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Watergate Impeachment Hearings House Judiciary Committee, July 26, 1974. Vote on motion to strike paragraph I of the Sarbanes substitute.
05.11 Charles Sandman (R New Jersey). Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded roll call. Peter Rodino (D New Jersey). The gentleman from New Jersey demands a roll call vote and he clerk will call the roll. All those in favor of the motion say aye. All those opposed, no. The clerk will call the roll. The Clerk. Mr. Donohue. Harold Donohue (D Massachusetts). No. The Clerk. Mr. Brooks. Jack Brooks (D Texas). No. The Clerk. Mr. Kastenmeier. Robert Kastenmeier (D Wisconsin). No. The Clerk. Mr. Edwards. Don Edwards. (D California). No. The Clerk. Mr. Hungate. William Hungate (D Missouri). No. The Clerk. Mr. Conyers. John Conyers (D Michigan). No. The Clerk. Mr. Eilberg. Joshua Eilberg (D Pennsylvania). No. The Clerk. Mr. Waldie. Jerome Waldie (D California). No. The Clerk. Mr. Flowers. Walter Flowers (D Alabama). No. The Clerk. Mr. Mann. James Mann (D South Carolina). No. The Clerk. Mr. Sarbanes. Paul Sarbanes (D Maryland). No. The Clerk. Mr. Seiberling. John Seiberling (D Ohio). No. The Clerk. Mr. Danielson. George Danielson (D California). No. The Clerk. Mr. Drinan. Robert Drinan (D Massachusetts). No. The Clerk. Mr. Rangel. Charles Rangel (D New York). No. The Clerk. Ms. Jordan. Barbara Jordan (D Texas). No. The Clerk. Mr. Thornton. Ray Thornton (D New York). No. The Clerk. Ms. Holtzman. Elizabeth Holtzman (D New York). No. The Clerk. Mr. Owens. Wayne Owens (D Utah). No. The Clerk. Mr. Mezvinsky. Edward Mezvinsky (D Iowa). No. The Clerk. Mr. Hutchinson. Edward Hutchinson (R Michigan). Aye. The Clerk. Mr. McClory. Robert McClory (D Iowa). Aye. The Clerk. Mr. Smith. Henry Smith III (R New York). No. The Clerk. Mr. Sandman. Charles Sandman Jr. (R New Jersey). Aye. The Clerk. Mr. Railsback. Tom Railsback (R Illinois). No. The Clerk. Mr. Wiggins. Charles Wiggins (R California). Aye. The Clerk. Mr. DENNIS. David Dennis (R Indiana). Aye. The Clerk. Mr. Fish. Hamilton Fish Jr. (R New York). No. The Clerk. Mr. Mayne. Wiley Mayne (R Iowa). Aye. The Clerk. Mr. Hogan. Lawrence Hogan (R Maryland). No. The Clerk. Mr. Butler. Caldwell Butler (R Virginia). No. The Clerk. Mr. Cohen. William Cohen (R Maine). No. The Clerk. Mr. Lott. Trent Lott (R Mississippi). Aye. The Clerk. Mr. Froehlich. Harold Froehlich (R Wisconsin). Aye. The Clerk. Mr. Moorhead. Carlos Moorhead (R California). Aye. The Clerk. Mr. Maraziti. Joseph Maraziti (R New Jersey). Aye. The Clerk. Mr. Latta. Delbert Latta (R Ohio). Aye. The Clerk. Mr. Rodino. Peter Rodino (D New Jersey). No.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 28, 1973
[00.13.18-Sen. WEICKER continues to air a great deal of dirt on the White House plans to discredit the ERVIN COMMITTEE.] Senator WEICKER. Well. now, Mr. Dean, I am going to go through a chronology of events because the thing that worries me, I suppose, more than anything else about these hearings is that people say these things happened in 1970, they happened in 1971. they happened in 1972, but it is 1973, and these are matters that were back then, they involve people that existed back then, and so it is now my intention to go through a chronology of something that affects this committee. Already having tried to establish somewhat as to what was being done to the credibility of this particular witness, we have your statement on the La Costa meeting, which is February 10 to 11 of 1973. Around March 26 or March 27, I indicated by press statements that I thought the Watergate conspiracy went beyond those seven persons engaged in the actual break-in. This was done in a, statement to the press outside my office and also in an interview with UPI. That was on the 26th and 27th of March. [00.14.57] Now I intend, Mr., Chairman, to read a taped telephone conversation between Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Kleindienst on the 28th of March, taped by Mr. Ehrlichman and in the possession of the committee. Mr. DASH. Senator Weicker, we might identify -it as having been submitted under subpena by Mr. Ehrlichman to this committee. Senator WIECKER. Thank you very much, Mr. Dash. [Reading] EHRLICHMAN. The President wanted me to cover with you. Are you on an outside line? KLEINDIENST I'm at my parents' house. EHRLICHMAN. Oh, fine, OK, so it's a direct line? Number one, he wanted me to ask you those two things that I did yesterday about the grand jury and about Baker. He had me call Pat Gray and have Pat contact Lowell Weicker to ask about this second story that he put out yesterday to the, effect that that he had information about White House involvement, And Weicker told Gray that he was talking there about political sabotage and not about the Watergate. KLEINDIENST. About the Segretti case? EHRLICHMAN. Yeah, and that he was quite vague with Pat as to what he had, KLEINDIENST. I called him also, you know, -after I talked to the President