Church Committee Hearings for James Angleton on September 9, 1975
Senator Frank Church (D- Idaho). Mr. Angleton -- well, first of all, Mr. Smothers, do you have any questions at this time? CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, Minority Council. Yes, I do Mr. Chairman. Mr. Angleton, there are two matters I would like to inquire into briefly. First, the process regarding approval for such actions as mail opening; and second, the nature of this working group itself. The chief counsel has just raised the question regarding the statement in the report of the interagency group, and you indicated in response to his question that that may have been put in by the FBI. Is that correct? James Angleton, CIA Counterintelligence. Pardon? CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, Minority Council. With respect to the discontinuance of the covert operation, mail opening, as mentioned in that report, you theorized, in response to Mr. Schwarz's question, that that may have been a statement put in by the FBI. To the best of your knowledge, didn't the FBI do most of the drafting on this report? James Angleton, CIA Counterintelligence. The FBI, as I recall it, collected the opinions after each meeting of the participating agencies and appeared at the next meeting with minutes and a draft of the previous session. CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, Minority Council. All right. With respect to the question then of mail opening, is it your experience that this kind of operation by the CIA would have been discussed in interagency working group meetings among persons who would otherwise have been uninformed of such operations? James Angleton, CIA Counterintelligence. I apologize but I am not hearing you very well. CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, Minority Council. With respect to the operation such as mail opening, is it your opinon that the CIA would have discussed such projects in working group meetings of persons from other agencies not otherwise privy to such operations? James Angleton, CIA Counterintelligence.. No. We would not raise such an operation. CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, Minority Council. . In the normal course of things, would there have been an approval channel other than such interagency groups for securing Presidential advice and consent to such operations ? James Angleton, CIA Counterintelligence. I am not aware of any other channel. CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, Minority Council. Would such channels as the Special Group or the Intelligence Board have been a proper place for such matters to be raised ? James Angleton, CIA Counterintelligence. I do not believe that an operation of this sensitivity would have been raised in any body. It would have been if there was going to be submission for Presidential approval, it would have been raised either by the Director of the FBI or the Director of Central Intelligence. CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, Minority Council. But in any event, it would not have been raised with this working group involved with the Huston plan? James Angleton, CIA Counterintelligence. That is correct. That is correct.
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, Minority Council. Mr. Angleton, if we could turn for a moment to the process resulting in the Huston plan itself. I would like to take you back to your testimony before the staff of this committee on the 12th of September. At that time, you were asked about the involvement of Mr. Tom Charles Huston in the development of this plan. I would like to read to you from page 16 of your transcript and ask you if it accurately reflects your comments at that time. Mr. Loch Johnson is doing the questioning, and his question to you is : Do you think that Tom Charles Huston viewed himself as a potential arbiter for domestic intelligence disagreements within the community? Your response : I think he did because his short letter of instructions to the heads of the intelligence community said that his role was to be what Dr. Kissinger's was in foreign policy. It was a very clear-cut edict, so to speak, that he was the ultimate authority in the Executive for domestic security. Mr. Angleton, is that statement still true ? James Angleton, CIA Counterintelligence. I m sorry sir. I do not know the text of that statement. CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, Minority Council. We re beginning on page 16 on the transcript from the 12th of September. James Angleton, CIA Counterintelligence. May I have your question again please? CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, Minority Council. Have you looked at your comments, there on the bottom of page 16 and extended onto the top of page 17. James Angleton, CIA Counterintelligence. I have. I have. CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, Minority Council. Does that accurately reflect your testimony on the 12th of September? James Angleton, CIA Counterintelligence. I think it does. I could expand on it, but I think that is quite accurate. CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, Minority Council. But that response then is still true? You still believe it to be true? James Angleton, CIA Counterintelligence. I believe it very much so and that particularly after listening to Mr. Huston yesterday.
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, Minority Council. Let me then raise with you another question regarding Mr. Huston's role. If you would, counsel, turn to page 24 of the same transcript. Mr. Angleton, the question is raised as to whether Mr. Huston was in fact the White House authority, but in addition as to whether he was competent to manage such a group as the one that was involved in the preparation of the Huston plan.If you would turn to the last Angleton statement on page 24, let me read into the record your comment at that time and ask if that still represents your view. Talking about his experience in the intelligence area, he was very knowledgeable. He had obviously gone into this matter at some length prior to the meeting. He knew prescisely what none of us really knew, that is the depths of the White House concern. In fact, the most dramatic moment, I think, was at the beginning of one meeting. At some stage in the meetings after preliminary draft had been put forward, he found it totally unacceptable, and his comments were to the effect that the subcommittee was not being responsive to the President's needs. Does that accurately reflect your comments? James Angleton, CIA Counterintelligence. It does indeed. I think it is almost a direct quotation as it relates to his insistence, after one of the sessions. He began the next session with the statement to the effect that the committee was not responding the drafting committee was not responding to the President's requests and was not responsive to it.
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, Minority Council. Then let me ask a final question. Was there any doubt in your mind during the period of these meetings, that your task was to respond to the White House s bidding and that the message regarding the desires of the White House was being brought by Tom Charles Huston? James Angleton, CIA Counterintelligence. I m sorry the last part I missed. CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, Minority Council. During the course of the meetings of this interagency intelligence group, was there any doubt in your mind that your purpose was to respond to the White House's bidding and that the message regarding the desires of the White House was being brought by Tom Charles Huston ? James Angleton, CIA Counterintelligence. There was no question in my mind, nor in the minds of others, that he represented the Commander in Chief in terms of bringing together this plan. He certainly never qualified what his authority was. He made it very clear, and he submitted in writing that he was to have this role for domestic intelligence comparable to Dr. Kissinger's role in foreign affairs. CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, Minority Council. Thank you, Mr. Angleton. Mr. Chairman, I have nothing further.