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Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities - Testimony of James McCord.
Senator GURNEY. The activities you have described, that is bugging the Democrat National committee and photographing as I understand documents there, as well as the McGovern and Muskie operations. Those all have to do with political campaigning, didn't they? Mr. McCORD. I think what we haven't discussed here are some of the other things that went into my motivations and to the explanation by Mr. Liddy to me of the reasons for undertaking this operation at the democratic national committee which included electronic photography and those two operations specifically, but the overall operation was not limited to that. Either in the original planning nor in the authorization by the attorney general. Senator GYRNEY. Well did anything you do in this area of bugging or electronic surveillance, have anything to do with anybody or any activity other than political campaigning of somebody? Mr. McCORD. It came into being because of the one of the basic motivations of mine, which I have stated, been concerned with were the violence oriented demonstrators that we previously discussed in testimony before this committee. Senator GURNEY. I don't want to interrupt at a guide, but it would be helpful Mr. McCord if you were responsive to the questions. Did you do any electronic bugging or surveillance that had anything to do with anybody or anything that did not involve political activity? Mr. McCORD. No sir. Senator GURNEY. You didn't spy on the Russians or the Chinese or anybody like that? Mr. McCORD. No sir. Senator GURNEY. Well, don't you think at sometime it might have occurred to you that perhaps these were illegal things and really didn't have anything to do with national security? Mr. McCORD. Oh yes, it occurred to me at the time the matters were being planned and being discussed, it's occurred to me since, yes. Senator GURNEY. Then why did you go ahead with it? Mr. McCORD. For the reasons I've, basically the reasons I've stated, but those are not the only reasons. The fact that the Attorney General, the White House itself, and my personal opinion the President of the United States I felt had set into motion this operation. Senator GURNEY. In other words, even though ...... Mr. McCORD. ' Because of the close relationship of Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Dean, the fact the Mr. Dean worked for the president. Senator GURNEY. Even though you, if I'm expressing your thoughts correctly, believed it to be illegal or highly suspicious that it was, none the less because the attorney general in your opinion was ordering this then you ought to go ahead and do it. Is that a fair thing to say? (lawyer heard saying " this is a gray area") Mr. McCORD. Sure, this is a gray area, no question about it. But, because the attorney general in his position and because the white house was involved in it, these matters were the matters on which my decision turned. I realized the illegality under normal circumstances, but I also realized that the attorney general can make matters legal by his signature on a piece of paper or his oral authorization of it, which he does do. In domestic subversion cases and in national security cases where electronic surveillance is involved, and it's been done hundreds of times. Senator GURNEY. I'd like to ask a question about this memorandum that you presented to the committee today entitled, 'Political pressure on the writer to except executive clemency and to remain silent'. Now, as I understand it from the testimony contained in here and other things that you have said, that you were very troubled by the fact that one, you were presented with this business of executive clemency, and promise of your family being taken care of, (James McCord seen cupping ear, in order to hear) and also a job later, that I guess you didn't think this was the right thing to do, or perhaps you weren't too convinced that it would happen and that you also were afraid that perjury was going to be engaged in in the trial, am I fairly stating your reactions about this? Mr. McCORD. Somewhat, yes sir.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 28, 1973 (1/2)
[01.00.15-DEAN describes instances where White House subordinates were required to take blame to protect those higher up, compares to his situation with the Watergate coverup.] Senator TALMADGE. All right. Proceed. Mr. DEAN. Another instance that occurs to me is when during the 1970 congressional campaign there were a number of rather rough, you might call, of questionable political ethical standard, ads run that got the name of the Shipley ad because Mr. Shipley had signed the ads. The ultimate blame came to rest at the White House and it came to rest on Chuck Colson. [01.00.54] Senator TALMADGE. You are saving then in your testimony. as I understand it, it was common practice -in the White House when something went wrong for subordinates to take the blame for their superiors; is that your testimony? Mr. DEAN. Yes. it is, Senator. Senator TALMADGE. 'Thank you very much, Mr. Dean. I must rush to the Senate floor and the committee will stand in recess until the vice chairman or some other member returns. Thank you, sir. Mr. DEAN. Fine. [01.01.20] Jim LEHRER v.o. states that Sen. TALMADGE has raised the new ethical issue of scapegoating, which will be pursued further with DEAN. [PBS NETWORK ID-title screen "SENATE HEARINGS ON CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES"] [01.04.06-TAPE OUT]
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities - Testimony of James McCord.
Mr. Sam DASH. I have one further question. Mr. McCORD. I will answer any question. Mr. DASH. Have you ever made that statement before this select committee, other than when you appeared before Minority counsel and myself a couple of days ago. But, have you ever made that statement before this committee, before the Grand Jury or before any investigating body until this time? Mr. McCORD. No sir. Mr. DASH. Could you please state to the committee why when you were making statements at earlier times before this committee, before the Grand Jury and other inquiring bodies you failed to disclose that information? Mr. McCORD. I'd be glad to. To take the Grand Jury, and get that one out of the way, when I appeared before the Grand Jury I told them, they inquired about political pressure. I raised the pressure that had been put to me by the Hunt's and told them as well that there was a personal friend who was involved also in political pressure against me, that personally at that point in time it was very painful thing to go into it, that I would be glad to do it at a later time and I hoped that they would defer that question till subsequent questioning and I would be glad to answer it, they said they would do so. I believe when I appeared before the Executive Committee here on March 28th, that your senators asked me the same question, and that I said "yes, there had been political pressure applied to me". That one such pressure had been by a government, one of your senators asked me if it were by a government employee, I think Senator Montoya and I responded "yes" and he asked if it were anyone with the White House and I said "no". He asked if it were from the Department of Justice, and I said "no". It was clear, I think to the Committee that I would like to able to answer that question at a later time, the reason for the delay is that I wanted to be as accurate as I could about the information and get it all together because it involved the President of the United States, in my opinion. And it was a very serious matter and I wanted to be very careful about it and accurate. Mr. DASH. I have no further questions Mr. Chairman.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, May 23, 1973 Testimony of John Caulfield.
Senator Joseph MONTOYA. Alright. Now did you come in contact quite frequently with Mr. Ehrlichman? Mr. John CAULFIELD. In the course of my duties yes sir, not on a daily basis certainly but, I would be working with his staff people (lawyer smoking) Mr. Egil Krogh when I first went in there, and as I've indicated. I would be assigned major projects. I was the White House representative for the marijuana and dangerous drug task force that began in the spring of 1969. Senator MONTOYA. Alright now, in the course of your employment at the White House, what relationship did you have with Mr. Dean when he came on board? Mr. CAULFIELD. Well, Mr. John Ehrlichman when I was working with him coming aboard the White House was council to the president. When Mr. Ehrlichman became the presidential assistant and headed up the domestic affairs council, Mr. John Dean came in and became the council to the president and I remained in the office of the council to the president, under Mr. Dean, my direct supervisor. Senator MONTOYA. Did he assign many things to you? Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes sir. Senator MONTOYA. Did Mr. Ehrlichman continue to assign things to you to do? Mr. CAULFIELD. As I've indicated senator only on rare occasions after Mr. Ehrlichman became assistant to the President for domestic affairs. Senator MONTOYA. Did Mr. Haldeman assign things to you? Mr. CAULFIELD. On only one or two occasions that I can recall senator, very rarely in fact almost never. Senator MONTOYA. Alright, now you mentioned that you had interviewed Mr. McCord for his employment at the executive offices and recommended him to go to work for the committee to re-elect the president, that is correct isn't it? Mr. CAULFIELD. Well, that's accentually correct senator, the recommendation was for employment at the Republican National Committee initially, and flowing from that Mr. McCord was hired by the committee to re-elect. Senator MONTOYA. How many interviews did you say you had with Mr. McCord? Mr. CAULFIELD. I recall two, I recall a luncheon when it was already established that he was on board. Senator MONTOYA. Who did you clear it with at the White House before you recommended Mr. McCord for that employment? Mr. CAULFIELD. I didn't clear anybody sir. Senator MONTOYA. Who did you call at the Republican National Committee? Mr. CAULFIELD. I called Mr. Barry Mountain, who was the then Deputy chairman for administration. Senator MONTOYA. Had he asked you to recommend someone? Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes sir. Senator MONTOYA. And was there a job classification for the individual that he wanted? Mr. CAULFIELD. No as I recall the way Mr. Mountain explained it to me they wanted someone to come up and do a security survey and possibly following the survey the party who did the survey would be hired as a supervisor of security at the Republican National Committee. Senator MONTOYA. Was there any discussion with respect to that classification that the man that would be chosen and the man that you might interview should be qualified in espionage activities for the party? Mr. CAULFIELD. Absolutely not sir. Senator MONTOYA. Were you aware that that was one of the competencies that this man should have anyway? Mr. CAULFIELD. No sir. In reviewing Mr. McCord's qualifications, they appeared to me from a career experience in security work, to be absolutely outstanding and his credentials appeared to be impeccable.