on Monday. EHRLICHMAN. Well, the President's feeling is that it wouldn't be too bad for YOU in your press conferences in the next couple of days to take a swing at that [putting in my own parentheses, that is me. Now I get back on the record] and just say we contacted the Senator because we continue to exercise diligence in this thing and we're determined to track down every lead and it turns out he doesn't have anything--- KLEINDIENST. I would really at this delicate point question the advisability of provoking, you know, a confrontation with Weicker. He is essentially with us, he and Baker get -along good. EHRLICHMAN. Is he? KLEINDIENST. [and as soon as I make this statement I intend to interrupt with my own comment] Baker has had a long talk with him and told him to shut up and said that he would-- [Laughter] [00.17.37] Senator WEICKER. Now, this is serious business, it is not a time for wisecracks, it is a time for everybody to be telling the truth and to be telling it hard, and I don't think there is any question--Howard at times you and I don't agree--but Howard Baker has never in any manner shape, or form, directly or indirectly ever told Senator Weicker to shut up, and I am going to put that one right out on the record. I think that--- [LAUGHTER.] Senator BAKER. It is indeed a serious moment but I cannot overlook the presumptuousness of a man who is five feet seven telling a six-foot-sixer to shut, up. [Laughter.] Senator WEICKER. Thank you. "And I talked with him"--I will just Start over again. "Baker has had a long talk with him," We are now back, this is Kleindienst speaking, talking: "I talked with him on Sunday after he said he didn't have anything but he's kind of an excitable kid and we just might not want to alienate him and I think that if he finds himself in a direct word battle with the White House and me and loses face about it I think in the long run we might need that guy's vote. [00.19.15]
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 29, 1973 (1/2)
[00.28.12-Sen. ERVIN has just finished reading a newspaper clipping that stated that ERVIN'S integrity was impeccable, in response to DEAN'S testimony that H.R. HALDEMAN wanted someone to dig up dirt on ERVIN] Senator ERVIN. I am deeply grateful for that compliment. [Applause]. [00.28.21-MORE ERVIN HUMOR!!!] And furthermore [laughter] when I was asked about, this I said it did not disturb me at all and I deeply regretted to say that all the indiscretions I had committed were barred by the statute of limitations and lapse of time. [Laughter.] And that I had lost my capacity to commit further indiscretions. [Applause and laughter.] Senator INOUYE. You are not that old. [00.29.01-Senator ERVIN gives a pithy rebuttal to those who question the Committee's purpose.] Senator ERVIN. This article states that, Secretary Butz went down to North Carolina and made some Uncomplimentary remarks about me in connection -with this investigation, saying I should call it off, as if it is my investigation rather than the Senate's And I was called and asked if I had any comments on Secretary Butz' statement and I said, "only one, and that was if the Secretary would come down before the committee and testify on his oath and on his personal knowledge that the Watergate affair had never happened, I would be the happiest man in the United States." [Laughter] The committee will stand in recess until 2 o'clock. [00.29.46-Senators stand for recess, reporters move into action-LEHRER v.o. states that ERVIN has ended the morning with another touch of SOUTHERN HUMOR] [00.29.52-LEHRER] LEHRER states that in a moment the "grilling" of DEAN will continue. [PBS network ID-title screen "SENATE HEARINGS ON CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES"] [00.33.19-LEHRER] LEHRER states that as the committee reconvenes, ERVIN has another question about the White House ENEMIES LIST [00.33.27]
Watergate Impeachment Hearings House Judiciary Committee, July 29, 1974. Carlos Moorhead (R - Calfornia).
Peter Rodino (D - New Jersey). The gentleman from California, Mr. Moorhead, is recognized. Carlos Moorhead (R California). Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, one thing certainly must be clear by now to everyone in America and that is certainly the President of the United States is not so all powerful under any circumstances that he can t be examined one way or the other for his acts. And if necessary be removed from office. I don t believe that any man in the history of this world has ever been examined as thoroughly as this President Richard Nixon. I don t know of anyone who has ever had $25 million of federal money spent on various investigations over a period of 2 years time. Many, many more millions of dollars by other private agencies. Everything that Mr. Nixon possibly could have done wrong surely has been uncovered by this time. And yet, you look at the evidence that is brought to us here today and it almost seems pathetic that $25 million brought in so very little.
