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Lawmakers April 28 1983
Paul Duke, Linda Wertheimer, and Cokie Roberts discuss Congress and foreign policy. Paul Duke comments since Members of Congress now travel more and have bigger staffs; they feel like they can take more informed and stronger stands on foreign policy. Linda Wertheimer comments Richard Stone has been appointed special envoy to Central America, a concession that Congress got from Reagan on El Salvador aid. Stone has potential conflicts with his past lobbying career. Cokie Roberts comments that the House Intelligence Committee delayed a vote on cutting off funds for the CIA to aid Nicaraguan insurgents until after a session of House, which will allow House Intelligence Committee to report to other members.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee Hearings on Presidential Campaign Activities, May 17, 19
Senator WEICKER. Alright, just two questions. First of all, where is Fred Fielding on this chart? Mr. KEHRLI. Fred Fielding was the deputy council, he was John Dean's deputy. Senator WEICKER. And on the chart here, he would be listed where? Mr. KEHRLI. He would be listed below Mr. Dean. Senator WEICKER. And had you ever worked with Mr. Fielding? Mr. KEHRLI. Yes I have. Senator WEICKER. In what capacity? Mr. KEHRLI. Well, in my capacity as staff secretary. One of my responsabilities is to make sure that any papers going to the president are thoroughly staffed, and that includes a legal opinion. And Mr. Fielding was often the contact, for these matters. Senator WEICKER. And then my last question Mr. Kehrli is, at the time of the '72 campaign or prior to it, were there any changes of your duties or any additional duties which were given to you which were pacipitated by the campaign? Mr. KEHRLI. No. In January 1972 I changed jobs, January One. And that's when I went from being a staff assistant to Mr. Haldeman into my present position of staff secretary. Senator WEICKER. But at no time did you aquire any duties that related to the campaign? Mr. KEHRLI. No. Senator WEICKER. I have no further questions Mr. Chairman.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee Hearings on Presidential Campaign Activities, May 17, 19
Senator WEICKER. And when was the last time that you talked to Mr. Haldeman? Mr. KEHRLI. Um, I think it was some time last week, I don't have an exact date, we were discussing what he wanted to do with his retirement benefits. Whether he wanted to convert his health insurance, things of this nature in terms of the official papers required when he resigned. Senator WEICKER. Did you make a similar phone call to Mr. Haldeman to alert him that his records also were being commandeered by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation? Mr. KEHRLI. No, because they weren't. Senator WEICKER. In other words, nothing, no papers of Mr. Haldeman's were taken by the bureau? Mr. KEHRLI. Not that I know of. I think we're confusing something here, and that is, at one point in time all the papers were taken and put in one area and there was extra security put on them, that was the initial movement. Then after that is the discussion that I had with Mr. Ehrlichman and these were the papers that were described in a couple of newspaper articles, FBI files. Senator WEICKER. I'm a little bit confused too on this point and don't let me in any way guide you, but in other words was there some special reason why you should have alerted Mr. Ehrlichman as compared to Mr. Haldeman? Mr. KEHRLI. Well, because we're talking about two different points in time, immediately after Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Haldeman resigned, all of the papers within their offices and actually all of their working papers were taken and put in one room, as I understand it, and I was only told this by Mr. Garmon so that there would be no problems with any papers disappearing. That happened on the first of May or about that time. Senator WEICKER. Mmmhmm. I understand. Mr. KEHRLI. Now, we're talking about last weekend, when the FBI had requested some papers back that had been part of this group. Senator WEICKER. Right. Mr. KEHRLI. And since they had been included in Mr. Ehrlichman's files, I wanted to make sure that he was aware of the fact that they had been requested. Senator WEICKER. Did you receive a request from the FBI to assist in this matter, is that how it came to your attention? Mr. KEHRLI. No, it came to my attention because, I happened to be walking past the room where we keep the files and I noticed there was some people in the room making a log of the different papers, an inventory list. Senator WEICKER. And at that point in time then you called Mr. Ehrlichman to let him know that this was being done to his papers? Mr. KEHRLI. Yes that's right.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 25, 1973
[00.18.50-DEAN continues to discuss the WHITE HOUSE dealings with the FBI investigation] I told Petersen that if I were to testify I would have to reveal this fact. 'Mr. Petersen suggested that the, interview be terminated, which it was, and that they would get back to me and we could complete it on another day. I was not called again and it was not because* I think. of my knowledge but because of other events and a motion that Mr. Bittman had filed not being pursued--but Fielding and Kehrli testified as to the evidentiary chain at the trial. I recall that at shortly after this meeting in Petersen", office, where I disclosed these facts to Petersen, I talked with Gray at a Department of Justice luncheon. [00.19.29-GRAY is playing ball with EHRLICHMAN and the WHITE HOUSE-destroyed the sensitive documents from HUNT'S safe] After the luncheon he came in; to me and told me, that. I must "hang tight" on not disclosing his receipt of the documents. He also informed me that he had destroyed the documents. I told Ehrlichman about this shortly after Gray told me he had destroyed the documents and when Ehrlichman called me, just before the President selected Gray as his nominee for Director of the FBI. Ehrlichman asked me if I had any problems with Gray and I reminded him of the destruction of the documents. He indicated that this was not, a problem. It 'was after I commenced my informal interviews -with the Watergate Prosecutors, in early April of this year that this subject arose again. I repeated my story, as I have to this committee, They later informed me that Gray denied having ever received such documents. This was the first issue of fact that arose in my discussions with The prosecutors, so my attorney requested that I take a polygraph test, which I did. Subsequently as is now public knowledge and not to MY surprise, because I believe that Gray is both an honorable and truthful man, he has admitted that He 'had received and destroyed the documents. [00.20.35] MR. KALMBACH AND SILENCE MONEY I would now like to turn back to the end of June 1972, After my meetings with General Walters and subsequent meeting with Haldeman and Ehrlichman I informed Mr. Mitchell that there could be no CIA assistance. To the best of my recollection, this occurred on the afternoon of June 28 in a meeting in Mr. Mitchell's office, and I believe that Mr. LaRue and Mr. Mardian were also present. There was a discussion of the need for support money in exchange for the silence for the men in jail and if the CIA could not do it they would have to find money somewhere else. Mr. LaRue indicated that Mr. Stans had only a small amount of cash. I believe he said $70,000 or $80,000, but more would be needed, After some discussion which I cannot recall with any specificity at, this time, [00.22.15] Mitchell asked me to get the approval; of Haldeman and Ehrlichman to use Mr. Herbert Kalmbach to raise the necessary money. [00.22.23-INTEREST in keeping the defendants quietly, alluding to illegal White House activities] Before I departed the, meeting I remembered that Mr. Mitchell, in an aside for my ears only, told me that the White House, in particular Ehrlichman, should be very interested and anxious to accommodate