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Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 29, 1974 (1/2)
[00.20.36] The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from--the gentleman from Pennsylvania Mr. Eilberg. Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say a few 'words concerning paragraph 2. 1 think the subject perhaps is not completely covered. I think all the members of the committee agree now that the President did authorize the taps. In addition to that I refer to a letter which the President wrote on July 12 to Senator Fulbright, chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, in which he says, "I ordered use of the most effective investigative procedures possible, including Wiretaps. I personally directed the surveillance including wiretapping of certain specific individuals." No question that the President assumes that responsibility. Yet it wasn't always that way. A little over a year ago, in February the White House learned of the forthcoming Time Magazine story disclosing the existence of wiretaps on White House employees and newsmen, John Dean, -who had learned of the files from Mardian, investigated the Time story by contacting Assistant FBI Director Mark Felt, Sullivan and Mardian. Each confirmed the existence of the wiretaps and Mardian said that he 'had delivered the files to Ehrlichman. Ehrlichman told Dean that he had the files but directed Dean to have press secretary Ronald Ziegler deny the story. The Time article, published on February 26, stated that a "White House spokesman" had denied that anyone at the White. House had authorized or approved any taps on White House employees or newsmen. On February 28, Dean reported to the President on the Time story and his meeting -with Sullivan about the wiretaps. Dean told the President that the White House -was "stonewalling totally" on the wiretap story and the President replied: "Oh, absolutely.", to -which I say, how interesting. Now, Mr. Chairman, I am one of those -who believe that the standard involved for impeachment does not, involve criminality, Nevertheless, I find in this paragraph many evidences of criminality on the part of the President and his men and I would just like to refer to a few of them. In 1969, General Alexander Haig ordered the FBI "on the highest authority," not to maintain records of the wiretaps initiated under the President's 1969 authorization. This information is contained in a memo from William Sullivan, Assistant Director of the FBI. Yet the general recordkeeping statutes (44 United States Code) set standards for recordkeeping, identifying what records must be maintained and provide rules for the orderly disposal of these records. 'Section 3105 specifically requires all Government employees to be familiar with the fact that records cannot; be alienated or destroyed except in the specific manner described in title 4 of the United States Code. Additionally, special provision for the FBI was made in title 28 of the United States Code, section 534, directing the FBI to preserve records except -where dissemination to other law enforcement agencies is authorized by law. It is also a felony (18 U.S.C. 2071) punishable by fine and/or imprisonment to "willfully and unlawful" conceal remove, mutilate, obliterate or destroy, or attempt to do so, or with intent to do so take and carry away any, record, proceeding, Map, book, paper, documents, or other thing, filed or deposited in any public office, or -with any public officer of the United States. It must be assumed that Haig knew it -was illegal for the FBI not to Maintain records for these wiretaps and it must be assumed that the only two men who could order him to give such directions to the FBI, Dr. Henry Kissinger, head of the National Security Council and the President of the United States, also knew that this was illegal. In July 1971, William Sullivan informed Robert Mardian, head of the Justice Department's Internal Security Division, that there were files and logs in these wiretaps and that be -was afraid that J. Edgar Hoover would use them as blackmail. against the President in order to keep Nixon from removing him from the top job at the FBI. After conversations with then Attorney General John Mitchell, and White House officials, Mardian flew to San Clemente to discuss the existence of these records personally with the President and John Ehrlichman. During these conversations the President ordered Mardian to get the files from Sullivan and to bring them to the White House. This order is a violation of the recordkeeping statutes in title 44. Mardian got the files involved and delivered them to the Oval Office in the White House. When he was interviewed about this episode by the FBI, Mardian was asked: "Did you give the bag to Mr. Nixon, the President of the United States ? " And Mardian replied: "I cannot answer that question." It must be assumed that he was protecting the President at this point because if he in fact gave them to a third party, he -would be shielding that person leaving the inference that the President had received them. Ehrlichman has testified that following delivery by Mardian, the President ordered him, Ehrlichman, to pick up the documents in the Oval Office and that he kept them in his own office until April 30, 1973, -when they were removed and placed in the files with other-Presidential; papers. The effect of the President's orders in this matter was again a violation of the pertinent sections of title 4-4. Mr. Chairman, I submit that this paragraph is a very strong paragraph, very important charge in the impeachment of the President of the United States. The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. [00.25.51]
Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 27, 1974
[00.39.47] Mr. McCLORY. Now, I do not agree with the interpretation of executive privilege as suggested by the gentleman from California, Mr. Wiggins, that the doctrine of executive privilege must yield when the President is being investigated. Otherwise the President is position where he can dictate what he wants to provide this committee with and what he does not want, to provide the committee with. I seems to me that in order for us to carry out a valid and full and fair investigation we, need all of the information which we have required and which we deem necessary. And our position has been strengthened by the recent opinion of the Supreme Court which has knocked down this doctrine, that so-called doctrine of the absolute executive privilege and in offering a, motion yesterday that we defer our proceedings for the purpose of giving the President an opportunity to provide the additional tapes that we have requested, it, seems to me that an opportunity again was offered for him to provide the kind of cooperation which it seems to me he should have been providing throughout these proceedings. And so I think it is perfectly valid for us to put in this article the inclusion of the words "and congressional committees" because in addition to his interference and in misuse perhaps of other agencies of Government, his defiance of this committee is, in my opinion, a, most serious matter and is entitled to be presented to the House of Representatives together with this proposed article as a later article which I propose to introduce. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. RAILSBACK. Mr. Chairman? The CHAIRMAN. I recognize the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Railsback./ Mr. RAILSBACK. Mr. Chairman, I am opposed to the, article by the gentleman, Mr. Danielson, from California. Anybody that had any knowledge I believe of the possible motivations at that particular time of the Patman committee, who was on the receiving end of a possible investigation to be conducted by Wright Patman, probably would have had good reason to try to avoid what they believe very easily could have been a political fishing expedition and I think it very significant that the members of his own committee decided not to go along with the chairman in conducting that kind of an investigation which I think many of them believed was going to be a political fishing expedition. In respect to executive privilege, I agree with the comments made by the gentleman from California, Mr. Wiggins, and as far as refusing to comply with our subpenas, it is my own belief that that failure should not constitute an independent or separate article or item of an article of impeachment. I think. the President probably had a right to assert executive privilege even though I am convinced that if in it had been taken to court, the court would have ruled against the President. I think--I think, 'Mr. Chairman, what we are doing here is we are adding something that cannot be proved and that would certainly weaken article 1. Mr. FISH. Will the, gentleman yield? Mr. RAILSBACK. Yes, I will, I will be glad to yield, Mr. FISH,. I thank the gentleman for yielding and I would just like to associate myself with his remarks. I think in considering the language in an article of impeachment we must always bear in mind that it must rise to the gravity of a crime against the constitutional system and I agree with you that this proposed additional language simply does not meet that test. The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California. All those in favor of the amendment, Please signify by saying aye. [Chorus of "ayes,"] The CHAIRMAN. All those opposed. [Chorus of "noes."] Mr. RAILSBACK. Can we have a record vote? Mr. Chairman, can we have a record vote, please? The CHAIRMAN. A record vote is demanded and the clerk will call the roll. All those in favor of the amendment, please signify by saying aye. All those opposed no, and the clerk- will call the roll. The CLERK. Mr. Donohue Mr. DONOHUE. Aye. The CLERK. Mr. Brooks. Mr. BROOKS. Ave. The CLERK. Mr. Kastenmeier. Mr. KASTENMEIER. Aye. The CLERK. Mr. Edwards. Mr. EDWARDS. Aye. The CLERK. Mr. Hungate. Mr. HUNGATE. Aye. The CLERK. Mr. Conyers. Mr. CONYERS. Aye. The CLERK. Mr Eilberg Mr. EILBERG. Aye. The CLERK. Mr. Waldie Mr. WALDIE. Aye. The CLERK. Mr. Flowers. Mr. FLOWERS. No. The CLERK. Mr. Mann. Mr. MANN. Aye. The CLERK. Mr. Sarbanes. Mr. SARBANES. Aye. The CLERK. Mr. Seiberling. Mr. SEIBERLING. Aye. The CLERK. Mr. Danielson. Mr. DANIELSON. Aye. The CLERK. Mr. Drinan. Mr. DRINAN. Aye. The CLERK. Mr. Rangel. Mr. RANGEL. Aye. The CLERK. MS. Jordan. MS. JORDAN. Aye. The CLERK. Mr. Thornton. Mr. THORNTON. Aye. The CLERK. Ms. Holtzman. MS. HOLTZMAN. Aye. The CLERK. Mr. Owens. Mr. OWENS. Aye. The CLERK. Mr. Mezvinsky. [-No response.] The CLERK. Mr. Hutchinson. Mr. HUTCHINSON. NO. The CLERK. Mr. McClory. Mr. McCLORY. Aye. The CLERK. Mr. Smith. Mr. SMITH. Aye. The CLERK. Mr. Sandman. Mr. SANDMAN. No. The CLERK. Mr. Railsback. Mr. RAILSBACK. NO. The CLERK. Mr. Wiggins. Mr. WIGGINS. Aye. The CLERK. Mr. Dennis. Mr. DENNIS. Aye. The CLERK. Mr. Fish. Mr. FISH No. The CLERK. Mr. Mayne. Mr. MAYNE, NO. The CLERK. Mr. Hogan. Mr. HOGAN. NO. The CLERK. Mr. Butler. Mr. BUTLER. No. The CLERK. Mr. Cohen. Mr. COHEN. No. The CLERK. Mr. Lott. Mr. LOTT. No. The CLERK. Mr. Froehlich. Mr. FROEHLICH. No. The CLERK. Mr. Moorhead, Mr. MOORHEAD. No. The CLERK. Mr. Maraziti Mr. MARAZITI. NO. The CLERK. Mr. Latta. Mr. LATTA. No. The CLERK. Mr. Rodino. The CHAIRMAN. Aye. Mr. MEZVINSKY. Mr. Chairman? The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Mezvinsky. Mr. MEZVINSKY/ I would like to register my vote as aye. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. MezvInsky is voting aye. Mr. MEZVINSKY. Aye. [00.46.41]
Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, May 9, 1974
[00.13.05] The CHAIRMAN. I recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Donohue. Mr. DONOHUE. Chairman. as understand it. the impeachment inquiry staff has received a wide variety of material which has, up until now, been subject to the requirements of confidentiality. Included in this class of confidential material are. documents 'which have been received from grand juries as well as materials developed by other congressional committees in executive sessions. Under the circumstances Mr. Chairman. it is my opinion we should not make, all this material public today. Therefore, I' move that during initial phase of the presentation the committee go into executive session pursuant to rule 11, clause 27 of our House rules. That rule provides that If evidence or testimony at an investigative hearing may tend to defame, degrade, or incriminate any person the committee shall receive such evidence, or testimony in executive session. Mr. McCLORY. I second the motion. The CHAIRMAN. The motion has been made and seconded. Mr. CONYERS. May I be recognized, Mr. Chairman? The CHAIRMAN. The motion, might advise the gentleman from Michigan, is not a debatable motion. Mr. CONYERS. This motion--well, point, of order-, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. The question is 'on the Motion Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, point of order. The CHAIRMAN. Since, the question is not one that is debatable, the Chair will put the question to the committee. All those in favor --- Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, point of order. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state his point of order. Mr. CONYERS. IS the Chair suggesting that a motion of this importance and magnitude, with no more than being stated and seconded, cannot be considered by the members of this committee gathered here for the purposes of an impeachment hearing? CHAIRMAN. Is the gentleman stating a point of order? Mr. CONYERS. Yes. The CHAIRMAN. Or is he inquiring of the Chair? The Chair has already ruled that the motion is not a debatable one in accordance. with the rules of the House, rule 11, 27m, and therefore, unless the gentleMan is ready to state. that he has an argument to support, his point of order, the, Chair is ready to present the, question on the motion. Mr. CONYERS. I ask for a rollcall vote Mr. Chairman., Ms. HOLTZMAN. Parliamentary inquiry. the CHAIRMAN. The lady will state it. Ms. HOLTZMAN. Thank I-oil. Did I understand the gentleman's motion was to close the hearings & receive this portion in the executive Session for the first phase, or only this hearing session? The CHAIRMAN. For the initial phase of the hearing. Ms. HOLTZMAN. I thank the Chairman.
Watergate Impeachment Hearings House Judiciary Committee, July 26, 1974.
28.13 Harold Froehlich (R Wisconsin). And so now we are here before, we finally got the Articles, the proposed Articles before us. And why have we spent this whole day arguing over the articles? Because they were not specific. Because many of the individuals on this committee did not know what the proposers of this Article were going to use to back it up. And so we have argued for a full day. Now, had the committee staff, which I understand is physically and emotionally drained, had the staff had the time to properly sit down and prepare the details, they could have backed up with a statement, the specifics for each one of these subparagraphs. We could have made a decision as a committee whether they should have been included or not included. But you see, we are here with an article presented when the debate started on Wednesday night. And we have been going for the television cameras morning, afternoon, and evening ever since. The staff people have been going, the committee has been going. There has not been time to detail the specifics of these charges, either in the charges or in supplementary material. And we can t stop to take the time.
Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 26, 1974 (2/2)
[01.25.00] I yield to Mr. Wiggins from California. The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California. Mr. WIGGINS. Thank the gentleman for or yielding. Let's not confuse apples and oranges. We do not have any responsibility to be specific at all here -with respect to the recommendation we Make to the House. Indedd, the House is able to recognize any member at any time to impeach Richard Nixon without any degree of specificity. We are talking rather about what happens at the Senate. This is a job which will be ours to carry to the Senate. Now, ladies and gentlemen, each in turn yesterday and the day before, we paid tribute to the Constitution. Now is the time to put tip or shut up because we are talking about the Constitution. We are talking about the, fifth amendment and the rights of a respondent not on the floor of the House of representatives but at the bar of the Senate. And specificity is required over there because the Constitution demands it. Wouldn't it be a damning indictment, Mr. Chairman, of this committee if, after all this time and all this money, we 'were unable to state specificity what this case is all about? I think it would. Now, all we are asking, Mr. Chairman, is that we get about it and do it. We shouldn't argue over that point. We should be precise and I suggest we do so. [01.26.33--cut to DUKE in studio] DUKE says that the next speaker will be Democrat John CONYERS to argue that the resolutions are specific enough [01.26.48--PBS network ID] [Promo for Masterpiece Theatre Sherlock Holmes feature] [promo for ATP tennis--a doubles match] [an anti-pollution/environmental message] [01.30.00--title screen "Impeachment Debate"] [Duke in studio, introduces Rep. CONYERS.] [01.30.17]
Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 26, 1974 (1/2)
[00.25.02] *See information in RIGHTS field before using* DUKE introduces the guest commentators, William VAN ALSTYNE and Martin DIAMOND, to offer perspective on the legal haggling in the committee. DIAMOND says that the conflict is part of a process, necessary, of getting beyond superficial compromise to an agreement of accomodation on a deep level VAN ALSTYNE says that the PRO-IMPEACHMENT side is strong, the OBSTRUCTION of JUSTICE count is strongly supported through the preliminary debate, and through the wording of the ARTICLE, close to the statutory definition, it's possible that if impeached and removed, NIXON could be criminally indicted. DUKE asks what is the status of the new bill drafted by SARBANES. Starts to go through the ARTICLE charge by charge, asking for comment. [THE CONSENSUS OF ALL OF THE COMMENTATORS IS THAT THE LACK OF SPECIFICITY IS A LEGAL TIGHTROPE FOR THE PRO-IMPEACHMENT SIDE--THEY WANT TO BE BROAD ENOUGH TO GIVE THE FLAVOR OF A CONSPIRACY, REQUIRED BECAUSE NOT ALL MEMBERS MAY AGREE ON ANY SPECIFIC CHARGE OF OBSTRUCTION, BUT NOT SO BROAD AS TO HAVE THE ARTICLE THROWN OUT ON GROUNDS OF DUE PROCESS. SPECIFICITY FAVORS THE PRO-NIXON SIDE] VAN ALSTYNE says that this is a largely political debate, because the historical and legal precedent for proceeding on general terms is well established, and technically, the HOUSE may send impeachment to the Senate on no articles whatsoever until asked for such by the Senate. [00.37.23]
Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 26, 1974 (2/2)
[01.03.42] Mr WALDIE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to my good friend and my able colleague, Mr Wiggins, to complete the statement of the President at the press conference. Mr. WIGGINS. Thank you, Mr. Waldie. I will pick up with the President's answer: "Mr. Zeigler and also Mr. Mitchell, speaking for the campaign committee, have responded to questions On this, the Watergate break-in---"and White House involvement on this in great detail. They have stated my position and have also stated the facts accurately." That is what bothers my friend. "This kind of activity as Mr. Ziegler has indicated has no place whatever in our electoral process or in our governmental process, and as Mr. Ziegler has stated, the White House as had no involvement whatever in this particular incident." Well, now, I have completed it but I think I ought to observe that Mr. Liddy and Mr. Hunt-- Mr. WALDIE. how about observing Mr. WIGGINS. [continuing]. Were not in the White House. Mr. WALDIE. How about observing that on your time. The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California. Mr. WALDIE. I want to, Mr. Chairman, continue with my interrupted narrative and not because I--not because I think the points I ,am Making are necessarily the most important points of this case but I think an understanding of the skeleton outlines of the case is necessary. I have covered June. 17. the date of the burglary, through June 30, the resignation of John Mitchell, and now I want to cover July 1 through September 15 which is the summer and early fall of that year, the next phase of the cover-up. During that period of time these events occurred which bear upon the conclusion as to what did the President know and when did he know it and what did he do. On July 51 4 days, 5 days after the Attorney-former Attorney General the campaign manager of the President, Mr, Mitchell had resigned his chairmanship he was interviewed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and he denied knowledge of any information on the break-in. He later said, well, he had been told a few things but he really didn't believe they were probably true. We, know that isn't so. He knew a great deal and he misrepresented his information to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. On July 19 and 20 Mr. Porter and Mr. Magruder falsely told FBI agents--these are gentlemen employed by the Committee to Re-Elect the President--that funds that had been paid Liddy, one of the indicted Watergate burglars, who was employed as general counsel by the Committee for Re-Election of the President and had been formerly