Robert MacNeil in studio, leads into interview with George HW Bush, US Ambassador to United Nations
Sander Vanocur. It s a very difficult technical thing to understand. But I think the best thing for our listeners and for ourselves is for you to explain just what is an issue on this question of the seating of China at this session of the General assembly. George HW Bush, US Ambassador to United Nations. What really is at issue is that. Well let s start with what s not an issue. What s not at issue is the seating of the People s Republic of China, Peking. Because our resolutions suggests that Peking should be affirmed representation and the Albanian resolution, which is the opposite of the United States policy, says that the People s Republic of China should be affirmed representation. So what s at issue is the question of the expulsion of the Republic of China, Taiwan. And this is the major difference between the Albanian resolution which says expel forthwith the representative of Chiang Kai-shek. And our resolution with definitively affirms continued representation of the Republic of China. So this is the major thing at issue. Now I could go into some detail with you if you re interested on the procedural matters like the important question or the non-expulsion resolution. But I think what most listeners don t understand, most people in our country, is really is the question at stake here is really the expulsion of the Republic of China. Because both our policies, those who oppose us and our many supporters, have offered representation to the People s Republic or what has here been known as Communist China.
Sander Vanocur. But there is disagreement is there not, Mr. Ambassador, on the question of an important question? Or as if you can get that brought before the General Assembly that in effect defeats the Albanian resolution? George HW Bush, US Ambassador to United Nations. Let me explain that because it s complicated. In the UN, under article 18 of the charter, there is a procedural move, which deals with the question of making the expulsion of a country an important question. And if it s deemed to be an important question, it then requires two thirds to become effective. So procedurally, our government, and we move this today, we move to get priority on our resolution that deals with exclusion, expulsion. And then we will vote on that resolution, we hope, and if we re successful, if we get 50% of the vote on this non-expulsion resolution which says kicking out Taiwan, it s more diplomatically phrased, but kicking out Taiwan is an important question, and we get over 50 % that means that to expel them it s going to take two thirds of the vote not 50%. So this is what we re working on and our pattern is to one, get priority on our resolution, this non expulsion resolution. Two, have that non-expulsion resolution carry by 50%, over 50% and at that point the precedent will have been reaffirmed, and this has been a precedent in the UN for a long time that expulsion requires two thirds.
Sander Vanocur. We have heard that many members who are worried about the whole precedent of expulsion and yet they do not want to do anything to offend the People s Republic of China. How do you meet their arguments? George HW Bush, US Ambassador to United Nations. Yes, well let me say that many of our closest allies, take the Scandinavian countries and England and France, are opposed to us on our policy. They don t really want the Republic of China to be kicked out of the UN. But when they establish diplomatic relations with Peking, the quid pro quo, the price that they had to pay to establish diplomatic relations, was recognizing Peking as the sole legitimate government of China. And thus, inherit therein, was voting at the same time to kick the Republic of China out. Now they would sigh a collective sigh of relief if these two entities, these two realities, could get together. And the question of expulsion would be laid aside because of agreement between the parties. But in the absence of that, they are committed to this argument of the Albanian resolution which says that Peking is the sole legitimate government and the others must go out. But our policy is just the opposite. We say look, there are two realities, they have been there for a long time, 20, 25 years. Now each one effectively has governed a certain amount of people. And we re not trying in our resolutions to say who the legitimate government is, or to say that our resolution will solve the problem. All we re trying to do is to stay away from what we think is a very dangerous precedent in the UN. And that s the question of expulsions. So we say both of these are realities. They both ought to be in. This is the fundamental difference we have on this question.
