Chairman? Mr. Chairman, I wanted to ask you a question if I could. I am still concerned about what I view a little bit as selective cooperation from the Independent Counsel regarding the Maggie Williams polygraph result, and it is my understanding that. the polygraph test on Maggie Williams was administered by the FBI under the supervision of the Independent Counsel and that. she took it voluntarily and that her counsel was advised by the Independent Counsel that she passed the test. Now, that's my understanding. Will I be permitted or would other Members of the Committee be permitted to question both Maggie Williams and her attorney regarding that test since we cannot get the actual results of that test?
August 2, 1994 - Part 8
(19:00:14) Senator BRYAN. Was that the same day or the following day? Mr. ALTMAN. A day or two later. Senator BRYAN. A day or two later. And this would have been after the meeting on the 3rd? Mr. ALTMAN. That was the meeting on the 3rd or the 4th. Senator BRYAN. Again, someone can correct me. I see my time. The CHAIRMAN. I'm going to try to keep it right at 10 minutes. We'll let the witness respond if he's in the middle of an answer. Go ahead, Mr. ALTMAN. Senator Bryan, I don't want to leave any ambiguity. I wavered. I should have recused myself from the beginning. And if I could do it all over again, I would. Senator BRYAN. Well, I appreciate that. The manner in which you recused yourself, Mr. Altman, invites great criticism and does not do you great credit. Let me just say that having done so after you get the press inquiry that there is going to be a nasty editorial or something the next day. The CHAIRMAN. Time now comes over to the Republican side. Senator D'AMATO. Mr. Chairman, because-and I want the record to be clear, there are more people on that side, because you have extended courtesies to us in an attempt to be able to ask our questions and have been solicitous, I would like to yield our time to our next person up. Senator GRAMM. Why don't we just Senator DAMATO. We're going to pass over. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Boxer. Senator BOXER. Well, thank you. Senator DAMATO. From one Brooklynite to another. 471 Senator DODD. What's up here? Senator BOXER. I'm getting very worried. Senator DODD. This kind of comity makes me nervous. Senator BOXER. Just because we're going to add back the time we 've bad over the Brooklyn jokes to my time. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Mr. Altman, this is very hard on you and I understand that and I just want you to know that I believe there is absolutely no indication that you did anything to impede the investigation of Madison Guaranty or Whitewater or anything related. As a matter of fact, I want to compliment you on the substance of that particular issue, because I think unlike some of my colleagues, the fact that you yourself thought of recusing yourself, that you yourself pursued it, even though you were told the personal friendship didn't disqualify you, I think it shows that you were very sensitive to the appearance of the situation. I know that you care about this Administration and the people in it. I think that's fine. And yet I think you bent over backward. I do agree with Senator Bryan that you were placed in a very difficult situation. It's not one of your doing and you tried to do it the best that you could, but I think it's important to note that at no time did you ever say to anyone involved in the case at the RTC that they should slow down this investigation, cover up this investigation in any way. As a matter of fact. RTC General Counsel Kulka who seemed to have the respect of almost everyone on both sides of the aisle, said on the contrary you stressed this case would be handled with professionalism and integrity in the same way any other case would be handled. Now, did anyone at the White House ever ask you to compromise your handling of this case, whether criminal or civil, did they ever talk you about the substance of this case and ask you to not pursue it? Mr. ALTMAN. No, Senator, they didn't. Senator BOXER. Did Mr. Nussbaum ask you not to keep Ellen Kulka a tough attorney, as General Counsel, did he ever directly ask you to remove her from the Madison case? Mr. ALTMAN. No, Senator, he didn't. Senator BOXER. But he did say something to you about her being 4 tough attorney and you responded in what way to his comment about Ellen Kulka? Mr. ALTMAN. Well, I had then and I have today the greatest confidence in Ellen Kulka. That's one of the reasons we hired her. Senator BOXER. All right. And you stated to Mr. Nussbaum the fact that you bad complete faith in her? Mr. ALTMAN. Yes, and I stated that and then repeated that she would be making these decisions. Senator BOXER. All right. And you already testified that you did nothing to stop Jay Stephens from being hired to assist in the RTC's Madison case even though you were told in a telephone conversation from some of the White House people that they were un.happy. you said what's done is done and you closed the book on it; is that correct? Mr. ALTMAN. Yes, ma'am. 472 Senator BOXER. So I have no reason to believe you compromised this case in any way. I think you understood the perception here. What troubles me is, what I'm trying to get to here is really more the way this Committee was treated by you and your responses to Committee questions. For that, I'm going to talk to you a little bit about Ms, Hanson. Now I know this is very difficult because in many ways she con- tradicts you and puts you in a difficult position. You contradict her and put her in a difficult position.
August 4, 1994 - Part 11
(21:20:39) Senator SHELBY. That's right and at that meeting Jean Hanson, the Treasury's General Counsel; Jack DeVore, Assistant Secretary of Treasury for Public Relations at the Treasury-he was then-retired then, he was there; Joshua Steiner, Chief of Staff to the Secretary of the Treasury, Bernard Nussbaum, he was there. Neal Eggleston was there, Associate Counsel to the President. Clifford Sloan, Associate Counsel to the President. You, Mr. Lindsey, the Assistant to the President's Senior Advisors and Mark Gearan; is that correct? Mr. LINDSEY. Correct. Senator SHELBY. You were asked about the referrals, I think someone-was he a writer with The New York Times, Jeff Gerth? Mr. LINDSEY. Yes, sir. Senator SHELBY, Are you familiar with this? Mr. LINDSEY. Yes, sir. Senator SHELBY. I believe he had inquired about some of thehad criminal referrals been made without getting into the substance. Mr. LINDSEY. But he did get into the substance. Senator SHELBY. Sorry? Mr. LINDSEY, He did get into the substance. He clearly indicated that he was aware that there were criminal referrals. He had a question about where the referrals had gone. Senator SHELBY. OK. Mr. LINDSEY. But he also asked about four checks. He said that he was aware that one of the referrals mentioned senator SHELBY. First, about the referrals, was he asking him why the referrals were not made to Little Rock to the U.S. Attorney's office? Mr. LINDSEY. Yes. Senator SHELBY. And what was your response, what was the conversation about there then? I Mr. LINDSEY. Mr. DeVore indicated to us that, in fact, apparently Senator SHELBY. This is a meeting-I don't mean to interrupt you now, but this was a meeting with all these people that I just related the names at the White House to try to get together to deal with this situation; is that right? Mr. LINDSEY. Jack DeVore apparently indicated that he wanted to come to the White House to discuss with us 450 Senator SHELBY. He's the Public Relations Officer with the' Treasury Department-or Assistant Secretary dealing with public' relations. Mr. LINDSEY. Yes, sir. Senator SHE SHELBY. OK. But he didn't come alone then, he brought Ms. Hanson, Mr. Steiner, and then all the lawyers including Mr. Nussbaum, Counsel for the President, all of you-all were there; is that right? Mr. LINDSEY. I was invited to the meeting, I didn't set it up, and I don't know who invited whom. Mr. DeVore indicated that he had',,.. had a phone conversation, I believe the day before, from Jeff Gerth; that Mr. Gerth was aware that there was referrals; that Mr. Gerth understood that those referrals had gone to Washington; and that Mr. Gerth was aware that at least one of the referrals involved four checks. Senator SHELBY. Four cashier's checks. Mr. LINDSEY. That was his understanding. Senator SHELBY, I believe this was yours-your words, if I can read them back to you just to refresh your recollection, "that he," Mr. Gerth, "knew that these particular referrals"-this is on page 74 of your deposition, Mr. Lindsey- "had been referred to Washington, that he understood"--"he" being Mr. Gerth, the writer of The Now York Times-"that the referrals involved or one of the referrals at least involved four cashier's checks, two made payable to Bill Clinton and two made payable to the Clinton for President Committee-Clinton for Governor Committee." These are your words; is that correct? Mr. LINDSEY. That's correct, that's my deposition. Senator SHELBY. OK. Now what transpired after that in this meeting, you- all were trying to decide how to deal with this? Mr. LINDSEY, Mr. DeVore indicated that he wanted to get back to Mr. Gerth. He wanted to indicate to Mr. Gerth that in fact the referrals had come to Washing-ton but that they had been forwarded on to Little Rock prior to Mr. Gerth's call. So there would be no suggestion that they were being bottled up or that somehow Mr. Gerth's call had caused them to be Senator SHELBY. Mr. Lindsey, just for the record here tonight, who was the U.S. Attorney in Little Rock, Arkansas? Mr. LINDSEY. At this point, I assume Paula Casey. Senator SHELBY. And what happened? Did she recuse herself from those cases? Mr. LINDSEY. She did, yes, sir. Senator SHELBY. And that's why they were referred back to Washington? Mr. LINDSEY. No, as I understand it. Senator SHELBY. Or was 1 getting ahead? Mr. LINDSEY. I think you're ahead. Again, I don't know this. MY understanding is that before they went to the U.S. Attorney's office in Little Rock, they came to Washington-for what reason I have no idea, but that they had gone on to the U.S. Attorney. He wanted to tell Mr. Gerth this so that Mr. Gerth wouldn't write that they were somehow being bottled up in Washington. He also wanted to confirm that there were referrals. Senator SHELBY. Did you suggest after-this is Mr. DeVore? 451 Mr. LINDSEY. That's correct. Senator SHELBY. He wanted to confirm to Jeff Gerth of The New York Times, that there had been, in fact, referrals? Mr. LINDSEY. That's correct. Senator SHELBY. Criminal referrals. Why did you suggest that he not do that, but you did; is that right? Mr. LINDSEY. I did because I believed that referrals were confidential documents and that we should not be confirming the fact of referrals to reporters. He indicated to me
August 2, 1994 - Part 6
