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Impeachment Hearings. House Judiciary Committee, July 30, 1974. Cambodia Bombing Article of Impeachment
Caldwell Butler (R-Virginia). All right. Now, does your research into this matter indicate that any limitations were placed on the membership of Congress as to whether they could or should or not pass this information on or anything of that nature? J. Stephen Walker. We have no evidence whatsoever as to that condition. Caldwell Butler (R-Virginia). I thank the gentleman. Mr. Chairman, I think the evidence indicates pretty clearly that the Congress through its leadership was kept advised of these incidents and that if the Congress through its leadership failed to pass it on that is a responsibility the Congress must share with the President. We can't impeach ourselves, yet.
Impeachment Hearings. House Judiciary Committee, July 30, 1974. Statement of Representative William Hungate
Peter Rodino (D - New Jersey). The gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Hungate, is recognized for 3 minutes and 30 seconds. William Hungate (D Missouri). Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I support this Article and feel more strongly about it than any other. I respect those who disagree and as I hear the arguments I think I know why there are no lawsuits in Heaven. The other side has all of the good lawyers. I am sorry to disagree with my colleagues, but I do. And I disagree with Professor Bickel too. It strikes me, that in United States v. Nixon Mr. St. Clair's argument was based on the fact that this was an intra-executive branch squabble which they should not enter and based his argument on Professor Bickel's writings. As I recall, Professor Bickel did not approve of the one man, one vote decision, Professor Bickel. He was wiser then perhaps. I do not always agree with him. He is not always right. In democracies and republics we face different problems than totalitarian countries where rulers can dismiss the legislatures. In republics, they ignore the people's representatives at their peril. Anyone can claim the Fifth Amendment and get it. And that includes the President. I think we wouldn t have any argument about that. But, how are we to obtain evidence? We got it in this case by accident.
Impeachment Hearings. House Judiciary Committee, July 30, 1974. Statement of Representative Robert McClory
Peter Rodino (D - New Jersey). The gentleman from Illinois is recognized for 4 minutes and 20 seconds. And after the gentleman from Illinois has consumed his time, there is no further time. The gentleman from Ohio was he seeking recognition for some, purpose other than Representative Bob Latta (R Ohio). Apparently the Chairman did not put my name down earlier in the day but I will not raise an objection. Peter Rodino (D - New Jersey). I regret, but the list that was given to me did not include the gentleman's name. Bob Latta (R Ohio). May I respectfully suggest to the Chair that at I could poll members around here that could say that I raised my hand but I will not do so.
Impeachment Hearings. House Judiciary Committee, July 30, 1974. Statement of Representative Robert McClory
Now, what did the President turn over in response to our request? He turned over nothing. If it were not for the fact that we got materials from the Special Prosecutor we wouldn t have evidence upon which to operate, to conduct our inquiry. As a matter of fact it would be entirely appropriate in response to the gentleman from Alabama to vote this as a sole and separate and distinct article of impeachment if we d received all that we had received from the President, and through the President, which is virtually nothing. So what we are considering here, the evidence we have, we didn t get from the President. We got it elsewhere.
Impeachment Hearings. House Judiciary Committee, July 30, 1974. Statement of Representative Robert McClory
Now, it seems to me that the other process that we could have gone through of contempt would be quite unacceptable and we did not want to go through that. I suggested that some months ago, but I was deterred in that by leaders from both sides of the aisle and with the prospect that we would take this up when it came to the consideration of an Article of impeachment. And that is what we are doing at this time. It seems to me that it is entirely appropriate that we should tell the President, and this will be a guide for future Presidents or future impeachments, that if there is no response, or if the response is inadequate to the requests that we make, if our subpoenas are defied, why then, the Congress is going to take this kind of decisive action. Contempt, of course, is a strong action. You can have summary contempt in a court and imprisonment and all kinds of strong penalties, so this is decisive action. This is firm action. But it seems to me that it is the only kind of action we can take under the circumstances and I urge a favorable vote on this Article III.
