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Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 25, 1973 - Statement of John Dean.
On Sunday, April 15, I went to Mr. Shaffer's office for an all-day meeting. I learned during the day that Ehrlichman had been trying to reach me during the better part of the day but I decided not to return his call. When I returned home about 7:30, the White House operator called me again and said that Ehrlichman had been trying to reach me. I then returned his call. He told me that he was going back to the office to do some work that night and would be in about 8:00 and would like to meet with me very much. I told him I would meet with him. I was quite aware of the reason that Ehrlichman wanted to meet with me, it was because I was sure that he had learned from the President what was going on as a result of the President's meeting with Kleindienst and Petersen and the fact that I had been to the prosecutors had obviously come out.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 14, 1973 - Testimony of Jeb Magruder
Samuel Dash, attorney. After the February 4 meeting in Mr. Mitchell's office when the plan was not still approved, did there come a time when anyone else at the White House urged you to get the Liddy plan approved? Jeb Magruder. Yes. Mr. Charles Colson called me one evening and asked me, in a sense, would we get off the stick and get the budget approved for Mr. Liddy's plans, that we needed information particularly on Mr. O'Brien. He did not mention, I want to make clear, anything relating to wiretapping or espionage at that time. Samuel Dash, attorney. But in that discussion did you get the impression yourself that he knew what the Liddy plan was? Jeb Magruder. Again I want to be careful here. I knew Mr. Hunt was a close friend of Mr. Colson's. He had been referred to me earlier by Mr. Colson. I did make the assumption that he did know but he did not say that he was aware of the specifics and never did say that to me at any time.
JFK Assassination Hearings - The end of Cyril H. Wecht
Shot opens to Dr. CYRIL H. WECHT giving the end of his closing statement in which he hopes that though the odds are against his analysis of the JFK assassination his testimony will be strongly considered by the committee, testimony that strongly questions the single bullet theory and suggest more than one assassin were involved (18:09:06) Committee Chair Mr. STOKES thanks Wecht (18:10:51) Committee adjourn until tomorrow (18:18:09) Hearings host SANFORD UNGAR voices over zoom out from committee that this closes a long day of testimony (18:11:40) Ungar sums up the day's testimony, all of which has been Wecht's contestation of the committee's panel of forensic pathologist findings - that there were more than three shots fired at the motorcade based on the bullets' trajectories (18:11:52) Ungar introduces his panel JEREMIAH O'LEARY from the Washington Star and DAVID LIFTON a critic of the Warren Commission - they discuss if Wecht has disproved the single bullet theory (18:12:38) Ungar closes out coverage (18:14:21) Shot changes to wide shot of court room with people filing out (18:14:33) Black Screen (18:14:40) Funding credits (18:14:45)
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 5, 1973
[00.47.58] Senator MONTOYA. And prior to March 4, how many meetings. did he have at the Department of Justice with Mr. Mitchell? Mr. REISNER. Prior to March 4, Senator MONTOYA. Yes. Mr. REISNER. I would say he met several times a week with Mr. Mitchell. That could be verified exactly in the calendar. Senator MONTOYA. And what individuals accompanied him to see Mr. Mitchell at the Department of Justice during this time? Mr. REISNER. It would have depended on the nature of the meet If the meeting concerned advertising, for example, I am certain Peter Daly would have accompanied him. Senator MONTOYA. If the meeting were concerned with clandestine activities, who would have accompanied him? Mr. REISNER. Clandestine activities? Senator MONTOYA. Yes. Mr. REISNER. Well, this is retrospective in the sense that I think I knew there were activities that weren't generally-- Senator MONTOYA. Now that the names of the individuals have been divulged, were any of those names engaged in clandestine activities were any of those individuals at the Department of Justice with Magruder during any of these times? Mr. REISNER. Well, I have testified that Mr. Liddy and Magruder went to the Department of Justice. Other individuals I not certain, Senator MONTOYA. What about Mr. Dean? Mr. REISNER. Yes, in the notebook, in the calendar, it indicated that Mr. Dean attended that meeting. Senator MONTOYA. On how many occasions would you say Mr. Liddy accompanied Mr. Magruder to see Mr. Mitchell? Mr. REISNER. As far as I know, there was only one occasion. But perhaps the calendar shows more than that. Senator MONTOYA. Now, prior to June 17, were you aware or did you have any knowledge of any plans to bug the DNC or the McGovern headquarters? Mr. REISNER. No, sir. Senator MONTOYA. Did you have an inkling that such a thing might be in the offing? Mr. REISNER. NO, sir, Senator MONTOYA. You did not ascertain this until after the matter was announced in the newspapers? Mr. REISNER. That is correct. Senator MONTOYA. Is that about right? Mr. REISNER. That is correct,. Senator MONTOYA. Now, were you aware, as AAto Mr. Magruder, of his activities with regard to employing individuals to disrupt any part of the Democratic campaign? Mr. REISNER. To Mr. Magruder's activities to employ individuals to disrupt the campaign, I cannot say that I was, There are individual incidents to which I have testified. For example, this Hoover funeral testimony that, I have discussed here today, where I overheard a phone call which indicates that it was related to an activity. I did not have any knowledge of any of that kind of activity except circumstantially. Senator MONTOYA. Were you aware of the instance where somebody from the CRP employed someone to park right in front of the White House and pose as a McGovern supporter? Mr. REISNER. Yes, sir. Senator MONTOYA. Were you aware of other similar incidents? Mr. REISNER. Yes sir There is a distinction here which may not be a good one. The distinction is that it seemed to me at the time that the purpose of that individual sitting in front of the White Houseand I learned about the individual after he had been removed and then was replaced there-that the purpose of that was some sort of a public relations effort, that it was for the publicity value of it, not for &lay disruptive value. Now, I am not certain that that is a, very-- Senator MONTOYA. Publicity for whom? Mr. REISNER. Well, negative publicity