Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 25, 1973
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 25, 1973
[00.29.28] On February 15, after late, breakfast, O'Brien and I took about a 2 hour walk down the, beach, at which time I told him what had occurred at La Costa. I told him that 'Moore had been dispatched to New York by Haldeman and Ehrlichman to tell Mitchell it was his responsibility to raise the future money for the convicted defendants. O'Brien's reaction--as he, was well aware-of feeling that this was Haldeman's and Ehrlichman's problem and not his- was that Mitchell would probably go through the roof, After returning from our walk we talked about the fact that I had been requested to suggest names for the. minority counsel. It was during this conversation that I thought of Mr. Martin Hoffman, whom I knew to be a very capable lawyer then serving as general counsel of the Atomic Energy Commission, and a person who had worked on the Hill. I called Mr. Hoffman and asked if he was interested. He said he was. but he did not know if Senator Baker would be because they had had a difference of opinion over a matter at the AEC. He said, however he had done. some work for Senator Baker in the past and liked him very much. I then called Ehrlichman and he agreed that Mr. Hoffman would be a good choice. 'Next I called Haldeman and he said OK if Ehrlichman said OK. during my conversation with Haldeman he, told me be had learned that the chief counsel Job had been offered to Mr. Ken Keating and Mr. Keating had sent a feeler to the White House as to whether he should be interested. Haldeman asked me. to think about it. After talking with Ehrlichman and Haldeman about Mr. Hoffman. I called Timmons and Johnson and asked them to float 'Mr. Hoffman's name to Senator Baker. Mr. Timmons called me back later and said it Wouldn't float because the Senator had indicated he had had some problem with 'Mr. Hoffman and Chairman Schlesinger over an AEC matter. He liked. Mr. Hoffman but said he was still miffed at him. Later that day I called Mr. Moore, but learned he. had gone] to 'New York to see Mitchell, I had talked with Moore earlier that week. but had forgotten he was going to New York on the 15th. Paul O'Brien called Mitchell in the midafternoon to report our conversation I was in and out of the, room while he was on the Telephone talking to Mitchell as I didn't feel it was in my business to listen to his conversation. I talked briefly 'with Mitchell at the and of the, conversation he had with O'Brien. He talked -about the possibility of Mr. Keating as chief counsel, Mr. Mitchell seemed intrigued by the idea. but doubted if Mr. Keating would accept. After I hung up. O'Brien reported that Mr. Moore had brought up the money raising matter, but Mitchell just didn't discuss it at any length with Moore. O'Brien departed Florida late that afternoon and my wife and I got away from the telephone on telephone for the he next 3 days. I returned to the office on 7 Monday, February 19, and spoke with Haldeman on either the 19th or 20th. He requested that I draw up an agenda for a meeting with the President regarding matters which the President should reflect on as a result of the LaCosta meeting and subsequent matters which had come up. Mr. Haldeman and I went over the high point of what should be raised, including items that had not come up at La Costa, such as Magruder's desire to return to the White House staff and sending Mr. Stans to the Senate for or a confirmable post as a tactic to counter the Watergate hearings. I prepared the agenda. I thought that I was, going to attend the meeting with the President, but Haldeman called for the agenda, and not me. I have submitted to the committee -a copy of the agenda. [00.33.06] Mr. DEAN. You will see, that the agenda deals with five items to be, discussed and resolved with the President. 1. Senator Baker's requested meeting with the President; 2. Submitting Secretary Stans' name for a confirmable position; 3. What to do with Mr. Magruder; 4. Using Mr. Buchanan during the Senate hearings; and 5. Getting the Attorney General back in touch with the White House. [00.33.31] Subsequent to Haldeman's meeting with the President, he informed that: The President would meet with Senator Baker; I should discuss with Mr. Stans his interest in a confirmable position; Magruder could not return to the White House staff; Buchanan could not be, used at the Senate hearings; and the. President would meet with the Attorney General. I have not explained at this point the, details of this rather significant document, but I believe the document is rather self-explanatory of the continuing coverup and I will, of course, answer any questions about it. I was not present when the President and Haldeman discussed these matters, but, I had discussed them with Haldeman before he, went. to see the President and he informed him Of the President's decisions after the meeting, thus, I assume that- the agenda I had prepared was the basis of their discussions. [00.34.22] On February 20, or 21, "Mr. Timmons told me he had arranged for the President to have an off-the-record record private meeting with Senator Baker. As you will note from the agenda I referred to list a moment ago, Mr. Timmons had reported that the Senator had told Timmons he wanted guidance and Timmons' interpretation was that the, Senator to help the White House. Haldeman told me to prepare a briefing paper for the President and bring it directly to him rather than routing it, through normal channels. I have submitted to the committee a copy of the agenda I prepared for' the President's meeting with Senator Baker. [00.35.00-BAKER appears very uncomfortable to hear DEAN reveal BAKER'S chumminess with the White House] Mr. DEAN. After the President met. with Senator Baker I was informed by Haldeman that the Senator had appeared to be very interested in being cooperative and the President had the impression that he might be helpful. This. of course, was the White House hope, but nothing that was reported from the meeting made this anything more than a hope.