Impeachment Hearings. House Judiciary Committee, July 30, 1974. Statement of Representative Bob Latta
Representative Robert McClory (R Illinois). I yield to the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Latta. Peter Rodino (D - New Jersey). The gentleman has I minute remaining. Bob Latta (R Ohio). Thank you very much for yielding. Robert McClory (R Illinois). I would like to yield about 45 seconds so I have 15 seconds. Bob Latta (R Ohio). I might say to my friend from Illinois that he is using my 4 minutes. He already spoke 10 minutes on this. So I am very generous. So he ought to let me at least have 60 seconds.
Impeachment Hearings. House Judiciary Committee, July 30, 1974. Statement of Representative Bob Latta
Robert McClory (R Illinois). Mr. Chairman, I would just say in conclusion that if what my colleague from Michigan says is true, that if we are powerless when it comes to expressing our authority with regard to impeachment where another branch of government is concerned and we have to take whatever they give and that is all. Why then of course, the power of impeachment would be sterile indeed and I urge a favorable vote on this article. Peter Rodino (D - New Jersey). All time has expired.
Impeachment Hearings. House Judiciary Committee, July 30, 1974. Cambodia Bombing Article of Impeachment.
Peter Rodino (D New Jersey). The gentleman is recognized. John Conyers (D Michigan). Mr. Chairman. I ask unanimous consent that all debate on this Article numbered IV, including consideration of any amendments thereto, be limited to a period not to exceed 2 hours to be divided equally between opponents and proponents of the Article. This would include, of course, the debate on any amendment which shall be limited to a period not to exceed 20 minutes divided equally also between opponents and proponents of the amendment. Tom Railsback (R Illinois). Mr. Chairman, I wonder if the gentleman would consider making it 1 hour? Peter Rodino (D New Jersey). Is the gentleman objecting to the unanimous consent, or reserving his right to object? Tom Railsback (R Illinois). I would object I wonder, to get all of this out of the way. I wonder if we could not make it one hour? John Conyers (D Michigan). If the gentleman from Illinois would agree to this, because I think it, is on the right track. How about an hour and one-half? Tom Railsback (R Illinois). Okay. Peter Rodino (D New Jersey). Without objection then, the Article will be debated for one hour and 30 minutes, the 90 minutes to be divided equally between opponents and proponents of the Article. This, of course, as the gentleman has already expressed in his unanimous consent request would also include the limitation on the time for debate on any amendment hereto, which would not exceed 20 minutes and which would be divided equally for opponents and proponents all such time coming out of the one hour and half. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Impeachment Hearings. House Judiciary Committee, July 30, 1974. Cambodia Bombing Article of Impeachment.
Peter Rodino (D New Jersey). Will the Members who seek recognition on this will kindly indicate by raising their hands. All those in support of the Amendment so that the Chair may recognize them and note them for recognition. Mr. Owens, Ms. Holtzman, Father Drinan, Mr. Rangel, Mr. Waldie, Mr. Conyers, Mr. Edwards, Mr. Kastenmeier. All those in opposition? Mr. Latta, so that we do not overlook you, Mr. Cohen, Mr. Butler, Mr. Hogan, Mr. Dennis, Mr. Smith, Mr. Fish, Mr. Railsback, Mr. Sandman. I have you, Mr. Railsback, Mr. Smith. Mr. Flowers. Mr. Seiberling in opposition. Just so that we won t overlook anyone, Mr. Latta, Mr. Cohen, Mr. Butler, Mr. Hogan, Mr. Dennis, Mr. Fish, Mr. Railsback, Mr. Sandman, Mr. Flowers, Mr. Seiberling and Mr. Mann. And those in favor, Mr. Owens, Ms. Holtzman, Mr. Kastenmeier, Mr. Edwards, Mr. Conyers, Mr. Waldie, and Father Drinan.
Impeachment Hearings. House Judiciary Committee, July 30, 1974. Cambodia Bombing Article of Impeachment.
Peter Rodino (D New Jersey). The opponents will be recognized for a period of approximately or less than 4 minutes, about 3 minutes and 45 seconds each. And those in support will be recognized for 6 minutes and 15 seconds each in support of the Amendment.
Watergate Impeachment Hearings House Judiciary Committee, July 29, 1974. Delbert Latta (R - Ohio).