for Senator McGovern would be the concept. If that negative publicity is disruptive, yes, sir. Senator MONTOYA. And you were aware of other instances? Mr. REISNER. Of individuals like that? Senator MONTOYA. Yes. Mr. REISNER. Well, yes, I have testified that I was aware of an individual who I think was referred to--I don't think--who was referred to as Sedan Chair and that that individual was obtaining information, it seemed, from the Humphrey campaign. Now, as to whether that individual worked for Mr. Humphrey and disgruntled at that moment and passed information, I can't say. could have been less negative. Senator MONTOYA. Well, were. you aware that there was a plan being executed to employ individuals to pose as McGovern supporters at the Democratic National Convention and to indulge in certain acts and that all this was under the sponsorship of the CRP? Mr. REISNER. Lot me be specific about this, because just a minute ago, when I said I was aware of that individual, what I was aware of was the purported fruits of his activity. You know, that is how I learned about the individual. Now, as to a plan to employ someone there, I listened to a conversation in which Mr. Liddy basically bursts into Mr. Magruder's office and said, "I have this idea." Now, I don't know whether--and the idea was to employ supporters who would pose as McGovern supporters--I presume it was McGovern supporters. Senator MONTOYA. At the Democratic National Convention? Mr. REISNER. The Democratic. National Convention. Senator MONTOYA. Tell us more about that conversation. Mr. REISNER. The nature of the conversation was Mr. Liddy coming in and saying, "I have this great idea." The idea, I think, was employing some sort of demonstrators who would wear McGovern identification badges or something. Senator MONTOYA. What kind of identification badges would they wear? Mr. REISNER. There was on one occasion, Senator, and I think I described this to your staff, a woman who would have disrobed at the Democratic National Convention. That was the nature of the conversation. Now, maybe that is important to point out, because I have no idea whether Mr. Magruder would have said that was a good idea or not.[Laughter.] He certainly did not indicate it was a good idea at the time. just was amazed. [Laughter]. [00.54.18]
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 7, 1973
[00.46.08] Senator WEICKER. I can understand that, but, I just want to get back to the point, I am trying to develop, that at, the time of your troubles, there, were those who stood with you and those who stood apart from you? Mr. SLOAN. And there were quite a few in the middle,. Senator WEICKER. All right. Mr. SLOAN. And I think, Senator, this may help answer your question. It was very difficult in each and every individual case to determine where those individuals stood, because people just were -not, talking to each other about, the pertinent issues at, this point. Senator WEICKER. But, you did know that you were one of the few people, that were insisting on telling the truth and you would not deviate from that; is that not correct? Mr. SLOAN. Yes, Sir; but at that point in time, all the forums that were potentially on the horizon for doing that had disappeared. I had done what, I thought was right. No resolution of the matter had been raised on the basis of what had said, because. basically, I had very limited knowledge, only of the fact that from a factual basis, all I could ever say was that I gave certain individuals certain money. In the case of Mr. Magruder, it was a ease of, yes, I knew I had been approached to do that, but in case of testimony, here he gives a Contrary testimony, I can full well, certainly in that period of time, fully understand the he prosecutor's position, unless they had additional Information, which I had no way of knowing, where he Simply could not proceed with that, where they had one man's word against another's, I felt there was nothing I could do, nothing more was going to come out, it, was all over, I had essentially lost. Senator WEICKER. Why did you try to have lunch with Mr. Chapin? Mr. SLOAN. You are not talking about the earlier meeting, you are, talking about the luncheon when I called him when he had gone to United Airlines? Senator WEICKER. Right. Mr. SLOAN. I think it was essentially, sir, the same kind of situation that it was with Bob Haldeman. Here was a man I had worked with for 2 1/2 years. I had not seen anything of him since the one time I had seen him in that whole period of time. I was about to leave town, he was about to leave town. I had seen a number of people at the White House over this intervening period. I think it was purely social. Senator WEICKER. Was there any concern in your mind that there were those in this picture who seemed to be ending up with rather good jobs, both within and without Government, while you seemed to have been left standing by yourself? Mr. SLOAN. Well, in going back to the Haldeman meeting and his very definitive definition to me of administration policy with regard to individuals who would not be appointed to positions in Government--now I do not know whether he meant positions that actually required Presidential confirmation--or Senate confirmation, excuse me--but I think it was only a few days after that, after that meeting with Bob Haldeman, which I felt very good about, because he had indicated to me, you know, I realize some mistakes were made, there is nothing being held against you, good luck in the private sector. But within, I think, a very short period of time after that, Mr. Magruder's appointment to the Commerce Department was announced and at that point, I just threw up my hands. In answer to your question, yes, sir; it was obvious to me that not only did they not address the problem of people, I think they had, fairly strong indications were involved--I perhaps can understand the intent to postpone it until after the political election, but there was certainly no attempt, even at that point, to take these people out of the picture. Senator WEICKER. In other words, that possibly, integrity is a disability in this matter? Mr. SLOAN. The way it is ultimately believed to be resolved, I would not think that it is a liability. I think it takes a long time. Senator WEICKER, Let me get back, if I could, to the meeting with Mr. Haldeman. You indicated there was some talk about the Segretti matter and he explained that this would turn out all right. Mr. SLOAN, Yes, sir; he said when this received the full light of day--I am not sure of his precise word-, or paraphrasing--that it would be understandable to the American people. Senator WEICKER. Now, what else was discussed; 45 minutes is a considerable period of time. The Strachan payments, which you Surmised went to Mr. Haldeman, was this a matter of discussion during that session? Mr. SLOAN. No, sir, no subject matter with regard to the finance campaign activities came up at all. It was not my purpose to be there to discuss any of that matter. Senator WEICKER. In other words, neither the payments to Liddy not to Strachan. none of these matters were discussed at all during that 45 minutes? Mr. SLOAN. Yes, sir. Only that discussion was re really a minor--not on those Matters, on really very broad matters that I referred to a Minute ago, in explaining that the team had left, me, in that, type Of context. I mentioned that I had been approached to perjure myself and take the fifth amendment, but I did not feel it was appropriate to make specific allegations as to individuals. I felt that that had already been addressed in the judicial processes and the point was, moot. [00.52.00]