Robert MacNeil. Can I come in there, Mr. Ambassador, I m wondering on that point, both you and Secretary Rogers when he spoke earlier to the assembly have made the point of reassuring those delegations you were attempting to reassure that your proposal did not freeze the situation. George HW Bush, US Ambassador to United Nations. Yes Sir. Robert MacNeil. What is the motive for making that reassurance? George HW Bush, US Ambassador to United Nations. Well I think the question is there s one thing that both of these governments agree on, The People s Republic and the Republic of China, and that is, that there is only one government of China. And so what we re saying is that down the line these things can be worked out. But what we are, the reason we make this assertion is that we don t feel it s the job of the UN to move in and make that determination. What we feel the UN should do is see that there are no dangerous precedent is set at the UN. And the dangerous precedent in our view is expulsion. It s never happened in 25 years of existence going on into the 26th. And so the reason we make this point is because we want, we think we can get support from those who have bilateral relations with Peking. There s nothing in our policy technically that makes one who has bilateral relations with Peking unable to support us. But as I said earlier our allies feel there is, that the quid pro quo was the legitimacy of Peking and inherent therein was the kicking out of Taiwan.
Robert MacNeil. Couldn t that be taken by some people, or interpreted by some people, to mean that the United States would view with some equanimity the disappearance of the Taiwan regime. This merger in some form or another in Communist China. George HW Bush, US Ambassador to United Nations. No, I don t think it should be taken that way at all. What it simply should do is that, how it should be taken, is to say that dealing with the problem here at the UN, given the principle of universality that is receiving widespread endorsement from many members here, we want both of them in. But nothing inherent in this, in our inability or our unwillingness at this point to come to grips with that final determination should mean that we are going to sell out this entity. Just quite to the contrary. The President has reaffirmed that we are not going to let down a friend. That we are not going to in that you can take in the UN or out, and we re struggling to keep them in. But if they go out we re still not going to let them down.
Sander Vanocur. Well that brings the question, Mr. Ambassador, I m sure you re aware of it. Dr. Kissinger is arriving in a couple of days in Peking. It has been assumed that the negotiations, whatever they may lead to between the United States and the People s Republic, will go on as a kind of tacit understanding between both governments. What happens here will not affect directly what will happen there and perhaps it may have sort of brooding presence there. But you had trouble, did you not, a few days ago when it was said in affect the United States was just walking through the steps that it didn t care. George HW Bush, US Ambassador to United Nations. Yes Sir. One of the problems we had from the inception of our policy is this. I think we finally laid it to rest. Our unhelpful friends and we re doing this here at the United Nations, many of them in the UN Secretariat, wanting to see us fail because of a conviction of a policy was wrong or a commitment to another policy. And many of the ambassadors from other countries, wanting to see us fail, kind of built up that the US can t be serious. The US isn t really trying. And that s absolutely absurd. The Secretary Rogers almost killed himself up on these bilaterals trying to make clear our position. Sander Vanocur. And twisted a few elbows too. George HW Bush, US Ambassador to United Nations. Well I wish I could tell quote what General Romulo told me about twisting elbows today but I m afraid it might offend some sensitive ears because it was a beautiful speech.
Robert MacNeil. Mr. Ambassador, as part of that arm twisting it s been reported that Secretary Rogers has been passing on, as a matter of fact or a point of fact, the threats from Senator Buckley and others in Congress to attempt to cut back US funds to the United Nations if Taiwan is expelled. Do you think that there is any reality to that threat? George HW Bush, US Ambassador to United Nations. Well I don t think Secretary Rogers has been doing that. I think what Secretary Rogers has done is try to make as elusively clear as he can. Frankly I reject the contention of arm twisting. I mean a forceful presentation of our views with no threat implied or given should not be, in my view, interpreted as arm twisting. And we re going to make our position as clear and I tried to do it in our speech today. Rogers did it in his up here and in doing it anyone who would listen. But I don t think the Secretary is endeavoring to pass along anything other than the fact that the American people are tremendously concerned about the expulsion of the Republic of China. And I don t consider that a threat. I think that it s just as important that the Albanian view be known here. It s terribly important, in fact, it s more important that the American view be known here, because of our leadership in the world. I don t think there s any implied threat. It s simply an articulate expression forcefully presented for a policy we desperately believe in.