(01:20:15) Mr. ALTMAN. This says The Washington Post and the Associated Press may be pursuing a story on that subject. It doesn't say that I 've communicated a detail of criminal referrals to the White House. This is a compendium of stories the press may be working On, that's all this is. That's all the Early Bird has ever been. Senator DODD. Your testimony today is that you don't have any recollection of this memorandum? 436 Mr. ALTMAN. I don't have a precise recollection of it, but I have a very clear recollection of the Early Bird and what it is. As I say this is a list of stories the press may be working on. That's all that it is. The word "Madison" doesn't appear in here. Senator DODD. Well, "criminal referrals" does. Mr. ALTMAN. I just think that if someone sends a list of stories the press may be working on, that's a heck of a lot different than saying, gee, this confirms that I advised the White House on the subject of the criminal referrals. I don't see any connection almost at all with them, between the two. Senator DODD. Well, I understand your interpretation of this, but-and I appreciate that, but I think it's also important to establish for the record that whether or not Ms. Hanson thought this was something other than just a Rose Law Firm story or referring to criminal referrals, your testimony is you don't have any-you don't recall receiving this memo. Mr. ALTMAN. That's number one, but I also have, as I say, a close familiarity with the Early Bird, and I just don't think that this memorandum confirms what several 'have suggested that it does confirm, not at all. Senator DODD. Let me move on because time does flee along here. First of all, yesterday Ms. Kulka was asked on numerous occasions, about whether or not you told her that she would be, in effect, in charge of these matters. I recall her saying that, in fact, occurred. I'm satisfied that was the case. We're going to have Mr. Ickes before this Committee and I gather that Mr. Ickes has stated that you told him and others in the meeting on February 2 that the statute of limitations was going to present a problem for the RTC and, in fact, communicated that information to the First Family, as I understand it. So I want to go over the meeting that you had on February 1 with Ms. Kulka. I gather that it was a meeting with Ms. Kulka, yourself, and Jean Hanson to discuss the statute of limitations on February 1; is that correct? Mr. ALTMAN. I believe so, Senator, yes. Senator DODD. Did Ellen Kulka tell you that the RTC would have enough information to file claims by the 28th of February even though its investigation may not be entirely completed? Mr. ALTMAN. I don't recall that. What I recall is Ms. Kulka saying that by the 28th the RTC would make its decision, and I believe that's what the Senator DODD. My colleagues, please, I can't hear. Mr. ALTMAN. I believe what I do recall them saying is that by the 28th the RTC would make its decision, and I believe before this Committee yesterday she did confirm that. The notion that we conveyed the information on February 2 that you referred to is categorically false. Senator DODD. Do you recall what she did tell you, rather than go through a series of questions here about that. At this point we already had a significant debate going on in the Senate about whether or not to extend the statute of limitations. Our colleague from New York was certainly reminding all of us each day as the calendar went by that we were getting closer. 437 Was there some implication that because the Senate or the Congress might extend the statute of limitations that it wouldn't pose a problem, or even if we didn't extend the statute, that the problem,Mr. ALTMAN. I recall Ms. Kulka saying that she would make her decision by February 28. 1 don't recall any discussion about the prospects. Senator DODD. There was no problem about having an adequate amount of information and the whole question of section 11, the fear of a decision that would impact the RTC's not bringing a case that was backed up by adequate evidence. Mr. ALTMAN. She said she would make her decision by the 28th, and as you know, the RTC has options to preserve its basis. It can file a claim in court to preserve it's basis or it can seek a tolling agreement, but I was never told somehow that there wouldn't be enough time to complete the investigation and that would somehow lead to a lapse of the statute of limitations deadline. I was never told anything at all like that. Senator DODD. You had some talking points Senator SASSER. Mr. Chairman, could Mr. Altman pull that microphone a little closer. I'm having trouble hearing. The CHAIRMAN. That would be helpful, and also time has run if you'd like to finish that out Senator Dodd.
July 29, 1994 - Part 3
(13:40:35) Mr. MONROE. That's correct. Senator KERRY. The warrant was not, in fact served until the day after Vincent Foster had taken his life; is that accurate? Mr. MONROE. That's accurate. It was served on July 21st. Senator FERRY. So this is speculation; is that correct? Mr. MONROE. That's correct. Senator KERRY. Now let me clarify for my colleagues on thc other side why this issue has come up about what is appropriate or not appropriate today. Now, I can understand why some of them may be expressing some embarrassment about the questions surrounding the death, but I do not think it is fair to suggest that there isn't cause for concern on this side about why we're here. Vincent Foster tragically took his life a year ago, 1 year ago, but as of March of this year, the Minority Leader was suggesting or calling the death an alleged suicide." As of this year. the House Republican Whip was publicly saying there's a lot out there that's weird. As of this year, Senators on this Committee were saying they didn't know where he might have died or where this took place, leaving of the notion out there it might have been somewhere else. As is year, another Senator in this Committee talked about the very mysterious circumstances under which he died. As of this year, a report published by former assistants to Jim Baker and Congressman Kemp reported that the office of Senator Moynihan was putting out the word that Foster committed suicide at a private park in Virginia. Not one Senator went to the floor to contradict this. There was a minor stock market crash. Moynihan put out the word it was a total fabrication, but there isn't any evidence whatsoever of this kind of totally fabricated element turning up in a Republican financial newsletter, which it didn't. In recent days, Jerry Falwell has been describing Mr.. Foster's death as mysterious, asking publicly whether it was a suicide and speculating breathlessly that it was a murder. The Wall Street Journal editorialized 2 days after his death that in the view of the,, newspaper he was "an unlikely suicide." And later The Wall Street' Journal described a report that be was murdered by a drug-deal ing-cabal of drug-dealing officers. That appeared on August 6, 1993. A well-known Republican media consultant who brought us the Willy Horton ads has been raising money money off of Mr. Foster's death by suggesting it wasn't suicide and calling for a new inves- tigation of this "mysterious death." So this is why- Senator DODD. As late as July 13th, the Congressman from Indi- ana has been literally filling the Congressional Record with:.." most obscene accusations regarding this as well. It's not just months ago. Senator KERRY. So when my colleagues say to us, I don't know why my friends on the other side of the aisle are concerned this, this is out there and now is the time to put it to rest. 63 I ask you, based on your 30 years of experience, based on your 25 years of experience, have you learned anything at all as sworn FBI officers that suggest that any of the things I read off there could be true? Mr. Monroe. Mr. MONROE. No, sir. Mr. COLOMBELL. No, sir. Dr. HIRSCH. Senator, I'm not a sworn FBI officer, but I do have an opinion about something you raised, and that concerns the place of Mr. Foster's death. It is my unequivocal, categorical opinion that it was impossible for him to have been killed elsewhere. Senator KERRY. You've done something like 20,000 autopsies, have you not? Dr. HIRSCH. I've lost track, Many thousands. Senator KERRY. I appreciate those opinions and I just think it really goes to underscore the damage the words have-thoughtlessness of this process, and we're not creating this, my friends. These things were said by other people. They're out there as a matter of record, and now is the time to clear it up.
August 4, 1994 - Part 13
(01:05:27) Senator MURRAY. And I appreciate that, but I wonder if we set the ethical bar so high, that no one can do any of these jobs? Mr. NUSSBAUM. I think that's a real problem. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Murray. Are there any further questions for the witness because, if not, I'm going to excuse the witness. We've got the results of the deposition here with Ms. Hanson. There's been a request that it be read into the record, and I'm going to do that, in its entirety, in one moment. What I'd like to do, because of the hour of the evening that it is, or the morning, 1:05, 1 would hope we would not get into a de' bate on the substance of this' tonight. I think nobody has had a chance to read it and digest it. It will be out there in the pub public arena. We can all have it and take it up tomorrow if there's a need to do so. Senator BRYAN. Mr. Chairman, may Mr. Nussbaum be excused? Senator SARBANES. I want to say something, Mr. Nussbaum Senator DODD. And I do too, just 2 seconds, but go ahead. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sarbanes. Senator SARBANES. I want to thank Mr. Nussbaum. I think he's raised some very serious questions, very thought provoking, on the recusal issue, and while there's been sharp reaction from many Members here on the Committee, I think if they think about it , the implications of some of what's happening are very serious indeed. You're getting to the point, to take an extreme, a President comes in, He nominates people to office and they have to recuse themselves simply because they're nominated. Or, you know, someone says, well, I met him and we're sort of friends and now there's a tough decision here and I'm recusing myself. Now, the Altman case may be different, I think, but I think in a sense, it represents the politics of our time. Unfortunately, what's happened is there's a cynicism that's assuming if you have any connection at all, you can't make a tough independent judgment, and I think if we start down that path, it's fraught with very serious implications. I think that you've argued that case very strongly tonight and, I'm frank to say, I think it needs to be given a great deal of thought and attention. I also want to say when the panel was here from the Associate Counsels of the White House Office, they drew virtually uniform praise from Members of the Committee for their forthrightness, for their obvious ability, for their commitment, and for their understanding. 513 And I think it ought to be noted that those were people you brought into Government. They, in effect, were your people. You're the one who picked them, brought them in, and to the extent that we praised them yesterday, I think it's a reflection upon you this evening. Senator DODD. Can I just Mr. NUSSBAUM. Thank you, Senator. Senator DODD. I want to pick up and be very brief. I want to associate myself completely with the remarks of my colleague from Maryland. He's terribly perceptive most of the time, if not all of the time, only when he disagrees with me, which is far too frequently I'm afraid, but I also wanted to express my view-maybe we're becoming addicted to this process here late at night, but I think it's an extremely important debate and we have to find a forum in which to conduct it because I think there's a terrible danger in applying a standard that has such rigidity that we defeat the purpose for which the rule was established. There's also the danger of tyranny. We're raising the bar of recusal to such a level that it has the outcome determined before any consideration is given. The notion that public perception should weigh as heavily as the ethical or legal questions is a frightening thought to me. It may be a bit old-fashioned, but I was taught to believe that in public service, the standard which you use to judge your conduct is you do what's right, even if it's unpopular, even if a good part of your constituency or the public or the press doesn't like it.