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 26, 1973
[00.18.53-THOMPSON makes some effort to question DEAN'S motives] Mr. THOMPSON. What, you are saying is that you had no 'concern for your own welfare, but you just wanted to stay on to help out others? Mr. DEAN. Well, as I say, I found myself helping out others without--I was in the process before I began thinking about the process. Mr. THOMPSON. Why did you not tell the Federal prosecutors -when you first. made, contact with them?: I believe it was April 2 of this year when your attorney first made contact with the Federal prosecutors. I am still not quite sure in my own mind why you did not, evidently, relate, to them the nature of the, President's involvement or the fact that the President was involved to some extent. Mr. DEAN. Well, Of course, it -was not my presence at the meetings, so I am not aware of what was discussed. My lawyer and I did discuss it. We were aware of the fact that there, were attorney-client privilege problems, there was executive privilege, there were national security matters and I frankly was hopeful that at some point. when the President returned. I would have a chance to go in and tell the President this is the way I saw it: this is -what I have done, and ask him, based on that, expect him to come forward and explain his involvement the way I thought he -would. Mr. THOMPSON. When were, you terminated at the White House, Mr. Dean? Mr. DEAN. My resignation was requested and accepted on April 30. Mr. THOMPSON. Without your involvement? Mr. DEAN. Without my involvement. Mr. THOMPSON. So you had from April 2 to April 30 in which to do what you are talking 'about, meet the President and try to get him to step forward. Mr. DEAN. Let me get this straight. I am talking about the period from April 2 to April 15. there were no discussions with the President. From April 15 on. I began inferentially, because it was impossible to explain things, explaining the highlights of some of the things that involved the President without getting terribly specific with him. but giving him very broad ideas of some of the areas that were involved. Mr. THOMPSON. If you were interested in his coming forward. Why did you not tell him that you were talking to the prosecutors or that you had made some contact with the prosecutors? Mr. DEAN. Well. I met with him on the 21st. I met with him again on the 22d, called again on the 23d. I had given him what I thought was the most dramatic way I could tell him what the situation was. Nothing happened as a result of that. He then went to California. When he came back from California I noted that there was- well actually, when I came back from Camp David on the 28th before they went to California--he had been in Florida in the interim; there was a very changed attitude about me at that point in time. I -was getting signals from Haldeman in my meetings with him. He directed me to come down, really from Camp David. He said, you just, cannot hole up there. I said I do not want to talk to -Mitchell. He said, I think you have to come down and talk to Mitchell. It was very clear to me Mr. Haldeman wanted me. to come down and talk to Mitchell and -Magruder. I saw a very different Bob Haldeman than I had dealt with over the last year. That was clear to me that there was a new concern and I had become a concern. It was for that. reason that I did not turn over the report I had written at Camp David. The whole atmosphere changed after--really, after I had gone to Camp David. Probably the greatest change occurred in the meeting on the afternoon of the 21st or the 22d, when Ehrlichman, Haldeman and I met with the President, and I said in front of the President for the first time ever that I thought I had kept this agreement, everything was being said, because I said, Ehrlichman Haldeman, and Dean are all indictable. Mr. THOMPSON. Let us consider what your motivations would be at that time. You mentioned first of all the attorney-client privilege, in which, of course. I assume you are talking about conversations that you would have had with the President. Mr. DEAN. That is correct. Mr. THOMPSON. But there is an abundance of information that you could have given which would not have involved attorney-client privilege based on what you told us. Mr. DEAN. As I say, we were researching it at the, time and we concluded that there was no attorney-client privilege. Mr. THOMPSON. I am talking about what Ehrlichman told you. According to your testimony, Ehrlichman told you that- the President had approved Executive clemency for Hunt to try to his mouth shut. You talked to Colson telling you that the President approved Executive clemency for Hunt to remain quiet. You have testified that Krogh told you that he got his instructions for the Ellsberg psychiatrist's break-in from the oval office. None of those. things involved communications with the President It could not have possibly involve the attorney-client privilege, could it? Mr. DEAN. They could not involve the attorney--client privilege. none of them involved conversations I had directly with the President, yes. Some of them did not. As I say, there was also the- executive privilege question, there were national security questions. We had resolved that in fact, these did not apply. [00.24.33]
Congressional Hearing - Alexander Haig
Preparations before Confirmation hearing for U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Adult Caucasian female Congressional staff member sits at hearing table for camera test. Two adult Caucasian men conversing in the audience, predominately adult Caucasian female and male press or staff members working at table in BG; one adult African American man among them. U.S. Representative Toby Roth (R-WI) taking his seat.