the needs of these men. He was referring to activities that they had conducted in the past that related to the White House, such as the Ellsberg break-in. I conveyed this request to Haldeman and Ehrlichman and they told me to proceed to contact Mr. Kalmbach. I called Mr. Kalmbach on June 28, and told him that Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Mitchell had requested that he come back to Washington as quickly as possible. He told me he would take the next flight. I met Mr. Kalmbach at the Mayflower Hotel on June 29. We first, met in the coffee shop, but could not find sufficient privacy to talk so we went to his room. I had always been very open In my dealings with Mr. Kalmbach, and I knew that he had stated, after he completed his fundraising activities prior to April 7, 1972, that he. did not wish to engage in any further fundraising activities, so I told him everything I knew about the case at that time, including my concern that it might involve the, President himself, but I did not know that for a fact. I also told him that Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Mitchell felt it was very important that he raise the money, I told him that per Mitchell's instructions he should contact Fred LaRue as to the amounts needed and the timing. [00.23.47] I knew that Kalmbach was not happy with this assignment, and he said he was undertaking it only because Mitchell. Haldeman and Ehrlichman had so requested. I do not know if Mr. Kalmbach discussed this with any of these persons but given the nature of the request, I did not expect him to take it of my word alone. I had never before given instructions to Kalmbach to raise any money or never passed on any similar instructions to him. Subsequent to our meeting, Kalmbach informed me he, was departing to raise the money, but he wanted Tony Ulasewicz to handle all deliveries because he was the only man he would trust. He said that he did not have his telephone number and requested that I call Jack Caulfield and request that Mr. Ulasewicz meet him in California. I called Caulfield and made the request. but I did not tell Caulfield the reason Kalmbach wanted to have Mr. Ulasewicz call him. Within a week or so, Kalmbach returned to Washington And requested that I meet him in Lafayette Park, which I did. He said that I could report to Haldeman and Ehrlichman that he had raised the money and, in fact, he said he had it in his briefcase with him, to the best of my recollection, he told me he was en route to meet Mr. Ulasewicz, but wanted me to know the job was done. Following that meeting, and several days later, as I recall, he called me and said that he had asked Fred LaRue to come to my office to give him the details of who was to get how much. I recall that such a meeting did occur in my office, but I was on and off the telephone while LaRue and Kalmbach were going over the figures and I have absolutely no recollection of the details of their discussion. I know that LaRue, had the figures on a sheet of paper and Kalmbach wrote them down in his own code on a small piece of paper which he placed in his wallet. I have no further knowledge of how or when or to whom delivery was made. Mr. Kalmbach merely told me later that it had been done and I passed this on to Ehrlichman and Haldeman. [00.25.45]
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 7, 1973
[00.34.08] Senator INOUYE. Now, as the events unfold, how do you feel, sir? Mr. SLOAN. Quite frankly, Senator- Senator INOUYE. Were you surprised? Mr. SLOAN. Yes, sir. Everyday I continue to be surprised. Senator INOUYE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator ERVIN. Senator Weicker. Senator WEICKER. Mr. Sloan, I would Like to, if you could go back to your meeting with Mr. Haldeman in the White House on January of this year. Mr. SLOAN, Yes, sir. Senator WEICKER. Now, first of all, exactly when was the date of this meeting? Mr. SLOAN, Senator, I am not sure of the precise date. My best recollection from memory would be toward the end of January perhaps early February. Senator WEICKER. And am I correct in stating you indicated the meeting lasted about 45 minutes? Mr. SLOAN. Yes, sir. Senator WEICKER. Well, my first question would by why, why the meeting, why did you request the meeting or did you request the Meeting? Mr. SLOAN. Yes, sir, I did. Senator WEICKER. Why? Mr. SLOAN. Senator, the reason I requested the meeting, and I think the period of time in question is important, the criminal trial was over, I think some of the information on Mr. Segretti had come out, but , generally it was in a lull period where in my judgment the decisions had been made, essentially the matter had been gotten away with, that it stopped with the conviction of the seven men. I was at the point in time where I was actively seeking private employment Mr. Haldeman had essentially asked me to undertake this task. The continuing on of the political leadership in the campaign in opposition to the views I held, the fact that presumably these same men were the source of any information that Mr. Haldeman had, I felt it in my interest particularly in terms of seeking private employment to be sure that there was not an active effort on the part of the administration because of misinformation of the reasons I had done what I had done, that there would be any active efforts to make things difficult for me in terms of seeking private employment. I sought him out. I had a very cordial meeting with him, spent about 45 minutes. I told him without naming names, because I thought it was a issue, but I told him essentially that I wanted to make very clear to him why I had done what I had done, end I said I also want YOU to know that I still feel total loyalty to the President of the United States, I have worked for him over this period of time, and my wife has for a, long period of time, because we believe in what he is and I want you to know that I feel that I did not leave the team, as far as I am concerned the team left me. And I said I cannot understand the continuing support of individuals who in my judgment it is pretty obvious are involved in this situation. I think he interpreted part of the purpose of my meeting was essentially to feel out the possibility of employment in the Government. This was not my purpose. I had long ago made the decision that, is not what I wanted to do, However, it did produce the discussion On his part, a statement that the policy of the administration was that no individual who had become a "Watergate" figure or prominently mentioned in the newspapers would be, placed in high Government office until the issue was totally resolved, and I said I totally understand that policy, I couldn't agree with you more, and he said in terms of your age I agree with your decision, this is the right time to go out in the private sector if you want to make a career there. However, if at a later date, if this matter is totally resolved, if you want to be considered for high position in Government I will be glad to sponsor you, Generally, I think this was the tone and nature of this discussion, Senator WEICKER. Now, did that meeting have anything to do with your being rehired by the Committee To Re-Elect the President as a consultant? Mr., SLOAN. No, sir; I made that, decision prior to that. This would be probably about the midpoint during that consultancy. I went to the committee in early January, probably I think January 3, [00.39.27]
JFK Assassination HSCA Hearings
House Select Committee on Assassinations hearing on the assassination of U.S. President John F. Kennedy, Committee Deputy Chief Counsel Gary T. Cornwell continuing to takes testimony of Professor Mark Weiss and Ernest Aschenasy on acoustic analysis of the Dallas Police audio transmission tape from the assassination. Weiss discusses the basic principles of audio analysis and echoes in Dealey Plaza, and the use and placement of microphones set to predict the echo pattern. Weiss discusses usingthe acoustic analysis of Dr. James E. Barger to become familiar with the acoustical structure of Dealey Plaza.