July 18, 1995 - Part 1
(10:20:26) We on this Committee should remember what we're not. We're not the FBI. We're not the Grand Jury or a Grand Jury. We're not prosecutors, nor are we defense attorneys. We're United States Senators carrying out the mandate of this institution and the mandate of a very, very specific resolution. Our charge in this set of hearings is to answer a narrowly tailored question: Did anyone at the White House impede the police investigation of Vince Foster's tragic suicide? That is our mission. Our charge during this phase is not to delve into the details of President Clinton's and Mrs. Clinton's land transactions or to audit their tax returns or to spin wild conspiracy theories. We're going to hear about what people did or did not do in the midst of their grief at a very, very emotional time. We may hear about sloppiness We're probably going to hear about mistakes. We're going to hear a lot about gossip and speculation. But let me emphasize there has never, never been any suggestion that the police wanted to review Whitewater or any substantive file in Vince Foster's office. They were investigating a tragic, tragic suicide. We're going to hear about discrepancies in testimony from witnesses doing their best, in my view, to recollect specific details in the midst of a highly charged emotional event from 2 years ago. I hope, Mr. Chairman that we'll do our best to keep everything we hear and learn during these hearings in that context. We cannot look at people's actions, in my view, in July 1993 in a vacuum, plot them out like steps in a chemical reaction or subject them to the cold microscope of rational analysis. I think we must examine these events for what they were, deeply human reactions to a deeply human tragedy. Mr. Chairman, there are few human experiences more traumatic than experiencing the suicide of a family member, a close friend or colleague, and I hope that each and every one of us will try to put ourselves in the shoes of those who lived through that tragedy. In examining this aspect of our hearings, I think we should ask ourselves how would we have reacted if this would have happened to someone on one of our staffs or to one of our childhood friends ' In the minutes and, literally, minutes and hours and days after this terrible suicide of a very decent man, friends and colleagues understandably acted on instinct, in my view, more than careful thought or plotting. One of the most traumatic and perplexing of human tragedies, a suicide. You've just been informed that some 13 one you're very close to, known all your life, has taken his life. How do you react? What are you thinking about? The people involved here were emotionally, mentally and physically exhausted, in my view, and we cannot expect people in such situations to exercise the clearest possible judgment in every case. The context, Mr. Chairman, is also important because of the nature of the office in question. We're not talking about a crime scene here; the tragic suicide occurred in Fort Marcy overlooking the Potomac River. The suicide of a lawyer does not mean that it is open season on that attorney's files. There are legitimate privacy and executive privilege issues involved, as Senator Sarbanes has pointed out. Think about it, if you would, in terms of a doctor/patient relationship. If your family doctor took his own life, would you want the police rummaging through your personal medical records in your doctor's office? Obviously we have different standards when we're talking about the President of the United States, but I think we should all at least acknowledge the understandable instinct to protect the privacy of the material in Vince Foster's office. To date, Mr. Chairman, as you and Senator Sarbanes in part have pointed out, we have spent at the Federal level more than $10 million in reviewing what is known as Whitewater. Independent Counsels, two offices, IS prosecutors, dozens of FBI agents and IRS agents, this Committee's work, independent investigators, press inquiries. It has been voluminous.
July 25, 1995 - Part 4
(14:55:38) Mr. WATKINS. Senator, my response would be that if this city has to try to find that someone is lying about it, then that's one thing. But as I've stated repeatedly today, I'm not saying Officer Braun doesn't believe she said that. I'm saying if she said it, I did not hear it, Had I heard it, I would have taken action. That's what I do. That's what my job was. I would have done one of three things: I would have notified the Chief of Staff, who was there, I would have notified the Counsel's Office, or would have said let's talk to the Secret Service. I do not recall Officer Braun making any request of me to lock or seal the office. Senator MURKOWSKI. Recognizing the circumstances, and hindsight, of course, is cheap, but in your opinion, should the office have been sealed? You indicated that you had responsibility as Assistant to the President for Management Administration. Mr. WATKINS. Senator, at the time the concern was to find-to determine the why of Vince doing that. The Park Police had been in constant contact or had been in contact for over 5-for about 5 hours with the Secret Service, and had there been, had they felt there was a compelling need to do that, I assume they would have requested that. I didn't think it was my responsibility. It never occurred to me that it was my responsibility to have the office sealed. Senator MURKOWSKI. When you went back to the office the next day, you had access to Foster's office the next day? 300 Mr. WATKINS. I did? No, sir. Senator MURKOWSKI. So you did not go into Foster's office, Mr. WATKINS. No. Senator MURKOWSKI. At all? Mr. WATKINS. No, sir. Senator MURKOWSKI. Mr. Gearan, I'm going to refer to notes that you indicated to the Committee you took with regard to the phone call from Phil Heymann. I think that was--I'm not sure of the notation here as to just when that occurred, but it's been made reference to by the Committee previously and it bears 11:45, 7/29 on the top. It's your notes regarding the Phil Heymann phone call. I'd ask that perhaps the witness be provided with those notes. Have you got them there? Mr. GEARAN. Senator, this is the phone call made at 11:45 on July 29th. Senator MURKOWSKI. That's the one. 11:45, July 29. Mr. GEARAN. Yes, I have that. Senator MURKOWSKI. At the bottom of the page, there's a reference that reads as follows: "There's a sense from Park Police and including Phil," that would be Phil Heymann, "and Department of Justice and probably the Washington field office, that too much of the investigation inquiry before, when, after was exercised by the White House and those too close to Vince." Then there's a notation, "suspicions extremely dangerous, do everything in your power to quiet suspicion." Then further, "I've had heated discussions on the way the documents were handled," I'm not sure "review," I guess, "Janet Reno." Then the last page of those, page 4 of this note, under the reference "PH," Phil Heymann, "d-o-c," documents, "have been distributed over my objections." Are these the same documents in each case referred to on page 2 with your interpretation I've had heated discussions by the way the documents were handled and then it says Bernie and, recognizing these are Heymann's comments, do you have any reason to believe that that reference to documents is the same as the reference at the conclusion of page 4? Do you know what documents Mr. Heymann was referring to specifically? Senator SARBANES. Mr. Chairman, would Senator Murkowski yield for a question? Senator MURKOWSKI. Sure. Senator SARBANES. Is this the same note that Senator Shelby questioned about extensively this morning? The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Senator SARBANES. It is the same? The CHAIRMAN. They are the same notes. Senator MURKOWSKI. If I may respond, my questions are specific to the documents themselves as to, see
August 9, 1995 - Part 2
(10:50:35) Certainly on July 22 1 wish I had looked more carefully into the bottom of the briefcase. I wish I had found the scraps of paper on that day, but that omission resulted in no harm. The note in the briefcase, fortunately, was discovered 4 days later, gave us a clue 1212 to what was bothering our friend Vince and turned over to law enforcement authorities excuse me, and turned over to law enforcement authorities. I believe the fundamental decisions I made were correct, how to conduct a prompt search for a suicide note in a lawyer's office how to handle files in that office. I was required to make difficult Judgments in a unique situation. I was required to balance differing interests in a sensible manner. I believe I did so. I do look back at those days in July 1993 with a profound sense of sadness and re- gret. That is because we lost Vince Foster. But I do not look back with regret at the way we in the White House Counsel's Office con ducted ourselves in those tragic days following his death and way we handled the documents in Vince's office. Let me now say that in my view, the reason we are having hearing on the handling of documents has really little to do with: how we handled the documents in July 1993. I believe, with all due respect to the distinguished Senators on this Committee, that it would have made no difference if during the search on July 22 had shown the Justice Department attorneys a portion of each doc- ument. It would have made no difference if we had even found a note on July 22 instead of July 26. It would have made no difference if I had served law enforcement officials 30 cups of coffee and spoke gently to them in other than a New York accent, which, unfortunately, is the only accent I have. We would still be having, these hearings. We would still be sitting here today. What prompted these hearings is something different. It is the linkage-the unfair linkage of two separate, disparate events. The first event involved my transfer in July 1993 of personal files, including a Whitewater file to the Clintons' personal attorneys follow ing Vince's death, a transfer which was totally proper and indeed, own to Justice Department officials. The second separate, disparate event involves the emergence in the fall of 1993 of Whitewater investigations and the resulting' media frenzy. Linking these two events is illogical, unwarranted; and unfair. They are totally unrelated. What we did- what I did in July 1993, particularly the transferring of personal files, had ab- solutely nothing to do with what has become the now-famous Whitewater matter. Yet our actions in that earlier period, in July 1993, are being judged on the basis of that later event. This linkage creates for some a so-called appearance of improper conduct, but unless in July 1993 you could see into the future, un less you could foresee the unforeseeable, there was absolutely no way to avoid that appearance. I have many talents. One of them is not seeing the future. In any event, it is this false linkage which has resulted in these hearings-it is this false linkage that has resulted in these hearings, not the way we handled the documents in July 1993. This exercise in political hindsight and chronological inaccuracy is unfair, but the fact that life may turn out to be unfair does not justify shrinking from your responsibilities, either in July 1993 or today. You know from the last time I appeared before this Committee that I strongly believe public officials do not have the option of avoiding their responsibilities because they are difficult or inconvenient or may result in criticism. I have learned-believe me, I 1213 have learned this is a controversial notion. I have learned that for many, the concern is not so much for duty or propriety, but for how things appear, or, perhaps more accurately, how they can be made to appear.