John Block Confirmation Hearing
U.S. Senators Charles Percy (R-IL), Alan Dixon (D-IL), House Representatives Ed Madigan (R-IL) and Robert Lundley (R-IL) seated with Secretary of Agriculture nominee John Block at witness table; adult Caucasian men and women standing and seated in BG. Committee Chairman Jesse Helms (off camera) offers Senator Percy time to begin his remarks. Percy introduces the men seated with him and promotes Illinois' importance in the agricultural sector.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 12, 1973
[00.18.18] Senator GURNEY. One thing that has been a puzzlement to me is Why you disbursed money to Mr. Liddy at all, because Mr. Sloan also testified that he disbursed something like $199,000 000 to Mr. Liddy? Mr. PORTER, That is right. Senator GURNEY. Why didn't Mr. Liddy go directly to Sloan for all the money? Why get some from you? Mr. PORTER. I do not know, sir. All I can do, is answer the question. In December, -Mr. Magruder told Liddy that he was going to come to me and that I was to get funds from Mr. Sloan. I was not aware that Mr. Sloan was also giving money to Mr. Liddy. The last, money I gave to Mr. Liddy, I think it should be pointed out, was in March of 1972, with the exception of the $3,300 that I was directed to give him in early May of 1972, which I--- Senator GURNEY. Did you know during any of this period of time that you were disbursing moneys to Mr. Liddy that he was also getting moneys from Mr. Sloan? Mr. PORTER. No sir; I did not. Senator GURNEY. In your testimony last week, too, you mentioned this conversation with Mr. Magruder after he had come from the, White House, as I recall, and quoting from the record, you said: "he also told me there were going to be several indictments and listed off a series of names, a number of names, people that he thought would be indicted." Who were these people that he thought would be indicted? Mr. PORTER. I believe, and then I would ask the counsel's help on this one, I believe the names that he mentioned were Mr. Mitchell, Mr. LaRue, Mr. Mardian, himself, and Mr. Magruder, Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Strachan, Mr. Dean, Mr. Colson. Mr. Dorsen, does that run the list? Mr. DORSEN. I do not remember. I think that is it. Senator GURNEY. Did you and he have any discussions as to why he thought they were implicated? Mr. PORTER. I am sorry, Senator. Senator GURNEY. I say did you and he have any discussion at that particular time as to why he thought they would be indicted? Mr. PORTER. No, sir. Senator GURNEY. Now, then, let us go to the California visit. That, of course, was when the news broke about the Watergate break-in, out in California that morning. And you mentioned that you were at breakfast with a number of people. Now, who were these people? Mr. PORTER. Yes, sir. I came down to breakfast at about 8:30. This was at the Beverly Hills Hotel. Mr. Caldero, who was working on the celebrities portion of the activities of that weekend, was with me. We sat down at the table next to Mr. and Mrs. LaRue, Mr. and Mrs. Mardian, and Mr. and Mrs. Magruder. It was during that breakfast--I was reading the paper; I think Mr. Caldero was, too, that I overheard Mr. Magruder say, does anyone know where I call find a secure phone? And nobody did, apparently. And he leaned over and asked me and leaned back in his chair over to the next table and said, "Do you know where I can find a secure phone?" I said that we had a phone, an outside line up in the Mitchell's suite. He said, "No, that was not good enough." I said, "Why do you need it?" He, said, "Well, Liddy wants to talk to me." That was all he said. I said, "Well, why don't you just go to a pay phone, pick a pay phone at random and call him." I do not know whether he did that or not. Senator GURNEY. Did he leave the room then? Mr. PORTER. I do not, believe so. Senator GURNEY. There was also testimony that I think it was your wife, in a chat with Mrs. Magruder, got the information that Mr. Magruder was on the phone all morning long. Mr. PORTER. That is right. Senator GURNEY. With Key Biscayne. Mr. PORTER. Yes, sir. Senator GURNEY. Can you amplify that any further? Do you know who he talked to? Mr. PORTER. No, sir, all I can say about that conversation further is that Mrs. Porter did mention to me that morning, Sunday morning. I guess she later has now told me that she went in to have a cup of coffee with Gail, I think, Mrs. Magruder, and our rooms were like across the hall. And I believe Mr. Magruder's parents at that time were with him also. Carol came, back and made a comment to me that Gail had said to her that Jeb had been up since very early in the morning, all morning, she said, on the phone to Key Biscayne. And that was the not of the conversation. Senator GURNEY. Did you see Mr. Magruder at all the rest of the day? Mr. PORTER. On Sunday, Senator? Senator GURNEY. Yes. Mr. PORTER. I believe I saw him that morning. He introduced me to his parents and I said hello to them. Senator GURNEY. Was there any conversation at any time during this day about the break-in? Mr. PORTER. No, sir, because Mr. Magruder was making arrangements at that time for air transportation back to Washington and he, left the group and flew back-to Washington some time Sunday morning, I believe. Senator GURNEY. What hat other people did you see during that day--that is, principals in this--Mr. Mitchell, Mr. LaRue, Mr. Mardian, anybody else? Mr. PORTER. Are you talking Saturday or Sunday, Senator? Senator GURNEY. Well, the day of the, the morning of the break-in. Mr. PORTER, Yes, sir. There was a meeting, a California political meeting, at the Airport Marina Hotel, at about 10 o'clock or 10:30, I believe, and the arrangements were that Governor Reagan was going to stop by the hotel and pick up Mr. Mitchell, which he did. We went down to the Airport Marina Hotel, and it was at the Airport Marina Hotel that I noticed, again noticing a lot of rather private conversations going on, [00.24.09]
