Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 25, 1973 - Statement of John Dean.
On either March 28th or 29th, Mr. Krogh came to my office because he happened to be in the Executive Office Building. He said he had come to express sympathy for me as a result of the adverse publicity I had received during the Gray hearings. He then began telling me that he had not himself had a good day since his own confirmation hearings and that he had been haunted by his experiences at the White House. I told Krogh that I thought that there was a very likely possibility that the Senate Watergate committee could stumble into the Ellsberg burglary. I told him that there were documents in the possession of the Justice Department which had been provided by the CIA in connection with the Watergate investigation which contained pictures of Liddy standing in front of Mr. Ellsberg's doctor's office in California. I told him that I had learned from the CIA that these pictures had been left in a camera returned by Hunt to the CIA and the CIA had developed the pictures. I said I did not believe that the Justice Department knew what the pictures were all about but that any investigator worth his salt would probably track down the incident as a result of the pictures. I told him that Ehrlichman had requested that I retrieve the documents from the Justice Department and got them back to the CIA where they might be withheld from the committee investigators but the CIA had been unwilling to do so. Krogh was very distressed to hear this news but said that maybe it was for the best in that he had personally been haunted by this incident for so long that he would like to get it out in the open.
We then entered into a discussion about the incident and I asked him if he had received his authorization to proceed with the burglary from Ehrlichman knowing well that Krogh would not undertake such a mission himself. Krogh responded that no he did not believe that Ehrlichman had been aware of the incident until shortly after it had occurred. Rather he had received his orders right out of the Oval Office. I was so surprised to hear this that I said, "You must be kidding." And he repeated again that he had received his instructions out of the Oval office. Mr. Krogh also indicated to me that he thought he might have perjured himself during his confirmation hearings and he was very bothered by that. He said he thought he had been asked some questions about the Cubans that he probably could have answered but was afraid to open up the whole area of the Plumbers operation so he did not properly answer the question. He had never really studied his transcript to determine if he had or had not perjured himself but he was concerned about it. I told him that there might be a possible solution to his problem if there was some way we could get him immunized on a national security basis and get the matter out in the open on that basis or some sort of procedure that would remedy his plight. I said I did not have anything specific in mind but it is something that we might talk to Henry Petersen about sometime in the future.
Shortly after Krogh left my office, I had a call from Ehrlichman who told me that Krogh had been in to see him about the matters we had just been talking about. He said that he was convinced that Krogh had not perjured himself, but he requested that I call Petersen to explore how we might deal with Krogh's situation. I told Ehrlichman that I did not think it was an appropriate time to call right now, but that maybe we could in the near future before the Senate committee came across the documents at the Justice Department that would unravel this entire matter. I never called Petersen on this matter.
Following my meeting with Mitchell and Magruder on March 28th, I realized that I was under pressure from both within the White House and without to either not testify or falsely testify. I had earlier discussed with Ehrlichman that if I was called upon to testify that I would probably be asked questions about the Dean investigation, my dealings with the FBI, the handling of the material in Hunt's safe, and the like. I recall testing Ehrlichman's reaction to my testimony and I got the result that I expected. He had asked me for an example of a problem area. I then told him that I would probably have to explain the delay of turning materials over to the FBI from Hunt's office. I said that the reason I had delayed was because of his instructions that I deep six and shred the evidence. Ehrlichman told me that he didn't think that I would have to explain the delay that way rather that I could say that I was making an inventory. I told him that I had not made an inventory and he said, "Well, I'm sure you can think of something." I have mentioned that I had received what I considered an indication from Haldeman when I had met with him preceding the Magruder and Mitchell meeting on the 28th that he was protecting himself. I also realized that when Ehrlichman had called me after my conversation with Mr. Krogh that, he was trying to tell me that what Krogh had earlier told me might not be correct. And I felt that he was somewhat unhappy that Krogh had given me the information he had.
By March 29th, Ehrlichman and Haldeman fully realized that I was not playing ball and in fact could present a serious problem to them. It was also evident to me that they were doing everything they could to protect themselves against my knowledge. I had been in continuous contact since March 25th with my attorney, Thomas Hogan, regarding whom he felt was the best available man in the criminal law field that I might discuss this entire matter with. We had talked on several occasions about Charles Shaffer, whom I had met several years ago and regarded highly as a criminal lawyer. On March 28th and 29th, however, I made several other calls to friends to ask them for suggested names of knowledgeable criminal lawyers, but decided on March 30th that I would retain Mr. Shaffer if he were available. Mr. Hogan informed me that he was and we arranged to meet with him.
The President, along with Haldeman and Ehrlichman, were going to be in California for a week or more in connection with the President's meeting with President Thieu of South Vietnam and I felt that this would give me an opportunity to decide how best I could come forward and end this matter. I had decided that I was going to inform the prosecutors of what the case was all about but before I did so I felt that I should consult with counsel to determine the scope of my own problems.
On March 30, shortly after lunch, I met with Mr. Hogan and Mr. Shaffer. I spent 5 hours telling them everything that I could remember and telling them that I was not going to continue in the coverup. Mr. Shaffer advised me to avoid further conversations regarding this subject and that he would like to talk with me again on Monday morning prior to his seeing the prosecutors. Accordingly, we met on Monday morning April 2nd and discussed the matter for several hours more. That afternoon, my attorneys went to the Government prosecutors and told them that I was willing to come forward with everything I knew about the case. There then followed a number of meetings between my attorneys and the prosecutors and myself in which we began to unfold everything I knew about the case. From the outset I was confronted with the problems of executive privilege and national security. Thus, it was agreed until these problems were resolved that I would exclude matters involving the President from these conversations. I was also uncertain of many of the dates and details of the facts that I had general knowledge of so I began reconstructing a chronology of events.
As each session progressed I was able to provide more information, more leads, and more explanations of the interrelationship within the White House and the relationships of persons, who were involved. During the period of April 2nd until April 15th, the meetings I had with the prosecutors were initially focusing on the activities 'which had led up to the June 17 break in at The Democratic National Committee and all the knowledge I had regarding the events before, June 17. But as our discussions evolved and I began telling them more and more of the coverup, their interest began to focus more and more in that area. As I began explaining what I knew, it was evident that the prosecutors had no conception of how extensive the coverup was so I tried to provide them with all the details that I could remember. Also, as the conversations began to get more and more specifics, we moved into areas that closer to the President. But prior to April 15th I did not discuss Presidential involvement.