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Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 25, 1973 - Statement of John Dean.
John Dean. The President called me to come to his Executive Office Building office about 4:00 that afternoon. He asked me if I had drafted a letter. I said that I had as well as I had prepared some thoughts for his statement. He asked to see the letter, a copy of which I which I have submitted to the committee, exhibit 46, but again I shall read it because it is very brief. Dear Mr. President, You have informed me that Bob Haldeman and John Ehrlichman have verbally tendered their requests to be given an immediate and indefinite leave of absence from your staff. By this letter I also wish to confirm my request that I be given such a leave of absence from you your staff. After the President read the letter, he handed it back to me and said it wasn't what he wanted. Senator Sam Ervin (D North Carolina) The audience will please refrain from laughter. John Dean. I then told him that I would not resign unless Haldeman and Ehrlichman resigned. I told him that I was not willing to be the White House scapegoat for the Watergate. He said that he understood my position and he wasn't asking me to be a scapegoat. I then gave him my recommendations of the draft statement. Before he read I the draft statement he said that he had checked his records and it had been on March 21st that I had met with him and given him the report on the problems of the Watergate and its coverup. I have submitted to the committee, exhibit 47, a copy of the draft statement I prepared for the President.
Congressional Hearing - Alexander Haig
Members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee posing for a group picture with U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig. Secretary Haig standing with U.S. Representative William Bloomfield (R-MI). Committee members gathering for group picture, including U.S. Representatives John LeBoutillier (R-NY) and Millicent Fenwick (R-NJ). U.S. Representative Benjamin Gilman (R-NY). Secretary Haig posing with committee members. Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman, U.S. Representative Clement J. Zablocki (D-WI).
Church Committee Hearings - CIA Director Richard Helms
Schwarz asks if there was a study group formed by the National Security Council upon order - Helms responds yes - Schwarz asks Helms if he told this group that CIA had stocks of biological weopons - Did you tell Kissinger or Nixon - No (00:21:06) Schwarz wants to know if Helms ever told Nixon that the CIA had a program which included offensive biological weopons - Helms says he can't recall but Nixon should have known having long been in the White House as both president and vice president (00:22:39) Church wants to know why if there is a statute that the director of the CIA report to the national secrutiy council did Helms not tell them about the CIA's possession of biological weopons stock - Helms responds he would not give such information to the staff of the National Security Council - Church responds the staff represented the interests of president (00:23:50)
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 28, 1973 (1/2)
[01.01.34-DEAN discusses, in response to questions drafted by the WHITE HOUSE, his activities with regard to demonstrators] Mr. DEAN. Now, lot me go to my responsibilities for the Department of Justice. And I will speak specifically with the area of demonstrators. When the demonstration situation was first developing. it, was quite obvious that somebody was going to have to talk to the demonstration leaders. I can recall-would you like to proceed, Senator? Senator INOUYE. Proceed. Mr. DEAN. I can recall that, the first time that, I had any knowledge of being involved in this was when I -was on my way, doing my normal Congressional relations work, coming up here to Congress on some project. I had a call just as I was leaving the Department down at the, gate, of the 10th Street entrance. I was on my way out and they said, Deputy Attorney General wants to see you right away. would you go up to his office? I went into his office and there was a large gathering in his Conference room, many members of the military, representatives of all the different departments and agencies, the Metropolitan Police. and the, like. At that time the Deputy Attorney General said. John, you are going to be the negotiator for the Government with the demonstrators to determine Who will have Permits and what the parameters of those permits will be. [00.03.01] At that time, when I started discussing permits with demonstration leaders, I was offered FBI information on all the demonstration leaders that I was negotiating with. I said, I do not want to have that information, I want to deal as one man looking in another man's eye and know that man for the reaction I get from him just dealing across the table. I do not want to know what he has been doing all his life or the like. I said, that is for others to judge rather than me. I just merely want to tell you the results of my negotiations. So I was not involved in intelligence from the outset. Now, as I testified, I did become aware from time to time of requests from the White House because of my proximity to the decisionmaking processes for various intelligence that would relate to political figures in their associations with the demonstrations and also, I was hearing complaints that the White House staff was unhappy -about the quality of this intelligence. But my role was merely -a conduit from the demonstration leaders back to a major committee that would make decisions and talk about what I would report. In fact, I would often [01.04.16-TAPE OUT]
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities - Testimony of James McCord.
