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Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 26, 1973
[00.08.22-THOMPSON questions DEAN about his activities in the coverup, attempting to cast some sort of aspersion on DEAN'S motives for coming forward?] Mr. THOMPSON. So, to summarize. your answer the answer Is yes, you did make the call and subsequent to that you had second thoughts about it and tried to retract it? Mr. DEAN. That is correct. Mr. THOMPSON. Would that be correct? I believe on the, 29th you talked to Mr. Kalmbach about raising money for the coverup. You said at that time you told him substantially everything that you knew. I believe that you helped Mr. Magruder in preparing himself for testimony before the grand jury in August. I assume you knew he was going to perjure himself in that grand test testimony. Mr. DEAN. That is correct. Mr. THOMPSON. Would you tell us how you obtained the FBI 302's? Mr. DEAN. Well, as I said in my statement yesterday, , I am not terribly clear on when I did actually first receive them, I had some preliminary discussions -with - Mr. Petersen about it and -Mr. Petersen suggested I deal directly -with Gray on the matter I had some discussions -with Gray about it. Initially, as I recall the sequence, there was a summary prepared or, I might add this, Mr. Gray offered to me, to come over to his office and read the reports. I might have even looked at some of the reports initially in his office but it was after I received the July 21 summary of the FBI investigation to date and showed that to 'Mitchell and Mardian that they said that they thought that I should permit Mardian, and Mitchell said O'Brien and Parkinson as well, the, right to look at these investigative, reports and discuss this with Ehrlichman and Haldeman, they thought it was a wise idea to follow what the FBI were doing. Mr. THOMPSON. That is a different area, Mr. Dean. If -you -want, to elaborate on that. a little later, fine, but I -want to be--- Mr. DEAN-. I don't know the precise date. I started receiving reports. Mr. THOMPSON. Are you definitely stating you said to Mr. Petersen. "You deal directly with Pat Gray on this matter". Mr. DEAN. That, is my best recollection Mr. THOMPSON. Did not in fact Mr. Kleindienst tell you that the only way he would make FBI 302's available was that he, would deliver them directly to the President, himself if the President asked for them directly, that he wouldn't give them to you? Mr. DEAN. That is possible, but I don't recall that. I had had a very happy relationship with Mr. Kleindienst The way you have stated it, is certainly not the way -Mr. Kleindienst stated it to me. Mr. THOMPSON. You said it is possible. Would that not be--- Mr. DEAN. He might. have said, you know, "If you want those at, the White House. they ought to go to the President. I don't recall any such conversation, frankly. Mr. THOMPSON. Did you ever tell 'Mr. Kleindienst that you were reporting on Your investigation directly to the President? Mr. DEAN. Did I report that to Kleindienst? Mr. THOMPSON. That you told Mr. Kleindienst that you were, reporting to the President. Mr. DEAN. -Not until I began reporting to the, President did I ever tell the Attorney General that the President had instructed him to do a given thing or ask that he do something Mr. THOMPSON-. I am not talking about what the. President was telling him to do. I am asking whether or not in June. or July of 1972 You told 'Mr. Kleindienst at that time. that You were reporting directly to the President. Mr. Dean. I believe, I told that. to Mr. Gray, not Mr. Kleindienst. Mr. THOMPSON. But you did not tell that to Mr. Kleindienst when you were attempting to get FBI material? Mr. DEAN. That Is correct. Mr. THOMPSON. Did you ever call Mr. Sloan in October of 1972 or thereafter or his attorney and talk to him about the possibilities of his claiming his fifth amendment privileges? Mr. DEAN. Yes, I did. I tried to reach Mr. Sloan. I had had a call from, as I recall. Mr. Parkinson. there had been considerable discussion about Mr. Sloan at the White House and at the reelection committee. In fact. Mr. Sloan at that time seemed to be looking for a confessional of any source, he could find, and reporting everything he knew. Ehrlichman knew this. for example, before Sloan sought him out. Other people at the White House knew this. I think that is one of the reasons that Ehrlichman did not want to talk with 'Mr. Sloan. Mr. Sloan came to see me on a number of occasions because I 'would talk with him and I reassured him on a number of occasions I didn't think that the fact he was treasurer -would necessarily result in him having to face criminal charges as a result of some of the misappropriations' of funds that had occurred there. Mr. THOMPSON. Did you ever tell him or his attorney? Mr. DEAN. I am getting to that. I am trying to give you the preface of why I said that: Mr. Sloan was headed for Florida, to testify in the trial, was going on down there with regard to Mr. Barker at the request of, receiving this information from Parkinson, he was going, tried to reach Mr. Sloan at his attorney's office, and Sloan not being there, as I recall. I asked Mr. Stoner or Triest(?), I think it was, Mr. Stoner, Stoner and Sloan had already left and Triest was there, was be prepared to have his client take the fifth amendment because he certainly would be a hero in the eyes of people around the, White House if he did.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 27, 1973 (1/2)
[00.51.25-DEAN responding to part of the White House memo blaming DEAN for the WATERGATE and the COVERUP] Mr. DEAN. I did discuss with Mr. Moore the fact that, but that was not the first time, I had discussed it with Mr. Moore. Mr. Moore and I had talked about, this on many occasions, that I thought that the coverup as harmful, bad, it had to stop at some point. We. were searching for answers as to how to end it. We could not find an answer, and finally, at one point when I was having direct access to the President I thought, and discussed -with Moore that I can do something to end it now and I will go in and tell the President what this is going to mean if it continues. Senator INOUYE. [QUOTING FROM W.H. MEMO ATTACKING DEAN'S TESTIMONY] "After the two of them met with the President on March 20 Moore told Dean 'I do not think the President has any idea of the kind of things that you have told me about." When Dean agreed that the President, did not, Moore told Dean that it was his obligation to advise the President and lectured Dean on this subject. Mr. DEAN. Well, Richard Moore to me is a wonderful man, and I often went to him for counsel. He is an older man, and I respected his Judgment very much. I believe I raised these things with Mr. Moore, I had raised them before and I told him what prompted my conversation that afternoon with Mr. Moore were the demands from Hunt and I wanted--by this time be was aware himself of the money demands because this had come up at La Costa when Mr. Ehrlichman had instructed Mr. Moore to go to