Watergate Impeachment Hearings House Judiciary Committee, July 29, 1974. Wayne Owens (D - Utah).
Peter Rodino (D New Jersey). I recognize the gentleman from Utah, Mr. Owens. Wayne Owens (D Utah). Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Article I of impeachment focused on many instances of one the immense abuse, the coverup of the Watergate break-in. In contrast, Article 11 is a collection of separate individual very serious abuses of the power of the Presidency. These are charges that the President used his power or knowingly permitted his power to be used to do something unconstitutional, illegal, immoral, or to do something legal but for important political or nonlegitimate purposes. This is not a grab bag of Presidential actions which a majority of the committee thinks is unwise or bad or contrary to our national interest. These are what they must be to be impeachable, acts which would be clear violations of the standards of conduct for any President. Violations which are so grave and are such an abuse of the Presidential trust that the public well-being requires that they be corrected.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 28, 1973 (1/2)
[00.02.00-NPACT letters on black screen-shot of John DEAN testifying; DEAN under questioning from Sen. ERVIN, denies the White House claim that the PRESIDENT desired to make the facts of Watergate be known: "I must testify to the contrary... Mr. Haldeman's specific instructions to me... and the subsequent meetings... quite the contrary intention] [00.03.37-title sequence-image of page bearing text of Senate Resolution 60, Robert MacNEILL v.o. reads Resolution-title screen 'SENATE HEARINGS ON CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES'] [00.04.18-MacNEILL in studio, b/w headshot of DEAN projected behind MacNEILL] MacNEILL states that DEAN has weathered his fourth day of testimony, and answered questions directly from the White House, which did not shake his claim that NIXON, HALDEMAN, and EHRLICHMAN were fully aware of the COVERUP [headshots of each principal in turn shown behind MacNEILL] MacNEILL states that the WHITE HOUSE contended that DEAN, Jeb MAGRUDER, and John MITCHELL "were the villains". However, after an hour of the WHITE HOUSE questions, the committee members tended to reinforce and strengthen today's testimony. States that there was a dramatic sidelight today, when Sen. Lowell WEICKER (R-CT) charged that the White House had attempted to discredit WEICKER and interfere with the committee, and that WEICKER said he had complained to Special Prosecutor Archibald COX about the incidents, prompting Senator Howard BAKER to announce that the committee's jurisdiction would expand to include investigation of any attempts to interfere with the committee's work, However, the main point of the day was that DEAN remained a calm, cool, and determined witness. [00.05.20-Jim LEHRER] LEHRER states that after listening to DEAN for four days and questioning him for more than an hour, Sen. BAKER has decided that the committee needs more information, and that such information must come from the White House. BAKER discussed this with NPACT reporter Peter KAYE. [00.05.36-BAKER in empty committee room, interviewed by KAYE] BAKER states that the record won't be complete without more information from the WHITE HOUSE, but it depends on which people are involved how the information will be obtained. States that his questioning of DEAN that day was an attempt to establish a framework to obtain evidence to answer the crucial question "WHAT did the PRESIDENT know and when did he know it?" DEAN'S response to those questions will help to frame the information obtained by other witnesses. It is significant that many incidents that are material in DEAN'S testimony, i.e. September 15, 1972, are meetings at which only DEAN and the PRESIDENT, and in one case, Mr. HALDEMAN, were present. States that to make a complete assessment, the committee needs testimony from these meetings, but he can't conceive of any way that the committee can get the information from the PRESIDENT. [***note: taping system not yet revealed to Prosecutors] BAKER states the ambiguous hope that the committee can get the testimony, although it can't compel it. [00.06.59-LEHRER] LEHRER states that there will be more from KAYE'S interview with BAKER at the end of the broadcast. [00.07.08-MacNEILL] MacNEILL states that the senators, in the fourth day with DEAN, went over much old ground, but did raise new questions about the President today. [00.07.19-to side view of committee table, ERVIN at center, MacNEILL v.o. gives hourly summary of the testimony] [00.08.50-Sen. INOUYE]
Impeachment Hearings. House Judiciary Committee, July 30, 1974. Statement of Representative Walter Flowers
Secondly then, we have not elevated this to the level of an impeachable, offense by either going to the House Floor or going to the courts, as my colleague from Illinois, Mr. Railsback, suggested. In this particular, you might argue that we are putting the cart before the horse. I think as my colleague from Arkansas has suggested, it would be better placed in either Article I or Article II that we have already voted on. I probably would oppose it as an inclusion, but it would certainly more likely lie in one of those articles.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 25, 1973
