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Impeachment Hearings House Judiciary Committee, July 25, 1974 Barbara Jordan Statement
Representative Barbara Jordan ( D Texas ) Of the impeachment process, it was Woodrow Wilson who said that nothing short of the grossest offenses against the plain law of land will suffice to give them speed and effectiveness. Indignation so great as to overgrow party interest may secure a conviction, but nothing else can. Commonsense would be revolted if we engaged upon this process for petty reasons. Congress has a lot to do. Appropriations, tax reform, health insurance, campaign finance reform, housing, environmental protection, energy sufficiency, mass transportation. Pettiness cannot be allowed to stand in the face of such overwhelming problems. So today we are not being petty. We are trying to be big because the task we have before us is a big one.
Impeachment Hearings House Judiciary Committee, July 25, 1974 Barbara Jordan Statement
Representative Barbara Jordan ( D Texas ) At this point I would like to juxtapose a few of the impeachment criteria with some of the actions the President has engaged in. Impeachment criteria: James Madison, from the Virginia Ratification Convention. If the President be connected in any suspicious manner with any person and there be grounds to believe that he will shelter him, he may be impeached. We have heard time and time again that the evidence reflects payment to the defendants of money. The President had knowledge that these funds were being paid and that these were funds collected for the 1972 Presidential campaign. We know that the President met with Mr. Henry Petersen 27 times to discuss matters related to Watergate and immediately thereafter met with the very persons who were implicated in the information Mr. Petersen was receiving. The words are, if the President be connected in any suspicious manner any person and there be grounds to believe that he will shelter that person, he may be impeached. Justice Story, Impeachment is intended for occasional and extraordinary cases where a superior power acting for the whole People is put into operation to protect their rights and rescue their liberties from violations. We know about the Huston plan. We know about the break-in of the psychiatrist's office. We know that there were absolute complete direction on September 3rd when the President indicated that a surreptitious entry had been made into Dr. Fielding's office after having met with Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Young.
Impeachment Hearings House Judiciary Committee, July 25, 1974 Barbara Jordan Statement
Representative Barbara Jordan ( D Texas ) Protect their rights. Rescue their liberties from violation. The South Carolina Ratification Convention impeachment criteria: Those are impeachable who behave amiss or betray their public trust. Beginning shortly after the Watergate break-in and continuing to the present time the President has engaged in a series of public statements and actions designed to thwart the lawful investigation by Government prosecutors. Moreover, the President has made public announcements and assertions bearing on the Watergate case which the evidence will show he knew to be false. These assertions, false assertions, impeachable, those who misbehave those who behave amiss or betray their public trust. James Madison again at the Constitutional Convention: President is impeachable if he attempts to subvert the Constitution. The Constitution charges the President with the task of taking care at the laws be faithfully executed and yet the President has counseled his aides to commit perjury, willfully disregarded the secrecy of grand jury proceedings, conceal surreptitious entry, attempted to compromise a Federal judge while publicly displaying his cooperation with the processes of criminal justice. A President is impeachable if he attempts to subvert the Constitution.
Impeachment Hearings House Judiciary Committee, July 25, 1974 Barbara Jordan Statement
Representative Barbara Jordan ( D - Texas ) If the impeachment provision in the Constitution of the United States will not reach the offenses charged here, then perhaps that 18th century Constitution should be abandoned to a 20th century paper shredder. Has the President committed offenses and planned and directed and acquiesced in a course of conduct which the Constitution will not tolerate? That s the question. We know that. We know the question. We should now forthwith proceed to answer the question. It is reason and not passion, which must guide our deliberations, guide our debate, and guide our decision. I yield back the balance of my time, Mr. Chairman.
Impeachment Hearings House Judiciary Committee, July 24, 1974 Charles Sandman Statement
Representative Charles Sandman (R - New Jersey) And now another thing that happened the other day, I raised a question which I thought was a good one. I wanted to know whether or not counsel could advise me as to whether or not the articles of impeachment should be specific. Should each article involve a singular subject? I thought it should. Counsel never opened their mouths. We never got that far. And the Chairman hit the gavel and under the table that went. So there has never been a decision even on that point. And from the law as I understand the law, the articles that we have been handed tonight don t fit what the law requires because here you have a general article of impeachment, everything including the kitchen sink. And this they say, from best information available to me from some of the best legal minds in the world, should not be. I wanted to know. But I got no answer. Now, I have consistently said from time to time that the Chairman has done a good job, a fair job. And I think he has. I complimented the staff. I complemented counsel. Both majority and minority, but there s never really been much difference between those two. And I meant what I said then as I mean it tonight. But things started to change 3 weeks ago. 3 weeks ago it changed from a non-partisan inquiry into a highly partisan prosecution if ever there was one.
Impeachment Hearings House Judiciary Committee, July 24, 1974 Charles Sandman Statement
Representative Charles Sandman (R - New Jersey) Now let s see what happened. Better than that, I suppose I should do away with current events and get down to why we re here tonight. And I hope that this has some advantage, I really do. I don t know as we re going to change any votes. I hope we do. One way or another, I hope it serves a purpose. I can be persuaded if somebody for the first time in seven months gives me something that is direct. I ll vote to impeach. Maybe that should be the challenge to my 36 other colleagues tonight, 37 of us. Now, I want to say this at the very outset. This is not a case, as far as I m concerned, for or against Richard Nixon. I ran for governor in my state last year and Richard Nixon didn t help me one blessed bit. So I have no reason to feel kindly toward him.
Impeachment Hearings House Judiciary Committee, July 24, 1974 Charles Sandman Statement
Representative Charles Sandman (R - New Jersey) Now, secondly, this is the third time in my life that I have had to vote whether or not someone should hold a very high office. And I think because of the coincidence it s worth telling you a little bit about it. The first vote that I cast in my life as public official was when I was the youngest member, newly elected, of the New Jersey state Senate. The first vote had to do with the seating of a Democrat Senator. And if there s anything I think I know it s the New Jersey election law. I listened to all of the experts from around the country testifying. At that time you only needed 11 Republicans to sign a petition and that Democrat would never sit in the Senate and we had 16 including me. I was the only Republican who voted to seat that Democrat. As a result of a long investigation it proved I was the only Republican right. He was seated. 16 years to the day later, I cast my first vote in the Congress. And that was on the seating of Adam Clayton Powell. What a coincidence. It meant no difference to me whether his name was Powell, Nixon or what it was. I voted my conscience as I understood the law without the persuasion of the Washington Post and others. I voted as I understood the law. I was one of only 13 Republicans. And I did not want Adam Clayton Powell seated. But under the Constitution as I understand it, the Congress did not have the right to exclude him for the reason they set forth. I was one of only 13 Republicans who voted to seat Adam Clayton Powell, purely on a Constitutional grounds. Only one of 13, and I may be one of less than that tonight, who knows. And more than that, who cares. I m doing this the way I think it should be done. This is the way I believe I pledged my oath of office. Although there were only 13 Republicans who voted to seat Adam, the United States Supreme Court said that only 13 Republicans were correct. Becuase they reversed the Congress and seated Adam.
