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August 2, 1994 - Part 4
(11:35:59) So as I said last evening, there are a series of issues. A new one has been introduced, in a sense, that was not part of the Senate resolution that deals with the testimony of Mr. Altman before this Committee on February 24. That's an issue as it relates to the others, but has become more of a central question here as to the veracity. That's an issue we've addressed already and will address again with Mr. Altman this afternoon. I have grave concerns, I would say, Mr. Chairman, about that, as others in this Committee have expressed last evening and again today. The second set of issues, in my view deals with the whole issue of how Mr. Altman got this job, the statutory authority that creates the kind of environment that brought us to this hearing. We have a vacancy and then ask someone to carry on two full-time jobs and to separate their functions in the middle of a case that comes to it, that affects the very institution for which they work. So you're inviting this kind of difficulty. That's the second set of issues. The third set of issues has to do with the context. They go into whether or not anyone involved at the Treasury or the White House tried to influence these criminal referrals and disrupt a process that would otherwise lead to a successful prosecution of those who were identified. That to me is the most serious of all the questions we have raised. That's the heart and meat, it seems to me, of the issues we have before us. Again, I'm listening to the debate about words and diaries and impressions and so forth, and they have some meaning, but I want us to get back to the central question here of whether or not anything was done that violated the Office of Government Ethics, anything improper done here. I would argue, to some extent, that the fact that there was a debate about recusal indicates a certain sensitivity to the issue that is not always evident in this town. Mr. 392 Altman or someone else may have just decided on their own that they were going to stay with the case no matter what anybody said. The fact that he was raising the issue and discussing it, and whether he should, ought not to be seen necessarily as an indictment of somebody. it can be construed as showing some degree of sensitivity. I would point out, Mr. Foreman, that you mentioned at the opening of your testimony that your first function that you were required to perform in the Department of the Treasury was a direction from Secretary Bentsen to instruct all the employees in that office as to what their obligations were under the Code of Ethics; is that not correct? Mr. FOREMAN. Yes, Senator. Senator DODD. That was on January 21, 1993? Mr. FOREMAN. Absolutely, sir. Senator DODD. That was the first day this Administration took office. Mr. FOREMAN. The first hour of the morning, sir. Senator DODD. I think that says something. It ought not to be just swept by. You're talking about an overall demeanor and attitude here about these issues. Now, again, in my view there were far too many meetings and there were far too many people involved and the language gets too cute for my taste quite frankly. But on the basic issue of whether or not there is a pattern here of unethical behavior or, in fact, illegal behavior, I'm waiting to see more evidence. Mr. Foreman, let me raise a particular issue with you, because the allegation has been made that any contact having to do with a press inquiry, the threshold question to some Members of this Committee is wrong. Now, I'm referring here to page 8 of the Office of Government Ethics Report and specifically to paragraph 3. It says, "the question of whether Ms. Hanson,", talking about Ms. Hanson in this case, -disclosure served an official interest raises a unique issue about the nature of the Office of the President, matters that would be of only personal significance for other Executive Branch offices may take on official significance when the President of the United States is involved." I wonder if you might expand on that notion. Someone earlier raised the question of whether or not if this had happened in the Department of Commerce, whether or not the same standards would apply. As I read this provision, it says that historically, we have treated the Presidency different than just any other agency of Government. Because, historically, we've appropriated moneys to support a press operation to answer questions about the personal lives of the President and the First Family, when the Presidency, is involved, there is a different standard than it would be for other agencies. Am I basically on track with that and would you expound on that a bit?
August 3, 1994 - Part 5
(16:55:45) Mr. KLEIN. I was concerned in two respects, Senator, One, as I said, I had heard that the issue of recusal had been raised, That's all I heard was that he had brought it up and there was nothing in the newspaper accounts referring to recusal in the lengthy descriptions of his testimony. Senator SASSER. Well, my time has expired, but you heard it had not been brought up by, not by Mr. Altman at the Committee Mr. KLEIN. No, I heard it had been brought up at the meeting, but not discussed at the hearing by Mr, Altman, and so I was concerned about the omission, essentially the same point that Mr. Eggleston just made. Senator SASSER. Thank you very much. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Sasser. Senator Gramm. Senator BRYAN. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. Earlier the point I think he had indicated that he had concerns about two points and I don't think that he fully responded to the question. The CHAIRMAN. He should respond. Mr. KLEIN. The second point I had, later in the day there were press accounts on Friday the 25th about the hearing. Late in the day about 4:00, Cliff Sloan, Associate Counsel, came to my office and asked me if he could talk to me and he said, look, I've read in the paper that Mr. Altman only testified that there was one meeting. He said I was involved in and know about some meetings in late September, early October. Sloan said, I don't know what Mr. Altman's knowledge was. 1 didn't deal with Mr. Altman, but I know about these meetings and I think it's important that the White House make sure it responds accurately to any questions and not say that there was only one meeting or anything like that. So I had a concern about additional meetings and I had a concern about the fact that as far as I could tell, recusal had not been mentioned, even though I had learned that recusal had in fact been discussed at the February 2nd meeting, The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Thank you, Senator Bryan. Senator Gramm. Senator GRAMM. Mr. Mein, your basic involvement here is that you're the one who was asked to look at the Altman testimony to try to decide what he had said that might not have comported with the facts.
July 20, 1995 - Part 1
(09:45:25) The CHAIRMAN. Unfortunately, you hear that a test was administered, but what was the basis, what were the questions, what was the scope; so it raises, in many cases, more questions than it answers when we hear that a test was administered. So we share that with you, and maybe he'll reconsider as time goes along. I'd like to say, at the outset of today's hearings and before we hear from the Park Police, that I want to reemphasize and make. something clear because I've had a number of people in the media raise this question to me as recently as this morning. Apparently I would hope that our witnesses, particularly Major Hines-I want to assure him that this Committee does not intend and has no interest in opening up or reopening the question of the tragic death of Mr. Foster. I see that is a concern of the Major in his statement. I've read the statement. We do not dispute in any way that it was anything but a suicide. I can understand the Park Police's feeling, as its characterization of the investigation, I think, took on certain nasty aspects, but we don't intend to look at that. After last summer's hearings, both the Majority and Minority reports concluded--I want to emphasize this-that the evidence overwhelmingly Supports the Park Police's conclusion that Mr. Foster died of a self-inflicted wound. I am aware of nothing that undermines this conclusion. I read Major I-lines' statement this morning, and I understand and appreciate the Park Police frustration with all of the totally unfounded speculation that Mr. Foster was a victim of foul play. The Park Police have worked hard to do a professional job, and such unfortunate speculation simply slows the Foster family's healing process. It raises concerns among the professionals at the Park Police. It is unfair to characterize their investigation as having not been thorough and complete. Last summer, at the request of Mr. Fiske, the Senate did not ex-amine the very important question of the handling of the papers. and documents, including the Whitewater papers, contained in 145 Foster's office. I want to reassure the Park Police that the Committee is now looking-and not only the Park Police, but everyone--were now looking into the handling of the papers in Mr. Foster's office after his death and whether there was any interference with law enforcement review or whether law enforcement was impeded from doing its job in that connection. So I would hope that settles that issue and that you would feel we are not attempting to replow a situation that should not be revisited. With that Senator SARBANES. Mr. Chairman, before you swear in the panel, I'd like to follow up on a matter we were discussing after the hearing yesterday. It's my understanding that Michael Chertoff and Richard Ben-Veniste will seek to interact with Mr. Kendall, who's the private attorney for the Clintons, with respect to the materials that have been furnished. Now, as I understand it, the material redacted does not involve Whitewater or Madison, but I think a procedure whereby our counsel has an opportunity to interact with Mr. Kendall on that matter would be helpful. At the end of the day and the discussions we had after the hearing, I think we reached that understanding, that they would seek to have that interchange over the weekend. Now, we have received an awful lot of documents from the White House which are official, and also documentation from Mr. Kendall as their private lawyer, but questions have been raised about some of the redactions, and I think we're endeavoring to find a process here by which our attorneys interacting with them can obtain some further understanding about how to handle that matter. Is that correct? Is that not correct?
Iran-Contra Hearings - Testimony of Colonel Oliver North.
Senator George Mitchell (D - Maine). Well, in fact the President s publically stated policy at that time was not to provide arms to Iran and to work actively to keep other nations from doing so. As you ll recall, in 1984 the Secretary of State had branded Iran a country which has repeatedly provided support or acts of international terrorism and by his action, he placed Iran on a list of countries to which American arms could not be shipped. And the President s publically stated policy on terrorism was that there would be no negation, no payments, and no ransom of any kind to obtain the release of terrorists. In fact I think at about that same time as he made the speech on Iran the President said and I quote America will never make concessions to terrorists, to do so would only invite more terrorism. Once we head down that path there will be no end to it. Now my question is, am I correct that every person dealing directly with the President on this matter was a member of the executive branch and therefore subordinate to and totally dependent upon the President? Colonel Oliver North. When you say this matter you re referring too? Senator George Mitchell (D - Maine). The Iran and advising him on the issue of sale of arms to Iran. Colonel Oliver North. To my knowledge that is correct. I do not know of any others that specifically talked to the President regarding our Iran initiative, but in the records I turned over to the committee and in some of the documents that were removed from my office and provided by the White House to this committee, it is very clear that there were a number of other initiatives ongoing - some by members of Congress, both houses, both sides of the aisle - who had an interest in some kind of dialogue with the Iranian government for the purposes that were identical to the ones that we pursued, perhaps more vigorously than some would agree, nonetheless there were a number of initiatives undertaken by private Americans, by Senators, by Congressmen, to get to a faction within Iran that would be more moderate. I would also take issue Senator with one of your comments. To my knowledge we have never said nor should we say that we will not negotiate. We have a policy of no concessions. We have a policy that is very clear and I still do not to this day believe that we made concessions to terrorists. We were dealing again in hopes of establishing a dialogue, a strategic dialogue with elements within Iran that could bring about a more pro-American, pro-western, anti-terrorist philosophy within that country. Senator George Mitchell (D - Maine). And I understand and appreciate your point of view as I m sure you understand and appreciate there are others who would characterize these events different than you do. But the point is that every person advising the President is subordinate and when the finding authorizing the sale of arms was signed by the President it specifically directed that no one in the Congress be notified of the covert action. We recall that going into effect. Colonel Oliver North. I do. Senator George Mitchell (D - Maine). And you said that the reason for that was the concern over leaks and the problem that because it might be leaked it would jeopardize the action. And you ve over the course in the last several days, expressed very forcefully that point of view. I raise that because there s another point of view on that same issue that hasn t been expressed and I d like to do that now, because I think we ought to have the benefit of all points of view on this as we consider what we should do about this law, which is very difficult.
Iran-Contra Hearings - Testimony of Colonel Oliver North.