August 2, 1994 - Part 9
(22:15:57) Mr. ALTMAN. I don't remember the precise conversation, but I ,think, Senator, it's important for me to note that I immediately amended the record. It was his conversation that told me about the fall meetings. I then went through the process I described earlier today Senator HATCH. The thing that's bothering me is that either Mr. Podesta. is wrong or you're wrong and if be's right, how could you possibly forget a White House accusation to you that what you did was misleading, or wrong, or not true? Mr. ALTMAN. Senator, I don't believe that the White House called me up and said I was misleading. I don't believe that or, at least, I don't recall it. I remember the two parts of the conversation. Yes, 'Sir, he did ask me about recusal. He said, and my answer was, I -thought that my answer was responsive to the question. Now, I that's important because it shows what I was thinking. I might have-as I said in hindsight, I should have been more ex on at Treasury and that he through what was viewed 498 pansive but it wasn't intentional. I said to him a week after the testimony I thought my answer was responsive to the question. Senator HATCH. But then, if you knew there was a problem with the testimony, why did you wait 3 weeks to correct the record on recusal? Mr. ALTMAN. Well, first of all Senator HATCH. It seems to me there's something wrong here. Mr. ALTMAN. I didn't wait 3 weeks. Senator HATCH. You did. Mr. ALTMAN. No, my letter of March 11 said I was discussing recusal with the White House. Senator HATCH. But that was February 3;. right? Mr. ALTMAN. I'm just saying that I Senator HATCH. That's at the February 3 meeting. Mr. ALTMAN. No. I'm just saying I notified the Committee that I was having a discussion-that there was a discussion with the White House on recusal on March 11. Now, I just didn't think the question called for that answer, and I appreciate that I perhaps should have, but I think the most important point is intent and my response to Podesta a week later shows that I didn't have an intent to withhold that information. Senator KERRY. The letter was on March 11. The recusal discussion was on February 3. Senator HATCH. But see on March 11, they still dont Senator KERRY. I am clarifying for Senator Hatch. Senator HATCH. You're backing me up on this, on the 2nd, rather. This just doesn't compute, and again, I'm not trying to give you a rough time. I just want to get the facts out there because there's a real distinct difference between what Dee Dee Myers says, what Bruce Lindsey says, what John Podesta says, and what you're saying here today. Mr. ALTMAN. But I think Mr. Podesta will affirm that when he asked me about recusal, I said, well, I thought my answer was responsive to the question. I think he'll affirm that. Senator HATCH. But the March 11 letter did not mention the recusal discussion at the February 2 meeting. Mr. ALTMAN. No, but Senator, I said to Mr. Podesta, I believe, my answer was responsive to the question, meaning that I thought I answered the question that I was asked. Senator HATCH. Why, then, didn't the March 11 letter mention the recusal discussion of February 2? Mr. ALTMAN. Well, rightly or wrongly, I didn't reach the conclusion from Mr. Podesta's call that I had answered improperly. I said-in fact, I said in contrast to that, I said to him, I gather, I thought my answer was responsive to the question. In other words, I thought I said John, I thought I answered properly. Senator HATCH. Mr. Altman, I don't mean to beat this to death, but he told you your testimony was misleading. Mr. ALTMAN. No, I don't believe he did tell me that. Senator HATCH. You don't recall that? Mr. ALTMAN. I don't recall that. Senator HATCH. You disagree with Mr. Podesta. 499 Mr. ALTMAN. I don't recall it. I recall him telling me two things and I recall them quite vividly. One was the fall meetings and the other was the recusal and my response to him. Senator HATCH. Regarding your February 1 meeting with Ms. Kulka, didn't Ms. Kulka brief you on the RTC status of its civil investigation of Whitewater? Mr. ALTMAN. No, sir. Senator HATCH. Mr. Nye testified under oath at his deposition as follows: Question: What was and what do you mean when you say the situation that Ellen Kulka was facing? Answer: That she was going to be forced to make a decision how to proceed without perfect information on a politically charged case or potentially charged case. Question: What did Ms. Kulka say about the imperfections of the information at that point? Answer: Just that she wouldn't have enough time between-her feeling was she wouldn't have enough time between then, the date of the meeting and the 28th, the statute of limitations expiration, to make as informed a decision that she would need to make. In her opinon that wouldn't be enough to go through all these mountains of documents and so forth, or for her staff to do so, and that ultimately she would have to be making a decision with the best information possible at that time. So the shortness of questions--so the shortness of time and the inability to develop fully the facts of the case was identified as a problem-as problems in and the answer is, yes. Now, Mr. Nye testified earlier today
August 4, 1994 - Part 7
(16:10:38) In the several days following Mr. Altman's February 24 testimony, I spoke to Mr. Steiner on three or four occasions. On February 25, Mr. Steiner told me that Mr. Altman had recused himself 362 from Madison matters. Mr. Steiner also told me about the procedures the RTC went through in hiring Jay Stephens, the former Republican U.S. Attorney, to pursue RTC civil claims arising out of the Madison failure. Finally, following a meeting on March I at the White House at which Mr. Nussbaum, Mr. Klein, Mr. Eggleston, Mr. Sloan, Mr, Lindsey, and I discussed Mr. Altman's testimony, I spoke with Mr. Altman about the possible need to supplement his testimony oil three points-first, how the February 2nd meeting was arranged; second, the fact that the recusal was discussed at the February 2nd meeting; and third, whether anyone from the RTC had advised the White House of the criminal referrals involving Madison. Mr. Altman and I had what in my view was a constructive con- versation on the three points, which resulted the next day in Mr' Altman's letter supplementing the record concerning the fall meetings. Mr. Altman later sent a letter on the recusal point. I had no subsequent conversations with Treasury or RTC personnel that related in any way to Madison Guaranty. That concludes my prepared remarks and I look forward to an-. swering your questions. The CHAIRMAN. Let me pick up right where you left off. The discussion you had on the phone with Mr. Altman where you made the three points as to omissions in his testimony that he was going to have to fill in, what was the date of that? Mr. PODESTA. March 1. The CHAIRMAN. Did I understand you to say that you mentioned recusal as one of the three items? Mr. PODESTA. I did. The CHAIRMAN. Are you surprised, in his letter of March 2 that he sent to us, that recusal is not mentioned there? Or on March 3? There's another letter that follows. Mr. PODESTA. Mr. Chairman, I think I need to give you something of a long answer to that, if you'll bear with me. It really, I think, needs to be answered in the context of all three points. I mentioned The CHAIRMAN. I'm going to let you do that, but I want to make sure that I've established the predicate for the question that I want you to respond to. Mr. PODESTA. I understand. The CHAIRMAN. I want to be clear in my mind when you had the conversation with Mr. Altman and you mentioned these items, that one of them was the recusal issue. This happened on Mr. PODESTA. March 1. The CHAIRMAN. On March 1. Mr. PODESTA. Let me give you a short-winded answer and then I can give you a long-winded one. Of the three points we discussed, these had been the subject of a meeting, as I mentioned, between four members of the Counsel's Office and Mr. Lindsey and I through the course of the afternoon on March 1st. When I talked to Mr. Altman, I think that those of us on the White House side viewed those three issues somewhat differently. With regard to the first question about how the meeting had been arranged, it was Mr. Nussbaum, I think, who was particularly concerned that Mr. 363 Altman had said that he had asked for a meeting with Mr. Nussbaum. And I think the testimony has shown that he believed that he called Mr. McLarty to set up the meeting, but then asked for Mr. Nussbaum to attend. I think all of us in the White House, with perhaps the exception of Mr. Nussbaum himself, felt that was a matter that would probably not need to be supplemented. It didn't seem, in our view, to be something the Committee would be particularly concerned about or that there would be a strong press reaction to. The CHAIRMAN. Let me do this. I'm going to give you Mr. PODESTA. I'm going to rank these. The CHAIRMAN, I just want to talk about recusal right now. I'd like to leave the other two aside because I want to pose a question to another witness here on this point. Mr. PODESTA. On the recusal point, I think it was our view that the better course was to supplement the testimony and mention recusal, but that it was a judgment call that should be left to Mr. Altman on that point. The CHAIRMAN. The main point I want to establish here is that you flagged that for him on March 1st, and you have no doubt in your mind about that. Mr. PODESTA. I have no doubt in my mind about that. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ickes, in the meeting on February 2nd, yesterday Mr. Eggleston estimated that he thought about half the meeting was spent on the recusal issue. What would be your recollection on what percentage of the time of the meeting would have been spent on the recusal issue? Mr, ICKES. Senator, as I sit here today, it's my best recollection that probably three-quarters of the meeting was spent on the statute of limitation, the balance on recusal. The CHAIRMAN. When I look at your handwritten notes, which have been transcribed and printed on a piece of paper, you have that, I assume? Mr. ICKES. I have that if you'll bear with me a moment, Yes, I have it, The CHAIRMAN. In going through your transcription of notes, I don't find anything about recusal. Can you tell me why that is?