Impeachment Hearings House Judiciary Committee, July 24, 1974 Charles Sandman Statement
Representative Charles Sandman (R - New Jersey) Now for the first time in my life, I have to judge a Republican, a man who holds the most powerful office in the world. Make no mistake about that. I look back over history and I try to judge what I should do here. This is the most important thing I shall ever do in my whole life and I know it. Far more important than whatever happens to me as a result of this vote. And I know that history tells me that 107 years ago the country was thrown into a fit of hysteria. And in less than 3 days, President Johnson was impeached during that fit of hysteria. That has gone down in history as one of the darkest moments in the government of this great nation. And I don t propose to be any part of a second blotch on the history of this great nation. How was it all done? The hysteria that was generated. Should it be done? Let s not use some words by some great people, let s use all of them and put them together. James Madison among other things said, the President should be impeached only for something extremely serious which affects his capability to conduct the affairs of the nation. And because of James Madison, a word was inserted into that part of the Constitution having to do with impeachment. He wasn t satisfied that it could be any crime because he said it had to be a high crime, a serious one. And this is what I think we have to follow. I m not a nitpicker. You can find almost anything that will disturb you. There s lots of things wrong. There were lots of crimes committed by lots of people. But were they placed at the door of the President? I don t think so. But maybe you can convince me in the rest of the time we have to argue. And if you do, I will vote to impeach. But not on what I ve gotten so far.
Impeachment Hearings House Judiciary Committee, July 24, 1974 Charles Sandman Statement
Representative Charles Sandman (R - New Jersey) Madison said that the President should be removed only for the most serious offense. To do otherwise would deprive the electorate of the right to select. To do otherwise would place a mechanism in the hands of a majority party that any time they choose they could throw the county into a turmoil to replace the Chief Executive and that should never happen. So it shouldn t be any kind of a crime, it should be a serious crime, effecting the Chief Executive s ability to rule the nation. Some people say we re here as a grand jury. I think we are here as much more than a grand jury because even Mr. Doar said. I do compliment his ability as a lawyer. I think he is one of the best I ve ever met and one of the fairest I ve met too, up to 3 weeks ago. But even he said the weight of evidence must be clear, it must be convincing. And let s keep to those 2 words. You can t substitute them for anything else clear and convincing. Now prove to me they are clear and convincing and I will vote to impeach. But you cannot and you should not under any circumstance attempt to remove the highest office in the world for anything less than clear and convincing. Anything less than something highly serious. This is what I prove I purpose to do.
Impeachment Hearings House Judiciary Committee, July 24, 1974 Charles Sandman Statement
Representative Charles Sandman (R - New Jersey) Now, many wrongs have been committed, no question about it. But were those wrongs directed by the President? Is there direct evidence that said he had anything to do about it? Of course there isn t. And what has happened in the interim, fair articles like this. A reliable news magazine I m told. What does it say? And if this isn t trying to incite the people into a frenzy against good judgment, you tell me what is. Newsweek, July 22nd 1974, The Evidence only half of an extremely damaging sentence. It says, quoting the President I want you all to stonewall it. Let them plead the 5th Amendment. Cover it up. Do anything. Save the plan. Terrible isn t it. They left off the other half of the President, as did that very fair Washington Post, when they buried on page 20 the other half of the sentence, which quoted the President as saying, but I rather it be done the other way. This is what has happened every day, every hour on the hour. So we don t have to do this in frenzy. Let s do it the right way.
Impeachment Hearings House Judiciary Committee, July 24, 1974 Charles Sandman Statement
Representative Charles Sandman (R - New Jersey) And I want to pose this one last thing. I wonder what the prosecutor in the United States Senate is going to do for witnesses. I wonder what he is going to do. Is he going to plead his whole case on tapes? Because he can t use any of the witnesses we had. Because every one of them testified, no active wrongdoing on the part of the President. And if you don t think so, go through the lot. Who was the man who handled the money, LaRue. Was there any involvement by the President? His answer to the question No. To the man who received the money, Bittman, the attorney did your client make any threat to get clemency from the President or any of his agents? The answer no. As to the man who supposedly directed the payment of the money, Mitchell did the President have anything to do with that direction? The answer no. Now with these kind of witnesses how do you prove that case before the Senate? Is there a soul here who honestly believes that 67 out of 100 Senators are willing to accept this kind of evidence? I don t think so. And I think this is why we re here. Now maybe in the time that is remaining, someone somehow will point out the fact that I m only human and I m not infallible. Maybe I overlooked something. Maybe there is a tie in with the President. Alright, there s 37 of you. Give me that information. Give it to 202 million Americans. Because up to this moment, you haven t.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 25, 1973
[00.44.32-White House P.R. vs. the facts, DEAN is dragged into the PR game against his wishes] I don't know if the President's statement -was meant to be a very literal play on carefully chosen words or whether he intended to give, it the broad-brush interpretation that it, later received. However, I would have certainly counseled the President against issuing the statement. And, I was very unhappy to have my name associated -with the statement without being consulted whatsoever, and being put out in front on the issue. [00.44.57] The issuing of the so-called "Dean Report" Was the first time I began to think about the fact that I might be being set up in case the Whole thing came crumbling down at a later time. I subsequently discussed this with other individuals-Mr. Moore, 'Mr. Fielding, and Mr. Mitchell--and they assured me, but not unanimously, that I need not worry because, they did not believe that anyone at the White House would do that to me. THE PRESIDENTIALLY DIRECTED COUNTEROFFENSIVE TO THE DEMOCRATIC CIVIL 'SUITS In early September, as the FBI and the Department of Justice investigations began winding down the concern of the White House and the reelection committee shifted to the very active, investigation that, was being pursued by the Democratic -National Committee through its discovery proceedings in its civil lawsuit against the re-election committee. The Democrats were making daily headlines with their lawsuit. Senator ERVIN. I would suggest