In Studio: Judy Woodruff- Elizabeth let s go back for a moment to some questions we started to talk about before Congressman Hamilton was there. But about some questions very specific questions, Democratic Congressman Peter Rodino raised with Colonel North. In Studio: Elizabeth Drew-Well Congressman Rodino as you pointed out is Chairman of the House Judiciary committee is interested in what happened over the weekend that Attorney General Mies was conducting an investigation of this whole series of events which led to the disclosure of the diversion. He clearly has some doubts about it. But he asked some surprising questions. I think they took North a bit by surprise. We should point out that that is the one exchange that Brendon Sullivan has tried to end. He said that Rodino had gone over his time but most of them had gone over their time. But Sullivan clearly didn t enjoy the line of questioning and they looked just a little less certain in their answers. I don t mean to incorrectly interpret but you can just tell what s been rehearsed that he s quite sure of. He s been over this for months. These didn t seem to be answered with the same assurances. Now the interesting thing is what was in the questions. Rodino asked if North had met with the Attorney General on the Friday. This is the Friday before the weekend when all the shredding went on and then they found the diversion memo. And whether during that meeting he asked the Attorney General whether they had 24 or 48 hours? North said of course he didn t recall anything like that. And Rodino pointed out that North s own assistant, Robert Earle had testified to the committee that this had happened. So North said well maybe I talked to someone at Justice. And maybe it was about trying to hold up the investigation of Southern Air Transport, which is the airline which had been both sending aide to the Contras and helping with the hostage release. And North had been trying to hold up the investigation of that apparently because it was supposed to lead to what we learned greater about the Contras. Then there was a question about well did he call the Justice Department and talk to Brad Reynolds, who was running the investigation. In Studio: Judy Woodruff- Because it appeared on his telephone log. In Studio: Elizabeth Drew-It was on his phone log. And he said no he didn t remember that and then he saw that his attorney, his then attorney Tom Greene s name was also on the phone log. Well maybe he called him. But that doesn t quite explain this. Well maybe I talked about needing the time to get the hostages out. Rodino said why did you ask if there was a cover memo on the diversion memo. And did you ask what happened to the five memoranda that went up. So there were a lot of interesting areas that Rodino opened up. In Studio: Judy Woodruff-But what would the significance be and again this was a hypothetical but this is what Congressman Rodino was asking. If North or his attorneys had a conversation with an assistant attorney general at the time of this investigation, this fact finding investigation was underway. In Studio: Elizabeth Drew-Well clearly overall he was looking to see if there was any kind of a fix. If there really was a proper investigation, whether he was negotiating something? Those opening questions clearly he was asking North whether he talked to the Attorney General and tried to get some time after which he shredded documents. There are a lot of questions about that weekend. I think they will be continued certainly when Poindexter comes in and absolutely when Attorney General Mies comes. But also all of these keep leading to among other things the President s role in this whole thing.
MLK Assassination Hearings - Nov 9, 1978
Samuel Devine (R- Ohio).Your discharge is from Scotland Yard for medical reasons? Alexander Eist, Retired Chief Inspector. I did yes sir. Samuel Devine (R- Ohio). I believe the medical reasons had to do with a thyroid involvement that has caused some eye protrusion. Is that accurate? Alexander Eist, Retired Chief Inspector. Absolutely. Yes sir. Samuel Devine (R- Ohio). But you were honorably discharged? Alexander Eist, Retired Chief Inspector. Absolutely. Yes sir. Samuel Devine (R- Ohio). Now further just a moment ago in answering counsel s question you said Mr. Ray talked to you about going to Africa and I think the quote was kill some more. Is that accurate? Alexander Eist, Retired Chief Inspector. Yes sir. Samuel Devine (R- Ohio). Kill some more? Alexander Eist, Retired Chief Inspector. Yes sir. Samuel Devine (R- Ohio).In another area Inspector, when did you first become aware that an American Congressional Committee had an interest in James Earl Ray? Alexander Eist, Retired Chief Inspector. In the news media in Great Britain, it had been published that James Earl Ray or his associate was alleging the FBI were crocked and they framed him. This was the first that I knew of it. Samuel Devine (R- Ohio).That was after this committee was created. Alexander Eist, Retired Chief Inspector. I assume so sir. Samuel Devine (R- Ohio). In January of 1977? Alexander Eist, Retired Chief Inspector. Yes Sir Samuel Devine (R- Ohio).That was about the time that you became aware of our interests. Is that correct? Alexander Eist, Retired Chief Inspector. Yes sir. Samuel Devine (R- Ohio). I would ask you whether you knew of Major & Mrs. David and Connie Mourner. Alexander Eist, Retired Chief Inspector. Meaunier Samuel Devine (R- Ohio). How do you spell that? Alexander Eist, Retired Chief Inspector. M-E-A-U-N-I-E-R Samuel Devine (R- Ohio). Who are they? Alexander Eist, Retired Chief Inspector. Major s is an air force major sir, who s stationed in Great Britain. Samuel Devine (R- Ohio). And where did you run into them Inspector? Alexander Eist, Retired Chief Inspector. Well they came into my public house sir. I first met them when I took this place over about two years ago. Samuel Devine (R- Ohio). About two years ago. When they told you of the new American investigation, what was your reaction? Alexander Eist, Retired Chief Inspector. Well sir that was the first that I knew of it when I saw it in the media about the framing by the FBI. Of Course naturally I had some interest because I saw the name Earl Ray and I had had dealings with him. Of course I was telling these two friends of mine and they continually coerced me into telling the FBI what I knew; because they were impressing on me how important it was to their country. Samuel Devine (R- Ohio). They suggested that you notify the FBI and the American authorities? Alexander Eist, Retired Chief Inspector. They did, yes. Samuel Devine (R- Ohio). What was your response to that? Alexander Eist, Retired Chief Inspector. I gave it some thought sir. Samuel Devine (R- Ohio). I beg your pardon. Alexander Eist, Retired Chief Inspector. I gave it some thought and I decided not really at that time but after a while that it is the proper thing to do to assist the authorities if I could against the allegations of framing. Samuel Devine (R- Ohio). Did you suggest to them that the American Authorities already knew of your relationship with Ray? Alexander Eist, Retired Chief Inspector. Yes I think I did sir. I was under the impression that they already knew the situation as I m explaining it this morning.
August 4, 1994 - Part 3
(11:25:32) Senator SHELBY. March 1993? Ms, WILLIAMS. Perhaps. Senator SHELBY. Had you dealt with him on more than this one occasion? MS. WILLIAMS. Yes, I have. Senator SHELBY. About how many times, in your best judgment, have you met and talked and dealt with Roger Altman? Ms. WILLIAMS. Well, quite a bit. Senator SHELBY. From 1993 on? Would it be as many as, say, 10 or 15 times? Ms. WILLIAMS. Yes, Senator SHELBY. More or less? Ms. WILLIAMS. It could be, yes. Senator SHELBY. And were those meetings or dealings about various things dealing with the Administration? Ms. WILLIAMS. Generally our meetings were Health Care related Senator SHELBY. Health Care related? Ms. WILLIAMS. Yes, Sir. Senator SHELBY. The word "paralyzed"---and he is quoting that and attributing that to you. Do you believe that Roger Altman is an intelligent man? Ms. WILLIAMS. Yes, I do. Senator SHELBY. I think we would stipulate that. Do you know whether he has ever attributed, done an attribution to you or something else that was not true? Ms. WILLIAMS. I do not know if he has done an attribution about me to someone else. I do not know that. Senator SHELBY. Have you used the word "paralyzed" in the context of a conversation with him? Did you, on this occasion? Ms. WILLIAMS. No, I did not, because I do not recall having a conversation with Mr. Altman. Second, because Senator SHELBY. You don't recall at all having a conversation with him on this occasion? MS. WILLIAMS. I do not, sir. Senator SHELBY. OK. Could you have had a conversation and not recalled it? Could there have been a conversation like this and you not recall it for various and sundry reasons? 309 Ms. WILLIAMS. I think that it is possible for a person not to have recalled it. I don't know if anyone here cae recall every conversa- tion they had on January whatever the date is, but I will say that what you do when you are trying to make a recollection, I believe, is you try and think about yourself. What would you do? What would you say? It gives you some sense about whether or not in an instance you would say that. I would not say that Mrs. Clinton is "paralyzed," one, because it just was not true. I look at her schedule. If this is the schedule of a "paralyzed" person, then she is in very good shape. Secondly, I would not discuss Mrs, Clinton's state of mind with anyone. That is what I know to be true about me. Senator SHELBY. Would you say, in describing the situation, if you do not want to claim ownership of the word "paralyzed" here, would you say she was deeply concerned? MS. WILLIAMS. Let me say that it would be unusual for a person who every day in the press was getting beaten up about a specific subject and a person who had to spend part of her time engaged in discussions with a private lawyer about things that happened 17 years ago, for this person not to be concerned. Senator SHELBY. "Deeply"? Deeply concerned? That is my phrase. MS. WILLIAMS. Mrs. Clinton did not express that to me, but I would have to be a blind person not to look at what was going on in the media and not to look at the time that she was spending with her personal lawyer not to know that this matter held some real interest for her. But let me go back to what I believe your question is. I do not recall having a conversation with Mr. Altman where I indicated that Mrs. Clinton was "paralyzed," for two reasons, and I will repeat them. One, it is not true she was paralyzed. Second, I know myself and I would not discuss Mrs. Clinton's state of mind. Now what I have volunteered to this Committee and to the House Committee is that during that period of time I certainly was outspoken in saying that I believed Whitewater was a distraction and that we needed to be about the business of the President's agenda. That is what I said. Senator SHELBY. If you didn't say that, or you have no recollection of saying that, or using that period, then do you believe that Roger Altman made this up and contemporaneously put it in his diary or scrap book? That would be sort of out of character for anyone would it not, to make up something like this that would be descriptive of what was going on, for example, at their house at that time, or his impression that he gathered from your conversation and write it down, put it in his diary or his scrapbook? Would that not be out of character for somebody to just make up something like that
August 4, 1994 - Part 5
(13:40:38) Ms. WILLIAMS. Yes, I was outspoken on the matter, Senator BOXER. So that it is possible that someone hearing you, perhaps, wax eloquent on the point-and I think you can. wax eloquent on the point and you did before us several times-might have taken away an inference that the country's agenda could be 344 paralyzed if this thing continued? Not to quibble over a word, but in essence the country's agenda could be paralyzed or could be stopped cold because too many people were having too many meetings, as Mr. Cutler said, about this matter? Would that be a fair characterization? MS. WILLIAMS. Yes, Senator, that would be fair. Senator BOXER. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think we've gone around and about with these witnesses. I think that the President and the First Lady have been well served. In a closing question, I would say to Mr. McLarty, now that Mr. Panetta is Chief of Staff, have you shared any of the lessons that. you learned from this whole situation? I And you were very open and honest with this Committee in telling us you believe it should have been handled differently or better, in a more streamlined fashion. Have you shared those thoughts with Mr. Panetta? Mr. MCLARTY. Chief of Staff Panetta, of course, was involved in the White House as Director of OMB and I think that's one of the things we did very well. We've had several discussions, not just specifically about this matter, although it included that, but other operations, decisionmaking at the White House. Chief of Staff Panetta is a good Californian and he will be an able-he is an able Chief of Staff. Senator BOXER. In answer to my question, have you discussed some of the management tools that you have at your disposal, perhaps some ways to handle this type of an incident in a better way, an incident that occurred many years ago that happened before the President was President? Have you discussed perhaps some of your insights on how to better handle the situation? Mr. McLARTY. Yes, Senator, we have and also of course Mr. Cutler's report addresses that in a very specific way and outlines specific steps which have already been implemented at this point. Senator BOXER. Mr. Chairman, I have to say one thing that I really learned today. As we seek to find the truth, it is worth noting that sometimes the truth is elusive because to one person, intense pressure is just a rough conversation. You know, I grew UP in New York, I grew up in Brooklyn and there's a way that people talk in New York and in Brooklyn, in the way they express themselves, that's a little bit different from the way people talk in Cali- fornia and now I'm a combination of both, so I don't know how talk. But the bottom The CHAIRMAN. I'd say there's a little of Brooklyn left. Senator BOXER. Well, they say you can never take Brooklyn out of the girl although you can take the girl out of Brooklyn. This is true. But I would say this: We have listened to Mr. McLarty. Indeed, I think all of us in this Committee, Republicans and Democrats, have probably spoken with Mr. McLarty. Mr. McLarty' as Chief of Staff, I would say you were as close to the President of the United States as you could get. Did you at that time speak with him every single day, would you say? Mr. McLARTY. Generally I did, if he were here. Senator BOXER. Probably a few times unless he was out of the country? 345 Mr. McLARTY. Unless he was traveling or something of that nature but generally every day. Senator BOXER. Tell me again, what did you say to Mr. Altman when he asked you about recusing himself from this issue? Mr. MCLARTY. I listened politely and encouraged Mr. Altman to make the decision he felt was the right one. Senator BOXER. Well, Mr. Chairman, that doesn't sound like intense pressure. It sounds like respect, it sounds like understanding. I thank you very much for your clear answers, both of you, and I am very glad that you both are where you are. The CHAIRMAN. I might just say before your time is gone, it also sounds like Mack McLarty. I think that advice he gave is consistent with at least the individual that I know him to be, so I'm not surprised that that would be his advice. Senator BOXER. And, Mr. Chairman, if I might say, it says a lot about Bill Clinton, who chose Mack McLarty. Mr. McLARTY. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Faircloth. Senator FAIRCLOTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to follow up on Senator Hatch's line of questioning. On Tuesday, Roger Altman testified-this question is to you, Ms. Williams.