New York and get Mr. Mitchell to take care of these problems. So for that reason I had never told Dick Moore everything I know but I had given him enough knowledge so that be could see the breadth of the problem. [00.53.20] Senator INOUYE. As the trusted aide and counsel to the President of the United States, did you not feel that it was your obligation and duty to as soon as possible advise him of the involvement in the Watergate break-in and the ensuing coverup? Mr. DEAN. Well, Senator, I think I have expressed before to walk into the President's door is not the easiest thing to do. My channels of reporting was through Mr. Haldeman or Mr. Ehrlichman, principally through Mr. Haldeman. Senator INOUYE. Didn't the enormity of the problem compel you to walk into the President's office? Mr. DEAN. Well, I can only assume that everything I told Mr. Haldeman and Ehrlichman would be going to the President also. As I have testified, on some occasions Mr. Haldeman would take notes about things I was telling him, He would take these notes shortly before be Would go into meetings with the President. I can also recall occasions when we were meeting when a call would come from Mr. Haldeman to come to the President's office or once -in Florida to come over to his residence and he would wait until I completed reporting. I assumed that everything I was telling Mr. Haldeman was going to the President. [00.54.38] Senator INOUYE. When did you begin to mistrust Mr. Haldeman? Mr. DEAN. I think that, the first signal I got that Mr. Haldeman had decided that, you might say, I -was off the reservation when I came back from Camp David. Senator INOUYE. What was the date, sir? Mr. DEAN. That was the 28th. I think that -was prompted by my attitude in a meeting with the President on the afternoon of the, 21st when there -was more discussion of different essentially coverup techniques without getting into great detail because. I cannot recall In great detail, everything they were saying the President was asking me, do I agree and I was saying no, and finally, at one point in that meeting I said that, right in front of the President, that I felt that Dean, Haldeman, and Ehrlichman could be indicted for obstruction of justice and this has to be recognized. And I think as a result of that meeting they saw that I had begun to change my attitude about any further involvement in a coverup. [00.55.52]
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 26, 1973 - Testimony of John Dean.
Fred Thompson, attorney. Did you have the impression when you talked to Mr. Kleindienst and Mr. Petersen that Mr. Ehrlichman was depending on you to take care of the situation or to get them to take care of the situation so that the White House would not be hurt? John Dean. At this point, I was merely a messenger. I was a conveyor of information on back and forth and I was being sent to different assignments to find out information at this point in time. When I talked to Ehrlichman and he asked me to find out what the Justice Department was doing, he wanted to find out how extensive their investigation was. As time evolved, there was frequent criticism of the scope of the investigation by Mr. Ehrlichman. There was, very clearly, the concern at the White House that the investigation would come right back into the White House.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 26, 1973
[00.44.21] Senator MONTOYA. What information did you have with respect to the involvement of any officials in the White House on that initial stage of the coverup? Mr. DEAN. Well, it was on Monday the 19th that I Was gaining information. I think the first very revealing information was that Mr. Strachan had destroyed, at Mr. Haldeman's suggestion. I also--that morning I had had a call from Ehrlichman who asked me to find Out what Mr. Colson's involvement was in this matter. Senator MONTOYA. Did you advise the President or Mr. Haldeman or Mr. Ehrlichman about the authority that might exist under law for the covert activity that was to ensue as a result of the organization of the plumbers? Mr. DEAN. I wasn't involved in the establishment of the plumbers and it was somewhat by accident that I was talking about Bud Krogh who I had known quite well and was partially responsible for my coming to the White House as a matter of fact, when I realized that a plumbers unit or whatever the proper name was for it was being established. At that time he told me that they had an operation that was seeking to determine major leaks. He invited me down to see the unit. He said, "We have a new sensor security system, and you might be interested in seeing it," so I went down and looked at it, and saw their scrambler phone and that was about the extent of it. [00.45.58] Senator MONTOYA. Who devised the, shelter of executive privilege as part of the coverup? Mr. DEAN. Well, the--I wouldn't say there was a conscious decision at any point In time to use executive privilege as a part of the coverup. It was always in existence With regard to White House staff because no one, the President's policy was he didn't want the staff coming up. It began to take a very severe focus during the--first of all, during the Patman hearings that, if push had gotten to shove in those hearings that. privilege would have been declared on Timmons and myself. Senator MONTOYA. You mean to tell me that you and Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman didn't discuss the use of executive privilege? Mr. DEAN. Yes sir; I was getting to that. Senator MONTOYA. As a coverup? Mr. DEAN. That was the first time it had occurred when there was some discussion of it that, was with regard to the Patman hearings in late September or early October. That was the only congressional problem that, arose. It was, during the Gray hearings when my name Moved to the information front, that we began discussing using or litigating with Dean the issue of executive privilege possibly being the strongest, and these were the discussions I had with the President whereas if we were, litigating the matter with Mr. Dean there would be no other witnesses from the White House who would have to appear because he would have the perfect reason that this matter is under litigation. Senator Ervin. We will take a 5 minute recess to vote. [00.47.50-LEHRER v.o. states that MONTOYA has been interrupted for a Senate vote] [PBS network ID-title screen "SENATE HEARINGS ON CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES"] [00.50.19-LEHRER in studio] LEHRER states that MONTOYA will continue his interrogation of DEAN. [00.50.27]
Watergate Hearings - Testimony of Gordon C. Strachan, July 23, 1973
Correspondent Robert MacNeill in television, reconvening hearings coverage. Chairman of the Committee Senator Sam Ervin (D-NC) recounting and confirming a series of events involving former White House aide Gordon C. Strachan, Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman, and Director of Committee to Re-Elect the President and former Attorney General John Mitchell regarding a "sophisticated intelligence operation."
