Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activiti...
00:14:11 - 00:16:11
Samuel Dash, attorney. Let us examine, Mr. Dean, your denial of your own complicity in the Watergate itself in May and June of 1972. Is it not true that although you expressed amazement at the mind-boggling, as you described it, Liddy plan remembered in a show-and-tell meeting in the Attorney General's office on January 27, 1972, you along with Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Magruder, did encourage Liddy to scale down this plan and budget and you didn't tell him to stop the activity?
John Dean. That s correct. And I might add that with hindsight, as I think I indicated in my statement yesterday, I probably should have been much more forceful in trying to stop the plan at that point when I in fact myself realized it was something that should not occur.
Samuel Dash, attorney. Well, Mr. Dean, after the scaled down Liddy plan was presented in Mitchell's office In February 4, 1972, which did not include the activities of mugging, kidnapping, or prostitution, but primarily electronic surveillance or break ins, although you say you disassociated yourself from it, as the White House representative, you did not in fact tell Liddy to stop it.
John Dean. That is correct.
Samuel Dash, attorney. And although you say that you told Haldeman that the White House should not be involved with the plan, you did not recommend that Haldeman put a stop to it which you knew he could have done if he wanted to?
John Dean. Well, again I must rely on hindsight. Given the circumstances that were existing at the time, I felt that someone wanted this. I knew I didn't want it. I knew I had put those on notice involved that I was going to have no part in it. I had similarly and with regard to Operation Sandwedge, let it die a natural death. I assumed the same thing was going to happen. Quite obviously it did not happen.