August 4, 1994 - Part 11
(21:50:11) Senator D'AMATO. Mr. Chairman, I believe Senator Mack--Senator Domenici, are you ready to make inquiry? Senator DOMENICI. I'm going to ask one question and make one observation. Mr. Podesta, a lot has been made, perhaps you're not aware of this, but during previous testimony that Legal Counsel for the Treasury Department, Ms. Hanson, had some major responsibility to correct the record. Once you found out about it, did you have any less responsibility and if you did, why didn't you see to it that the record was corrected? Mr. PODESTA. Senator, I think that the Administration has a duty to this Committee. As I said in my opening statement, I worked up here for a long time. I think we had a duty to you. That was what my phone call to Mr. Altman was about, was trying to find the best way to make sure the record was complete. Senator D'AMATO. For which I commend you. 460 Mr. PODESTA. And I just hope you understand that in the wake of that, in the wake of the criticism of the contacts with regardwe received a subpoena-that we thought it was not reasonable at that point to go forward talking to Treasury about their testimony what we had said and what Mr. Altman had said, and that's, I think, the best explanation I can give you for what our conduct was. Senator DOMENICI, So you're saying when Mr. Fiske issued the: subpoenas, either to you or the White House or the White House and you, that at that point you thought or were you given legal advice that perhaps you should not proceed any further with this matter? I don't understand the nature of the subpoenas. We're hearing a lot about Mr. PODESTA. Senator, the inquiry that the subpoenas were directed at was who said what to who, and I think that having more contacts in that context would have been criticized, And I think it would have been fairly criticized. So while I think people have expressed regret in these hearings about some of their conduct, the one thing I do not regret is that we did not talk to Treasury further. about the testimony or about their supplements to the testimony or the letters. Senator DOMENICI. I have one observation and frankly it may be because I don't understand all of the dynamics and the lawsuits and the pressure you're under; Mr. Stephanopoulos, with reference to all of this various testimony under oath and I gather there's a lot of that. You've testified many, many times under oath. You've stated that here. I do want to tell you honestly, while I was not as familiar with your work in the Congress as was Mr. Gephardt, for whom you worked, I did serve one time for 12 or 14 days when we put together a big economic package. And I really found that your abilities were rather spectacular, including your ability to summarize, your ability to recall, your ability to wrap up a meeting and remember everything that occurred, during the day. And I must tell you, I read your deposition and-I'm dumb founded that so many answers say "I don't recall" and "I don't remember." I just have to tell you that on the record, and you're really free to answer right now. Mr. STEPHANOPOULOS. I'm happy to answer, sir, and thank you. I would just say I also spent several hours before this Committee in depositions giving full accounts of everything that I did. If you.. ask me looking back 5 months what I remember, if I can remember-, every word of a conversation, a phone conversation that lasted between 30 seconds and 2 minutes, my honest answer, like everybody else in this room, is no. I simply cannot remember word of a conversation 5 months ago. I would also say, and just give you a picture of my day on Friday, February 25th. said, I'm a staffer. You know that I'm a staffer. I've done that a long time. Like many of your staffers, I'm required to go issue to issue very quickly. On that day, I began work at 6-00 a.m. I was at work immediately--- Senator DOMENICI. Which day are you referring to? 461 Mr. STEPHANOPOULOS. This is Friday, February 25th. I received phone calls immediately at 6:00 a.m. about the Hebron Massacre because we had to come up with a response for the Today Show on television. I was dealing with that from about 6:00 to 8:00 in the morning. We immediately went from that to help staff the President on a meeting he had with several Senators, maybe some in this room, about Aldrich Ames. I had to go from that to help staff a meeting on Health Care. I think I probably had two separate lunches that day and a reception and probably 30 or 40 phone calls.
JFK Assassination Hearings - Larry Sturdivan (Part III)
Opens with exhibit of film footage of human skulls being shot by bullets, shown frame by frame in slow motion - LARRY STURDIVAN describes purpose and results of this experiment - the image is very dark, black and white, the skulls explode and move in direction of bullet ( I 11:00:48 - O 11:03:50) Sturdivan explians bullet's point of entry into skull and the result of the impact on the skull's structure, 2 new exhibits added and displayed: one is an illustration of the JFK's back with the skull drawn into a silhoutte of the body and the other is 2 skull photographs, one atop the other, showing different results of bullet impact (I 11:05:20) Delegate WALTER FAUNTROY of the District of Columbia asks striking velocity of bullet that entered JFK's back - Sturdivan answers 1800 ft/s and explains effect passage through body would have on bullet's path (11:09:35) Fauntroy asks if bullets could then pass through another man - Sturdivan answers yes, Fauntroy asks about the speed and angle possibilities of the bullet then entering Gov. Connally - Sturdivan explains (11:12:34) Fauntroy asks if the bullet could shatter Conally's wrist bone after its passage through his body - Sturdivan answers yes (11:16:45) Fauntroy asks if there were another bullet that hit Conally what would the difference be in outcome - Sturdivan answers there would be no difference other than in the bullet's entry point into Connally, it would be at a different angle (11:17:50) New exhibit introduced - it is an image comparing three bullets fired from a Mannlicher-Carcano rifle - two of the bullets were used on goat carcasses in tests done at request of Warren Commision and the other is Exhibit 399 - the actual bullet thought to have passed through JFK and Connally: Bullet A which grazed a goat's rib is slightly deformed, Bullet B which went through gelatin alone is in pristene condition, and Bullet 399 which is slightly flattened - Discussion follows between Fauntroy and Sturdivan as to how Bullet 399 could have done so much damage and emerged relatively unscathed (I 11:22:50 - O 11:27:20) Fauntroy asks if a single bullet could inflict all the injuries - Sturdivan answers yes (11:27:20) The question of why JFK's head moved in the opposite direction of bullet is introduced (11:28:00) Exhibit introduced of physics formulas come up with by Sturdivan to deduce what bullet's impact would have on JFK's head movement - they correspond to bullet velocity and the mass of the head (11:30:00) Introduction of photos of JFK's head movement (11:33:00) Sturdivan: "The deposited momentum from the bullet was not sufficient to cause any dramatic movement in any direction" (11:33:54) Sturdivan interprets JFK's head movement as "neuro-muscular reaction", uses Jack Rabbit hunting as illustration - body springs into action upon being shot - and explains what he beleives could have been possible stimuluses touched by the impact of the shot (I 11:35:10 - O 11:38:04) Sturdivan introduces footage of goat executions to illustrate head movement (11:38:10) Charles Matthews gives source of films - Edgewood Arsenals - and again gives the disclaimer that this sort of testing is no longer done by the Army (11:39:00) Fellow council member substantiates from personal experience that Jack Rabbits will indeed spring into neuro-muscular action upon being shot (11:40:20) Goat films screened - host of TV coverage voice comes over shot of court room to warn sensitve viewers to turn away - Sturdivan dates the 3 films to 1948: #1 shows a goat in a strange head harness, anaesthetized and shot dead - the body immediately slumps, #2 is a similar shot of a goat but this time shot at 2400 frames per second allowing a better slo-mo image - upon being shot this goat seems to leap into the air before collapsing, #3 is of a goat already dead, it is suspended from the ceiling - upon being shot it does not move at all (I 11:40:40 - O 11:45:50) Shot returns to committee and Fauntroy recaps Sturdivan's testimony thus far as supporting the single bullet theory (11:46:00) In response to Fauntroy's inqueries about JFK's head explosion, Sturdivan: "The radial velocity is imparted as the bullet goes through and after it is gone" - Fauntroy: "And that caused the explosion effect" - Sturdivan: "Yes, and the neuro-muscular movement" (11:48:10) Representative CHRISTOPHER DODD of Conneticut recognized by chair to question Sturdivan (11:48:45) Dodd asks if Sturdivan has any background in anatomy to come to his conclusions - Sturdivan answers yes he has training in school and on the job, Dodd asks about the differences between tests on live and dead samples - Sturdivan answers they have a minimal effect on the bullet's path and velocity (11:49:10) Dodd asks if the first shot was the bullet through JFK's back vs. the head, could it have caused the head reaction, touching or brushing the spinal cord in its path - Sturdivan answers yes it is possible (11:50:15) Dodd: "This is 1978," his reaction upon finding out goat tests done in 1948 - Dodd knocks over glass with this dramatic quote and looks annoyed, goes on: "What would you haved done now? What would you do differently?" Sturdivan responds that he might have done tests illustrating that a bullet could shatter a wrist bone and remain undeformed - that in fact since science proves that bone is not as strong as the bullet the test is not necessary (11:54:05) Sturdivan would not recommend his test, he will not conduct an unnecessary experiment simply to "quiet the critics" (11:56:50) Representative SAMUEL DEVINE from Ohio recognized by committee to question Sturdivan, he requests exhibit 399, he asks Sturdivan if he has ever seen the actual assassination bullet in person - Sturdivan answers no, Sturdivan is given the bullet to look at and handle (11:57:04) With the actual bullet in his hand Sturdivan is asked now if looking at it he can say in his opinion if it took the path determined by the Warren Commision - He answers yes (11:59:08) Devine asks if after watching the Zapruder film he is not troubled by the fact that JFK's head did not move in the same direction as the bullet - Sturdivan answers no: "the momentum of the bullet could not have thrown him in any direction violently" (12:00:15) Chair, Mr. Stokes, confirms to his disbelief that Sturdavin has never before examined bullet 399 (12:01:10) Mr. FORD of Tennessee is called on to question Sturdavin, he asks about the different drag force of soft and hard bullets - exhibit of drag force equation put on easel (12:01:33)
August 4, 1994 - Part 13
(01:30:38) Question: Was Mr. Altman an active participant in these discussions? Answer: I don't recall. They took-the discussion took place in his office. Question: Do you recall him saying anything? Did he agree with anybody Senator DODD. The question above that, was Mr. Altman an active participant. The CHAIRMAN. I just read that. Senator DODD. OK I'm sorry. The CHAIRMAN. Let me pick up with the top of 14. Question; Was Mr. Altman an active participant in these discussions? Answer: I don't recall. They took-the discussion took place in his office. Question: Do you recall him saying anything? Did he a agree with anybody? Did he disagree with anybody? Can you recall at all what he said. Answer, I don't recall. Question- Do you recall having a strong feeling as to whether the record should be corrected to reflect what you've told us here tonight? Answer: I recall having a strong feeling that the record was going-was going to require supplementation. As I stated, at that point I did not have a transcript and had not had an opportunity to review the transcript in full. But it was my view that the record was going to have to be supplemented. That's my recollection. Question: And when Mr. Altman said that you pre-cleared his letter and signed off on it, did you consider the letter that he sent--I assume this must be the March 2nd letter-to be the letter that corrected the statements that you just told us about? I will show you the letter. Mr. PITT. It is on page 336 of the printed hearings. Ms. HANSON. I understood this letter to be designed to address a specific issue. That was, to answer Senator Bond's question of who notified the White House- And that was the reference to two conversations that took place between Treasury staff and White House personnel, one of those conversations being my conversation with Mr. Nussbaum. As I stated, on March 3rd there was an article that appeared in The Washington Post that described the two fall meetings. This letter was designed and intended to put the Committee on notice of these two meetings, but not, in my view, to com pletely supplement the record as it related