History of the U.S. Congress
Adult Caucasian Congressman briefly speaking to the House of Representative chamber. U.S. Representative Ronald Dellums (D-CA) briefly speaking animatedly at the well of the House. Speaker of the House Tip O’Neill (D-MA) speaking from the Speaker’s Platform. Norman Ornstein explains the function of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, a hold-over of British Parliament. Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, Rep. Daniel Rostenkowski (D-IL) confirming that if the Speaker of the House states they’re working all night, then they will stay up all night working to pass legislation.
More Opening Day 98th Congress, 1983
Opening Day 98th Congress, Speaker of the House Tip O'Neill recognizes Majority Leader Rep. Jim Wright (D-TX). Rep. Wright offers privileged resolution. Adult Caucasian male reading clerk says resolution is to inform Senate that a quorum is present in the House of Representatives, Tip O'Neill has been elected Speaker of the House, and Benjamin Guthrie has been appointed Clerk of the House of Representatives. O'Neill approves resolution, recognizes Majority Leader Wright. Rep. Wright offers another privileged resolution; Speaker O'Neill greets man on platform. Clerk reads resolution calling for three member committee of both House and Senate to inform the President that a quorum is present in Congress and they are ready to receive communications. O'Neill approves resolution as he greets man and child. O'Neill appoints Reps. Robert Michel (R-IL), Jim Wright (D-TX), and Tom Foley (D-WA) to be members of the committee.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 26, 1973
[00.39.20] Mr. DEAN. There would be an effort to discredit the committee, by painting it as very partisan through a behind-the- scenes media effort. That there was also discussion of how to make sure that there were raised also the problems that the Democratic Party might have been engaged in but at that point there was nothing specific to raise, We were hoping to find things. In fact at one, point, in the conversation it was suggested we hire private investigators, Mr. Haldeman suggested this. I raised the fact this is more political surveillance and that is the last thing in the world we need. Then, I think, I tried to recount most of this in my testimony and I will be happy to do it all again for you if you would like me to. Senator MONTOYA. Do you know whether Or not since the, Watergate, entry, do you know whether or not the CRP. the White House or anyone else under the auspices of the CRP was hired to conduct a gathering of more intelligence or to engage in the invasion of the right of privacy of individuals? Mr. DEAN. I only know of the fact that that has been done with; regard to me and I don't believe it has been done by those entities. It might be indirectly but I have no firsthand knowledge of that. Senator MONTOYA. Do you know -whether or not there were any other buggings other than the ones that you have mentioned or any, eavesdropping through electronic devices? Mr. DEAN. No, sir, I think I have mentioned those that, I am aware of. Senator MONTOYA. In what respects did you discuss the possible blocking or impeding of the Senate investigation at the White House at any time? Mr. DEAN. Well, as I say, as a result of the La Costa meetings there were set in motion a host of follow-up activities. I think some of the agenda that you see in my submissions for meetings indicate the thrust of things that were developing at the La, Costa meeting. I think in particular some of those agenda are self-explanatory as to the tactics and the thoughts as to how to deal with the situation. Senator MONTOYA. When you informed Liddy to get Hunt our of the country, who had instructed you to do this? Mr. DEAN. This Was--- Senator MONTOYA. And what conversation actually took place Prior to your informing Mr. Liddy to get Hunt out of the country? [00.42.28] Mr. DEAN. This occurred on Monday the 19th of June in 1972. It was a late afternoon meeting In Mr. Ehrlichman's office with Mr. Colson. The first question before the meeting got down to any substance was raised by Mr. Ehrlichman as to where Mr. Hunt was. He asked me and I said I had no idea. He asked Mr. Colson and Mr. Colson made a similar comment. I was then asked by Mr. Ehrlichman to call Mr. Liddy and tell Mr. Liddy to tell Mr. Hunt to get out of the country. I did that. It was a short time thereafter that I began to think about the wisdom of having made that call and re-raised it. There was a brief discussion between Ehrlichman and myself and finally Mr. Colson entered the discussion and he said he also thought it was a very unwise idea. Ehrlichman concurred. This all took place within about, oh, 15, 20 minute span and I was asked to call Mr. Liddy back and retract the instruction. I did that. Liddy said to me that he didn't know if it was possible because the message had already been passed and I have no further knowledge of whether in fact, Hunt did leave the country or not as a result of that. Senator MONTOYA. When was the first real meeting to organize the coverup and who was present at that first meeting? Mr. DEAN. I think that the coverup is somewhat similar to the planning of this whole thing, that just sort of happened. I know that when I Came, back from out of the country there had already been Significant events, which had occurred, The coverup was already--it had begun and was in fact In place and was going. [00.44.21]
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities - Testimony of James McCord.
Sam Ervin (D - North Carolina). Now, how long had you known, when did you first know John or Jack Caulfield? James McCord. I first met him in early September 1971. I had heard of him before. Sam Ervin (D - North Carolina). Where was he working at the first time you first met him? James McCord. At the White House. Sam Ervin (D - North Carolina). Did have any connection later with rather, I believe you stated that you were employed by the committee to re-elect the president on the recommendation of Mr. Caulfield. James McCord. Yes sir. Sam Ervin (D - North Carolina). Did Mr. Caulfield later have any association with the committee? James McCord. Yes sir. Sam Ervin (D - North Carolina). And after that association, did he go to one of the executive departments? James McCord. I understood from him that he did, yes sir. Sam Ervin (D - North Carolina). Do you know which department? James McCord. I believe it was the Treasury department. Sam Ervin (D - North Carolina). Do you know what position he held there? James McCord. It was a senior position with I believe it's called the alcohol tax and firearms division of .... Sam Ervin (D - North Carolina). Now was he working in the Treasury department at the time that he had the meetings with you? James McCord. He told me that, yes sir. Sam Ervin (D - North Carolina). As I recall, you met with him first on Friday January the 12th, somewhere on the George Washington Parkway. James McCord. It was that Friday, yes sir. Sam Ervin (D - North Carolina). Did he give you any reason why he wanted to meet you on the George Washington Parkway, instead of seeing you at his home or your home? James McCord. No sir. Sam Ervin (D - North Carolina). Who was present at that meeting? James McCord. Just the two of us. Sam Ervin (D - North Carolina). And at that time he urged you to plead guilty? The case was still pending, was it not? James McCord. Yes sir. Sam Ervin (D - North Carolina). It was just about the time the trial started, wasn't it? James McCord. This was the first week of the trial. Sam Ervin (D - North Carolina). And he urged you to plead guilty and assured you that if you pleaded guilty, you would receive executive clemency and also be given a chance to, after you served in a sentence to help to be re-habilitated in a job, didn't he? James McCord. I believe all is correct, except the word plead guilty and I'll try to re-state that for accuracy. The word "plead guilty" had been used over the telephone to me by this unknown, un-identified individual whose voice I described, and then subsequently, ... Sam Ervin (D - North Carolina). That was prior to the meetings? James McCord. Yes sir. Sam Ervin (D - North Carolina). Excuse me, do you have something further? James McCord. Well, in the conversations on the 12th of January and in the two subsequent meetings, the word "plead guilty" would come up in this general language, are you going to plead guilty or how about pleading guilty, or what are your feelings about pleading now?