Senator Herman TALMADGE. You testified this morning about a meeting in Mr. Mitchell s office. Was there more than one meeting with the Attorney General or only one? Mr. James McCORD. I understood that there was more than, there was more than one. Senator TALMADGE. Talking about in which you personally were involved. Mr. McCORD. I did not attend, but I was told by Mr. Liddy that there was more than one meeting that took place. I had heard him mention two specifically. Senator TALMADGE. Did you yourself ever attend a meeting in Mr. Mitchell s office, about any matter? Mr. McCORD. No sir. I attended meetings, yes, in his office, at the Committee to Re-Elect the President when he subsequently came over, I visited his offices at the Attorney Generals office at the Department of Justice in December on another matter, but not to discuss these particular operations. Senator TALMADGE. How many different visits of conversations have you ever had with Mr. Mitchell? Mr. McCORD. Numerous sir. Senator TALMADGE. Dozen, fifteen, twenty, more? Mr. McCORD. I would guess fifteen. Senator TALMADGE. Does he know you by your name, individually? Mr. McCORD. Yes sir. Senator TALMADGE. And you know him? Mr. McCORD. Yes sir. Senator TALMADGE. You called him Mr. Attorney General, I presume? Mr. McCORD. Yes sir. Senator TALMADGE. And what did he call you? Mr. McCORD. Before June 17th? (courtroom breaks into laughter, clapping, funny) Senator TALMADGE. (laughing, smiling) Before and after, please. Mr. McCORD. I haven't seen him since June 17th, he called me Jim I believe. Senator TALMADGE. He called you Jim, so you were on a first name basis with him. And that's the only evidence that you have that would involve either the President of the United States or the Attorney General? Mr. McCORD. I'm sorry sir, I missed the question. Senator TALMADGE. The evidence that you have just reported including the individuals that you have named, based on what they heard others say which is hear-say, is the only evidence that you have involving either the President or the former Attorney General, is that correct? Mr. McCORD. No sir, the charts for example that I have described here .... Senator TALMADGE. I'm sorry, I can't hear you. What? Mr. McCORD. The charts of Mr. Liddy, which Mr. Liddy ... Senator TALMADGE. Targets of Mr. Liddy? Mr. McCORD. Charts, cardboard charts were one other evidence of his meetings with Mr. Mitchell and subsequently the money which Mr. Liddy transmitted to me for use in the operation he stated came thru the doings, the authorization of Mr. Mitchell. Senator TALMADGE. Those charts were also, you're relying on Mr. Liddy s hearsay testimony on that. Mr. McCORD. That is correct sir. Senator TALMADGE. Now, what made you think that either Mr. Caulfield or Mr. Hunt had the authority to offer executive clemency to you? Mr. McCORD. Mr. Caulfield because he told me that he was conveying a message from the very top level of the White House. Senator TALMADGE. You assume when he said top level that meant the President of the United States. Mr. McCORD. I assumed it meant one of three people sir. Senator TALMADGE. Alright, name them. Mr. McCORD. Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Erhlichman or the president. Senator TALMADGE. And what made you think Mr. Hunt had authority to offer executive clemency? Mr. McCORD. I did not believe that he had the authority, but I believed that the message that he was conveying probably that the message did originate with the White House. Because of several things, one that I knew from conversations with him and with his wife that he was in touch with the attorneys for the Committee for the Re-Election of the President, for one thing. Senator TALMADGE. Who was Mr. Hunts immediate superior? Mr. McCORD. His immediate superior at the White House, as I understood from him was Mr. Charles Colson, if that is your question sir. Senator TALMADGE. Mr. Colson, and he was council to the president? Mr. McCORD. I believe he was on the White House staff, this is prior to June 17th.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 25, 1973
Press reporters question Senator. Senator Howard Baker (R Tennessee). Of course there are two parts to that. The White House s perception on that. And then Mr. Dean s account of the conversation that actually transpired. I think that by and large Mr. Dean s recollection of that account is essentially correct in all its material details. The account of Mr. Wally Johnson of the White House staff calling me when I was in Tennessee and asking if the White House could have a say-so in the selection of minority counsel, I told them they could not. That accords with my understanding. Mr. Dean s recollection of my brief meeting with the President shortly before a reception that I was attending, at which time I recommended the President against the claim of executive privilege is essentially correct. I do not recall the President indicating that he would rely instead only on written interrogatories, but that isn t a major point. But beyond that, I think that Mr. Dean has pretty generally stated the situation as I recall it.