Voting Rights Act Extension
Chairman of the Whole House and Rep. Richard Bolling (D-MO) asks: "For what purpose does the gentleman from California rise?....The committee will be in order! Committee will not proceed until the committee is in order. Members will please take their seats. Committee will not proceed with its business until its in order." Gavel is banged multiple times. Adult Caucasian and African American men and women seated around the House rostrum.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 25, 1973
[00.18.49-After the SEGRETTI publicity, heads roll on the WHITE HOUSE staff to protect the bigshots by sacrificing smaller players] Haldeman said that he was personally too close to Chapin to make a judgment on such it thing and that if it was going to be done it was going to be reraised with the President it would have to be done so by Ehrlichman. Ehrlichman said that he did not think that it was possible to reraise the -matter and subsequently Chapin resigned from the White House staff. [00.19.10] DISCUSSIONS OF A WRITTEN DEAN REPORT As the press accounts of Segretti's activities lingered on after the election as well as the continuing Watergate stories there was serious discussion about putting out the facts. [00.19.25] in late November I recall conversation with Haldeman in his office. We talked about the facts and he asked my opinion about what would happen if we put them out- I told him that I thought that the then pending trial would be put back into -a grand jury and it was very likely that Mitchell, Magruder, Strachan, Ehrlichman, Haldeman, and Dean could be indicted. He asked me to elaborate. I said I had no idea nor did I have full knowledge of what happened before June 17 but I did know that there is a good possibility, that any reconvened grand jury could get into questioning of obstruction of justice which would lead right to us. [00.20.04-the option of coming clean is raised and dismissed-instead, DEAN is ordered to write a fake report clearing the White House] Haldeman said that the President wished now that the election was over, to get rid of the Watergate and related matters by laying them open but based on what I had just told him he said it doesn't seem to be a very viable option. I told him that I was ready at any time to account for in self and that I thought, we should continue to examine, that option so that the President is not damaged. He then asked me to attempt. to write a, report that could be made public; a report that Would be a written version of the So-called Dean investigation that the President had announced on August 29 and include a new report on the Segretti matter. I told Haldeman that I thought that this could only create additional new problems, because it would be just like a peek into the tent without letting anyone in and it would be very difficult to write, but I would do my best, I did not tell Haldeman that I was also opposed to writing a report under my name which I felt would come back to haunt me some day. Accordingly, to follow his instructions I decided that I would draft a series of carefully worded interrogatories for each individual whose name had come up in the press regarding political sabotage and espionage activities Then based on the affidavits I would write a summary report and attach the affidavits I thought that I would merely waltz Over the Watergate matter referring to the fact that other governmental Investigations, the FBI and the grand jury, had cleared anyone in the White House from involvement. After drafting the document I reluctantly Submitted it to Haldeman on December 5. 1 have submitted a copy of this document to the Committee. Mr. DEAN. Haldeman in turn gave it to Ehrlichman who made the editorial changes that appear on the draft. Ehrlichman then gave It to Ziegler. On December 13, a meeting was scheduled in Haldeman's office, to discuss the matter but was subsequently moved to Ziegler's office. Present at the meeting were. Haldeman. 'Moore, Ziegler and myself. Ehrlichman had shown up for the earlier meeting in Haldeman's office but when it was moved to Ziegler's office. he never returned to the meeting, to the best of my recollection. Nothing was resolved at the meeting and it was a consensus of the group that the White House should continue, in Dick Moore's words, to "hunker down"--do nothing--on the general theory that no one would be arrested for what they didn't say. [00.22.28] THE HANDLING OF DEMANDS FOR WHITE HOUSE MONEY Turning to the handling of demand for White House money, I have previously discussed Mr. Kalmbach's raising the money for the first pressures for support money for silence, These pressures were continuous and following the election there were increasing pressures from Hunt for money for himself and the other defendants as a means of assuring their silence. [00.22.53] While this pressure had begun before the election, it steadily grew after the election until the demands were being made directly to the white House for financial assistance. Before getting into the details of these pressures and how they were handled I believe it might be helpful to explain the situation at the White House regarding the handling and availability of cash. In early 1971, I was asked by Haldeman to assist in establishing the, reelection committee in that they had no lawyer of their own. My activities resulted in my learning that there were large sums of cash that had been left over from the 1968 Nixon primaries and some funds had been left from the 1970 congressional fundraising efforts. These moneys, which were referred to as surplus moneys, were held by Kalmbach and controlled by Haldeman and Ehrlichman. I have submitted to the committee, a memorandum prepared by Strachan of a meeting that was attended by Haldeman Strachan, and myself on 'May 18, 1971, which reflects the tight controls Haldeman exercised over the surplus moneys held by Kalmbach. [00.24.06] Mr. DEAN-. I have, also submitted to the, committee documents evidencing that it was necessary to have Haldeman's approval, based on a full explanation of the reasons, for even the smallest disbursement by Kalmbach of the, surplus money. Mr. DEAN-. In this instance, I am reefering to an expenditure of $813. It, was sometime prior to April 7, 1972, that I learned that cash was being sent, to the White House. I was not told the amount, but I was asked by Strachan if I could suggest someone outside of the Government who might be willing to hold a, large amount of cash in a safety deposit -box. I told him I would have to think about it but later told him I couldn't think of anyone. It was in late June or early July 1972, that I learned that $350,000 of the surplus money had been. delivered to the White House prior to April 7, 1972. 1 was informed that the money came from the 1968 primaries and that the delivery was made. before April 7 to insure that it not become a part of the 1972 campaign, funds. [00.25.04]
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 26, 1973 - Testimony of John Dean.
