[00.38.26-EHRLICHMAN is angry because he cannot fix the grand jury] Ehrlichman asked me why I couldn't do anything with Petersen about this and I told him that Petersen had done the best be could but that there was nothing he could do about it because the grand jury wanted Stans to appear. Ehrlichman would not accept my explanation and called Petersen and was very harsh in telling Petersen that he should honor the White House request that Stans not be forced to appear at the courthouse to go before the grand jury. I was present when Ehrlichman called Petersen and felt that he was wrong in doing so. I felt that Petersen had been more than accommodating and that if he could have done, it, he would, but obviously the grand jury wanted to see these people and Petersen was not happy with the procedures that had been followed with the others. It had merely been an accommodation. Accordingly. I called Mr. Petersen and apologized for the call that he had received from Ehrlichman. The only significant matter that I can recall in connection with any of the grand jury appearances was in connection with Colson's grand jury appearance also. After Colson returned from his grand jury interview he sent me a memorandum, a Copy of which I have submitted to the committee--which he suggested I might wish to send on to the prosecutors. I had been present during Colson's interview with the prosecutors before his sworn statement was taken and I did not find anything of significance in the memorandum that he had failed to cover during his interview. [00.39.51-attempt to hold the line at MAGRUDER for approving LIDDY plan, insulate the WHITE HOUSE] Mr. DEAN. I had also received information from Magruder that he had been pressured by Colson and members of Colson's staff into authorizing the adoption of Liddy's plan on several occasions this information was not, reflected in the memorandum that Colson had prepared. I felt that the memorandum was rather self-serving to Mr. Colson and I was not convinced that it was totally factual. The memorandum also came to my attention almost a week after Colson had sent it to me because, immediately following his appearance before the grand jury at the end of August. I had gone to San Clemente. I advised Colson that I did not know if everything in his memorandum Was consistent with Magruder's testimony and thought we, ought to leave well enough alone. He agreed. Accordingly I filed the document rather than forward it to Mr. Silbert. [00.40.38-DENIALS by the White House to the public of involvement in WATERGATE] THE SO-CALLED DEAN INVESTIGATION. It was while I was in San Clemente, at the end of August that the President announced at a press conference the so-called "Dean Report cleared everybody presently employed the White House or in the administration from any complicity in the Watergate matter. This statement was made on August 29, 1972. I would like, to recall to the committee what the White House had publicly said about this incident prior to the August 29 statement of the President. On June 19, Ziegler reported that there was no inquiry being, made by the. White House, into the matter. On June 20 Ziegler stated that the case is something that, the President will not get into at all despite the fact, that Mr. Hunt had been publicly linked to the White House. On June 21, Ziegler stated that Colson had assured him that he was not involved and the White House repeated the statement that the President, -would not get involved. On June the President stated that as Ziegler had said, the, White House has had no involvement whatever in this particular incident. On July 8, when the President was in California, he ruled out a special prosecutor and said that the FBI and other authorities will pursue the investigation thoroughly and completely. And, Ziegler further reported on that date that the President would not be getting special reports on this politically sensitive case since that would be inappropriate. [00.42.01] Suddenly came the, August 29 statement, citing the Dean investigation. I had no advance knowledge that the President was going to indicate that I had investigated the matter and found no complicity on the, part of anybody at the White House or anyone presently employed in the administration. I first learned of the matter when I heard it on a television news broadcast that evening after I had departed from the compound at San Clemente. I was going to walk up to the residence, and listen to the press conference that day because I had never been to a press conference on the west coast, but at the last minute. I returned to my room and later turned on the television and heard the statement. [00.42.39-DEAN describes problems with the WHITE HOUSE P.R. effort-links from White House to Watergate] Had I been consulted in advance by the President. I would have strongly opposed the, issuing of such a statement for several reasons which I would have told the President. First. I was aware that Gordon Strachan had Close daily liaison with 'Mr. Magruder and had carried information relating to wiretapped conversations into the White House and later destroyed incriminating documents at Haldeman's direction. Second, I had never been able to determine whether Haldeman had advance knowledge or not and in fact had never asked him because I didn't feel I could . [00.43.12] Third. I had always suspected, but never been able to substantiate my suspicion that Colson was far more knowledgeable than he protested. I was very aware of Mr. Colson's efforts to disassociate himself with Hunt and of Colson's continual production of documents that would disassociate himself with Hunt, Colson protested too much. Finally, I -was aware of the two meetings that I had attended and had reported these to both Haldeman and Ehrlichman. I reported to Haldeman, as I mentioned earlier, shortly after the meetings had occurred -when I told him I thought the idea was bad and incredible, and told him that I would have no connection or relationship -with the matter. I had reported this to Ehrlichman in June 1972, shortly after the incident. [00.43.58-evident that HALDEMAN was aware of the LIDDY plan before the breakin] I never understood how the Liddy plan had been approved and Magruder had indicated to me that there had been White House pressure to get, the plan moving. Accordingly, I -would have been the last to say unequivocally, as the President so stated, that no one presently employed at the White House had any advance knowledge of the matter. I did believe, however, that nobody at the. White House knew that there was going to be, a break-in of the Democratic -National Committee on June 17, because I don't, believe that, anyone other than those directly involved knew that that was going to happen, on that day. [00.44.32]