[00.02.00-in to DEAN testifying about efforts to involve the CIA in the coverup, vis a vis claiming national security interests to withhold documents pertaining to the work of Howard HUNT] Mr. DEAN---- I reported this to Ehrlichman and he. told me that he thought that the CIA ought to get all of the material back and that no card should be left. in the file and that national security grounds should be used to withhold release of the information. On February 9, 1973. I spoke with Director Schlesinger of the CIA and asked him. if it. would be possible to retrieve the material that had been sent to the Department of Justice in connection with the Watergate investigation. I told him that I had discussed this with the Department of Justice and they indicated that they would merely leave a card in their files Indicating that, the material had been returned to the CIA. I subsequently had a visit from General Walters in late February at which time he, told me that. the CIA was opposed to retrieving Material and leaving a card indicating that they had so retrieved It because they also had been requested by the Senate not to destroy any material; relating to the case. I told Walters that I did not suggest that the material be, destroyed: rather I thought that national security grounds might justify withholding release of the information to Senate investigators. He said it, simply could not, be, done and I dropped the matter. [00.03.22] As I 'will explain later in a meeting with Mr. Krogh. the fact that this material was in the possession of the Department of Justice meant to me that, it was inevitable that, the burglary of Ellsberg's psychiatrist office would be discovered. I felt that, any, investigation worth its salt -would certainly be able to look at the pictures in the files at the Department of Justice and immediately determine the location and from there discover the fact that there had been a burglary of the office that was in the picture. I would now like to turn to the White House plan for dealing with this committee. [00.03.50] WHITE HOUSE PLAN FOR PERPETUATING THE COVERUP THROUGHOUT THE SENATE WATERGATE INVESTIGATION Even before the Watergate criminal trial in January of this year, there had been press reports and rumors that the Senate planned independent hearings on the Watergate and related matter. The White House Congressional Relations Staff reported that the subject of the Watergate hearings was being discussed in the Senate Democratic, Policy Committee, but they did not know the substance of those discussions. I was aware of the interest of Ehrlichman and Haldeman in the prospects of such hearings because they had discussed It, with me, and Bill Timmons told me they had discussed it, with him. On December 13, 1972. Timmons informed me that Senator Jackson was coming to the White House for a meeting with the President. Timmons said that Senator Jackson -was a member of the Senate Democratic Policy Committee and had an excellent rapport with the President. Timmons asked me -what I thought about having the President inquire of Senator Jackson regarding the potential of a Senate inquiry into the Watergate. I responded I thought it was good idea, but -would have to check. Timmons said the, meeting -with Senator Jackson was going to be without staff present, and asked me to draft, a memorandum to the President, raising the issue. I told him I would check with Haldeman, [00.05.06] I prepared a memorandum for the President and went to Haldeman's office, but he was not there, He was in the President's office with Ann Armstrong who was discussing with the President joining the White House, staff. A meeting had been scheduled in Mr. Haldeman's office at which Ehrlichman, Moore. Ziegler, and I were to attend. When Ehrlichman came to Haldeman's office for the meeting I raised the matter of the President's asking Senator Jackson about the hearings because I did not have authority to send memorandums directly to the President. Ehrlichman thought it, was a good idea, so I walked the memorandum down to Alex Butterfield to take to the President before the meeting. I have submitted to the committee a copy of the memorandum. Mr. DEAN. when Haldeman returned to his office with Mrs. Armstrong, Ehrlichman, and I were in his office waiting. But he asked us to leave and proceed with the meeting in Ziegler's office where Moore and Ziegler were waiting. I have referred earlier to the substance of this meeting of December 13 in discussing the proposed written Dean report. Ehrlichman returned to his office and Haldeman later came to the meeting and told me that he had blocked the memorandum regarding the Watergate inquiry from going to the President. He, in fact, had the original memorandum with him and had drawn a line through it. I told him that Timmons had suggested it and that Ehrlichman had also approved it. He said he had not known that, and made a notation on the memorandum to the President and immediately sent it back to Butterfield to give to the President. I learned that, day from Timmons, -who later met with Senator Jackson, that the Senator did not, know what the Senate, Democratic Policy Committee was going to do about the Watergate. I do not know if the President discussed this subject with Senator Jackson, [00.06.58] Timmons continued to report to Haldeman and me, that there were rumblings on the. Hill that the Senate. was going to proceed with hearings, Senator Kennedy's Subcommittee on Administrative Practices and Procedures had been conducting an investigation for several months, but it was uncertain as to whether they would proceed. [00.07.15]
Watergate Impeachment Hearings House Judiciary Committee, July 29, 1974. Elizabeth Holtzman (D - New York).