Delbert Latta (R Ohio). utmost caution, that we weaken, that we weaken that office that we hold so dear. 02.10 And let me direct my attention in the few moments that we have to another area that concerns me because we ve touched upon it so lightly. In fact, I heard somebody say, and I am sure he said it in jest, something about it is a bugaboo. And I have reference to national security. National security. What are we talking about? We re talking about protecting the lives and the security of 220 million Americans. That is what we are talking about. So let s not talk about it lightly. I happen to be one who since I have been in the Congress of the United States who has supported a strong national defense, a strong national defense. We can t be second. We have got to be strong. And we are talking about national defense as a bugaboo issue? I think not.
Watergate Impeachment Hearings House Judiciary Committee, July 29, 1974. Delbert Latta (R - Ohio).
Delbert Latta (R Ohio). The President of the United States was concerned about leaks right after he took office. Now, let s take a look at what he was talking about. Where were these leaks coming from? Were they coming from somebody's bridge club or out of some nonsensitive agency of the Government? We know better than that. They were coming from no other place than the National Security Council. Now who sits on the National Security Council? Staff members? The President of the United States, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, along with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General by designation of the President. Now they don t talk about rules for a handball game. They discuss and make the policy for the defense of this country, your defense, my defense, our children's defense. That is what they do. And these leaks that concerned the President of the United States were coming directly out of that National Security Council.
Watergate Impeachment Hearings House Judiciary Committee, July 29, 1974. Delbert Latta (R - Ohio).
Delbert Latta (R Ohio). Now what were they? Many of our colleagues here today have alluded to them. And I don t want to duplicate what they ve said. But let me point out that about every time the National Security Council would make a decision, a couple of days later, and I hate to mention newspapers but I must, the New York Times would publish it or the Evening Star. Wouldn t this concern you? It concerned me. It concerned the President.
Watergate Impeachment Hearings House Judiciary Committee, July 29, 1974. Delbert Latta (R - Ohio).
Delbert Latta (R Ohio). Let me give you just one. On April 6th, the New York Times prints a front page article indicating US consideration of unilateral withdrawal. June 1969, shortly after a decision had been reached to begin initial withdrawal of troops, the New York Times and the Evening Star reported this decision indicating that it would be made public following the meeting, following the meeting with the South Vietnamese President Thieu. Leaks damaging Dr. Kissinger's diplomatic efforts to end the war. For the South Vietnamese Government to hear publicly of our apparent willingness to consider unilateral withdrawal without first discussing the matter with President Thieu. What does this do to our credibility?
Watergate Impeachment Hearings House Judiciary Committee, July 29, 1974. Delbert Latta (R - Ohio).
Delbert Latta (R Ohio). Damaging leaks had been occurring with regard to the SALT negotiation have been discussed, and also the internal uses by our Government of the strategic force posture. A study was made to determine what programs should be adopted relative to our country's, get this, deterrent conventional and nuclear capability. The study included five possible strategic options from an emphasis on offensive capability to heavy reliance on anti-ballistic missile systems. Costs even were discussed. Notwithstanding the obvious need for secrecy of this study, the May 1st, 1969, edition of the New York Times reported the five strategic options under study and even gave the cost estimates. The United States Intelligence Board, having been engaged in an analysis of the Soviet Union's testing of missiles, and issued a report in June 1969 setting forth their estimate of the Soviet Union's strategic strength and possible first-strike capability. Peter Rodino (D - New Jersey). The gentleman has consumed 10 minutes. Delbert Latta (R Ohio). I wish I had 10 more, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Watergate Impeachment Hearings House Judiciary Committee, July 29, 1974. Carlos Moorhead (R - Calfornia).
Carlos Moorhead (R California). If IRS was used wrongly, no one would object louder or stronger than I. I spent 16 years running a legal aid and lawyers reference service and no one has any more respect for the underdog or the law than I do. And there is nothing that brings the fear into the heart of average American than is brought into their heart by an IRS audit. That must be clear to everyone. But the cold hard facts are that the IRS was not misused by the President. It s true that 4 days before he talked to the President Mr. Dean at least took a list of enemies to the IRS and asked for something to be done about it. But the evidence that was brought to us by our staff was that the President's connection with Mr. Dean was very, very slight during those particular days and picked up only in the months of 1973. Now it s true that Dean and Nixon had a meeting on the 15th of September, but there is not one shred of evidence that anything was done as a result of that meeting on the 15th of September. And no real evidence that anyone took those comments seriously. And certainly on Mr. Dean's request the IRS consideration, of certain people, there was nothing done. The names were put, away and were never presented to another soul.
