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Impeachment Hearings. House Judiciary Committee, July 30, 1974. Cambodia Bombing Article of Impeachment. Delbert Latta
Impeachment Hearings. House Judiciary Committee, July 30, 1974. Cambodia Bombing Article of Impeachment. Delbert Latta (R - Ohio).
Impeachment Hearings. House Judiciary Committee, July 30, 1974. Cambodia Bombing Article of Impeachment. Lawrence Hogan
Impeachment Hearings. House Judiciary Committee, July 30, 1974. Cambodia Bombing Article of Impeachment. Lawrence Hogan (R - Maryland).
Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 24, 1974 Robert McClory Statement
Finally, the clearest and most convincing issue before us is perhaps one, which is perhaps more fundamental to our inquiry, is that of the committee subpoenas. In which we requested information from the President. Fundamental to the entire impeachment inquiry is his obligation to provide us the information we require so that we can perform our role. We do want a strong Chief Executive, but we also want a Congress which is given full recognition as well as the courts. Likewise it s essential the President respect that part of the Constitution which vests in the house the soul power of impeachment. The House judiciary committee as the designated unit of the House of Representatives is endeavoring to fulfill that role with honor and dignity consist with our responsibilities. At this particular time in our history we demand a Congress capable of exercising its law making authority, but also its power of the oversight function, which includes that of the extraordinary authority of impeachment.
Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 26, 1974 (1/2)
[00.57.23] Mr. DENNIS. Would the gentleman yield? Mr. DANIELSON. In a moment I may yield. Likewise, the fact of notice pleadings, which our counsel, Mr. Jenner. has pointed out, is clear here. The President is put on notice as to the specific types of impeachable conduct which we allege against him. This is enough to alert him, to give him notice as to what are the charges. And bear in mind that if and when this matter reaches the Senate, it will be accompanied not only by a committee report, but, of course, by the final articles of impeachment, and he will then, if he desires. have the right to make a motion for a bill of particulars or the idea being to request a greater specificity in the charges against him. Or, if some of those charges appear to be a little bit vague and uncertain as to time, and place, and manner, he can make a motion to make more specific and certain, and aided by the results of those motions, he will have a wealth of information, everything that he could possibly need to make his own defense in this case. In essence, in this case he, is in a better position simply because, and I know this cannot be charged to him at the present time, but as a practical matter, and in the real world in which we are operating, the President does have some 40 volumes of evidentiary and statistical Matter already at his disposal and in his office, and I think that unless we are to stultify commonsense we are going acknowledge that that fact. I would say this, if this committee should decide in order to lessen the concern of our colleagues on the other aisle list any specific item of -factual information in these articles, it must be couched in such language, and the committee report worded in such language that it is imminently clear that proof in the Senate would not be restricted to those specific items. Mr. DENNIS. Would the gentleman yield? Mr. SANDMAN. Would the gentleman yield? Mr. DANIELSON. I yield back to my donor. It is not my time. I yield back to Mr. Kastenmeier. Mr. COHEN. Mr. Chairman? The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Wisconsin has time remaining. Mr. KASTENMEIER. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time. Mr. COHEN. Mr. Chairman? The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Indiana is recognized for 5 Minutes. Mr. DENNIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask one question of friend from Maryland briefly, if he could give me his attention for just a moment. On the theory you advanced of your article this morning as I understood you, and am I correct that before the acts or acts of alleged agents and subordinates could be attributed to the President you would have by some means and some type of evidence to establish the existence of the policy which you allege he had adopted, is that correct? Mr. SARBANES. The acts of the subordinates have to be carrying out the policy of the President. Mr. DENNIS. Yes, and before you could prove them as against the President, you would have to first establish policy, would you not! Mr. SARBANES. Well, there is a possibility of ratification here, which I think the gentleman---- Mr. DENNIS. But before you could attribute their acts to him By your own theory, you would have to have a -policy there which They were carrying Out, isnt that right You would have to have the policy established first? Mr. SARBANES. Not if there was a ratification involved. and there could be a, ratification involved on the part of the President with respect to acts of his subordinates. Mr. DENNIS. You would have to prove a ratification then. Mr. SARBANES. Absent a ratification, there would have to be established policy. Mr. DENNIS. What the gentleman is really doing under another name, is adopting a theory Of conspiracy , isn't he? Mr. SARBANES. I asked that question this morning and while I indicated I did not tie the, article to the proof of a criminal conspiracy, I did say that the article contained elements of a conspiracy theory; Yes. Mr. DENNIS. And first by a Horn Book law you have got to prove that the conspiracy exists, before the acts of the co-conspirators are attributable to the principal. That is just elementary, is A not? Mr. SARBANES. Well the President can intrude into that conspiracy and ratify events. If that happens, then I think the gentleman recognize that those, acts are then part and parcel of' the President's responsibility. Mr. DENNIS. I suggest to the gentleman that proceeding on the. theory he is proceeding on, he better consider , if he ,has not. he may have, just, by what evidence he. is to establish this policy or conspiracy Or whatever you want, to call it, because until he does that/ the acts of these other people are not going to mean a thing, in my opinion. Now shifting to another matter, I just would like to talk about this matter of specificity for a moment. In a criminal charge, I just read the criminal rule, and that is the existing criminal rule. This 'IS least, a quasi- criminal -case, and my friend from California, Mr. Danielson, I am sure is aware of the due process clause and the very reason why we, require specificity is the exact reason why my friend from California seeks to be against it. It is for the exact purpose that a man may know what he is charged with, and that the proof may be held down indeed, to that with which he is charged. And I suggest that ordinary due process of law absolutely requires that,. Now I am not going to yield for a minute, No one contends and I do not contend certainly that you have got to plead in an indictment of the evidence by which you intend to support your specific, charge. But, you do have to say, if you are charging the man with making false and misleading statements, you do have to say in that on April 14, 1973, he did say to Henry Petersen, Assistant Attorney General of the United States, the so that he will know. He cannot be, required under the Constitution to look back over everything he may have said Sometime that somebody is now ...... [01.03.56--TAPE OUT]
Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 27, 1974 (2/2)