Focus on the 70s - The Nixon Years - PT1
B&W: Cold War background history: MS Sen Richard Nixon sitting on House of Un-American Activities Committee hearings. MS witness RONALD REAGAN being sworn in by committee. TLS line of five newsreel cameramen at hearings. TLS crowd sitting at hearings. Cut to LS/MSs Chinese Nationalist soldiers wearing British styled MK 1 helmets marching along Great Wall.
Lawmakers - Japanese American Internment - June 21, 1984
House Committee to investigate funding Japanese American reparations. Representative Bob Matsui testifying. Representative Norman Mineta testifies, "And that any step short of compensation, would be an empty gesture. I ask and entreat this sub-committee to give us back our honor, give us back the dignity and the pride that this government so unnecessarily took from us in 1942."
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee Hearings on Presidential Campaign Activities, May 17, 19
Senator SAM ERVIN. (D - NC) Do you know Mr. (trying to pronounce name) Kechanian (?) Mr. KEHRLI. (corrects him) Kechanian, yes sir. Senator ERVIN. What was his assignment? Mr. KEHRLI. He was a writer. Senator ERVIN. And he came in under Mr. Price, one of the writers with Mr. R. Price and Mr. Buchanan? Mr. KEHRLI. Yes sir. Senator ERVIN. That's the only question, Senator Baker.
Capitol Journal - 1985 - Year in Review
Carter thanks guests and closes out show, credits roll over Representative FORTNEY "PETE" STARK (D-CA)) who satirizes the House Ways and Means Committee's formulation of a new tax code
CONGRESS: WE THE PEOPLE
13.39.12-Newman-Committee activity doesn't always result on new laws, but Committees do engage in "markup" for key new bills before the bills are sent to the House Floor. The Committee's drafting is key to getting the full chamber to approve a bill. Shots of a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing, Sen. TED KENNEDY and ORRIN HATCH have a little argument. Shot of BOB DOLE chairing the Senate Finance Committee in closed session. Shot of Sen. JOHN CHAFEE (R-RI) says that Dole has gotten the Republicans on the committee into reasonable unity over the Budget. Shots of a Committee hearing chaired by Dole. Dole and ranking Democrat Russell Long. Shot of Rep. JAMIE WHITTEN (D-MS) in a House Appropriations Committee meeting, in office, says that he doesn't run the committee, just oversees it. Shot of Rep. JOHN DINGLE chairing Energy Committee. V.O.-Dingle takes a rather authoritarian tack in running his committee. Shot of DINGLE banging his gavel and chewing out a witness. Shot of Dingle walking with staffer. V.O.-authoritarian leaders like Dingle are largely a thing of the past. 13.42.25-Still of a meeting of Committee Chairmen from the early '60's. V.O.-chairmen like Donald Smith ruled over the passage of Civil Rights bills, obstructing them procedurally. Shot of Rep. RICHARD BOLLING, describes how Judge Smith would obstruct the meetings on Civil Rights Bills. Newman-Committee chairs also lost some autocratic power when rules changes opened Committee hearings to the press and the public. There are still some closed-door sessions. Shot of Rep. TOM FOLEY discussing changes in Committee system, the former autocratic power of the Chairmen. Discusses reforms, which limited the power of full committee chairs, although Subcommittee chairs weren't affected, leading to too many subcommittees in Congress. 13.44.57-Newman-Committes are an essential division of labor in Congress and a way for members to try to advance themselves. Essentially, Congress works through the committee system. Signs off. Closing credits/WETA credit/funding credits/PBS ID 13.47.31--OUT
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 25, 1973 - Statement of John Dean.
The meeting with the President, Ehrlichman, Haldeman, Mitchell, and me was again a general discussion of the Senate. Watergate hearings situation and, did not accomplish anything. Rather it was a further indication that there would be no effort to stop the coverup from continuing. I recall that Mitchell told the President that he felt that the only problem that he now had was the fact that he was taking a public beating on his posture on executive privilege That the statement on executive privilege was too broad and that probably something should be, done to change his posture on the matter. Mitchell was not suggesting that members or the White House staff go to the Hill to testify, rather that some more cooperative position be developed to avoid the a adverse publicity. It was at this time that the President said that Kleindienst was to be working these things out with Senator Baker and he apparently had not been doing so. The President said that Timmons had told him that a member of Senator Baker's staff was very desirous of a meeting to get guidance. It was at this point, that the President called the Attorney General and told him that he should get up to meet with Senator Baker as soon as possible and get some of these problems regarding executive privilege and the turning of documents over resolved with the committee immediately.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 28, 1973. Testimony of John Dean.
