Waco Hearings - DAY 6
Waco Hearings - DAY 6
WACO HEARINGS: 3:00 - 4:03PM - Master Number 10969 - INTRODUCTION: The following footage of the Waco Hearings consists of questioning of the thirteenth group of panelists. They are: Peter Smerick; former FBI Special Agent, Jim Cavanaugn; ATF Special Agent who was present at Waco on February 28th and who initially began negotiations with the Davidians, Byron Sage; Supervisor Special Resident Agent In Charge at the Austin office and lead negotiator during the 51-day standoff, Gary Nesner; Supervisor Special Agent at the FBI Academy at Quantico Army Base and Negotiations Supervisor at Waco, Jeffery Jamar; FBI Special Agent in Charge at the San Antonio office and overall FBI Commander at Waco and Mr. Ronald McCarthy; former officer with the Los Angeles Police Department. Questions, and or statements are presented to the panelists from Representatives: Brewster, McCollum and Lantos. 15:00:02 Old footage from Master Number 10968 shows the Sub-Committee Chamber in recess. 15:03:02 New footage shows the Sub-Committee Chamber in recess. 15:28:02 Chairman McCollum brings the Congressional Sub-Committee Chamber back to order. 15:28:23 Congressman Brewster begins his time by asking Agent Jamar the first in a series of question; when was the plan for the second raid was made, and why was April 19th chosen for its' execution date. He replies the plan was designed in late March, and approved on April 17th, but doesn't state why the 19th was selected. Rep. Brewster then asks if the negotiations played an important role during the last days of the siege. Agent Jamar replies yes, because negotiators were still looking for a sign that Koresh would surrender. Congressman Brewster then asks Agent Jamar how much food Koresh had stockpiled. He answers enough to last about 2 or 3 years. Agent Jamar is then asked if the FBI used tapes of rabbits being slaughtered as a pressure tactic. He replies yes, and adds that such tactics began on March 22nd. Congressman Brewster then asks what waiting another 10, 20 or 60 days would have lost. Agent Jamar replies that the FBI wanted to retain control of the situation, and asserts to do that they needed to use gas to prevent a breakout or a mass suicide from occurring. Continuing on, Agent Jamar states that as time passed, Koresh's control over the situation increased, and so did his chances for fulfilling his prophecy. Rep. Brewster then states that the Texas Rangers were not too pleased with the way you (Agent Jamar) treated them. He then asks him if he realized their discontent. Agent Jamar replies by stating that the Texas Rangers had legitimate complaints against him, but asserts that he attempted to reconcile the situation as best he could. 15:36:03 Chairman McCollum begins his time by asking Agent Jamar to describe the sanitation conditions inside the compound. He replies by detailing how human waist was disposed of and that there was only one running water tap in the entire compound. Pressing the issue, Congressman McCollum asks if any disease resulted from the conditions. He replies no. Turning then to Agent Sage, Rep. McCollum asks if Koresh's position changed from being god and having to be a martyr to that of only being a messenger from god on, or about, April 14th. He replies yes. Pressing the issue Congressman McCollum asks Agent Sage if he conveyed this development to Mr. Hubbell, or anyone in the Justice Department, prior to April 19th. He replies by detailing the content of his memos drafted for Mr. Hubbell, but fails to directly answer the question. Congressman McCollum repeats the question, and then Agent Sage answers no. Interjecting, Agent Jamar states that the Attorney General was made aware of the offer, and had one of her officers contact a field negotiator about it. Correcting Agent Jamar, Chairman McCollum asserts that the question was, did you personally call Mr. Hubbell, the Attorney General, any at the Justice Department or the White House about the change in Koresh's attitude before the April 19th assault. He replies that he personally never made such a communication. 15:47:16 Congressman Lantos begins his time by stating there have been three primary approaches in these hearings. They are: proving that there is a vast government conspiracy surrounding Waco, identifying the kind and nature of the mistakes that occurred at Waco and connecting Waco to the Jones Town Massacre. He then invites the panelists to comment on the connection Waco has with the Jones Town Massacre. Agent Jamar replies that Waco is another Jones Town, in the sense that, it involved a charismatic leader. Continuing on, he states that Koresh was deeply concerned with having his followers die in his name, but not necessarily he himself dying with them. Mr. Nesner responds that the connection Waco made with Jones Town was often discussed with Koresh during negotiations. Mr. McCarthy replies by telling how a young congressman had flown to Jones Town in an attempt to remedy the situation, and was murdered. Continuing on, he asserts that although that congressman may have provoked the situation, he was not responsible for the deaths that occurred, just like the FBI is not responsible for the deaths that occurred at Waco. Agent Cavanaugn replies by first stating that there are no risk free decisions in negotiations, and then asserts that negotiation strategies need to be strengthened. Continuing on, he states that during the planning of the initial raid, ATF Agents were very concerned about botching the raid and having critics label it another "Jones Town." Mr. Smerick answers by stating that at Waco there was a charismatic leader whose followers were willing to give up their family, children and freedom, therefore, a behavioral parallel connection can be made between Jones Town and Waco. Agent Sage responds by stating he agrees with the other panelists' comments. 15:57:52 Chairman McCollum recesses the Sub-Committee Chamber due to a vote. 15:57:58 The Sub-Committee Chamber is shown in recess. 16:02:08 TIME OUT.