Watergate Hearings, June 25, 1973 - Testimony of John Dean
Watergate Hearings, June 25, 1973 - Testimony of John Dean
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 25, 1973 - Testimony of John Dean. Excessive concern over demonstrators.
Watergate Hearings, June 25, 1973 - Testimony of John Dean
John Dean. It was not until I joined the White House staff in July of 1970 that I fully realized the strong feelings that the President and his staff had toward antiwar demonstrators and demonstrators in general. But even before my joining the White House staff, I was partially aware of this Presidential concern. A concern that in turn permeated much of the White House. During my tenure at the Justice Department as an associate Deputy Attorney General, I was involved in representing the Government in discussions with demonstration leaders regarding the terms of demonstration permits for activities in the Capitol city. While I was not the decision maker in this capacity, I was in close proximity to the decision making process and thus realized that the White House, principally Mr. Ehrlichman, often made or cleared the final decisions regarding demonstration activity. It was also because of my proximity to those involved with demonstrations at the Department of Justice that I became aware that the White House was continually seeking intelligence information about demonstration leaders and their supporters that would either discredit them personally or indicate that the demonstration was in fact sponsored by some foreign enemy. There were also White House requests for information regarding ties between major political figures, specifically Members of the U.S. Senate, who opposed the President s war policies and demonstration leaders. I also recall that the information regarding demonstrators, or rather lack of information showing connections between the demonstration leaders and foreign governments or major political figures, was often reported to a disbelieving and complaining White House staff that felt the entire system for gathering such intelligence was worthless. As I shall elaborate shortly, this attitude towards intelligence gathering capabilities of Government regarding demonstrations prevailed through my tenure at the Justice Department and the White House. And I was hearing complaints from the President personally as late as March 12 of this year.
Watergate Hearings, June 25, 1973 - Testimony of John Dean
John Dean. It was when I joined the White House staff in July of 1970 that I became fully aware of the extent of concern at the White House regarding demonstrations and intelligence information relating to demonstrators. It was approximately 1 month after I arrived at the White House that I was informed about the project that had been going on before I arrived to restructure the Government's intelligence gathering capacities vis-a-vis demonstrators and domestic radicals. The revised domestic intelligence plan was submitted in document form for the President's approval. The committee has in its, possession a copy of that document and certain related memoranda pursuant to the order of Judge Sirica. After I was told of the Presidentially approved plan that called for bugging, burglarizing mail covers and the like, I was instructed by Mr. Haldeman to see what I could do to get the plan implemented. I thought the plan was as totally uncalled for and unjustified. I talked with Mr. Mitchell about the plan and he said he knew there was a great concern or desire at the White House to see that the plan was implemented. But he agreed fully with FBI Director Hoover who opposed the plan, with one exception. Mitchell I thought that an interagency evaluation committee might be useful because it was not good to have the FBI standing alone without the information of other intelligence agencies and the sharing of information is always good and avoids duplication. After my conversation with Mitchell, I wrote a memorandum requesting that the evaluation committee be established and the restraints could be removed later. I told Mr. Haldeman that the only way to proceed was one stop at a time, and this could be an important first step. He agreed.
Watergate Hearings, June 25, 1973 - Testimony of John Dean
John Dean. The Interagency Evaluation Committee, the IEC as it was referred to, was created, as I recall, in early 1971. I requested Mr. Jack Caulfield, who had been assigned to my office, to serve as the White House liaison to the IEC. And when Mr. Caulfield left the White House, Mr. David Wilson of my staff served as liaison. I am unaware of the IEC ever having engaged in any illegal activities or assignments and certainly no such assignment was ever requested by my office. The reports from the IEC, or summaries of the reports, were forwarded to Mr. Haldeman and sometimes Ehrlichman. In addition to the intelligence reports from the IEC, my office also received regular intelligence reports ports regarding demonstrators and radical groups from the FBI and on some occasions from the CIA. A member of my staff would review the material to determine if it should be forwarded to Mr. Haldeman, that is for bringing to the President's attention, or sent to another member of the staff who might have an interest in the contents of the report.
Watergate Hearings, June 25, 1973 - Testimony of John Dean
John Dean. Mr. Chairman, from time to time, I am going to skip parts of the statement in an effort to make sure that I can move as quickly as possible and get the statement completed within the time the committee has requested. So I will Senator Sam Ervin (D North Carolina). I believe it would be well read the whole statement since you thought it was important enough to write it. John Dean. I will honor the chairman's wish.
Watergate Hearings, June 25, 1973 - Testimony of John Dean
John Dean. For example, Len Garment would be, sent information regarding Indian uprisings, Mr. Kissinger or General Haig information regarding travels of antiwar groups to Hanoi. Also prior to and during a demonstration my office would prepare summary reports for the President of the anticipated size of the demonstration, any information about the leaders of the demonstration, and during the demonstration, a description of the activity of the demonstrators and the Government's handling or anticipated handling of the demonstration. Contrary to the policy that had existed before I came to the White House, I sought to keep the White House out of tactical decisions regarding the demonstrations. I felt these were decisions for the Department of Justice and the police. I felt my job was to merely keep the White House informed as to what might happen or was happening. My own desires in this matter were sometimes superseded when Mr. Ehrlichman or Mr. Haldeman did not like the way a particular demonstration was being handled. Sometimes they so instructed me to inform the Justice Department or Chief Wilson of the Metropolitan Police and sometimes Mr. Ehrlichman himself would so inform Justice Department or the Chief Wilson. As soon as a potential demonstration was in the wind, I began receiving calls from Mr. Larry Higby, Mr. Haldeman's principal staff assistant, requesting intelligence reports. I also received frequent complaints regarding the quality of available information despite the fact that I felt the White House had the best information available to the Government.