Senator Sam Ervin (D North Carolina). And that was applied to a great list of people, including some of the most distinguished commentators of the news media on the national scene was it not? John Dean. Yes, sir. Senator Sam Ervin (D North Carolina). Not only that, yesterday a document was put in evidence and identified to you, as I recall, as coming from Mr. Colson's office entitled "Opponent Priority Activity. And on page 3 of that document it has this among the opponent priority activity, No. 14, Samuel M. Lambert, L-a-m-b-e-r-t, President, National Education Association, has taken us on vis-a-vis Federal aid to parochial schools, a 1972 issue." Didn't those in the White House interested in President Nixon's reelection and then the reelection committee classify among their enemies people who dissented from President Nixon's programs? John Dean. As I say, those who were able to command audience were singled out. Senator Sam Ervin (D North Carolina). Here is a man listed among the opponents or the enemies whose only offense is that he believed in the first amendment and shared Thomas Jefferson's conviction as expressed in the Virginia statute for religious freedom that to compel a man to make contributions of money for the dissemination of religious opinions he disbelieves is sinful and tyrannical. Isn't that true? John Dean. I cannot disagree with the chairman at all.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 25, 1973 - Statement of John Dean.
The next time I heard anything about the draft statement was on April 17th, when the President called and informed me that he had decided not to request any resignations until after the Grand Jury took action and that he would issue a statement very shortly. That statement of April 17th is a matter of public record. I would only like to point out one or two items about the statement. The President said that on March 21st as a result of serious charges which came to his attention, some of which were publicly reported, he began an intense new inquiry into this whole matter. I would merely refer the committee's attention back to my earlier testimony as to what the President did after my report to him on March 21st as to the White House's deep involvement in the coverup. In short, the President commenced no investigation at all. Rather, the President, Haldeman and Ehrlichman commenced to protect themselves against the unraveling of the coverup. Secondly, I would also like to raise the paragraph that had been put in the statement that no one in a position of major importance in the administration should be given immunity from prosecution. While a statement went virtually unnoticed in the public, it was very evident to me what the President was saying, Dean will not be a witness against anyone so the Government might as well stop dealing with him.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 14, 1973
[00.53.24] Senator MONTOYA. Did you approve the disbursements of any funds to Mr. LaRue or anyone for use by these defendants? Mr. MAGRUDER. No, I had no knowledge of the funds until the newspapers accounts. Mr. LaRue did ask me on one occasion and probably in January if I know somebody who could make a drop for him. and I suggested Mr. Porter as a potential person to do that and the next day he said, "No, never mind. Ave don't need anybody to make the drop." Senator MONTOYA. Who was offering the defendants Executive clemency? Mr. MAGRUDER. I do not know sir, Senator. Senator MONTOYA. Well. did any Information come to you about that time, as to whether or not, Executive clemency had been promised to any of these defendants? Mr. MAGRUDER. Well. as I have indicated before in my--before I testified before the grand jury the second time I was particularly concerned about, my own situation since I -was the target for the, grand jury and so I asked the individuals, Mr. Dean and Mr. Mitchell specifically would I be protected and, are the defendants being protected and they indicated to me that they were. The words "Executive clemency" were used but I can say honestly that the words "Executive clemency" were bandied about quite freely at that that time. Senator MONTOYA. When was the first time that, you talked to Mr. Haldeman about the Watergate? Mr. MAGRUDER. was the Sunday after the break-in. Senator MONTOYA. How many other times did you talk to him about this from then until January? Mr. 'MAGRUDER. I didn't--oh, well, I might have, I think we had a number of meetings during the campaign when we discussed how we would handle the Watergate as a public relations issue. Mr. MacGregor who was then our campaign director, was having a very difficult time at his press conferences and so on with this issue and 'I can remember a number of conversations that I had with Mr. Haldeman. Senator MONTOYA. Did you have these conversation-, at the White House? Mr. MAGRUDER. I had some of them at, the White House; yes, sir. Senator MONTOYA. Were any other persons present during these conversations? Mr. MAGRUDER. Individuals like Mr. Dwight Chapin, Mr. Richard Moore, other people who worked in what I would call the general public relations area but we were talking only about how these should be handled from our committee, and there was some--and with Mr. Ziegler and Mr. Warren as to how to handle press inquiries, At this time many of the newspapers were very active in pressing this issue and we were trying to respond to the problem. Senator MONTOYA. Well. if you were talking about the Watergate this is context and with that objective in mind, it, necessarily follows that you had to lay all the sordid details on top of the table so that you could reach a consensus of approach, Wouldn't that be right? Mr. MAGRUDER. No, sir; in fact I think I listened to Clark MacGregor as an example and Clark yesterday said that he evidently was told a story and that at is absolutely correct. We told Mr. MacGregor there was no involvement by any individual other than Mr. Liddy. We told that story to every individual who was not, connected directly with either the break-in or the coverup, and Mr. MacGregor believed 'It. I think, fully. I think other people in the White House believed it fully , the prosecutors believed it fully. [00.56.47] Senator MONTOYA. How can they believe that Mr. Liddy would the only one involved when they had also sent to You Mr. Hunt to work under Mr. Liddy? Mr. MAGRUDER. NOW. you have to remember that the, only person that I know of who sent Mr. Hunt to work for Mr. Liddy was Mr. Howard who -worked for Mr. Colson so that someone like Clark MacGregor would have no knowledge of Mr. Hunt, either. I think Mr. MacGregor as an example was completely in the dark throughout the, entire campaign and probably today is glad that He was. [Laughter.] Senator MONTOYA. Now, how many times would you say you talked to him? You haven't answered that question. Mr. MAGRUDER. I am sorry, talked to-- Senator MONTOYA. To Mr. Haldeman about the Watergate. Mr. MAGRUDER. I talked I talked to him on the day after the break-in On Sunday, I talked to him in January--- now. about Hie true facts about the he Watergate only in January. We talked during, the campaign a number of times. not very often about the public relations aspects but not about how it happened, of how we were going to counteract the press activity that was occurring during, the campaign, quite a different story, and you did not have to he involved in the break-in to try to handle it. Senator MONTOYA. You mean you could handle it'. Publicitywise if you didn't know the details ? Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes , Sir. I know many people did handle it who did not know the details . [00.58.13]