August 4, 1994 - Part 9
(18:15:04) Senator FAIRCLOTH. As you may be aware, Roger Altman testified before us Tuesday and one of the items discussed was his diary, as he has called it, or a scrapbook of historical significance. After a meeting with Maggie Williams, Hillary Clinton's Chief of Staff, on January 11th, Mr. Altman wrote that he had gotten the impression the White House was actively trying to negotiate officials at the Justice Department the scope and jurisdiction of what a Special Counsel could look into. This, of course, was prior to the appointment of the Special Counsel. The point being that after months of opposing the appointment of a Special Counsel, the Clintons were finally about to succumb to the growing political pressure and to ask the Attorney General to appoint a Special Counsel, but not until they first tried to limit what he could look into. Mr. Fiske, did you-Mr. Lindsey rather., did you talk with Robert Fiske prior to his appointment as Special Counsel? Mr. LINDSEY. No, sir. Senator FAIRCLOTH, Did you talk with Bernard Nussbaum about Mr. Fiske before his appointment as Special Counsel? Mr. LINDSEY. I don't believe so. I think I had heard that Mr. Fiske's name had been mentioned as a possible candidate, but I don't believe Senator FAIRCLOTH. This is an important question: Did you talk with Bernard Nussbaum about Robert Fiske prior to his appointment as Special Counsel? Mr. LINDSEY. Again, I think I had heard that Mr. Fiske's name was one of the names being mentioned, Bernie and I may have talked about that, but we didn't talk in any detail about it, it was simply a discussion about the newspaper accounts. Senator FAIRCLOTH. Did you talk with anyone at the Justice Department concerning jurisdiction or scope of the Special Counsel? Mr. LINDSEY. No, sir, I did not and I do not know of anyone in the White House who did. Senator FAIRCLOTH. Thank you. And thank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sarbanes, do I understand (18:17:02)(tape #10093 ends) Senator SARBANES. I think Senator Murray has been here throughout and The CHAIRMAN. She's prepared to have you go next. Senator MURRAY. I'm really used to going last. Senator SARBANES. Fin happy to defer to you. Senator MURRAY. OK, that's fine. I'm ready. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Murray. Senator MURRAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank you, Senator Sarbanes. 398 Welcome, gentlemen. I sit way over here, I generally go last, usually every question has been asked, but in my State we believe In conserving resources, so I don't like to rehash what we've already gone through. If for a minute you will indulge me, I want to review what I think I know after 5 days here. It seems to me that the RTC handed down nine criminal referrals on Madison Guaranty, Apparently the President and the First Lady were named as possible witnesses so this information which was perceived by some as newsworthy was leaked from the RTC to the press. That apparently is no Surprise to anybody either. Reporters started asking questions. They wanted responses and more information, and they started calling the RTC, the Department of Treasury and the White House. So because of those press inquiries, officials from those agencies and the White House met to discuss how to deal with those press inquiries. I think I'm right so far. Now because of all of those meetings that occurred as a result of press inquiries, charges are now being made that those meetings were illegal or unethical or im proper. And, as a result of that, we have piled through tons of depositions and paperwork, 5 days of hearings and a lot of questions. Am I right in all of that? Mr. STEPHANOPOULOS. Basically. Senator MURRAY. Well, I do believe that it would have been better if a lot of those meetings hadn't taken place, but I also think that it's unfair that when the press knows something and, hence, the American people and Senate staff know it, there should be a process in place so that those who are affected by that information should also have it. My question is: How do we set up a system so that contacts can be made between Government agencies so that people in Government know what everybody else knows? Maybe Mr. Stephanopoulos can address this. Mr. STEPHANOPOULOS. Sure, I'd be happy. I think that Mr. Cutler did testify or is planning on testifying before this Committee and I think he's laid out appropriate guidelines for making sure you contact Counsel's Office on that. But I think that the basic dynamic point that is also right. There was an awful lot of information flying out of the RTC and other places that we weren't aware of but there were a number of reporters and other organizations were and that put us at something of a disadvantage but I think it should be done properly and Mr. Cutler has laid out proper guidelines. Senator MURRAY. He does testify tomorrow, and I will be listening to his testimony, because I hope we learn some lessons from this in order to handle it right in the future. There will be times in the future for some President down the road who may have to deal with the same kind of thing and I don't think it's fair for them to be at a disadvantage. The other question we have spent a great deal of time on here is the question of recusals and I want to get to what I think is the problem there. Mr. Stephanopoulos, do you know Ellen Kulka? Mr. STEPHANOPOULOS. No, I do not.
August 1, 1994 - Part 7
(19:31:10)(Tape #10062 begins) when I viewed a portion of the tape, was because when Mr. Podesta called Mr. Altman and told him about his responses to Senator Bond's questions, Mr. Altman asked me about it, and I had-we had to find a cassette player, a tape player, and find Senator Bond's questions because we didn't have a transcript. Now, why the White House had a transcript on Monday, or a draft on Monday and a transcript on Tuesday, and I didn't nave a copy, to my recollection, I haven't any idea, but that is where I was. In addition, I didn't have a transcript when the letter was written and the letter, as I said before, was intended to deal with one specific issue, that is, the fall meetings. I don't recall having a discussion with Mr. Altman about the recusal issue as it having to that letter, or hearing, that Mr. Podesta bad raised as an issue with Mr. Altman in his conversation. Senator GRAmm. Ms. Hanson, did you ever have any doubt about the fact that there had been a recusal discussion on February 2, 1994? HANSON. No, sir. GRAMM. And yet you beard Mr. Altman say, point-blank, three times. that no discussion had occurred of any subject except 138 the deadline, the February 28, 1994, deadline. I just continue to be puzzled. It's not as if the March 2, 1994, letter ended all this. He wrote another letter on March 3, 1994. He wrote another letter on March, 11, 1994. Not until March 21, 1994, does he mention this issue as part of the February 2, 1994, meeting, Why? Ms. HANSON. Sir, I don't know. As I stated, on March 4, 1994; Grand Jury subpoenas were served. Under instruction from my counsel, I no longer talked with anybody about the Madison matter or worked on the Madison matter. At that point, I still hadn't had an opportunity to read the transcript. I didn't have an opportunity to read the transcript until the weekend after the subpoenas were served. So the answer to your question, sir, is I don't know. Senator GRAmm. I just would like to make the point on this subject, that you're not an employee of the RTC. I guess I can understand filling in for Mr. Altman because be's busy. I understand that. (19:33:45)(End of tape #10061) I have people on my staff that do things for me, trying to fill in for me. I understand that. What I don't understand is, you are the General Counsel of the Treasury Department. These things are your job, and it seems to me that, of all the other issues, having Roger Altman tell this Committee the truth was an important part of your job. He had all these opportunities, after be's been warned by the White House, he, or someone, has watched this tape, two different transcripts are available, yet not until March 21, 1994, does he get around to telling us this. It's something that I don't understand, and it seems to me, by any reading of your job description, that this was part of your job. Ms. HANsON. I disagree, sir. Senator GRAmm. Now, let me Ms. HANsON. I don't think it was my job to physically locate a transcript. I think it was my job to ask for a transcript, which I did, repeatedly. As I stated, why I didn't have one, I don't know. Senator GRAmm. When did you see a transcript? Ms. HANSON. It was later in that week. Senator GRAmm. Why did we not get the letter about the subject matter-the second subject matter of the February 2, 1994, meeting, then, until March 21, 1994?
August 1, 1994 - Part 8
(21:30:17) The CHAiRmAN. We are going to stay with the time. With respect to the transcript from the hearing, the Treasury Department received a transcript, from this Committee, the day after the hearing. If you're the General Counsel over there, and I don't know how things get passed around within the Treasury Department, we have the name of the individual that received the transcript the day after the hearing, So, you should understand, the record should be clear that the Treasury Department had a full transcript 24 hours after that hearing. Why you didn't get it, or somehow were out of the loop on it, we can't begin to answer, but you should understand, the Department, for which youre the top lawyer, had one the day after the hearing. Ms. HANsoN. Senator Riegle, Mr. Altman didn't have one on March 1, 1994, either, so I don't know what happened to the transcript. The CHAIRMAN. You may want to go back tomorrow and ask Ms. HANsON. I Will, absolutely, go back and check this out. The CHAIRMAN. I want to go to the questions. I'm going to call on Senator Roth. Is it critical, Senator Gramm, or should we go to Senator Roth? Senator GRAMM. III wait and come back. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Roth. Senator RoTH. Yes. Mr. Chairman, last Friday, in my opening remarks, I expressed concern about two things. One, was whether our rules, policy, and guidelines on matters of ethics and conflicts of interest were adequate. Second, whether or not these rules were adequately enforced. As I listen to the testimony today, I become aware there have been some pretty strict policies established both in the RTC, as well as in the White House, but the thing that concerns me, Ms. Hanson, is I see very little evidence of any effort being made to enforce these rules and regulations. In the case of the RTC, it was established this morning that it is the policy of the RTC not to disclose criminal referrals, or information about their preparation, on an institution-specific basis. In answer to a question as to whether there were any exceptions to that policy, whether referrals extended to press inquiries, we were told there were no exceptions of any type. Now, my question to you is whether or not, in your discussions and determination of contacting the White House, the policy of the RTC came under consideration in any way? 168 Ms. HANSON. No, sir, but I believe the policy of the RTC, as I understand it, is that criminal referrals are to be confidential and that there is no exception for talking to the press, If that's the case, then that policy and that regulation were breached by the RTC employee, or employees, who gave the press all this information which was the reason that I ended up talking with Mr. Nussbaum. If that hadn't occurred, then the conversations wouldn't have taken place. Senator ROTH. At the time you contacted Mr. Nussbaum, was it clear that there had been a leak, and were you aware of what that leak was? Ms. HANSON. There was absolutely no question in my mind, at the time I spoke with Mr. Nussbaum, that either it had been leaked or was about to be leaked. That view was confirmed, the following day, by an RTC Early Bird. In addition as I've stated, the IG report-the IG chronology, that was released yesterday, showed reporter interest on September 23, 1993. Senator ROTH. But, if I understand your testimony, Ms. Hanson, at the time you called Mr. Nussbaum, you did not, specifically, know whether or not there was a leak. As you just said, either there had been a leak or you knew there was going to be a leak. Ms. HANSON. Whether I knew---- Senator ROTH. The facts are you did not, actually, know at that time. Is that not correct?