JFK Assassination HSCA Hearings
House Select Committee on Assassinations hearing on the assassination of U.S. President John F. Kennedy, Committee Deputy Chief Counsel Gary T. Cornwell continuing to take testimony of Professor Mark Weiss and Ernest Aschenasy on acoustic analysis of the Dallas audio transmission tape. Weiss discusses reproduction of sound and echo patterns based upon sound source and listener location. Weiss discusses the scientific principles used in his analysis.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 28, 1973 (1/2)
[00.12.57-DEAN answers questions by Sen. BAKER about the state of NIXON'S knowledge of the coverup as of the Sept. 15, 1972 meeting with DEAN.] Senator BAKER. Go ahead. Mr. DEAN. At that point, it had not been assigned to any judge at all. Another point that came out, as I testified earlier in my, conversations was the fact that he alluded, told me for the first time that I had ever heard this, that shortly after he had assumed office, Mr. Hoover had been over to Visit with him. He told me that Mr. Hoover had informed him that his campaign had been bugged and the President said. this is something that we may be able to use ourselves at some point down the road to explain the fact that we have been subject to the same type of activity. Mr. DEAN. Not until many, many months later. Senator BAKER. You have already testified to that conversation. Mr. DEAN. Yes, I did. Senator BAKER. Go ahead. I am sorry, Mr. Dean. Tell me, anything else you can at all, no matter how minute, about the meeting of September 15. Mr. DEAN. The next matter- I recall is the fact that we did get into a discussion about the civil cases. Senator BAKER. I am sorry, Mr. Dean. Thank you very much. Mr. DEAN. The next thing that I recall occurred was a discussion that ensued about the civil cases. He asked me some questions about the civil cases and it was in the course of this conversation that I told him what I knew at that point in time about the status of the civil cases, where they -were, and I knew because I was fairly familiar at that time with the precise status of the cases. It was also as a result of this conversation that we got into a discussion, or I told him that I had learned from the lawyers at the reelection committee that they had been making or they had somebody who was making an ex parte contact with the judge -who had jurisdiction over the principal suit of the greatest concern, which was the suit by Mr. O'Brien, Larry O'Brien and the DNC. Senator BAKER. Is this, once again, close to the exact language you used? [00.15.55] Mr. DEAN. Yes that was--I did not know who it -was that was making the contacts at that time for certain, so I just told him that the lawyers at the reelection committee are making ex parte contacts or have made ex parte contacts and are hoping to got some favorable rulings. Senator BAKER. Did the President make, any remark at that point, or did Mr. Haldeman? [00.16.19] Mr. DEAN-. I recall the President said something to the effect, well, that is helpful. Senator BAKER. Is that close to his exact language? Mr. DEAN. Yes, sir. Senator BAKER. Is there anything else? Mr. DEAN. We talked about the Common Cause suit as well and I told him that I didn't think it -was any problem. This was a suit that was trying to bring or identify the donors or the contributors of some $10 million of unidentified campaign moneys that had not been reported prior to April 7. The suit, I told him moneys him, I didn't think would be a problem because the lawyers at the reelection committee felt that they could tie this one up in discovery for quite a while. Senator BAKER. What did the President say to that? Mr. DEAN. I don't recall any specific comment to that. I think as we were, going through some of these descriptions, I was just reporting as best I could and I don't recall him giving me -what his reaction was at that point. Senator BAKER. You understand why I am asking you these questions? Mr. DEAN. Yes, I do. [00.17.29] Senator BAKER. All right. Now, I don't mean to shorten your description of the September 15 meeting, but for the sake of moving on, were there other important matters discussed at that time? Mr. DEAN. Well, yes, the matter of the Patman hearing did come up, because the President was aware of that, I assume, from his news summaries or the newspapers that there was likely to be congressional inquiry on the House side. He asked me who was handling that. I told him that, Richard Cook a member of the congressional relations staff, who had worked with the Patman committee at one point in time, was doing the principal work on it. He then told me that Mr. Timmons should be spending his time and get on to of it, something of that--that would be very close, to the language he used. Senator BAKER. Mr. Dean, excuse me, I see we have a vote signal from the Senate. The committee will stand in recess until we return.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 13, 1973 (1/2)