Robert MacNeil. Do you think there s any danger from the Congress or the Senate actually voting to reduce as a result of the expulsion of Taiwan? George HW Bush, US Ambassador to United Nations. I m not going to speculate on it. No matter what I say, even talking about it in the context like this makes me a little goosey frankly, because I find that we re living across on this side of the street, I hope our mission across the street isn t this way, in the darnedest rumor mill in the world. It s unbelievable. I thought the Congress and the Sander Vanocur. Worse than the House of Representatives? George HW Bush, US Ambassador to United Nations. They re much worse. Sandy, you can t, it s amazing. I mean one of the lounge reports from last week, just to give you a little flavor, is the US Ambassadors were seen writing out checks to delegates who are uncommitted on China. Sander Vanocur. But you re the one that can afford it. George HW Bush, US Ambassador to United Nations. And that s a gross exaggeration too.
Robert MacNeil. Mr. Ambassador, how close are you to getting the votes you need. George HW Bush, US Ambassador to United Nations. Very close. Very Close. Robert MacNeil. Are you on the low side of being close or the above side? George HW Bush, US Ambassador to United Nations. I don t know. I m the only one who can t show you a list. I looked at every newspaper I could get while I was upstairs talking with one of my ambassadorial colleagues from a nation that s considered non-committed at this point. And he leaned over to a friend of mine from one of the networks and he said Can I see your list again? I d like very much to know how you have us down. But without going into and everyone has a list. But my view is that it s just so close right this minute that we couldn t say. And yet I ve said from the beginning we re on a winnable proposition and I can see a pattern of votes that if they go our way, we will succeed on priority and important question. And the Albanian resolution would thus be defeated and then we d have a good chance for the DR. But I can t tell you at all in this candor that it s in the bag at this point.
Sander Vanocur. Let s take this question first Mr. Ambassador. I want to follow up with the second question. If you do not defeat the Albanian move, what do you see to be the consequences in terms of the next step in US policy? There s really little you can do about it. George HW Bush, US Ambassador to United Nations. Well if indeed, because if we don t defeat the Albanian resolution that means the important question would have failed. And that means the Albanian resolution, Peking in and Taiwan out, would carry. And that would be the end of the ballgame for all intents and purposes, if it passes, the Albanian resolution passes in its existing form. And at that point we would have lost a heartbreaking battle and we would have taken a very dangerous step in concert with other nations towards expulsion.
Sander Vanocur. Next question following that one. What happens if you win in terms of United States Chinese policy? George HW Bush, US Ambassador to United Nations. Well again the answer to that question is we don t know. We know it's, we simply don t know the answer to that because we know there has been rigidity on the part of the People s Republic of China and to that degree some on the part of the Republic of China. And we can t say, but we would of put up to both of them a formula so fair, so equitable, so just, that they will have to make a very difficult decision. And all we re saying is that s what the UN ought to do.
Sander Vanocur. One further question. There s no question in your mind, what we call rigidity they would call it ideological purity, that the People s Republic will not come in unless it s on their terms. Is there any question in your mind that they may be fudging? George HW Bush, US Ambassador to United Nations. Well it s hard to say we certainly have no evidence of this fact. But you know and I don t want to throw this out as a tantalizer, but one thing I ve learned in my brief diplomatic career is that a position forcefully spelled out may not be the final position. And of course we ve seen this in trying to accommodate and come out with resolutions in the Security Council and elsewhere. But I can t say, you say what s your evidence to accommodate flexibility and I can t tell you that there is any. All I m saying is that in our strongly held view the UN ought to do the decent thing and fair thing. We ve strongly believed this is what our policy is about and let these countries then make these determinations. Robert MacNeil. Mr. Ambassador, Thank you very much.