Watergate Impeachment Hearings House Judiciary Committee, July 29, 1974. Carlos Moorhead (R - Calfornia).
Carlos Moorhead (R California). We have the question of the Plumber's group. Plumbers is a name of art that has been given to this special group. I don t approve of many of their later activities. Certainly they went beyond any power that the President expected them to have. We have the testimony, the sworn testimony, of Egil Krogh. He said with respect to the purpose for the special investigations unit it is Mr. Krogh's sworn testimony that on or about July 15, 1971, he was given oral instructions by Mr. John Ehrlichman to begin a special national security project to coordinate a Government efforts to determine the causes, sources, and ramifications of unauthorized disclosure of classified documents known as the Pentagon Papers.
Watergate Impeachment Hearings House Judiciary Committee, July 29, 1974. Carlos Moorhead (R - Calfornia).
Carlos Moorhead (R California). We have other national security matters. We have the 17 wiretaps that were approved by J. Edgar Hoover and the President. There s mention made of two or three other wiretaps that were not authorized by the President and no showing whatsoever of any authorization by the President. But the 17 wiretaps were actually made at the President's request, or at least with his signature, were very definitely brought about by a very great concern with Henry Kissinger with the SALT negotiations that were going to take place and with the knowledge that might be given to a foreign country. Peter Rodino (D - New Jersey). The time of the gentleman has expired. Carlos Moorhead (R California). I would like another 10 minutes too.
Watergate Impeachment Hearings House Judiciary Committee, July 29, 1974. Wayne Owens (D - Utah).
Wayne Owens (D Utah). There are other serious offenses of the President which do not in my opinion raise to the level of impeachability. On the basis of evidence before us I do not believe that the allegations of bribery, for example, in the ITT case or the Milk case, have been sustained. But each one of the abuses contained in Article II is adequate in itself to sustain impeachment in my opinion. These instances of Presidential abuse center around the violation of the guarantee of civil liberties contained in the Bill of Rights, namely, the right to be free from Government interference in his privacy, his home, his letters and his belongings, and his conversations.
Watergate Impeachment Hearings House Judiciary Committee, July 29, 1974. Wayne Owens (D - Utah).
Wayne Owens (D Utah). This Article of Impeachment does not attempt to apply new standards to this President. We apply old standards which everyone knows of through the impeachment process. And impeachment is the only remedy for or the abuses which Article II proposes to correct. Some of them are not criminal abuses and even if they were criminal, the President when sitting is beyond criminal process. Probably the principal reason the Framers included the impeachment power in the Constitution was because they saw that the only remedy against a President for the unlawful enlargement of the executive power and the encroachment upon individual liberties was through this type of stern accountability, the only remedy. By passing these Articles of Impeachment we set an example. It is a fair example because we apply only the most fundamental and basic standards of which any President should be aware.
Watergate Impeachment Hearings House Judiciary Committee, July 29, 1974. Wayne Owens (D - Utah).