to those two meetings because it didn't have the specific information to respond to Senator Bond's question. That remained to be completed in full in response to a review of the entire record. Mr. Codinha resuming: Question: And then on March 3rd there is another letter. Did you also review and pre- clear that letter? Answer: I reviewed the letter of March 3rd. Question: And was that meant to supplement the record on the Bond question? Answer: [Pause.] On which question? Question: On Senator Bond s question about the contacts and elaborate and ex pand the record as you just discussed was the intention of you and Mr. Altman to do? Ms. STRAUSS. I am confused about what question we are talking about- What question by Senator Bond and the contacts? Mr. CODINHA. The one we played- 519 Ms. STRAUSS. On how the White House was notified of the criminal referrals? Mr. Codinha resuming: Question: Yes. Answer: The March 3rd letter? Question: Yes. Answer- No. Question: And the March 11th letter, did you review and sign off on that one? Answer: No. Question: Did you ever attempt to supplement the record any more than you've described today? Answer- No. As I've stated, I expected there to he a full review of the transcript. I had understood from Mr. Harris on two occasions that there were going to be additional questions that were going to be furnished. I expected that both the record would be reviewed and additional questions received, and the record completed in full quickly. But because of the intervening events, that didn't happen. Question: And the "intervening events" you're describing are the Grand Jury's notification of subpoena? Answer: In particular, yes. And also Secretary Bentsen's commencement of Question: The OGE Answer [continuing): for the OGE investigation. Mr. CODINHA. I have no farther questions. Joe, do you want to inquire? And I take it that's the entire transcript. There's more transcript, but that's what we have transcribed at this time. Senator BOXER. Mr. Chairman, as the person who really asked the staff to do this, I want to say I'm extremely grateful to the staff for both sides, Legal Counsel, the staff, the court reporters because I think it's very important for Mr. 39999Altman and for Ms. Hanson that this be put in the record tonight, and I do appreciate, and I want to say to Mr. DAmato thank you, and thank you, Mr. Chairman, for doing this. A human life is at stake here in a lot of ways. Senator DAMATO. I am pleased we put so much into this. I don't think we have to read it all because the Chairman went to extraordinary lengths, but I would hope that he would have the balance entered in because I think it gives a full picture and I don't intend to editorialize. Senator BOXER. I so move we put the balance in the record. The CHAIRMAN. Absolutely. Senator KERRY. I want to ask the Counsel whether the question was asked why the letter didn't mention future information? Senator DODD. I'M sorry, John? Senator KERRY. Did the letter-was the question asked about Codinha, all the questions that were asked were right here? I thought more was to come. Codinha, I can't recall what he says. The CHAIRMAN. We'll have to see that tomorrow morning. We've gone as far as we can go this evening. I think we've had a full day by any measure, and I want to thank the staff particularly for their hard work and for the quick turnaround on this deposition. The Committee stands in recess. We'll resume tomorrow morning at 9:30 a.m. in this room. (01:37:12) [Whereupon, at 1:40 a.m., the hearing was adjourned, to reconvene at 9:30 a.m., on Friday, August 5, 1994.1 (01:40:07)(tape #10103 ends)
Whitewater Hearings August 1, 1994 - Part 1
(11:30:30) Ms. KULKA. Mr. Stephens wasn't hired. The firm of Pillsbury, Madison, and Sutro was hired. In connection with identifying an appropriate law firm to handle this, the Senior Counsel identified four law firms-I don't remember the names of the others-who had experience in complex, sensitive litigation who might be able to handle it. The Senior Counsel asked for bids, asked who had legal services agreements with us where their rates were fixed, and asked for them to provide proposals or bids which would describe cost factors, expertise, and so on. In the course of doing that, the Pillsbury firm identified the personnel, as they must, to comply with our regulations, who might work on the matter. They identified a number of people, including three partners. The lead partner was clearly going to be a person who had handled other high-profile, sensitive matters, and that was a man named Mr. Patterson. Another partner they identified to work on the matter was Jay Stephens who, my staff advised me, was the immediate former U.S. Attorney in Washington who had been appointed by a Republican. Senator SASSER. All right. Ms, KuLKA. If I just might add one more thought. Senator SASSER, Sure. Ms. KULKA. I came -to Washington in the middle of January and, in fact, in the middle of a snowstorm. I do not recollect ever having beard of who Mr. Stephens was before in the North. I knew nothing about the controversial nature of remarks he bad made or who he was, other than what my staff told me. Senator SASSER. The firm of which Mr. Stephens was a partner was hired the same day, I think, that Secretary Altman testified before this Committee. Isn't that true? Ms. KULKA. I really have never looked at the (lay the en gagement letter was signed. They were identified before, and may have even started to work before then. Senator SASSER. The point I'm diiving at is this. Mr. Jay Stephens' law firm was hired at a time before Secretary Altman 18 recused himself and the Jay Stephens law firm was hired in the ordinary course of business of fhe Resolution Trust Corporation, because it met the objective criteria of the agency, I presume. Ms. KuLKA. That's correct. Senator SASSER. So, if Mr. Altman had wanted to act as a tool of the Administration to kill the Madison case, it would have not been very wise to retain the services of the Jay Stephens law firm, it? would . Ms. KuLKA. Mr. Altman never had any role in the selection of counsel and be never tried to. Senator SASSER. Right. That's the point I'm trying to make, Ms. Kulka, and I thank you for making it. Mr. Roelle, is it your testimony that in October 1993, Mr. Altman told Ms. Hanson, the General Counsel -for the Treasury Department, in your presence to go tell Mr. Nussbaum, the Counsel for the White House, about the press leaks that might be attendant to the proposed criminal referrals to the Justice Department? STATEMENT OF WILLIAM H. ROELLE, FORMER SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER, RESOLUTION TRUST CORPORATION, WASHINGTON, DC Mr. ROELLE. I surmise that. He didn't say it that way, Senator. He instructed her to tell a number of people about the impending news release on this matter and be mentioned the name Bernie, along with several other names. He did not say Mr. Nussbaum. Senator SASSER. Did you make that surmise there that day when Mr. Altman allegedly made this communication to Ms. Hanson? Mr. ROELLE. No, sir. I didn't even think about it until actually it was later when I was thinking about it that I realized it could have been Mr. Nussbaum. I remarked to my wife that night it's possible that's who he meant, although I do not know. All I know is that be said Bernie. Senator SASSER. Did you make the connection that it might be Mr. Nussbaum after the meeting with Mr. Altman and Ms. Hanson? Mr. ROELLE. Yes, sir. Senator SASSER, That's curious that it wouldn't occur to you until after the meeting. In other words, he referred to Bernie in the meeting, but it was not until after the meeting that it occurred to you that he might be talking about the White House Counsel, Mr. Nussbaum. Mr. ROELLE. No, I don't think it was curious at all. I had seen something on the press that night about Bernie Nussbaum and it occurred to me at that point that's who be might have meant. Senator SASSER. Mr. Roelle, when it occurred to you that he might have meant Bernie Nussbaum, the Counsel for the White House, what was your reaction? Did you think it was proper for Ms. Hanson to discuss this matter with Mr. Nussbaum? Mr. RoELLE. It was a matter of a pending leak that the press bad gotten bold of. I, had self would have wished there had been no contact at all with the White House. But I made no inference one way or the other about what was appropriate in terms of a press leak.
August 2, 1994 - Part 1
(10:55:11) The CHAIRMAN. Senator Shelby, I don't want to be arbitrary in cutting you off, but we're holding everybody to the time limit. This is important and we'll come back to it. Senator SHELBY. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mack. OPENING COMMENTS OF SENATOR CONNIE MACK Senator MACK Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Steiner, I want to just continue on with a question or two. This goes back to the recusal discussion earlier. I think you were asked, a few minutes ago, why you recommended that Mr. Altman recuse himself. Mr. STEINER. That's correct. Senator MACK. I think what you said was something like the political pressure is going build. It would be better to do it now to as opposed to later. Is that close? Mr. STEINER. That's correct, Senator, Senator MACK. Were there any other reasons, in your mind, as to why he should recuse himself? Mr. STEINER. Senator, I thought that in the absence of a recusal, it would open him to possible political accusations and I wanted to prevent those accusations from occurring. Senator MACK. What kind of political accusations? Mr. STEINER. The kind that we have seen recently, that he is somehow interfering or trying to protect people through his role as interim CEO of the-RTC. Senator MACK. So it was only the appearance that concerned you, is that correct? Mr. STEINER. Senator, Mr. Altman had made it very clear on numerous occasions, both to the Treasury staff and the RTC staff, that he wanted this case handled in identical fashion to all other cases. What that meant was that at no point did he anticipate making a decision about this case or being involved in the investigation. And in the event that a decision was brought to him, he planned to follow the advice of the General Counsel. Senator MACK. Again, your concerns were not things about confidentiality, about propriety, about conflicts of interest, it was the perception, from a political point of view, as to how it would be received? Mr. STEINER. That's correct, Senator. As I said, Mr. Altman made it very clear that he wanted this case handled in an identical fashion. Senator MACK. I appreciate that. I just wanted to get a clear statement of what your thinking was. Mr. DeVore, I too wanted to welcome you back to the Senate, to this Committee. Calling our attention to the meeting you attended at the White House with Ms. Jean Hanson on October 14, 1993, it is my understanding that this was supposed to be a meeting to discuss press leaks, that is, stories that were likely to appear in the next few days on Madison. Is that correct? Mr. DEVORE. Senator, that wasn't my understanding. My understanding was that when I received the call from the reporter, and 345 I sent word out that the reporter had called me and what he told me, that it was a meeting convened primarily to listen to my account of what the reporter had to say. I was not aware of any stories that were imminent. Senator MACK. Did you set up the meeting? Mr. DEVORE. Not in my recollection, I did not. Senator MACK. Do you have any idea who did? Mr. DEVORE. I do not. Senator MACK. This was a meeting then, to discuss a press inquiry? Mr. DEVORE. Let me not speak to the purpose of the meeting; let me speak only to why I thought I was going to the meeting. I thought I was going to the meeting to tell the White House something I didn't know the knew, and that is that this reporter for a major newspaper had a lot of information on an investigation being conducted by the RTC. Senator MACK. So you were surprised then at what you beard at the meeting? Mr. DEVORE. There were one or two surprises, yes, sir. Senator MACK. What were those surprises? Mr. DEVORE. Well, one of the things I learned is that a couple of other reporters bad been talking to the White House about this matter. I had not been aware of that. Senator MACK. But you thought you were going there to give them information? Mr. DEVORE. Yes, sir. Senator MACK. Do you remember who was at the meeting? Mr. DEVORE. Yes, sir. From the Treasury, it was Jean Hanson, Josh Steiner, and me. From the White House, it was Bernard Nussbaum, Bruce Lindsay, , Mark Geron, and there were some other people whose names I didn't know who were in and out of the meeting. Senator MACK. The point was that most of those people, as I understand it, were attorneys doesn't say anything about what the meeting was all about? Mr. DEVORE. I don't understand your question. Senator MACK. I was under the impression, frankly, that this was a meeting that was called for the purposes of discussing press inquiries. I bad just assumed that it was going to be a meeting of press types and was surprised when I saw the list of people who were there. It seemed like it was a group of attorneys.
