Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 25, 1973
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 25, 1973
[00.07.34-DEAN] FIRST DEALINGS WITH THE CIA I will turn now to the first dealings I had with the CIA It was during the meeting in Mitchell's office on June 23 or 24 that Mardian first raised the proposition that the CIA could, take care of this entire matter if they -wished, in that they had funds and covert procedures for distributing funds. I was personally unaware, of the workings of the CIA, but Mardian and Mitchell appeared very knowledgeable. [00.08.00] As a result of this conversation, which was prompted by my reporting that Gray thought the CIA might be involved, Mitchell suggested I explore with Ehrlichman and Haldeman having the White House contact the CIA for assistance. It was also argued that the individuals involved in the, Watergate incident 'as former CIA operatives, might compromise the CIA in some manner, and the CIA should be interested in assisting. On Monday morning June 26, 1 spoke with Ehrlichman regarding this suggestion, He thought it was a good idea and worth exploring. He told me to Call the CIA and explore it with them. I told him that I had never dealt with anyone, at the CIA. and did not know Director Helms. He told me that. I should not call Helms rather General Walters. I told him I did not know General Walters either. He then told me that he and Haldeman had had a little chat--as he called it-- with Helms and General Walters a few days earlier about their dealings with the FBI in relationship to the investigation. He was not specific. [00.09.10--taking care of business, EHRLICHMAN style] He then told me that I should deal with General Walters because he was a good friend of the White House and the White House had put him in the Deputy Director position so they could have some influence over the Agency. He told me that I should tell General Walters that I was, calling because he (Ehrlichman) had requested that I follow up on the earlier meeting they had and if there were any problems General Walters should call him. After my Meeting with Ehrlichman. I telephoned General Walters. I told him I was calling at Ehrlichman's request on a matter relating to his previous discussions, with Ehrlichman and Haldeman and would like. to have him visit with Me if possible. He seemed somewhat surprised and uncertain about my call, so I told him that he might like to check with Mr. Ehrlichman He said he would got back to me and he later called me back to set up a meeting for about noon at that day. When General Walters came to my office I told him again that I was meeting with him at Ehrlichman request. I made some general arguments about the Watergate case. It was from my discussion as a result of general comment with Walters that I became aware of that Ehrlichman and Haldeman had discussed the Dahlberg and Mexican money. We then discussed the fact that some of the, FBI were pursuing were, to my understanding, were unrelated to the Watergate but could result in persons, totally uninvolved being embarrassed. I would just like to note to counsel for the, record that that some, of this is different from the original; pagination of my draft that may have been lost through the transcribing of it here. I also told him that I understood that the FBI had developed three possible theories of the case. which I explained and then asked if, in fact, any of the men arrested were persons that were working for the CIA. [00.11.04] General Walters assured me that they were not, I then told him that I had been -asked to explore every possible means of dealing with this rather embarrassing and troublesome situation, because some of the men involved were looking for assistance. I asked if there any possible way the CIA could be of assistance in providing support for the individuals involved. General Walters told me, that while it could, of course. be done, he told me that. he knew the Director's feelings about such a matter and the Director would only do it on a direct order from the President. He then went on to say that to do anything to compound the situation would be most unwise and that to involve the CIA would only compound the problem because it would require that the President become directly involved. While I cannot recall in detail everything General Walters told me, I do recall that his argument was most sound and very persuasive, I told him I agreed with his position fully and I had merely been asked to explore the potential, which he, very rightly, stated was too great a risk. As the discussion ended I asked him that if he had any further ideas and told him I would appreciate the benefit of his thoughts I thanked him for his coming over and his candid answers and he, departed. [00.12.16-EHRLICHMAN asks DEAN to lean harder on the CIA to enter the coverup] subsequent to my meeting with General Walters. I reported back to Ehrlichman that, Walters had informed me that any involvement by the CIA in this matter was impossible. I recall that when I reported this to Ehrlichman, he. very cynically said "very interesting", he told me, that I should talk with General Walters further and push him a little harder to see if the CIA couldn't help out, particularly with regard to the unnecessary pursuit of investigative leads. I also recall Ehrlichman saying something to the effect that General Walters seems to have forgotten how he got -where he is today. [00.12.49]