[01.03.57] ought to get ahold of the transcripts and look at them. The two preceding speakers forgot to relate a couple, of important events. The President of the United States, who was interested in finding out about the involvement of Haldeman and Ehrlichman his two top aides, had specifically assured Henry Petersen, the new top law enforcement officer investigating the Watergate situation, that he would not divulge any information given to him, and he said it something like this: ""You are talking only to me, and there is not, going to be anybody else in the White House staff. In other words, I am acting counsel and everything else." The President then suggested the only exception might be Moore. When Petersen expressed some reservation about information being disclosed to Mr. Moore, the President said "Let's-better keep it with me then." At that meeting Petersen supplied the President with a memorandum which he had requested on April 15 summarizing the, existing evidence that implicated Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Strachan. Later that same day, April 16, there was a telephone conversation. Even more specifically the President told Mr. Petersen this, He said; he asked Petersen if there were any developments he should know about and he reassured Petersen that, "Of course, as you know, anything you tell me, as I think I told you earlier, will not be passed on because I know the rules of the grand jury." Now, it is true that some of the information that was given to the President by Henry Petersen was not, strictly grand jury information, although as the gentleman, my friend that spoke before me said, that this was in a treacherous area. Let me just say that what the President did is significant because in examining Henry Peterson myself and this has not come Out, Henry Peterson said in his opinion there wouldn't be, anything wrong with relating the charges to the two top aides so that they would be apprised and he could get somebody else to take their place. I specifically asked if he, differentiated between the charges and tell them to take some positive course of 'action. Henry Petersen Said, "DO you mean tactics?" And here was the conversation. "Now, in light of this," and I am examining Henry Petersen, "you testified earlier this morning I think, and frankly, I agree with what you said, that it is not, improper for you, I don't think it is improper for you to divulge this to the President. What concerns me so much about this is that the President didn't seem to be revealing charges. He is stating information, and possibly even making suggestions to them what they could do." Now I am referring specifically to what the President told to two professional criminal defendants on the morning of the 17th. The President told Haldeman that the money issue was critical. "Another thing, if you could get Strachan and yourself to sit down and do some hard thinking about, what kind of strategy you are going to have with the money, you know what I mean?" And my recollection is that Mr. Haldeman said, "Yeah. "And then he goes on and he takes up after some material deleted, and he goes in to Kalmbach. "What does Kalmbach know. What is Kalmbach going to say? In addition, the President instructed Haldeman, "Well, be sure that Kalmbach is at least aware of this, that LaRue had talked very freely, He is a broken man." When Henry Petersen said he didn't think, there was anything wrong with advising of the charges, he was not talking about the President trying to get them to engage in some kind of a tactic. 'Not only was that true, he differentiated between advising even of charges to the top aides and advising Kalmbach, who had already been implicated and it was suggested to the President earlier that Kalmbach was going to have to be called as a witness. I suggest that when Henry Petersen said in response to a question by Mr. Eilberg that we were not talking about Federal Rule 6E that relates to the grand jury but we were talking about section 1503 of title 18 -which has to do with the impediment, the obstruction of the due administration of justice, and I suggest that it is up to each one Of us members to look at the facts that have been related by the President's own transcripts and make up their minds whether they think that the President was simply relating to Haldeman and Ehrlichman the charges that had been leveled against them, or whether he was telling them what they should do. Mr. HUNGATE. Would the gentleman yield, briefly? Mr. RAILSBACK. Yes, Mr. HUNGATE. I think in evaluating this testimony which you have So ably delineated that you recall the conversation of April 16, 1973, in the President's transcripts, GPO page 941, where Nixon says "Well, let me say I have got Petersen on a short leash." Ehrlichman says "OK." I thank the gentleman. Mr. RAILSBACK. That is true. Let me just say in closing, in fairness to my friend, Mr. Wiggins, who has just slipped me a note, Henry Petersen further suggested after this kind of examination that dealt with the difference between charges and tactics. and somebody like Kalmbach who is not a top aide, who he also told Haldeman to notify, he suggested it is a question for this to determine whether there - was corruption in the mind of the President. In other words, -what were the President's motives, and that is the issue. The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. All time has expired, and the question is now on the motion of the gentleman from Alabama. All those in favor of the motion please signify by saying aye. [Chorus of "ayes."] The CHAIRMAN. All those opposed? [Chorus of "noes."] The CHAIRMAN. The noes have it, the noes appear to have it and Mr. SANDMAN. On this I demand the yeas and nays. The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from New Jersey demands a rollcall vote, and the clerk will call the roll. All those in favor of the motion please signify by saying aye, and all those opposed, no. [01.09.57]
1983 - US House Floor Debate
Rep. John Murtha (D-PA) speaking during a House floor debate; regarding Republican vs Democratic House Committee membership; declines to sign a Republican petition to the Supreme Court.
Watergate Impeachment Hearings House Judiciary Committee, July 29, 1974. Vote on article II of the Donohue resolution
Watergate Impeachment Hearings House Judiciary Committee, July 29, 1974
U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee: Arab-Israeli Conflict
U.S. House Representative and Chairman of the Committee, Lawrence Fountain (D-NC), about to continue his remarks, adult Caucasian male steps in to correct him quietly. Rep. Fountain acknowledges that he got a little ahead of himself, explaining that he's not used to being the Chairman. He lets U.S. Secretary of State, George Shultz proceed with his statement. Secretary George Shultz seated at witness table with Nick Veliotis, Assistant Secretary of State for the Middle East, and Richard Fairbanks, a special representative for the Middle East; they try to figure out audio issues emanating from the microphone; adult Caucasian men and women seated in BG.
Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 27, 1974 (1/2)
[00.53.25] The CHAIRMAN. time of the gentleman from Ohio has expired. The gentleman from California, Mr. Wiggins. Mr. WIGGINS. I thank the chairman for yielding. The motion on the table is to strike the, language of the Sarbanes' substitute in subparagraph 2. That, subparagraph is directed to the withholding Of information by the President and I shall direct, my remarks to that subparagraph only. At the outset. Mr. Chairman. let's reflect what happened just a few moments ago, I think that we have pinned down absolutely that we are talking about Presidential misconduct and not the knowledge, the acts of others unless they were known to the President. Much of the material recited to us in Support of subparagraph 2 are not the acts of the President, at all but, rather, the acts of others. And I am -willing to concede that there are plenty of misdeeds by others, but, unless we attribute them to the President by the evidence they are. not relevant to this case. The evidence of Presidential action commences- Presidential knowledge commences, on -March 21, but, before I mention that, let's reflect about, some withholding prior to that time. on September 15, John Dean was up to his elbows in money payments. We all know that to be, a fact. Did he disclose, anything about, that, to the President insofar as our evidence is concerned on the conversations of September 15 ? Did he give the President any information at that time, upon which the, President could act? And the answer is no. What about, February 28? John Dean is deeply involved In a criminal conspiracy to obstruct Justice, according to John Dean, but, what, did he tell the President, speaking Of withholding on February 28? Absolutely nothing. What about March 13, now, the next, conversation with Dean? Well, there is One, on the 7th too, I will not march through these but just simply emphasize that there was some withholding here withholding by John Dean of information in his possession from the President, Upon which the President might have acted had that information been conveyed to him. Mr. SEIBERLING. Will the gentleman yield? Mr. WIGGINS. I do not. think I am going to have the time, John, and will if I do have the, time. The conversation of the 21st has to be, read in its totality, morning and afternoon, and the full context of those remarks have to be understood, I suggest to my colleagues that the clear thrust of the afternoon conversation was that. all of this information had to be presented to a grand jury. That was a Presidential decision. He had many comments indicating that that was his preferred Course of action 5 inconsistent with the concept of withholding. On March 27 the President sought