JFK Assassination HSCA Hearings
House Select Committee on Assassinations hearing on the assassination of U.S. President John F. Kennedy, Committee Deputy Chief Counsel Gary T. Cornwell continuing to take testimony of Professor Mark Weiss and Ernest Aschenasy on acoustic analysis of the Dallas audio transmission tape from the assassination of President Kennedy. Weiss and Aschenasy concluded there was a 95 percent possibility that a shot was fired from the grassy knoll. Weiss discusses the scientific principles used in the analysis of the audio tape of the JFK assassination.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 29, 1973 (1/2)
[00.24.03-INOUYE questions DEAN about activities using the IRS to punish ENEMIES and reward FRIENDS of the NIXON ADMINISTRATION] Senator INOUYE. Did the President personally express interest in this? Mr. DEAN. It gets more and more painful to bring these names out as it was painful to bring the President's name out. It is painful to bring out other people. It was Rosemary Woods who kept asking me the status of the case because, this individual was seeing the President a good deal. Senator INOUYE. What is the status of the case? Mr. DEAN-. Well, as I say, it was ultimately referred over to the Civil Division, or the Tax Division of the Department of Justice. I asked to be advised on the various status of' the case. I told Miss Woods at one point that she should just stay as far away from this as possible. She was seeing the individual, having encounters with the individual who was the subject of the tax case and he would protest his innocence to her. He Is a fine man, and she was quite convinced of his innocence and could not believe that he was not being harassed by agents that were trying to get somebody who was close to the President. The individual was using the President's name a great deal, he was traveling with the President to China and Russia and other places, and the like. As a result, of this, I merely asked that I be, kept advised of the status of the ease. When it was at, the Justice Department, the Justice Department assessed it. I had a conversation with Mr. Ralph Erickson, he, said "There is nothing we can do with this. There is one thing more we can do." and he said "there, are some weaknesses in the investigation and we may send it back to the Internal Revenue Service for one last look to see if this fellow, it really is a solid case." They did do that and it came back "Absolutely solid case." I said, "Don't touch it, send it, right on through, and that is what they did and the case is proceeding forward. Senator INOUYE. Has he been indicted? Mr. DEAN. I do not know if he has been indicted yet, but I know that there is no. to my knowledge, there is noting which has been done to impede, the case'. Senator INOUYE. Mr. Erickson was fired, was he not? Mr. DEAN-. Was he fired ? Senator INOUYE. Yes. Mr. DEAN I don't think that is quite accurate, no. Senator INOUYE. Would you wish to tell us who this important individual is? Mr. DEAN. It, might a affect his tax case. Senator INOUYE. Then, please do not, tell us [laughter]. [00.26.39-More discussion of the ENEMIES LIST] I would like to now discuss, a case Involving an enemy. Mr. Dean, I am certainly aware that these hearings unfortunately have permanently damaged the reputations of good and decent people, Furthermore reputations have been destroyed in past months, in past years by activities allegedly related to activities in the White House. In Your statement you mentioned that on February 28, 1973, you Were asked to look into a case of Mr. A. Ernest Fitzgerald by Mr. Clark Mollenhoff. Do you recall that? Mr. DEAN. Yes: I do'. Senator INOUYE. This gentleman is the one. the fellow who Worked in the Air Force, Department of the Air Force? Mr. DEAN. That is correct. Senator INOUYE. And he is the person -who was requested by a duly authorized Senate committee to testify on the C-5A? Mr. DEAN. That is correct. [00.27.45-Sen. INOUYE wants DEAN to comment on the firing of an Air Force man who may have been considered an ENEMY of the WHITE HOUSE] Senator INOUYE, I believe it is very important to 'Mr. Fitzgerald to learn whether he was released or fired because, of reduction in force in the Air Force, as the Air Force claims, or whether he was fired either by the Air Force or under orders of the White House or the President, because he told the truth about the $2 billion cost overrun of the C-5A. If we can clear the reputation of one man I think this committee would have done well today. So, may I ask a few questions? Mr. DEAN. Senator---- Senator INOUYE. Was the President of the United, States concerned about the Fitzgerald case? Mr. DEAN. May I preface my answer with this: I believe it was on January 31 of this Year that Mr. Mollenhoff raised this at a press conference. The President was caught totally off guard by the answer and what you might say is he sort of was winging it on how to respond to Mr. Mollenhoff's question. There was a lot of misinformation that got into the record. The President apparently confused two or three other cases he was aware of he had remembered the name Fitzgerald and as a result of that Mr. Ziegler had a conversation with the President after having other conversations with Mr. Mollenhoff, Mr. Ziegler says the President wants you to get into this. I subsequently had that instruction directly from the President also. [00.29.30] I had a man on my staff handle this. I was not directly handling it and, as I told Mr. Mollenhoff when he and I had several telephone conversations, that, I said, "Clark, this is one I am going to have to study but I have not gotten into right yet." I still have not had a chance to get into it and I think, based on my testimony, you can see, what I was doing, why I was not able to get into the Fitzgerald case so I am not terribly familiar with the substance of the Fitzgerald case. So it will be very difficult for me to answer those questions, and I had, full intention of looking into the matter but before, I got to it I was. relieved from my duties 'at the White House. [00.30.17]