August 2, 1994 - Part 6
(00:09:08)(tape #10070 begins) Commentary of hearings hosts DON BODE and NINA TOTENBERG from tv studio, they also talk with STEVE ROBERTS of U.S. News and World Report (09:17:13) Hearing resumes: The CHAIRMAN. The Committee will come to order. Let me invite everyone to find a seat. We have a few Members coming back from the vote who have not yet arrived and in deference to every Member and to Mr. Altman as well, I'm going to let Senator D'Amato go ahead with his first round of questioning. Then if we're pretty much all reassembled, I'm going to take the time to show the videotape, and that way everyone will have the chance to see it. If that's acceptable, I'm going to call on Senator D'Amato now for his first round of questioning. Senator D'AMATO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Altman, let's go back to the night of February 23, about 5:30 p.m. Do you recall having called me at my office? Mr. ALTMAN. I recall that we had a conversation that evening, Senator. 419 Senator D'AMATO. You called me ostensibly for the purpose of advising me that you were considering, the White House was consid- ering, a nominee to take over ashead of the RTC; is that correct? Mr ALTMAN That may have been why I called. I don't recall pre cisely, but that sounds right. Senator D'AMATO. Let me refresh your recollection. You called me specifically for that and you mentioned Mr. Larry Simon. Do you recall now? Mr. ALTMAN. I recall having a conversation with you about that, Senator DAMATO. Then you went on further to say, would I meet with Mr. Simon? You said, you did not want to put forth his nomination unless I felt comfortable with it, and I said have Larry call me. Do you recall that? Mr. ALTMAN. Yes, sir. Senator D'AMATO. I went on to say to you, and I find it rather ironic because the very next day you used this language, I think You referred to "heads up." I said I want to give you a "heads up." Pre going to ask you tomorrow about the issue of recusal because I believe you're in an untenable position. Do you remember that? Mr ALTMAN. I remember you said you were going to ask me Senator DAMATO. Do you remember me telling you we're going to ask you if you had any contacts, you or the Treasury, with the White House as it relates to Madison/Whitewater? Do you recall that? Mr. ALTMAN. No, I don't recall that specifically. Senator D'AMATO. That is specifically the conversation. Thereafter, I believe you had occasion to speak to Mr. Ickes, is that true, about 5:30 p.m., a little after 5:30 p.m., didn't you have a telephone conversation with Mr. Ickes? Mr. ALTMAN. I spoke to Mr. Ickes that afternoon, I don't know if it was before or after your call. Senator D'AMATO. Did you speak to Mr. Ickes about the question of Whitewater and recusal? Mr. ALTMAN. I recall saying to Mr. Ickes that I intended to announce in my testimony on February 24, 1 would be stepping down as RTC Chairman on the scheduled expiration date of March 30. Senator D'AMATO. So you had a contact with Mr. Ickes as it related to the recusal and as it related Mr. ALTMAN. No, Senator. I don't recall any conversation between myself and Mr. Ickes on recusal. Senator DAMATO. Fine, Do you recall the 24th you came in and you testified before us? Mr. ALTMAN. Yes, sir. Senator DAMATO. All right. Let me refer you to the same question that I advised you was going to be asked, you see, because we had prepared those questions and Senator Gramm wanted to raise that issue, and he did:
August 2, 1994 - Part 9
(21:50:46) Mr. ALTMAN. No, ma'am the did not. Senator MURRAY. Is the Madison investigation, in fact, still moving forward? Mr. ALTMAN. When I left the RTC on March 30 and I haven't had any contact whatsoever of any kind with it since then so I don't know where it stands today. Senator MURRAY. Did you at any time use your position as head of RTC to improperly notify the White House regarding Madison? Mr. ALTMAN. I don't believe so, Senator MURRAY. And again, I'm curious about this one issue. Did the RTC or Treasury , to your knowledge, provide the same information to Members of Congress or their staff that you discussed at the February 2 meeting. Mr. ALTMAN. In terms of these procedural alternatives that the RTC faced on Madison and any other statute of limitation situation, I believe the answer to that is yes. Senator MURRAY. And to whom was that given? Mr. ALTMAN. Well, I wrote myself-I wrote a letter to Senator D'Amato. I wrote a response to 41 Republican Senators. There were at least 7 contacts between congressional staff and RTC staff, which I'm told involved the same procedural matters. Senator MURRAY. Did it include information on the statute of limitations? Mr. ALTMAN. I'm told that they did. Senator MURRAY. I think one of the other questions we're facing here is whether there was information given at the meeting with the White House that was nonpublic. It seems to me if Congress had it, 1 member or 40 members, it was no longer nonpublic. 495 Mr. ALTMAN. Again, the Office of Government Ethics reached that conclusion. Senator MURRAY. The other controversial issue here seems to be this issue of recusal, specifically whether you were to recuse yourself on February 2 or 24. We have this 3-week period. Did anything horrible occur duirng these 3 weeks that made a difference whether or not you recused yourself on the 2nd or on the 24th? Mr. ALTMAN. It had nothing to do with the investigation of Madison whatsoever. When I testified at the very beginning today, I said I thought recusal was a false issue because it bad nothing to do with the investigation and because, whichever way I decided, yes, to formally recuse or to remain de facto recused, the impact was the same, absolutely the same. Senator MURRAY. No action nothing occurred between February 2 and February 24 that made a difference whether or not you recused yourself at the beginning of the month or the end of the month? Mr. ALTMAN. No, Senator. Senator MURRAY. Thank you, Mr, Chairman. That concludes my questions. The CHAIRMAN. Let me suggest, we've gone now through and everybody has had one opportunity . You've been at the table a Ion time. Would you like to take a break? What would be your wish? Mr. ALTMAN. I'd appreciate a few minutes. The CHAIRMAN. Why don't we do this: It's now 5 minutes to 10 p.m. Why don't we take a 10-minute break and come back and I'd like to try to finish tonight. I know that if we don't stay with it, we're likely to go on over into tomorrow. So that's something everybody has to weigh. We've got other witnesses coming tomorrow. I know you've been here a long time. I think it's probably better if we can finish tonight. So let's have the Committee stand in recess for 10 minutes, and you have a chance to refresh yourself, and then well resume. (21:53:53) [Recess.) (21:53:55) Commentary of hearing hosts DON BODE and NINA TOTENBEG from tv studio, they also talk to Senator PHIL GRAMM
Waco Hearings - DAY 10
WACO HEARINGS: 2:55 - 3:59PM - Master Number 11011 - INTRODUCTION: The following footage of the Waco Hearings consists of the questioning of panelist Attorney General, Janet Reno. Questions, and or statements are presented to the panelist from the following Representatives: Barr, Souder, Chabot, McCollum, Schumer, Scott, Barr, Watt and Hyde. 14:54:46 Old footage from Master Number 11010 shows Congressman Barr asking Attorney General Reno about policy changes. 14:59:21 Fresh footage shows Attorney General Reno responding to Congressman Barr's question concerning reforms. She replies by stating training and interagency cooperation has been enhanced. 15:00:33 Congressman Souder begins his time by making several statements concerning previous testimony. He then asserts that the evidence supporting the argument the raid proceeded because of concern for the children does not add up. Attorney General Reno replies that is correct, but then reasserts previous testimony concerning why the plan did in fact proceed. 15:08:40 Congressman Taylor begins his time by asking Attorney General Reno if there is anything that she has seen, heard or read that justifies the killing of the four ATF Agents or the wounding of the additional 20 by Koresh and his followers. She replies no, and is then asked if FBI Agents take an oath to enforce all laws regardless of personal prejudice. Attorney General Reno replies yes, and is then asked if Koresh was above the law because of his religious beliefs. Attorney General Reno answers no. Rep. Taylor then inquires of the guilt the surviving Davidians take for the events at Waco. She replies the verdicts received by the Davidians assert their actions are inexcusable. 15:13:18 Congressman Chabot begins his time by asking Attorney General Reno if a school bus of children was hijacked by the Davidians would the FBI has acted in the same manner as it did at Waco on April 19th. She answers yes had all other factors been the same as during the 51-day siege. Rep. Chabot then makes several remarks about Mr. Potts and Ruby Ridge before asking if approving Mr. Potts for a promotion sends the wrong message in terms of accountability. Attorney General Reno replies she has reviewed his role in the events at Waco, and found nothing improper. 15:18:48 Chairman McCollum begins his time by recounting Attorney General Reno's testimony relative to what motivated her to approve the raid. He then asserts that previous testimony does not collaborate her testimony. Continuing on, Rep. McCollum states to Attorney General Reno that it bothers him that she never meet with Mr. Dagaret to determine if more time could have been allocated to negotiations, and then asks her if she truly believed that the gas insertion tanks would not have been fired upon. Attorney General Reno replies by stating she was only pressured to approve the plan by the facts of the situation. Continuing on, she makes reference to the Hostage Rescue Team becoming fatigued, Koresh's tendency to manipulate and lie and how the conditions within the compound were not healthy for the Davidian children. Attorney General Reno then asserts that of course the FBI predicted the Davidians would fire on the tanks otherwise the armored vehicles would not have been used. 15:33:13 Congressman Schumer begins his time quoting several newspaper articles that assert Republicans intend to embarrass Attorney General Reno during her testimony. He then asks her if there is anything that has been learnt from the hearing that would make her question her decision on April 19th. She replies by stating she is assured many on the Majority would never attempt to humiliate her. Continuing on, Attorney General Reno asserts that she and her staff plan to review the hearings to insure there is nothing has been overlooked. 15:35:52 Congressman Scott begins his time by asking Attorney General Reno if it was the FBI's intention to insert gas for a full 48-hours. She replies by stating how insertion was to have been very controlled. Rep. Scott then inquires if the fact that it is difficult to predict a person's reaction to CS-Gas was taken into consideration. Attorney General Reno answers yes, but adds the gas should have had a greater affect than it did. 15:38:25 Congressman Barr begins his time by asking Attorney General Reno why Captain Cook of the Texas Rangers was given Mr. Foster's telephone number at the White House by Texas Governor Richards. She answers she doesn't know. Rep. Barr then asks if Mr. Foster maintained a private Waco file. Again, Attorney General Reno replies no, and is next asked if she knows what might have happened to such a file if it existed. Attorney General Reno answers no. Congressman Barr then states it's odd that questions regarding Waco were directed at the White House. Attorney General Reno comments the issue has to do with the timing of events. Pressing the issue, Congressman Barr asks Attorney General Reno if she is aware of any involvement by Mr. Foster in the events surrounding Waco. She replies no, and is then asked had Mr. Foster maintained a Waco file and it disappeared, should there be an investigation to determine where it went. Attorney General Reno answers it would depend on the file. 15:44:29 Congressman Watt begins his time by discussing the seven recommendations the FBI made regarding Waco. He then asks if the additional training and personnel was made in support of the Exclusionary Rule. Attorney General Reno replies agents now are taught about constitutionality. Rep. Watt then asks what "swat" stands for. Attorney General Reno answers "special weapons and tactics" She is then asked what kind of training does the Hostage Rescue Team receive, and replies it, the Crisis Management and Swat Teams now work together to insure peaceful resolutions can be made in the future. 15:50:20 Congressman Hyde begins his time by retaliating against Congressman Schumer's reading of newspaper quotes. He then asks Attorney General Reno if it is true that she would have done nothing differently in hindsight of Waco. She replies by stating how she would have liked to bring in another Hostage Rescue Team in order to maintain the perimeter longer. Rep. Hyde then reads excerpts from Mr. Smerick's memo as contained in the Justice Report, and then asks why wasn't more attention made of the behavior scientists' recommendations. Attorney General Reno replies by stating many of Mr. Smerick's remarks were made in early March, and then reads experts from the negotiation transcripts, which present information contrasting Mr. Smerick's perspective. 15:56:44 TIME OUT.