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities - Testimony of James McCord.
Sam Ervin (D - North Carolina). Mr. McCord, there is evidence here that the people, the five men arrested in the Watergate on after the midnight on the seventeenth, eighteenth of June had some hundred dollar bills, some new 100 dollar bills in their possession or in their rooms. James McCord. Yes sir. Sam Ervin (D - North Carolina). Where did that money come from, if you know? James McCord. I don't know sir. Sam Ervin (D - North Carolina). Did you have any of it? James McCord. No sir. Sam Ervin (D - North Carolina). Then you say that from after the return of the bills of indictment in September, down to the last day of the trial that you were urged to plead guilty, remain silent by a number of people. Did Mr. Hunt ever urge you to plead guilty and remain silent? James McCord. (looking tight lipped - not answering question) Sam Ervin (D - North Carolina). That is E. Howard Hunt. James McCord. Yes sir, ....I'm trying to recall sir of the exact words .... Sam Ervin (D - North Carolina). Yes. James McCord. The words most frequently used by Mr. Hunt with me was that executive clemency would be available to me. Sam Ervin (D - North Carolina). Yes. How many times did he urge you to plead guilty? James McCord. No sir, I mean to correct that statement. I don't recall Mr. Hunt using those words with me, to plead guilty. Sam Ervin (D - North Carolina). Did he urge you to remain silent? James McCord. Not in exact words, no sir. Sam Ervin (D - North Carolina). What words did he use, as near as you remember? James McCord. He used words to the effect that, he used words stating that executive clemency is going to be made available to us. And he spoke in terms as though it already had been committed. I say already, already as of the time that he first mentioned it to me. Sam Ervin (D - North Carolina). Now, you stated that you were paid some money through the instrumentality of Mrs. Hunt and also that your lawyer fees were taken care of, as I understood you. James McCord. Yes sir. Sam Ervin (D - North Carolina). Do you know who paid your lawyer fees? James McCord. I was told that both monies came from the committee to re-elect the president. Sam Ervin (D - North Carolina). Do you know the amount of your lawyer fees? James McCord. Yes sir. Sam Ervin (D - North Carolina). What was it? James McCord. The amount that I received was from the committee was 25,000 dollars, yes sir. Sam Ervin (D - North Carolina). Now, did your lawyer urge you to enter a plea of guilty? I'm talking about Mr. Gerald Alch. James McCord. I don't recall that, no sir. Sam Ervin (D - North Carolina). But, he did go with you to Mr. (William) Bitman's office? James McCord. Yes sir. Sam Ervin (D - North Carolina). Mr. Bitman was a lawyer for Mr. Hunt, was he not? James McCord. Yes sir. Sam Ervin (D - North Carolina). After that, you didn't talk to Mr. Bitman yourself? James McCord. No sir. Sam Ervin (D - North Carolina). But Mr. Alch did? James McCord. Yes sir. Sam Ervin (D - North Carolina). And after his conversation with Mr. Bitman, he told you that Mr. Bitman urged you to plead guilty and remain silent and said you would get executive clemency. James McCord. I'll correct that sir, if I left that impression. I believe the words were this, in the afternoon of January 8th, Mr. Alch said that Mr. Bitman wanted to talk with me about quote" who's word I would trust regarding a White House offer of executive clemency". And then at the meeting at his office Mr. Alch came back to me after a meeting with Mr. Bitman and told me that I would be contacted by a friend I had formally known at the White House and contacted that evening. I believe that was the substance of that conversation.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, Testimony of James W McCord (Jim McCord)
Senator Sam Ervin (D North Carolina). You may proceed now. James McCord. The sentence which follows the last sentence which I read from the memorandum reads, "The dates of the telephone calls set forth below are the current and that word is mistyped. It should be correct dates to the best, of my recollection. The second paragraph is: On the afternoon of January 8, 1973 the first day of the Watergate trial, Gerald Alch, my attorney, told me that William O. Bittman, attorney for E. Howard Hunt wanted to meet with me at Bittman's office that afternoon. When I asked why, Alch stated that Bittman wanted to talk with me about "whose word I would trust regarding a White House offer of Executive clemency." Alch added that Bittman wanted to talk with both Bernard Barker and me that afternoon. I had no intention of accepting Executive clemency, but I did want to find out what was going on and by whom and exactly what the White House was doing now. A few days before, the White House had tried to lay the Watergate operation off on the CIA and now it was clear that I was going to have to find out what was up now. To do so involved some risks. To fail to do so was in my opinion to work in a vacuum, regarding White House intentions and plans, which involved even greater risks, I felt.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 28, 1973. Testimony of John Dean.
