Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 30, 1974
Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 30, 1974
[00.02.03] Mr. SMITH......beginning of the bombing that was secret. And I think that perhaps our passage of the War Powers Act. the passage by the Congress and the signing by the President has made this question moot as to future Presidents. I agree with Mr. Waldie, the gentleman from California, that the here will offer guidelines to future Presidents. The mere fact that we are debating this matter, the mere fact that we are talking about it, the mere fact that we are agonizing about it a little bit, it is a troublesome matter, and there are too many aspects that are unknown. and I am going to oppose it. But I think we should, this committee should have gone into it more deeply than we did. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. The. gentleman from New York, Mr. Fish, is recognized for 3 minutes and 45 seconds. Mr. FISH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think, Mr. Chairman, the question before us naturally is, is the unauthorized bombing an impeachable offense. Was it treason? I do not believe so. Was it bribery? Clearly not. Therefore, is it a high crime? And the high crimes that we have been talking about these past 5 days are crimes that would show a contempt for the Constitution. Now, we know where the authority to declare war lies. It is in the Congress. Therefore, I think the question comes down to whether this unauthorized bombing was a contempt of this institution, the Congress of the United States. The fact, is that we in the Congress share responsibility. The facts Of the lack Of concealment have come out In this debate, and I do not think it was necessary to characterize not only the political leadership but, the committee leadership in both parties, in both the House and the Senate as having been carefully selected. But, these Men did know, on our behalf, and so the Congress does have this responsibility. I liken this particular proposed article to that which concerned unauthorized impoundments. In both cases, as has been said in this debate, the fact was that for decades the Congress itself was giving ground to the Executive, in both cases the acted far too slowly for many, but the fact is today it has acted With the budget control and the anti-impoundment legislation which is now law, with the War Powers Act, which is now law. So, Mr. Chairman, I cannot absolve myself or my colleagues for our Part of the blame by heaping It exclusively on the President. I yield back- the balance of my time. The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Illinois Mr. Railsback, is recognized for 3 minutes and 45 seconds. Mr. RAILSBACK. Mr. Chairman. I cannot help think' what short memories we have. I was a part of a Republican task force which, in 1968, visited some of the northern university I- campuses and I remember we visited Harvard, Northeastern University and MIT. It was shortly after the Harvard bust that we visited that campus and we interviewed people that were with the SDS, we interviewed the student government leaders. and we interviewed a group called the Afro-Americans, and we listened to the most bitter frustration, disillusionment, concerns, distrust about that particular establishment. And they conveyed to Us in no uncertain terms that, the disillusionment and frustration which they felt was caused by false and misleading statements that had been made by the different administrations one after the Other. The fact that they had been told that we were going to be out of Vietnam in another-6 months, and they had been promised that the war was almost over, only to find that there was an even greater commitment of American troops. Recently many of us had a chance to read a book by a Pulitzer Prize winner, Mr. David Halberstam who wrote about our involvement in Southeast Asia with particular reference to the Kennedy and Johnson administration. I want to refer to just one particular reference that he makes. "Machismo," says Halberstam, "was no small part of it." Johnson "had always been haunted by the idea that, he, would be judged as being insufficiently Manly for the job that he would lack courage at a crucial moment." Westmoreland and McNamara are guilty because of their misplaced confidence in ground troops. LBJ was the real war criminal when be deceived the American people, in July 1965 by deciding to send over 100,000 to 125,000 troops, but telling the. American people that it was only .50,000 and that it "does not imply any change in policy whatever." In fact, notes Halberstam. "it was the beginning of an entirely new policy 'which -would see What was the South Vietnamese war become primarily an American war, I suggest to you that, LBJ was no more accountable probably than The President preceding him, and the, President preceding that President, that he was no more accountable than this Congress, those of us that sat in this Congress, approved policies, failed to exercise congressional oversight. [00.08.20]