Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 25, 1973 - Testimony of John Dean.
Mr. Chairman, this would be a point where I could summarize part of this statement regarding handling of the FBI interview with the White House and just merely state generally that they followed a very similar pattern. Senator Sam Ervin (D North Carolina). That would be all right. If you could indicate for the committee the pages on which the statements are made that you summarize so we can have those pages printed in full in the body of the record. John Dean. All right, sir. I ll summarize beginning at the bottom of page 63 through 66 and merely note to the committee that the handling of the FBI interviews at the White House followed the pattern that had first been established by the interview with Mr. Colson. I had cleared this procedure with Mr. Ehrlichman. He felt it was a good idea I was there. I was there when he was present or when he was interviewed and I think that the material is self-explanatory as to any questions that the committee might have regarding those interviews.
I will now turn to my first meetings with Gray, beginning on page 66 regarding the investigation. I believe that it was on June 21 that I first met, with Gray in his office in the late morning regarding the FBI's investigation. At that meeting he told me he fully realized the sensitive nature of the investigation that they were pursuing and that he had placed his most trusted senior people in charge of the investigation. I told Gray I had been asked to keep informed about the investigation. Mr. Gray told me that he had been visiting a number of regional offices and would be doing so in the future. Thus, if I needed any information I should call Mr. Mark Felt in his absence.
I might note at this point that indeed Gray was frequently absent from the city during the course of the investigation and this irritated Ehrlichman greatly when he asked me to get information from Gray and Gray was out of the city. On several occasions in fact, Ehrlichman instructed me to tell Gray to return to the city and mind the store. I passed this message to Gray, but I cannot recall when or what prompted Ehrlichman to have me do so. I do recall that one occasion it related to some recently leaked information had come out of the FBI.
During my meeting with Gray on June 21st he also told me a man by the name of Mr. Bates was heading the investigation. I do not know Mr. Bates and when I reported this back to Ehrlichman and he asked who Bates was. I told him I did not know Bates. I can recall on several occasions Ehrlichman asking me if I thought that Gray knew what he was doing and if he had the investigation under control. I responded that he seemed to be relying on men in whom be had full trust.
To the best of my recollection, it was during this June 21st meeting with Gray that he informed me that the FBI had uncovered a number of major banking transactions that had transpired in the account of one of the arrested Cubans, Mr. Barker. He informed me that had traced a $25,000 check to a Mr. Kenneth Dahlberg and four checks totaling $89,000 to a bank in Mexico City. I do not recall whether I first learned about the Dahlberg check from Mr. Gray or whether I learned about it in a meeting in Mitchell's office by reason of the fact that the FBI was trying to contact Dahlberg about the matter and Dahlberg had called Mr. Stans. At any rate, the fact was that the FBI was investigating these matters was of utmost concern to Mr. Stans when he learned of it. Stans was concerned about the Dahlberg check. I was informed because it was in fact a contribution from Mr. Dwayne Andreas whom I did not know, but I was told was a longtime me backer of Senator Hubert Humphrey. Neither Stans nor Mitchell wanted Mr. Andreas to be embarrassed by disclosure of the contribution. The concern about the Mexican money was made a little less clear to me. I was told it was a contribution from a group of Texans who had used an intermediary in Mexico to make the contribution. Although I had not been told, I assumed at that time that they were concerned because it sounded to me as if it might have been a corporate contribution and clearly in violation of the law.
Mr. Stans also explained that he had checked with Sloan to find out how this money had ended up in Mr. Barker's bank account. And Sloan reported that he had given the checks to Liddy and requested that he cash them. He said he had no idea how Liddy had cashed them, but surmised that he had obviously used Barker to cash them. I was also told, and I do not recall specifically who told me this, that this money had absolutely nothing to do with the Watergate. It was unrelated and it was merely a coincidence of fact that Liddy had used Barker to cash the checks and Liddy had returned the money to Sloan. I was told that the investigation of this matter which appeared to be connected with Watergate but wasn't was unfounded and would merely result in an unnecessary embarrassment to the contributors. Accordingly, Mitchell and Stans both asked me to see if there was anything the White House could do to prevent this unnecessary embarrassment. I in turn, related these facts to both Haldeman and Ehrlichman.