Senator Sam Ervin (D North Carolina). Now, was there anything in the document that, told who was going to do the selecting of these selected targets of internal security interests? John Dean. Not to my knowledge. Senator Sam Ervin (D North Carolina). And that was left up by the document to the imagination or interpretation of anybody engaged in the, intelligence work? John Dean. That is correct. Senator Sam Ervin (D North Carolina). Now there was another John Dean. I believe that, one of the reasons for developing this was to get intelligence that was more responsive to the requirements of the White House. As I think I have testified, there were continued complaints about the intelligence and I think that is why the White House took charge of the project. Senator Sam Ervin (D North Carolina). The White House was dissatisfied with the work being done by the FBI, the CIA, the NSA, and the other intelligence gathering agencies. It wanted to assume some degree of supervision over those agencies didn't it? John Dean. That is correct.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 28, 1973 (1/2)
[00.33.49-DEAN responds to the charge of the WHITE HOUSE question that DEAN implicated others in receiving funds to pay off the WATERGATE DEFENDANTS in order to protect himself] Mr. DEAN. Well, if you will recall my testimony on that when I spoke with Mr. Stans, I told him Mr. Fielding would be over to pick up the package. I also informed Mr. Stans that Mr. Fielding would not know what he was picking up. I was quite, surprised and I must say annoyed when Mr. Fielding came back and told me that he had realized that he had received cash. I did not have any desire to involve Mr. Fielding in this, because he had not been in involved in it before that. I assumed when he was making the trip that he -would be no more than an innocent agent in the matter and he would be unknowing as to what he was doing. I still think to this day he didn't know what the full purpose of that money was and I told him at the time, I said, "Well, don't worry about it. It is nothing for you to be concerned !about." Senator INOUYE. Mr. Dean, you have testified as to your close working relationship to your deputy. Mr. Fielding. It was he who you sent to pick up the $22,000 from' Mr. Stans, he who helped you to sort, the documents from Mr. Hunt's safe and he who sent to England to retrieve Mr. Young's secretary. Did Mr. Fielding know that you were involved in a conspiracy to obstruct justice, perjure testimony, and pay defendants for their silence? Mr. DEAN. I have no idea what Mr. Fielding knew. I didn't discuss these things with him. When he, to the best of my 'knowledge, his involvement merely was dealing with, going through the material in Mr. Hunt's safe, -with me, -and then dealing with Miss Chenow and going to England to get, her and brief her, He also assisted in briefing Mr. Krogh and he also accompanied me when Mr. Ehrlichman requested that he join me, In preparing himself for his interview before the FBI because, it related to matters with the plumbers unit. Mr. Fielding had become familiar with some of the problems of the Plumbers unit as a, result of dealing with Chenow and he had also talked to David young, who Was in the Plumbers unit. So, he was more knowledgeable than I was. That is my knowledge of Mr. Fielding's knowledge. [00.36.14-the WHITE HOUSE questions attack DEAN'S assumption about others' knowledge of the coverup] Senator INOUYE. Mr. Dean, if your deputy, Mr. Fielding, who worked so closely with you and who carried out, some of your missions connected with the, conspiracy, had absolutely no knowledge of the coverup conspiracy, how do you so blithely assume that others on the White House staff, and even the President, did know of your conspiracy? Mr. DEAN. Did know of my conspiracy? [00.36.42] Mr. DEAN. Well, I wouldn't classify it as my conspiracy. I would say that involved others in a coverup operation. I recall that I was involved with others on countless occasions, Mr. Fielding complaining to me that I was leaving him out, I wasn't explaining to him what I was doing. We had had a very close working relationship. I think today, Mr. Fielding is very happy that I did not. tell him what, I was doing or involve him any more than the degree he was involved in the entire matter. In fact he has subsequently thanked me for not involving him. Senator INOUYE. The question was, if I may repeat, it, again, if your deputy, Mr. Fielding, who worked closely with you and who carried Out some of your missions connected with the conspiracy, had absolutely no knowledge, of the coverup conspiracy, how do you so blithely assume that others on the White House staff and even the President did know of the conspiracy? Mr. DEAN. Well, as I say, I don't know how many other people on the White House staff know of the conspiracy to--not my conspiracy but the general coverup conspiracy. I certainly know that I was getting instructions from Mr. Haldeman and Ehrlichman and I know of my conversation 'with the President. I know that there -Were Other people on the staff who were quite aware of the fact that the White House was not baring its soul on this matter. There. were, as I said, parallel coverup situations with regard to Mr. Segretti, where, people who were not involved in other aspects become involved in that. There was the Patman hearing, where it was quite evident that the White House did not want to have the Patman hearings. There were a series of various phases to the coverup and various people in the White House knew. [00.38.53-the WHITE HOUSE questions call into question DEAN'S account of meetings with NIXON] Senator INOUYE. Mr. Dean, beginning in late May and early June there Were a Series of newspaper stories reporting -what you had told various investigators which quoted sources close to you as to what he had said. A number of these news reports, for example, the page 1 story in the Washington Post of June 3, alleged that you began your private meetings with the President either early in the year or as in the case of this particular story beginning on January 1. According to your testimony your first. private meeting with the President in 1973 Was not until February 27. Did you or did you not, tell investigators and/or friends that You began' meeting with the President, either the first of the year or beginning January 1, and were these stories an attempt to exaggerate the length -of time which You had been dealing directly with the President and by implication imparting to him knowledge of the Watergate? [00.39.58]
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 25, 1973 - Testimony of John Dean.
I do not recall ever reporting this meeting to Ehrlichman because he had a somewhat strained relationship with Kleindienst and I thought he would raise havoc that I did not have an assurance from Kleindienst that he would take care of everything. I did report, however, that I felt that Petersen would handle the matter fairly and not pursue a wide-open inquiry into everything the White House had been doing for 4 years. I made this statement not because of anything Petersen specifically said as much as the impression he gave me that he realized the problems of a wide-open investigation of the White House in an election year.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 25, 1973 - Testimony of John Dean.
On June 22nd, at the request of Ehrlichman and Haldeman I went to see Mr. Gray at this office in the early evening to discuss the Dahlberg and Mexican checks and determine how the FBI was proceeding with these matters. Mr. Gray told me that they were pursuing it by seeking to interview the persons who had drawn the checks. It was during my meeting with Mr. Gray on June 22 that we also talked about his theories of the case as it was beginning to unfold. I remember well that he drew a diagram for me showing his theories. At that time Mr. Gray had the following theories: it was a setup job by a double agent, it was a CIA operation because of the number of former CIA people involved, or it was someone in the reelection committee who was responsible. Gray had also had some other theories which he discussed, but I do not recall them now. I do remember that those I have mentioned were his principle theories. Before the meeting ended, I recall that Gray and I again had a brief discussion of the problems of an investigation into the White House. Gray expressed his awareness of the potential problems of such an investigation and also told me that if I needed any information I should call either Mark Felt or himself. Gray also informed me that he was going to meet with the CIA to discuss their possible involvement and he would let me know the outcome of that meeting.
