Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 25, 1973
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 25, 1973
[00.18.49-After the SEGRETTI publicity, heads roll on the WHITE HOUSE staff to protect the bigshots by sacrificing smaller players] Haldeman said that he was personally too close to Chapin to make a judgment on such it thing and that if it was going to be done it was going to be reraised with the President it would have to be done so by Ehrlichman. Ehrlichman said that he did not think that it was possible to reraise the -matter and subsequently Chapin resigned from the White House staff. [00.19.10] DISCUSSIONS OF A WRITTEN DEAN REPORT As the press accounts of Segretti's activities lingered on after the election as well as the continuing Watergate stories there was serious discussion about putting out the facts. [00.19.25] in late November I recall conversation with Haldeman in his office. We talked about the facts and he asked my opinion about what would happen if we put them out- I told him that I thought that the then pending trial would be put back into -a grand jury and it was very likely that Mitchell, Magruder, Strachan, Ehrlichman, Haldeman, and Dean could be indicted. He asked me to elaborate. I said I had no idea nor did I have full knowledge of what happened before June 17 but I did know that there is a good possibility, that any reconvened grand jury could get into questioning of obstruction of justice which would lead right to us. [00.20.04-the option of coming clean is raised and dismissed-instead, DEAN is ordered to write a fake report clearing the White House] Haldeman said that the President wished now that the election was over, to get rid of the Watergate and related matters by laying them open but based on what I had just told him he said it doesn't seem to be a very viable option. I told him that I was ready at any time to account for in self and that I thought, we should continue to examine, that option so that the President is not damaged. He then asked me to attempt. to write a, report that could be made public; a report that Would be a written version of the So-called Dean investigation that the President had announced on August 29 and include a new report on the Segretti matter. I told Haldeman that I thought that this could only create additional new problems, because it would be just like a peek into the tent without letting anyone in and it would be very difficult to write, but I would do my best, I did not tell Haldeman that I was also opposed to writing a report under my name which I felt would come back to haunt me some day. Accordingly, to follow his instructions I decided that I would draft a series of carefully worded interrogatories for each individual whose name had come up in the press regarding political sabotage and espionage activities Then based on the affidavits I would write a summary report and attach the affidavits I thought that I would merely waltz Over the Watergate matter referring to the fact that other governmental Investigations, the FBI and the grand jury, had cleared anyone in the White House from involvement. After drafting the document I reluctantly Submitted it to Haldeman on December 5. 1 have submitted a copy of this document to the Committee. Mr. DEAN. Haldeman in turn gave it to Ehrlichman who made the editorial changes that appear on the draft. Ehrlichman then gave It to Ziegler. On December 13, a meeting was scheduled in Haldeman's office, to discuss the matter but was subsequently moved to Ziegler's office. Present at the meeting were. Haldeman. 'Moore, Ziegler and myself. Ehrlichman had shown up for the earlier meeting in Haldeman's office but when it was moved to Ziegler's office. he never returned to the meeting, to the best of my recollection. Nothing was resolved at the meeting and it was a consensus of the group that the White House should continue, in Dick Moore's words, to "hunker down"--do nothing--on the general theory that no one would be arrested for what they didn't say. [00.22.28] THE HANDLING OF DEMANDS FOR WHITE HOUSE MONEY Turning to the handling of demand for White House money, I have previously discussed Mr. Kalmbach's raising the money for the first pressures for support money for silence, These pressures were continuous and following the election there were increasing pressures from Hunt for money for himself and the other defendants as a means of assuring their silence. [00.22.53] While this pressure had begun before the election, it steadily grew after the election until the demands were being made directly to the white House for financial assistance. Before getting into the details of these pressures and how they were handled I believe it might be helpful to explain the situation at the White House regarding the handling and availability of cash. In early 1971, I was asked by Haldeman to assist in establishing the, reelection committee in that they had no lawyer of their own. My activities resulted in my learning that there were large sums of cash that had been left over from the 1968 Nixon primaries and some funds had been left from the 1970 congressional fundraising efforts. These moneys, which were referred to as surplus moneys, were held by Kalmbach and controlled by Haldeman and Ehrlichman. I have submitted to the committee, a memorandum prepared by Strachan of a meeting that was attended by Haldeman Strachan, and myself on 'May 18, 1971, which reflects the tight controls Haldeman exercised over the surplus moneys held by Kalmbach. [00.24.06] Mr. DEAN-. I have, also submitted to the, committee documents evidencing that it was necessary to have Haldeman's approval, based on a full explanation of the reasons, for even the smallest disbursement by Kalmbach of the, surplus money. Mr. DEAN-. In this instance, I am reefering to an expenditure of $813. It, was sometime prior to April 7, 1972, that I learned that cash was being sent, to the White House. I was not told the amount, but I was asked by Strachan if I could suggest someone outside of the Government who might be willing to hold a, large amount of cash in a safety deposit -box. I told him I would have to think about it but later told him I couldn't think of anyone. It was in late June or early July 1972, that I learned that $350,000 of the surplus money had been. delivered to the White House prior to April 7, 1972. 1 was informed that the money came from the 1968 primaries and that the delivery was made. before April 7 to insure that it not become a part of the 1972 campaign, funds. [00.25.04]