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 29, 1973 (1/2)
[00.16.59-MacNEILL in studio] MacNEILL states that these precedents for involving the President in the congressional investigation, there will be a short break. [PBS network ID-title screen "SENATE HEARINGS ON CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES"] [00.20.30-MacNEILL] MacNEILL states that the committee will resume with a debate over what it is empowered to investigate. [00.20.44-ERVIN] Senator ERVIN. Senator Inouye. Senator INOUYE. Thank- you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Dean, I have a few questions I would like to follow up on. In your colloquy with Senator Baker on the meeting of April 14, at which time, you have testified that you had a discussion with the President--- Mr. DEAN. April 15, Senator? Senator INOUYE. April 15? Mr. DEAN. Yes. Senator INOUYE. On the matter of immunity? Mr. DEAN. That is correct. [00.21.11] Senator INOUYE. You have indicated that the President told you that he will make, no effort to interfere in your negotiations with the Government. Mr. DEAN. He made that very clear to me, Senator And I might say that that was one of the things that led me to issue the statement that I did regarding my unwillingness to be a scapegoat in this matter. [00.21.35] Senator INOUYE. Do you think at that time the President was aware that you had evidence that might incriminate him? Mr. DEAN. I am sure, he was aware of the conversations we have had and [00.21.44-DEAN suggests he thinks the conversations were TAPED] as I have indicated to the, committee, because of the nature of the conversation, because of subsequent events, I had reason to believe that that conversation was being taped. The subsequent events that gave me further confirmation of that were the fact that the prosecutors indicated the President had indicated to Mr. Petersen that he had taped my conversation or allegedly taped my conversation and that I had said that I had immunity in exchange for the testimony of Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman. [00.22.21-INOUYE returns to the subject of the ENEMIES LIST] Senator INOUYE. This is my final question relating to the matter of friends and enemies. First, may I touch upon the matter of friends. You indicated earlier that the White House was looking into a tax matter involving a very, involving a person very close to the President, and I believe you indicated that he -was guilty up to his teeth. Mr. DEAN. That is correct. Senator INOUYE. Was this matter at that moment in the hands of the, Criminal Investigation Division? Mr. DEAN. When it was first brought to my attention it was still at the Internal Revenue Service. I was asked to see what I could do about it. I called and spoke with Mr. Walters on this case and told him what the concern was. I then--he told me at that point in time, he said-well, let me back up just a moment. The individual involved had said that he thought he was being harassed by the agents of the Internal Revenue Service. I raised this with Mr. Walters and he said, he assured me, that could not be the case after he looked into it. He said there is a very strong case against this individual, and that ultimately it is going to be transferred to the Tax Division at the Department of Justice for further analysis. I merely asked to be kept advised of the status of the case because I felt the President may want to know because this was an individual the President saw with great regularity and I got questions on it with considerable regularity. [00.24.03]
Focus on the 70s - The Nixon Years - PT5
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities: Minority Counsel Fred Thompson questioning Alexander Butterfield regarding the White House recordings and the installation of bugs. MS President Nixon delivering national address (no audio).
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 28, 1973 (2/2)
[01.13.38-Sen. INOUYE continues to ask DEAN the WHITE HOUSE questions relating to DEAN'S involvement in political intelligence] Senator INOUYE. In interagency meetings to plan for handling demonstrations were you not the White House representative ? Mr. DEAN. From the time I went to the White House, yes, with some exceptions. There were some types of demonstrations that I did not go to the Justice Department on or I went with others, because they were Of a particular nature that I had no expertise in the, problem area. I am thinking particularly of the Wounded Knee situation. I did go over to the meeting on how to deal with Wounded Knee, but I really was not personally aware of the Indians' grievance problems. so Mr. Garment took over and dealt with that. When there was a demonstration to occur in Washington like the May Day demonstrations. I did participate with the Attorney General at, those in finding out what the Government was going to do, because I was asked and expected to report in my summaries that the, President had a great interest in as to what was going to be the Government's response in dealing with such situations. [01.14.48-some humor about EHRLICHMAN] Mr. Ehrlichman frequently maintained a continuing interest in this. In fact, I can recall another member of the staff saying that as far as demonstration goes, Mr. Ehrlichman is like a Dalmatian at the fire; he just can't stay away from them. He liked to know what was happening. Senator INOUYE. In the, St. Louis Post Dispatch of May 14, 1973, there is a report that you attempted to recruit a Department of Interior employee, Mr. Kenneth Tapman, for undercover work at the Democratic Convention. Did you attempt to recruit Mr. Tapman or any others for undercover work and what prior experience did you have in recruiting for undercover work? Mr. DEAN. Well, I can't recall recruiting anybody for undercover work other than I did have a discussion with Mr. Tapman, but I have to put this in context. Mr. Tapman had been with the Department of the Interior for a number of years. He and I had worked very closely with the demonstrators He was with me, during most of the negotiations we had on the major demonstrations. Mr. Tapman wears his hair far longer than I do, he developed an excellent rapport, with many of these people. He also had rapport with the police officials, the, Metropolitan Police and the like, when I was having no relationships at this point in time as we went down toward the planning for the convention with what the reelection committee was going to do, but, I knew that there was going to be, a need for the White House. to be well informed. I suggested that Mr. Tapman might like to do this, because I would be able to have a set of eyes and ears down there of somebody who I thought could assess the circumstances. [00.16.44] Somebody who