August 10, 1995 - Part 2
(12:10:39) Mr. NUSSBAUM. I just told you, Senator, I would have been delighted to have seen the scraps of paper. I wanted to find it more than anyone else on the earth at that time. We had a funeral the next day. People did not know why Vince died. There was absolutely no reason for me not to want to discover the scraps of paper, to put them together, to see that handwritten list. I wanted it, I wanted it for my sake, I wanted for the White House's sake, I wanted it for Lisa Foster's sake. Mr. MURKOWSKI. I understand. Mr. NUSSBAUM. So all the speculation and all this paranoia, if I can use it, is misconceived. It's wrong. Mr. MURKOWSKI. Well, I appreciate your recollection of it as com pared to the recollection of other witnesses before the Committee who claim obviously a different version and have given testimony to this Committee of such. 1350 Now, we've had testimony from Mr. Foster's secretary that she saw something yellow in the briefcase. Bill Burton saw* yellow paper in the briefcase. I can't understand how, you know, cavalierly, we could have a situation where you put your hands in the' briefcase, took out the files, and at some other time didn't look back in the briefcase. You didn't allow anybody else to look in the briefcase. Nobody else asked and you didn't. Mr. NUSSBAUM. No, I didn't prevent anybody from looking at the briefcase. Mr. MURKOWSKI. Nobody asked? Mr. NUSSBAUM. Nobody asked. If somebody said, open the briefcase, I want to look in the bottom, of course I would have done that, absolutely I would have done that. I had no reason not to do that, Senator. There was no conceivable reason why 1 would not want to find those scraps of paper that day. That's why all these recollections are almost beside the point. Some of them are inaccurate, I believe, but they are besides the point. I wanted to find a note that day. I wanted to find scraps of paper that day. And when I found them, or when Steve Neuwirth found them on the 26th, we were happy because now we had an insight into what was bothering Vince, and I would have liked that insight before I flew away to Arkansas the next morning, the 23rd, to go to Vince's funeral. Mr. MURKOWSKI. My last question. Mr. Nussbaum, you remember Michael Spafford, the Foster family attorney, told this Committee that on the afternoon of the 22nd, after law enforcement officials had left Mr. Foster's office, that Cliff Sloan had picked up the briefcase, was looking into it, and told you. that there were scraps of paper in the briefcase and he testified that you essentially said, quote "Don't worry about it." Now, I gather you don't remember that conversation either? Mr. NUSSBAUM. Nor does Cliff Sloan, and Cliff Sloan is a person with a photographic, a phonographic memory, I'll use the word phonographic memory, as well as photographic memory, and he I think would remember that conversation. Obviously memory is playing tricks on some of us. Mr. MURKOWSKI. And it is on Mr. Spafford as well? Sloan and Mr. NUSSBAUM. I don't think it's playing tricks on Mr. myself; I think in this instance, it's playing tricks on Mr. Spafford, who is a good, decent, and honest person and I'm sure he's telling his best recollection as he sees it. Neither Sloan nor I remember that conversation. Mr. MURKOWSKI. In your opinion, is the note that was found, Mr. Foster's note, is that a suicide note, or does that note really reflect on the circumstances that were bothering Mr. Foster with regard to the Travelgate issue, in your best opinion? Mr. NUSSBAUM. In my best opinion, it's a list of things that were clearly bothering Mr. Foster in this timeframe. It reflected a lot of anguish, especially the last line and the reference to The Wall Street Journal editorials. It's probably not a suicide note, but it is a list of things reflecting despair and anguish. It is the kind of thing, that if I had found on the 22nd, and believe me, I wish I had, if I had found on the 22nd, I would have turned over immediately to law enforcement authorities. 1351 Mr. MURKOWSKI. There was a period of time when you found the note and kept the note, Mr. NUSSBAUM, That's correct. Mr. MURKOWSKI. So you really didn't mean to turn it over immediately because you kept them over night? Mr. NUSSBAUM. I would have turned it over immediately on the 22nd, because that was my agreement with law enforcement authorities if we found something like that to do it. But when it was found on the 26th, and I saw it, I believed that Lisa Foster and the President should have an opportunity to see it because, as I said, common decency, and I didn't see any harm in waiting 24 hours before turning it over and letting them see it before it gets into the press. Mr. MURKOWSKI. Well, but it clearly wasn't immediate, because you found it Monday early afternoon and didn't turn it over until late Tuesday? Mr. NUSSBAUM. Correct, Senator, for the reasons Mr. MURKOWSKI. And finally- Mr. NUSSBAUM. -for the good and sufficient reasons I gave. Mr. MURKOWSKI. I understand. Finally, in your best opinion, knowing Mr. Foster, this in your opinion, the note in question was not a suicide note? Mr. NUSSBAUM. Yes, it was not a suicide note. It doesn't say, goodbye cruel world.
Whitewater Hearings August 1, 1994 - Part 1
(11:40:47) Mr. ROELLE. The Vice President in Kansas City, who notified me that evening. I advised him, don't do any more or any less than you would normally do in any criminal referral. At that point, I called Mr. Altman. I talked to him for maybe 6 minutes. He indicated to me he really didn't understand what I was expressing to him and that he would have Jean Hanson call me, and if I would go over it with her, he would appreciate it. At which point be bung up and I believe a few hours later, although I'm not sure exactly when, Ms. Hanson called me and asked what was going on. I expressed to her that we had some more criminal referrals 8 on the Madison issue. 21 I went over those criminal referrals very briefly, based on the information that I had been given orally over the telephone about what they were about. That conversation may have lasted 10 or 15 minutes. Then we talked briefly about if it would be appropriate for those criminal referrals to be seen by anybody? I said, "In my judgment, it makes no difference if anybody sees them and, therefore, I don't think they should be seen because they were going to proceed normally I advised Ms. Hanson that I bad told the staff in Kansas City to proceed normally with these criminal referrals, Go ahead and process them. She said, "OK. I will express that to Mr. Altman." We talked briefly about-I had asked her, "Who do you, intend to tell about this besides Mr. Altman?" She said, "Well, I hadn't really thought about anybody." And I said, "Good, I do not think it would be appropriate to discuss it with anybody." I also, I believe, have testified to numerous different groups that I was never thinking of the White House when I made that statement. I was thinking about other officials at Treasury. We had a number of officials at Treasury always at meetings with the RTC, and I thought these things should be kept confidential, and the best way to do that was not to discuss them, Senator MACK. Do you think that she understood your message about confidentiality? Mr. ROELLE. I don't know. She never expressed it one way or the other. She said, "I will discuss this with Mr. Altman and we will get back to you if we need to." Senator MACK. In the conversation, did you tell her that the referrals mentioned the Clintons and Governor Jim Guy Tucker? Mr. ROELLE. I did indicate what each of the nine criminal referrals had reference to and I did mention that the President and First Lady bad been mentioned in the criminal referrals. Senator MACK. How about Governor Jim Guy Tucker? Mr. RoELLE. I did say what-I'm not sure where I stand here, Mr. Chairman. I want to be totally responsive. But I'm not sure what I'm supposed to say about what's in these criminal referrals. I will say that I told Ms. Hanson what each of the nine criminal referrals' basic charges were. The CHAIRMAN. If you'll yield just a minute, just on the scope issue. Senator MACK. Let me make a point here. The CHAIRmAN. I don't want to go across this line, though. Senator MACK, I'm not going to. What I think Mr. Roelle le is saying is that he has real reservations, even today, about providing information that was included in those referrals. When we asked him for the cover page on those referrals, he refused to it to us. Yet, that's information that the White House apparently has The CHAiRmAN. I think, if I may say Senator D'AMATO. Mr. Chairman, I think that the Senator is Making a very important point, He's not going to try to cross the line. What he is saying is that Mr, Roelle considers that information SO confidential, so as not to compromise someone, that be doesn't think he can cross the line and reveal names, et cetera. 22 I think it is instructive, though, and Senator Mack has made the point, is attempting to make the point, that that same information was given-the information lie cannot give this Committee todayto the White House. That's a very valid point. Senator MOSELEY-BRAUN, Mr. Chairman? The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment, please. I understand the point you're making. I think, Mr. Roelle, you're correct, in your hesitation to not go into the details of the criminal referrals here today. I think that's appropriate. That would violate our scope requirements. And so, just so we all understand the fact as to where that line is, you've stopped short of it and I think it's appropriate here that you do so.
