Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 25, 1973
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 25, 1973
[00.35.22-DEAN discusses WHITE HOUSE efforts to court Sen. BAKER prior to the start of the ERVIN COMMITTEE hearings] Also, Senator Baker told the President that he wanted his contact Point, to be, Mr. Kleindienst, rather than someone on the White House staff. Haldeman told me that, Senator Baker, had urged The President to waive executive privilege and send members of the White Staff to the hearings quickly as possible, but the President had told Senator Baker that he I he was going to hold the line at written interrogatories. I was told that both the President and Senator Baker had discussed that there should be an effort to get, the, hearings over as quickly as Possible. This report of the meeting which Haldeman gave, me was later confirmed In discussions I had with the President myself in early March of this year. [00.36.03-WHITE HOUSE desire to push Atty. Gen. KLEINDIENST to fix up the case] On February 22, Mr. Haldeman requested that I prepare a briefing paper for the President's meeting that day -with Attorney General Kleindienst. Throughout the Watergate investigation Haldeman and particularly Ehrlichman had complained about Mr. Kleindienst's passive role in the investigation and prosecution. Haldeman and Ehrlichman were both aware of the strained relationship between Kleindienst and the White House. I knew that Ehrlichman was riding hard on the Justice Department in an effort to undermine Mr. Kleindienst. I also knew from conversations with Kleindienst that he had little. affection for Mr. Ehrlichman. The Senate Watergate hearings presented the real possibility of the Justice Department having to make further criminal investigations that would lead back to the White House. [00.36.45] Accordingly, the President was the only one who could bring Mr. Kleindienst back in the family to protect the White House and this meeting was designed to do just that. As a result, of Senator Baker's request that Kleindienst be his contact point, the President had a perfect vehicle to solicit Kleindienst's assistance during the hearings and if anything should develop during the hearings to not let all hell break loose in a subsequent investigation. I have submitted to the committee a copy of the briefing paper I was requested to prepare. I know that this document went to the President because just, before the meeting was to occur. I realized that the President might not understand The reference to the fact that Kleindienst was considering one particularly attractive offer from a law firm that he was likely to accept, I called Haldeman to explain this, but Haldeman said the paper had gone in and the President would understand that this was a reference to Governor Connally's law firm because Governor Connally had dismissed it with the President. The, President subsequently discussed this meeting with me in early March. He told me that he would continue to call Mr. Kleindienst from time to time, but, I should also make certain that Kleindienst was working closely with Senator Baker in preparation for the he Select Committee hearings. As I mentioned earlier. I had also been informed that the President had made a decision that Magruder could not return to the White House. Magruder had been working at the inaugural committee and even before the inauguration he told me that he had called Mr. Higby requesting a meeting with Haldeman to discuss his future. After the inauguration. Magruder told me that he had to decide what he was going to do. Prior to that meeting I had informed Haldeman that Mr. O'Brien had had some discussions with Magruder and that Magruder had indicated that Haldeman and Colson were very much involved in the planning and approval of 'he Liddy operation. After Magruder met with Haldeman in late, January 1973, 1 had occasion to see him in the hall of the EOB, He told me that he had talked -with Haldeman and Mitchell about running for office In California and -was planning a trip to California to test the, water. He said now was the time, because he felt he could get good financial backing I felt Magruder was in for some serious problems both before the grand jury and the Senate, hearings, but -without saying this to him, I tried to dissuade him from running for office until this entire matter had been resolved. Shortly after this conversation with Magruder I phoned Haldeman and told him that I thought Magruder was making a mistake in going to California in pursuit of an elected office. Haldeman agreed and said he was going to call Bob Finch and suggest that when Magruder met with him, Finch, that he be dissuaded. He asked me to call Kalmbach and make a similar suggestion, which I did, and Kalmbach said he would do it. After Magruder returned from California he, had decided that he wanted to stay in Washington. He was pushing hard to return to the White House staff, -and work on the, Bicentennial program, No one had the heart to tell -Magruder that the President had said had said that he could not return to the White House staff. [00.40.04-Alleged authorization/pressure from HALDEMAN/NIXON for MAGRUDER to approve NIXON plan, with a push to keep MAGRUDER quiet.] It -was during this period of time, which I believe was mid-February, Magruder had a conversation with Mr. O'Brien, in -which he told O'Brien that, he had received his final authorization for Liddy's activities from Gordon Strachan and that Strachan had reported that Haldeman -had cleared the, matter with the President. I reported this to Haldeman., -who expressed concern over Magruder's statement. After I reported this information. the White House efforts to find a Job for Magruder became intense. [00.40.35]