Wayne Owens (D Utah). And it is an example to future Presidents and to all who hold civil authority in this country that the Congress even to the exercise of its impeachment capability will stand against the abuse of power and the invasion of civil liberties which would undermine our Constitution or the rights and the dignity of the individual. We should not forget that the history of liberty in the world is very short. The history of tyranny is very long and the principal source of oppression has always been the unrestrained power of the state.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 14, 1973
[00.02.00--in to title screen "SENATE HEARINGS ON CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES"] [00.03.57--MacNEILL] MacNEILL states that after testifying that he did order the GEMSTONE files destroyed, MAGRUDER will address the role of John DEAN in the Watergate and the COVERUP. [00.04.16--DASH] Mr. DASH. Now, as to Mr. Dean's participation, by the way, in these meetings, was Mr. Dean operating on his own, or what was your Understanding of Mr. Dean's role at these meetings? Mr. MAGRUDER. Mr. Dean was the person who had worked with us on many of these legal matters. He had brought Mr. Liddy to the meeting. he was a close associate of ours through Mr. Mitchell and, of course, all of us knew Mr. Dean very well. And he was one person from the, White House who worked with us very closely. It was very natural for Mr. Dean in this situation to be part of our meetings at this point in time because of his association and of his background. Mr. DASH. And would he, from your understanding, be representing any White House interest at these meetings? Mr. MAGRUDER. I think you would really have, to ask Mr. Dean that question. Mr. DASH. Now, did you instruct Mr. Reisner to destroy any other files? Mr. MAGRUDER. As I recall, I asked. Mr. Reisner to cull through my files, pull out. any sensitive material that could be embarrassing to us. There was the suit that was placed against, us by the Democratic National Committee that asked for immediate disclosure. As I recall, we all indicated that we should remove any documents that could 'be damaging, whether they related at all to the Watergate or not. [00.05.30] Mr. DASH. Mr. Sloan has testified before the committee, Mr. Magruder, that, shortly after your return and after the break-in, that you asked him to perjure himself concerning the, amount of money that Mr. Sloan had given Mr. Liddy. Could you state your own recollection of that discussion with Mr. Sloan? Mr. MAGRUDER. Well, the, first, discussion--we had two meetings on Monday. The first, meeting was when I determined from him that the money was our money, and we, discussed that in his office.. And he came up to my office, and in attempting to allay his concerns or help him. in some sense give some advice, I think, we talked about what would he do about the money. My understanding of the new election law indicated that he would be personally liable for cash funds that were not reported. These were, not, reported funds. So I indicated at that meeting that, I thought he had 'a problem and might have to do something about it. He said, you mean commit perjury? I said you might have to do something like that to solve your problem and very honestly, was doing that in good faith to Mr. Sloan to assist him at, that time. Now, later we met, three times, twice that week and once after returned from his vacation. That was on the subject of how much money had been allocated to Mr. Liddy. Now. I, in thinking Of about 7 months from the time, we, authorized the funds, -to the time of the November election. I thought that Mr. Liddy should have received somewhere between $100,000 and $125,000, approximately. That was my guesstimate. Mr. Porter indicated that He had distributed about $20,000 Or $30,000 to Liddy, so I assumed that Mr. Sloan probably distributed Somewhere under $100,000. Now, I will fully admit that I had hoped that the figure was as, low as possible, and we all hoped that it -was low, Mr. Sloan would not tell me what the figure was. He refused to tell me the figure. He said, I cannot tell you the figure. I Said, just tell me, what. it IS; so We can work On the solution of this problem, If we do not know how much you gave Mr. Liddy, how can we determine what the money went for? On the third meeting, he and I went out and had a couple of drinks and he still would not discuss the facts of this sit situation with me. I did not at that, time or In any of those meetings ask him to do, anything relating to money other than tell me what the figure was and that I hoped it, was a low figure. And I certainly did hope it was a low figure. But I had no problem accepting a higher figure, because I thought we could work something out relating to any figure within reasonable limits. I think the. real problem was that he knew it was $199,000 and I was aghast at that figure. because there was no way Mr. Liddy should have received that much money in that, short period of time. It was only 2 1/2 months since its; approval. [00.08.23]
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 25, 1973