[00.02.45-in to John DEAN testifying] DEAN indicates his unwillingness to resign from the WHITE HOUSE staff unless HALDEMAN and EHRLICHMAN did likewise, and the time delay before those resignations were announced [00.03.07-image of page bearing Senate Resolution 60, Robert MacNEILL v.o. reads resolution] [title screen "SENATE HEARINGS ON CAMPAIGN ACTIVITES"-MacNEILL in studio] [00.03.44] MacNEILL states that if the SELECT COMMITTEE expected the day's questioning to test the credibility of star witness John DEAN, it failed to do so. States that DEAN withstood five hours of questioning and his 'damning' charges against NIXON remain intact, and without official rebuttal. The WHITE HOUSE remained silent about DEAN'S charges that NIXON knew of the WATERGATE COVERUP for 8 months, discussed EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY for the defendants, and was aware of payoffs to keep the defendants silent. States that DEAN expressed awareness of the seriousness of his charges and of the fact that on many matters, "it was his word alone against the President's". MacNEILL quotes DEAN, "I am not here as a sinner seeking a confessional, I am here to tell the truth". States that the truth is yet unknown, as DEAN's charges conflict with at least six claims of innocence or ignorance made by the PRESIDENT, but states that after watching the testimony, H.R. HALDEMAN told reporters that it would soon become clear that NIXON had no involvement in the coverup. [00.04.54-Jim LEHRER] LEHRER states that DEAN has been the sole witness for two whole days, but the committee has only begun to test his testimony against others. So far, the WHITE HOUSE has not made any response, but a group of lawyers including Judge RITCHEY denied DEAN'S charges that the WHITE HOUSE lobbied the judge to conduct the DNC Civil Suit against CRP favorably to the White House. LEHRER states that Charles COLSON said DEAN'S testimony was as full of holes as Swiss Cheese, but, when asked directly, COLSON said that DEAN'S charge that COLSON sought an EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY assurance for E. Howard HUNT was "not true, but no a lie either". LEHRER states that the WHITE HOUSE has submitted a list of questions that it wants the committee to ask DEAN, but that those questions have been unused thus far. Senator INOUYE says that he thinks the WHITE HOUSE questions are worth asking. LEHRER notes that the questions originated from a memorandum prepared by DEAN'S replacement as WHITE HOUSE COUNSEL, Leonard GARMENT. [00.06.00-INOUYE speaking to reporters] INOUYE states that most of the SENATORS seem unwilling to touch the questions, but that he sees no reason why not, and if the memorandum in question is properly identified by its origin, the questions raised in it will be appropriate, whether asked by a REPUBLICAN or a DEMOCRAT. [Reporter asks INOUYE if he has read the questions] INOUYE states that he has. [same Reporter asks for the gist of the questions] INOUYE states that in most instances, the questions are a rehash of the previous issues, but that it appears that the WHITE HOUSE wants to prove that DEAN was the brains behind the entire WATERGATE operation, from planning to coverup. [00.06.50-MacNEILL] MacNEILL states that INOUYE will ask the WHITE HOUSE questions if no one else has done so. [00.07.03-LEHRER introduces guest commentator Steven HESS, former NIXON White House staffer] LEHRER asks what viewers of the replayed hearings should look for. HESS replies (somewhat dismayed) that in DEAN'S second day on the stand, "no one laid a glove on him". Pressed by LEHRER, HESS says that is more a result of poor questioning than of DEAN'S personal credibility as a witness. States that the SENATORS were sloppy, poorly prepared, and jumped from subject to subject too much. [I THINK THAT HESS WAS MOST LIKELY GETTING PAID BY THE WHITE HOUSE TO SAY THAT] [00.07.43]
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 7, 1973
[00.58.52] AFTERNOON SESSION, THURSDAY, JUNE 7, 1973 Senator ERVIN. The committee will Come to order. I understand the first witness will be Mr. Porter. We intend to recall Mr. Porter at a later date and it is the hope of the chairman that, at this time, we will only go Into questions about his knowledge or lack of knowledge of the budgeting and break-in of the Watergate and any alleged attempts to cover up that episode. The counsel will call the witness. Mr. DASH. Mr. Herbert Porter, will you please take the witness chair? senator ERVIN. Mr. Porter, will you stand up and rise your right hand? [PORTER standing to be sworn in, right hand raised] Do you swear that, the evidence, which you shall give to the Senate, Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities shall be the truth the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? Mr. PORTER. I do; so help me God. Mr. DASH. Mr. Chairman, Mr. David Dorsen, assistant chief counsel, will ask the opening questions of this witness. [IT IS VERY STRANGE HOW MUCH DORSEN RESEMBLES SAM DASH] Mr. DORSEN. Mr. Porter, could you please give your full name and address" TESTIMONY OF HERBERT LLOYD PORTER, ACCOMPANIED BY CHARLES B. MURRAY, COUNSEL Mr. PORTER. Yes, sir; my name is Herbert Lloyd Porter. My Present address is 32451 Mediterranean Drive, Laguna Niguel, Calif. Mr. DORSEN. Mr. Porter, I see you are represented by counsel. Could counsel please identify himself? Mr. MURRAY. Charles B. Murray Is my name, sir. Mr. DORSEN. Mr. Porter, I understand that you have a brief Opening statement Would you please make it at this time? Mr. PORTER. Thank you. My full name is Herbert Lloyd Porter. I am also known as "Bart" Porter. I was born and reared in California. I served 2 years as an officer in the U.S. Marine Corps, after which I spent 7 1/2 years in the marketing of data processing computers and software. Having never been involved in any political campaign or other political activity, I was both honored and excited at the opportunity to help in some way toward the reelection of Richard Nixon to a second term in the White House. Prior to joining the Committee for the Re-Election of the President in May 1971, I served a brief period in the White House, working in the office of the Director of Communications Herbert G. Klein. My function at the Committee for, the Re-Election of the President was to organize the surrogate candidate program. My title was director of scheduling. I was also responsible, for organizing all celebrities, entertainers, and athletes for the campaign. Almost all my time, while at the Committee for the Re-Election of the President, was spent organizing and directing the activities of these several groups. Stories have appeared in both newspapers and magazines mentioning my name in connection with what has come to be known as Watergate. A few of these stories have been fairly accurate, some half true, while others have been totally false. The record will show that I have made no comments to any reporters or newsmen over the past several months, This may or may not have been wise on my part, but I was trying the best I knew how to protect my wife and my three children from the consequences of any excess publicity. I have cooperated fully with both the Federal prosecutors and members of the investigative staff of this committee, and I have made full disclosure to them. I also wish to state that in cooperating with both the Federal prosecutors and this committee, I did so voluntarily and, in the case of the Federal prosecutors, I appeared at my own request, At no time did I ever seek immunity from either group, nor did I authorize my lawyer to do so. I have made no deals. I have, agreed only to tell the truth. I will answer all questions, put to me by this committee regarding testimony heretofore given by me. At no time did I ever have, any intention of covering up a criminal act. At no time did I knowingly engage in any coverup of the Watergate burglary. I had no prior knowledge of the Watergate burglary. And up to this very moment, I have no knowledge of the involvement of others. I have been guilty of a, deep sense of loyalty to the President of the United States. The facts speak for themselves. Finally, may I say that this whole affair air has had a most, devastating effect on my personal life. Because of the unfavorable publicity, I have been terminated from a lucrative position in private industry, a fact which, in turn, has caused me to forfeit, at substantial loss, the purchase of a new home in California, where I was born and planned to live, This is my situation, Mr. Chairman. I am now ready to answer any and all questions to the best of my ability. Mr. DORSEN. Mr. Porter, in your opening statement------ [01.04.11--TAPE OUT]
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 12, 1973