Peter Rodino (D New Jersey). I recognize the gentlelady from New York, Ms. Holtzman. Elizabeth Holtzman (D New York). Thank you, Mr. Chairman. A question has been raised tonight, what are the rights of the President? And I think we have to confront what his duties are. And he takes an oath, a solemn oath, to defend and protect the Constitution of the United States to the best of his ability. The Preamble of this Constitution says, "We, the people of the United States... to secure the blessings of liberty," and that is our precious heritage. And what has this President done as this committee has examined? We have seen the President has engaged in a course of conduct in which the ends justify the means. And in which the "blessings of liberty" have been trampled to our disgrace.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 27, 1973 (1/2)
[00.30.46-Sen. INOUYE continues to read the memo accusing DEAN of masterminding WATERGATE and the COVERUP] Senator INOUYE. [QUOTING W.H. MEMO] "It -was Dean who was the agent in some of the money dealings with the arrested persons." Mr. DEAN. Would you repeat that, please, Senator? Senator INOUYE. "It was Dean who -was the agent in some of the money dealings with arrested persons." Mr. DEAN. I never had any direct dealings with any of the arrested persons. I conveyed messages back of the pressure that was being placed, not only on the reelection committee, but ultimately on the White House, particularly the one that, came to my attention -where a threat had been delivered directly to me of concern to Mr. Ehrlichman. I think I testified that Mr. Ehrlichman raised that immediately with Mr. Mitchell when Mr. Mitchell did attend a meeting in Mr. Ehrlichman's presence. Senator INOUYE. Did you have any dealings with arrested persons? Mr. DEAN. Direct dealings? I had a telephone conversation, the telephone conversations I have discussed -with Mr. Liddy, the meeting I had with Mr. Liddy. I have never met Mr. Hunt other than the meeting one occasion I referred to when he was in Mr. Colson's outer office in August of 1971, which is 'roughly the time, I recall meeting him, after having seen him in there on a number of occasions, I have never met any other individuals. Senator INOUYE. Did you in fact discuss money with Mr. Liddy? Mr. DEAN. Mr. Liddy at the time I called him--this was in January, I believe, it was January 5 of this Par. He had been trying to reach Mr. Krogh. He had received a letter from the Senate Commerce Committee investigators and they were seeking responses from Mr. Liddy regarding Mr. Krogh. Liddy then called Krogh, Krogh did not take the call. That is one of the documents that -was not submitted, which I -have submitted to the committee,, the gist of the call that was returned to Liddy. I had a, report subsequently that Mr. Liddy was rather miffed and a little outraged at the fact that he couldn't get hold of who he thought was a good and loyal friend, Mr. Krogh, Mr. Krogh asked me if I would personally do something about that. That Saturday, I called Mr. Liddy just to tell, to convey to him the reasons that Mr. Krogh did not wish to speak with him, because he wanted to testify before the Senate Commerce Committee in connection with his confirmation hearing that he had not, talked With Mr. Liddy. So; I explained this to Mr. Liddy and during the course of that conversation, Mr. Liddy told me, he said he hoped that somebody -would take care, of the, attorneys fees, I reported to -Mr. Liddy that I -would pass that message, along. [00.33.30] Senator INOUYE. [QUOTING W.H. MEMO.] "It was Dean who told Colson not to make a transcript of Colson's taped conversation with Hunt and said that he, Dean, would handle the matter." This is a report from the Federal prosecutors, reported in the 'New York Times. Mr. DEAN. That is not correct. To the contrary, I made a transcript of Mr. Colson's telephone conversation on a cassette tape shortly after Mr. Colson brought me his IBM tape of the, conversation. I took a copy of that and played it for Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman at Camp David on November 15. Later that afternoon, after getting instructions that I should raise this with Mr. Mitchell, that he should take care of the problem for Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman, I took it to New York with me and played it for Mr. Mitchell as well. I got no instruction at that point in time from Mr. Mitchell. Senator INOUYE. Where is the tape? Mr. DEAN. It has been turned over--the committee has a copy of the transcript of the conversation . Senator INOUYE. I do not know if they have the tape or not. Mr. DASH. Senator Inouye, we do not have the tape, I am assuming the prosecutors have it. We have a transcript of the tape'. [00.34.44] Senator INOUYE. [QUOTING W.H. MEMO] "Throughout all of this, Dean was perfectly situated to mastermind and to carry out a coverup since, as counsel to the President and the man in charge for the White House, he had full access to what was happening in the investigation. He sat in on FBI interviews with White House witnesses and received investigative reports. Dean and Ehrlichman met with Attorney General Kleindienst late in July. The Attorney General described the investigation and said that it did not appear that any White House people or any high-ranking committee people were involved in the preparation or planning or discussion of the break-in.'" This is from Mr. Ehrlichman. [00.35.26] Mr. DEAN. Senator, if I just might add one point. I do not know if the committee has a copy of the cassette that I prepared based on Mr. Colson's tape. I do have that In my possession and will be happy to turn that over to the, committee. Mr. DASH. We, do not have it. Mr. DEAN. YOU do not have that? All right. On the other comment you made regarding the Attorney General's public statements. I never discussed with Mr. Kleindienst the coverup that was going on at the White House and the investigation I am sure he is referring to there was his own conclusion. [00.36.10]
House Subcommittee Shreddergate Investigation