your voice has dropped and I suggest you talk more directly into the microphone. Mr. DEAN-. I Will Move' closer then. I have several hours and I thought I ought to ease it back a little bit. On or about September 9 or 10, I received a Presidential request from both Haldeman and Colson. [00.47.10] The President felt that the best defense, to the actions being pursued by the Democrats, and the charges and implications that were stemming from the lawsuits being filed by the Democrats, -was our own counteroffensive with our Own series Of lawsuits against, the Democrats. I recall that Colson called me repeatedly and finally reported that he had just come from the President's Office and that the President wanted action on this as quickly as humanly possible. I informed Mr. Colson that I Was working on it but that I wasn't going to suggest filing any lawsuit or taking any action that was not well founded. I had talked with Mitchell, Ken Parkinson. and Paul O'Brien about the matter and Mr. Parkinson informed me that he was working on several potential counteractions I requested that he submit a memorandum to me as soon as possible because there was great interest at the White House in a counterattack, including the interest by the President. On September 11. 1972, Mr. Parkinson submitted his memorandum to me and after the memorandum I redrafted his documents for submission to Haldeman. I have submitted to the committee copies of both Mr. Parkinson's memorandum and the memorandum I submitted to Haldeman. [00.47.32] Mr. DEAN. You will note that my memorandum of September 12, 1972, to Mr. Haldeman has a "P" with a checkmark in the upper right-hand corner. which indicates that the document was forwarded directly to, or reviewed by, the President. I later learned that the President was pleased and wanted a full follow-up on the items in the memorandum The markings on the memo are Mr. Haldeman's Markings. It was also about this time, late July--early September, that I learned during a meeting in Mitchell's office that Mr. Rhoemer McPhee was having private discussions with Judge Richey regarding the civil suit filed by the Democrats. I believe this fact was known to Mr. Mitchell. Mr. LaRue, Paul O'Brien, and Ken Parkinson--and later again by McPhee--that Judge Richey was to be helpful whenever he could. I subsequently talked' with Mr. McPhee. about this, as late as March 2 of this year, when he told me he was going to visit the judge in the judges rose garden over the weekend to discuss an aspect of the case. MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT--SEPTEMBER 15, 1972 [00.48.51] On September 15 the Justice Department announced the handing down of the seven indictments by the Federal grand jury investigating the Watergate. Late that afternoon I received a call requesting me to come to the President's Oval Office. When I arrived at the Oval Office I found Haldeman and the President. The President asked me to sit down. Both men appeared to he in very good spirits and my reception was very warm and cordial. [00.49.23-NIXON gives approval to DEAN'S handling of the coverup] The President then told me that Bob--referring to Haldeman--had kept him posted on my handling of the Watergate case. The President told me I had done a good job and he appreciated how difficult a task it had been and the President was pleased that the case had stopped with Liddy. I responded that I could not take credit because others had done much more difficult things than I had done. As the President discussed the present status of the situation I told him SO all that I had been able to do was to contain the case and assist in keeping, 'it out of the While House. [00.50.00-DEAN warns that the plan will have to change, and may not work forever] I also told him that there was a long way to go before this matter would end and that I certainly could make no assurances that the day Would not come when this matter would start to unravel. Early in our conversation the President said to me that former FBI Director Hoover had told him shortly after he had assumed office in 1969 that his campaign had been bugged in 1968. the President said that at some point we should get the facts out on this and use this to counter the problems that we were encountering. [00.50.34]
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee Hearings on Presidential Campaign Activities, May 17, 19
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee Hearings on Presidential Campaign Activities, May 17, 1973 - Testimony of Sergeant Paul William Leeper, Metropolitan Police Department United States Senate Caucus Room, Washington DC Sergeant Paul Leeper being sworn in by Chairman Sam Ervin. Sam ERVIN. ...give the Senate Select Committee on the presidential campaign activities shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth so help you god? Sergeant LEEPER. Yes sir. Mr. Sam DASH. Sergeant Leeper, for the record would you please state your name and your address. Sergeant LEEPER. My name is Paul William Leeper, I'm a sergeant assigned to the Metropolitan Police Department. My address is 2301 El Street (L Street) Northwest, Washington D.C. Mr. DASH. And how long have you been a police officer sergeant? Sergeant LEEPER. I'm in my twelve year sir. Mr. DASH. And a Sergeant? Sergeant LEEPER. For the last two and a half, three years. Mr. DASH. What is your assignment on the police department? Sergeant LEEPER. My assignment right now sir is I'm in charge of the second districts casual clothes squad. Mr. DASH. And where does that operate, what is the area or region of the city? Sergeant LEEPER. In the area of the Watergate complex, the White House down in that area. Mr. DASH. Was that your position on June 17th, 1972. Sergeant LEEPER. Yes sir, we were working in that area. Mr. DASH. Now sergeant, is the dress that you are presently wearing at this committee hearing, the type of dress that you usually wear in your occupation? Sergeant LEEPER. No sir. Mr. DASH. What is your usual dress? Sergeant LEEPER. Well we vary, anything from old army shirts to golf jackets, golf hats, casual clothes. I had a pair, on the night in question, I had a pair of blue slacks on, a blue jacket with a University wrote across the front of it, and a golf hat. Mr. DASH. And the police automobile that you use, is this a marked automobile or un-marked automobile? Sergeant LEEPER. No sir, it's un-marked. Mr. DASH. And was that the kind of automobile that you were in on June 17th, 1972? Sergeant LEEPER. Yes sir. Mr. DASH. Now, can we have first chart five. While they're getting the chart, sergeant can you tell us, did there come a time, sometime early in the morning of June 17, or late in the evening (Sergeant Leeper opens up file folder) whatever time it occurred of June 16th that you received a call to come to the vicinity of the Watergate complex in Washington D.C.? Sergeant LEEPER. Yes sir. Mr. DASH. What was the nature of that call? Sergeant LEEPER. Well the call came out at about zero one fifty two hours on the morning of the 17th, Saturday. And the call originally came out for any scout car, which would be a marked vehicle on the police department and an official unit to respond to the Watergate, 2600 Virginia Avenue, to assist a special officer. The official vehicle would be either a sergeant, lieutenant, or a captains cruiser. These would be marked vehicles. No one answered up and the dispatcher.....