[00.08.25--committee room] Senator ERVIN. The committee will come to order. I presume Senator Baker will be here in a minute. Since the witness will first read a written statement of which Senator Baker has a copy, we will proceed. Mr. STANS. Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, I am very sorry that the circumstances of my appearance made it necessary for my counsel to raise legal points in order to protect my right to a fair trial in New York. I personally would much have preferred to testify without any need to protect myself in that criminal action in which I feel that in the setting of a fair and impartial trial I would be exonerated. However, I want to assure you now that I will do my very best to be helpful to the committee in my testimony. Less than 2 years ago, one of the proudest moments of my experience occurred here on the Senate side of the Capitol, as I approached the end of my service as Secretary of Commerce. Some of you and many of your colleagues on the Senate Commerce Committee were extremely generous in a public hearing in praise of my efforts over a 3-year period as head of the Department of Commerce and some of the Democratic Senators even wished me success in my new undertaking as a fundraiser--but not too much success, they said. All of those comments remain highly valued to me, now, as much as any reward of the many years I spent in public service in two administrations. I would like my appearance here today to be another service in the public interest, The circumstances that bring us together are extremely regrettable, but I still share a strong mutual concern with you-in this case establishing the facts and the truth of these matters Of national interest. For that reason, as you know, I have cooperated with your staff prior to my appearance here today, just as I intend to do fully with the committee here now. My sense of integrity compels me to do so. In the past, I have refrained from answering 'in a piece-meal fashion various questions which have been raised by the media concerning the Presidential campaign and other related matters. For that, I have been highly criticized. But I felt, that, it was better if I could answer these questions before an appropriate forum in the setting and perspective of the overall situation. This would enable me to give a complete picture rather than a piece-meal response, and this is what I hope to do today, to the extent, I am able. This may help resolve some, questions as to which there has been a minimum of understanding and much erroneous public information. Next, let me say that I have cooperated fully with every official agency that has sought, information from me. I have met twice with the staff Of this committee, once with the staff of the House Banking and Currency committee, have had three meetings with the FBI and at, least six with the General Accounting Office, have given a deposition to the assistant U.S. attorney in Washington and have met with the assistant U.S. attorney in New York and twice testified before a New York grand jury. All of this has been voluntary, I have also testified several times by deposition in civil suits and once in a Florida criminal case. Also, during all the investigations which have commenced since June 17, 1972, I have instructed all finance committee personnel to cooperate fully and candidly. The reported testimony of Hugh Sloan, Jr., Paul Barrick, Judy Hoback, Evelyn Hyde, and Arden Chambers, is evidence that this is being done. I am convinced that, none of these persons had a part in Watergate or the subsequent events. However, as will come out, Mr. Sloan's recollections and mine may differ in a, few respects. This is obviously attributable to the passage of time, or the pressures of events at the time, or subjective recall. Just as he has given you his best, recollection, I will give you mine, on the various financial matters. On the major issue, that of involvement in the Watergate matter, I am satisfied that he is completely innocent. Now, it is my understanding that, the. committee is probing three matters on which it might assume that I have some knowledge--the espionage charges, including the Watergate bugging, and the coverup charges that allegedly followed; the sabotage charges, including the Segretti operation; and the handling of campaign finances. On these three matters I would like to state this: [00.13.30] (1) I had no knowledge of the Watergate break-in or any other espionage efforts before I read about them in the press, or of the efforts to cover up after the event. (2) I had no knowledge of any sabotage program to disrupt the campaign by Segretti or anyone else. (3) To the best of my knowledge, there were no intentional violations of the laws relating to campaign financing by the finance committees for which I had responsibility. Because of the complexity of the, new law that became effective in the course of the campaign, and the vast, amount of work that, had to be done under the law, there may have been some unintended technical violations by the committee, [00.14.21]
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 28, 1973 (1/2)
Former White House Counsel John Dean responds to allegations that he exaggerated the scope of his contact with U.S. President Richard Nixon in order to make his testimony seem more important, for his own purposes. John Dean: "Senator, where the source of that story came from I don't have any idea. It certainly was not from me. I always, in dealing with any of the investigators from either this committee or from the Prosecutor's office, told them exactly what I knew. I don't know of any exaggeration at any time, any place, regarding my knowledge of this matter. So I can't-- it's obviously a loaded question and I don't know how to answer, other then to say what I've just said."
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities May 17, 1973 - Testimony of Robert Odle
[wide shot of Committee table] Senator JOSEPH MONTOYA. (D-NM) [close shot Sen. Montoya] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Odle, by way of preliminary foundation, will you give us your entire job classification and duties which you performed as head of the administration and personnel? Mr. ODLE. Yes, sir. I was basically in charge of office management and that would include procurement of office space, assignment of office space, procurement and assignment of office supplies, installations of office equipment, to desks, furniture, telephones, switchboards, um all of the kinds of things that you would expect one to do in the capacity of office manager. In terms of personnel, I was partially responsible for hiring and firing, particularly at the lower levels, secretarial recruitment was one of my key jobs, finding secretaries. Senator MONTOYA. Would that include the hiring of secretaries for the directors? Mr. ODLE. If they requested a secretary, yes. Senator MONTOYA. Did you hire any secretaries for any of the directors? Mr. ODLE. What, by do you mean? do, do (stutters) Senator MONTOYA. For instance, Mr. Liddy. Mr. ODLE. Yeah, I did not. Somebody in our operation found, I believe, Mrs. Harmony and she was hired as Mr. Liddy's secretary after Mr. Liddy interviewed her. Senator MONTOYA. Did you arrange for the interview? Mr. ODLE. No. Senator MONTOYA. What about Jeb Magruder's secretary? Mr. ODLE. No, they came with him from the White House. Senator MONTOYA. Did you arrange for the allocation of space? Mr. ODLE. Yes. Senator MONTOYA. Now please explain how much space you had at that particular building and was the entire operation under the roof of one building? Mr. ODLE. At what point in time Senator? in the height of the campaign? Senator MONTOYA. Let us say from the time that Mr. Mitchell went onboard as campaign director. Mr. ODLE. We had a suite on the second floor, we had a suite on the fourth floor. The campaign director had a suite on the fourth floor, We later, after Mr. Mitchell came aboard took the entire third floor, we took the suite on the fifth floor, the suite on the eighth, the suite on the ninth and suite on the 11th. Senator MONTOYA. Now, when you speak of suites do you mean the entire floor? Mr. ODLE. No, sir, we only had one entire floor in that building and everything and that was the third. We had suites from as many as five private offices, say to 25. That is what I mean when I say a suite. Senator MONTOYA. Now where did you have the file room? Mr. ODLE. The what? Senator MONTOYA. Where did you have the file room? The file room. Mr. ODLE. I don't believe we had a file room, sir. Senator MONTOYA. Did you have files in different offices? Mr. ODLE. Yes, sir. Senator MONTOYA. Now, when you speak of files which you made available to the FBI, why were you called upon to make these files available? Mr. ODLE. Um, the subpoenas from the FBI, were directed to Clark MacGregor or his authorized representative, and Maurice Stans or his authorized representative. I turned out to be the authorized representative. In addition to that, I was the administrative person at the committee, the administrative officer and it was sort of natural since I knew the building fairly well and knew the people fairly well, that I would be asked to assume that role.