August 2, 1994 - Part 1
(10:55:11) The CHAIRMAN. Senator Shelby, I don't want to be arbitrary in cutting you off, but we're holding everybody to the time limit. This is important and we'll come back to it. Senator SHELBY. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mack. OPENING COMMENTS OF SENATOR CONNIE MACK Senator MACK Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Steiner, I want to just continue on with a question or two. This goes back to the recusal discussion earlier. I think you were asked, a few minutes ago, why you recommended that Mr. Altman recuse himself. Mr. STEINER. That's correct. Senator MACK. I think what you said was something like the political pressure is going build. It would be better to do it now to as opposed to later. Is that close? Mr. STEINER. That's correct, Senator, Senator MACK. Were there any other reasons, in your mind, as to why he should recuse himself? Mr. STEINER. Senator, I thought that in the absence of a recusal, it would open him to possible political accusations and I wanted to prevent those accusations from occurring. Senator MACK. What kind of political accusations? Mr. STEINER. The kind that we have seen recently, that he is somehow interfering or trying to protect people through his role as interim CEO of the-RTC. Senator MACK. So it was only the appearance that concerned you, is that correct? Mr. STEINER. Senator, Mr. Altman had made it very clear on numerous occasions, both to the Treasury staff and the RTC staff, that he wanted this case handled in identical fashion to all other cases. What that meant was that at no point did he anticipate making a decision about this case or being involved in the investigation. And in the event that a decision was brought to him, he planned to follow the advice of the General Counsel. Senator MACK. Again, your concerns were not things about confidentiality, about propriety, about conflicts of interest, it was the perception, from a political point of view, as to how it would be received? Mr. STEINER. That's correct, Senator. As I said, Mr. Altman made it very clear that he wanted this case handled in an identical fashion. Senator MACK. I appreciate that. I just wanted to get a clear statement of what your thinking was. Mr. DeVore, I too wanted to welcome you back to the Senate, to this Committee. Calling our attention to the meeting you attended at the White House with Ms. Jean Hanson on October 14, 1993, it is my understanding that this was supposed to be a meeting to discuss press leaks, that is, stories that were likely to appear in the next few days on Madison. Is that correct? Mr. DEVORE. Senator, that wasn't my understanding. My understanding was that when I received the call from the reporter, and 345 I sent word out that the reporter had called me and what he told me, that it was a meeting convened primarily to listen to my account of what the reporter had to say. I was not aware of any stories that were imminent. Senator MACK. Did you set up the meeting? Mr. DEVORE. Not in my recollection, I did not. Senator MACK. Do you have any idea who did? Mr. DEVORE. I do not. Senator MACK. This was a meeting then, to discuss a press inquiry? Mr. DEVORE. Let me not speak to the purpose of the meeting; let me speak only to why I thought I was going to the meeting. I thought I was going to the meeting to tell the White House something I didn't know the knew, and that is that this reporter for a major newspaper had a lot of information on an investigation being conducted by the RTC. Senator MACK. So you were surprised then at what you beard at the meeting? Mr. DEVORE. There were one or two surprises, yes, sir. Senator MACK. What were those surprises? Mr. DEVORE. Well, one of the things I learned is that a couple of other reporters bad been talking to the White House about this matter. I had not been aware of that. Senator MACK. But you thought you were going there to give them information? Mr. DEVORE. Yes, sir. Senator MACK. Do you remember who was at the meeting? Mr. DEVORE. Yes, sir. From the Treasury, it was Jean Hanson, Josh Steiner, and me. From the White House, it was Bernard Nussbaum, Bruce Lindsay, , Mark Geron, and there were some other people whose names I didn't know who were in and out of the meeting. Senator MACK. The point was that most of those people, as I understand it, were attorneys doesn't say anything about what the meeting was all about? Mr. DEVORE. I don't understand your question. Senator MACK. I was under the impression, frankly, that this was a meeting that was called for the purposes of discussing press inquiries. I bad just assumed that it was going to be a meeting of press types and was surprised when I saw the list of people who were there. It seemed like it was a group of attorneys.
August 2, 1994 - Part 2
(10:55:00)(tape #10066 begins) a "tortured" day to describe the day? That was a tough day, was it not? 344 Mr. STEINER. It was a tough day, Senator, that's correct. (10:55:11) The CHAIRMAN. Senator Shelby, I don't want to be arbitrary in cutting you off, but we're holding everybody to the time limit. This is important and we'll come back to it. Senator SHELBY. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mack. OPENING COMMENTS OF SENATOR CONNIE MACK Senator MACK Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Steiner, I want to just continue on with a question or two. This goes back to the recusal discussion earlier. I think you were asked, a few minutes ago, why you recommended that Mr. Altman recuse himself. Mr. STEINER. That's correct. Senator MACK. I think what you said was something like the political pressure is going build. It would be better to do it now to as opposed to later. Is that close? Mr. STEINER. That's correct, Senator, Senator MACK. Were there any other reasons, in your mind, as to why he should recuse himself? Mr. STEINER. Senator, I thought that in the absence of a recusal, it would open him to possible political accusations and I wanted to prevent those accusations from occurring. Senator MACK. What kind of political accusations? Mr. STEINER. The kind that we have seen recently, that he is somehow interfering or trying to protect people through his role as interim CEO of the-RTC. Senator MACK. So it was only the appearance that concerned you, is that correct? Mr. STEINER. Senator, Mr. Altman had made it very clear on numerous occasions, both to the Treasury staff and the RTC staff, that he wanted this case handled in identical fashion to all other cases. What that meant was that at no point did he anticipate making a decision about this case or being involved in the investigation. And in the event that a decision was brought to him, he planned to follow the advice of the General Counsel. Senator MACK. Again, your concerns were not things about confidentiality, about propriety, about conflicts of interest, it was the perception, from a political point of view, as to how it would be received? Mr. STEINER. That's correct, Senator. As I said, Mr. Altman made it very clear that he wanted this case handled in an identical fashion. Senator MACK. I appreciate that. I just wanted to get a clear statement of what your thinking was. Mr. DeVore, I too wanted to welcome you back to the Senate, to this Committee. Calling our attention to the meeting you attended at the White House with Ms. Jean Hanson on October 14, 1993, it is my understanding that this was supposed to be a meeting to discuss press leaks, that is, stories that were likely to appear in the next few days on Madison. Is that correct? Mr. DEVORE. Senator, that wasn't my understanding. My understanding was that when I received the call from the reporter, and 345 I sent word out that the reporter had called me and what he told me, that it was a meeting convened primarily to listen to my account of what the reporter had to say. I was not aware of any stories that were imminent. Senator MACK. Did you set up the meeting? Mr. DEVORE. Not in my recollection, I did not. Senator MACK. Do you have any idea who did? Mr. DEVORE. I do not. Senator MACK. This was a meeting then, to discuss a press inquiry? Mr. DEVORE. Let me not speak to the purpose of the meeting; let me speak only to why I thought I was going to the meeting. I thought I was going to the meeting to tell the White House something I didn't know the knew, and that is that this reporter for a major newspaper had a lot of information on an investigation being conducted by the RTC. Senator MACK. So you were surprised then at what you beard at the meeting? Mr. DEVORE. There were one or two surprises, yes, sir. Senator MACK. What were those surprises? Mr. DEVORE. Well, one of the things I learned is that a couple of other reporters bad been talking to the White House about this matter. I had not been aware of that. Senator MACK. But you thought you were going there to give them information? Mr. DEVORE. Yes, sir. Senator MACK. Do you remember who was at the meeting? Mr. DEVORE. Yes, sir. From the Treasury, it was Jean Hanson, Josh Steiner, and me. From the White House, it was Bernard Nussbaum, Bruce Lindsay, , Mark Geron, and there were some other people whose names I didn't know who were in and out of the meeting. Senator MACK. The point was that most of those people, as I understand it, were attorneys doesn't say anything about what the meeting was all about? Mr. DEVORE. I don't understand your question. Senator MACK. I was under the impression, frankly, that this was a meeting that was called for the purposes of discussing press inquiries. I bad just assumed that it was going to be a meeting of press types and was surprised when I saw the list of people who were there. It seemed like it was a group of attorneys.