Committee Chairman U.S. Representative James J. Howard (D-NJ) questions EPA Chief of Staff John Daniel at Public Works and Transportation Committee hearing on the shredding of public documents carried out by the EPA (Environmental Protection Agency); Howard asks Daniel when he first knew of the shredders, if it was on Thursday or Tuesday; U.S. Representative Gus Savage (D-IL) sleeps in his chair. Daniel says that on Tuesday, staff of a different Congressional Committee asked him if there was a shredder in the office of EPA Assistant Administrator Rita Lavelle and what was being done to secure records in Lavelle’s office, saying he advised them that those records had been secured. Rep Howard asks if Daniel ascertained the next day, according to newspapers, that there was no shredder in Lavelle’s office; Daniel says he did not know of shredders in other offices until Thursday of last week. Howard asks Daniel how he ascertained of the shredders; Daniel says on Tuesday he did inquire of the files in Lavelle’s office, was ensured documents sequestered by the EPA Inspector General and being inventoried by persons under the Inspector General’s supervision. Daniel adds he asked if she was a shredder in Lavelle’s office and was told that there was not. Howard asks Daniel if he later found out that there was shredder in Lavelle’s suite of offices; Daniel says there had never been a shredder to his knowledge. Howard comments that all the Committee has to go on is what has been said in the press. U.S. Rep. Robert Young (D-MO) asks for a timeline of all of the events in question. U.S. Rep. Gene Snyder (R-KY) says the majority side of the Committee (Democrats) make copies of the minority’s timeline.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 25, 1973
[00.35.22-DEAN discusses WHITE HOUSE efforts to court Sen. BAKER prior to the start of the ERVIN COMMITTEE hearings] Also, Senator Baker told the President that he wanted his contact Point, to be, Mr. Kleindienst, rather than someone on the White House staff. Haldeman told me that, Senator Baker, had urged The President to waive executive privilege and send members of the White Staff to the hearings quickly as possible, but the President had told Senator Baker that he I he was going to hold the line at written interrogatories. I was told that both the President and Senator Baker had discussed that there should be an effort to get, the, hearings over as quickly as Possible. This report of the meeting which Haldeman gave, me was later confirmed In discussions I had with the President myself in early March of this year. [00.36.03-WHITE HOUSE desire to push Atty. Gen. KLEINDIENST to fix up the case] On February 22, Mr. Haldeman requested that I prepare a briefing paper for the President's meeting that day -with Attorney General Kleindienst. Throughout the Watergate investigation Haldeman and particularly Ehrlichman had complained about Mr. Kleindienst's passive role in the investigation and prosecution. Haldeman and Ehrlichman were both aware of the strained relationship between Kleindienst and the White House. I knew that Ehrlichman was riding hard on the Justice Department in an effort to undermine Mr. Kleindienst. I also knew from conversations with Kleindienst that he had little. affection for Mr. Ehrlichman. The Senate Watergate hearings presented the real possibility of the Justice Department having to make further criminal investigations that would lead back to the White House. [00.36.45] Accordingly, the President was the only one who could bring Mr. Kleindienst back in the family to protect the White House and this meeting was designed to do just that. As a result, of Senator Baker's request that Kleindienst be his contact point, the President had a perfect vehicle to solicit Kleindienst's assistance during the hearings and if anything should develop during the hearings to not let all hell break loose in a subsequent investigation. I have submitted to the committee a copy of the briefing paper I was requested to prepare. I know that this document went to the President because just, before the meeting was to occur. I realized that the President might not understand The reference to the fact that Kleindienst was considering one particularly attractive offer from a law firm that he was likely to accept, I called Haldeman to explain this, but Haldeman said the paper had gone in and the President would understand that this was a reference to Governor Connally's law firm because Governor Connally had dismissed it with the President. The, President subsequently discussed this meeting with me in early March. He told me that he would continue to call Mr. Kleindienst from time to time, but, I should also make certain that Kleindienst was working closely with Senator Baker in preparation for the he Select Committee hearings. As I mentioned earlier. I had also been informed that the President had made a decision that Magruder could not return to the White House. Magruder had been working at the inaugural committee and even before the inauguration he told me that he had called Mr. Higby requesting a meeting with Haldeman to discuss his future. After the inauguration. Magruder told me that he had to decide what he was going to do. Prior to that meeting I had informed Haldeman that Mr. O'Brien had had some discussions with Magruder and that Magruder had indicated that Haldeman and Colson were very much involved in the planning and approval of 'he Liddy operation. After Magruder met with Haldeman in late, January 1973, 1 had occasion to see him in the hall of the EOB, He told me that he had talked -with Haldeman and Mitchell about running for office In California and -was planning a trip to California to test the, water. He said now was the time, because he felt he could get good financial backing I felt Magruder was in for some serious problems both before the grand jury and the Senate, hearings, but -without saying this to him, I tried to dissuade him from running for office until this entire matter had been resolved. Shortly after this conversation with Magruder I phoned Haldeman and told him that I thought Magruder was making a mistake in going to California in pursuit of an elected office. Haldeman agreed and said he was going to call Bob Finch and suggest that when Magruder met with him, Finch, that he be dissuaded. He asked me to call Kalmbach and make a similar suggestion, which I did, and Kalmbach said he would do it. After Magruder returned from California he, had decided that he wanted to stay in Washington. He was pushing hard to return to the White House staff, -and work on the, Bicentennial program, No one had the heart to tell -Magruder that the President had said had said that he could not return to the White House staff. [00.40.04-Alleged authorization/pressure from HALDEMAN/NIXON for MAGRUDER to approve NIXON plan, with a push to keep MAGRUDER quiet.] It -was during this period of time, which I believe was mid-February, Magruder had a conversation with Mr. O'Brien, in -which he told O'Brien that, he had received his final authorization for Liddy's activities from Gordon Strachan and that Strachan had reported that Haldeman -had cleared the, matter with the President. I reported this to Haldeman., -who expressed concern over Magruder's statement. After I reported this information. the White House efforts to find a Job for Magruder became intense. [00.40.35]
Watergate Impeachment Hearings House Judiciary Committee, July 29, 1974. Carlos Moorhead (R - Calfornia).