JFK Assassination Hearings - E. Aschkenasy & Mark Weiss, H.B. McClain
U.S. House Representative Louis Stokes (D-OH) recognizes Chief Counsel Professor Robert Blakey. Blakey gives a long explanation of the work of the acoustics committee which investigated based on the tape of the assassination the question of how many shots Oswald could have gotten off within the diagnosed time frame.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 6, 1973 Testimony of Hugh Sloan
Sam Ervin (D - North Carolina). Now, there was a good deal of consternation among the officers and employees of the Committee To Re-Elect the President when it was reported on the morning of June 17, 1972, that one of the employees of the committee, Mr. McCord, and four other people had been arrested in an act of burglary during the early morning hours of that day, wasn t it? Hugh Sloan. Yes, sir. Sam Ervin (D - North Carolina). And that was the time that Mr. Liddy made his statement to you to the effect that some of his boys had been caught in the Watergate and he had made a mistake in letting one of our people participate in the matter? Hugh Sloan. Yes, sir; that is correct. Excuse me, Senator. He did not say, "My boys were caught last night in the Watergate." He just said, "My boys were caught," with no direct connection to Watergate. Sam Ervin (D - North Carolina). You inferred what he was talking about? Hugh Sloan. Not until after I read the newspapers, Senator. He made that comment to me before I knew of the break in.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, July 10, 1973
[00.22.47-DASH continues to interrogate MITCHELL about the events at the time of the Watergate break-in] Mr. DASH. At that time, out in California, did it ever cross your when you read about this that perhaps the Liddy plan had been put in operation? Mr. MITCHELL. Well, that had crossed my mind but the players were different and, of course, there was a lot of discussion about CIA and because of the Cuban Americans who were involved in it. It vomit until actually later on that it struck home to me that this could have been the same operation that had a genesis back in the earlier Conversation. Mr. DASH. Well then, after you returned from California, and I understand that was on June 19, 1972. Mr. MITCHELL. Yes, Sir. it was. Mr. DASH. When. and how were you briefed as to what actually happened in this matter? [00.23.39] Mr. MITCHELL. Well. how was I briefed as to what actually happened? Mr. DASH. Yes. Mr. MITCHELL. Well, that is such a broad statement that. I could tell you for the next 6 months I was being briefed on it. Mr. DASH. I mean, let's take the--- Mr. MITCHELL. Excuse me. Mr. Dash. YOU are asking the, questions" Mr. DASH. That is all right, I think you were about ready to give me a shorter than a longer answer. Mr. MITCHELL. Well, I was giving you a shorter answer to the fact that the first so-called briefing on What had happened, and you used the word "actually" which I will have to omit from that for the time being because I have never quite got to the bottom of it, was after Mr. Mardian and Mr. LaRue had met with Mr. Liddy and Mr. Liddy provided them with quite an extensive story on Mr. Liddy's activities. [00.24.38-DISCUSSION OF LIDDY'S activities with PLUMBERS] Mr. DASH. Will you tell us briefly what that extensive story included? Mr. MITCHELL. Well, it included the, fact, that he was involved with other individuals in the Watergate activity, that he, had also made surveillance of McGovern headquarters, I believe it was, and that he had previously, as part of what has since, become known as the Plumbers group, acted extensively in certain -areas while he was at the White House in connection with the Ellsberg matter, in the Dita Beard matter and a few of the other little gems. Mr. DASH. When you say the Ellsberg matter what specifically are you referring to? Mr. MITCHELL. Well, I am referring to, well, it certainly wasn't, the prosecution. Mr. DASH. NO. Mr. MITCHELL. Obviously it had to do with the surreptitious entry of the doctor's office in California. Mr. DASH. And when you refer to the Dita Beard matter what specifically did you learn through Mr. LaRue and Mr. Mardian? Mr. MITCHELL. Well, if my recollection is correct he was assisting in spiriting her out of wherever they spirited her out of, either New York or Washington. [00.25.59-This MEETING was, as DEAN stated, a major point in the developing COVERUP. MITCHELL denies that it was so significant] Mr. DASH. Was there a meeting in your apartment on the evening that you arrived in Washington on June 19, attended by Mr. LaRue, Mr. Mardian, Mr. Dean. Mr. Magruder--- Mr. MITCHELL. Magruder and myself, that is correct. Mr. DASH. DO you recall the purpose of that meeting, the discussion on that took place there? Mr. MITCHELL. I recall that, we, had been traveling all day and, of course, we had very little information about what the current status was of the entry of the Democratic National Committee, and -we met at the apartment to discuss it. They were, of course, clamoring for a response from the committee because of Mr. McCord's involvement, et cetera, and we had quite a general discussion of the subject matter. [00.26.52] Mr. DASH. Do you recall any discussion of the -so-called either Gemstone files or wiretapping files that you had in your possession? Mr. MITCHELL. -No, I had not heard of the Gemstone file., as of that meeting and, as of that date, I had not heard that anybody there at that particular meeting knew of the wiretapping aspects of that or that had any connection with it. Mr. DASH. Did either you or anybody in your presence at That meeting discuss Mr. Liddy having a good fire at his house? Mr. MITCHELL. Not in my recollection was there any discussion of destruction of documents at that meeting. [00.27.27] Mr. DASH. You are aware of the testimony of Mr. Magruder that he did get the idea to destroy the documents and he did in fact burn the Gemstone documents? Mr. MITCHELL. I am aware of his testimony and think his testimony was one of these general things "It was decided that" or something to that effect, but, to my recollection, there was no such discussion of it. [00.27.51]
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 13, 1973 (2/2)
[01.16.25] Senator BAKER. Ws there any discussion of the Watergate or related activities? Mr. STANS. Absolutely not,. Senator BAKER. Or of intelligence gathering? Mr. STANS. NO, Senator BAKER. Or the form, matter, and type of fiscal control that would be exercised by you over campaign expenditures? Mr. STANS. Yes, I think that was discussed because I wanted it very clear with Mr. Mitchell that we had precisely the arrangement that I have discussed here. Senator BAKER. Did you discuss then the matter of the finance committee meeting where as Mr. Sloan described it, I believe, there was a discussion of the authorization of larger expenditures by this committee consisting Of political types and finance types. Was that discussed at the meeting with Mr. -Mitchell on February 22? Mr. STANS. Senator, I would appreciate it if you would repeat, the question. I didn't, quite get the point, Senator BAKER. All right, sir. It is my understanding that, there. was a committee made up of representatives of the finance committee and of the political side of the campaign that met periodically to discuss expenditures proposed or made for the campaign. Is that correct? Mr. STANS. That is correct. It was called the budget committee. Senator BAKER. Was the budget, committee's formulation or function discussed with Mr. Mitchell on February 22? Mr. STANS. I don't know but, I wouldn't be surprised if it were because it was one of the matters of organization that was important to me at the time. Senator BAKER. Drawing your attention to March 8, 4 p.m., "Robert," I can't, read the words, "Chairman Richardson, Pres. P-r-e-s," period. Mr. BARKER. Mr. Chairman, I think this is getting into an area where we need not to tread. Senator BAKER. Then at your request I certainly shall not. The next, item is April 25 to Liddy. I will read off a list, here and ask you if you can comment on this list of appointments Mr. Stans, since they appear to be in sequence: April 25, 2 p.m. Liddy; May 1, 3:30, Liddy; May 8, 10:30; and 2 p.m., Liddy-23, 2 o'clock, Liddy; May 30, 10 o'clock, Liddy- May 14, 3:30, 4:30, Liddy, Since, these are all Liddy appointments and they are all in chronological order, apparently, could you tell us what that group of meetings With Mr. Liddy was about? Mr. STANS. Yes, Mr. Liddy by- then was the counsel for the committee He, had been given a number of responsibilities to pursue as a regular matter. I remember some specific subjects that, came up such as the contribution of a man in Chicago who wanted to give stock and we had some considerable discussions with his attorney conducted by Mr. Liddy over a period of time, I remember giving Mr. Liddy the responsibility of seeing that everyone of the national and State committees had properly registered with the General Accounting Office, had properly registered with the Treasury Department and I was following these matters with '-Mr. Liddy as the general counsel from time to time, as the Occasion warranted in addition to the fact that Mr. Liddy appeared at the daily staff meetings. In our staff meeting minutes of April 24, for example, there is an item "Liddy is to continue follow-up of all States not yet registered to submit a weekly list to Stans each Monday of all those not, yet done." Another item "Liddy is to furnish Stans with a legal opinion on anonymous contributions prior to April 7." He was the counsel for the committee. I have given to the committee a number of his legal opinions in writing which indicate that he was quite active and our daily staff minutes show a number of things that were assigned to him. It was quite routine that I discussed all of these matters with him. Senator BAKER. There was no discussion of the Watergate or of intelligence gathering? Mr. STANS. There was absolutely no discussion of that type. [01.20.36] Senator BAKER. The next item is June 16, 1972, and there are two entries, one at 11:30 in the morning I take to be "Haldeman at the White House." And the other 4 in the afternoon, "Liddy." Mr. STANS. That, was the day of a Cabinet meeting at the White House also, I can't recall specifically the purpose of my meeting with Mr. Haldeman. Senator BAKER. Was there any discussion of the Watergate? Mr. STANS. Oh, absolutely not. Senator BAKER. Bear in mind, this was the day before the break-in of the Democratic National Committee headquarters. There was no Mention of intelligence-gathering activities? Mr. STANS. No, absolutely not. Senator BAKER. Of the impending break-in later that night or early the next morning of the Democratic National Committee headquarters? Mr. STANS. No, Senator, absolutely not. Now, I think I did testify yesterday that I saw Haldeman a few times in the course of the year to discuss the size of the budget, the amount of money that the campaign was seeming to cost and my feeling of concern about whether we could raise that, amount of money. In the absence of any other information, I would tell you that the best of my recollection is that that would be what we discussed on June 16. [01.22.04]