Watergate Hearings, June 25, 1973 - Testimony of John Dean
John Dean. I became directly and personally aware of the President's own interest in my reports regarding demonstrations when he called me during a demonstration of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War which occurred on the Mall in front of the Capitol. This was the occasion in May 1971, and I believe that s the date, when the Government first sought to enjoin the demonstration and later backed down. The President called me for a first-hand report during the demonstration and expressed his concern that I keep him abreast of what was occurring. Accordingly, we prepared hourly status reports and sent them to the President. I was made aware of the President's strong feelings about even the smallest of demonstrations during the late winter of 1971, when the President happened to look out the windows of the residence of the White House and saw a lone man with a large 10-foot sign stretched out in front of Lafayette Park. Mr. Higby called me to his office to tell me of the President's displeasure with the sign in the park and told me that Mr. Haldeman had said the sign had to come down. When I came out of Mr. Higby's office, I ran into Dwight Chapin who said that he was going to get some "thugs" to remove that man from Lafayette Park. He said it would take him a few hours to get them, but they could do the job. [general uproar in audience] Senator Sam Ervin (D North Carolina). The audience are here by the consent of the committee. And I am going to request the audience to refrain from giving expression of their feelings, by laugher or otherwise. I hope the audience will restrain themselves in that respect. I told him I didn't believe that was necessary I then called the Secret Service and net with Mr. Louis Sims. Mr. Sims said that he felt that the Park Police could work it out. I went out with Mr. Sims, surveyed the situation, and Mr. Sims talked with the Park Police. Within 30 minutes the man had been convinced that he should move to the back of Lafayette Park. There the sign was out of sight from the White House. I reported back to Mr. Haldeman and after a personal look see, he was delighted. I told Mr. Chapin he could call off the troops.
Watergate Hearings, June 25, 1973 - Testimony of John Dean
John Dean. I also recall that the first time I ever traveled with the President was on a trip in 1971 to the Football Hall of Fame and on to Iowa to open a dam. After arriving at the Akron-Canton airport, I noticed that there was virtually no hostile demonstrator in sight of the President. Later when the President arrived at the motel, he was spending the night in Akron, I was a few paces behind him as he walked into the lobby. Across the street were chanting, Vietcong flag-waving demonstrators. The President, after seeing the demonstrators, told the Secret Service, agent beside him, in some rather blunt synonyms, to get the demonstrators out of there. The word was passed, but the demonstrators could not be moved much to the distress of the advance men who were responsible for the President's trip. It was after observing that incident that I talked with several individuals in charge of advancing Presidential visits. And that I learned a major part of any Presidential trip advance operation was insuring that demonstrators were unseen and unheard by the President.
Watergate Hearings, June 25, 1973 - Testimony of John Dean
John Dean. In early February of 1972, I learned that any means, legal or illegal, were authorized by Mr. Haldeman to deal with demonstrators when the President was traveling or appearing some place. I would like to add that when I learned of the illegal means that were being employed, I advised that such tactics not be employed in the future and if demonstrations occurred, they occurred. I stated earlier that there was a continuing dissatisfaction with the available intelligence reports. The most frequent critic was Mr. Haldeman, but the President himself discussed this with me in early March of this year as a part of the planned counteroffensive for dealing with the Senate Watergate investigation. The President wanted to show that his opponents had employed demonstrators against him during his reelection campaign. However, with each demonstration that the President was confronted with, and each incident that occurred during the campaign, my office had sought to determine if it had in fact been instigated by political opponents of the President, Senator McGovern, the Democratic Party, or whomever. We never found a scintilla of viable evidence indicating that these demonstrators were part of a master plan, nor that they were funded by the Democratic political funds, nor that they had any direct connection with the McGovern campaign. This was explained to Mr. Haldeman, but the President believed that the opposite was, in fact, true. I have submitted to the committee, exhibit no. 1, the text of the President's memorandum to me on this subject.
Watergate Hearings, June 25, 1973 - Testimony of John Dean
John Dean. On February 16, 1973, almost a month prior to this direct request from the President, I had, at Mr. Haldeman's request, received all the available intelligence on the demonstrations the President had been subjected to during the, 1972 campaign. This intelligence did not evidence what the President was looking for, but I turned it over to Mr. William Baroody telling him the President wanted a speech as part of the counteroffensive to the Watergate inquiry. Several weeks later Mr. Baroody reported that he too agreed that the information wasn't there for a speech. While there, were, other things which occurred, that evidence the concern about demonstrators, I believe the foregoing gives this committee a good sampling of the degree of concern.