JFK Assassination HSCA Hearings
House Select Committee on Assassinations hearing on the assassination of U.S. President John F. Kennedy, Professor Mark Weiss using two pins and a length of string to demonstrate the method for finding another echo surface in Dealey Plaza. Weiss says there were 22 echo paths in total found in the acoustic analysis of Dealey Plaza.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities Sept 26, 1973 - Testimony of Pat Buchanan
Senator Dash uses the previous line of question to inquire whether Mr. Buchanan believed or advocated the White House use its influence and power to impact the flow of money and support to foundations, institutions sympathetic to the Democratic Party.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 28, 1973 (1/2)
[00.25.00-DEAN discussing the Sept. 15, 1972 Oval Office meeting and the state of Nixon's knowledge of the coverup at that time] Senator BAKER. What else was said by him or by Mr. Haldeman or by you in that context? Mr. DEAN. Well, this into a, evolved into a, immediately into a conversation about the Internal Revenue Service and using the Internal Revenue Service to audit returns of people. I had--again, we were on, you know, I knew the wavelength we had had been talking about, because I had had similar requests in the past to audit returns of people, and I told the President that the, Internal Revenue Service had been--- [00.25.39] Senator BAKER. Wait, wait, wait. You knew the wavelength because you knew from your previous use of the Internal Revenue Service? Mr. DEAN. That is correct. I had requests from Mr. Haldeman in the past that certain individuals have audits commenced on them. Senator BAKER. What did you do with that? Mr. DEAN. Well, I can--the one time. I recall getting one I did not know exactly what I was going to do with it because I was always reluctant to call Mr. Walters at that time, who was the head of the Internal Revenue Service so I went to Mr. Caulfield, who had friends in the Internal Revenue Service and he said, "I think I know a way this can be done." Apparently there is some system where the appropriate anonymous letter comes into a regional office and if it is--those who know how to do this can write the right letter and sufficient information will prompt an audit on that individual. Senator BAKER. Is that known as the informer statute? Mr. DEAN. No; I do not believe it is an informer statute, It is just something that will be of sufficient attention to that regional office, that branch of the audit branch of that regional office, that will institute an audit. [00.26.48-NIXON'S post-election plans to consolidate power in the executive branch to make all agencies devices to screw ENEMIES] I went on to tell the President that we did not seem to have the clout at the White House to get this done. I had talked to Walters about it in the past, and told him that I had had instructions from Mr. Haldeman on one occasion, and he said that, he brought to my attention the, making of the IRS political, and said that, You will recall what happened back in 1948 with Truman and that administration and -the cleaning house and the changing of the Internal Revenue Service. And these were all new facts to me, and what he was telling me was "Don't call me with this sort of thing." Senator BAKER. Tell me, if -you do not mind, what you did. Did you in fact set up an audit? Your counsel is trying to reach you and I think he may have something to say. Mr. DEAN. [conferring with counsel]. He Just said, which was quite accurate, I do not mind telling you any fact that is true. [Laughter.] Senator BAKER.. I would say that was a very lawyer-like piece of advice. [Laughter.] Mr. DEAN. So in this instance there -was, the one I was referring to in the past, there was an audit commenced. Now I, for example, read a Memorandum into the record this morning per request of some material requested by the committee that had to do with an audit of Mr. Gibbons, of the Teamsters Union. I merely put that in my file, and that is where it has remained to this day. [00.28.35] Senator BAKER. To shorten this, and I do not, mean to shorten it if you care, to go on with it, did you In fact initiate IRS inquiries or audits as a result of suggestions from the White House staff or the President? [00.28.47-NIXON'S plans post-election to make the IRS a punitive arm of the White House to harass ENEMIES] Mr. DEAN-. Well, the President at this time, to keep in the focus you want to keep in, told me to keep a good list, so that these could be--you know, we would take care of these people after the election, and we went into--I told him that IRS was a democratically oriented bureaucracy and to do something like that was a virtual impossibility. And then the conversation moved to the fact that he was going to make some dramatic changes in all of the agencies and, at this point in time, Haldeman opened up his pad and started making notes as to what the President was describing as to his post-election intentions. As a result of the President giving his thoughts on what he wanted to do post-election with all of the agencies and as far as changing personnel. Mr. Haldeman also injected Into the conversation at that time that he had already commenced a project to determine which people in which agencies were responsive and were not responsive to the White House. Senator BAKER. Mr. Dean, in deference to my colleagues and the requirements of time, let me try to refocus now: is, there anything else about the September 15 meeting that would shed light On the President's knowledge and the scope and depth of his knowledge, if any, of the, Watergate break-in on June 17 or the coverup activities, so-called, thereafter and prior to September 15? Mr. DEAN. I think I described pretty well in full of the 30, 40 minute meeting, however long it was. As I say at the end of the meeting, the meeting it turned to rather unrelated chatter about a book I was reading. [00.30.35]
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, July 10, 1973 (1/2)
[00.10.25-GURNEY questions MITCHELL about NIXON'S possible concerns about "dirty tricks" in the campaign-softball questions for MITCHELL designed to elicit testimony favorable to NIXON] Senator GURNEY. Well, the general thrust of my question of course, was to find out if the President had any concern about bugging electronic surveillance, or dirty tricks in the upcoming 1972 campaign. I suppose if he had, he ought to have discussed it with you, the No. 1 campaign director? Mr. MITCHELL. No, Senator, I believe that, the conversations went more to the security of the buildings and the personnel than they did electronic surveillance. Obviously, we did have and we discussed from time to time, the necessity of sweeping for a determination of whether there, was electronic surveillance of the sensitive areas within the campaign headquarters. But, of course, as far as the President was concerned, this was always done by the Secret Service and that was not so much a concern on his part as far as he personally was involved, but just to make sure that we did have good security in connection -with our campaign activities. Senator GURNEY. And that, I guess, is one of the reasons why Mr. McCord was on board; is that correct? Mr. MITCHELL. There is no question about that, sir, and no question about, the fact that, there were constant sweeps of the building at 1701 and the installation of in-house television so that they could watch corridors and so forth. Senator GURNEY. Some of these matters I am going to touch on have obviously been touched on before, but I will Try 'only to bring up things, perhaps, that were not mentioned or perhaps should be mentioned a little more fully. [00.12.17] Going to the March meeting at Key Biscayne with Magruder, was LaRue present all the time during these discussions with Magruder? Mr. MITCHELL. That would be my belief, Senator, I know that, Mr. Magruder's testimony is to the contrary, but, I might help if I explain the circumstances. It is rather a large house. It was built as a one-family house and then the fellow who owned it Inherited a mother- and father-in-law to come to live with him, so he built a second wing on it was a, complete operation down there and a large, Florida, room, which had two telephones in the room. So I think Magruder's statement was that LaRue was in and out of the room from time to time, and so forth. Well, if he, -was in and out of the room, he must. have had very weak kidneys, because there were certainly enough telephones in there to take care of without leaving the room. Senator GURNEY. What was LaRue's job at this time with you? Mr. MITCHELL. 'Well, he had been---Fred LaRue had been at the Committee for the Re-Election Of the, President for quite a few months and he was what you, I presume, would call a special assistant, although until we got the place organized over there, they never had any titles, while, I was there, until after I came aboard 'so that, they could be sorted out and put in the proper spots. I believe you would call him a special assistant to me, and he was staying at the house on Key Biscayne with us, so that he was there, not only at the meeting that, I had with Magruder, but also the one that, I had the, previous day or the subsequent day, whichever it was, with Harry Flemming. Senator GURNEY. His mission on that occasion -was to be your right-hand man to help you out, is that the idea? Mr. MITCHELL. I would believe that to be the case,, besides the fact that he is awfully good company and delightful to have around. [00.14.35] Senator GURNEY. Do you recall whether he was present when these electronic plans were discussed by Magruder? Mr. MITCHELL. To the best of my recollection, and I am quite sure that I am correct, that he was present and he did take part In the discussion. Senator GURNEY. Going to this Magruder meeting--- guess I should say alleged meeting in view earlier testimony today-about the Gemstone files, You mentioned that in the morning----- Mr. MITCHELL. Is the Gemstone file supposed to be the same as the Mitchell file? [00.15.10] Senator GURNEY. Well, the Gemstone files, of course, involved information about the bugging-transcripts, things like that. And the testimony of course, previous here was that they had been put In the Mitchell files and they had been brought to your attention by Mr. Magruder You testified this morning that Occurred In the morning, this meeting with Magruder, in which he, discussed the Gemstone files. Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. Magruder testified that it happened at the, 8:30 a.m. meeting.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 28, 1973 (1/2)