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 26, 1973
[00.46.45] Senator ERVIN. The committee is anxious to avoid disclosing any matters which affect national security. which are matters defined as matters relating to national defense or relating to our relations, with other nations and for this reason we will not make this first document public. Senator BARER. Mr. Chairman, may I say a word in that respect? Senator ERVIN., Yes. Senator BAKER. I, too, would like to join in commending Mr. Murphy who, in addition to being- Deputy Director of the joint Atomic Energy Committee staff, is the security officer of the Atomic Energy Committee. I am a member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and while we, are going along with bread and butter, I would like to thank Congressman Mel Price, Who is Chairman, for consenting to the additional burden on the staff of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy to assure the storage of these documents was done in accordance with the requirements of the law. Senator ERVIN. One other question and then I will turn you back to Senator Weicker. How did you get possession of these documents including the one that Mr. Murphy retained custody of? Mr. DEAN. The documents were originally In the possession of Mr. Tom Huston, who had been assigned. I believe directly by the President to -work on this project. When I came on the White House staff, Huston was placed on my staff and was on my staff for some time. I had a general awareness of the fact that he was working on this project, but none of the specifics. At the time Mr. Huston was departing the staff he turned over the documents to me that I had possession of. Some of the documents that that are contained and I maintained in the file, I had never seen before the time he turned them over to me. The only--I had seen the basic documents shortly after I joined the White House staff when Mr. Haldeman told me that Mr. Huston had been working get the plan implemented, but there were some difficulties in implementation. That is basically how I came in contact with the matter. Senator ERVIN. Have you had the physical custody of these papers since that time? Mr. DEAN. Well, I had them until I took them and placed them in a safety deposit box under an instruction of Senator Mansfield that anything that might have any bearing on this entire matter should be Preserved. Senator ERVIN. Senator Weicker you may resume your examination I thought it was wise to bring all of the documents in evidence that we think ought to be put there. Senator WEICKER. Thank you. Mr. Chairman. Now, Mr. Dean, would you be good enough then to read to the committee the memorandum from you to 'Mr. Mitchell Which, I believe now, I have got to rely on my memory of several months time since I have seen these things dated in September 1970; is that correct? Mr. DEAN. September 18, 1970. Senator WEICKER. September 18. [00.50.14-DEAN'S work in 1970 to establish Domestic Intelligence operations] Mr. DEAN. [reading]. Memorandum For the. Attorney General: Pursuant to our conversation yesterday, 'September 17, 1970, I suggest the following procedures to commence our domestic intelligence operation as quickly as possible. 1. Interagency Domestic Intelligence Unit. A key to the entire operation will be the creation of an interagency intelligence unit for both operational and evaluation purposes. Obviously, the selection of persons to this unit will be of vital importance to the success of the mission. As we discussed the selection of the personnel for this unit is an appropriate first step for several reasons. First, effective coordination of the different agencies must be developed it an early stage through the establishment of the unit. Second. Hoover has indicated a strong opposition to the creation of such a unit and, to bring the FBI fully on board, this seems an first step to guarantee their proper and full participation in the program. Third, the unit can serve to make appropriate recommendations for the type of intelligence that should be immediately pursued by the various agencies. In regard to this third point. I believe we agreed that it would inappropriate to have any blanket removal of restrictions: rather, the most appropriate procedure would be to decide on the type of intelligence we need, based on an assessment of the recommendations of this unit, and then to proceed to remove the restraints as necessary to obtain such intelligence. To proceed to create the interagency intelligence unit. particularly the evaluation group or committee I recommend that we request the names of four nominees from each of the intelligence agencies involved. While the precise composition of the unit may vary as we gain experience, I think that two members should be appointed initially from each agency, in addition to your personal representative, who should also be involved in the proceedings. Because of the interagency aspects of this request it would probably be best if the request came from the White House, if you agree, I will make such a request of the agency heads; however, I feel that it is essential that you work this out with Hoover before I have any dealings with him directly. [00.52.37]
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, Testimony of James W McCord (Jim McCord)
Samuel Dash, attorney. Did you have any knowledge, direct or indirect, that would lead you to believe or have information that the CIA was involved in this plan? James McCord. I had just the contrary, that there was no indication, no evidence, no statements to me that this was a CIA operation. That quite the contrary that it was an operation which involved the Attorney General of the United States at that point in time. Subsequently, he became the director of the Committee To Re-Elect the President, involved the counsel to the White House, involved Mr. Jeb Magruder and Mr. Liddy, who was then general counsel, at that point in time for the Committee To Re-Elect the President and subsequently was the finance committee general counsel. Therefore, in my mind there was an absolute certainty that the CIA was not involved, neither did I ever receive any statements from any of the other codefendants at any point in time up to June 17 or subsequently, that this was a CIA operation. Samuel Dash, attorney. For the record, your restatement of your belief that the Attorney General, Mr. Magruder, other than Mr. Liddy, was hearsay based on what Mr. Liddy told you and Mr. Hunt? James McCord. That is correct.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, May 18, 1973
DO NOT USE Robert MacNeill signs over to Jim Lehrer, cut to head/shoulder shot of Lehrer seated at desk, with photo blowup of White House directly behind his head. Lehrer elaborates on McCord's testimony about pressure from a Mr. John Caulfield on McCord to remain silent at trial to protect higher officials. Lehrer describes Caulfield as a Treasury Department official, but also as a former Police intelligence officer, Nixon campaigner in '68, and an aide to Atty. General Mitchell in the Committee to Re-Elect. Pan to center of set, zoom in on large screen between Robert MacNeill's and Lehrer's desks, showing B/W photo of John Caulfield, not a flattering one, makes him look very mean. MacNeill compares the day's testimony to spy novel episodes, secret meetings, payphones, spying, expenditures for bugging equipment, emphasizing the blase quality of McCord's narrative about these sensational subjects. Lehrer reminds that there are many facts still to be discovered, and that in the days testimony, much of McCord's testimony was noted by the Senate committee as HEARSAY, which is not legally proof of either Nixon's or the Attorney General's involvement. Introduces Georgetown Univ. Law prof. William Greenhall and author Alan Barth as consultants to NPACT on the legalities of the testimony.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 25, 1973
[00.58.30-Efforts to involve the CIA in the coverup] General Cushman had been the Deputy Director of the CIA at, the time the matter occurred, and when he was asked, he reported that. he had been requested from John Ehrlichman). When Ehrlichman was informed of this, I believe by General Cushman. he denied the fact that he had ever made such a request, and told Cushman that he had never been asked for such assistance. General Cushman prepared a memorandum that indicated that his request had come from either Ehrlichman Colson, or myself. Ehrlichman forwarded a copy of this document to me and asked if I would get this matter taken of, I told him I thought it was somewhat strange that my name was on the memorandum from Cushman in that I had never spoken with Cushman in my life. He then asked me if I did not think it would be better that, Cushman mentioned no one since he, could not remember who it was. I remember suspecting -at, the time, as I do today, that Ehrlichman had had my name inserted in the memorandum as a means of getting me to make, sure that Cushman would have no names in the memorandum at all. I remember calling General Cushman and telling him that I had received from Ehrlichman a copy of his memorandum and that I was somewhat surprised to find my name in it because, this was the first time I had ever spoken with him. He agreed that we had never talked and I said that. Ehrlichman had suggested to me that, if he could not remember who it was, he., Cushman, probably should not mention anyone. A short time later, another memorandum on this subject of who had asked for Hunt to have the assistance of the CIA come forward from. General Cushman and this time no names were mentioned at all. It was after this episode in getting the Cushman statement corrected that I had an occasion to discuss this with Colson. Colson told Me that, he had been present when Ehrlichman had made the. call to Cushman. [01.00.26] 'The other CIA material relating to Hunt's dealings with the CIA emanated from a series of questions that had been asked by the Watergate prosecutors. I recall a discussion with CIA Director Helms and one of his deputies in Ehrlichman's office when they went over the type, of material that they would be providing to the Department of Justice. I subsequently had occasion, -while at the Department of Justice, to talk with Henry Petersen about the CIA material and he showed me a copy of the information the CIA had provided him, and he. told me Mr. Gray had the same material. [01.00.59] I remember that the document had attached to it a number of photographs which had come from a camera--again my text has gotten confused--had come from