employed by the White House involved in the Plumbers group, that the funds paid Mr. Liddy were for legal political intelligence gathering and not for illicit electronic surveillance or surreptitious entry. He lied when he told the FBI agents that. On August 10 Mr.. Porter perjured himself by lying before the grand jury on the same story. On August 18 Mr. Magruder testified falsely to the grand jury. On August 28, Mr. Krogh, who was the head of the Plumbers this group that was so involved in surreptitious entry throughout the Nixon administration, testified falsely as to the activities of Mr. Liddy and Mr. Hunt when they were employees of the White House before Watergate. And on August 29 the President made, another misstatement to the Nation when he said that he had had a Dean report which had been a complete investigation of Watergate and there was no White House personnel involved. In fact, there was no Dean report and there clearly was no investigation. because Dean's obligation and assignment was to contain, not to investigate, but to cover, not to disclose. The President kenw that. He had never met Dean on August 29 when he told the Nation to lull them into complacency that he was attempting to get to the bottom of this problem. He never told them that he had never met this gentleman that had conducted the so-called report and that in fact he had never received the report, because there was no report, never has been, and to this day there is not a Dean report. Then on September 12, Mr. Magruder testified falsely about the purpose of a meeting with Mitchell, Magruder, Dean and Liddy in which the genesis of the group that broke into the Watergate was first described and political intelligence with surreptitious entry and bugging was discussed. then finally on September 15 the first phase was successfully' accomplished of containment. They held the risk and the exposure to the five burglars that were arrested on the premises and to Hunt and Liddy. The risk and the exposure was contained and the President September 15, that very day, met Mr. Dean for the first time and was complimentary to him, complimented him on doing such a good job in containing this risk to just those seven people. It did not get beyond those five burglars and Mr. Hunt and Liddy and that was an enormous accomplishment and the President's language and Mr. Dean's language is instructive. The President said, "Well, you had quite a day today, didn't you? You got Watergate on the way." The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. I recognize the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. McClory. [01.09.51]
Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, May 9, 1974
The CHAIRMAN. I recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Donohue. Mr. DONOHUE. Chairman. as understand it. the impeachment inquiry staff has received a wide variety of material which has, up until now, been subject to the requirements of confidentiality. Included in this class of confidential material are. documents 'which have been received from grand juries as well as materials developed by other congressional committees in executive sessions. Under the circumstances Mr. Chairman. it is my opinion we should not make, all this material public today. Therefore, I' move that during initial phase of the presentation the committee go into executive session pursuant to rule 11, clause 27 of our House rules. That rule provides that If evidence or testimony at an investigative hearing may tend to defame, degrade, or incriminate any person the committee shall receive such evidence, or testimony in executive session. Mr. McCLORY. I second the motion. The CHAIRMAN. The motion has been made and seconded. Mr. CONYERS. May I be recognized, Mr. Chairman? [CHAIRMAN RODINO attempting none too subtly to jackboot the motion into a vote without debate] The CHAIRMAN. The motion, I might advise the gentleman from Michigan, is not a debatable motion. Mr. CONYERS. This motion--well, point, of order-, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the Motion Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, point of order. The CHAIRMAN. Since, the question is not one that is debatable, the Chair will put the question to the committee. All those in favor --- Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, point of order. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state his point of order. Mr. CONYERS. Is the Chair suggesting that a motion of this importance and magnitude, with no more than being stated and seconded, cannot be considered by the members of this committee gathered here for the purposes of an impeachment hearing? CHAIRMAN. Is the gentleman stating a point of order? Mr. CONYERS. Yes. The CHAIRMAN. Or is he inquiring of the Chair? The Chair has Mready ruled that the motion is not a debatable one in accordance. with the rules of the House, rule 11, 27m, and therefore, unless the gentleMan is ready to state. that he has an argument to support, his point of order, the, Chair is ready to present the, question on the motion. [00.22.14]
Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 30, 1974 (2/2)
Committee Chairman U.S. Representative Peter Rodino (D-NJ) at House Judiciary Committee Impeachment Hearings for U.S. President Richard Nixon, recognizes Representative Father Robert Drinan (D-MA), who discusses two previous votes on contempt citations during his time in Congress, the first against Dr. Frank Stanton (CBS President, regarding the House investigation of “Selling of the Pentagon”) in 1971, and the second with G. Gordon Liddy in 1973. Drinan considers the President to be in the same category as any person whose documents are subpoenaed by Congress, adding he finds nothing would justify the defiance of Congress’ subpoena; cites the Supreme Court ruling that Nixon had not invoked any military or diplomatic justification for his refusal of the subpoenas. Drinan points out that Nixon cannot be indicted in a court for contempt as a sitting president. Drinan is in favor of Article Three’s citation of contempt against Nixon.
Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 29, 1974 (2/2)
[01.25.55] I recognize the gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Froehlich. Mr. FROEHLICH. . Mr. Chairman, my concern over the extended use of the wiretaps and the abusive use of the IRS have been fully developed here, this evening and today, and I, therefore, yield to the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Latta. The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Ohio is recognized. Mr. LATTA. Can I take my time now, Mr. Chairman.-' The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it is so ordered, and the gentleman is so recognized. Mr. LATTA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr. Froehlich for yielding to me. Mr. Chairman, if -we had not had all these -weeks of in-depth study on the evidentiary material I frankly would have a hard time making a judgment on this article after hearing all of these remarks that have been made by our colleagues, I think this probably is attributable to the fact that I believe in the history of the Congress that there has not been a committee that has studied so intently for or' such a long period of time and given such attention, and I do not believe we have ever had a committee in the Congress that has had better attendance, even be hind closed doors at committee sessions. And I want to commend you, Mr. Chairman, for the attention that, you have given and the direction that you have given in this committee. Certainly there are disagreements, and I think by now there is one thing on which we can all agree, however, and that is that, there are many areas of disagreement. And our vote depends on which into interpretation we place upon them. If we choose to view the President in a bad light, we can do that, and if we *choose to view him in a good light, there is ample evidence to permit us to do that. We have also learned this afternoon that a majority on this committee wishes to hold a President impeachable for actions of subordinates under subparagraphs 1 and 2, even though he had no knowledge of the action of said subordinates. Now, Mr. Chairman and members of this committee and fellow Americans, this bothers me tremendously. Mr. RAILSBACK. Would the gentleman yield? Mr. LATTA. I will be happy to yield. Mr. RAILSBACK. Thank you for yielding. You are not suggesting, I take it, that in respect to the subparagraph 1 relating to IRS that on September 15, there was no conversation between John Dean and the President at which time John Dean has testified that there was an extensive discussion about the IRS audits? Mr. LATTA. I have direct reference to the refusal of this committee to adopt the Wiggins amendment. Mr. Chairman, as I say, this bothers me tremendously, not only for now, but for the future. What we do here, will be written down as a precedent to be used in the future, and I'm not particularly concerned about the present occupant of the White House. I am most deeply concerned about the Office of the President of the United States, and -where that Office will be not 10 years from now or 20 years from now, but in generations to come, because I highly revere that office. It is the most respected office in all the world, and it is the most powerful. Nobody can deny the fact. that every nation on the face of this globe looks to the Oval Office of the, President of the United States, and what we are saying here is that we can impeach a, President for actions of his subordinates without his knowledge. And what can that do to the Office, of the President in the future, when you -can impeach for actions of a subordinate without his knowledge? As members of this committee know there, are approximately 3,900 employees at the Executive Office of the President. There are, 2,600,000 employees of the Federal Government. not counting the military. Could somebody down the line. years hence interpret our actions here that he would have to be held accountable, for any and all of these actions, even though he had no knowledge of them, because they are under his jurisdiction, under his administration, and technically they are? So, I think that -we must proceed with utmost caution, that 'We, weaken, that we weaken that office that we hold so dear. [01.31.22]
Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 26, 1974 (2/2)