[00.58.02] Senator INOUYE. I notice that other Presidential candidates voluntarily disclosed all of their contributions which were made prior to April 7. Was there any reason foil refusing to do so on your parts sir? Mr. STANS. I think, Senator, there were some of the other candidates for the Presidency who did not disclose the source of their contributions I do not believe that Senator Jackson made that disclosure and I do not believe that Wilbur Mills made that disclosure and there, may have been one or more others that did not, disclose. We viewed the disclosure of contributions by some of the candidates who had not, received much money anyway as a political ploy in an effort to try to force us to disclose. I have said yesterday that our committee had no concern about disclosure except insofar as it affected the rights of the individuals under the law and we, didn't think we had the right to waive the privilege for them. So as a matter of policy, and I was joined in this by representatives of the campaign committee and the White House, the conclusion was reached that we would not make that disclosure. Now, that matter is still the subject of litigation and we have not yet disclosed the names of our contributors before April 7 except as to one group of names amounting to about $6 million that we disclosed just before the election. Senator INOUYE. As one who, has been described as the most successful political fundraiser in the history of the United States, would you recommend to this committee that legislation be drafted to prohibit the receipt and disbursement of cash in political campaigns? Mr. STAINS. Well, I am a bit ambivalent, on that. I am not quite sure. I think any finance chairman would welcome that kind of legislation, because 'it eliminates one potential series of questions as to where the cash came from and where it went. But I think you have got to be very careful in drafting it to make sure that you don't destroy some of the means by which elections are carried on, because there are times when you have to pay certain expenses in cash on the spot. You have to have petty cash funds with which to pay small bills, and so forth. Carefully drafted, I would, as a, finance chairman, say, that it would Make life a little bit easier because, we wouldn't have so many questions to answer later on, Senator INOUYE. Yesterday and this morning, you have testified that you had no reason to question the integrity or the reliability of such associates as Mr. LaRue--you have described him as a good person--Mr. Mitchell, or -Mr. Kalmbach. When did you begin suspecting that something was wrong? Mr. STANS. I didn't have any Suspicions about any of these people until after the disclosures in the press following, I believe it was March *****SECTION OF TRANSCRIPT MISSING*** [Sen. INOUYE continues to question STANS. STANS states that it was March 23 when McCORD's letter to Judge SIRICA began to involve more names in the scandal. He has no firsthand knowledge of the activities alleged, and got most of his information from TV. Sen. INOUYE asks whether before McCORD'S letter, if STANS recalled seeing reports in the Washington POST naming CHAPIN, Donald SEGRETTI, and other powerful figures in the aftermath of WATERGATE, and if those reports made him suspicious. STANS. states that he doesn't believe everything he reads in the POST. the SEGRETTI matter was not described as being connected to WATERGATE, and he did not know of SEGRETTI or his SABOTAGE of opposing candidates. He had no reason to believe that anyone besides the original Watergate BURGLARS were involved at that time. INOUYE. asks if it is STANS' testimony that he had no reason to suspect, prior to March 23, 1972, that KALMBACH, MITCHELL, HALDEMAN, EHRLICHMAN, were possibly involved in WATERGATE. STANS confirms this. INOUYE expressed disbelief that in STANS' position as finance chairman and cochair of the CRP budget committee, that he heard no discussion of these matters.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 27, 1973
[00.53.04-GURNEY continues to question DEAN about his receipt of the FBI files of the Watergate investigation-DEAN is not stumped in the least, GURNEY is getting cross with DEAN.] Senator GURNEY. Let me get back again now to the conversation with Mr. Gray. Wasn't he pretty specific with you that the only reason he would turn these things over to you is because the President of the United States requested them through you? Mr. DEAN. Well, Senator, in my dealing with Mr. Gray, from the very outset he was very anxious to be of any assistance he could. For example, when I first met with him and he told me he was traveling--- Senator GURNEY. Could we get to my question now. Mr. DEAN. Certainly, I just want to explain the circumstance of a conversation so you can understand it in full and can fully appreciate it. When he told me, for example, he was traveling around the country a lot and I should deal -with Mark Felt, that to me evidenced that Mr. Gray wanted to be of assistance; if he wasn't there, I should talk to others. The same tenor was in the conversation that he, would have to check, and he wanted assurances these were going to the President, this information -would