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 25, 1973
[00.40.35-EFFORT to find a job for MAGRUDER to keep him from testifying that STRACHAN, speaking for HALDEMAN, and allegedly the PRESIDENT, told him to authorize money for the LIDDY plan] Haldeman assigned Mr. Higby to the, task. Higby called me to discuss the general type of job that I thought would satisfy Magruder and then Higby instructed Mr. Terry Jones, the head of the White House personnel operation, to find an available, high level, nonconfirmable position for Magruder. During the time when 'Mr. Jones was reviewing all the potential jobs for Magruder, I recall that Magruder dropped by my office and told me. he had discussed his potential problems in full with both Higby and Haldeman. He asked me for my assistance and support in finding him a job. I assured 'Magruder I would help. He also indicated that 'Mitchell was trying to help get the job matter resolved. On February 28, Mr. Jones submitted a memorandum to Higby and myself, a copy of which I have submitted to the committee. Mr. DEAN. After Haldeman reviewed the memorandum. A meeting was scheduled for Magruder to meet, with Haldeman and I was asked to attend. This meeting occurred during the first week of March, and Magruder explained to Haldeman at the meeting that he, did not -want to leave Washington. Haldeman told Magruder that his working at the Bicentennial was not realistic, but to consider the position at the Department of Commerce as an Assistant to the Secretary for Policy Development. Magruder said he was interested but wanted some assurance from Haldeman that if he made it through the Senate hearings as he had the grand jury and trial, that he could have a better job later. Haldeman Said that he could not -make a firm promise, but that he would do all he personally could do to assist. This was good enough for Magruder. Haldeman said that Mr. Jones would 'be told to proceed with Secretary Dent 'to get the position at, the Commerce Department finalized. On March 5, 1 received a call from Secretary Dent regarding his hiring Magruder. I did not want to tell Secretary Dent that Magruder was totally free from future problems so I was evasive with him. I hinted that Magruder might have some problems. Because I regretted misleading him, I prepared a memorandum for my files--something I seldom do because I felt Magruder was, In fact, going to have problems. In fact, I thought everyone was going to have problems. I have submitted a copy of this memorandum reflecting this conviction with Secretary Dent to the committee. [00.43.20] Mr. DEAN. I would now like to turn to the meetings. I had with the President in February and March of this year. I have described to the committee several matter,, that followed the La Costa meeting which directly involved Presidential decisionmaking and Presidential involvement I would now like to turn to my direct dealings with the President which began in late February of 1973 with regard to the Watergate and related matters. I feel I can best set forth what transpired at these meetings by discussing what occurred at each meeting MEETING. OF FEBRUARY 27 This was the first meeting I had had with the President since my September 15, 1972. meeting which related to the Watergate It was at this meeting that the President directed that I report directly to him regarding all Watergate matters. He told me that this matter was taking too much time from Haldeman's and Ehrlichman's normal duties and he also told me that they were principals in the matter and, therefore I could be more Objective than they. The President then. told me of his meetings with Senator Baker and the Attorney General He told me that Senator Baker had requested that the Attorney General be his contact point and that I should keep in contact with the Attorney General to make sure that the Attorney General and Senator Baker were working together. He asked me to follow Up immediately to determine if the Attorney General and Baker had met. I informed him that I had earlier or discussed this with the Attorney General and the Attorney General was planning to meet -with Senator Baker and Senator Ervin to discuss turning over FBI data regarding the Watergate investigation. A brief discussion followed in which the President recounted. what had already been reported 'to me by Haldeman. that he had told Senator Baker that he would not permit White House staff to appear before the Select Committee, rather he would only permit the taking Of written interrogatories. He asked me if I agreed with this and I said that written interrogatories were something that could be handled whereas appearances might create serious problems. [00.45.25-NIXON's resolve to continue coverup] He told me he, would never let Haldeman and Ehrlichman go to the Hill. He also told me that Senator Gurney would be very friendly to the White, House and that it would not be necessary to contact him because the President said Senator Gurney would know what to do on his own. [00.45.40-NIXON compliments DEAN on the execution of the coverup, encourages him to continue it.] On the 'way out of his office he told me I had done an excellent job of dealing with this matter during the campaign; that it had been the only issue that McGovern had had and the Democrats had tried to make something out of it but to no avail. I told him as we were walking together out, of the office. that I had only managed to contain the, matter during the campaign, but I was not sure it could be contained indefinitely. He then told me that we would have had to fight back and he -was confident that, I could do the job.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 27, 1973 (1/2)
[00.36.10-Sen. INOUYE confronts DEAN with the White House memo accusing DEAN of masterminding the coverup] Senator INOUYE. [QUOTING W.H. MEMO] "History fails to record that at that moment. Dean corrected the Attorney General's erroneous impression by pointing out that Mitchell, Magruder, and Dean had all been involved in planning of operations of which Watergate was an obvious derivative or that Strachan had knowledge of the fruits of this kind of operation, or that all of them were suborning perjury and otherwise. seeking to conceal the facts." [00.36.36] Mr. DEAN. Senator, I would just, like to make, a general observation. This document has obviously been prepared by somebody who was not at the White House at the time, this was all occurring. It sounds like they are putting it back together through newspaper accounts. Senator INOUYE. This is from the office of Your successor, sir. Mr. DEAN. I understand. And I don't believe my successor was there and didn't spend the nearly 3 years in the White House that I did. Senator INOUYE. [QUOTING W.H. MEMO-THIS PASSAGE GETS QUITE A FEW CHUCKLES FROM THE AUDIENCE] "Dean's activity in the coverup also made him, perhaps unwittingly, the principal author of the political and constitutional crisis that Watergate now epitomizes. [Laughter] It would have been embarrassing for the President if the true facts had become known shortly after June 17th, but it is the kind of embarrassment that an immensely popular President could easily have weathered. [Laughter] The political problem has been magnified one thousand-fold because the truth is coming to light so belatedly, because of insinuations that the White House Was a party to the coverup, and above all, because the White House was led to say things about Watergate that have since been found to have been untrue. These added consequences were John Dean's doing." [00.38.01] Mr. DEAN. Well, Senator, I think that, my testimony answers in great detail my dealings with Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Ehrlichman, and the President, and based on what I know, and knowing the position I held in the White House staff, there is no way conceivable that I could have done and conceived and implemented the plan that they are trying to suggest that I did. [00.38.33] Senator INOUYE. [QUOTING W.H. MEMO] "Dean was responsible within the White House for becoming apprised of what had happened. From June 17 on, Dean had periodic conversations with Ehrlichman about virtually every aspect of this case." This is from Mr. Ehrlichman. "Dean reported also to Haldeman and to Ziegler, to whom he gave repeated assurances that he had made an intensive investigation and had found no White House involvement." This is from Mr. Ziegler. "Dean was the foundation of the proposition that the White House was not involved'" and this is from Ehrlichman. [00.39.20] "Spring 1973. "With the election past, and public interest in Watergate on the wane, Dean may have thought that this coverup had been a success, although he purported to continue an ongoing investigation." [00.39.35] Mr. DEAN. Senator, if I might interject, I don't know how quickly they are, jumping from winter to spring, but I would draw, to the attention of the committee and the Senator the La Costa meeting and the events that transpired there, which I believe are documented by materials prepared by Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Higby, his assistant, as well as subsequent materials that were prepared for the President, and I think these speak for themselves. Senator INOUYE. [QUOTING W.H. MEMO] "At the same time, Dean was affecting a failing memory and talking to Magruder as if Dean did not recall the previous Watergate planning meetings in which he had participated." This is from Magruder's testimony. Mr. DEAN. We, reviewed that earlier, and as I said, I did, when I was talking to Magruder, I was telling him I did not, understand what had happened between February 4 and June 17 that resulted in that event occurring, that I never had hard evidence, I never knew for sure what the facts -were, I didn't know how the plan had been approved I didn't know how much White House pressure had been put on him; I didn't know for a fact if Mitchell had or had not approved it; I had never talked with Mr. Mitchell about it. I think that is what Mr. Magruder is referring to, or, as I said earlier, he may have confused. later meetings when I came back from Camp David and I did indeed give him the impression that I could not remember what had happened, because I didn't want to get into any discussions about what had happened at that time. [00.41.18]
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities - Testimony of Robert Odle.
