Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 14, 1973
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 14, 1973
[00.46.59--A VERY BIG RATIONALIZATION] Mr. MAGRUDER...Now, here are ethical, legitimate people whom I respected, I respect Mr. Coffin tremendously. He was a very close friend of mine. I saw people I was very close to breaking the law without any, regard for any other person's pattern of behavior of belief. I believed as firmly as they did that the President was correct in this issue. So, consequently--and let, me just say, when these subjects came up and although I was aware they were illegal, and I am sure the others did, we had become somewhat inured to using some activities that would help us in accomplishing what we thought was a legitimate cause. Now, that, is absolutely incorrect; two wrongs do not make a right. For the past year, I have. obviously had to consider that and, understand completely that, that was an absolute, incorrect decision But, that. is basically, I think, the reason why that decision was made. because -of that atmosphere that had occurred and to all of us who had worked in the, White House, there was that feeling of resentment and of frustration at being unable to deal with issues on a legal basis . Senator BAKER. There are countless cliches that come to mind that I could use to try to describe that state of mind or that attitude--fighting 'fire with fire, two wrongs don't make, a right, and all rest. But, they all seem inadequate. Mr. MAGRUDER. Well. they certainly were and I have no justification for them, nor will I make any today. I fully accept the responsibility of having made an absolutely disastrous decision, or at least having participated. I didn't make the decision but, certainly I participated. Senator BAKER. A decision really that is going to affect history that was made in almost a casual way. Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes, Senator BAKER. SO on J January 27, February 4. March 30, 1972, you considered a plan formulated by Mr., Liddy for illegal and clandestine activity. It was put into effect and ultimately led to a. break-in of the Democratic National Committee headquarters at. the, Watergate on May 28, 1972, which went undetected. Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes, sir. Senator BAKER. We understand from other testimony--I do not remember whether you made the, point or not--that there was criticism of the first break-in. I believe by Mr. Mitchell, that, it, did not produce the desired results and there. was a second break-in effort on June, 17, 1972. Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes, sir. Senator DARER. And the illegal entry was detected. It. Was reported to you and others, including Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Dean, and Mr. LaRue, during your visit in California,. Mr. MAGRUDER. It 'was reported to Mr. Mardian Mr. LaRue, myself and Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Dean was not, in California with us. Senator BAKER. Someone, suggested I think Mr., Haldeman, from Key Biscayne, that you should return to Washington on June 19. Mr. MAGRUDER. He suggested it to me. [00.50.03] Senator BAKER. Let's examine that conversation a little more--What was the extent of 'Mr. Haldeman knowledge of the situation? What did he tell you and why did he ask you to return?, Mr. MAGRUDER. Senator, I don't know the, extent, of his prior knowledge. Senator BAKER. What did he appear to know? Mr. MAGRUDER. The discussion was simply what had happened. I told him that the break-in had occurred. that the five people had been apprehended, that one of them was Jim McCord, our security chief, that money was found there that was probably our money, although we did not know at that time. He suggested that I get back to Washington to try to solve that matter. Senator BAKER. Can you elaborate that conversation at all? Mr. MAGRUDER. It was a straightforward discussion of the, problem and in effect-Magruder, you get back and try to solve that problem. He did not suggest, and I want to make it clear, that I start any coverup or anything of that kind. He just wanted somebody back there to get hold of the situation. because obviously it was going to deteriorate. Senator BAKER. . Did he tell anyoue else to go back or suggest to you that anyoue accompany you? Mr. MAGRUDER. No, he did not, He specifically asked me to go. [00.51.15] Senator BAKER. What I am going to ask. 'Mr. Magruder,, is patently unfair. to you ,and to Mr. Haldeman, But with that apology in advance and with the full foreknowledge that as far as I am concerned, I am asking for the purpose rather than the content of the conversation, because we will have Mr. Haldeman here later as a witness--can you tell me anything about that conversation the tone of voice, 'the manner the anxiety, the lack of concern--are there any Indices of emotion or content of that conversation that indicate to you that Mr. Haldeman knew how the break-in had been planned a and executed. What Was involved and what had to occur? Mr. MAGRUDER. I think--I have known Mr. Haldeman for a considerable length of time, I have worked for him. I happen to respect him tremendously, still do, will continue to do, because I think he, is an extremely competent and fine individual. But his manner of working, as many of you Senators on the Republican side know, is rather direct, somewhat abrupt. He is not one who engages in long discussions over issues--ate least in his working relationship with People who are subordinate to him, which in effect, although I did not work directly under him at that time, I still was. So our discussion was rather short and rather to the point, rather one of, you have got a problem, You had better solve it. [00.52.35]