Watergate Hearings, June 25, 1973 - Testimony of John Dean
Watergate Hearings, June 25, 1973 - Testimony of John Dean
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 25, 1973 - Testimony of John Dean. Establishing and intelligence gathering capability at the reelection committee.
Watergate Hearings, June 25, 1973 - Testimony of John Dean
John Dean. I shall now turn to my knowledge of how an intelligence unit was established at the reelection committee. To the best of my recollection, it was the spring of 1971 that Mr. Haldeman discussed with me what my office should do during the forthcoming campaign year. He told me that we should take maximum advantage of the President's incumbency and the focus of everyone in the White House should be on reelecting the President. It was decided that the principal area of concern for my office should be keeping the White House in compliance with the election laws and improving our intelligence regarding demonstrations. I was also told that I should provide legal assistance in establishing the reelection committee and insuring that they had their own capacity to deal with the potential threats of demonstrations during the campaign and particularly the convention. I advised Haldeman that Jack Caulfield was developing security plan and that he wanted to discuss his plan with Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Ehrlichman. I also told him I would seek to get the Interagency Evaluation Committee working on the potential for demonstrations during the campaign and subsequently called Mr. Bernie Wells, the head of the IEC, to my office and told him of the concern of the White House for good intelligence during the coming campaign.
Watergate Hearings, June 25, 1973 - Testimony of John Dean
John Dean. During the months that followed. I devoted most of my time to regular office functions, keeping abreast of the new campaign legislation, and familiarizing myself with existing election laws, the Hatch Act, and related laws. It was not until after the proposed Operation Sandwedge had been shelved and Magruder had left the White House to from the reelection committee, that I began receiving calls from Strachan and Magruder that I was expected to suggest a lawyer to head up the demonstration intelligence operation at the reelection committee and to serve also as general counsel. On several occasions Magruder told me that he would like to have Mr. Fred Fielding, my principal assistant, for this job. Fielding and I discussed it but rejected it for several reasons. First, Fielding was aware of the fact that I was considering leaving the White House at, that time. I was actually interviewing for jobs outside of government and he knew that I would recommend that he succeed me as counsel. Secondly, if I stayed I would need his assistance during the months ahead. I might add parenthetically, as I look back if I had accepted the job I was interviewing for at that time I would not be sitting here today.
Watergate Hearings, June 25, 1973 - Testimony of John Dean
John Dean. After I informed Magruder that Mr. Fielding was not available, he requested that I suggest someone else because he was desperately in need of an in-house lawyer. Accordingly, I next went to Mr. Krogh and asked him if David Young might be available and interested. Krogh told me that Young was very much involved in the declassification project and could not be spared. The reason Young had occurred to me is that I had spent several days traveling with him in mid-October, interviewing prospective candidates for nomination to the Supreme Court. I might add that during those days of traveling around the country together he never told me what the plumbers unit was doing or had done. But I felt that Mr. Young was a bright and extremely capable lawyer who would make an excellent general counsel, and could handle the security and demonstration problems of the campaign. During my conversation with Mr. Krogh about Young, he suggested that Mr. Gordon Liddy might be available in that he had just about completed his work. Krogh spoke very highly of Liddy's legal ability and said that his FBI Treasury Department background in law enforcement would qualify him to handle a demonstration intelligence and security operation for the reelection committee. I did not know Mr. Liddy, but I respected Krogh's judgment, both as to his judgment of other lawyers and his knowledge of law enforcement. Bud had dealt with the demonstration problems for the White House before I joined the staff. I asked Mr. Krogh to find out if Mr. Liddy was interested. Several days later Krogh informed me that Liddy was interested and asked me to come to his office, Krogh's office, and meet Liddy and describe the job. I did this. I told Liddy that the primary responsibility for the job was to serve as the lawyer for the reelection committee, but among the responsibilities of the general counsel would be keeping abreast of the potential of demonstrations that might affect the campaign. Liddy said he was interested. Krogh said that he would first have to clear it with Ehrlichman. I advised them that Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Magruder would be making the decision on filling the post and if Krogh got the okay from Ehrlichman, I would set up a meeting for Liddy to be interviewed by Mr. Mitchell. When Mr. Krogh gave me the okay from Ehrlichman, I called Mr. Mitchell and told him that Krogh, with Ehrlichman's approval, had suggested Gordon Liddy for the general counsel post and I arranged for Liddy to meet with Mitchell on Nov 24, 1971, after Mr. Caulfield met with Mr. Mitchell.
Watergate Hearings, June 25, 1973 - Testimony of John Dean
John Dean. I attended the meeting with Mitchell and Liddy and I have submitted to the committee, exhibit no. 12, a copy of an agenda Mr. Liddy prepared for the interview session. While I cannot recall every detail that was as discussed, I do recall that it was a very general job type interview. Mitchell realized that Liddy was not familiar with the election laws and asked if I would assist him in any way I could in getting himself familiar with those laws. I agreed. There was virtually no discussion of intelligence plans other than Liddy would draw up some sort of plans. Most of the conversation centered around title and compensation. Mr. Mitchell agreed that Liddy would be titled general counsel. I do not recall the rate of his compensation. I also recall that Liddy asked Mr. Mitchell when he would actually join the campaign, but Mitchell said he did not know. After this meeting, Mitchell called me to say that he wanted Magruder to interview Liddy because Magruder would be the man working most with him. I so advised Liddy and on Dec 8, 1971, Magruder requested I bring Liddy over to his office for an interview. The interview in Magruder's office on Dec 8 was brief and nonsubstantive. Magruder told Liddy that he had a host of legal problems that needed attention immediately and pointed to a stack of papers that I assumed contained the problems that he was concerned about. There was a brief discussion of Liddy's responsibilities for demonstrations vis-a-vis the campaign and Liddy said that after he got acclimated to the committee's problems and needs he would draw up a plan. Magruder requested that Liddy come to work as soon as possible which I believe was the following Monday.
Watergate Hearings, June 25, 1973 - Testimony of John Dean
John Dean. After Liddy was hired at the reelection committee, I informed my staff, principally Mr. Fred Fielding and Mr. David Wilson, that they should assist Liddy in becoming familiar with the election laws. I made my election law file available to Liddy and believe that he used them and he had periodic contact with my staff and myself on election law matters. I can recall that I had several discussions with Liddy about his responsibilities with the reelection committee in complying with the election laws. He told me that he had more work than there were hours in the day to complete it. I urged him to get volunteer lawyers to assist him and suggested several names of lawyers who might assist him. I can also recall that several weeks after Liddy left the White House he was asked to turn in his White House pass. Liddy came to me and asked me to intervene on his behalf so that he might retain his pass he and avoid the cumbersome procedures of clearance every time he wished to enter the White House. I thought that my office would have a good deal of contact with Liddy, so I requested that he be permitted to keep his pass. This request was turned down, however because they had decided to provide a fixed number of passes for the people at the reelection committee and Magruder would decide who got the passes. I so informed Liddy and never heard any more about the matter.