JFK Assassination HSCA Hearings
House Select Committee on Assassinations hearing on the Assassination of U.S. President John F. Kennedy, Committee Chief Counsel G. Robert Blakey continuing to discuss the acoustic analysis carried out on the Dallas Police audio transmission tape by the firm of Bolt, Beranek, and Newman (BBN). In actual firing tests conducted on behalf of the Dallas Police Department in Dealey Plaza during August 1978, Dr. James E. Barger set out to determine what the echo pattern looks like for two shooter locations; the Texas School Book Depository and the Grassy Knoll, with several target locations along the JFK motorcade route. Dr. Barger matched his 1978 Dealey Plaza environment tape with the 1963 audio tape, was able to arrive at several conclusions: the motorcycle whose radio transmitted the broadcast was apparently in Dealey Plaza; there was a 95 percent chance probability that two of the impulses were caused by gunshot; there was a 60-70 percent probability that there were three shots; there were indications of a fourth shot from the grassy knoll, put at a 50-50 probability.
Capitol Journal
WETA "CAPITOL JOURNAL" 12/18/1986 IN 01.00.00-WETA credit/funding credits/title sequence 01.00.32-Hosts Hodding Carter and Mark Shields. Discussion of the unfolding IRAN-CONTRA scandal. Introduces Senator WARREN RUDMAN (R-NH) and former Senator HOWARD BAKER. 01.01.18-C/S DONALD REGAN surrounded by reporters. REGAN says he testified under oath that he did not know about diversion of funds from IRAN to the CONTRAS. C/S Sen. PATRICK LEAHY (D-VT) speaking to reporters, says that REGAN seemed forthright and honest, but REGAN'S knowledge is not the full story-still need POINDEXTER'S and NORTH'S testimony. Shot of White House spokesman issuing press statement in White House Press room. The statement, from REAGAN, says that REAGAN wants the full story of IRAN-CONTRA to come out immediately. Shot of NORTH standing to be sworn in to House meeting. V.O.-REAGAN asked CONGRESS to give NORTH and POINDEXTER limited IMMUNITY so they would testify. Shot of POINDEXTER being sworn in to House committee hearing. Shot of panel of House committee. 01.02.45--Shot of Sen. RICHARD LUGAR speaking to press outside Capitol, says he supports IMMUNITY, hopes NORTH and POINDEXTER will testify fully soon. C/S Sen. ORRIN HATCH speaking to reporters, HATCH says that he's interested in national security and foreign policy, not "prosecuting" people. C/S Sen. DAVID DURENBERGER (R-MN) with reporters, says he's concerned about getting into games with REAGAN about immunity and who will testify. V.O.-DURENBERGER and Sen. PATRICK LEAHY decided that the Senate Intelligence committee would reject REAGAN'S proposal of immunity for NORTH and POINDEXTER. Shot of Rep. LEE HAMILTON, newly appointed chair of House investigative committee, giving press conference, says that he believes that NORTH will make full disclosure, and did not personally request immunity, so his committee will work to get NORTH and POINDEXTER to testify. 01.04.20-Shot of Sen. RUDMAN and Sen. DANIEL INOUYE on panel of Senate Select Committee. V.O.-this committee is made up of six "mainstream Democrats" and five republicans, chaired by INOUYE. INOUYE says that the public and the press have prejudged that REAGAN is guilty in the IRAN-CONTRA deals, but he's not convinced. C/S Sen. RUDMAN, says that neither party wants to be perceived as attacking or defending REAGAN but to pursue the facts fairly. 01.05.18-Host Hodding Carter with Sen. RUDMAN. Discussion of possibility of REAGAN testifying. RUDMAN says that REAGAN could testify if his is the only testimony that can resolve a serious conflict, but he doesn't think that REAGAN should be brought to testify unnecessarily. Discussion of possible maneuvers if REAGAN gets pursued for his testimony. Sen. HOWARD BAKER says that it's never a good idea for a President to testify. BAKER says that it's apparent that REAGAN doesn't know the facts of the situation, and shouldn't volunteer to testify unless it's absolutely necessary. Discussion of LEAKS in the PRESS, leading to a negative portrayal of OLIVER NORTH-is NORTH being set up to be the FALL GUY? Is it possible that NORTH could have undertaken his actions largely unsupervised and without knowledge of superiors? 01.08.36-Sen. RUDMAN says he doesn't believe that NORTH is being set up, believes that NORTH will testify fully in the future, and he believes it is possible that NORTH acted on his own without knowledge and approval of high authorities. Shields counters that NORTH had to get the money from somewhere, which leads to suspicion of high authorities. RUDMAN says he's just saying it's conceivable that a small group of people could pull it off. BAKER is asked if NORTH could have acted alone-he says it's not conceivable for a Lieutenant Colonel to pull off such an operation. Lists agencies bound to be involved, the CIA, National Security Council, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, etc. Says that such an operation is bound to leave a trail of paper and personal contacts that can come to light later on.