On June 22nd, at the request of Ehrlichman and Haldeman I went to see Mr. Gray at this office in the early evening to discuss the Dahlberg and Mexican checks and determine how the FBI was proceeding with these matters. Mr. Gray told me that they were pursuing it by seeking to interview the persons who had drawn the checks. It was during my meeting with Mr. Gray on June 22 that we also talked about his theories of the case as it was beginning to unfold. I remember well that he drew a diagram for me showing his theories. At that time Mr. Gray had the following theories: it was a setup job by a double agent, it was a CIA operation because of the number of former CIA people involved, or it was someone in the reelection committee who was responsible. Gray had also had some other theories which he discussed, but I do not recall them now. I do remember that those I have mentioned were his principle theories. Before the meeting ended, I recall that Gray and I again had a brief discussion of the problems of an investigation into the White House. Gray expressed his awareness of the potential problems of such an investigation and also told me that if I needed any information I should call either Mark Felt or himself. Gray also informed me that he was going to meet with the CIA to discuss their possible involvement and he would let me know the outcome of that meeting.
On June 23rd I reported my conversation with Gray of the preceding evening to Ehrlichman and Haldeman. We discussed the Dahlberg and Mexican checks and the fact that the FBI was looking for answers regarding these checks. I had the impression that either Ehrlichman or Haldeman might have had a conversation with someone else about this matter but this is mere speculation on my part at that time.
Within the first days of my involvement in the coverup, a pattern had developed where I was carrying messages from Mitchell, Stans, and Mardian to Ehrlichman and Haldeman and vice versa about how each quarter was handling the coverup and the relevant information as to what was occurring. I was also reporting to them all the information I was receiving about the case from the Justice Department and the FBI. I checked with Haldeman and Ehrlichman before I did anything. One of the few sets of early documents evidencing this working relationship with Haldeman and Ehrlichman relates to responding to Larry O'Brien's letter of June 24th to the President requesting the appointment of a special prosecutor. I have submitted these documents to the committee, exhibit 15. Consistent with the reporting pattern that had developed, I reported to Mitchell in a meeting also attended by Mr. Mardian and Mr. LaRue, Gray's theories of the case as he had related them to me. This meeting occurred, to the best of my recollection, on Friday afternoon June 23rd or Saturday morning, June 24th. During this meeting there were wide-ranging discussions of the many problems then confronting the reelection committee including such matters as the problem of the civil lawsuit filed by the Democratic National Committee and the problems that could cause the problem of the Dahlberg and Mexican cheeks. And to the best of my recollection this was the first time I had heard any discussion of the need for money to take care of those who were involved in the break in of June 17th.
John Dean. I think also, Mr. Vice Chairman, that I might omit the first paragraph here on page 71 of my prepared statement and proceed with regard to my receipt of the reports. Senator Howard Baker (R Tennessee). Mr. Dean, it will be entirely agreeable and as the chairman asked you previously if you would note for the record that point in your statement where you would resume by appropriate identification. John Dean. All right, I will leave out the first paragraph on page 71. And I will begin by summarizing and saying to the best of my recollection it was in early July when I called Gray to discuss the matter of receiving reports from the FBI. Gray indicated that he was going to be in his office on Saturday and that I should come to his office and take a look at the reports in his office. I told him that I thought it was unwise for me to be coming in and out of the Justice Department, particularly since most of the guards and people at the Justice Department knew me. Accordingly, we arranged to meet later at his apartment and he said that he would discuss the matter with me then. I recall we took a stroll up to the side of his apartment building and sat on a bench in front of the river and talked generally about the case and I raised with him the matter of my receiving some of the raw FBI data regarding the investigation. Gray said that he would have to check but wanted an assurance from me that this information was being reported to the President and that was the principal purpose of the request. I assured him that it was being reported to the President even though I was not directly aware of the fact at that time, I was aware that Ehrlichman or Haldeman had daily discussions with the President and I felt certain because Haldeman often made notes of my reporting back about the information I was bringing to their attention that this information was being given to the President.
John Dean. I do not recall when actually I received the first written information from the FBI, but I believe it was after the 21st of July when I received a summary report that had been prepared on the investigation to that stage. I would also like to now summarize to the bottom of the page and indicate that when Samuel Dash, attorney. Bottom of page 72. John Dean. 72 correct. And indicate that after I did get possession of the documents, the FBI files, I found them not very meaningful. And later Mr. Mardian, Mr. Parkinson, Mr. O'Brien came over to my office and read the reports. They all reached the same conclusion. And I recall Mardian's reaction was that the documents indicated that the investigation was too vigorous and he was quite critical of Gray and asked me to call Gray to slow down but I never made such a call. Summarizing the first paragraph on page 73. I d also note that that I never showed any of these reports to any persons who were interviewed by the FBI and they were only given to Mr. Dick Moore of the White House Staff when he was working on the Segretti matter for Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Haldeman.