[01.16.08] Mr. RAILSBACK. Mr. Chairman? Mr. Chairman? The CHAIRMAN. I recognize the gentleman from New York, Mr. Rangel, for 5 minutes. Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Chairman, and my colleagues, it seems to me that our constitutional responsibility is really to respond to the House of Representatives. It seems to me that we would be taking on more than mandate allows if we were to draw some very narrow allegations and not have the evidence that not have heard over all of these months presented to the Members of the House. I think their judgment as to final allegation, if any, is going to be presented to the Senate, we cannot be presumptive enough that it just meets our needs, and to cut ,off to them the benefit of all of this, all of these months of research. If members are having some type of a problem in terms of what they are prepared to vote for in connection with an article of impeachment, it seems to me that this does not necessarily have to be done in a parliamentary way to just delay these proceedings. I think that each member would. have the opportunity as to what in his own mind be believes is an impeachable offense. And I personally believe there is enough in the edited transcripts for that purpose. But, he should not preclude the information which we have compiled from reaching the floor of the House of Representatives We merely have the responsibility to report our findings to the House, and if we vote articles of impeachment they may, in fact be rejected by the House. If we suggest to them that three or four articles have been voted on by the majority of the members of this committee, and they see fit to expand, then it seems to me at this late time that if the -Members want facts, my God, we have had more than enough facts to reach questions of whether or not we should vote on a particular article. But, if there are Members that are. prepared to vote on a particular article, it seems to me we should be, prepared to vote on that, and then to Move so that we can work our will and report back to the House Of Representatives. I think that is our restrictive constitutional responsibility, and we should not allow our vote to be interpreted as being the vote of the House. Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Ohio. *NOTE*-- The following segment was stricken from the official record of the hearing* MR. SEIBERLING. I would like to suggest that the other gentleman from Ohio owes this committee and Mr. Jenner an apology for what I consider to be an uprofessional and certainly an unjudicial comment on a completely extraneous matter with respect to Mr. Jenner. And I hope the gentleman would reflect that it is completely unbecoming t0 the dignity of these proceedings and in all my time on this committee its the first time I've ever heard this kind of thing in [unclear]. Mr. LATTA. Will the Gentleman Yield? Mr. SEIBERLING. I don't have the time. Mr. LATTA. Who has the time? The gentleman is entitled to his opinion and that's all it is. I might say that the gentleman, Mr. Mann, was referring to some of the items that, the articles that he agreed with, and then went into the matter of some of the activities of Mr. Jenner that he agreed with, and I'm not gonna give a blanket endorsement to what came out in the paper today---- Mr. SEIBERLING. Well, all I---- Mr. LATTA. Will the Gentleman please withhold just a minute--- Mr. SEIBERLING. I would hope the gentleman would reflect on what he said. Mr. LATTA. I think the American people are interested in what was in the article, and here it is--- [the time is withdrawn from Mr. LATTA.] *End of STRICKEN SECTION* The CHAIRMAN. There is still discussion, but the Chair is going to recess at this time until 8 o'clock. [01.20.28--DUKE v.o. begins] DUKE announces end of first five hours of debate. [cut DUKE in studio] DUKE calls it a turning point as members begin to debate specific articles. Became evident that the PRO-NIXON REPUBLICAN members intend to use a variety of tactic to slow down the process Indicatiop that the DEMOCRATIC majority may have difficulty in getting REPUBLICANS to sign on to ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT,but nonetheless, a majority does exist for IMPEACHMENT, and some form of ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT will almost certainly be submitted to the HOUSE Floor. LEHRER signs off (the morning sessions were videotaped and broadcast after the evening sessions, making the time well after midnight. [PBS ID] [01.22.34--OUT]
Watergate Impeachment Hearings House Judiciary Committee, July 26, 1974.
Watergate Impeachment Hearings House Judiciary Committee, July 26, 1974. Tom Railsback (R Illinois). I want to thank the gentleman for yielding and very briefly just say I was impressed also with the statement of Mr. Froehlich. And if we are going to be prepared to present a bill of particulars to the body, for the life of me I wonder why we can t have our own bill of particulars to take to the House, if we call it a bill of particulars or if we call it some kind of supporting evidence, but many of us feel we do need something. Perhaps it should be in the nature of a bill of particulars. John Seiberling (D Ohio). Well, as long as it is tentative, because new evidence may well be discovered before we got to the point of a trial in the Senate. Tom Railsback (R Illinois). It could be tentative, but I think it would help our colleagues and I really think it would help us. Peter Rodino (D New Jersey). The time of the gentleman has expired.
Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 30, 1974 (1/2)
[00.02.00] Mr. SEIBERLING......action on this question may be premature in that there is still incompleteness to the investigation of this whole matter. And I would like to ask the Chair if it isn't correct that the resolution House Resolution 803 under which we are operating. will authorize the staff to continue to keep the investigation open. on this particular point even after we have voted on this matter this evening. Is that correct? The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 803 under which this committee has been conducting its inquiry, the vitality of the investigation will continue and the investigation therefore Into this area will continue. Mr. SEIBERLING. I thank the Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman now has 11 minutes remaining, the gentleman from Iowa. Mr. MEZVINSKY. I yield 11 of those to the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Brooks. Mr. BROOKS. 'Mr. Chairman, I want to explain a little further the detail as to how the---- The CHAIRMAN. Will the gentleman defer? Does the gentleman, who controls the time, and who has the right to assert his arguments last, does he intend to use all of the time now? Mr. MEZVINSKY. I would yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Brooks. The CHAIRMAN. The, gentleman has 11 minutes. Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, to clarify the fact that the President does take a very personal interest in his activities, in our conversations before this committee and in testimony, Mr. Butterfield testified that Mr. Haldeman never did anything without the knowledge of the President. I want to quote from that testimony of Mr. Butterfield. [quoting] Mr. JENNER. Was there any occasion during all of the. time that you were at the White House that there came to your attention that Haldeman ever did anything without the knowledge of the President? Mr. BUTTERFIELD. No, never. Mr. JENNER. Dealing with White House affairs? Mr. BUTTERFIELD. No, never, Nothing unilateral at all. He was essentially, I may have said this, but an implementer. Mr. Haldeman implemented the decisions of the President, as did Mr. Ehrlichman, but perhaps to a lesser extent. But Haldeman especially was an implementer because the President ran his own personal affairs. He was not a decisionmaker. Mr. JENNER. Mr. Butterfield, would you repeat that for me? I didn't hear it. Mr. BUTTERFIELD. I said I did not know Mr. Haldeman to be a decisionmaker. He was entirely in my view an implementer I can hardly recall the decisions, any decisions that he made, unless that it was that the White House staff mess personnel would wear jackets or something along that line. He implemented the President's decisions. The President was the decisionmaker. The President was 100 percent in charge. [end quoted section] I want to point out that the last witness before this committee, Mr. Herb Kalmbach, the President's personal attorney who served as the President's personal representative at San Clemente, and during his appearance the following discussion took place between Mr. Kalmbach and our friend Mr. Jenner. [quoting] Mr. JENNER. A. previous witness has testified, as a matter of fact, Alexander Butterfield, that the President was "very interested" in the grounds at Key Biscayne, Camp David, San Clemente, the house, the cottage and the grounds. From your experience in serving in the capacity you indicated, is that a fair characterization? Mr. KALMBACH. It is. Mr. JENNER. And that arises from your personal knowledge and experience in dealing with this matter? Mr. KALMBACH. Yes. [end quoted section] Mr. RAILSBACK. Mr. Chairman--would the gentleman yield? Mr. BROOKS. I would rather complete this. Mr. RAILSBACK. Go ahead. Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Kalmbach, in reply to another question- [quoting (Kalmbach)] Mr. Jenner, I recall walking with the President and Mrs. Nixon around the grounds subsequent to the time that they had moved into their property and, of course, were in San Clemente. They pointed out to me, the President pointed out to me and also Mrs. Nixon, certain rosebushes that should be pulled up and changed and moved around. There was a great interest in the grounds, a great interest in all things relative to that property. Mr. JENNER. And did the President go into some detail as to specific items? Mr. KALMBACH. Yes, sir, of course. I recall his attention to detail involved in the building of the swimming pool at the San Clemente property. [end quoted section] Mr. BROOKS. Down a couple of questions [quoting] Mr. JENNER. Well was that in 1969? Mr. KALMBACH. I don't recall when the pool-we had a meeting I recall in one of the gazebos with the President, Mr. Rebozo, Mr. Ehrlichman, myself, Harold Lynch and I think Frank DeMarco were there, and the President went over the schematics and the layout with great attention and I cannot pinpoint the date. My logs would show that, I believe. [end quoted section] [00.07.26]
Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 27, 1974 (1/2)