[00.21.20-Sen. INOUYE continues to pose to DEAN the questions sent from the WHITE HOUSE] Senator INOUYE. Did you take any notes of this meeting? Mr. DEAN. Of the, September 15 meeting? Senator INOUYE. Yes, sir. Mr. DEAN. No, sir; and I did not take notes of other meetings for a very specific reason. I recall at, one time Mr. Moore saying to me, John, you are having a lot of meetings with the President; you ought to be recording these. Some of the things that were being discussed in these meetings I did not want to make records of, Senator. Senator INOUYE. Why, sir? Mr. DEAN. I thought they were very incriminating to the President Of the United States. Senator INOUYE. Mr. Chairman, this is not part of the questioning, but, could you advise this committee what sort of information you received? [00.21.55-DEAN tells what kinds of information were discussed that made him reluctant to keep notes of his meetings with NIXON.] Mr. DEAN. Well, I have recalled most, of it in my testimony regarding the conversation on clemency for Mr. Hunt, the million dollar conversation, when the President told me that it. would I problem to raise $1 million on the 13th. I did not, think documents like this should be around the White House, because the White House had a similar problem as far as information getting out,. Senator INOUYE. Did you discuss this September 15 meeting With anyone at that time or at any time since? Mr. DEAN. I believe when I came out of the meeting, I fold Mr. Fielding of my office that I had spent about 30 or 40 minutes with the President and Mr. Fielding did not have full knowledge Of my activities at this time. But I told him that fact that the meeting had occurred and that the President seemed very pleased with the job that I had been doing thus far. I think Mr. Fielding probably had a general awareness about the specifies of the fact that I was involved in assisting with the, coverup. Senator INOUYE. You have indicated in your testimony that you were certain after the September 15 meeting that the President was fully aware of the coverup, did you not? Mr. DEAN. Yes, sir. Senator INOUYE. And you further testified that you believed that, you had on your spurs in handling the coverup by February 27, when you were told by the President that you would report to him directly. Is that not correct? Mr. DEAN. I do not believe I used the word "my spurs." I think that, was another characterization. I said I thought I had earned my stripes. [00.23.48-POINTED question originating from the WHITE HOUSE] Senator INOUYE. If that was the case, why did you feel it necessary on February 27 to tell the President that you had been participating In a coverup and therefore, might be chargeable with obstruction of justice? Mr. DEAN. Because on the preceding day, he had indicated to me that Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman were principals and I was Wrestling with what he meant by that. I wanted him to know that I felt also that I -was a principal. So I wanted him to be able to assess whether I could be objective in reporting directly to him on the matter. [00.24.28] Senator INOUYE. If the President was aware on September 15 of the Coverup, was he not, aware that you were implicated also? Mr. DEAN. I would think so, but I did not understand his remark at the time. Senator INOUYE. Then, why was it necessary on February 27 to advise him that you -were guilty of Obstruction of justice? Mr. DEAN. Because as I 'said. Senator, when he mentioned the fact that Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Haldeman -were principals, I did not, understand what, he meant.. I wanted to make it clear to him , that that I felt, I also had legal problems and I had been involved in obstruction of justice. Any time I was in the oval office, I did not want to withhold anything from the President at any time, and felt that any information that he was seeking or came out as a result of the conversation, that I should give it to him. [00.25.20-the WHITE HOUSE questions hit upon an apparent inconsistency in DEAN'S testimony-DEAN is calm in responding] Senator INOUYE. If you were not clear as to whether the President clearly understood, are you suggesting that on September 15 he did not clearly understand what was happening? Mr. DEAN. I have testified that one of the reasons I sought the meeting of the 21st is because I did not think the President fully understood the implications of the coverup, the fact, that people had been involved in obstruction of justice and I wanted to make it very clear to him that this was my interpretation of the situation. At that time, I did have access to the President. When he did call we the night before, I did raise it and felt that I should go in and tell him the implications of this entire matter. [00.26.09-AGAIN, the WHITE HOUSE questions attempt to pick apart DEAN'S testimony on semantic grounds] Senator INOUYE. If you felt that the President of the United States did not, fully understand the implications on February 27, how did you expect the, President to understand the implications on September 15 of the prior year? [00.26.25-DEAN'S response is calm] Mr. DEAN. When I went in on the 15th of the prior year -as I say, this was sort of a congratulations, good job, John, Bob's told me what you have been doing. At the, time, we went on to discuss other aspects of the efforts to prevent the entire matter from mm coming out before the election. We talked about, when the civil suit would proceed, we talked about when the criminal suit would be tried. The discussion at that time was very--the President was asking most of the questions and I was giving very short answers. I might also add that I was very unused to going into the President's office. I was extremely nervous -when I was before him. This was the first time, I had ever really had a sort of one-to-one session with him. The other meetings I have been in, there have been many other members of the staff. I have not done most of the talking; rather, I was the man who was in there taking notes or taking other people into the meetings So I would answer his questions and listen and do the best I could to report. [00.27.39]
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, May 23, 1973 Testimony of John Caulfield.
Master 10373 Part 2 Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, May 23, 1973 Testimony of John Caulfield. Caucus Room, Russell Senate Office Building, Washington DC [cut to wide shot of committee table-- close shot of Sen. GURNEY] Senator GURNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Caulfield, your testimony certainly has been very full and very clear. I just want to press home one or two points. Referring to the previous testimony by Mr. McCord, at page 320 of the record, he had this to say about his conversations and meeting with you. "Caulfield stated that he was carrying the message of Executive clemency to me from the very highest levels of the White House. He stated that the President of the United States was in Key Biscayne, Fla., that weekend, referring to the weekend following January 8, the following meetings that we were in then, and that the President had been told of the results of the meeting." Did you ever learn that the President had learned of the results of any of your meetings with Mr. McCord? Mr. CAULFIELD. Absolutely not sir. Senator GURNEY. He also stated this further on in the testimony on the next page. "Mr. McCord. He, meaning you, may have a message to you at our next meeting from the President." Did you ever tell him that? Mr. CAULFIELD. No sir. Senator GURNEY. Did you ever have any communication with the President of the United States with regard to this so-called Executive clemency offer to Mr. McCord? Mr. CAULFIELD. None whatsoever sir. Senator GURNEY. Did you ever hear Mr. Dean, in any of your conversations with Mr. Dean, ever refer to the fact that he had informed the President of any of these meetings? Mr. CAULFIELD. No sir. Senator GURNEY. Did Mr. Dean ever say to you "The President has instructed me to make this offer of Executive clemency to McCord through you," or through anybody else as far as that's concerned? Mr. CAULFIELD. Absolutely not, sir. Senator GURNEY. Did you ever apply any pressure to Mr. McCord in any of these meetings for him to do anything in regard to this upcoming trial? Mr. CAULFIELD. No sir. Senator GURNEY. Did you ever urge him or advise him to plead guilty? Mr. CAULFIELD. Never. Senator GURNEY. This point has been covered but it is important because of Mr. McCord's testimony. My understanding is that your understanding about these calls to the Embassy and the wiretaps on the Embassies that this was his theory of defense, a way that be could get out of it by having the case dismissed if these wiretaps had occurred, is that correct? Mr. CAULFIELD. That is correct, Senator GURNEY. Did Mr. McCord ever discuss with you what other plans he might have if he were found guilty at the trial? Mr. CAULFIELD. No sir.