is unfamiliar with a demonstration, and a lot of people overreacted to demonstrations, would see that, you know, a group was coming down the, street and because one tear gas canister was thrown, they would react that a hydrogen bomb had been thrown. Mr. Tapman was a type who had been probably through more tear gas than anybody other than Chief Wilson himself. I thought Mr. Tapman would serve as ,in excellent source of information for me and I told him that I wanted him, asked him if he, was interested in going down there. I said, you can't be on the White House payroll to do this, quite obviously. Senator INOUYE. Then your answer to this question, did you attempt to recruit Mr. Tapman--- Mr. DEAN. IS yes. Senator INOUYE. [continuing]. Is yes. Mr. DEAN. This was for both conventions, incidentally, I might add. First of all, to go down and get an understanding of what type of demonstrations were occurring at the Democratic Convention, what were the, logistic, problems. I wasn't really familiar with Miami because I hadn't been to the 1968 convention and I didn't know the logistical problems that were confronting us, so I suggested he go, for example, to both and see, how the police handled it and see what the problems were, going to be and the like. [01.18.03-a line of questioning about DEAN'S involvement with the CIA in the COVERUP] Senator INOUYE. This is another very lengthy question: Mr. Dean, you have testified concerning your conversations on three, different occasions with General Vernon Walters, the, Deputy Director of the CIA, beginning on the 26th of June. General Walters prepared a memorandum for the record of each of these conversations 'With you. In General Walters' memorandum record for your meeting with him on June 26, you are reported to have asked General Walters whether there was not some way that the Central Intelligence. Agency could pay bail for the Watergate defendants and if the men went to prison, could CIA find some way to pay their salaries while they were, in jail out of covert action funds. In your testimony, you made no mention of asking General Walters whether the CIA could pay the Watergate defendants defendants' bail or salaries while they were in prison, Was this an intended omission on your part in the interest of saving them or do you deny that, you made these, specific requests of General Walters?
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, July 10, 1973
[00.30.17-THOMPSON questions MITCHELL about who pushed LIDDY to devise a plan for campaign spying and MAGRUDER to fund the plan] Mr. THOMPSON. I think I see what you mean and I do not want to' try to draw names out that you do not want to present, but just presented one name. Would it be your opinion, if you care us your opinion, as to whether or not it might have come from more than one source? Mr. MITCHELL. It is always conceivable. Mr. THOMPSON. Do you have any reason to believe that it Was either one source or more than one source? Mr. MITCHELL. No, I have no ability to weigh the potentials for the sources of concern in this area. Mr. THOMPSON. Knowing Mr. Magruder, what kind of pressure would he have responded to take an action which, of course, would have been a serious matter; to supersede the orders of his superior? Would anyone in the White House, for example, do you think, with kind of authority, have so impressed him that 'he, would have superseded your orders and acceded to their wishes? [00.31.20-MITCHELL tries as hard as he can without lying outright to make the LIDDY plan approval out to be MAGRUDER'S idea] Mr. MITCHELL. I am sure it could not have been anybody in the White House. It must have been somebody in the White House with which he had a working relationship which he thought perhaps was in the interest of the campaign or somebody who had what you might refer to as superior authority? Mr. THOMPSON. A working relationship during the, campaign Or prior to the campaign? Mr. MITCHELL. -No ; I would put this very much on the basis of a working relationship during the campaign that goes to Some of the testimony here of the people who have evidenced an interest in this intelligence-gathering field. Mr. THOMPSON. Of course, there were many people, in the White House Involved in the campaign, were there not? Mr. MITCHELL. What is your question, were there many people? Mr. THOMPSON. Yes. Mr. MITCHELL. I believe that. the record shows there were quite a few. Mr. THOMPSON. Maybe too many people, would you think? Mr. MITCHELL. At times, that was my opinion. [00.32.20] Mr. THOMPSON. You were discussing some of Mr. Reisner's testimony this morning with Mr. Dash, with regard to the Gemstone documents. I have here verbatim, Mr. Reisner's testimony. I would like to ask you a couple of questions after I read that. I believe Mr. Reisner was talking about Mr. 'Magruder handing him certain documents. "I was handed the documents and I was asked to put them in Mr. Mitchell's files. The nature of that is that things that Mr. Magruder might have wished to take up with 'Mr. Mitchell were put in the file marked "Mr. Mitchell's file' and that does not indicate any more than that.." Were you aware that Mr. Magruder was keeping a file marked "Mr. Mitchell's file,"? [00.33.07-MITCHELL attempts to dodge this line of questioning-the "Mitchell File" did contain wiretap and bugged conversation transcripts] Mr. MITCHELL. Well. Mr. Thompson. I think I can best explain that, that during my busy schedule when Mr. Magruder could get in to see me, as special assistant, where he was the clearing house for memorandums from other people, that he would have more than one item normally, to discuss. They would be in the folder. Frequently we would sit and discuss them and he would take them back. Others, if they were long position papers on matters, he would leave them with Me to read. If that is a Mitchell file, that, is the Jacket in which he brought the materials into the, office. Mr. THOMPSON. Did he ever leave such a file with you for any period of time? Mr. MITCHELL. -Not as a file. He would leave from time to time position papers, certainly. [00.34.02] Mr. THOMPSON. So' as far as you are concerned, your remembrance is that the Mitchell file was not in fact your file, but his file, which he Was using to bring documents to you? Mr. MITCHELL. The only thing that I can identify it as is a folder in which he brought up these memorandums to my office.. Mr. THOMPSON. What Color Was it, if you recall? MITCHELL. I do not recall, sir. [00.34.18]
Watergate Hearings - Testimony of John J Caulfield May 22, 1973
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, May 22, 1973 - Testimony of John J. Caulfield. He reads his statement to the Committee. Caucus Room, Russell Senate Office Building, Washington DC
THE PRESIDENCY IN THE POST WAR WORLD -THE TRUMAN YEARS Truman and the Uses of Power.