[00.38.26-EHRLICHMAN is angry because he cannot fix the grand jury] Ehrlichman asked me why I couldn't do anything with Petersen about this and I told him that Petersen had done the best be could but that there was nothing he could do about it because the grand jury wanted Stans to appear. Ehrlichman would not accept my explanation and called Petersen and was very harsh in telling Petersen that he should honor the White House request that Stans not be forced to appear at the courthouse to go before the grand jury. I was present when Ehrlichman called Petersen and felt that he was wrong in doing so. I felt that Petersen had been more than accommodating and that if he could have done, it, he would, but obviously the grand jury wanted to see these people and Petersen was not happy with the procedures that had been followed with the others. It had merely been an accommodation. Accordingly. I called Mr. Petersen and apologized for the call that he had received from Ehrlichman. The only significant matter that I can recall in connection with any of the grand jury appearances was in connection with Colson's grand jury appearance also. After Colson returned from his grand jury interview he sent me a memorandum, a Copy of which I have submitted to the committee--which he suggested I might wish to send on to the prosecutors. I had been present during Colson's interview with the prosecutors before his sworn statement was taken and I did not find anything of significance in the memorandum that he had failed to cover during his interview. [00.39.51-attempt to hold the line at MAGRUDER for approving LIDDY plan, insulate the WHITE HOUSE] Mr. DEAN. I had also received information from Magruder that he had been pressured by Colson and members of Colson's staff into authorizing the adoption of Liddy's plan on several occasions this information was not, reflected in the memorandum that Colson had prepared. I felt that the memorandum was rather self-serving to Mr. Colson and I was not convinced that it was totally factual. The memorandum also came to my attention almost a week after Colson had sent it to me because, immediately following his appearance before the grand jury at the end of August. I had gone to San Clemente. I advised Colson that I did not know if everything in his memorandum Was consistent with Magruder's testimony and thought we, ought to leave well enough alone. He agreed. Accordingly I filed the document rather than forward it to Mr. Silbert. [00.40.38-DENIALS by the White House to the public of involvement in WATERGATE] THE SO-CALLED DEAN INVESTIGATION. It was while I was in San Clemente, at the end of August that the President announced at a press conference the so-called "Dean Report cleared everybody presently employed the White House or in the administration from any complicity in the Watergate matter. This statement was made on August 29, 1972. I would like, to recall to the committee what the White House had publicly said about this incident prior to the August 29 statement of the President. On June 19, Ziegler reported that there was no inquiry being, made by the. White House, into the matter. On June 20 Ziegler stated that the case is something that, the President will not get into at all despite the fact, that Mr. Hunt had been publicly linked to the White House. On June 21, Ziegler stated that Colson had assured him that he was not involved and the White House repeated the statement that the President, -would not get involved. On June the President stated that as Ziegler had said, the, White House has had no involvement whatever in this particular incident. On July 8, when the President was in California, he ruled out a special prosecutor and said that the FBI and other authorities will pursue the investigation thoroughly and completely. And, Ziegler further reported on that date that the President would not be getting special reports on this politically sensitive case since that would be inappropriate. [00.42.01] Suddenly came the, August 29 statement, citing the Dean investigation. I had no advance knowledge that the President was going to indicate that I had investigated the matter and found no complicity on the, part of anybody at the White House or anyone presently employed in the administration. I first learned of the matter when I heard it on a television news broadcast that evening after I had departed from the compound at San Clemente. I was going to walk up to the residence, and listen to the press conference that day because I had never been to a press conference on the west coast, but at the last minute. I returned to my room and later turned on the television and heard the statement. [00.42.39-DEAN describes problems with the WHITE HOUSE P.R. effort-links from White House to Watergate] Had I been consulted in advance by the President. I would have strongly opposed the, issuing of such a statement for several reasons which I would have told the President. First. I was aware that Gordon Strachan had Close daily liaison with 'Mr. Magruder and had carried information relating to wiretapped conversations into the White House and later destroyed incriminating documents at Haldeman's direction. Second, I had never been able to determine whether Haldeman had advance knowledge or not and in fact had never asked him because I didn't feel I could . [00.43.12] Third. I had always suspected, but never been able to substantiate my suspicion that Colson was far more knowledgeable than he protested. I was very aware of Mr. Colson's efforts to disassociate himself with Hunt and of Colson's continual production of documents that would disassociate himself with Hunt, Colson protested too much. Finally, I -was aware of the two meetings that I had attended and had reported these to both Haldeman and Ehrlichman. I reported to Haldeman, as I mentioned earlier, shortly after the meetings had occurred -when I told him I thought the idea was bad and