Mr. FRED THOMPSON. I have just one or two questions. As I understand the significance of this first memorandum, the February nine memorandum. First of all, it's a memorandum which came from the white house to the committee. And secondly, it refers the fact that the attorney general asked Mr. Malek to devise a management audit system at a time when he was still Attorney General. On February the 9th, as I understand it he resigned on March the first as Attorney General, and it does reflect those two facts. Is that correct? Mr. ODLE. Yes sir. It would seem to be my impression that the Senate's interest in the memorandum was not in the substance of the memorandum, but rather the fact that .... Mr. THOMPSON. The fact that something was sent? Mr. ODLE. Went back and forth, which is a perfectly natural thing for, to happen. Mr. THOMPSON. That's all, that's all the questions I have Mr. Chairman. Senator HOWARD BAKER. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Chairman I have no further questions, but I can't resist the temptation to say to Mr. Odle that he's been a very good witness, he's been very forthcoming. He's testified at great length, and it was brought to my attention, a few minutes ago, that when his testimony was interrupted for us to go to lunch that one of the networks played "To Tell the Truth". Mr. ODLE. Well Senator, I appreciate that comment very much. I would say this, if I said I was happy to be here completely, I'd be committing perjury. (courtroom laughs)
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 25, 1973
[00.29.28] On February 15, after late, breakfast, O'Brien and I took about a 2 hour walk down the, beach, at which time I told him what had occurred at La Costa. I told him that 'Moore had been dispatched to New York by Haldeman and Ehrlichman to tell Mitchell it was his responsibility to raise the future money for the convicted defendants. O'Brien's reaction--as he, was well aware-of feeling that this was Haldeman's and Ehrlichman's problem and not his- was that Mitchell would probably go through the roof, After returning from our walk we talked about the fact that I had been requested to suggest names for the. minority counsel. It was during this conversation that I thought of Mr. Martin Hoffman, whom I knew to be a very capable lawyer then serving as general counsel of the Atomic Energy Commission, and a person who had worked on the Hill. I called Mr. Hoffman and asked if he was interested. He said he was. but he did not know if Senator Baker would be because they had had a difference of opinion over a matter at the AEC. He said, however he had done. some work for Senator Baker in the past and liked him very much. I then called Ehrlichman and he agreed that Mr. Hoffman would be a good choice. 'Next I called Haldeman and he said OK if Ehrlichman said OK. during my conversation with Haldeman he, told me be had learned that the chief counsel Job had been offered to Mr. Ken Keating and Mr. Keating had sent a feeler to the White House as to whether he should be interested. Haldeman asked me. to think about it. After talking with Ehrlichman and Haldeman about Mr. Hoffman. I called Timmons and Johnson and asked them to float 'Mr. Hoffman's name to Senator Baker. Mr. Timmons called me back later and said it Wouldn't float because the Senator had indicated he had had some problem with 'Mr. Hoffman and Chairman Schlesinger over an AEC matter. He liked. Mr. Hoffman but said he was still miffed at him. Later that day I called Mr. Moore, but learned he. had gone] to 'New York to see Mitchell, I had talked with Moore earlier that week. but had forgotten he was going to New York on the 15th. Paul O'Brien called Mitchell in the midafternoon to report our conversation I was in and out of the, room while he was on the Telephone talking to Mitchell as I didn't feel it was in my business to listen to his conversation. I talked briefly 'with Mitchell at the and of the, conversation he had with O'Brien. He talked -about the possibility of Mr. Keating as chief counsel, Mr. Mitchell seemed intrigued by the idea. but doubted if Mr. Keating would accept. After I hung up. O'Brien reported that Mr. Moore had brought up the money raising matter, but Mitchell just didn't discuss it at any length with Moore. O'Brien departed Florida late that afternoon and my wife and I got away from the telephone on telephone for the he next 3 days. I returned to the office on 7 Monday, February 19, and spoke with Haldeman on either the 19th or 20th. He requested that I draw up an agenda for a meeting with the President regarding matters which the President should reflect on as a result of the LaCosta meeting and subsequent matters which had come up. Mr. Haldeman and I went over the high point of what should be raised, including items that had not come up at La Costa, such as Magruder's desire to return to the White House staff and sending Mr. Stans to the Senate for or a confirmable post as a tactic to counter the Watergate hearings. I prepared the agenda. I thought that I was, going to attend the meeting with the President, but Haldeman called for the agenda, and not me. I have submitted to the committee -a copy of the agenda. [00.33.06] Mr. DEAN. You will see, that the agenda deals with five items to be, discussed and resolved with the President. 