Carlos Moorhead (R California). There has been a suggestion that perhaps the IRS was used to help friends. Well, certain people, evidently a few of them, had come to the people in the White House and said that they were being harassed by the IRS. I wonder how many Congressmen have had people come to them and say that they were being harassed by some agency of the Federal Government. These were checked into by a simple request what s happening? This was the testimony that we have. There was no special Consideration given. There was no evidence of any pressure put on these people. What kind of a count for impeachment is that?
Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 24, 1974 Robert Kastenmeier Statement
I would also say that as the general debate progresses and as the articles of impeachment are offered and debated the specifics of the case against the President hopefully will emerge. But even then in the several days and under the procedural limitations we cannot hope to treat very much of the mass of evidence we have considered over these many months. However, the public is aware that these materials are now released publically. Television, radio, newspapers, and news magazines have attempted to communicate what this mass evidence means and while we here will have but a few hours of your attention in terms of the discussion of the implications of it, the public release of the materials should help the public even more.
Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 24, 1974 Robert Kastenmeier Statement
Mr. Chairman we have labored long and hard in effort for it to be fair to the President and to those among us who must sit in judgment but may not share common views. We now decide how to vote for or against impeachment. It is not our duty to attempt to assess whether Mr. Nixon committed common crimes. That is a determination which must ultimately rest elsewhere. In my own case, my decision has been made. I have concluded after careful consideration of all the evidence that President Nixon must be impeached and removed from office. I say this, whatever the record of the administration may be in other fields notwithstanding. This decision was not reached lightly nor was it made out of personal animosity towards the President. The process of impeachment is of drastic undertaking not only for the congress but for the country and cannot be taken causally. I would also have as I have thought many times Mr. Nixon were the leader of my party, if instead Mr. Nixon were instead Mr. Johnson or Mr. Kennedy and had been charged with same offenses could I freely and with as much certainty come to the same conclusion. I have to answer yes.
Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 24, 1974 Robert Kastenmeier Statement
Justice Brandice warned Americans of dangers of official illegality. In the government of laws, he wrote, existence of the government will be imperiled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our government is the potent and omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If government because a law breaker it breeds contempt for the law. It invites every man to become a law unto himself. It invites anarchy.
Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 24, 1974 Robert Kastenmeier Statement
Chairman Peter Rodino (D - New Jersey). The Chair is going to be compelled to recess for a period of time. The Chair will state that the meeting will resume at the call of the Chair but it is necessary that we do recess for a period of time.
Impeachment Hearings. House Judiciary Committee, July 30, 1974. Cambodia Bombing Article of Impeachment.
Peter Rodino (D New Jersey). The committee will be in order. John Conyers (D Michigan). Mr. Chairman? Peter Rodino (D New Jersey). I recognize the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Conyers. John Conyers (D Michigan). I have an article at the desk that has also been distributed to the members. I move it and ask that it be read at this point. Peter Rodino (D New Jersey). The clerk will please read the article. Clerk. In his conduct of the office of President of the United States, Richard M. Nixon in violation of his constitutional oath faithfully to execute the office of President of the United States and, to the best of his ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States and disregard of his constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, on and subsequent to March 17, 1969, authorized ordered and ratified the concealment from the Congress of the facts and the submission to the Congress of false and misleading statements concerning the existence, scope, and nature of American bombing operations in Cambodia in derogation of the power of the Congress to declare war, to make appropriations, and to raise and support armies, and by such conduct warrants impeachment and trial and removal from office.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee Hearings on Presidential Campaign Activities, May 17, 19
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee Hearings on Presidential Campaign Activities, May 17, 1973 - Testimony of Bruce A Kehrli, Special Assistant to the President United States Senate Caucus Room, Washington DC
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 28, 1973. Testimony of John Dean.