U.S. Rep. Jim Wright Speaks at DNC Orientation
United States Representative Jim Wright (D-TX) speaks to new Democratic National Committee (DNC) members coming into the House of Representatives. Attendees are predominately adult Caucasian men. US Congressman Wright discusses Congressional district representation and House Committees; TV news camera crew in BG. Incoming US Representative Frank McCloskey (D-IN) listening to Wright speak. Incoming US Representative Tim Valentine (D-NC) listening to Wright speak. Caucasian woman seated with an open briefcase, incoming US Representative Robert J Mrazek (D-NY) sits next to her.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 29, 1973 (1/2
[00.33.52-GURNEY continues to try to discredit DEAN'S testimony about meeting KALMBACH to start the PAYOFFS to the arrested BURGLARS] Senator GURNEY. Well. could that particular meeting you speak of at the Mayflower have occurred some other time? Could it have been a later meeting or an earlier meeting? Mr. DEAN. No, sir. 'To the best of my recollection. this was the first time We ever talked about this matter and these were the circumstances under which -we talked about it. when he flew in from California. He had taken a late flight. he was tired, and we met in the coffee. shop, went to his room, as I have repeated, then had the discussion. Senator GURNEY. Let me just, try to refresh your recollection. Could this meeting have taken place out in front of the Hay-Adams Hotel? Mr. DEAN. In front of the Hay-Adams Hotel? Senator GURNEY. That is right, that you walked over from your office and he walked over from his hotel and met out in front of the Hay-Adams and discussed it there? Mr. DEAN. I have testified to a subsequent occasion when we met, after he had the, money in his possession, as he told me, and I believe he told me he was going to meet with Mr. Ulasewicz at that time. That was in Lafayette Park. I can recall very clearly being in Lafayette Park, because we stood and we each put our foot up on the bench and we were looking back over at the, White House and talking. He had his attachT case with him. I had -walked out of my office and this was some time after this initial me meeting. Senator GURNEY. That couldn't have, been the initial meeting, at least according to your recollection? Mr. DEAN No, sir. [00.35.23-GURNEY returns again to his effort to find some improprieties in DEAN'S use of CAMPAIGN FUNDS for personal expenditures, he is really beating a dead horse] Senator GURNEY. Well, I guess we will just have to wait for Mr. Kalmbach and find out what he remembers. Let's go back a little, bit to the credit cards again, You know, we had a discussion on that and the use of the. $4,850. I asked you why you couldn't use credit cards. Mr. DEAN. And I responded I preferred not to use credit cards. Senator GURNEY. Well, now, the committee, staff 'has brought, to my attention here a list of some of the checks drawn on your account. I wonder if the staff would furnish the witness with copy of these checks. Mr. DEAN. I can barely read the copy I have here, particularly the first one, Senator. Senator GURNEY. Well, I can't read the first one, either, but I really don't think that is important. The second one down Which is legible on my sheet here--is it on yours? Mr. DEAN. Yes, it is. [00.36.33] Senator GURNEY. That is a check as I see dated September 21, 1972. This was very close, of course, to the October taking of the $4,850. Here is a check made out, to the American Express CO. for $908.47. Mr. DEAN. That is correct, Senator GURNEY. Signed John W. Dean. Is this a check drawn on your account? Mr. DEAN. Yes, it is. [00.37.12] Senator GURNEY. Is this in payment of credit card bills? Mr. DEAN. Yes, it is. Senator GURNEY. Then we, go down a little. further on November 13. There is another check drawn to Bankamericard for $250.51. Is this also your check? Mr. DEAN. That is correct. Senator GURNEY. Is this also for credit card bills? Mr. DEAN. Yes, it is. Senator GURNEY. Then going further down, there is another further check dated November 22, 1972, Bankamericard, $106.50. Is this your check? Mr. DEAN. Yes, it is. Senator GURNEY. Did that go for credit card payments? Mr. DEAN. Yes, it, did. Senator GURNEY. Then dropping further down, another In March to the American Express Co. for $531.45. Is this your check? MR. DEAN. That is correct. Senator GURNEY. And another in April, American Express Co., Mr. DEAN. That is correct. Senator GURNEY. 'Now, I don't know whether there. are others or not, because we don't have all of the, financial records. Mr. DEAN. I am sure there are. Senator. Senator GURNEY. Do you have any recollection what those were for? Mr. DEAN. Off the top, I do not. As I have told the committee I am perfectly willing to turn over all of my financial records to the committee where these can be fully analyzed. I believe in my own records will be found the stubs that indicate that each expenditure is for a given credit card payment. I know that because of the result of some foreign travel, -when I did use my credit cards when traveling abroad, some, of the foreign travel particularly takes as much as 6 months to a year, which surprised me, to catch up to make a payment. Senator GURNEY. I See. Do you have an air travel credit card? Mr. DEAN. No,; I do not. Senator GURNEY. You would pay for your air travel either off American Express or Bankamericard? Mr. DEAN. That is correct. or by cash. Senator GURNEY. Let me ask the chief counsel of the. committee, have we subpenaed the financial records? Mr. DASH. We have subpenaed all the records of Mr. Dean and we also have, one, of our chief Investigators, Mr. Carmine Bellino, who will be going over those records with Mr. Dean. [00.39.18-DEAN totally defeats GURNEY'S effort to discredit his account of the meeting with KALMBACH (this tape, tcr= 00.28.56)-it's totally hilarious] Mr. DEAN. I might go back over one point. The name of the coffee shop at the Statler Hilton is the Mayflower. [Applause.] [the audience loves it, GURNEY appears chagrined, ERVIN pounds gavel] Senator ERVIN. The audience -will please refrain from applause or demonstrating their reaction to any testimony. Senator GURNEY. IS that What your attorney just told you? Mr. DEAN. Yes, he did. Senator GURNEY. His memory apparently is much better than yours-- Mr. SHAFFER. Mr. Chairman, that was' Mr. McCandless. I would like to give him credit for that. [Laughter] [00.40.01]