1. Senator Baker's requested meeting with the President; 2. Submitting Secretary Stans' name for a confirmable position; 3. What to do with Mr. Magruder; 4. Using Mr. Buchanan during the Senate hearings; and 5. Getting the Attorney General back in touch with the White House. [00.33.31] Subsequent to Haldeman's meeting with the President, he informed that: The President would meet with Senator Baker; I should discuss with Mr. Stans his interest in a confirmable position; Magruder could not return to the White House staff; Buchanan could not be, used at the Senate hearings; and the. President would meet with the Attorney General. I have not explained at this point the, details of this rather significant document, but I believe the document is rather self-explanatory of the continuing coverup and I will, of course, answer any questions about it. I was not present when the President and Haldeman discussed these matters, but, I had discussed them with Haldeman before he, went. to see the President and he informed him Of the President's decisions after the meeting, thus, I assume that- the agenda I had prepared was the basis of their discussions. [00.34.22] On February 20, or 21, "Mr. Timmons told me he had arranged for the President to have an off-the-record record private meeting with Senator Baker. As you will note from the agenda I referred to list a moment ago, Mr. Timmons had reported that the Senator had told Timmons he wanted guidance and Timmons' interpretation was that the, Senator to help the White House. Haldeman told me to prepare a briefing paper for the President and bring it directly to him rather than routing it, through normal channels. I have submitted to the committee a copy of the agenda I prepared for' the President's meeting with Senator Baker. [00.35.00-BAKER appears very uncomfortable to hear DEAN reveal BAKER'S chumminess with the White House] Mr. DEAN. After the President met. with Senator Baker I was informed by Haldeman that the Senator had appeared to be very interested in being cooperative and the President had the impression that he might be helpful. This. of course, was the White House hope, but nothing that was reported from the meeting made this anything more than a hope.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 12, 1973 (2/2)
[01.14.53] ***SEE RESTRICTIONS FIELD IN RIGHTS SECTION**** Senator MONTOYA Well, Mr. Stone says $89,000, so there is conflict there--Mr. Sloan, I mean. Mr. STANS. Senator, may I say that I think Mr. Sloan's record a number of cases is that he said $81,000. I am sure that is the right one, Senator MONTOYA. And $39,000 on another occasion. Is that correct?' Mr. STANS. That is correct. Senator MONTOYA. And those are the only cash disbursements that it is your feeling went to the White House? Mr. STANS, Well, the $350,000 went to the, White House. The $75,000 that I gave to Mr. Kalmbach went for a White House purpose but I do not know that the White House ever got it. So far as I know, the $81,000 did not go to the White House, and the $39,000 did not go to the White House except, for one item,. which I have not yet told you about. On November 28, I got a call from John Dean, or it, may have been a day or two before November 28 which led to an action on November 28, saying that the $350,000 fund which had been turned over to Strachan in April had ad been depleted by $22,000 ; $22,000 had been used for some purpose, Since it was a fund for polling, I Just assumed that it was for polling. He said that he would like very much to have that fund restored to $350,000 so that if he ever had to account, for it, it would be intact. And as a matter of fact, along about, that time, we began discussions about whether or not the $350,000 might be given to the finance committee and taken into its receipts. But, he indicated it was quite important that he have $22,000 to restore the fund. So I gave him $22,000 out of the money that I had received through Tim Babcock, on November 28. He sent Gordon Strachan of the White House staff over to the office to pick it, up. Now, the other $17,000 that I had received from Tim Babcock I gave to Fred LaRue as a, payment on account of the $30,000 that he had given me to give back to the Philippine national. So that $39,000 was expended and those transactions have all been reported to the General Accounting Office in our last report. Mr. BARKER. - Senator Montoya, Senator Montoya, for the record, I might, indicate that in Mr. Dash's questioning on June 6 of Mr. Sloan at page 1254, he refers to the $81,000 figure, consisting of $18,000 and $63,000. Senator MONTOYA. I received that information from the transcript of the interview which indicates the sum of $89,000, so there must have been a typographical error but on page 4 of the interview of which we have a record it, indicates $89,000. Now, let's go back to [he cashier's check that, Mr. Dahlberg got in Miami and brought to Washington and then went back to Miami and was cashed. -Now was the cashier's check for $25,000, was that in the name of Mr. Dahlberg? Mr. STANS. Yes, it was on a Miami bank payable to Kenneth Dahlberg. Senator MONTOYA. Did he endorse it? Mr. STANS. Yes, he did. He endorsed it Just before he gave it, to me. Senator MONTOYA. Who cashed it? Mr. STANS. Well, I don't know for, a fact who cashed it except that I gave it to Mr. Sloan at the first, opportunity. Mr. Sloan discussed it 'with our general counsel Mr. Liddy, and -according to Mr. Sloan, Mr. Liddy undertook to cash it. Senator MONTOYA. That is all, Mr. Chairman. Senator ERVIN. It is sort of a warm day and the witness has been on the Stand for a long time. It is apparent we can't finish today so 'Without objection on the part of some member of the committee we Will stand in recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning, Thank you. [01.19.40--Senators, photographers, others, stand to leave] [00.19.45--MacNEILL in studio] MacNEILL states that STANS will return to the stand tomorrow, to be questioned about the degree of his ignorance about how the money he raised was spent. Probably also comment about STANS' assertion that he complained to the White House about the cost of the campaign. States that STANS' testimony leads logically to next witness, Deputy Campaign Director Jeb MAGRUDER. STANS said that MAGRUDER was the one to authorize sums of money paid to LIDDY, and with LIDDY taking the Fifth, STANS' testimony is important. [01.20.41]
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities - Testimony of James McCord.