THE CHALLENGERS '96 - "Senator Phil Gramm"
Program host Ken Bode recalls the first Senate office run of U.S. Senator Phil Gramm (R-TX), when he ran against incumbent Lloyd Bentsen, who was also running for President at the time. Bode wants to know what made Sen. Gramm think he was going to beat Bentsen. Gramm jokes he didn't want anyone accusing him of underestimating his abilities. He simply had a strong feeling about the direction of the country, but did not know many people and was grossly outspent by his opponent. Sen. Gramm says after the defeat, he apologized to his wife for at the time he was without a job and the money had been spent; she told him he had an opportunity few others did in that he traveled all around Texas, and people listened to him speak. Though he lost, Gramm says he had already decided to run again. Bode asks about Gramm's Democratic credentials, who explains that his grandmother was a dominant force in the family, and she saw Republicans as "those guys in blue shirts who burned down her Grandmother's house." Bode states Gramm was elected in 1978 to the House of Representatives and that Rep. Jim Wright got him on the Budget Committee. Sen. Gramm sees that as one side of the story, explains that he was one of those who put together the Boll Weevils Conservative Democrats who demanded a place on the Ways and Means Committee and Budget Committee. Rep. Wright acquiesced, but not "out of the kindness of his heart." Bode confirms he was kicked off the committee by House Speaker Tip O'Neill. Gramm says Wright also kicked him off, and it was because he had co-authored the Reagan Program as well as getting conservative Democrats and Republicans to vote for the Reagan budget. Gramm believes their objections were due to the fact his side won, not that his views were different.
Watergate Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 5, 1973. Testimony of Robert Reiser
Senator Daniel Inouye (D Hawaii). Then from November 1972 to April 1973, you became a staff assistant of the President of the United States? Robert Reisner, aide to Jeb Magruder. Yes, sir. Senator Daniel Inouye (D Hawaii). What was your pay then? Robert Reisner, aide to Jeb Magruder. It was exactly the same as it was when I worked for Mr. MacGregor. It was $19,000. Senator Daniel Inouye (D Hawaii). And from April 1973 to this date you have been employed by the Office of Management and Budget? Robert Reisner, aide to Jeb Magruder. Yes, sir. Senator Daniel Inouye (D Hawaii). What is your pay there? Robert Reisner, aide to Jeb Magruder. At the time I was employed by the White House, I was on what they call the administrative roll. That means when the pay increase took place in January it didn t affect me. Therefore, I was given, when I was offered this new job, the offer was made and it would have been a one-grade increase over what would have been a GS-13 salary to a GS-14 salary which is what I am now at the Office of Management and Budget. That is $23,000 or something like that. Senator Daniel Inouye (D Hawaii). $23,000? Robert Reisner, aide to Jeb Magruder. I think it is $23,400.
