Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 26, 1973
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 26, 1973
[00.07.37-LEHRER in studio] LEHRER states that the two counsels and Senator TALMADGE have questioned DEAN in a way to check the facts of his testimony and test his credibility. [PBS network ID-title screen "SENATE HEARINGS ON CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES"] [00.10.11-LEHRER] LEHRER states that Sen. WEICKER will ask the next round of questions [00.10.19-to committee room, shot of Sen. ERVIN.] AFTERNOON SESSION, TUESDAY, JUNE 26, 1973 Senator ERVIN., The committee 'will come to order. Senator Weicker. Senator WEICKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Dean, I would like to completely chancre gears from the testimony which you gave this morning and go back to the beginning of the statement you made yesterday in order to put this in its proper context because it is so completely different from what was discussed this morning and yesterday. I am going to read the early portions of your statement in Order to set. the framework for the questions I am going to ask. This is quoting from your statement of yesterday. [READING] It was when I joined the White House staff in July of 1970, that I -became fully aware of the extent of concern at the White House regarding demonstrations and intelligence information relating to demonstrators. It was approximately one month after I arrived at the White House that I was informed about the project that had been going on before I arrived to restructure the Government's Intelligence-gathering capacities vis-a-vis demonstrators and domestic radicals. The revised domestic intelligence plan was submitted in a document for the President. The committee has in its possession a copy of that document and certain related memoranda pursuant to the order of Judge Sirica. [END QUOTED SECTION] I want to inform the chairman and members of the committee so there is, no apprehension here, I do not intend to go into the memorandum of 1970, I understand that there are matters contained therein which the chairman is handling at the present time so it, is not my intent to go into that document. [READING] After I was told of the Presidentially approved plan, that called for bugging, burglarizing, mail covers, and the like, I was instructed 'by Haldeman to see what I could do to get, the plan implemented. I thought the plan was totally uncalled for and unjustified. I talked with Mitchell about the plan, and he said he knew there was a great desire at the White House to see the plan implemented, but, he agreed fully with FBI Director Hoover, who opposed the plan, with one exception. He thought that an interagency evaluation committee might be useful because it was not good to have the FBI standing alone without the information of other intelligence agencies and the sharing of information is always good and avoids duplication. After my conversation with Mitchell, I wrote a memorandum requesting that the evaluation committee be established, [00.12.55-long shot of the committee room, starting at rear with public audience, panning to front over reporters and photographers, committee table] and the restraints could be removed later. I told Haldeman that the only way to proceed was one step at a time, and this could be an important first step. He agreed, The Interagency Evaluation valuation Committee (IEC) was created, as I recall, in early 1971, I requested Jack Caulfield, who had been assigned to my office. to serve as the, White House liaison to the IEC, and when "Mr., Caulfield left the White House Mr. David Wilson of my staff served as liaison. I am unaware of the IEC ever having engaged in any illegal activities or assignments, and certainly no such assignment was ever requested by my office The reports from the IEC, or summaries of the reports were forwarded to Haldeman and sometimes Ehrlichman. In addition to the intelligence reports from the IEC, my office also received regular intelligence reports regarding demonstrators and radical groups from the FBI and on some occasions from the CIA, A member of my staff would review the material to determine if it should be forwarded to 'Mr. Haldeman--that is, for bringing to the President's attention--or sent to another member of the staff Who might have an interest in the contents of the report. [END QUOTED SECTION] [00.14.00]