August 2, 1994 - Part 3
(13:00:41) Senator MURRAY. So you learned everything from a reporter? Mr. DEVORE. No. I can't recall who at the October 14 meeting told me that, in fact, while the reporter had called me on October 11, the criminal referral had been made on October 8, so someone, either at that meeting or shortly before that meeting told me that a criminal referral bad been made on October 8. Senator MURRAY. But you bad not seen the criminal referrals? Mr. DEVORE. I have not to this day seen the criminal referrals. Senator MURRAY. But you learned about them from a reporter who called you. That's where you first heard about it? Mr. DEVORE. About the investigation, yes. Senator MURRAY. Is it your experience as a Press Secretary, that if a reporter calls from a major newspaper with information, that that information is public or about to become public? Mr. DEVORE. It's my experience and my strong belief that by definition, once a reporter obtains information, it ceases being nonpublic. It ceases being confidential. Senator MURRAY. Have you ever received nonpublic confidential information from the RTC? Mr. DEVORE. No. Senator MURRAY. Thank you. Mr. Steiner, in your deposition, you told this Committee that you wrote impressionistically. Can you tell us what you meant by that? Mr. STEINER. Well, often, Senator, I would write about meetings that I did, not, in fact, attend based on conversations of one of the participants, as opposed to all of them or perhaps even third-hand from people who had not even attended the meetings. Senator MURRAY. So you don't record your thoughts accurately, you just record your impressions of what you thought occurred? Mr. STEINER. I made no effort not to be accurate, Senator, but I want to be clear, I was not attempting to be precise or construct an exact narrative. Senator MURRAY. You had a conversation with George Stephanopoulos earlier in February about the recusal issue; is that correct? Mr. STEINER. It was on or around February 16, Senator. Senator MURRAY. Did be tell you that Roger Altman ought to go ahead and recuse himself? Did be think that was the proper course of action? Mr. STEINER. He said that be thought it was Mr. Altman's decision to make, but that he thought it was wiser for Mr. Altman to recuse himself Senator MURRAY. He thought it was wiser for Mr. Altman to recuse himself Was that what he told you? Mr. STEINER. Those aren't the precise words that he used but ,bat was the content of the message. 368 Senator MURRAY. You did not record that conversation in your diary? Mr. STEINER, No, I did not. Senator MURRAY. Do you know why you didn't? Mr. STEINER. Well, this document doesn't capture every conversation that I had because it wasn't intended to be an exact chro- nology of events that occur- red. Senator MURRAY. Mr. Foreman, did you ever discuss the issue of Roger Altman's recusal with anyone at the White House? Mr. FOREMAN. Yes, Senator. As I mentioned in my opening statement, I had 2 or 3 brief conversations with Beth Nolan, the Senior Ethics Officer in the White House Counsel's Office. Senator MURRAY. With Beth Nolan. Is she respected in the ethics field? Mr. FOREMAN. Very much. exactly did you discuss with her? Senator MURRAY. What Mr. FOREMAN. I informed her about the procedures relating to the framework of the civil claims involving Madison, that I hag no personal knowledge of any of the substance of the civil claims, that I was only talking to her in terms of informing her that we were going to be doing a legal analysis on the recusal, that we had received a letter from Congressman Leach asking us to look at the recusal issue, and that we were going to start working with the Office of Government Ethics and the Resolution Trust Corporation ethics officers to consider that recusal issue. Senator MURRAY. Did she offer an opinion as to whether or not he should recuse himself? Mr. FOREMAN. No, she did not. Senator MURRAY, Let me ask you this: What was your opinion? Should Mr. Altman have recused himself? You're an Ethics Officer. Mr. FOREMAN. The first time that I beard the question to me, my first reaction was he should recuse himself before I did the legal analysis as to whether or not he needed to or had to by law. Senator MURRAY. So were there ethical or legal reasons that he should recuse himself that you knew of? Mr. FOREMAN. In the end 7 it became a discretionary judgment for him because there was no ethics regulatory requirement, as we decided with OGE, that he must recuse himself Therefore, it becomes a matter of discretion, and my view was be should recuse himself. Senator MURRAY. Well, I've heard some people suggest that there are those in the White House who were pressuring Roger Altman not to recuse himself because Altman might give Madison Guaranty some kind of special treatment. Have you ever seen or heard an evidence that would give that theory any credence?
August 2, 1994 - Part 11
(00:20:40) Senator MACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Have you finished your time? Senator MACK. Yes. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Boxer. Senator BOXER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and good morning to everyone, my colleagues, Mr. Altman. I keep telling myself it's only 9:20 p.m. in California so I'm convincing myself I'm not tired. Mr. Altman, it is my very honest view that there's some of those on this Committee who want your head on a platter as some tangible result of these $400,000 hearings. That's my belief. And if I believed for 1 minute, for 1 second that you tried to weaken the investigation of Madison Guaranty or any other S&L because there are tons of others, I'd be right there with them. So far, I believe quite the opposite. Now, 1 didn't know you before when you served in Government. I don't know much about you, but I can tell you that I believe quite the opposite is the case. You hired Ellen Kulka, a tough litigator, to handle the Madison case; is that correct, that you hired her? Mr. ALTMAN. I did, yes, Senator. Senator BOXER. And when Bernie Nussbaum was grumpy about Ellen Kulka and said something to the effect of, you know, she's tough and maybe we better not-maybe she can 't be trusted or words to that effect, you kept her in her place and you defended her, did you not? Mr. ALTMAN. Yes, Senator, Senator BOXER. Did you not defend her to Mr. ALTMAN. I told him I bad confidence in her. Senator BOXER. Sorry? 531 Mr. ALTMAN. I told him I had confidence in her. Senator BOXER. You did. So if you were to "please" Mr. Nussbaum, you certainly wouldn't have, it seems to me, defended her. You recommended a Republican to head the RTC; is that correct? Mr. ALTMAN. Yes. senator BOXER. You spoke to some people up here about that individual? Mr. ALTMAN. Yes, Senator. Senator BOXER. Is that correct? You took no action to stop the hiring of Republican Jay Stephens as Outside Counsel of the RTC; is at correct? Mr. ALTMAN. That's correct. senator BOXER, Even after you were called by a couple of folks at the White House and they complained about Mr. Stephens and they explained to you that be, Mr. Stephens, had been very harshly critical of the President, you said it's a done deal, didn't you? Mr. ALTMAN. Yes, Senator. Senator BOXER. Did you say you'd look into it? Mr. ALTMAN. No, I did not. Senator BOXER. Did you say you were stunned by it? Mr. ALTMAN. No. Senator BOXER. Did you talk to Ms. Kulka about getting rid of Mr. Stephens? Mr. ALTMAN. No, I didn't. senator BOXER. Did you chastise her for that? Mr. ALTMAN. No, I didn't chastise her. I thought it was kind of vintage Ellen. Senator BOXER. It was vintage Ellen. Did you tell the staff at the RTC to treat Madison as they would any other case? Mr. ALTMAN. Yes, Senator, I did. Senator BOXER. Because Mr. Roelle said that. Ms. Kulka said it. And Mr. Ryan said it. They all said it. Ms. Hanson said it. You briefed Republican Senators and Congresspeople on this issue just about the same time you briefed the White House on the procedure: is that correct, in letters and so on? Mr. ALTMAN. I responded to the inquiries that were coming to me, Yes. Senator BOXER. The recusal to take yourself out of the Madison case, that was your idea, was it not? Mr. ALTMAN. Yes, it was. Senator BOXER. Initially? Mr. ALTMAN. Yes, it was. Senator BOXER. And. in the face of White House Counsel, I'll call it disapproval grumpiness, agitation, excitement, you eventually recused yourself, did you not? Mr. ALTMAN. Yes, I did. Senator BOXER, Now, Ms. Hanson told you at the February 24 Senate hearing when you turned around to her, did she not tell you that your testimony was complete vis-a-vis the meetings and, that You were correct to say there were no other meetings; is that correct? Mr. ALTMAN, She confirmed that my response to Senator Bond on that question was the right one. 532 Senator BOXER. So when we saw her on that tape shaking her head no, you said were there any other meetings, and basically that's what you said, she said no. Mr. ALTMAN. Yes. Senator BOXER. Now, I personally fault Ms. Hanson for not get ting the transcript. She tells us she knew they had to be corrected, but somehow this woman, who is of very high caliber, couldn't figure out a way to get the transcript and doesn't make the corrections but didn't she sign off on your corrections? Mr. ALTMAN. She signed off on the letter I sent to Senator Riegle on March 2, and, I think, the March 3 letter. Senator BOXER. When she signed off on that, did she say, but Mr. Altman, this isn't right or Roger, we need to do more? Mr. ALTMAN. No.