LAWMAKERS
ROBERTS-intro report on new House Committee on Children and Families meeting. 21.01.16-C/S of ten-year old boy who looks like Bobby Brady adjusting microphone to testify to Congressional committee. Has trouble getting the mic down to the right height. His statement says kids are concerned about the news. A ten-year-old girl testifies that kids are concerned about war and "blowing up the world", says countries should agree to get along, the money for arms could go to schools. Children are the future, etc. Another girl asks if the world "has to be like this". Shots of kids entering the committee chamber. C/S GEORGE MILLER (D-CA), says that kids will bring the problems and issues right up to Congress. C/S Rep. DAN MARRIOTT (chair of the committee) says CHILDREN and FAMILIES should be top priority. 21.03.30-M/S group of African-American children, approx. age 10, waiting to testify. Pan over chamber of committee, the floor is literally covered with the little rugrats. A girl with southern accent reads statement (sounds like it was written by her teacher or her mom) about unemployment. Another girl says inflation should be fixed by price controls and companies shouldn't be allowed to raise their prices whenever they feel like it. A girl asks why the government makes more bombs if it says it wants peace. 21.05.06-C/S Rep. J.J. PICKLE (D-TX) in office, says that committee meetings like the one with all the kids are an insult to the committees that do the hard work of legislating, are unnecessary. C/S Rep. MILLER in office, denies that LIBERALS are trying to grandstand on CHILDREN'S ISSUES through the COMMITTEE ON YOUTH, CHILDREN, and FAMILIES. C/S Rep. MARRIOTT, says he learned that he might have to spend more time with his kids. C/S Rep. MILLER, says he could see the fathers on the committee wondering if they were active enough in their kids' lives. Gives a debatable theory of EARLY CHILDHOOD DEVELOPMENT. 21.07.24-DUKE-intro commentary. 21.07.42-Commentary by Otis Pike, discusses the BISHOPS COUNCIL resolution on NUCLEAR ARMS RACE, compares to the House debate on NUCLEAR FREEZE, both groups doing a lot of preaching and using ridiculous parliamentary tactics. 21.09.48-DUKE-signs off. Closing Credits [over groundlevel shot of red TULIPS with Capitol in background, MAGNOLIA blossoms, CHERRY TREES, more flowers in various D.C. settings] /transcript order information/WETA credit/sponsor credits/PBS ID 21.12.48--OUT
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 25, 1973 - Statement of John Dean.
The meeting with the President that afternoon with Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and myself was a tremendous disappointment to me because it was quite clear that the coverup as far as the White House was concerned was going to continue. I recall that while Haldeman, Ehrlichman and I were sitting at a small table in front of the President in his Executive Office Building office that I for the first time said in front of the President that I thought that Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Dean were all indictable for obstruction of justice and that was the reason I disagreeing with all that was being discussed at that point in time. I could tell that both Haldeman, and particularly Ehrlichman, were very unhappy with my comments. I had let them very clearly know that I was not going to participate in the matter any further and that I thought it was time that everybody start thinking about telling the truth. I again repeated to them I did not think it was possible to perpetuate the coverup and the important thing now was to get the President out in front.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 25, 1973 - Statement of John Dean.
Meeting on March 22nd. The arrangements had been made to have a meeting after lunch with the President with Ehrlichman, Haldeman, Haldeman, Mitchell, and myself.Mr. Mitchell came to Washington that morning for a meeting in Haldeman's office in which Ehrlichman, Mitchell, Haldeman, and myself were present. I recall that one of the first things Ehrlichman asked of Mitchell -was whether Hunt's money problem had been taken care of. Mitchell said that he didn't think it was a problem any further. There then followed a general discussion of the status of the Senate hearings, and the discussion never got down to specifies. It had been my impression that Haldeman and Ehrlichman were going to try to get Mitchell to come forward and explain his involvement in the matter. This did not occur. Mitchell said that he thought everything was going along very well with the exception of the posture of the President on executive privilege. He said that he felt that the President was going to have to back down somewhat or it would appear he was preventing information from coming out of the White House.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 25, 1973 - Statement of John Dean.
On Friday morning, March 23rd, my house was surrounded by camera crews as a result of Gray's statement the day before that I had probably lied. Accordingly, I decided to wait until the camera crews departed before going to the office. It was midmorning when Paul O'Brien called to tell me about Judge Sirica reading McCord's letter in open court. O'Brien gave me the high points of the letter as had been reported to him by someone from the courthouse. He told me that McCord had only hearsay knowledge. I then called Ehrlichman to tell him about it. He said he had a copy of the letter and read it to me. I asked him how he received a copy so quickly. He responded, "It just came floating into my office." He asked me what I thought about it and I told him I was not surprised at all and repeated to him what O'Brien had told me that McCord probably had only hearsay knowledge. He asked me if I was in my office and I informed him that I was a prisoner of the press and would be in shortly.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 28, 1973. Testimony of John Dean.
Senator Sam Ervin (D North Carolina). Now, do you not know that at this plan was put into effect, or rather was approved for use by the President without the prior knowledge of Mr. Mitchell? John Dean. I do not know that for a fact, no, sir. When I talked to Mr. Mitchell about it, it had reached the stage that they wanted to do something. Mr. Mitchell and I talked about it and we decided that the best thing to do was to create the IEC and that would possibly satisfy everybody's request to do something. Senator Sam Ervin (D North Carolina). Now, the IEC, in effect, was a proposal to set up a group representing or representatives from the FBI, CIA, NSA, DIA and the counterintelligence units of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force to furnish information about the activities of all of these agencies to the White House? John Dean. I believe that is correct. But I believe that at that time, also the military, I m not sure they were involved because they had already made a decision that they were not going to do any domestic intelligence work.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 26, 1973 - Testimony of John Dean.