out as an option the appointment of a Special Prosecutor to hear all of these factual allegations of John Dean. You recall he said we will let Judge Sirica appoint the Special Prosecutor and say, "Judge, lets go." Those are the President's words. That option was rejected not to cover up but rather was rejected at the stance and request of Henry Petersen who thought it would cast unfairly upon the ability, of the Department of Justice. You recall that on March 27 or thereabouts, the President announced as his policy, inconsistent with this withholding consent, that everybody would go to the grand jury and fully without testify claiming any privilege. You recall that in the first week of April, when John Dean was contemplating going to the, U.S. attorney, the President's instruction to John Dean was, don't lie. John, tell the truth when you go before the grand--before the U.S. attorney. That is an important event, ladies and gentlemen. Presidential knowledge that John Dean was going to tell his story and was in fact telling his story to the 'U.S. attorney commencing in the first week in April. So was Magruder Those facts were known to the President. Now, that is the truth. Thereafter, when the President is alleged to have withheld information from Henry Petersen, the head of the Criminal Division, he is Withholding information according to the argument -which Petersen knows already by reason of the revelations of John Dean and Magruder before the grand jury. In terms of withholding information, ladies and gentlemen, recall that this President made a special effort to get John Mitchell, the big enchilada, as it were, to come forward and testify freely, fully, and fairly before the grand jury. This is--- The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. [00.58.44]
Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 29, 1974 (1/2)
[00.24.11] Mr. WIGGINS. I will be happy to yield to my colleague from California for the purpose of completing his sentence. Mr. WALDIE. Well, I appreciate. that. If I--it is hard for me to complete a sentence when I want to analyze a conversation, but let me just--- Mr. WIGGINS. Do the best you can. [Laughter] . Mr. WALDIE. I appreciate that. I do appreciate that. I referred to March 21 and the conversation that I will be reading.. -will be a description of how the Ellsberg case became a national security case. The, President is told by Dean about the break-in out there and he says the President said, "I don't, know what, the hell we did that for," and Dean said, "I don't either, and the President Said, "Who in the name of God did that?"--and then move on to page 112, of the March 21 transcript and the President says, "Properly, it, has to do with the Ellsberg thing. I do not know what the hell uh"--and Haldeman says, "Well.-- The President says, "I don't know. The President says, "What is the answer on that? How do you keep that out? I don't know, -well we cant keep it out if Hunt"--"the point is, it's irrelevant." Dean says, "You might, you might put it on a national security grounds basis, which really, it was." Haldeman says, "It absolutely is." And Dean says, "And just say that--uh." The President says, "Yeah." And the--- The CHAIRMAN. The, other minute of the gentleman has expired. Mr. WALDIE. Well. I really did not finish the sentence. [Laughter.] It is a long sentence. Mr. WIGGINS. I think you have, I think you have, Mr. Chairman, how much time do we have remaining on this side? The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California has 8 minutes. Mr. WIGGINS. I will be happy to yield to my colleague from Ohio, Mr. Latta. The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Ohio is recognized for 4 minutes. Mr. LATTA. I thank the gentleman from California. This is about the longest minute we have thus far. Let me say he mentioned one conversation that I think we ought to go back to a prior conversation. His minute did not permit him to do that. And I have reference to the first, time that the President of, the United States found out about this, months after the break-in. And that is the conversations between the President and John Dean On March 17, 1974. Let's read that. Ehrlichman "And this"--and the President spoke up and said, "In connection with Hunt?" Dean says, "In connection with Hunt and Liddy both", The President inquires, "They work for him?" Dean, "They--these fellows had to be some Idiots and we have learned after the fact. They went out and went into Dr. Ellsberg's doctor's office and they had--they were geared up with all this CIA equipment, cameras and the like, they turned the stuff back in to the CIA at, some point in time and left the film In the camera," Good sleuths, I might interject. "The CIA has not put this together, and they don't know what it all means right now." And the President says, "What in the world. what in the name Of" blank "was Ehrlichman having something," and this is unintelligible, "in the Ellsberg?" This is the first time he ever heard of it months after- this had taken place. Dean says, "They were trying to--this was a part of an operation in connection with the Pentagon Papers. They were--the whole thing--they wanted to get Ellsberg's psychiatric record for some reason." President, "Well, this is the first I ever heard of this. I"-unintelligible again, and perhaps some expletives, that were not deleted-"care about Ellsberg was not our problem," and Dean says, "That is right." Now, the gentleman from Iowa has mentioned something about the FBI not getting into this case and I think we had better talk about that. It was brought out before our committee. The late J. Edgar Hoover happened to know the father-in-law of Mr. Ellsberg and the FBI was not responding to the prodding of the administration to get on With investigating these leaks to which I shall refer in considerable length when we get on general debate on the articles themselves. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time to Mr. Wiggins. Mr. WIGGINS. Mr. Chairman? The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman has 3 1/2 minutes remaining out the total. Mr. WIGGINS. May I be recognized? The CHAIRMAN. It The gentleman is recognized. Mr. WIGGINS. Mr. Chairman, it was my intention to discuss the Huston plan and to clarify for the benefit of our members the origin of that plan and to demonstrate that, it was a plan of the top people in this country recommended to the President of the United States, and he acted pursuant to their advice -and approved their plan for a period of about 4 or 5 days and thereafter canceled his prior approval upon the, recommendation of the Attorney General. I only intended to take the time on that subject because some of my colleagues seem to be concerned about that 4- or 5-day period of approval by the President of the United States in 1970. Rather in my remaining moments, Mr. Chairman, I Want to try to place this Plumbers issue in its proper focus. The question is not whether the creation of the Plumbers was justified. There is no law nor regulation nor rule nor act of Congress prohibiting the President of the United States from establishing unit within the executive branch for the purpose of coordinating intelligence activities. That is not the issue. The issue is rather whether or not the activities of that, once Created, constituted an impeachable offense with respect to the President. We know that they do not unless the President approved of them, acquiesced in them, condoned them.
Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 27, 1974 (1/2)