August 2, 1994 - Part 3
(13:05:45) Mr. FOREMAN. I've seen information recently as all of the hearings and things are join& on. I can tell you in February, while we were working on the legal analysis, I knew of no such views. Senator MURRAY. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Let me say we have time, I think, just before our break to accomodate the two Senators that have not yet asked questions. Senator DODD. What your plans would be then is to terminate with this plan or can those of us who have some different points come back to this panel? 369 The CHAIRMAN. Let me seek guidance from the Committee. flow many Members have additional questions for any of the members of this panel? Senator Dodd and Senator Shelby. Anybody else on this side? I will have some additional questions. Senator DAmato, Senator Faircloth, Senator Roth, Senator Hatch, and then there are some Members that aren't here at the moment. So when we finish with Senator Hatch and Senator Sarbanes, well go into the recess until 2:15 p.m. We'll come back and resume at that time. We'll stay with this panel until every Senator that wishes to ask questions has had the chance to do so, proceeding in the same fashion, and then we'll dismiss this panel. And at at point, then, we'll go to Mr. Altman. So that will be our order. Senator Hatch. OPENING COMMENTS OF SENATOR ORRIN G. HATCH Senator HATCH. Thanks, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Steiner, after Roger returned from the February 2 meeting at the White House, he stopped by your office and told you that Bernard Nussbaum, the White House Counsel, did not agree with Mr. Altman's plans to recuse himself from the Madison Guaranty matter; is that right? I think you testified to that. Mr. STEINER. He said that Mr. Nussbaum, I believe, had made strong arguments as to why recusal was not the best course of action. Senator HATCH. Mr. Altman also told you Mr. Nussbaum believed that the Madison Guaranty matter would be handled more fairly if Mr. Altman remained involved; is that right? Mr. STEINER. I believe he said to me that Mr. Nussbaum's belief was that the RTC bad a reputation as being a partisan institution, and that be was eager to ensure that this investigation be carried out in a completely impartial, nonpartisan fashion. Senator HATCH. You understood from Mr. Altman that Mr. Nussbaum thought that the RTC might well be too tough in the Madison Guaranty case if Mr. Altman were involved. Mr. STEINER. I do not recall Senator HATCH. Were not involved. Excuse me. Mr. STEINER. I do not recall Mr. Altman ever saying that to me, no. Senator HATCH. Do you recall Mr. Altman stating that Mr. Nussbaum was particularly concerned that a new RTC General Counsel, Ellen Kulka, was tough and tenacious? Mr. STEINER. I have no recollection of that, no. Senator HATCH. Mr. Steiner, let me jump ahead to the week of February 14. You first learned sometime during this week that the RTC had hired Jay Stephens and his law firm Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro, as Outside Counsel in the Madison Guaranty case; right? Mr. STEINER. That's correct, Senator. Senator HATCH. And you learned this in a telephone call from the White House; is that right? Mr. STEINER. From either Mr. Podesta or Mr. Stern, I believe. Senator HATCH. From either Podesta or Todd Stern. John Podesta was the Assistant to the President at that time; right, and Todd Stem worked with Mr. Podesta? Mr. STEINER. That's correct. 370 Senator HATCH. Now, you understood at the time that Mr. Podesta, was to use your terms, "the point of contact" at the White House for all Whitewater-related matters; right? Mr. STEINER. That's correct. Senator HATCH. Do you remember now, which one called you? Mr. STEINER. No, I do not. Senator HATCH. Either Mr. Podesta or Mr. Stern was very upset at the time that the RTC had hired Jay Stephens; is that right? Mr. STEINER. I actually do not recall them speaking in particularly upset tones. I recall them asking me a question. Senator HATCH. They were not happy with it. Mr. STEINER. No, they were not. Senator HATCH. And you were also shocked by the news, as I understand it. Mr. STEINER. I was certainly surprised, Senator. Senator HATCH. And either Podesta or Stern asked you to inquire how Jay Stephens had been hired? Mr. STEINER. That's correct. Senator HATCH. You agreed to do so? Mr. STEINER. That's correct. Senator HATCH. You determined from Jean Hanson or her assistant, Robin Gross, that Jay Stephens had been hired through ordinary RTC hiring procedures? Mr. STEINER. That's correct. Senator HATCH. You also learned that Ellen Kulka was responsible for- the decision to hire Mr. Stephens? Mr. STEINER. I do not recall learning that, no, Senator. Senator Hatch. Let me focus on the events of Fe bruary 25 Let me just first ask you to read aloud the portion of your diary beginning with the phrase "after Howell Raines" and ending with 'Xincredibly stupid and improper." If you could read that for us. Mr. STEINER. After Howell Raines from The New York Times called to say they were going to write a brutal editorial, Mr. Altman decided to recuse himself Do you want me to read verbatim?
Capital Journal - Federal Budget and City Programs
(20:02:00) WETA logo, PBS funding credits (20:00:15) Opens to footage of Speaker of the House TIP O'NEILL presiding over a vote rejecting the President's budget, quick display of the Senate and House vote counts on Reagan's budget, shot of Republican Congressmen - including NEWT GINGRICH walking out on a round table meeting of the House Administration Committee, long shot of the White House, President RONALD REAGAN in a national address from the oval office calls on the American people for support of his budget, several quick shots of New Orleans - old street with lines of second floor terraces, shots of young people walking and playing on sidewalks in housing project, New Orleans mayor surrounded by entourage in speech says the proposed budget will not work for the city (20:01:21) Capital Journal host HODDING CARTER in tv studio introduces program (20:01:29) Capital Journal title screen and animation (20:01:38) In studio Carter explains shows topic - the 1986 budget, during explanation graphics illustrate the rapid sharp increase of the national debt and the reduction of the national deficit by proposed budget plans (20:03:15) Segment on social security - medium shot of senior citizens seated outside a grocery store on a bench, various shots of senior citizens shopping in grocery store - one shot shows several seniors in line at the check out with one lady paying cashier for her groceries, shot of seniors playing cards outside - they are seated in lawn chairs, shot of old man feeding pigeons, shot of several old people walking on the sidewalk (20:03:52) Back in studio Carter speaks with DONALD W. MORAN Executive Assistant Director at the Office of Management and Budget about the proposed budget (20:05:50) Segment on New Orleans - nice montage of shots of Bourbon Street - happy tourists walk down the center of the street, various signs - many of them neon - for bars, clubs, and strip joints, a jazz band performs on stage with a trumpet soloing, a Bourbon street sign, long shot of city from across bay of water at twilight, shot of the New Orleans dock, shot of the Super Dome, the New Orleans Symphony applauded after performance, shot of defunct world's fair ground, shot of old paddle boat passing a huge barge going the opposite way up stream (20:07:01) PBS reporter ANDREA FLEISCHER on a quaint New Orleans street with a Southern mansion behind her explains New Orleans economic woes, a street trolley cruises the streets of New Orleans, b/w footage of President LYNDON JOHNSON signing the Civil Rights Act in front of a large audience, clip of Johnson at podium urging for funds to rebuild American cities, in speech President RICHARD NIXON claims to have renewed American cities, quick clip of President JIMMY CARTER speaking, aerial shot of New Orleans downtown, comments of MOON LANDRIEU former New Orleans mayor on federal funding of the city, city councilman BRIAN WAGNER criticizes federal funding, another aerial downtown New Orleans shot, more footage of barges on water, aerial shots of oil rigs off New Orleans' coast, shots of a couple of old Southern mansions surrounded by gates in the city, shot of poor people waiting outside doorway, quick shot of teacher teaching public school class, shots of new down town development and renovation, SCOTT DITCH of the Rouse Company explains why they are able to renovate the New Orleans' world fair ground (20:10:46) Shots of a rally on the steps of the Capital to protest domestic spending cuts, New Orleans mayor DUTCH MORIAL speaks out against proposed budgets that he says will damage city economies, shots of the construction of an apartment complex in New Orleans, comments of HENRY LAMBERT - apartment complex developer (20:12:08) Footage of a housing project in New Orleans - various shots of adults and kids hanging around and playing outside the project buildings, State legislator JOHN JACKSON visits the housing project - his former home - and recieves a warm welcome from residents, Legislator Jackson says funding cuts are "the height of insensitivity", footage of an elderly man picking up a check from a Catholic charity - he smokes a cigarette as he waits inside the charity building and says social security has not been helping him, further comments of Moon Ladrieu (20:13:25) Footage of a class reunion of the McGee (?) Girls school - an affluent white private school - shots of giggling women socializing within a circle, MUZZIE LABOUISSE - school director criticizes federal funding of cities - calling the needy undeserving, comments of J. PETER LABOUISSE on the inability to fund city social programs (20:14:18) More shots of New Orleans tourists riding horse and carriage and street trolley - at the back of street trolley a man plays jazz saxophone (20:14:40) Back in tv studio Carter introduces second guest - St. Paul Minnesota Mayor GEORGE LUTIMER - he and guest Donald Moran talk about federal funding of city programs (20:17:55) Carter introduces Senator PHIL GRAMM and Senator ERNEST HOLLINGS - they join the discussion group from Capital Hill and are broadcast in the studio on a large monitor - the group discusses federal budget priorities (20:26:00) Carter thanks guests and closes out show (20:26:30) Credits roll over footage of jazz band playing New Orleans club (20:27:33) PBS funding credits
August 4, 1994 - Part 13
(00:20:23) Senator KERRY. Now, ethically, my other colleagues have talked about some of that, and I point, as they have, to a very, very clear statement in your own standard that you have read to this Con,. mittee tonight, and this morning. The standard you gave us is it will result in an appearance of conflict. Now you cite to us these other groups that have made a finding. I've read every one of their statements. I found them wanting. Because they, like you, stuck with-just stuck to the legalese and this is not a business just about legalese. You know, some Senators refuse PAC money. Some Senators don't take gifts. Some Senators never took honoraria. The law didn't require it, but people perceived what you have cited as a higher standard. I respectfully say to you that not to have been sensitive, ethically, to both the friendship, and no one has mentioned this, but also to the fact that everybody in this town talked about Mr. Altman as potential future Secretary of the Treasury. For him to walk into the White House after everyone he talked to had helped him make up his mind to recuse himself and it was their opinion and his that he should recuse himself, you should have said Roger, fine, it's your decision. But no, you're sitting here saying I kept telling him the bottom line was it was his decision, but a whole bunch of stuff comes in between from his boss, from his White House. So any sensitive employee to the future is going to be saying well, gee, they don't really want me to do this. Now, Senator Shelby said to you it was a mauling. I'm not going to characterize it as a mauling. I don't know what it was. All I know is this public employee had made up his mind to recuse himself. The people who worked for him thought he was going there to do it, He went in there to do it and he told you he was doing it and he came out of there not doing it. That's the bottom line. That's the bottom line. I agree with the Chairman, you should not have done anything. Instead, there was a different opinion. Then, ultimately, this man, after all of this notion of accepting sworn duty, recused himself for The New York Times editorial boy, Howell Rains. Mr. NUSSBAUM. That's right. That's right. Senator KERRY. So this is a serious issue here for this Committee to think about what happened in the context of politics, the ethics, and sort of the legal reasoning that you've given us. Mr. NUSSBAUM. Doesn't that show, Senator, why he recused himself? Senator KERRY. Beg your pardon? Mr. NUSSBAUM. When he recused himself in a conversation with Howell Rains of The New York Times, doesn't that really show Senator KERRY. It shows a lot of things. Mr. NUSSBAUM. It shows that he didn't want the public relations heat that would come from acting in this matter and, Senator Senator KERRY. Mr. Nussbaum, that is where you are ethically failing here because we live with public relations heat every day. It's the bread and butter of our life. 501 Mr. NUSSBAUM. Right, and you should take it. Senator KERRY. And it is a reflection of the public which is what this country is all about. What happened, in this case, is you were dealing with legalese and not a sensitivity to how the public would perceive this, which is ultimately what motivated him to react, which is ultimately what keeps this country straight and true as a democracy. Mr. NUSSBAUM. Senator, you and I have a profound philosophical difference here. Senator KERRY. If you think you could ram down the throats of Americans the notion that there was not somehow an appearance of a problem in his being there given the fact that he had this close relationship, then I think you are just missing the standard by which we're living in this community today. Mr. NUSSBAUM. I'm missing it, the OGE is missing it, his ethics advisors are missing it Senator KERRY. No, because I'll tell you what, if you read the OGE report, the OGE report specifically said they could not rule as to Mr. Altman's behavior with respect to the September 29th transfer and they only ruled, if you'll read page 2, as to the Treasury employees, not the White House employees. Don't throw that report at me again. Mr. NUSSBAUM. Senator Senator KERRY. That's what it says. Mr. NUSSBAUM. It says what it says, Senator, Senator KERRY. I'll read it to you. Could I have the report, please? I mean, let's-you know, you want to say it says what it says. Let me read it to you. Page 2, second paragraph: Because your authority as Secretary of the Treasury relates to employees of the Department, the report of the Inspectors General is necessarily focused upon the activities of officials of the Treasury Department. For that reason our analysis is not intended to cover, nor should it in any way reflect upon, the actions of individuals who are employed by the White House. We could put that in the record at this point.
