Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 25, 1973 - Testimony of John Dean. Operation Sandwedge.
John Dean. I would now like to turn to a political intelligence and security plan that was designed for the campaign, but ultimately was rejected. While Caulfield was a member of my staff, the use of Mr. Ulasewicz slowly diminished. I had no need for such investigative work and I only requested Caulfield to obtain investigative information when someone else on the staff requested it. While I did try to find assignments for Caulfield that related to the work of the counsel's office it was difficult in that he was not a lawyer. Mr. Caulfield was aware of this situation and in the spring of 1971 he came to me and told me that he was thinking of leaving the White House staff and establishing an investigative security consulting corporation. He felt that there was a need and a market for such an activity and what he described as a "Republican Intertel". The Intertel firm being a long established firm that s been in existence for a number of years working in the field. He told me that he felt he should get started as soon as possible so that he could have a going concern by campaign time and that his firm could provide investigative security assistance to the campaign. We casually discussed this on several occasions. The basic and initial concept he had developed was an operation that could be funded by contracts with corporations. Mr. Caulfield's firm would provide services for these corporations, but would also provide free services to the 1972 reelection campaign. I recall telling Caulfield that I could not help him in the intelligence field because I did not have any expertise in the area, but I advised him that he should work with a lawyer in developing the concept he had just outlined to me because it was fraught with legal problems. For example, I told him corporations are prohibited under Federal law from making direct or indirect campaign contributions.
John Dean. Shortly after these conversations, Caulfield informed me that he had formed a group to develop a plan to submit to Mr. Ehrlichman, Mr. Haldeman, and Mr. Mitchell. The planning group intended to become the principal officers of the corporation once it commenced its activity. Caulfield and the group spent several months developing their plans and in early August or September of 1971 Caulfield brought me a copy of a memorandum entitled Operation Sandwedge. And told me he was seeking a meeting with Mr. Ehrlichman to discuss the matter and requested that I assist him in getting a meeting with Mr. Mitchell. I do not know if Mr. Caulfield met with Mr. Ehrlichman. If he did, I was not, present and have no knowledge of the meeting. I read the memorandum and found it to be a privately operated extension of the types of things that Caulfield had been performing for Ehrlichman. I returned the memorandum to Caulfield and told him I would raise it with Mitchell. To the best of my recollection Operation Sandwedge envisioned the creation of a corporation called Security Consulting Group, Inc. which was to have offices In Washington, Chicago, and New York. It was to have an "overt" and "covert" capacity. The covert capacity would have operated out of New York, presumably under the aegis of Mr. Ulasewicz, and was to be separate and apart from the other operations in Washington and Chicago. The principal activity of the Security Consulting Group was to provide private security for all phases of the campaign, but the New York covert operation would have the capacity to provide bag men to carry money and engage in electronic surveillance if called upon to do so.
John Dean. Although I returned the Copy of the memorandum given me by Caulfield, I did find in my records a copy of the proposed budget, which reflects some of the items I have just mentioned. I also found a number of memorandums relating to the campaign security aspects of the plan. I have submitted these documents to the committee, exhibit no. 9.
John Dean. I did discuss Operation Sandwedge with Mr. Mitchell. I recall that he was not interested at all. He told me that he thought Jack Caulfield was a fine person, but he felt the principal problems would relate to security and the problems that demonstrators might cause to the campaign. Mr. Mitchell said he wanted a lawyer to handle any such operation and asked me to think about candidates. I told him that Jack Caulfield had requested an opportunity to discuss his plan with him, and I told him that I told Jack I would convey the message. I did not wish to dismiss the proposal, so I kept putting Caulfield off and when he raised it with me, because I liked Jack I did not want to hurt his feelings, I continued to keep putting him off. I also recall that Ehrlichman raised Operation Sandwedge with me. I do not know if this was a result of his meeting with Caulfield or Caulfield sending him a copy of the memorandum. Ehrlichman told me that he would like to keep Tommy Ulasewicz around during the campaign but he did not think much of Caulfield's proposed grand plan. Ehrlichman told me that Mitchell knew about Tony Ulasewicz and that Mitchell and Jack Caulfield should talk about Tony's future.
John Dean. Meanwhile, Caulfield kept requesting an answer on his plans. He had his heart set on his proposal. He had spent long hours in preparing it and I knew he was going to be very disappointed to learn that it had been shot down. Every few weeks Mr. Caulfield would an item or two to prompt my attention and to prompt me to take action. I have submitted to the committee, in exhibit no. 9, the types of items he would send. I would just file them and do nothing, as I had decided that the best course of action to save Jacks feelings was to let the matter die a death through no action. Indeed, that happened. By November, 1971, Mr. Caulfield realized that his plan was dead and he abandoned the idea. Realizing this, he told me he would like to work for Mr. Mitchell in the campaign as an aide-de-camp and requested that I assist him in getting an appointment with Mitchell. I arranged for him to meet with Mr. Mitchell on November 24, 1971. Pursuant to Mr. Caulfield's request, I was not present during the entire meeting, but Jack later said that Mr. Mitchell had requested that he do some investigative work on McCloskey's campaign. Apparently, Caulfield convinced Mr. Mitchell that some greatly reduced versions of Operation Sandwedge might be of value, or he was seeking to show Mitchell what he could do. At any rate, Caulfield continued to call his intelligence gathering operation, Operation Sandwedge. I have submitted to the committee, exhibit no. 10, copies of the investigative report that Mr. Caulfield prepared for Mr. Mitchell on the McCloskey New Hampshire campaign. And I hasten to add that to the best of my knowledge, Caulfield employed no illegal procedures in gathering this information.
John Dean. Pursuant to the request of Mr. Ehrlichman that Mr. Mitchell determine whether continued funding should be provided for Mr. Ulasewicz, Mitchell asked me what Ulasewicz had been doing. I told him that I did not know, but would have Caulfield prepare a summary of the activities. On January 12, 1972, I informed Mitchell that Caulfield had prepared such a list and suggested he meet with him. I refer the committee to exhibit no. 11. I would also note at this point that there is no list covering that exhibit because while I initially thought I did have a list I have searched my records that are available and I have no such list available. There is a possibility there might be a list in my files that remain at the White, House. I do not recall how this matter was resolved, but I believe some arrangement was made to compensate Mr. Ulasewicz, but to my knowledge, he was not used in any manner other than that to which I shall refer later in my statement. Mr. Caulfield and Mr. Kalmbach would know about the arrangements that were made.