[00.25.17] Mr. HOGAN., Mr. Chairman? The. CHAIRMAN. I recognize the gentleman from Maryland . Mr. HOGAN.. Mr. Chairman, it seems that my good friend from New Jersey, Mr. Sandman, is carrying water on both shoulders, and I say this kindly. He subjected all of us yesterday to belabored arguments about the necessity for specificity. Now, he convinced a number of us that he is right. We should have specificity. So, what we are involved in now, is not an effort to embellish, to exaggerate the narrative material which almost all of us are familiar with in a general way. We are trying to be responsible and specifically support every item in the articles of impeachment, with not supposition, not rumor, but specific facts acts to support those charges. Now, I would have thought that the gentleman from New Jersey would be applauding this effort. Because of his eloquence yesterday he convinced us of the rightness of his arguments, so I am very surprised now that he is saying that we are just wasting our time. Mr. SANDMAN. Would the gentleman yield? Mr. MARAZITI. Would the gentleman yield? Mr. HOGAN. I will. yield to both gentlemen from New Jersey, but Mr. Sandman, whose name I used first. Mr. SANDMAN. Well, I am certainly not carrying water on both shoulders. What you are doing today is not any more definitive today than it was yesterday because, you are not adding One blessed word of clarification' to the articles of impeachment. All you are doing is rehashing the same narrative that, the public was exposed to yesterday, for a dozen hours and this is what, I think we should say. Mr. HOGAN. Well, I would say to the gentleman that I think presentation today is strikingly dissimilar to the statements made yesterday to which I personally took exception. I think that we should stick specifically to the facts and the evidence and I think that is what has been evolving here, today and I will---- Mr. MARAZITI. Will the gentleman yield? Mr. HOGAN. I will yield to my other friend from New Jersey, Mr. Maraziti. Mr. MARAZITI. Thank you, Mr. Hogan, for yielding. Let me. say that Mr. Sandman has stated the position that I had intended to state, that the specific point is this, that what we have asked for and what he has asked for is including the allegations in the, articles of impeachment. Now, we have a recitation of facts. All well and good. I have no objection to it. But, I am saying--I am not talking, about facts or evidence. I am talking about allegations that ought to be included in the articles of impeachment, not a recitation here. If you want a recitation here, fine, but if these are the allegations, put the allegations in the articles of impeachment so we know what we are voting on, so that the respondent knows how to defend. Mr. HOGAN. I would say to my friend from New Jersey that he is--- Mr. RAILSBACK. Mr. Chairman----- Mr. HOGAN [continuing]. That he is free to offer amendments to the Sarbanes, substitute or to the Donohue resolution, inserting in the, kind of specificity, to use a much worn word, that he desires. We have advice from our expert counsel that it is not necessary. It is my own feeling that it is not necessary to have it in the impeachment resolution itself, although I do agree that we have a responsibility to shore UP the allegations in the impeachment resolution with factual evidentiary material and that is the effort, in which we are now engaged. Mr. SARBANES. Will the gentleman yield? Mr. HOGAN. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Railsback. Mr. RAILSBACK. Mr. Doar, I am -wondering if the, staff, pursuant to our discussions yesterday is preparing in effect what a amounts to a bill of particulars? Mr. DOAR. We are. We are; yes, we are, Mr. Congressman. Mr. RAILSBACK. You are. and are there going to be specific references to the item within each article? Mr. DOAR. Yes. Mr. RAILSBACK. Then, I am inclined frankly, Mr. Chairman, to agree, with Mr. Sandman that perhaps this is all a waste of time. In other words, I think we do know how we are going to vote. Is the bill of Particulars going to be submitted to us anyway for our approval or disapproval? Mr. DOAR. Well, I do not know what plans the chairman has. As I indicated yesterday, Mr. Congressman, this would be included as part of the proposed report. Mr. RAILSBACK. I thought Mr. Cohen did a fine job in laying out a lot of facts and I thought it was an excellent presentation. I just, wonder if perhaps this should not be done in another way so that we can move along? Mr. DENNIS. Mr. Chairman Mr. HOGAN. I think I have the time I yield to the gentleman from Indiana and then to the gentleman from Mississippi. Mr. DENNIS. I thank the gentleman for yielding. I am really seeking recognition to speak on my own time on the amendment. Mr. HOGAN. I yield to the gentleman from Mississippi. Mr. LOTT. I have one quick question, then. Mr. Doar, when will we get this bill of particulars? Mr. DOAR. Well, Mr. Congressman, as I say, it was our idea that we prepare this material as part of the proposed committee report and it would be up to the committee as to how that would be handled. Mr. DENNIS. Will the gentleman yield? The CHAIRMAN. The time, of the gentleman from Maryland has expired. The gentleman from Indiana. [00.30.54]
Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 30, 1974
[00.08.20] Mr. RAILSBACK. It seems to me ironic that when the Ellsberg papers came out the Nixon administration was concerned about that leak not because they revealed things that had happened under the Nixon administration, but, because of the decision and policy decisions that had been made under the Johnson and Kennedy years. What an irony and how foolish we would be, to impeach this President for that particular incident, when the whole South Vietnamese involvement was one series of mistakes, one right after the other. The CHAIRMAN. I recognize the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Sandman, for' 3 minutes and 4.5 seconds. Mr. SANDMAN. -Mr. Chair-man, I would like to address my remarks to the 37 other members, and I would just like. you to remember one little thing that I am going to say to you. Do you want to be remember as part of that Congress that tried to impeach a President of the United States because he did something which ended a war that his two predecessors could not do? That is a pretty good question. And I said yesterday that one of the closest admirers that the previous President had I think was myself. I thought he was a great man. I can remember when President Johnson. the first year was down here, invited 40 freshmen to come over to the Oval Office and sit down with him. And it was at that particular time that he was making up his mind to accelerate the bombing. I know that history is going to be very unkind, in my mind, to 'what was a great man and a great President He revealed to us the advice that he had received from all of the generals, General Westmoreland and all of the rest of them all on one piece of paper with their recommendations, and he said to us, you know, I never -went to West Point, I am not a general, and he said I don't know as we have any generals in this room or any West Pointers either. But, these are the best military minds in the world, and I want. you to look at their advice to me as the Chief Executive, and on every piece of paper, about 40 of them, the recommendation was to accelerate, and he said, what would you do, I am asking you. There was not one that gave a dissenting opinion. There were 40 people in that room besides the President and every one of them a Congressman. and hindsight is always better than foresight, isn't it? And a -Monday morning quarterback could made a better guess, I suppose, but based upon the best information available the President acted. It was not the right decision, as time revealed, and he is not going to go down in history as a man who did a very good job with that war. I remember when he, made his farewell address over in the Longworth Building, and I guess everyone does too, a very sad man, a brokenhearted man because on his conscience was the death of thousands of people, and the one thing he wanted to do more than anything else in the world -was to end that war and he could not do it. Then along came Richard 'Nixon with all of the faults that he may have had. He ended that war. One-half million people were in Southeast Asia when he became President. Fifty thousand Americans lost their lives there, and nobody is dying in Southeast Asia today. And so we want to reward him by impeaching him because he did not. tell everybody what he was going to do before he did it. And this is an awfully funny way to run a war, isn't it? Concealment. Every war is run on concealment. You do not tell the opposition what you are going to do before you do it. I voted for or the war powers amendment and so did everybody else. It is a good thing. But, let us not forget the commencement of activities in Vietnam was the 81st time an emergency power was exercised by a President. And I say to you, let us not be remembered because we want to reward this man by throwing him out of office. The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. [00.13.07]
Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 24, 1974 Robert McClory Statement
Now in the light of today s Supreme Court decision, there may be indeed other available evidence to the committee within the next few days or weeks. Substantial additional evidence from the White House tapes upon which this committee can better judge the guilt or innocence of the President in the whole Watergate affair. The doctrine of absolute executive privilege upon which the President and his council relied has been substantially rejected by the Supreme Court and we can expect hopefully that we will get promptly and without equivocation from the White House the additional tapes which we also subpoenaed and which are now under the President s decision to be made available to the special prosecutor. And we also have the mechanism for excising those irrelevant parts which might not be appropriate for us to see.
Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 25, 1974 (1/2)
[00.48.11] [Jim LEHRER and Paul DUKE in studio] LEHRER introduces Caroline LEWIS's interview of Rep. Jack BROOKS, D-TX [cut to LEWIS with BROOKS] LEWIS asks BROOKS whether the pro-impeachment side gained today. BROOKS says that many have come to beleive that NIXON's activities were "not in the public interest". praises both DEMOCRATS and REPUBLICANS for their conduct and eloquence LEWIS asks about the pro-impeachment speeches of REPUBLICAN members, whether this will help in the HOUSE floor vote. BROOKS says that the participation of the REPUBLICANS in the impeachment drive will give it legitimacy and not make it seem like a purely partisan affair. Says that he sympathizes with the REPUBLICAN members in their tough decision to cross party lines, that the whole process is "not fun". LEWIS asks if the timing of the President's economic speech is intentionally timed to distract from the hearings. BROOKS calls it "one of those strange coincidences", LEWIS mentions charges that impeachment would damage the office of the Presidency permanently] BROOKS replies that the impeachment would save the Presidency from degradation, and that the system would be stronger afterward. [return to DUKE and LEHRER.] LEHRER takes the chance to defend his TEXAS roots by mentioning that Rep. BROOKS, expected to be the most long-winded speaker, in fact used the least time in speaking of any member. DUKE informs that there are 8 remaining members to speak, hopefully they will be finished tonight. [00.51.28] [cut to shot of committee bench, few members seated, photographers busy] LEHRER describes as key moments in the day the speeches of REPUBLICANS who sided for impeachment, noting that the general debate is closed to finished, which will mean a move to the "nitty gritty" of finalizing the writing of the ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT. [00.53.42--pullback from committee room shot to LEHRER in studio, committee room action projected on screen over LEHRER'S shoulder] LEHRER says that the task now is to draw up articles that satisfy the largest number of Representatives, to get maximum REPUBLICAN support for legitimacy in the full HOUSE vote. Introduces two guest commentators, [cut to guests seated] William VAN ALSTYNE and Jack KRAMER, both law professors. LEHRER asks whether the wording of the articles will in fact be crucial to the effort, and whether getting 38 lawyers to agree to anything will take long. VAN ALSTYNE says it may not take long, it appears that the two articles motioned by Rep. DONOHUE at the outset will likely be the core of the final articles, although there will be nitpicking about language, etc. DUKE asks whether, then, the final articles will be broad ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT. VAN ALSTYNE says yes, but that within the broad articles there will be specific, narrow counts of each offense. LEHRER asks whether specificity is necessary KRAMER replies that the specificity gives the ARTICLES legitimacy, for example the specific component of ABUSE OF POWER related to the President's violation of his OATH OF OFFICE, raised by Republican members in debate. DUKE inquires about the importance of outspoken REPUBLICANS condemning the President's actions and at least hinting toward advocating impeachment, that there are as many as 5 and possibly 7 pro-impeachment REPUBLICANS on the committee. KRAMER says that it could be significant if those members act as "floor managers" in the full House debate, they could influence many REPUBLICANS to vote against NIXON. Notes that this is 40% of the committee, and that committee REPUBLICANS are generally more conservative than House REPUBLICANS at large. LEHRER says it's also significant that two Southern DEMOCRATS indicated strong leanings toward impeachment. [00.57.38.--cut to shot of Chairman RODINO, preparing to open meeting] LEHRER, v.o., notes that the committee has not been terribly punctual at these hearings. DUKE interrupts to send viewers to LEWIS, with a late-breaking development [cut LEWIS with Rep. Delbert LATTA, R-Ohio] LEWIS asks what LATTA, as a NIXON supporter, has in mind to try to prevent impeachment. LATTA begs to clarify, saying he supports NIXON's policies but that he does not support any wrongdoing. Continues that there has been no evidence presented to definitely link NIXON to any of the subordinates' wrongdoing. That the "American People" will not support removing the President for other people's wrongdoing. Says that he has introduced a CENSURE resolution on the grounds that while NIXON was not aware of the wrongdoing by his associates, he was at fault for not knowing. LEWIS asks whether a mere CENSURE resolution will fly after all of the allegations raised. LATTA says that impeachment won't fly unless the allegations can be proven, asserts that proof is not forthcoming. LEWIS asks how much support he has for the CENSURE resolution. LATTA says it hasn't been discussed much, but that most members against impeachment will probably support it. LEWIS asks if there aren't already enough votes to put the ARTICLES OF IMPEACHEMENT through to the House floor? LATTA says that there is no doubt about that, but a CENSURE resolution could have an effect on the floor vote. [00.59.57] [cut to Chairman RODINO] DUKE (v.o.) comments on LATTA'S idea for CENSURE, hazarding the guess that it might be a "fallback" position for conservative REPUBLICANS, in order to offer a milder alternative to impeachment, a recognition that they can't win in the committee, that it is a sign of the tide turning against the President. Notes that there have been rumors about censure resolutions, which are unprecedented for a President. [01.01.06--shot of large group of photographers, lenses pointed toward TV camera] LEHRER notes Rep. LATTA'S openness about the fact that the CENSURE resolution would be aimed at influencing the full House Floor vote. [01.01.14--pullback into studio, LEHRER seated, committee room action projection on monitor] LEHRER states his gratefulness to have two legal authorities in the studio to comment on the developments Asks what the legal precedent is for a censure motion against the President. VAN ALSTYNE says there is frankly very little precedent. Says a good academic might try to assess whether Congress can strike a medium ground of reproof, but that his opinion is that it ought not. Says that in one previous case, probably that of Andrew Jackson.... [01.01.47--cut to Chairman RODINO, gaveling] LEHRER, v.o., cuts off VAN ALSTYNE. Chair recognizes Rep. Charles RANGEL, D-NY Rep. RANGEL begins by thanking the Chair for including less senior members fully in the debate. [01.03.59--TAPE OUT] )
Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 29, 1974 (2/2)
[01.09.40] The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentlelady has expired. the gentleman from California has 4 minutes remaining. Mr. WIGGINS. I yield the 4 minutes to the gentleman from Indiana, The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Indiana is recognized. Mr. DENNIS. I thank the gentleman, Mr. Chairman. First I would like to call attention to exactly what the Keith decision, which had not become law at the time we are talking about, held. 'The Keith decision stated that it -was necessary to get a. court warrant before instituting wiretaps in matters which involved only the domestic aspects of national security, That was not handed down at the time we are talking about, which was back in 1969, and the general assumption in governmental circles was that you did not need a prior court order to institute wiretaps for the domestic aspects of national security at that time. The contrary had never been held. But, it is important to know what the Keith decision did hold, even when it was handed down, and I read from the opinion of the court. We emphasize before concluding this opinion the scope of our decision. As stated at the outset, this case involves only the domestic aspects of national security. We have not addressed and express no opinion as to the issues which may be involved with respect to activities of foreign powers or their agents. And in the footnote they say for the view that warrantless surveillance though impermissible in domestic security cases may be constitutional where foreign powers are involved see United States v. Smith and so forth. Now' a great many of these wiretaps here. were cases -where foreign were certainly involved and where foreign powers were certain affairs were certainly interested and where some people might even have been agents of foreign powers and even under this decision would still in all probability be lawful? Addressing what the gentlelady from Texas said, the. court said further, "Nor does our decision rest on the Language of section 2.511 or any other section of title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. That Act does not attempt to define or delineate that the powers of the President to meet domestic threats to the national security." It did not apply to it. It had to do with ordinary crime. So they did not take any guidance from the act. They did not speak where foreign people were involved. And they then held for the first time that strictly domestic national security required a court order. Now, back In 1969 there -were -a lot of important leaks. In early March--and I am using now the books of our testimony. both the President's presentation and our own presentation-- in early March of 1969, and this is from the President's presentation to our, committee, a decision was reached to conduct B-52 raids into Cambodia. They were conducted secretly and we had it in our testimony, too, to maintain the tacit approval of Prince Norodom Sihanouk. However, on May 6, 1969. William Beecher accurately reported these raids in the. Now York Times, jeopardizing the relationship with Prince Sihanouk. On April 1, 1969, the Department of Defense made a troop study about withdrawing troops from Vietnam. It had not yet been discussed with the South Vietnamese Government. Before, it was discussed with the South Vietnamese government, on April 6, 1969, Mr. Frankel ran an article in the New York Times, which jeopardized our relationship with the South Vietnamese Government. Mr. Kissinger so testified in an affidavit which he filed. The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman--- Mr. DENNIS. And other similar matters all happened in 1969, and, to finish my sentence "Dear Mr. Hoover. Agent Sullivan wrote May, 1969, "1 thought you would like to know that Colonel Haig called me this morning to advise that they are, releasing X today. At least this is one leak that will be stopped." Respectfully, W. C. Sullivan." [01.14.26]
Watergate Impeachment Hearings. House Judiciary Committee, July 27, 1974. Vote to adopt Article one, Watergate Coverup
Watergate Impeachment Hearings. House Judiciary Committee, July 27, 1974. Vote to adopt Article one, Watergate Coverup
Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 24, 1974
The empty committee room. Lewis voiceover reports that the meeting room has been cleared due to a bomb threat, resulting in the summary dismissal of the committee. Lewis says this is why Chairman Rodion looked "uptight" when he announced the recess. Caroline Lewis standing in a hall with microphone in hand. She says that the room is being checked.
Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 27, 1974 (1/2)
[00.08.44] Mr. HUTCHINSON. . Mr. Chairman? The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hutchinson. Mr. HUTCHINSON. I will yield additional time to Mr. Wiggins. Mr. Wiggins. Thank you, Mr. Hutchinson. The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman is recognized. Mr. WIGGINS, I only wish to make one point because it has been discussed elsewhere, and that, is Mr. Haldeman had the opportunity to review tapes prior to his testimony. At that time Mr. Haldeman and the President but very few others were aware Of this taping system. Mr. Haldeman reviewed these tapes. The implication is, being placed in the minds of the committee that this was again part and parcel Of a Corrupt design so that Haldeman could tailor his testimony falsely before a grand jury. Now, that is a suspicion alone, but let me tell you that there Is another side that I think is equally defensible and that is that Mr. Haldeman reviewed that tape so as to testify truthfully to the events, thereon rather than falsely. I think that is an eminently reasonable conclusion, inconsistent with, this suspicious circumstance, and the President is entitled to the more favorable construction of that event. I merely wanted to make that observation with respect to listening to the tapes and I thank the gentleman from Michigan for permitting me to amplify it. Mr. HUTCHINSON. I thank the gentleman. Does the gentleman from Indiana desire to be recognized on this question? Mr. DENNIS. Mr.--- Mr. HUTCHINSON,, I would be happy to yield to the gentleman from Indiana. Mr. DENNIS. I will say to the gentleman from Michigan that I think my friend from California has very adequately covered this matter and I do not really think I have anything particular to add. I yield time to him if he has anything else he wants to say. Mr. WIGGINS. Mr. Hutchinson----- Mr. HUTCHINSON. I yield back the balance of my time. The CHAIRMAN. The question on the motion of the gentleman from Alabama. All those in favor of the motion please signify by saying aye. [Chorus of -'ayes."] All those opposed, no, and the [Chorus of "hoes."] The CHAIRMAN. All those in favor of the motion, please signify by saying aye. [Chorus of "ayes."] The CHAIRMAN. All those opposed. [Chorus of "noes."] The CHAIRMAN. The noes appear to have it. Mr. SANDMAN. I demand a. tally of the vote. The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from New Jersey demands a rollcall vote. The clerk will -call the role. All those in favor of the motion please signify by saying aye. All those opposed, no. The CLERK. Mr. Donohue. Mr. DONOHUE. No. The CLERK. Mr. Brooks. Mr. BROOKS. No. The CLERK. Mr. Kastenmeier Mr. KASTENMEIER. No. The CLERK. Mr. Edwards. Mr. EDWARDS. No. The CLERK. Mr. Hungate. Mr. HUNGATE. No. The CLERK. Mr. Conyers. Mr. CONYERS. No. The CLERK. Mr. Eilberg. Mr. EILBERG. No. The CLERK. Mr. Waldie. Mr. WALDIE. No. The CLERK. Mr. Flowers. Mr. FLOWERS. Present The CLERK. Mr. Mann. Mr. MANN. No. The, CLERK. Mr. Sarbanes. Mr. SARBANES. No. The CLERK. Mr. Seiberling. Mr. SEIBERLING. No. The CLERK. Mr. Danielson. Mr. DANIELSON. No. The CLERK. Mr. Drinan. Mr. DRINAN. No. The CLERK. Mr. Rangel. Mr. RANGEL. NO. The CLERK. Ms. Jordan. Ms. JORDAN. NO. The CLERK. Mr. Thornton. Mr. THORNTON. No. The CLERK. Ms. Holtzman. Ms. HOLTZMAN. No. The CLERK. Mr. Owens. Mr. OWENS. No. The CLERK. Mr. Mezvinsky. . Mr. MEZVINSKY. No. The CLERK. Mr. Hutchinson; Mr. HUTCHINSON. Aye. The CLERK. Mr. McClory. Mr. McCLORY. Aye. The CLERK. Mr. Smith. Mr. SMITH. Aye. The CLERK. Mr. Sandman. Mr. SANDMAN. Aye. The CLERK. Mr. Railsback. Mr. RAILSBACK. No. The CLERK. Mr. Wiggins. Mr. WIGGINS. Aye. The CLERK. Mr. Dennis. Mr. DENNIS. Mr. Chairman, I am quite puzzled. When the author of the, amendment votes "present" I hardly know what to do but I. vote aye. The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman made up his mind rather quickly. Mr. DENNIS. I do that. The CLERK. Mr. Dennis votes, aye. Mr. Fish. Mr. FISH. No. The CLERK. Mr. Mayne. Mr. MAYNE. Aye. The CLERK. Mr. Hogan Mr. HOGAN. No. The CLERK. Mr. Butler. Mr. BUTLER. No. The CLERK. Mr. Cohen. Mr. COHEN. No. The CLERK. Mr. Lott. Mr. LOTT. Aye. The CLERK. Mr. Froehlich. Mr. FROEHLICH. Aye. The CLERK. Mr. Moorhead. Mr. MOORHEAD. Aye The CLERK. Mr. Maraziti. Mr. MARAZITI. Aye. The CLERK. Mr. Latta. Mr. LATTA. Aye. The CLERK. Mr. Rodino. The CHAIRMAN. NO. The CLERK. Mr. Chairman? The CHAIRMAN. The, clerk will report. The CLERK. Twelve members have voted aye, 25 members have voted no, and 1 member has voted present. The CHAIRMAN. And the motion is not agreed to. [00.14.27]
US House Ways and Means Committee - Pre-Conference on Spending
US House Ways and Means Committee - Pre-Conference on Spending; United States Congressional hearing room. Predominately adult Caucasian men conversing and walking around; Congressmen, staff members, and press; some Caucasian women, one African American man. Adult Caucasian man with bowtie and tobacco pipe. US Representative Sam Gibbons (D-FL) walking around chamber, shakes hands with African American man; Caucasian male press photographers and US Capitol Police officer in FG. Rep. Gibbons talking. Caucasian news camera man. Rep. Gibbons talking with Younger adult Caucasian man.
Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 25, 1974 (2/2)
[01.03.54] [continued speech of Rep. OWENS, D-Utah] My background is that which the authors of the Constitution foresaw for those who would be asked to judge Presidents. I am a politician. And I would be much less than candid if I were not to state for the record that I approached this responsibility as a longtime political adversary of this President. I am not certain how many people have really believed me over the many months of this inquiry when I have repeatedly said that Iwould forget my political background and approach this matter objectively. Having served on the staffs of Senator Robert Kennedy, and then Senator Edward Kennedy, the press and others have from the beginning taken my vote almost for granted, which I regret. Recognizing all that, I want now to state, as strongly and as clearly IS I can, because it is important that the public have confidence in our committee's impartiality, that, I believe I have been successful in setting aside the natural inclinations I may have brought with me to this in inquiry. I have honestly sought to learn the truth as I have had the ability to recognize it and to be, guided by nothing else than the truth in my actions. I, too, recognize that this is the most important vote that I will probably ever cast, and I want to face that mirror in later years with the peace that will come from knowledge that I gave my best efforts to this inquiry and voted solely upon the dictates of my conscience. I have studied the evidence before this committee very carefully over many months, I have participated every single presentation of evidence. I have listened to every single witness. I have read extensively about impeachment, agonized about impeachment, and have discussed impeachment and its implications for good or bad, with many Intelligent men and women both in Washington and in Utah. I have now measured the actions of President Richard Nixon by my understanding of his unique constitutional responsibilities. I believe that impeachment of a President is a grave act to be undertaken only in the most extreme of circumstances, and only for a violation of a principle of conduct which we are willing to say should be applied to all future Presidents and established as a constitutional precedent. Each member must determine for himself whether the evidence is sufficient to vote to place the President on trial before the U.S. Senate, whose constitutional role it is to be the final judge. I believe that we must vote to impeach if we believe the evidence so clear and convincing that it would support conviction Of the President during a Senate trial.
Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 27, 1974 (2/2)
[01.10.30] Mr. BUTLER. Specifically, on or about June 28, 1972, Jeb Magruder met with CRP Director of Scheduling Herbert Porter and asked him to prepare false testimony concerning the purposes for which cash had been' disbursed to Liddy. Specifically, on July 19 and 20, 1972, respectively, Porter and Magruder falsely told FBI agents that the funds obtained from CRP were for legal intelligence gathering activities. Specifically, on August 10, Porter testified falsely before the, Watergate grand jury as to the purpose of the $199,000 in cash paid to Liddy. Specifically on August 18, Magruder after discussing his false story about, the Liddy money with Dean and Mitchell, testified falsely be-- fore the Watergate grand Jury. Specifically, on September 12 or 13, 1972, Magruder met with Mitchell and Dean to plan a false certain meetings among -Mitchell, Magruder, Dean, and Liddy in early 1972, Specifically, Magruder thereafter testified about the meetings before the Watergate grand jury. Now, I would direct your attention to page 86 of our transcript of the testimony in which it shows that on March 21, during his morning meeting with Dean the President was told of' the perjury by both .Magruder and Porter. Dealing with the top of page 87, the President says, "Who?" and this deals -with something preceding it, and I won't burden you with that. It talks about Mitchell, and then Dean says: [quoted] Mitchell, I don't know how much knowledge he actually had. I know Magruder has perjured himself in the grand jury. I know that Porter has perjured himself, uh, in the grand jury. [end] And the President says, "Porter [unintelligible], who is that, in effect, and "he is one of Magruder's deputies." And the President "Yeah." Then on March 13, 1973, "Dean told the, President directly that Strachan's denial of prior knowledge of the Liddy plan was, false and that Strachan planned to stonewall again in the future. And I call your attention to page 70 of our transcript, the one prepared for the committee. Dean says: [quoted section] Well, Chapin didn't know anything about the Watergate, and-- PRESIDENT. You don't think so? ,, DEAN. No, absolutely not. PRESIDENT, Did Strachan? DEAN. Yes. PRESIDENT. He knew? DEAN. Yes. PRESIDENT. Well, then, Bob knew. He probably told Bob, then. He may not have. He may not have. DEAN. He was, he was judicious in what he relayed and, uh, but Strachan is tough as nails. PRESIDENT. What'll he say: Just go in and say he didn't know? DEAN. He'll go in and stonewall it and say, "I don't know anything about what you are talking about." He has already done it twice, as you know, in interviews. PRESIDENT. I guess he should, shouldn't lie., in the interests of--why? I suppose we can all that justice, call we? We can't call it [unintelligible]. DEAN. Well it, it-- PRESIDENT. The point is, how do you justify that? DEAN. It's a-- it's a personal loyalty with him. He doesn't want it any other way. He didn't have to be told. He didn't have to be asked, It just is something that he found is the way he wanted to handle the Situation, PRESIDENT. But he knew? He knew about Watergate? Strachan did? DEAN. Uh-huh PRESIDENT. I'll be damned. Well, that's the problem in Bob's case, isn't it? It's not Chapin then, but Strachan--'cause Strachan worked for him. DEAN. Uh-huh. [end quoted section] The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman has already consumed 5 minutes. Mr. BUTLER. Mr. Chairman. may I have 5 minutes more to speak in opposition to the motion? The CHAIRMAN. I thought the gentleman was speaking in opposition to the motion? Mr. BUTLER. I was, but I thought I was on Mr. Flowers' time, and I thought he is the. proponent of the motion. Mr. Chairman, I will take my 5 minutes wherever I may, but I would-- The CHAIRMAN. If the gentleman is seeking 5 more minutes, the gentleman will be recognized for the 5 minutes, and that will consume the 10 minutes in opposition to the amendment. Mr. BUTLER. Well, we will have to live with that, Mr. Chairman. Returning now, if I may, I would like to emphasize that the procedural aspects of these proceedings are not -without their levity, and I consider this an extremely serious matter, and there is, indeed, extensive evidence which I would, given the time, enlarge upon. I am going through my prepared remarks, and I will conclude, and I will let you know when my time has run out. But, it goes for, at this moment, some 13 pages, and it extensively develops, with specific, whatever that word is, the point which this, paragraph is addressed to, the approving the condoning, the acquiescence in and the counseling of witnesses with respect to false testimony. It is a grave matter, and I regret that we have, chosen to limit time, but I will do what I can with what I have. [01.16.04]
Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 30, 1974 (1/2)