Senator Joseph Montoya (D New Mexico). Well, as a matter of fact you did relay some information to was it Caulfield, so that he could in turn relay such information to Mr. McCord about clemency? John Dean. That is correct. Senator Joseph Montoya (D New Mexico). And when was this? John Dean. That was in roughly January 10th, as I recall the date was. Senator Joseph Montoya (D New Mexico). Did you not tell Mr. Caulfield at that time that this promise of immunity was coming from somebody at a very high level at the White House? John Dean. Yes. I did. But Mr. Caulfield, when we talked about it specifically and it was not at that time, as he told me that he thought the only thing that would turn McCord around was a direct request from the President. And I told him that he could not do that because I had no such request from the President, although I did have the general assurance that clemency would be, since it would be given to Mr. Hunt it should also apply to others.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 25, 1973 - Statement of John Dean.
When the President, issued his statement on April 17th in which he was quite obviously trying to affect any decisions I was having with the Government regarding my testimony by inserting the phrase there regarding no immunity and combined with the fact that he had requested that I sign a virtual confession on Monday of that week, I decided that indeed I was being set up and that it was time that I let the word out that I would not be a scapegoat. Accordingly, on April 19th, I issued a statement to that effect. After my statement of April 19th, I had virtually no contact with the members of the White House staff. I did have occasion to speak with Mr. Leonard Garment. I recall asking him who had placed the "no immunity" paragraph in the President's statement. Garment said while he did not know for certain, he believed that Ehrlichman had placed it in the draft because it had not been there in the earlier drafts, but in the draft that emerged from Ehrlichman's consideration when Ehrlichman went over the final statement with the President.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, Testimony of James W McCord (Jim McCord)
Samuel Dash, attorney. All right. Now, will you please read the statement, and will you read it clearly, so we can all hear it now in the microphone? James McCord. I will state as a preliminary that the dates of the telephone calls that I refer to in this statement are to the best of my recollection. They may be inaccurate by a day or two, but they are the best recollection I have of the dates, on which the calls occurred. The subject is political pressure on the writer to accept Executive clemency and remain silent. Political pressure from the White House was conveyed to me in January 1973 by John Caulfield to remain silent, take Executive clemency by going off to prison quietly, and I was told that while there, I would receive financial aid and later rehabilitation and a job. I was further told in a January meeting in 1973 with Caulfield that the President of the United States was aware of our meeting that the results of the meeting would be conveyed to the President, and that at a future meeting there would likely be a personal message from the President himself.
LAWMAKERS, May 17, 1984
REAGAN giving speech from WHITE HOUSE press room, saying unless MX MISSILE is built, SOVIETS won't have incentive to return to ARMS CONTROL TALKS. Pullback shows press and camera crews filling the small auditorium. WERTHEIMER v.o.-MX advocates last year included prominent DEMOCRATS, who included a mandate for REAGAN to enter ARMS NEGOTIATIONS if MX MISSILE was built. Shot of Rep. LES ASPIN speaking in HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE. Shots of other CONGRESSMEN in HOUSE. Shot of ASPIN outdoors, says that in election year with no ARMS TALKS, the MX question is complicated for CONGRESSMEN. Shot of Rep. MAVROULES (D-MA) in front of CAPITOL BUILDING, says the MX issue is of "insane escalation" versus "rationality" in ARMS RACE. He hopes DEMOCRATS use the MX issue for political gain.
Budget Reconciliation Act 1981 Debate
U.S. House Representative Del Latta (R-OH) yields three minutes of time to Rep. Phil Gramm (D-TX). Speaker of the House Tip O'Neill (D-MA) recognizes Rep. Gramm, adult Caucasian male and female clerks seated around House rostrum. Rep. Gramm begins his remarks: "Mr. Speaker, we've had numerous people come to the well and speak as if we're talking about, a question of whether to allow the President to have his program, supported by two hundred members of this body in a firm, hard commitment, voted on up or down, or whether we are going to break it into six packages and make it more difficult to pass. I'd like to make it very clear that that's not the issue and that's not what the Rules Committee did."
Lawmakers - May 27, 1982 - Farm Crisis
House Agriculture Committee hearing on the Farm Crisis Act. Farmer testifying. I am a dirt farmer. I live in central Indiana. I have farmed for 54 years. Farmer testifying. This is probably the first time that a farmer from Texas is going to be able to declare that the United States is in a full-scale depression. So I ll just go ahead and declare that right now. I think that the President and Congress should do the same. (Tom Daschle (D - South Dakota) voice over - "(To certain extent I think the farmers preaching to the choir when it comes to the House Agriculture Committee. I think to a large extent the committee itself knows. They take an interest actively in agriculture. They go back to their districts, they find out from there just how serious the situation is. ) Farmer testifying. I guess if I have a sinking heart it s because of that reason. We spent our own money to come out here. It makes me go home sad. The fact that we don t have someone here that will even sit and listen. Now they probably have reasons for not doing that, but I have to say I m pretty saddened by this. Representative Kika de la Garza (D - Texas) Your trip has not been in vain. It has been a very valuable contribution. If we would have had here a full house and no one listened to you, you probably could have gone home pretty happy. Farmer testifying. Thanks you very much Mr. Chairman. I guess that will console me for the time being. Tom Daschle (D - South Dakota) shaking hands with farmers at the hearing.