Robert MacNeil. That s an extraordinarily candid interview for a UN Ambassador wasn t it? I haven t heard anything like that from a UN Ambassador for as long as I can remember. Sander Vanocur. Well, he s an extraordinarily frank man. And he probably was put here for a purpose, Robert. When he was appointed by the President there was criticism because he wasn t a conventional diplomat. But indeed we haven t had conventional diplomats representing us at the UN for some time. We had Adlai Stevenson, Arthur Goldberg, George Bush, these are not the conventional Robert MacNeil. He s much more the conventional politician. Sander Vanocur. Oh, sure. Because they never served in the House of Representatives or on the House Ways and Means Committee. And George Bush, who was a former Congressman from Houston, went to school at the feet of the expert, Wilbur Mills, the chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee. Now unlike here at the UN, down at Ways and Means rarely a vote is taken, chairman Mills rarely moves before he has a consensus. But I suppose he has learned a great deal in that regard, because I suspect he won t move here for a vote unless he knows he has the votes. And that s a very good thing I think to have here. It s good also because if this has to be sold, if it gets very rough here, with members of the House, especially on the Republican side of the aisle, George Bush having come from the club, so to speak, can go back and try another kind of persuasion on them. So you have really here a dual tracking, the work here at the UN on a diplomatic level, and the political side which I suppose is giving Mr. Nixon some problems. I m not sure the problem is as great as some have suggested, but it s a problem nevertheless. So you ve got two tracks that you re trying to cover both.
Robert MacNeil. I find it very hard to believe myself that it could ever come in the Senate to reducing funds to the United Nations because Taiwan is expelled. United Nations stands for so many other things in this country than merely the membership of Taiwan, however emotional and important that is to the American people. Sander Vanocur. I totally agree. But you know in politics, as in everything else in life, there s posturing and there s reality. And indeed the whole thing suggests that there s a myth and there s a reality. There s a myth going on here at the UN and there s the reality going on when Henry Kissinger gets off the plane in Peking on Wednesday. Negotiations go forward, relations improve, but there is a certain structure here, a certain sort of posture that has to be preserved, both by us and both by the People s Republic of China.
Robert MacNeil. It s tempting to think that what we re seeing here on another level is not actually the writing of history in the UN, it s more of a sort of editing of history to make it kind of respectable for our descendants who may see some considerable absurdity and find it very hard to understand why the reality was ignored, why the myth was pursued for so long. Sander Vanocur. Well, I suppose somebody at the end of the century reading a history book about the relationship, this love hate relationship the American people have had with the Chinese people and then these long, cold, 20 years of winter that we ve had in our diplomatic relations will just be astounded. The American people, largely formed by a certain kind on condescension toward the Chinese, were weaned on the idea that these people were our good friends, that they would never desert us. And it took us about 22 years of an emotional jag to get over what happened in 1949. Indeed, it s ironic that Dean Acheson, the man who wrote the white paper, or supervised the white paper that the State Department issued in 1949 saying that there was nothing the United States government could have done to prevent the takeover of the mainland by the Communists should have died less than ten days ago. It s almost as if there a theatrical full circle being played out this week.
Robert MacNeil. Well also I think another part of the belief in the public that sustained the myth for so long, is the conception of Chaing Kai-shek s Kuomintang government as a government that truly represented the Chinese people, that it was a worthwhile government for the Chinese people before it was pushed out by the Communists. And I think most Western mined historians of China just don t support that proposition at all. Sander Vanocur. No, no one did. But in those days, we were looking for scapegoats. Because we couldn t understand in the flush of our victory over the Japanese, and Hitler, the Axis Powers, that we should lose there. And we were in that period where we had to look for scapegoats. We thought we found them. We ruined many man s lives. And no doubt, we set our policy back in that part of the world for years. Because I remember in the early part of the Kennedy administration, rationales being offered for our involvement in Indo China that this was a containment of mainland China. Well here we are, we re winding down the war in Indo China, and we re going toward normalization of relations with the Chinese Communists.