a Camera, the camera which had been returned by Hunt to the CIA. It is a camera that had been borrowed by Hunt from the CIA. [01.01.25-the most STUPID BURGLARS IN THE WORLD-Gordon LIDDY strikes again!] The pictures which had been processed by the* CIA, included a picture of Liddy standing in front of Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office. I informed Ehrlichman about this and that is the reason that he, subsequently requested that I seek to retrieve the documents before the Senate investigators got a copy of the material. I discussed this with Petersen, but he said that they had received a letter in early January of this year from Senator Mansfield regarding the, maintenance of all records relating to the case and that the only thing That he could do would be to extract the, document and leave a card to the effect that the document. had been returned to CIA. I reported this to Ehrlichman and he. told me that he thought that the CIA ought to get all of the material back and that no card should be left. in the file and that national security grounds should be used to withhold release of the information. On February 9, 1973. I spoke with Director Schlesinger of the CIA and asked him. if it. would be possible to retrieve the material that had been sent to the Department of Justice in connection with the Watergate investigation. I told him that I had discussed this with the Department of Justice and they indicated that they would merely leave a card in their files Indicating that, the material had been returned to the CIA. I subsequently had a visit from General Walters in late February at which time he, told me that. the CIA was opposed to retrieving Material and leaving a card indicating that they had so retrieved It because they also had been requested by the Senate not to destroy any material; relating to the case. I told Walters that I did not suggest that the material be, destroyed: rather I thought that national security grounds might justify withholding release of the information to Senate investigators. He said it, simply could not, be, done and I dropped the matter. [00.03.10] As I 'will explain later in a meeting with Mr. Krogh. the fact that this material was in the possession of the Department of Justice meant to me that, it was inevitable that, the burglary of Ellsberg's psychiatrist office would be discovered. I felt that, any, investigation worth its salt -would certainly be able to look at the pictures in the files at the Department of Justice and immediately determine the location and from there discover the fact that there had been a burglary of the office that was in the picture. I would now like to turn to the White House plan for dealing with this committee. [01.03.50] WHITE HOUSE PLAN FOR PERPETUATING THE COVERUP THROUGHOUT THE SENATE WATERGATE INVESTIGATION Even before the Watergate criminal trial in January of this year, there had been press reports and rumors that the Senate planned independent hearings on the Watergate and related matters. The White House Congressional Relations Staff reported that the subject of the Watergate hearings was being discussed in the Senate Democratic, Policy Committee, but they did not know the substance of those discussions. I was aware of the interest of Ehrlichman and Haldeman in the prospects of such hearings because they had discussed It, with me, and Bill Timmons told me they had discussed it, with him.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 7, 1973
[00.25.38] *SEE RESTRICTIONS FIELD IN RIGHTS SECTION***** Senator INOUYE. You advised the committee that Mr. Magruder, told you that he perjured himself 12 times. Did he tell you about, 12 times he perjured himself? Mr. PORTER. No, sir, he did not. He made that comment the afternoon-the same afternoon, on April 14. Senator INOUYE, I am just-as a mutter of curiosity, you have' indicated that you were moved to take certain actions because of fear of ostracism; you did not want to be ostracized by the team. Mr. PORTER. I am not--- Senator INOUYE. I think that is the phrase you used. What team are you talking about? Mr. PORTER. It is just a generic term, Senator; not any particular squad of people. I used the term generically, I think. Senator INOUYE. People like Mr. Haldeman? Mr. PORTER. Probably. Senator INOUYE. Mr. Mitchell? Mr. PORTER. Probably. Senator INOUYE. The President? Mr. PORTER. I don't think that ever crossed my mind, no, sir. Senator INOUYE. I have other questions, but they relate to the, dirty tricks and I have been advised we will take these up later on. So, Mr. Chairman, I yield at this time, Thank you very much. Mr. PORTER. Yes sir. Senator ERVIN. If there is no objection, we. have some more votes coming up very quickly and our time is running out. Can you come back Tuesday? Mr. PORTER. Sir, I am going to California in the morning with Mrs. Porter. It will require me to fly back on Monday. If that is what the committee wants me to do, I will certainly be willing to do it. Senator ERVIN. I don't think we can finish this afternoon. I hate to inconvenience you. Mr. PORTER. No inconvenience. Senator ERVIN. The committee will stand in recess until Tuesday at 10 o'clock. Mr. PORTER. Yes, sir, I -will be here. [00.27.50--LEHRER in studio] LEHRER discusses the sum total of testimony thus far, saying that it's clear that some bigshots are involved, but not clear how far up into the White House the trail leads. Calls on David AUSTEN, guest commentator and Georgetown University Law Professor, to discuss his view as a lawyer of the proceedings AUSTEN says that PORTER'S testimony was the most interseting, legally speaking, having admitted to two instances of Perjury. States that PORTER'S memory appears outstanding, remembering exact words from old conversations, which will make it easier for cross-examining attorneys to use the transcripts to pick at his testimony word for word. Adds that PORTER did not come across as well as SLOAN, who exuded honesty and candor, while PORTER testified that he only came forward with his story because MAGRUDER's decision to testify put PORTER in the position of having to testify to protect himself, while SLOAN did so out of no apparent self-interest, making his testimony much more credible to a jury. AUSTEN adds that the legal profession took some lumps during PORTER'S testimony, in that there were allegations of improper action toward clients, including even falling asleep during a consultation. Lastly, says AUSTEN,, it seems that the verdict is in on the legal profession, and it seems to be unfavorable. MacNEILL states that PORTER could presumably still be indicted for PERJURY, would he be able to claim some mitigating circumstances by virtue of coming clean for the committee? AUSTEN states that PORTER'S indictment is up to the prosecutor, so he may exercise discretion and can't be forced to indict PORTER, but in the case of conviction, the question of punishment and mitigating circumstances would be up to a judge. MacNEILL states that the deposition of H.R. HALDEMAN had been released that day, in which HALDEMAN said that John DEAN was never asked to investigate WATERGATE for the White House, raising doubts about NIXON'S statements that DEAN had investigated and found no involvement by White House personnel. [00.32.30]
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, July 10, 1973
[00.12.40-DASH interrogates MITCHELL about the state of MITCHELL'S knowledge about NIXON'S knowledge of the Watergate and COVERUP] [00.12. Mr. DASH. But that statement is not made on any information the President told you or you told the President or anybody told you about what the President knows? Mr. MITCHELL. Would you repeat that again? Mr. DASH. I say that statement you have just made, is not based on anything the President told you specifically, anything you fold the President, anything anybody told you that he had told the President? Mr. MITCHELL. I understand the thrust of your question. That is correct. It is based solely on my association with the President and not conversations on the affirmative side of the subject matter. Mr. DASH. I have no further questions. Senator ERVIN. The committee will stand in recess until 2 o'clock. [00.13.20-SENATORS stand to leave, photographers and reporters go into action] [00.13.25-LEHRER in studio] LEHRER states that the latest attempt to determine the PRESIDENT'S knowledge of Watergate has ended. [PBS network ID-title screen "SENATE HEARINGS ON CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES] [00.16.55-LEHRER] LEHRER states that Fred THOMPSON will ask MITCHELL about government intelligence operations] [00.17.07-shot of ERVIN and DASH conferring, ERVIN bangs gavel] AFTERNOON SESSION, TUESDAY, JULY 10, 1973 Senator ERVIN. The committee, will come to order. Mr. Thompson. Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Mitchell, you have testified concerning the so-called 1970 plan or the Huston plan or the Huston project, and then in answering questions from Mr. Dash you went Into talking about -what is known as the Plumbers project in the White House. [00.17.49] Would, You say that the Plumbers in the White House. as you know them to be was a logical extension of this 1970 plan which was evidently rescinded? Mr. MITCHELL. I would not say so. Mr. Thompson. because of the time frame intervening and also the consideration of the Interagency Evaluation Commission--Committee in the meantime. I think that Was Somewhat of a self-starter, later on caused used by events and if I would have to guess, without knowing it was probably generated about the time of the Pentagon Papers. Now, these are opinions I am giving to you, I have no knowledge on it. [00.18.35] Mr. THOMPSON. You mentioned a field for, need Of coordination between the intelligence-gathering agencies, is that correct? Mr. MITCHELL. Yes, sir, I do. Mr. THOMPSON. Was this just in the White House or was this also in the, intelligence community. Mr. MITCHELL. Well. it was In parts Of the intelligence community and it certainly was in the Justice Department. We, as I think I mentioned this morning, found that we were receiving intelligence from headquarters where we might not have expected it in connection with anticipation of violent acts in connection with demonstration and at other times just pure violent acts. I mentioned the Alcoholic Tax and Firearms Bureau which had, I thought, quite a very competent intelligence Capacity, certainly, in connection with some of the problems that we had In the Justice Department. [00.19.30]
Church Committee Hearings - Tom Charles Huston
Huddleston and Huston have a long discussion about why Huston had requested tax/financial information from the IRS about different political organizations, Huddleston wants to know if the White House was using the Special Services division of the IRS as an intelligence gathering tool
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 28, 1973. Testimony of John Dean.