Senator MONTOYA. Did you at that time when the plan unfolded before your very eyes by Mr. Liddy, did you feel any concern what might happen and who would take care of the situation if it did happen? Mr. McCORD. Yes. Senator MONTOYA. Now, what kind of concern did you have? Mr. McCORD. Concerns that what did happen, might happen. Senator MONTOYA. Well, now when you were arrested at the watergate and taken to jail two attorneys apparently appeared there the next morning. Who were those attorneys? Mr. McCORD. A Mr. Rafferty and a Mr. Douglas Caddy. Senator MONTOYA. Who sent them there? Mr. McCORD. I did not know at the time, I've since understood the Mr. Hunt had a part in arranging for their appearance. Senator MONTOYA. Was anything said to you by these attorneys to keep quiet or not divulge anything or even the source of your employment? Mr. McCORD. There was a brief discussion with all of the defendants at that first meeting, if that is what you're referring to at the place we were arrested. Senator MONTOYA. Where was this discussion? Mr. McCORD. In the second district precinct in Washington, police precinct. Senator MONTOYA. Now, you also indicated that you visited other places. Now during your employment with the committee, what places did you visit throughout the country other than New York by which Mr. Odle testified yesterday. Mr. McCORD. Chicago. Senator MONTOYA. I believe he testified about Chicago, now what other places did you visit? Mr. McCORD. Miami, Florida. Senator MONTOYA. How long did you stay there? Mr. McCORD. Two or three days. Senator MONTOYA. What was your mission there? Mr. McCORD. It was along with about half a dozen White House personnel to review the overall planning for the use of the Doral Hotel which was to be used in August 1972 as for both offices and residences for the committee for the re-election of the president staff and for the white house staff, both. My task there was to look over the security needs and to recommend measures to appropriate to those needs. Senator MONTOYA. And who went to Miami to plan the security for the Democratic National Committee? Mr. McCORD. The democratic national committee. Senator MONTOYA. And the convention. You indicated that you had an interest in that. Mr. McCORD. I did not, I don't know sir, I did not. Senator MONTOYA. Now, didn't you state that there would be some effort made to carry on a surveillance program at the Democratic National committee? Mr. McCORD. Yes sir. Senator MONTOYA. Who was assigned to that task, if you know? Mr. McCORD. I knew that Mr. Hunt had some activity in that regard. Senator MONTOYA. Did he hire other people to your knowledge? Mr. McCORD. I believe he utilized some of the other men that were in the watergate operation. I'd understood that from him, I was not certain as to the exact nature. Senator MONTOYA. Now, you were on two payrolls apparently when Mr. Liddy hired you for this clandestine operation, you were on Mr. Odle's payroll as well as Mr. Liddy's, is that correct? Mr. McCORD. That's correct sir. Senator MONTOYA. And you were receiving how much from Mr. Odle and how much from Mr. Liddy on a monthly basis? Mr. McCORD. Approximately, um one twelfth of the twenty thousand dollars a year salary from Mr. Odle, two thousand from Mr. Liddy. Senator MONTOYA. And did your attorney at any time communicate to you that there had been some offers of clemency, that is your attorney Mr. Alch? Mr. McCORD. Yes sir. Senator MONTOYA. Would you state what you received by way of information in that respect? Mr. McCORD. Yes sir. Senator MONTOYA. Please do so. Mr. McCORD. My recollection was that the date was in late September or early October 1972, when Mr. Alch who was in town came from a meeting he said with Mr. Bitman and stated that executive clemency and financial support and rehabilitation would be made available to the defendants in the case, including me. Senator MONTOYA. That's all Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 28, 1973
[00.07.13-WEICKER goes on in his description of the "gross" acts by the NIXON White House, the ENEMIES LIST] This, I would say, say, falls into the area of gross: Memorandum for John Dean from Charles Colson: I received a well-informed tip that there are income tax discrepancies involving the returns of Harold J. Gibbons, the vice president of the Teamsters Union in St. Louis. This has come to we on very, very good authority. Gibbons, you should know, is an all out enemy, a McGovernite, ardently anti-Nixon. He is one of the three labor leaders who were recently invited to Hanoi. Please see if this can be started on at once and if there is in informer's fee, let me know. There is a good cause at which it can be donated. [00.07.56] Let me read from your memorandum, Mr. Dean, and I imagine this couldn't have been one of your proudest moments in life. If I am not mistaken, the subject dealing with Our political enemies Was a memorandum written by you to Mr. Haldeman, is that correct? Mr. DEAN. I will have to confess, I had to do some research to prepare that, because it was a new field for me.. Senator WEICKER, Well, I think we have got to get it all out on the table here, and that means everybody. And I am going to read two paragraphs which I find to be absolutely amazing having been written in the White House of the United States. "After reviewing this matter with a number of persons possessed of expertise in the field"--the subject of this is "Dealing with our political enemies"--"I have concluded that we do not need an elaborate mechanism or game plan, rather we need a, good project coordinator and full support for the project. In brief, the system would work as follows. [00.09.01-WEICKER reads a memo written by DEAN which lays out a plan to "Screw" political enemies] The project coordinator should then determine--and this is one of the ways the system operates--what source of dealings these individuals have with the Government--talking about our political enemies now--and how we can best screw them (for example grant availability, Federal contracts, litigation, prosecution, et cetera). Now. to move along to that portion of the Internal Revenue Service memo--this is how you use the Internal Revenue Service against your political enemies--just one sentence: [00.09.46-WEICKER reveals for the TV cameras the NIXON White House position on administrative agencies of the Government serving political interests] Walters must be made to know that discrete political actions and investigations on behalf of the administration are a firm requirement and responsibility on his part. In the same memorandum, "We have been unable to obtain information in the possession of IRS regarding our political enemies. And then lastly, in one of the lists which we received, as I understand it, are the "Opponent, Priority Activity"--Mr. Dean, does that come from Mr. Colson's office to Mr. Bell ? Mr. DEAN. That is correct. Senator WEICKER. All right. The language it first is very prosaic. "Having studied the attached material and evaluated the recommendations for the discussed action, I believe you will find my list worthwhile for go status"-the space age come to dirty politics. "It is in priority order." [00.10.41-WEICKER airs a lot of the White House's dirty laundry on shameful political practices] -Now I want everybody to listen to some of the comments that are made alongside the names: "It is time to give the message"; "they should be hit hard starting with" this particular Individual; "A scandal would be most helpful here; "we should give him a try. Positive results would stick a pin in Jackson's white hat"; "coming on fast. Emerging as a leading black anti-Nixon spokesman Has known weakness for white females." These are the exhibits. these are the exhibits that were turned in yesterday They form a part of the record of activity, along with those matters unconstitutional and illegal. [00.11.33-WEICKER reads from DEAN'S statement, on subject of strategy to stonewall and obstruct the ERVIN COMMITTEE.] Now, we get, to the point as to whether or not these attitudes still prevail or whether, in fact, they still continue. Mr. Dean, I am now referring to your statement on page 163. [READING] Ehrlichman and Haldeman concluded that the theory for dealing with this Committee should be as follows: The White House will take a public posture of full cooperation, but privately will attempt to restrain the investigation and make it as difficult as possible to get information and witnesses. A behind the scenes media effort would be made to make the Senate inquiry appear very partisan. The ultimate goal would be to discredit the hearing and reduce their impact by attempting to show that the Democrats have engaged in the same type of activities. Would you like to expand on that statement at all at this time? I plan to go through a chronology of events. even as they affect me and You. But. is there' anything in the way of a general statement that You would like to make at this time? Mr. DEAN. I think I indicated this to counsel yesterday, that at this Particular La Costa meeting I made several which I have not turned over as an exhibit but will be turned over as an exhibit, and this material is documented in that form. [00.13.18]
