Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activiti...
.Caucus Room, Russell Senate Office Building
1973 (Actual Year)
[00.27.24-Sen. GURNEY continues his pro-WHITE HOUSE questioning, trying to imply that DEAN brought LIDDY to the CRP and orchestrated his spying activities] Senator GURNEY. Would that not be important in finding out his qualifications, his previous employment? Mr. DEAN. Well, I was told, for example, when I met him--when I talked to Mr. Krogh about him, I can recall Mr. Krogh very specifically telling me that he had written some of the best legal memorandums that he had run across in a long time. He explained that Gordon had taken some rather complex subjects and analyzed them in a very precise way. One of these -memoranda had gone in to the President and the President had complimented Mr. Liddy through Mr. Krogh on the quality of the document that he had prepared. Senator GURNEY. Was it understood that part of his duties -would be in charge of security or things like that? Mr. DEAN. That is correct. Senator GURNEY. Well, did you ask any questions of him as to what he had had been doing in the area of security? Mr. DEAN. I was told that he had an FBI, Treasury Department, law enforcement background. There, was not a, great focus on that at that time. I know Mr. Krogh had worked in the past before, I came to the 'White House and partially after I was still at the White House with the demonstrator problem. Mr. Krogh was very knowledgeable in the area, and -when he told me that he thought Mr. Liddy had these qualifications I thought that Mr. Krogh's judgment was good and in fact, it was partially Mr. Krogh's working with me from my position at the Department of Justice that resulted in my coming into the White House. Senator GURNEY. You never did go into -what he had been doing with Krogh and Hunt? Mr. DEAN. No, I did not. [00.29.02-DEAN'S role in planning the WATERGATE-GURNEY wants to make DEAN'S role seem significant] Senator GURNEY. The January 27 meeting occurred and as I recall, you testified that the original plan--and I do not know what the word was that you used to describe it, but--- Mr. DEAN. I think I called it a mission impossible plan. Senator GURNEY. I think that is probably a, good description. Did you ever talk to Mr. Mitchell or Mr. Magruder after this horrendous plan, about whether Liddy really was competent, to stay on and work for the, Committee, To Re-Elect the. President? Mr. DEAN. As I recall, the only conversation I had was a very brief conversation. Mr. Liddy was taking the charts off the easel and they were preparing to leave the office when I paused in front of Mr. Mitchell's desk and he told me that, this was certainly out, of the question I do not, think anyone knew that a plan of that dimension was going to be presented at that time. Senator GURNEY. Well, did it worry you that this man came up with kidnapping prostitution, mugging, and all the rest, of it? Mr. DEAN. Yes, sir, it did. Senator GURNEY. But you never really discussed it with Mitchell and Magruder as to his capability, Liddy's capability of staying on at the job? [00.30.20] Mr. DEAN. Well, sir, you would have had to have been there to believe it and I might say that, it was so far out that there -was no hope, in my mind that anyone was ever going to approve any plan like this. So I just assumed that it was going to die, a, natural death. Senator GURNEY. Now we come, to the second meeting that occurred on February 1. My recollection is that you came in a little later this day. Mr. DEAN. That is correct. Senator GURNEY. My recollection also is that you testified that you -were, again disturbed. My Very disturbed at what he was proposing. Is that true? Mr. DEAN. That is correct and I was injecting myself into the meeting in an effort to terminate the meeting, which I did. Senator GURNEY. Well, did you have any discussion after the meeting with Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Magruder about his continuing? Mr. DEAN. I had a direct discussion with Mr. Liddy at, that time. I might add. after the first meeting I had told Mr. Liddy he should destroy the charts. After the second meeting, as we were leaving the office, I told him that I would not discuss this with him any further. I indicated to him that it still was not what was necessary and it was a rather brief discussion, I must say I felt very sorry for Gordon Liddy during much of this because of the fact that he had received no guidance from anybody that, I could tell-certainly none from me--as to what was expected of him. It is not my nature to be hard on somebody. Rather I was trying to tell him that I felt this was not what was contemplated. [00.32.09]
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