Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 27, 1973 (1/2)
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 27, 1973 (1/2)
[00.41.18-Sen. INOUYE continues to interrogate DEAN] Senator INOUYE. Were you surprised when you heard of the. June 17 break-in ? Mr. DEAN. Was I surprised ? Senator INOUYE. Yes. Mr. DEAN. As I told you, my immediate reaction was, after hearing the facts, that it was something that Mr. Colson had been involved in. I was more appalled than surprised. Senator INOUYE. Talking about the first time you heard of the break-in on the 17th, were you surprised? Mr. DEAN-. As I say, I learned it through a conversation that I had on the telephone with my assistant on the 18th, when I called after landing in San Francisco, his persuading me, to come back. When I first heard of -it, [00.42.02] I can't say I was surprised to hear it, knowing what I 'knew had occurred in the White House in the past. Senator INOUYE. You had anticipated something like this? [00.42.14] Mr. DEAN. I hadn't anticipated anything like this, no. I can't. say I anticipated it, but I can't say I was surprised to hear of it, because I was aware, of the fact that there had been a past effort, to accomplish a burglary on the Brookings Institute and I had also heard of the Ellsberg psychiatrist break-in by that time. Senator INOUYE. You were not surprised because you were an author of the plan? Mr. DEAN. No, sir; that was not my immediate reaction. I didn't think the plan had been approved Senator INOUYE. [QUOTING W.H. MEMO ATTACKING DEAN'S TESTIMONY] "In February, however, with the Ervin committee beginning its work, the President was again. concerned that all of the available facts be made known. In the middle of February 1973, Dean and Richard Moore met with Ehrlichman and Haldeman -it San Clemente. Dean was assigned to reduce "to written form all of the detailed facts as they related both to the Committee To Re-Elect and the White House.'" This is from Mr. Ehrlichman. [00.43.20-DEAN disputes being ordered to make a written report of Watergate] Mr. DEAN. I received no such instruction when I was at La Costa to prepare, any written report and have no knowledge of ever being given such an instruction. Senator INOUYE., This is also substantiated by Mr. Moore. Mr. DEAN. I have, no knowledge of that, There, was, as I say, an earlier effort in December to prepare such a report, and I have, submitted that document to the committee. If there were discussions of Preparing a written report, it was of the ilk of a report that was prepared in the December period, which I, for lack of a better term, call a fairy tale. Senator INOUYE. [QUOTING W.H. MEMO ATTACKING DEAN'S TESTIMONY] "Dean was pressed continually for or that statement, particularly by Haldeman, but never produced it." Mr. DEAN. Well as I say, I recall, the only time I recall Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman pushing me and pressing me for a statement is when I -was up at Camp David and not in that time frame. Senator INOUYE. [QUOTING W.H. MEMO ATTACKING DEAN'S TESTIMONY] "At this point, the Gray confirmation hearings were imminent and the Ervin hearings were on the horizon. The President, who had barely known Dean, determined that counsel to the President was the appropriate person with whom to work in formulating the President's position on executive privilege and similar legal issues in that these hearings in news conferences on March 2 and 15, at which they would arise, would present. Between February 27 and April 16, the President met with Dean and usually others, 21 or 22 times and there were 14 telephone conversations between March 10 and April 22." Mr. DEAN. Senator, I will stand on my testimony with regard to those last few paragraphs you have read. [00.45.18] Senator INOUYE. [QUOTING W.H. MEMO ATTACKING DEAN'S TESTIMONY] "It is probable that Dean helped induce the views on attorney- client privilege and on separation of powers that would have immunized Dean himself from having to testify under oath." Mr. DEAN. I -will comment on that to the effect that Mr.--or the President and I when we discussed the Dean appearance, I told him that if I go up there, I am going to testify. There is no way to go up. We had had countless occasions when the executive privilege, issue had come up before, there was a parallel developing between the Gray hearings and the, ITT hearings where Mr. Flanigan made an appearance before the Senate Judiciary Committee. This was quite evident. In my discussions with the President he made, it clear to me he did not want Mr. Ehrlichman or Haldeman to appear and I told him the strongest case for executive privilege would rest on the counsel to the President and we did discuss that. [00.46.23]