August 2, 1994 - Part 10
(01:40:47) Mr. ALTMAN. I did, yes, Senator. Senator BOXER. And when Bernie Nussbaum was grumpy about Ellen Kulka and said something to the effect of, you know, she's tough and maybe we better not-maybe she can 't be trusted or words to that effect, you kept her in her place and you defended her, did you not? Mr. ALTMAN. Yes, Senator, Senator BOXER. Did you not defend her to Mr. ALTMAN. I told him I had confidence in her. Senator BOXER. Sorry? 531 Mr. ALTMAN. I told him I had confidence in her. Senator BOXER. You did. So if you were to "please" Mr. Nussbaum, you certainly wouldn't have, it seems to me, defended her. You recommended a Republican to head the RTC; is that correct? Mr. ALTMAN. Yes. senator BOXER. You spoke to some people up here about that individual? Mr. ALTMAN. Yes, Senator. Senator BOXER. Is that correct? You took no action to stop the hiring of Republican Jay Stephens as Outside Counsel of the RTC; is at correct? Mr. ALTMAN. That's correct. senator BOXER, Even after you were called by a couple of folks at the White House and they complained about Mr. Stephens and they explained to you that be, Mr. Stephens, had been very harshly critical of the President, you said it's a done deal, didn't you? Mr. ALTMAN. Yes, Senator. Senator BOXER. Did you say you'd look into it? Mr. ALTMAN. No, I did not. Senator BOXER. Did you say you were stunned by it? Mr. ALTMAN. No. Senator BOXER. Did you talk to Ms. Kulka about getting rid of Mr. Stephens? Mr. ALTMAN. No, I didn't. senator BOXER. Did you chastise her for that? Mr. ALTMAN. No, I didn't chastise her. I thought it was kind of vintage Ellen. Senator BOXER. It was vintage Ellen. Did you tell the staff at the RTC to treat Madison as they would any other case? Mr. ALTMAN. Yes, Senator, I did. Senator BOXER. Because Mr. Roelle said that. Ms. Kulka said it. And Mr. Ryan said it. They all said it. Ms. Hanson said it. You briefed Republican Senators and Congresspeople on this issue just about the same time you briefed the White House on the procedure: is that correct, in letters and so on? Mr. ALTMAN. I responded to the inquiries that were coming to me, Yes. Senator BOXER. The recusal to take yourself out of the Madison case, that was your idea, was it not? Mr. ALTMAN. Yes, it was. Senator BOXER. Initially? Mr. ALTMAN. Yes, it was. Senator BOXER. And. in the face of White House Counsel, I'll call it disapproval grumpiness, agitation, excitement, you eventually recused yourself, did you not? Mr. ALTMAN. Yes, I did. Senator BOXER, Now, Ms. Hanson told you at the February 24 Senate hearing when you turned around to her, did she not tell you that your testimony was complete vis-a-vis the meetings and, that You were correct to say there were no other meetings; is that correct? Mr. ALTMAN, She confirmed that my response to Senator Bond on that question was the right one. 532 Senator BOXER. So when we saw her on that tape shaking her head no, you said were there any other meetings, and basically that's what you said, she said no. Mr. ALTMAN. Yes. Senator BOXER. Now, I personally fault Ms. Hanson for not get ting the transcript. She tells us she knew they had to be corrected, but somehow this woman, who is of very high caliber, couldn't figure out a way to get the transcript and doesn't make the corrections but didn't she sign off on your corrections? Mr. ALTMAN. She signed off on the letter I sent to Senator Riegle on March 2, and, I think, the March 3 letter. Senator BOXER. When she signed off on that, did she say, but Mr. Altman, this isn't right or Roger, we need to do more? Mr. ALTMAN. No. Senator BOXER. Mr. Altman, do you feel it would have been bet'ter if you bad not had that briefing at the White House? Mr. ALTMAN. In hindsight, it should have been done in writing Senator BOXER. In hindsight, it should have been done in writ- ing, just as you did to Members of this Committee, other Senators, and Congresspeople. That's your view at this point? Mr. ALTMAN. Yes, although if any Senator had called me, I would have given him the information right over the phone if I had it. it was generic. Senator BOXER. Mr. Ryan came to Senator DAmato's office and briefed him personally so obviously the RTC was willing to do that. And now that you know all about these other meetings where the criminal referrals were discussed in terms of a press leak you think it would have been better, even though you didn't know about them, that they hadn't taken place at all? Mr. ALTMAN. Yes. We've said that. I agree with it. Senator BOXER. And you think it would have been better if you went with your gut and had recused yourself because in your heart you didn't feel perfectly good about it-and that was a noble thing-you should have gone with it and you agree with that now. Mr. ALTMAN. I should have done that initially. I know it has created a great big uproar and I regret that. I wish I hadn't. But I did recuse myself.
August 1, 1994 - Part 3
(14:01:05) Mr. RYAN. I have not seen that report. I haven't had an opportunity to review it in depth. Senator BOND. Let me ask you another way. Were you to have' an exception that said if there was a prospective leak or a possible press inquiry, would that not open you to disclosure of every piece of confidential information? Mr. RYAN. It would. Senator BOND. Excuse me, let the record say that Mr. RYAN. It would. Senator BOND. -Mr. Ryan said that it would. Because, once the press found that the RTC was a great fishing ground, you could expect Mr. Katsanos' phone to ring 24 hours a day. Is that correct? Mr. RYAN. That's correct. Senator BOND. Mr. Katsanos? Mr. KATSANOS. That is correct. The CHAiRMAN. Sounds like it's been ringing 24 hours a day. Senator BOND. I bad some questions for Mr. Roelle. The CHAIRMAN. He'll be back in just a -moment. Ile had to step away for a second. Mr, KATSANOS. Senator Bond, may I inject one point here on the question of referrals? Senator BOND. Yes. Mr. KATSANOS. Our policy is if a reporter approaches our office and has information, and in our determination very good information, about a referral, we still would not acknowledge it. Senator BOND. I thank you, sir, and I believe that makes great sense. Ms. Kulka, let me turn to you. What was it that led you to write the memo on February 4, 1994, discussing appropriate limitations on discussion? Was there a query? Was there information that came to your attention that necessitated such a memo? Ms. KULKA. I think it was partly my frustration for seeing how things operated at the RTC, especially Mr. Katsanos' Early Bird, which I believe spread information around to inappropriate people. For instance, those things are not marked confidential. They're not delivered in sealed envelopes. They are delivered to the outside inbox so anyone passing through my office, for instance, could see them. I thought they provided a lot of information or misinformation that we would neither want to deny nor admit, and that was endemic to what was going on at the RTC that caused me the kind of concerns that led me, after the discussion with Mr. Ryan, to issue this memo. Senator MACK. With respect to-was there a particular reason why that memo was written 2 days after the White House meeting? Ms. KuLKA. No. 67 Senator BOND. You did not know about the White House meeting'? Ms. KuLKA. That's correct. Senator BOND. In preparing the briefing for the February 24, 1994, appearance before the Banking Committee, did Mr. Altman or Ms. Hanson reveal to the people involved in the meeting the existence of the fall 1993 briefings to the White House? Ms. KuLKA. No. Senator Bond. That was not discussed? Ms. KuLKA. That's correct. Senator BOND. Mr. Roelle, in your first meeting with Mr. Altman, he laid down certain guidelines with respect to special measures to be taken when there were high-profile individuals affiliated with failed S&L's. Is that correct? Mr. ROELLE. The first meeting on Madison? Senator BOND. March 1993. Mr. ROELLE. Yes, sir. Senator BOND. Mr. Altman said he didn't want to read it in the paper. Mr. ROELLE. That's correct. Senator BOND. This became your standard operating procedure. You wanted to make sure he didn't read any of these things in the paper. Mr. RoELLE. That's correct. ..Senator BOND. If they involved high-profile individuals. Mr. RoELLE. That's correct. Senator BOND. Mr. Roelle, were you involved in any discussions with Mr. Altman, Ms. Hanson, Mr. Newman, or other Treasury officials in the time period of March to May 1993, on the issue of the RTC's position on extending the statute of limitations which, as you may recall, was conveyed in a reversal of policy and the letter signed May 4, 1993, by Mr. Altman, in which the RTC went on record as saying it no longer supported extension of the statute of limitations? Mr. ROELLE. Yes, I'm aware there were a number of discussions. Senator BOND. Who was involved and what was the subject of those discussions? Mr. ROELLE. It's whether-there's two issues, just so everybody understands. There's two issues relating to the statute of limitations, There's one relating to our ability to pursue cases that have wrongdoing with regard to willful intent and fraud. And then there was the issue-the later issue with regard to some of the States being in conflict with
August 1, 1994 - Part 7
(20:30:33) Senator GRAMM. I guess I'm puzzled about your role in press releases-I mean, press leaks. You're the General Counsel. I know it's Your job to be sure that people at the Treasury are complying with the law. How did you get this job, as a key input, on this press leak issue? Ms. HANSON. As I say, I was asked-I was given this information unsolicited. I understand Mr. Altman asked Mr. Roelle to give this information to me. I gave the information to Mr. Altman. He asked me to speak with Mr. Nussbaum. Mr. Nussbaum, as I stated and as I understood,' was the appropriate contact person in the White House, with respect to investigations, so he would have been the right person to talk to. Senator GRAMM. Investigations or press leaks? Ms' HANSON. This was a press leak that also related to an investigation. Senator GRAmm. At the meeting of February 2, 1994, at which Mr. Altman was present, you talked about a lot of issues. Obviously we know of the two that have been mentioned. At that meeting , to the best of your memory, did anyone ever casually, tangen- 152 tially, or in any way mention the meeting of September 29 1 or the meeting of October 14, 19939 Ms. HANSON. On February 2, 1994? Senator GRAmm. Yes. Ms. HANSON. No, sir. Senator GRAMM. A very relevant issue, it seems to me is'' Mr. Altman wrote to us on March 2, 1994. He said, "I have' le today, of two conversations which did take place between Treasury staff and the White House." He says that in his March 2, 194 letter. Now, you tell us that he told you to go to the White House for the September meeting. You have verified that this is your memo to him, after you came back, that it has your initials on it, and the kind of memo you would have written. So there were at two contacts with Mr. Altman regarding the September meeting One, he told you to go and, two, when you came back you gave this memo. Did you ever talk to him about the meeting on Sep ber 29, 1993, or the meeting on October 14, 1993? Senator GRAMM. Yes. At any time prior to his testimony? Ms. HANSON. I don't recall ever having a conversation with him about the October 14, 1993, meeting one way or the other. I don't recall having a conversation with him about the September 29, 1993, meeting, although, as I've testified, my September 30, 1993, memorandum was located. At the time that the March 2, 1994, let- ter was written, the statement that he made was consistent with my recollection at the time. We've gone over these questions. Senator GRAmm. Ms. Hanson, let me stop you right there because this is a different issue. Mr. Altman writes, here in his letter, that he has just learned "today" of these two meetings. He just' learned "today," that's what this says. You say that be sent you to the first of the two meetings, and we have a memo that you gave him telling him that you went and, basically what happened. You saw this letter, did you ever say to him, "Mr. Altman, you told me to go to the first meeting, and I sent you a memo on that meeting. How can you write a letter to this Committee of Congress, saying you just found out about it today?" Did you ever raise that issue with him? Ms. HANSON. Sir, at the time that letter was written, that statement was consistent with my recollection. I have testified that it wasn't until after that letter that I-as I worked on the process of recalling what had happened last fall-that I recalled that I had a conversation with him about it and that he sent me. It wasn't until the search for the documents, in response to the Independent Counsel's subpoena, that the September 30, 1993, memo was located, and I have no recollection, independent recollection, as I sit here now, of having written it, although it is clear to me that I did. At the time Mr. Altman wrote that letter, it was consistent with my recollection of the matter and I will tell you, that is a good ex- ample of why trying to deal with things piecemeal, rather than dealing with them in an orderly fashion, can be a problem.