Red Scare, House of Un-American Activities Committee: GV Committee room filled with people during the HUAC hearings. "Are you now, or have you ever been a member of the Communist Party?" MS man in bowtie defending himself against the allegations. MS man speaking to the committee. GV captivated men and women seated in committee room during HUAC hearings. MS various men testifying before committee, asked of their Communist predilections. Nice GV pan of Hollywood elite HUMPHREY BOGART, LAUREN BACALL, DANNY KAYE, RICHARD CONTI, JUNE HAVER, in Washington, DC walking past the Capitol Building. GV Hollywood stars posing for cameras outside the Capitol. MS Bogart & Bacall in Washington, Dome of the Capitol Building is seen in the background.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 27, 1973 (2/2)
[01.03.49-DEAN responds to the White House Memo accusing DEAN of masterminding the coverup] Mr. DEAN.---I was asked to handle testimony in different ways. Wen I came down from Camp David there was no doubt in my mind that I wasn't going to play the coverup game and I wasn't I going to give them any further information with which they could play the coverup game. Senator INOUYE. Were you In fact, Mr. Dean, preparing your own testimony? Mr. DEAN. I was going through and recalling everything I could remember about the incidents. I had been asked to do that, and if the President had called and asked me for that report-- Senator INOUYE. Did you spend the 6 days preparing testimony for your own use? Mr. DEAN. Let me complete, Senator If the President called me and asked me for that report, I would have sent it, to the President of the United States. There is no doubt about that. That isn't, who was calling and asking me for it, It was Mr. Ehrlichman who was calling me from -California, he wanted any part I had of it, and based on the earlier conversations I had had wasn't about to give it to Mr. Ehrlichman. So I can't say I was preparing my own testimony because I wasn't Preparing my own testimony. I was trying to reconstruct, as I had been asked to do I what I remembered as to what had occurred'. [01.05.01] Senator INOUYE. You have testified on several occasions that you were concerned with the enormity of the problem. If it was so, why did you not on your own present to the President your written report? Mr. DEAN. Well, I thought I had very clearly made, the point to 'the President on the 21st. What I saw occurring after the 21st indicated to me that there was a certain degree of protection going on by Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman. I was never sure that if I had sent the, report the President would ever see it for one thing. Senator INOUYE. As the President's counsel, and you were seeing the President quite often during those days, could you not have personally handed the report to him? [01.05.46] Mr. DEAN. The President was in California, Senator, at the, time. He left shortly after I came down and I had this little, round of activities; -with Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Magruder, and they -were off to California. Senator INOUYE. [QUOTING W.H. MEMO ATTACKING DEAN'S TESTIMONY] "The failure of Dean's muse while he was on the mountain is understandable since by this time it would have been impossible to write a believable report that would not have been self-indicting. While he was at Camp David, Dean told Ehrlichman's assistant that he was not getting the statement done but was planning his own defense." And this is from Mr. Ehrlichman. Mr. DEAN. That is not true, Senator Senator INOUYE. [QUOTING W.H. MEMO ATTACKING DEAN'S TESTIMONY] "Haldeman talked with him several times and felt, that Dean was not having much progress in writing his report, but it became clear that he was worrying more about himself.'"' This is from Haldeman. Mr. DEAN. Well, as I say when I came down from Camp David, I don't think it was a question of worrying about, myself as what I was witnessing was Mr. Haldeman and then subsequently Mr. Ehrlichman becoming very concerned about themselves. [01.07.09] Senator INOUYE. [QUOTING W.H. MEMO ATTACKING DEAN'S TESTIMONY] "On the 25th the President suggested it be announced that Dean would appear before the grand jury." Mr. DEAN. On what. date? Senator INOUYE. On March 25. Mr. DEAN. On March 25, I was at Camp David. The President was in Florida. That was a Sunday as I recall, and I recall no conversation with the President. I have, no knowledge of that at all. That is a new one to -me. [01.07.45] Senator INOUYE. [QUOTING W.H. MEMO ATTACKING DEAN'S TESTIMONY] "On the 26th Dean agreed but said he -would do so only if given immunity." Mr. DEAN. No, sir, I had no conversations with anybody. They were in Florida at that, time. The discussion that morning, if You will recall was that the President came out 'With a statement that he warmly endorsed me, he expressed new confidence or renewed confidence, in me, that he had allegedly spoken directly with me, and had no concern at, all about my prior knowledge of this matter and I do not recall any statement about going before the grand jury being issued when he was giving me this very warm embrace. [01.08.23]
The Lawmakers April 12, 1984
House Committee, staff, TV cameras, in meeting to deliberate on bill. Voiceover says most parts of bill will never see light of day. Representative Harold Sawyer (R - Michigan) The Chairman of the Criminal Justice Sub-Committee, happens to be John Conyers of Michigan. John s principal interest in life are police brutality, violence in sports and corporate crime. And virtually noting else ever moves out of his committee. It s sort of repository for bills that don t want to be moved.