Church Committee Hearings - Tom Charles Huston
Testimony of Tom Charles Huston, Nixon White House Aid, who says that he was concerned with bombers, assassins and snipers and he took responsibility for the White House's dealings with them
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 29, 1973 (1/2)
[00.22.51-INOUYE probes DEAN for evidence of efforts to tamper, intimidate, or interfere with the ERVIN COMMITTEE] Senator INOUYE. You just stated that at a later time you came to the digging up dirt. When did you get to the digging up dirt stage? Mr. DEAN. That must have, been, I can only recall an allusion to the fact that this would be, you know, looking into at some point in time but it really was not the focus of any discussion I can recall. Senator INOUYE. Who suggested this, sir? Mr. DEAN. The only comment I can recall making myself is, and I had made a similar comment with regard to the Patman committee hearing, and you will recall that I requested, after a discussion -with Mr. Haldeman that we cheek the financial or the campaign filing requirements Of the members of the Patman committee. I did receive a, document I have submitted that, document. To this day I have not, read that document and I cant tell you what it says. I didn't, have any interest in that. I had also been suggesting, I had had a suggestion, for Mr. Haldeman to call Governor Connally, to ask him about Mr. Patman and he said, "I think Mr. Patman might have one soft spot," but he also indicated some Republicans might have similar soft Spots, and when -Mr. Timmons and I discussed this -we realized this might create more problems than it would solve. [00.24.14] NOW, coming back to this committee, I can recall a comment when this discussion came up that it would be. very difficult for some members possibly some of the members of this committee, to throw stones when they were living in a glass house, and that is the comment I recall making. Senator INOUYE. Returning to the, President's statement which you quoted, "That we will take care of them after the election," did the President ever tell you what he meant by that? [00.24.50-INOUYE asks DEAN about references by NIXON to "taking care of" hostile reporters after the election] Mr. DEAN. To me, the way the conversation was evolving. and it moved right from there to the Internal Revenue Service, and there may have preceded that--because I am taking such care in any reference that I make to my conversations I recall with the President- to something about the Internal Revenue Service that led into the fact that I should keep a good list and then he -went on to talk, I do recall him very clearly telling Me to make a good list Of those who are giving us problems. that we will take care. of them after the election, We will make life less than pleasant for them, and it moved. the conversation moved, directly from there to a discussion of the Internal Revenue Service and I told him how, I was really telling him the fact that, I could not call Mr. Walters and tell Mr. Walters to get an audit started. [00.25.44-DEAN contends that NIXON pushed him to get the IRS to reward friends and punish ENEMIES.] And the President was rather annoyed at this and I told him the reason why when he asked me and I said, -well, because the bureaucracy of the Internal Revenue Service Is primarily Democratic and something like this cannot be done. Senator INOUYE. Did you ever call Mr. Walters to attempt to provide special treatment for anyone ? Mr. DEAN. To provide special treatment? Senator INOUYE. Yes or no? Mr. DEAN. No. I called him and asked him a number of questions on occasions on tax cases. Yes, but I don't recall ever asking him for special treatment and. to the contrary, Mr. Walters, is the type of man that, he and I discussed on a number of occasions the extreme danger of the White House doing anything that would politicize the Internal Revenue Service and he felt very strongly about That and the like. I got criticisms--- Senator INOUYE. Mr. Walters was not the man to see, who was your contact man in the Internal Revenue Service? Mr. DEAN. Mr. Caulfield had a contact man and he -will have to tell you who that, is because I do not know. Senator INOUYE. I thank you very much, Mr. Dean. Mr. DEAN. Thank you, Senator. [00.26.55-ERVIN, grinning, responds to the allegations that the WHITE HOUSE tried to dig up dirt on him] Senator ERVIN. I sort of regret that anything was brought out about the alleged attempt, the request, of Bob Haldeman about me, but I am glad it happened because President Nixon's campaign manager in 1968 and again in 1972 Charles R. Jonas, Jr., made this statement, and I cannot refrain from reading it because I am very grateful to him for it. He said, "Charles R. Jonas, Jr., who headed 'Nixon's reelection campaign in North Carolina, and has recently said he might run for Ervin's Senate seat, said he had not been contacted by anyone to discredit Ervin. "That would be an impossible task and almost foolish to attempt,' Jonas said when reached by phone. 'I think that Senator Ervin is one of the handful of people in the Senate whom it would be impossible to discredit. I think that is why he was chosen. He has a record of impeccable honesty and integrity. If I had to depend on any one, person in the Senate to proceed fairly and in a way that would protect the innocent, it would be Senator Ervin."' [00.28.12]
U.S. House Subcommittee : Shreddergate Part 2
EPA staff chief John Daniel refers to his colleague, Eugene Lucero to answer U.S. House Subcommittee on Environment and Public Works Chairman Robert Roe's (D-NJ) questions on law enforcement sensitive documents during hearing; Rep. Norman Mineta (D-CA) seated next to Rep. Roe. Lucero points out that there were a series of approximately 700,000 documents that were "possibly available to the committee"; EPA Assistant Administrator Michael A. Brown seated next to Lucero. He states they tentatively screened documents in his office that might be considered sensitive and in dispute, and those documents were put aside. Rep. Roe, off camera, asks for a specific number, but Lucero can only say he has two file cabinets worth, and no specific page count. Rep. Roe asks, off camera, if the agency official is suggesting all of the law enforcement sensitive documents are in those file cabinets. Lucero states those are the only ones in his office. Rep. Roe asks if there are other documents, which prompts Lucero to state that other parts of the agency may have more documents, which proves a point to Rep. Roe; that even he does not know the exact number of documents that exist.
U.S. House Subcommittee : Shreddergate Part 2
U.S. House Subcommittee on Environment and Public Works hearing in progress; Representative Ronald Packard (R-CA) asks EPA Staff Chief John Daniel if there is any evidence in his office that enforcement sensitive documents are missing or have been destroyed. Daniel replies there is no such evidence. Rep. Packard asks if Daniel's employees are aware of any evidence of the same nature. Daniel clarifies that the employees are under the direction EPA official Eugene Lucero, seated next to him, and he has not spoken to all 10,000 employees. Packard wants to confirm that Daniel is unaware of any paper shredders being at the EPA before January 6th. Daniel clarifies that Shredders in the Offices of Emergency and Remedial Response and Waste Program Enforcement arrived on January 6th, but other shredders have been around longer. Daniel confirms that those January 6th shredders were removed on February 10th and those shredders weren't used to destroy enforcement sensitive documents or anything subpoenaed by the committee. Packard asks if regional offices were given the same instructions on handing enforcement sensitive documents as implemented in the main office; Daniel affirms that.