[00.21.03] Mr. HOGAN. I will be very pleased to do so, Mr. Chairman. If the Chair would advise me at that -point in the expiration of my time, I will conclude in midsentence and yield. May I continue? The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman is recognized. Mr. HOGAN. Mr. Gray reported this fact to Mr. Dean, that he was going to have a meeting with Helms. SO on the morning of the 28th, Ehrlichman telephoned Gray and told him to cancel the meeting with Helms because he did not want the meeting to take. place at which Helms would tell that there was no CIA involvement. Gray canceled the meeting. The same, day Gray instructed his FBI agents to go out and interview Ogarrio, and continue to try to locate Dahlberg. Also on the 28th Dean asked Walters if, even after knowing there was no CIA involvement, Dean asked Walters if the CIA could stop the FBI investigations of the Dahlberg and Ogarrio checks. Walters refused to do so. Since he could not use CIA to block the investigation, Dean then acted directly, called Gray and insisted that for national security reasons or because Of CIA interest, that Gray's instructions to interview those two men should be withdrawn. Gray did cancel the interviews. But a few days later, Gray called Walters and said that he would interview them unless CIA put into writing its objection. CIA refused to do so and Walters sent Gray a memo saying that CIA had absolutely no interest. They expressed their dissatisfaction with the way the White House, was interfering with their agencies and their concern that the President's interests were not being served by his aides. These above activities were set in motion by the President, and limited the investigatory efforts of the FBI. Now there are other problems I was going to detail but I will not be able to but I do want to call to the attention and recollection of my colleagues the conversation whereby Gray called San Clemente and got Clark MacGregor on the phone and he said to Clark "that I want to talk with the President about his aides trying to misuse"--these are Gray's words not ours-- "misuse the CIA and the FBI." A few minutes later the President called Mr. Gray and did not in any way allude to any conversation he had with Mr. MacGregor or Gray's concern and congratulated Mr. Gray for doing an outstanding job in the hijacking. Mr. Gray could not contain himself any more, he blurted out, "Mr. President, your aides are trying to destroy You. They are misusing the FBI and CIA." And then Mr. Gray testified there was a perceptible pause and the President said, "Go on With your aggressive investigation, Pat." He did not even inquire about this involvement of his aides trying to misuse the FBI and the CIA. I only wish I had another hour to detail more specifies in this area but unfortunately, I do not and I will yield to the gentleman from California, Mr. Danielson. Mr. DANIELSON. Mr. chairman at this point I -wish to save time but in support of my amendment to include congressional committees, I wish to reefer to and by this reference incorporate the comments I made this morning at the time of the amendment and also my comments made on the day before yesterday, July 25, with respect to the House Committee on Banking 'and Currency. There is further evidence in support of such activities with respect to the Senate select committee and this committee and I also incorporate them by reference. Due to the shortage, of time I yield to my brother, Father Drinan. Mr. HOGAN. I think I still have the time but I will be happy to yield to the Congressman form from Massachusetts Mr. DRINAN. Thank you very much. I want to point out the necessity of retaining this section because it deals with something very fundamental, that by Federal law, any person who influences or seeks to influence or intimidates or impedes any witness in any proceeding, commits a crime. Let us take the summer of John Dean during that particular year. On June 21 he is assigned to this case and he sits first of all, with Mr. Gray and the FBI people at every single interview when people from White House go before the FBI. Is Mr. Dean seeking to influence or intimidate or impede? He happens to be the President's counsel. And all of the people who saw Dean there, -who knew, recognized that this is most unusual, especially after the President on the very day after Mr. Dean was assigned, said that the White House has had no involvement whatsoever in Watergate and the President's counsel is there on the phone, day after day, for 2 long weeks with Mr. Patrick Gray. Well, Dean and Ehrlichman really could write a book on how to be a double agent of the FBI. Did he seek to--did he succeed in influencing? That is not the question. The offense is done even if he endeavors to influence. Mr. Dean was before this committee. I cannot imagine him intimidating but he can influence and he can impede and he was very successful. [00.26.20]
Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 29, 1974 (1/2)
[00.43.01] Mr. BROOKS. Now later Dean joined the President and Haldeman and continued their meetings. We have not received a tape recording of this portion of the conversation but Dean testified that at that meeting there was a discussion of the unwillingness of the IRS to follow up on the White House directive. In his testimony the following exchange took place between Mr. Doar and Mr. Dean: [quoting] Mr. DOAR. Did you discuss your assignment with respect to the IRS with the President during your meeting on September 15? Mr. DEAN. I am not sure how directly or specifically it came up. But there was Indeed a rather extended discussion with the President on the use not IRS. He made some rather specific comments to me which in turn resulted in me going back to Mr. Walters again. Mr. DOAR. When you say the use of IRS, what are you talking about? Mr. DEAN. Well, as I recall the conversation, we were talking about the problems of having IRS conduct audits and I told him that we hadn't been very successful at this because Mr. Walters had told me that be just didn't want to do it. I did not, I did not push him. As far as I was concerned, I was off the' hook. I had done what I had been asked. I related this to the President and he said- The CHAIRMAN. The time--- Mr. BROOKS. May I complete this paragraph, and he said something to the effect, "well, if Shultz thinks he has been Put Over there to be some sort of candy ass, he is mistaken and if you have got any problems you just come tell me and I will get it straightened out." The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired, [00.44.43--cut LEHRER in studio, says that Rep. DENNIS will speak next--PBS network ID--promos for PBS Programming--these are kind of crazy, very dated, i.e. a "civics lesson" cartoon show] [00.48.02--title screen "Impeachment Debate July 29, 1974--pullback to LEHRER in studio, introduction of the debate to pass Rep. WIGGINS' amendment] [00.48.18--cut audience shot of committee room--committee bench] [00.48.18]
Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 27, 1974 (1/2)
[00.14.27] The gentleman from Alabama. Mr. FLOWERS. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk. The CHAIRMAN. The clerk will read the amendment. The CLERK. [reading] Amendment by Mr. Flowers. Strike subparagraph 4 of the Sarbanes substitute. Mr. FLOWERS Mr. Chairman, I would like the same motion that the 'debate on my amendment be limited to 20 minutes to be divided 10 minutes to the proponents of the motion and 10 minutes to those that oppose the motion. I ask unanimous consent. Mr. CHAIRMAN. Without objection, and the policy will accordingly be the same, that the 20 minutes will be divided among the proponents and the opponents evenly. Mr. FLOWERS. Thank- you, Mr. Chairman. I have discussed at length this subparagraph with the gentleman from Maryland, Mr. Hogan, and I would yield my time to him. Mr. HOGAN. I thank the gentleman from Alabama. As we know, the paragraph -reads: Interfering or endeavoring to interfere with the conduct of investigations by the Department of Justice of the United States, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Office of Watergate Special Prosecution Force. Now, perhaps I feel the importance of this more than most because of my former affiliation with the FBI,. but the fact that the President and the White House used the FBI and the CIA to thwart the investigation troubles me very deeply because if we do not have confidence In these important sensitive agencies, then the very core of our country is in jeopardy. So I am going to be very specific and my colleagues, if they so desire, can have from me later citations in the evidentiary record to substantiate the comments which I am going to make. on June 21, 1972, Ehrlichman told Acting FBI Director Gray that Dean would be handling inquiry into Watergate for the White House. The following day, the 22d of June Gray informed Dean that the $100 bills found on the Watergate burglars had been traced to the Miami bank account of Bernard Barker, who, as you will recall, was one of the burglars, and Ogarrio had been identified as the makers of the checks and that the FBI was trying to locate these men for interview. The following day Dean reported this information to Haldeman and Haldeman reported it to the President. We, subpenaed a tape of the conversation between the President and Mr. Haldeman and it was not, given to us. But we do know from other testimony that the, same day the President personally directed Haldeman and Ehrlichman to meet with CIA Director Helms and Deputy CIA Director Walters to express White House concerns and ask Walters to meet with FBI Director Gray and communicate these White House concerns to Gray. They did meet with Helms. And Helms told Ehrlichman and Haldeman that there was no CIA involvement in the Watergate break-in and he told him that he had previously given similar assurances to Mr. Gray. Haldeman told Helms that the FBI investigation was leading, to important people and it was, the President's wish, because an FBI investigation in Mexico might uncover CIA activities or assets, that Walters suggested to Gray that it was not, advantageous to pursue the inquiry, into Mexico . Ehrlichman's testimony subsequently was that the Mexican checks traced to this Florida bank account were dismissed as a specific example of the President concern. NOW, why Were, they concerned about these, checks? They -were concerned because these checks were a direct, link from the burglars to the, Committee TO Re-Elect the President. And if that link had not been forged, we would not, be, sitting here today. So that is why they did not want the, investigation to go forward into Mexico. During or shortly after the meeting among Ehrlichman, Haldeman Helms, and Walters, John Dean called Gray and told him that he Could expect. call from Deputy CIA Director Walters. Immediately after the meeting with Haldeman and Ehrlichman, Walters met with Gray and expressed these so-called concerns. So Gray agreed to hold up the, FBI interview of Ogarrio and he, indicated that the FBI, however Was still going, to try to locate Dahlberg. Parenthetically, at, this very time Dahlberg was meeting with Maurice Stans at the Committee To Re-Elect the President while the FBI was trying to find him. Walters thinking that there might possibly be, some CIA involvement of which he was not personally aware, checked his operatives Checked his Operatives in the field to see if there was any jeopardy to CIA activities, He found out from them that there was no jeopardy involved. on June, 26, 1972, Walters so advised White House liaison man John Dean. On the, 27th of June Helms officially notified Gray that the CIA had no interest in Ogarrio, And Helms and Gray in their telephone conversations set up a meeting time, for the following day so the two Of them could discuss the, question of possible, CIA interest in Watergate. Mr. Gray reported this to Dean. The, CHAIRMAN. The 5 minutes--- Mr. HOGAN. Mr. Chairman, I now seek 5 minutes recognition on my own time. The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman is recognized. HOWEVER, the Chair would like to state that since the gentleman is speaking in opposition to the amendment and there were others who--there are others who sought to be recognized. would the gentleman be ready to yield 2 minutes to two other gentlemen? Otherwise, it is not going to--the Chair is not going to be able to recognize them within that time. [00.21.03]
Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 24, 1974
[00.13.03] [in to DUKE seated in studio] DUKE indicates two dramatic moments in the first night of arguments, both involving REPUBLICAN representatives from Illinois. First, sez DUKE, Rep. McCLORY indicated that he might vote for impeachment on the article of ABUSE OF POWER by President NIXON. Second, Rep. RAILSBACK came close to implicating the President in the Watergate case, leading DUKE to believe that RAILSBACK might vote to impeach, making at least three REPUBLICANS on the committe believed to have deserted NIXON's side. DUKE opines to LEHRER that the evening's debate took place on a generally high level, with most Representatives taking the high road. LEHRER agrees, saying he is also struck by the difference in styles among the congressmen who spoke. [cut to shot of LEWIS interviewing Rep. RAILSBACK. Also holding out a microphone to the Rep. is Sam DONALDSON.] RAILSBACK is discussing his speech, DONALDSON asks one more question, whether RAILSBACK is going to announce his vote yet RAILSBACK says that he's going to listen to the rest of the debate. LEWIS requests more time with the congressman. RAILSBACK expresses his concern that the White House is not cooperating. Another female reporter asks if RAILSBACK believes honestly that NIXON will step forward and give up the evidence voluntarily. RAILSBACK says that yes, he does. [cut back to studio, showing DUKE seated and LEHRER standing next to a bulletin board of photos under categories "AYES", "NAYS", "MAYBE AYES", AND "MAYBE NAYS"] DUKE recaps the night's events, saying there were six who spoke to clearly indicate their vote woudl be for impeachment (all DEMOCRATS), two indicate they would certainly vote against (all REPUBLICANS), and two who indicated they could possibly vote for at least one ARTICLE OF IMPEACHMENT (also REPUBLICANS). [pan/zoom in on LEHRER at board] [zoom in on board] LEHRER discusses the breakdown, 19 "AYES", 6 confirmed "NAYS", 5 leaning toward "NAY", and 7 leaning toward "AYE". Asks LEWIS for input [cut to LEWIS standing with Rep. McCLORY] LEWIS asks whether Rep. McCLORY can state any further his postion on voting for the article on contempt of Congress. McCLORY replies in the affirmative, stating that NIXON should provide all requested materials to the committee. His refusal demands action, and is a valid grounds for impeachment. Says that since the Supreme Court has demanded the WHITE HOUSE TAPES be turned over to the Federal District Court for the criminal trials, this is even further argument that they should be turned over to the Judiciary Committee. Says that he hopes impeachment is not necessary to get the evidence turned over. LEWIS asks McCLORY whether as a Sr. member of the committee he will try to negotiate a turnover of evidence with the White House, possibly through VP FORD. McCLORY says that if the tapes can be gotten within a month or so, that a delay might be in order, but a longer wait than that and the committe will have to proceed [00.22.22]
Watergate Impeachment Hearings House Judiciary Committee, July 26, 1974. Vote on motion to strike paragraph I of the Sarbanes substitute.
Watergate Impeachment Hearings House Judiciary Committee, July 26, 1974. Vote on motion to strike paragraph I of the Sarbanes substitute.
Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 30, 1974 (2/2)
[01.31.26] Mr. FROEHLICH. It further stated that in the last analysis it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Thus, the Court said, in essence, that the President was absolutely correct in defending his interpretation of the Constitution but that the Supreme Court's decision with respect to claim of executive privilege was dispositive in the last analysis. It then held that although the courts will afford the utmost deference in the Presidential need for confidentiality when the. claim of privilege is based merely on generalized interest in confidentiality the assertion of the privilege must yield to a demonstrated specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial, that is, the tapes must be given to the district court for in camera inspection. I The decision of Supreme Court did not say that executive privilege was not a viable doctrine,. On the contrary, it said that certain powers and privileges flow from the nature of enumerated powers, the protection of confidentiality of Presidential communication has similar constitutional underpinnings. It also said the privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution Thus, the Supreme Court-, has stated emphatically that executive privilege is a constitutional privilege available to the President. Now, whenever a situation where ere' members of this committee, like Mr. Jaworski, are asserting the right to have certain information because under article I the House shall have the sole power of impeachment, but that clause says nothing about a President being powerless to assert what he understands to be his constitutional responsibility to protect his office. Therefore, at best -we have two great branches of government involved in a stalemate both arguing the Constitution. As the Supreme Court, said it is emphatically the province and duty of the Supreme Court to say what the law is. So if the members of this committee believe their position, they should have gone to court and asked the court to say what the law is. The committee has every right to assert its understanding of the Constitution but it is not the final arbitrator. It is not the judge and jury. Our Constitution gives the courts the responsibility to interpret the law and I would remind the committee that the President has,, responded to have judicial subpena served upon him and has recently stated he intends to fully comply with the Supreme Court rulings. So there is a remedy available to test these theories of constitutional authority to get information and that is to use the courts, not to attempt to impeach a President for defending what he believes to be his duty under the Constitution. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. SEIBERLING. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. I recognize the gentleman from Ohio, Seiberling. Mr. SEIBERLING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I support the Thornton substitute. I also support the McClory original article, though I think the substitute is an improvement- And the reason it is an improvement is because it makes it even more clear that we are not stating a broad power to obtain Presidential documents in any type of congressional proceeding but we are limiting it to an impeachment proceeding which is what we have before, us". Now, it seems to me that no one can dispute that 'without the power to investigate, the impeachment power is meaningless. It is inconceivable that the Founding Fathers believed that a subject of an impeachment inquiry should be able to withhold relevant evidence from impeachment proceedings. Certain privileges founded in our concept of due process I believe are applicable even in impeachment proceedings, but certainly so-called executive privilege is not one of them. Impeachment is the express exception in the Constitution to the so-called separation of powers doctrine. The very purpose of the impeachment power is to discover and remove those civil officers who committed certain serious offenses against the state. Stonewalling tactics have no legitimate place in procedures which are designed to find the truth as rapidly and as completely as possible. Now, if this were a court case the question of privilege would be one for the judge of the court to decide but here, in the first instance, at the committee is the judge, acting for the full House, and the House thereafter, and if the House votes articles of impeachment, ---- [01.36.04--TAPE OUT]
Watergate Impeachment Hearings House Judiciary Committee, July 26, 1974.
57.35 Let's look at his conversation with Petersen in April. He says to Petersen April 27th, he is describing this March 21st conversation about the Hunt blackmail payment. He said to Peterson, "And believe me, nothing was approved. I mean as far as I'm concerned I turned it, off totally." But if we recall the language that the President used on March 21st at the end of his conversation, his very own words, he said to Dean, "That's why for your immediate thing you've got no choice with Hunt, but the 120 or whatever it is, right? Well for Christ's sake, get it, in a way that uh." And then he goes on and he says to Petersen, Well, he says, when I was talking to Dean about this blackmail money or this million dollars I said to Dean, "You couldn't put it through a Cuban Committee, could you?" Well, the President never said that to Dean. He never said anything like that. What in fact he said to Dean was how to make up an alibi on the Cuban money. The President's own words, "As far as what happened up to this time," and that is referring to all the hush money payments, our cover the is just going to be the Cuban Committee, did this for them up through the election." Dean, "That isn't, of course, quite the way it happened." President, "I know but it's the way it is going to have to happen." Where do we see the President of the United States in his conversations either with Mr. Kleindienst or Mr. Petersen making any attempt to deal with the criminal liability of the people around him and get rid of the cancer not only in his White House but in our country? And that is what we are, talking about here, Mr. Chairman. And I urge that this motion to strike be defeated. Peter Rodino (D New Jersey). The time of the gentlelady had expired.
Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 26, 1974 (2/2)
[01.03.50] Mr. DRINAN. On June 20,1972, John Mitchell said that the Committee To Re-Elect had no legal, moral, or ethical responsibility for the Watergate break-in. Two days later the President publicly said John "Mitchell has accurately stated the facts. On that same day the President said the White House has had no involvement whatsoever in Watergate. The very next day, however, the President directed Haldeman to get the CIA to head off the FBI investigation. Everyone knows that really the intent to have the CIA tell the FBI that the CIA has an involvement in Mexico was because of the laundered money. The President of the United States had to know about the laundered Money because the checks had shown up and they were traceable to the bank account of Bernard Barker. Mr. Helms, the head of the CIA, told Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman that there was no involvement of the CIA in the Watergate and the FBI can go forward in Mexico and that we have no interest in that matter. But, Haldeman said that he feared that the FBI should not do this and Ehrlichman said that the President himself was concerned about the Mexican money and the Florida bank account. This is the President who 3 days earlier said we have no involvement whatsoever in the Watergate. And at the end of that meeting on June 23, Ehrlichman advised Walters that Mr. Dean would take over in negotiating with the CIA On June 26 Mr. Walters told Mr. Dean that no FBI investigator could compromise any CIA activities. On June 27, Doan met with 'Walters once again, and he had the effrontery to ask the CIA A to deviate from the basic purpose and to pay bail for the people who were involved in the Watergate, and to pay them salaries, And Mr. Walters said I shall not unless the President orders it. And Dean said that Mr. Ehrlichman has approved of it, and Dean went back to Ehrlichman and Ehrlichman said to Dean to push Walters a little harder. And the very next day Mr. Dean summoned Mr. Walters to his White House office, and Dean brought up, the five Mexican checks and the check of Mr. Dahlberg and Dean again asked Mr. Walters to have the CIA stop, the FBI investigation. There is no involvement. We have no specifies? On June 28, Dean and Ehrlichman knew that Gray and Helms were not going to collaborate and they canceled the whole thing. Other specific things happened in that long summer 2 years ago, Dean obtained raw data from Pat Gray on the FBI Watergate in., investigation and Mr. Dean turned that over to the Committee to Re-Elect. Attorney General Kleindienst had refused that information and that information impelled the investigation. Other things happened in that early August of 1972. The President himself asked Mr. Ehrlichman to arrange that Stans not be compelled to go before the grand jury, and that was granted, and similar compromising arrangements were made by the special prosecutor for Colson and Krogh and Young and Chapin and Strachan. They gave testimony before the prosecutors and not before the jury. The only possible explanation is the adoption by the President himself, of a policy to obstruct the investigation of the break-in. I Yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from California Mr. Waldie. The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman is recognized. Mr. WALDIE. Thank yon. Mr. Chairman. Back to the evening of the 20th where the President is having,"". conversation with John Mitchell and they are talking about Watergate, but the Phone unhappily is a phone that is not hooked to, taping system. It is one of those things that happened on the, 20th and we just have to live with those unhappy circumstances. So the only evidence we have of what they really talked about was a dictabelt where the President recorded as was his custom, the events that occurred during the day and on that dictabelt he got to this paragraph and said: "I also talked to John Mitchell, tried to cheer him up a bit. He is terribly chagrined that the activities of anybody attached to his committee should have been handled in such a manner. He only regretted he had not policed all people More effectively in his own organization." And that's another one of those, sad circumstances where then the is a 40-second or 42-second silence on that dictabelt that we have to put up with. But, after that we know then that John Mitchell knew what had happened. There is no question about it that John Mitchell told the President that CRP people were involved. Next day John Mitchell put out a press release saving he deplored that Watergate break-in but fortunately there were' no CRP official people involved, no campaign people. And Ron Ziegler joined in that and said you are right and neither are there any White House people in that third-rate burglary attempt. Now, John Mitchell lied. Everybody agrees. Everybody but John Mitchell, for the record. John Mitchell lied. There were campaign people involved and he knew it. Ron Ziegler lied. Ron Ziegler may not have known it because Ziegler has an ability not to understand many things that occur. But, there -were White House people, Hunt and the President know Hunt was there. Then on the 22d here is the overt acceptance of the President of the plan, the President asked in a press conference what he thought the Watergate burglary, were any members from the White House involved, and he said John Mitchell and Ron Ziegler have told you about that even and they told you the truth and I agree with them. He said there were no White House people involved. he said there were no Committee To Re-Elect the President people involved. There were. He knew about it. At that point he joined publicly, in front of all of the American people, the plan to cover tip as he, of necessity, thought he had to. He could have gone before the American people at that press conference and said it is incredible, this fellow Liddy went to my Attorney General out on the golf course, and told him to bail out these fellows. and I fired the Attorney General because he didn't report it and didn't put Liddy in jail. He could have said. I have been told that there is CRP money involved, that they found down there money from the Committee To Re-Elect the President, I can't believe that. That's beyond my--in fact, you know what I did, I threw an ashtray across the room when I was told that. That's what he could have said if he wanted to tell the truth. The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Massachusetts has expired. Mr. WALDIE. But he said that there were no White House people and no campaign people involved. The President lied and the President covered up. [01.10.36]
Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 29, 1974 (2/2)
[01.03.57] Mr. SANDMAN. Mr. Danielson, says that it is all right even if you can show that, the President did not know about it or that he did not direct it. No other human being can be held responsible for the acts of his agents in any kind of a criminal conviction unless he has one or the other of those conditions present. Mr. DANIELSON. Would the gentleman yield for a response? Mr. SANDMAN. When I am through if I have some time. Now, I have asked that we make a simple sentence out of each charge. The opposition have danced around that request for several days. Now, this is I think points to precisely why you will not do it. Through some mistake I suppose I got some of the arguments that the staff gave fellows on that side to use, but one of these things starts out with early 1970. Mr. HUNGATE. Pardon me. Mr. SANDMAN. Haldeman directed Mollenhoff. It is my time. That Does not say that the President did it, it says that Haldeman does. That was in 1970. 'The next thing that you have here on page 2 is John Caulfield, a member of Dean's staff, he did something at the request of Haldeman. It does not, say at the request of the President. Now. are you talking about the incident of March 13? We are entitled to know because if that is the one you are, concerned about you are not going to have much of a case. And then You have another one here in the spring of 1972, Ehrlichman wanted some information on O'Brien, but there is nothing in the information in front of me here, that was handed to me by the staff that that involves the President. Another time Ehrlichman---- Mr. HUNGATE. Would the gentleman yield for a question? Mr. SANDMAN. Not yet, Ehrlichman told Shultz. It does not say the President told Shultz. Then we get down to Ehrlichman told Kalmbach. The President did not tell Kalmbach. Ehrlichman told Kalmbach, and this is another date September 1972, Is that the one that you are going to rely on? We should know. Now, in addition to that,, the biggest one of all that you are relying upon, apparently is the conversation of September 15. 1972, where if you listen to that tape there is no question that the President is extremely disturbed on what Dean is telling him, and it is there that he explodes about Shultz. And these are ugly words taken by themselves, they are terrible. But, the important thing about that conversation of September 15, 1972, there is no proof that has been presented by this committee or any other committee that shows that the President followed that up by talking to Shultz or anyone else. And in addition to that, why don't we for the first time, admit that not a single audit was made on a single soul on that list. This is important. This again is why you would not agree on specifics. You will nail down one date, that one act, and now low and behold, you are taking away the right of requiring that the President have knowledge of the wrongdoing or that be direct it. You are entirely wrong and you know it. This should be adopted. The CHAIRMAN. The, time, of the gentleman has expired. Mr. HOGAN. Mr. Chairman? The CHAIRMAN. recognize the gentleman from Maine. Mr. COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Sandman just indicated that the motion of Mr. Wiggins adds just two things. But, he failed to state. that it omits one very important a thing, and that is the question of ratification. And I notice that the gentleman from California was rather reticent about expressing this word "ratification" in his proposed amendment. Now, there. are two major areas which are of concern to me in this subject, of abuse of agencies under the Internal Revenue Service and the FBI. Now, for example, we do have direct evidence, before committee, taken before this committee and given by John Dean, that on September 11 he did have a conversation With the Director of the Internal Revenue Service during which time, he presented a list political enemies for the purpose of having those enemies audited. Now, there is no evidence, before this committee, in my opinion, would justifying saying the President knew in advance of Mr. Dean's activities. However, on September 15, the, conversation to which Mr. Sandman just referred to, we do have direct evidence that the President was indeed interested in having this matter pursued. Mr. Sandman forgot to indicate that or failed to point out, I should say, that we were missing 17 minutes of this September 15 tape which was not presented to the, committee, which we have Subpenaed. This is the portion of the tape, according to Mr. Dean, whereby the President directed Dean to go back and see George Shultz and if he did not get cooperation to let him know. Now, the question is, is Dean credible? Well, we have direct evidence from the, Internal Revenue Commissioner who testified before the Senate select committee that, indeed, Dean did come back to him on September 26, just several days after his conversation with the President, presenting a reduced list and again asking for audits. Now, I suggest and submit to this committee that the President's activities on September 15 would, indeed, constitute a ratification of the, prior act, which would make him responsible for- such activities. With respect to the FBI abuse, I am referring specifically to the investigation of Daniel Schorr. that there is evidence before this committee that Daniel Schorr- did criticize one of the President's speeches, and that while aboard Air Force One, Mr. Higby and Mr. Haldeman asked the FBI to conduct an investigation. Again we have no evidence before us to say that the President knew that they had called while aboard Air Force One, to ask for that investigation. but we do have direct evidence before the committee taken from the lips. Of Mr. Colson, and Mr. Colson told this committee that once that FBI investigation was exposed by the press, that he then came to the President and said we've got a problem here, we are in a jam, what do you think about sending out a statement that indicates that Mr. Schorr is being investigated because we are considering him as a consultant to the White House, to which the President approved. I would submit to this committee that that in turn would constitute ratification of the prior activities on behalf of the FBI, which I think were an abuse. And for those reasons, I cannot, without express wording in the motion offered by Mr. Wiggins, support that without the word ratification. And I yield to the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Butler. [01.10.45]
Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 30, 1974 (1/2)
[00.07.26] Mr. BROOKS. Now, gentlemen, I would at this time yield to my friend, Mr. Railsback. Mr. RAILSBACK. I thank the gentleman for yielding. Are you--are you establishing or trying to establish by reference to Butterfield that the President knew what Haldeman knew or--in other words are you trying to say that there was a, knowing conversion by reason of what Haldeman knew or, can you just explain that a little? Mr. BROOKS. What I am trying to establish is that very clearly these assistants and close associates and executives of the President did -what he wanted them to do and that Haldeman testified and Butterfield testified that he, the President made the decisions and that they implemented them. It is just that simple. It was not something that they individually thought up and did. These were implementations of the President's ideas, to quote his own people. Now, may I conclude--- Mr. RAILSBACK. Would YOU just yield? I thought that Ehrlichman was the primary participant in the San Clemente matter and not Haldeman. Also what about Colson saying the, President didn't want to know a lot? In other words, he left it to his subordinates. Mr. BROOKS. I am just quoting Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Butterfield -who sat outside the door all those years. And I would reserve my closing time, and yield--reserve that 6 minutes, Mr. Chairman, if I might. Mr. DENNIS. Can't do that under the rules. Regular order, Mr. Chairman. Mr. BROOKS. I can yield it back to Mr. Mezvinsky and then get it If that would suit the technicalities of the situation' The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman has 6 minutes remaining and Unless the gentleman from Michigan wants to proceed, the gentleman is now to consume his time. -Mr. RANGEL. Will the gentleman yield? Mr. BROOKS. Certainly I yield to my distinguished friend from "New York, Mr. Rangel. Mr. RANGEL. Thank you. We have a real problem here as it relates to the President's involvement. The President did sign that tax form. We all sign a tax form and we say that to the best of our knowledge the facts in that form are true. The unique thing about this case is that when the Internal Revenue did finally review the President's tax forms, it said because it was the President of the United States that they didn't feel that they should approach the President. It appears now that when the, President saw fit to turn over all of his books and records to the Joint Committee the committee did what the Internal Revenue Service did not do, and that is contact the taxpayer, We know that is basic regardless of what office we hold. When there are questions in connection with a tax form, the very least that should be done is You contact the taxpayer and have him explain away the discrepancies. In this particular case we find the President's men, that is these tax experts, not cooperating with the Internal Revenue We find the President not cooperating and answering the questions of the Joint Committee. And, if these things were to be held in abeyance it would mean that any President 'Who is not subject to criminal indictment will never have his conduct as relates to payment or nonpayment of income taxes reviewed. Now, a lot of talk. has been said that because the word "fraudulently" was accepted as a part of this article that we have the responsibility to prove the President's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If this were so, I would not be able to vote for the article. But the President's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt involves criminal liability which at this time the President has immunity from. It seems to me that the buck has to stop somewhere. The IRS will not ask the taxpayer. The Joint Committee said that, it would not go into criminal liability because that was a question for this committee. And we are merely recommending to the House under a resolution which allows for a continued investigation that the President be made to answer for not paying the taxes when it is clear he should have paid it'. It seems to me that the President again will have an opportunity to have more information presented to the Members of the House of Representatives since it has not been presented to the Congress or the IRS and then the President, too , will have the opportunity to come forward at long last in the Senate Of the United States and if in fact he is not guilty he will have the opportunity to present the facts. I thank the gentleman for yielding to me and I yield back. [00.12.52]
Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 26, 1974 (1/2)
[00.09.28] Mr. WIGGINS. Now, we can be suspicious but those suspicions have not provoked any grand Jury -who has investigated this, has not provoked Judge Sirica has not Provoked anybody else to return criminal indictments because they don't know. Let's recognize that that gap is a suspicious circumstance to me but this is not evidence We have the situation of the President being less than candid according to Mr. Sarbanes in saying that was no White House involvement on June 20, 1972. But let me tell you what John Dean said, He said he talked to Liddy on that day and you know what Liddy told him?, Liddy first--the statement was made by Dean as follows: First, Gordon, he said, "I -want to know whether anybody in the White House was involved in this," and Liddy, the architect of all replied, "No ; they were not." And that, continued to be the state of the President's knowledge thereafter. If that is the kind of quality of evidence, this evidence upon which this plot hatched this policy, let me say that it is ambiguous. It is confusing. might be susceptible of different interpretations but we know what. the law is. You can't do it on that basis. If there is a benign interpretation pointing toward innocence 'we must take it. We must take it. Well, let me say that first essential charge that the President made in his policy is not supported by the evidence. The, CHAIRMAN. The time. of the gentleman from Mississippi has expired. Mr. FROEHLICH. AM r. Chairman? The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Pennsylvania is recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Chairman, I yield to 'the, gentleman from Massachusetts , Father Drinan. Mr. DRINAN. Thank you, very much for yielding. It seems to me those who have challenged the wording here! Have to turn up with another policy. The wording here in the Sarbanes substitute is very clear. We are not saying that Mr. Nixon invented this policy. He made it his policy to carry out the obstruction of justice It, seems to me that that is the only possible conclusion that one, could come. to you look at the vast amount of evidence following the incident at the Democratic National Committee. If this is another explanation it has not turned up in all of our investigations. It seems to me the situation is unique for or many reasons and the principle one is this, that the President has withheld the evidence. In 69 cases of possible impeachment in all our history only on(-, individual has ever sought to withhold evidence from an impeachment inquiry and that Person invoked the fifth amendment. What are, the alternatives to that careful wording, "The President made it his policy?" Can you say that all these things are mere chance'? There is absolutely no coherent explanation. You can take that but lawyers resist that. There has to be some explanation of all of the tragic events that took place out and inside the Oval Office. Can we say that the President knew nothing about what Haldeman and Ehrlichman were doing, that they themselves conspired alone? That, is contrary to all of the, evidence. I Say therefore that we have to name some policy that the President had and this substitute we say he made it his policy to obstruct justice. I would love to find another policy. I have searched for 6 months with the other lawyers here for another policy but I have come to the inescapable conclusion that the President made it his policy to impede the investigation of the burglary in the Democratic National Committee. I yield back to the gentleman from Pennsylvania. Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from California, Mr. Waldie. The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California is recognized. Mr. WALDIE. Mr. Chairman, I too want to address myself to the question of the President's policy. Understand, we are dealing with policy that will not bear the scrutiny of light. It is an action and a plan and a policy of the White House and people in the highest level of Government in the United States and it simply will not bear scrutiny. They cannot stand to have anybody examine this policy. So therefore to demand that we, provide a parchment scroll of a Presidential declaration that on such and such an hour of such and such a day a policy ,Was established by the White House to engage in a coverup of illicit ..'activities is really- quite unrealistic and is not really advanced I think with the objective and the desire to really get at the truth. But a policy "Of this nature a, policy of this nature, is a surreptitious covert Policy that evolves. Its parameters and it's limits are not known at its inception. The policy is we have got to cover up. We simply cannot let the ..People of America know that we have financed political intelligence .activities that have resulted in the burglary of the, Democratic' National Committee Headquarters at the Watergate Hotel because once they find that out, they will find out that whole litany of covert activities authorized and financed by the White House, by Hint and Liddy, "the principals of the Watergate burglary, the "plumbers," that whole "litany of illegal covert activities described by John Mitchell as the "horrors of the White House." It is the policy, is clear. You can't permit the American people to discover that because you are in a national election year. The policy is to protect the election of the President. It is Implicit. Nobody denies it. The policy is to protect the election of the President by immediately taking actions to cover up the entry and the participation and authorization and part of that entry illegal and surreptitious into the Watergate Hotel by the White House and by the Committee To Re-Elect the President. And it didn't start late in the period after the entry. It started immediately. Howard Hunt, one of the burglars, and Gordon Liddy, another of the burglars, who were not picked up the night of the 17th--five were picked up, they were not they were across the street in *the electronics gear room-- immediately went back to the White House and picked tip $10,000 in cash that had been paid by Gordon Liddy from campaign funds of the Committee too To Re-Elect the President for emergencies such as this, and he gave that $10,000 cash early the morning of the burglary to an attorney to defend those, burglars. The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Pennsylvania has expired.