August 1, 1994 - Part 8
(20:56:27)(Tape #10063 begins) They had-because they had been modified, for my use, to just talk about the statute of limitations issue, so yes, they were almost identical. Senator Mup-RAY. Would it be correct to say that information provided at the February 2, 1994, meeting was being shared elsewhere, specifically, in Congress or congressional briefings? Ms. HANSON. It's my understanding that was correct yes. Senator MURRAY. I tend to agree with my friend, Senator Bennett, who said a little earlier, 'If these meetings hadn't occurred, we wouldn't have to hold these hearings." I wish those meetings hadn't occurred, and I think my family, at this point, wishes they hadn't as well, but I understand the motivation. I think I know what it's like. I think we all do, when a press story is shaped by leaks and the inclination is to coordinate a response. If you hadn't met, we'd probably all be criticizing the Administration for being disorganized. Let me ask you the one, really, relevant question here. Have you, Ms. Hanson, ever done anything, anything whatsoever, to impede or derail an investigation at the RTC or the Department of Justice? Ms. HANSON. Never. Senator MURRAY. To be complete, are you aware of anybody who is responsible for derailing or impeding an investigation into Madison? 160 Ms. HANSON. No. Senator MURRAY. Do you know of anybody or have you yourself ever seen the criminal referrals? Ms. HANSON. I have never seen the criminal referrals. Senator MURRAY. Thank you. Mr. Chairman from MY unique perspective way down here, it seems to me that the chairs are getting empty and the yawns are getting larger so I'II yield back my time. The CHAIRMAN. Do I understand you need to take a short break? Ms. HANSON. Yes. The Chairman. I don't want your lawyer deciding it. I want you deciding it, and there's a big difference between the two. I mean, I'd gotten an indication that you needed one, but if that's his thinking not yours, we're going to continue, no disrespect to him. Ms. HANSON. Let's continue for a few minutes. The CHAiRMAN. Very good. Senator Hatch, you're re going to finish your line of questioning now. Senator HATCH. I'll try to finish this time. Ms. Hanson, when we finished before, you had called Mr. Nussbaum on February 8, 1994, and I wasn't quite sure what your answer was, but as I understand it, at the time you called him, you were of the view, personally, that the RTC civil case would not be handed over to Mr. Fiske at that time. Ms. HANSON. I don't remember what my view was, at that point, sir. I've told you what I understood from Ms. Kulka. Senator HATCH. You don't recall conveying that to Mr. Nussbaum? Ms. HANSON. I don't. Senator HATCH. You're not denying that you may have conveyed it to him at that time, are you? Ms. HANSON. I'm not denying it. I don't recall. Senator HATCH. Let me jump ahead a few weeks to February 24, 1994, the day that Mr. Altman testified before the Banking Committee. On that day, you received a call from Neil Eggleston. Is that right? Ms. HANSON. That's correct. Senator HATCH. On February 24 1994. He was an attorney in the White House Counsel's Office. Correct? Ms. HANSON. Correct. Senator HATCH. He was, then, working for Mr. Nussbaum? Ms. HANSON. Yes. Senator HATCH. And Mr. Nussbaum called to ask you whether former U.S. Attorney, Jay Stephens, was the lead outside counsel representing the RTC in the Madison Guaranty matter? Ms. HANSON. This was after the hearing on February 24, 1994, yes. Senator HATCH. It was clear to you that Mr. Eggleston viewed this as a problem, wasn't it? Ms. Hanson. He just asked me the question. Senator HATCH. He wasn't the only Administration official who complained to you about the RTC's hiring of Mr, Stephens, was he? Ms. HANSON. He was the only White House official that I spoke to about the matter. 161 Senator HATCH. But he wasn't the only one who complained to you about it, was he? Ms. HANSON. There were other people in the Treasury Department that I spoke to. Senator HATCH. Anybody else in the Administration? Ms. HANsON. In the White House, no. Senator HATCH. In fact, Joshua Steiner, the Chief of Staff to Treasury Secretary Bentsen, bad told you that be thought Ellen Kulka should be fired for hiring Stephens, hadn't he? Ms. HANSON. Yes, he did.
August 2, 1994 - Part 2
(11:15:35) Senator FAIRCLOTH. If ducking's not misleading-ducking is misleading, now what does lying do. Mr. STEINER. Senator, as I said, I have no reason to believe, nor do I believe, that Mr. Altman lied to this Committee. Senator FAIRCLOTH. But he ducked? Mr. STEINER. Senator, I think he was asked a question which be didn't anticipate. Senator FAIRCLOTH. In fact, you kind of admired his ducking because you said he ducked gracefully rather than clumsily. I mean, that's nicer ducking than kind of stumbling through a duck, to gracefully duck. Mr. Foreman. Mr. FOREMAN. Yes, Sir? Senator FAIRCLOTH. In your deposition, you testified about a conversation you bad with Beth Nolan who worked for Bill Clinton in the White House. In that conversation, you said that you told her that there was concern about the possibility of new leadership at the RTC, in other words, somebody besides Altman. You said the concern was that the new leadership might, and I quote, "come up with some off-the-wall decisions relative to the Madison civil case." Mr. Foreman, as Ethics Director, why should you care whether someone other than Roger Altman made the decision about the Madison Guaranty civil case? You're the Ethics Director. You're supposed to be grading them, not directing them. Mr. FOREMAN. Senator, excuse me. That was not my comment from my head. I was passing on something that I bad heard. Senator FAIRCLOTH. Wait a minute, what now? Who were you passing it on from? Mr. FOREMAN. To the best of my recollection, Ms. Hanson said to me, something like there was concern because the other leadership in the RTC was brand new in their positions and someone bad expressed a concern that there was no experience with the thoroughness and fairness with which they made decisions, That was the basis of the comment that I passed on to Ms. Nolan. Senator FAIRCLOTH. I would think the Ethics Director, you're somewhat of a judge. You're supposed to be setting, the example, isn't that right? 351 Mr. FOREMAN. I would like to think so. Senator FAIRCLOTH. So you're worried about passing,,, on information as to who might come up with something different would produce a different outcome from what you all were hoping for. Mr. FOREMAN. Senator, that's not what that comment goes toward. One of the factors, when one looks to decide to make a discretionary decision of whether to recuse is looking at the other people who would be making the decision if that person doesn't. It's one of the factors listed in section 5.02. 1 was merely passing on a comment that someone bad made to me. Senator FAIRCLOTH. Let me ask you another question, then, and if you'll be shorter in your answer, Mr. Foreman. In depositions, we have learned that you had a conversation with Jean Hanson who testified here yesterday for 8 hours. In that conversation, you and Jean Hanson talked of concerns that Ellen Kulka would be the one making the decisions about Madison Guarantee Yesterday, we learned that Ellen Kulka is regarded as being a tough lawyer. If you weren't trying to influence the outcome of the decision on whether to file civil cases in the Madison matter, why were you concerned about a tough lawyer being the one to make the decision? Mr. FOREMAN. I wasn't concerned at all about a tough lawyer making the decision. That was fine with me, I had no view on the question of who would be making the decision. My only interest was that somebody bad mentioned this, which is a fact related to people who would be making the decision if Roger didn't. I personally had no concern about that, and as I said before, I believed that Mr. Altman should recuse himself from this matter. Senator FAIRCLOTH. Bernard Nussbaum complained to Jean Hanson about the choice of Ellen Kulka, the person who will make the decision in the Madison matter. Nussbaum, twice, wanted to know how Kulka got hired without being cleared by him, even though the RTC is supposed to be an independent agency. The White House wanted to take the Madison Guaranty civil cases away from Ellen Kulka, and ]instead, put the decision in the hands of Robert Fiske. Why would the White House want to replace a lawyer that the think is too tough with Robert Fiske? Were they thinking he'd be softer? Mr. FOREMAN. I don't have any idea about that, Senator. I had no knowledge about that at the time, and I don't know what anyone may have been thinking who said that.
August 2, 1994 - Part 11
(00:35:18) Senator KERRY. No. You're reading from the Eggleston memorandum. Mr. BRAUNREUTHER. Yes. Page 6 and page 7, the question is on page 6. Senator DODD. Do we all have copies of this? Senator DOMENICI. So let me read this to you. This is how, I think, they perceived you, as long as-that was your role as a decisionmaker as long as you didn't recuse yourself The question posed in this memo is, and I'm going to read memo number 1: This says, "now that Mr. Altman as acting CEO of the RTC has recused himself from further involvement in the Madison Guaranty matters, who"_'who at the RTC will be the decisionmaker on whether to bring a civil action arising out of the failure of Madison Guaranty." Now, that answer reveals that you were to he the decisionmaker. And again, maybe you didn't believe that, but that's what this White House memo says. You were the decisionmaker. Mr. ALTMAN. Senator, they may have believed that, but they were wrong. Senator DOMENICI. I'm going to et to you and let you answer it. You might very well be the one that doesn't think it but they do and that accounts for the pressure. Let me read on, The answer reveals you were to be the decisionmaker until you recused yourself. Now I'm going to read from the memo that I 'have marked out as paragraph 2 and it continues on, and it says, "following his testimony before the Senate Banking Committee on Thursday, Mr. Altman recused himself as acting CEO of the RTC from any further involvement in Madison Guaranty/Whitewater matters. The top official at RTC, who will be making these decisions on Madison Guaranty, is Jack Ryan., Mr. Ryan was formerly with the Office of Thrift Supervision. He is a career official. His principal advisor will be Ellen Kulka, now General Counsel at RTC who also comes from OTS Ms. Kulka is also a career official." I And it continues on. "We intend to nominate a person for the position of CEO of the RTC within the next few weeks. We can participate"-excuse me---"we can anticipate that any person the "President nominates will be pressured to recuse from the Madisonrelated matters. If the person refuses to recuse and if that person is forced to recuse to achieve confirmation, then Jack Ryan will reMain the decisionmaker on Madison matters at RTC." Now, actually, I've been wondering where all this pressure comes ,to keep you there, and I believe this is the answer. And I'm not ,saying you necessarily believe this, but now I believe unequivocally 536 that the decisionmaker was always perceived, the one who decide whether lawsuits were filed in that 3-week period,, thatwere perceived by the White House to be that person. Now you can elaborate, Mr. ALTMAN. Well, my best understanding is that's not consistent with the testimony of the other participants in the meeting. they all said that they got the message in terms of my not playing any role in the case. I think they said that themselves. It's also not consistent with Mr. Steiner's diary where he says every- one agreed that I'd play no role in the case. And also, Senator, on February 11, the Congress of the United States extended the statute of limitations for 2 more years, made the issue completely moot on February 11. Senator DOMENICI. Mr. Mr. ALTMAN. On February 11 the 2-year extension I was not going to play any role, I was stepping down on March 30. Senator DOMENICI. You understand that on February 2 is what I'm talking about, when they talked you out of-when they talked you out of recusing yourself. On February 2, they had no idea at the White House that the statute would be extended on February 11. And let me further confirm for you something very interesting about this memo, OK? This memo was from-it was sent by Harold Ickes-this memo by Harold Ickes to the First Lady. Do you have any comment? Mr. ALTMAN. No, not really. Senator DOMENICI. Thank you. Senator KERRY. Mr. Chairman, if I could say to my friend The CHAIRMAN. Let me just indicate, Senator Moseley-Braun is next in the order and she's been waiting patiently. I want to call on her and if she wants to yield to you, she can. I don't want to Senator MOSELEY-BRAUN. I will be delighted to yield back some time after I ask MY question. I can do that, that's not a problem because I don't think--this shouldn't take too long.