Senator Sam Ervin (D North Carolina). Yes. I was very much intrigued by Mr. Buzhardt's document and I would like to invite your attention to page 8, the statement he makes on there. Robert McCandless, attorney. Mr. Chairman, he does not have the Buzhardt document, so-called. Senator Sam Ervin (D North Carolina). I can read this very short statement: In February however, with the Ervin committee beginning its work, the President was concerned that all the available facts be made known." And also a statement on page 10 to the effect "during this period, the point was frequently raised by various people, including primarily the President, that the whole story of the Watergate should be made public." Do you know any action that the President took subsequent to the establishment of this committee and prior to the time this committee started to function which showed his concern that all the available facts with respect to the Watergate be made known? John Dean. Mr. Chairman, I must. testify to the contrary, that I think some of the documents that I have submitted regarding Mr. Haldeman's specific instructions to me on dealing with what was called the Watergate tactics and then the subsequent La Costa meetings, which occurred on June 11 and 12, the subsequent meetings where there were efforts to woo members of this committee, the discussions of executive privilege to prevent the testimony of people from the White House, could well be concluded to evidence quite the contrary intention.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 14, 1973
[00.25.50] Mr. DASH. What was your discussion with Mr., Mitchell in New York? Mr. MAGRUDER. Well, I went through all of the problems I thought could occur because of the problems that, renewed interest in this case -would bring from your committee and from the grand jury and indicated what, should I do, and he indicated that I should hold, that, he would take care of things, that, everything would be taken care of. Now, at that time I realized that he, was no longer directly involved at the White House, as he had been. and so I asked to see Mr. Haldeman with him the next day he was going to Washington. Mr. DASH. But, at that meeting, Mr. Magruder, what did you ask Mr. Mitchell, to assure you of ? Mr. MAGRUDER. Again I asked for the same assurances of salary and being taken care of if I had to go a away for any period of time. Mr. DASH. Did you mention Executive clemency? Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes. I did. Mr. DASH. Then you said you asked for a meeting With Mr. Haldeman? Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes. I feel that it would be appropriate since this was something now that he was more directly involved on a day-to-day basis. Mr. DASH. Did you have, that meeting with Mr. Haldeman? Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes, I did. Mr. DASH. When? Mr. MAGRUDER. On the following day, Wednesday, Mr. DASH. Who was present,? Mr. MAGRUDER. Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Mitchell, and myself. Mr. DASH. What, was discussed? Mr. MAGRUDER; Well, we. discussed the same things that we had discussed with Mr. Mitchell, that, I discussed with Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Haldeman, was very careful to indicate to me that he would help me in any way as a friend but could make no commitments for the President indicated that the real problems were differences of opinion over meetings. particularly the January and February meetings, Where, Of course, my view was that since the, three, Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Dean, and I, had' agreed to my testimony that they, therefore, should stay with that, agreement. Mr. Mitchell indicated, of course, he was willing to do this but -Mr. Dean indicated that he had some question about it, Mr. DASH. But Mr. Magruder, at this time everybody knew. Mr. MAGRUDER. Mr. Haldeman--- Mr. DASH. Everybody knew that, that agreement was an agreement based on a false story. was that not true? Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes, that is correct, Mr. DASH. And Mr. Haldeman knew that, then, did he not? Mr. MAGRUDER. I cannot recall in my meeting with him in January whether--yes, I am sure I did discuss those meetings, yes. Mr. DASH. So the attempt to get together and agree on that meeting was an attempt to get together and agree on at least from Your point of view, would be the full story? Mr. MAGRUDER. That is correct, Mr. Haldeman recommended that Mr. Dean and Mr. Mitchell and I meet, which we. did that afternoon. Mr. DASH. What was the result of that meeting? Mr. MAGRUDER. I realize that Mr. r. Dean had different opinions then as to what he, would do probably, and so then my--I thought that probably it was more, appropriate that even on that, Monday that I get separate counsel so that I could get, advice independent of the individuals who had participated with me in these activities. Mr. DASH, In other words, you really could not agree at the meeting with Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Dean. Mr. MAGRUDER. Well, it was cooperative. Mr. DASH. What was Mr. Dean's position? Mr. MAGRUDER. He would not indicate a position. Mr. DASH. All right. Did there come a time. when you did get independent counsel? Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes, Mr. Parkinson, who was counsel of the committee, recommended Mr. Bierbower and on that Saturday I went to meet him, he was out of the country, and I met him and we agreed, he agreed to be my counsel that Saturday evening. Mr. DASH. Did there come, a time when you decided that you should go to the U.S. attorney's office? Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes, that is correct. Mr. DASH. When did you go to the U.S. attorney's office? Mr. MAGRUDER. We agreed, they discussed the things with the U.S. attorney, I think on April 12 and I saw them informally on April 13 and saw them formally on April 14 on Saturday, April 14. Mr. DASH. At that time did you tell everything to the assistant attorneys? Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes, I cooperated. Mr. DASH. Who did you meet with? Mr. MAGRUDER. Mr. Silbert, Mr. Glanzer, and -Mr. Campbell. Mr. DASH. Did you tell them everything you are, now telling this committee? Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes. Mr. DASH. Did you have a meeting afterward with Mr. Ehrlichman? Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes, Mr. Ehrlichman called while I was with the' U.S. attorneys and asked me would I come, over and talk to him about the case. We talked to the U.S. attorneys and they agreed as a courtesy that we should and Mr. Bierbower and the other attorney with Mr. Bierbower and I went to see Mr. Ehrlichman that, afternoon. Mr. DASH. Then, according to that meeting that you had with Ehrlichman what happened? Mr. MAGRUDER. We told him in rather capsule form basically what I told you this morning. Mr. DASH. All right. Now, I have just, two final questions. I want to go back to the, time when you came back from California to Washington, putting you back to around June -24. Do you recall having a meeting with Mr. Stans and with Mr. Mitchell? Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes, Sir. [00.30.45]