incredible, and told him that I would have no connection or relationship -with the matter. I had reported this to Ehrlichman in June 1972, shortly after the incident. [00.43.58-evident that HALDEMAN was aware of the LIDDY plan before the breakin] I never understood how the Liddy plan had been approved and Magruder had indicated to me that there had been White House pressure to get, the plan moving. Accordingly, I -would have been the last to say unequivocally, as the President so stated, that no one presently employed at the White House had any advance knowledge of the matter. I did believe, however, that nobody at the. White House knew that there was going to be, a break-in of the Democratic -National Committee on June 17, because I don't, believe that, anyone other than those directly involved knew that that was going to happen, on that day. [00.44.32]
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 12, 1973
[00.39.41] [STANS' attorney Robert BARKER continues to argue that STANS should not be required to testify because his testimony would prejudice his chances for a fair trial in a criminal indictment against him] On August 2, 1972, Mr. Stans voluntarily appeared and gave sworn testimony to the assistant U.S. attorney for use before the Watergate grand jury here in Washington, D.C. Subsequently, Mr. Stans voluntarily appeared before the staff of the House Banking and Currency Committee and gave information with respect to campaign finances and cooperated with that, committee, On six different occasions, in addition to submitting the official reports required of the committee, Mr. Stans gave affidavits and discussed matters, with Representatives of the General Accounting Office concerning campaign Finances and activities. He did everything he could to clarify matters. Again voluntarily, he went, to New York and appeared before the U.S. attorney handling the grand jury investigation into the Vesco contribution to the campaign. He then also voluntarily appeared on two occasions before that grand jury and fully and candidly and completely testified as to the matters known to him to the best of his ability. In addition, on three occasions, he has given en deposition-, in the civil litigation arising out of the campaign. He has also testified for the litigation in Florida, a criminal case down there. Subsequently, he appeared before the staff of this committee and on two occasions, gave them information concerning the campaign activities and finances, and he fully intended to appear voluntarily before this committee and to give it, all the cooperation and assistance that he could. However, on May 10, the United States of America, of which this committee is a part, a coordinate branch, changed the whole situation. It brought an indictment against Mr. Stans, charging him with very serious crimes arising out of the campaign and his duties as chairman of the finance committee. As you know, Mr. Stans pleaded innocent. Now, Mr. Stans is before this committee under subpena, with a direction to testify about his function as chairman of the Committee To Re-Elect the President. Inevitably, directly or indirectly, this hearing will influence any jury which might be called to hear the case In New York. This places Mr. Stans in an impossible position and a completely unfair one. Under our constitutional system and the fundamental laws of this land, an accused is entitled to a fair trial by an impartial jury, unimpeded by a deluge of publicity. In other words, as the Supreme Court said in Estes v. Texas, the concept of due process of law entitled the defendant to "both judicial serenity and calm." Now, Mr. Chairman, the inevitable Kleig light of publicity which will result from Mr. Stans' appearance here would preclude any judicial serenity and calm at the trial now set, as I say, for September 11 in New York. It would also tend to deny him the possibility of an impartial jury of the, kind guaranteed by' the sixth amendment. To paraphrase the language, of the Supreme Court in Delaney v. U.S. (199 F. 2d. 107Y 1st cir., 1952), Mr. Stans' appearance before, this committee and the television and other news media, related thereto would accomplish additional investigation and extensive publicity Which would serve no other purpose than to further prejudice Mr. Stans' right to a fair trial. Now, the Supreme Court, in speaking of the problem of publicity and fair trial, has said, the Court has insisted that no one, be, punished for a crime without a charge fairly made and fairly tried in a public trial free of prejudice, passion, commitment, and tyrannical power." (Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 222, 236-237, 1940). Also speaking of freedom Of the Press, the Supreme Court has said it must not be allowed to divert, the trial from the very purpose of the court system, to adjudicate controversies both in the calmness and solemnity of the court-room according to legal procedures. Among the legal procedures is the requirement that the jury's verdict, be based on evidence received in open court, not from outside sources," (Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350, 351, 1965). The undeviating rule of the Supreme Court was stated long ago by Mr. Justice Holmes, when he said, "The theory of our system is that the conclusions, to be reached in a case will be induced only by evidence and argument in open court and not by any outside influence, whether of private talk or public print." (Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 4621 1907). [00.45.20]