Senator Sam Ervin (D North Carolina). Now, returning to Mr. Buzhardt's assertion that the President was desirous, beginning in September, to have all of the facts revealed after the establishment of this committee, will you tell us again what meetings were had in the White House in respect to this committee and who was present? John Dean. With dealing with this committee? Senator Sam Ervin (D North Carolina). Yes. John Dean. With respect to the President or the leading up to that as well? Senator Sam Ervin (D North Carolina). Well, I am particularly interested in the President, since Mr. Buzhardt says he was anxious that all facts be revealed. John Dean. Well, it was when the President was in San Clemente, and I arrived on the, left on the 9th, was out there on the 10th and 11th for meetings. I recall that, February of this year, I recall that Mr. Haldeman departed the meeting once or twice and he finally told the President what we were meeting on while we were out there. We left there and went to, down to La Costa where the meetings proceeded and there we had the remainder of the two days of discussions about how to deal with this committee. During the course of the meetings at one point in time, as I had mentioned earlier, there was an assessment made by Mr. Ehrlichman, there had been disappointment that they had not been able to influence the selection of the committee. There had been disappointment that they had not been able to amend successfully your resolution to put a bipartisan, you know have equal representation between Republicans and Democrats, that the Floor amendments that had been offered had been defeated. Some of these are evidenced in the memorandum from Mr. Haldeman that is in the exhibit I submitted.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 26, 1973 - Testimony of John Dean.
Sam Ervin (D - North Carolina). The committee will come to order. The committee counsel will question the witness Samuel Dash, attorney. Mr. Dean, you stated, did you not, that well before the so-called Liddy plan spelled out in meetings on January 27 and February 4, 1972, that there was an atmosphere in the White House conducive to the bugging and break in of the Democratic National Committee headquarters. Is that true? John Dean. That is correct.
Church Committee Hearings - Tom Charles Huston
Church recognizes Senator WALTER HUDDLESTON, Huddleston asks Huston what he knows about the White House receiving intelligence information from the IRS about political organizations - Huston reponds he had no hand in this information exchange and he speculates that it came indirectly from the IRS through the FBI - Huddleston then gives a short speech in which he says that the IRS passage of information is typical of all the intelligence agency operations the Senate Committee is investigating where top officials deny requesting improper activities and lower rank employees respond that they were just carrying out orders and everyone escapes full accountability
Interview with U.S. House Representative Mary Rose Oakar
Off-screen adult female asks U.S. House Representative Mary Rose Oakar (D-OH) if this was the logical time, as the Social Security system is being reformed, to address women's issues. Rep. Oakar agrees, states that every year she has introduced legislation to address inequities, chairs task force for Aging Committee on Social Security and Women. Oakar credits recommendations by current committee to correct issues with widows and divorcees. They are small issues, but ones that take Social Security reform in right direction. Oakar thinks there needs to be comprehensive reform, states she has gotten some commitments that if temporary reforms are enacted now, comprehensive reform toward correcting Social Security inequities toward women will be revisited. Oakar notes the last budget bill cut $22 billion dollars from Social Security, and women were most affected. Oakar sees budget cuts disproportionately affecting women more financially.
Impeachment Hearings. House Judiciary Committee, July 30, 1974. Statement of Representative William Hungate
When you talk of the separation of powers and the confrontation we face here, I am indebted to another fine Congressman, the late George Andrews from Alabama for my education on this subject that deeply impressed me. We do have three co-equal branches. But as Speaker McCormick used to say, "All Members of the Congress are equal, but some are more equal, than others." I think all branches of government are equal, but some are more equal. You can become President without being elected. We have had some tragic assassinations. Lyndon B. Johnson and Andrew Johnson both became President without being elected. In fact, Andrew was never elected. You can go to the Supreme Court without being elected. You can go to the Senate without being elected. Members serve there and they are never elected. They go back and they are simply appointed. But, you cannot come in the House of Representatives without passing before the People and being elected. And you only serve for 2 years. You had better be close to the people, you had better refresh your mandate. This is the reason why I think the Founding Fathers put the sole power of impeachment in the Congress, the power to impeach the President, in the Congress, the power to impeach the Supreme Court Justices in the Congress, and the ultimate power in the case of confrontation, I submit, should be in the body nearest to the People, closest to the People's control. I submit the House of Representatives is that body, and I cannot acquiesce in agreeing that it is an inferior body, or in making it one now. If we are to simply push papers, there are many paper pushers of independence who will choose to do that elsewhere. I urge approval of Article III.