[00.24.12] Mr. McCLORY. I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I certainly feel that the original draft of the, article was good. it was in good legalistic and constitutional language On the other bond, I do not want, to oppose this rather elaborate, and argumentative, language that is contained in this amendment. I think the gentleman from Virginia was seeking recognition. Mr. OWENS. Well, I would support the amendment of the gentleman from Illinois as amended by the amendment of the gentleman from Arkansas, but it seemed like to me that the principle is more absolute and clear as set down in the original amendment offered by the gentleman. Mr. McCLORY. I think the gentleman from Virginia would like to be recognized. Mr. CONYERS. Would the gentleman yield to me? Mr. OWENS. The gentleman from Virginia. Mr. BUTLER. I would like to. if I may. direct a question to the gentleman from Arkansas, if you will also yield to me. Mr. OWENS. I will yield for that purpose. .Mr. BUTLER. I am concerned. and the gentleman knows my reservation about this whole article, I am concerned about this language in your amendment which says in order to resolve by direct evidence fundamental questions relating to Presidential direction, knowledge or approval of actions, and here is the language that I wonder about, "demonstrated by other evidence to be substantial grounds for impeachment of the President." Now, does that mean that we have a preliminary finding of substantial grounds for impeachment of the President in all of -it before we issued a subpena in all of these areas with reference, for example, let its take the, dairy situation? Mr. THORNTON. . It seems, if the gentleman will yield, it seems to me. that the requirement is that a threshold level of evidence of substantial offenses which might rise to the level of impeachable offenses must be demonstrated before an impeachment could occur upon a refusal to obey a subpena, and that is the thought that I have tried to express. Mr. BUTLER. And clarifying this a little further than you have said here that we have, in fact, made that preliminary determination as to these other matters by this resolution? Mr. THORNTON. That there is a body of evidence substantial enough to raise serious questions with regard to milk and other matters supporting the issuance of subpenas of other material as necessary to resolve some of those matters. Mr. BUTLER. SO, it is your thought by this action to remove us from the areas of previous impeachment proceeding the basis for impeachment? Mr. THORNTON. That is correct, and further to tie it to the kind of evidence which does appear, for example, in article 1. The CHAIRMAN. The time has expired, on the amendment. All time has expired on the amendment, and the question now occurs on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Arkansas, Mr. Thornton. Mr. FLOWERS. Rollcall vote, Mr. Chairman. Rollcall vote. The CHAIRMAN. All those in favor of the amendment when the roll is called please signify by saying aye, and all those opposed signify by saying no. The clerk will cal I the roll, The CLERK. Mr. Donohue. Mr. DONOHUE. Aye. The CLERK. Mr. Brooks. Mr. BROOKS. Aye. The, CLERK. Mr. Kastenmeier. Mr. KASTENMEIER. Aye. The, CLERK. Mr. Edwards. Mr. EDWARDS. Aye. The CLERK. Mr. Hungate. Mr. HUNGATE. Aye. The CLERK. Mr. Conyers. Mr. CONYERS. No. The CLERK. Mr. Eilberg. Mr. EILBERG. Aye. The CLERK. Mr. Waldie. Mr. WALDIE. Aye. The CLERK. Mr. Flowers. Mr. FLOWERS. No. The CLERK. Mr. Mann. Mr. MANN. Aye. The CLERK . Mr. Sarbanes. Mr. SARBANES. Aye. The CLERK. Mr. Seiberling. Mr. SEIBERLING. Aye. The, CLERK. Mr. Danielson. Mr. DANIELSON. Aye. The CLERK. Mr. Drinan. Mr. DRINAN. Aye. The CLERK. Mr. Rangel. Mr. RANGEL. Aye. The CLERK. Ms. Jordan. MS. JORDAN. Aye. The CLERK. Mr. Thornton. Mr. THORNTON. Aye. The CLERK. MS. Holtzman. MS. HOLTZMAN. Aye. The CLERK. Mr. Owens. Mr. OWENS. NO. The CLERK. Mr. Mezvinsky. Mr. MEZVINSKY. Aye. The CLERK. Mr. Hutchinson. Mr. HUTCHINSON. Aye. The CLERK- Mr. McClory, Mr. McCLORY. Aye. The CLERK. Mr. Smith. Mr. SMITH. No. The CLERK. Mr. Sandman. Mr. SANDMAN. NO. The CLERK. Mr. Railsback. Mr. RAILSBACK. No. The CLERK. Mr. WIGGINS. Mr. WIGGINS. No. The CLERK. Mr. Dennis. Mr. DENNIS. No. The CLERK. Mr. Fish. Mr. FISH. Aye. The CLERK. Mr. Mayne. Mr. MAYNE. No. The CLERK. Mr. Hogan. Mr. HOGAN. NO. The CLERK. Mr. Butler. Mr. BUTLER. Aye. The CLERK. Mr. Cohen. Mr. COHEN. Aye. The CLERK. Mr. Lott. Mr. LOTT. Aye. The CLERK. Mr. Froehlich. Mr. FROEHLICH. NO. The CLERK. Mr. Moorhead. Mr. MOORHEAD. No. The CLERK. Mr. Maraziti. Mr. MARAZITI. No. The CLERK. Mr. Latta. Mr. LATTA. No. The CLERK. Mr. Rodino. The CHAIRMAN. Aye. The CLERK. Mr. Chairman? The CHAIRMAN. The clerk will report. The CLERK. Twenty-four members have voted aye, 14 members have voted no. The CHAIRMAN. And the amendment is agreed to. [00.30.24--Paul DUKE in studio]
Impeachment Hearings House Judiciary Committee, July 24, 1974 Statement of Don Edward
Impeachment Hearings House Judiciary Committee, July 24, 1974 Statement of Representative Don Edward (D California) Mr. CHAIRMAN. I recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Edwards, for purposes of debate, only, and not to exceed 15 minutes. Mr. Edwards. Mr. EDWARDS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I always listen with keen interest to our eloquent colleague from New Jersey. I think the fact with regard to the leaks are, of course, unfortunate, but I don't think, it is really accurate to say that the leaks came all from this side. It has been made very clear by the press and Others that the faucet dripped from both taps, the hot and the cold. Insofar as the evidence that was released that my friend Mr. Sandman criticized, I voted against that too, but I think it should be pointed out that the President's counsel, Mr. St. Clair was here. He was a part of all of these proceedings, and be recommended very strongly To the committee that this evidence be released. Mr. Chairman, there's been Some mention by some of our colleagues tonight regarding the Supreme Court decision and I think that we should remember that the Supreme Court -was very explicit in the decision. The evidence that will be released to Mr. Jaworski has only deal with the criminal trials that will take place. It will take several months perhaps for the production and the examination and the deciphering of those tapes, and then only the portions relevant to the trials will be given to the Special Prosecutor. The remainder will be sealed and returned to the White House. Our needs with regard to this large impeachment inquiry are much wider. Our needs are much wider in scope than those of the Special Prosecutor and in the criminal case. And incidentally our subpenas still remain in effect, and we invite the White House) the President, to honor those subpoenas. And it certainly would make our job a great deal easier. And I think the President should be reminded that the Supreme rejected its claim of executive privilege. Mr. Chairman, this is one member who thinks that the welfare of the Country dictates that we proceed deliberately, but with due speed in this undertaking that has been assigned to us by the full House Of Representatives. And I would hope that the committee does not consider any delay because of the Supreme Court decision. Mr. Chairman, you and I and our 36 colleagues, and our splendid staff, have worked here in room 2141 Rayburn for many weeks. We have learned much about the President and all of the President's men and, indeed, quite a lot about each other. More importantly I think, we have learned the lesson, and we are indebted substantially to Mr. Doar, and and Mr. Jenner, and Mr. Cates and the fine members of the staff for this relearning process. This is a lesson we were all taught in school and by our parents, and which we in turn tried to pass on to our children, and it has to do with the value and the beauty of our Constitution and the understanding that representative government, if it is going to work, requires that we all respect and obey the Constitution. And that means all 220 million of us. It is the compact have with each other that enables us to live together, in peace, to pursue happiness in raising our children, and enjoying our friends. It requires that we treat one another with decency and respect when we are at work and when we are at school. It is the cement that holds us together as a decent and humane society. The President of the United States is also a citizen, just like rest of us, [01.04.02--TAPE OUT]
U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee: Arab-Israeli Conflict
U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee hearings related to Arab-Israeli Conflict. Elderly and middle-aged adult Caucasian males sitting and standing around the three tiered dais; U.S. House Representative and Chairman, Lawrence Fountain (D-NC) speaking with Ranking Member, Rep. William Broomfield (R-MI), and going over some papers to see if there can be a more succinct version of U.S. President Ronald Reagan's proposals. Secretary of State George Shultz seated at witness table, flanked by Nick Veliotis, Assistant Secretary of State for the Middle East, and Richard Fairbanks, a special representative for the Middle East; adult Caucasian men and women seated in BG. Reps. Fountain, Broomfield, Edward Derwinski (R-IL), Paul Findlay (R-IL), and Larry Wynn Jr. (R-KS) all seated at top level tier of the dais. Adult Caucasian male and female photographers taking pictures of Secretary Shultz seated at the witness table with his two male colleagues seated between him. Secretary Shultz and two men seated at the witness table, waiting for proceedings to begin.