go to the President. I am sure he knew very well that the President didn't want to sit down and read a stack of raw FBI materials. [00.54.13] Senator GURNEY. Then it is your understanding that it was Mr. Gray's understanding that the reason why you were there getting those 302 forms is because the President had you requested you to; is that correct? Mr. DEAN. I don't believe that is necessarily my understanding that 'he, as I recall wanted to know, you know was this information going back to the President, and I assured him it -was. [00.54.39-GURNEY continues to try to paint DEAN as the chief architect of the coverup, particularly that he intentionally withheld information from NIXON] Senator GURNEY. Well, did it? Did you ever report to the President what was in those 302 forms? Mr. DEAN. There was never anything in those FBI reports that I read, worth reporting even to Mr. Haldeman or Mr. Ehrlichman. Senator GURNEY. Did You ever show a single one, of the 82 302 files to the President? Mr. DEAN. No, not to my recollection; no, sir. Senator GURNEY. Did You ever report a, single information that was in those files to the President? Mr. DEAN. Not, to my recollection, no. I may have reported the general tenor of the investigation -which was, I might say, very vigorous. Senator GURNEY. You reported that to the President? Mr. DEAN. No, I would report that to Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman and as my channel of reporting. Senator GURNEY. Did you ever get a call from Mr. Gray about this newspaper story about one of the reports being shown to Mr. Segretti? Mr. DEAN. Yes, I did. Senator GURNEY. Would you report that to the committee? [00.55.33] Mr. DEAN. Well, I recall that when that story broke, Mr. Gray called me and asked -me, if that were true, and I said absolutely not. that the FBI reports have never left my office and I have never showed an FBI report to Mr. Segretti which, in fact, is true. I -never showed an FBI report to Mr. Segretti. Senator GURNEY. did you gather from this conversation that Mr. Gray was pretty disturbed about the fact that, the, report might be shown not only to Segretti but any anybody else? Mr. DEAN. I didn't have the impression that, he was upset by it. I don't know how often Mr. Gray and I talked but we talked frequently. We had worked together at, the Department of Justice, and while it was reported that he called me with some outrage, Mr. Gray and I generally didn't have that type, of conversation. He said something to the effect that "Is that true, you know, I can't believe you would do that," and I said "No, it is not true and I never showed Segretti any FBI reports." [00.56.46-GURNEY tries to gloss over the closeness of the White House relationship to the FBI and suggest something sinister about DEAN receiving the 302 forms for the Watergate investigation] Senator GURNEY. Of course you worked at the Department of Justice for some time. and I suppose you have some, familiarity with the procedures down there. Isn't it a most unusual thing for a 302 report to be let out of the FBI office to anyone? Mr. DEAN. Well, I know this: that the White House receives on a regular basis and my office was the recipient, on a regular basis, of countless FBI information. Now this deals with everything from background investigation---- Senator GURNEY. I am talking about the 302 forms that are filed with raw data. Mr. DEAN. Yes. Senator GURNEY. Not reports. Mr. DEAN. I don't recall ever receiving 302's at the White House other than on this incident. I really was never terribly aware of what the Policy was. I didn't work with the criminal cases in the Department of Justice while, I was there so I don't know, if there were other occasions when 302's were sent anywhere or not. I cant answer the question Senator GURNEY. But I understood you to say your understanding with Gray on these 302 files would be that you would guard them very closely. Mr. DEAN. That is correct. Senator GURNEY. Who did you show, them to? Mr. DEAN. Well, as I testified, after the report on the 21st came to my office, Mr. Mardian was anxious to see them. Mr. Mitchell thought that -was a good idea and also that Mr. O'Brien and Mr. Parkinson also came to see, them. They came to my office, I recall them scanning them. They decided there really wasn't much in there that interested them. The thing that sticks In my mind most is that Mardian was, who was apparently very familiar with 302 and FBI investigations from being the head of the Internal Security Division said that, you know, "Gray is just, going hog wild here" because of the tone, and the tenor, of the, interoffice from one field office or from headquarters to field offices, that the tone of the cables that were being sent out of headquarters. Senator GURNEY. Mardian, O'Brien, Parkinson weren't even in the White House then? Mr. DEAN. That is correct. Mr. DEAN. The reelection committee. Senator GURNEY. Do you think Mr. Gray had any idea that people like that outside of the White House were looking at these files? Mr. DEAN. I am sure he had none because I didn't tell him. [00.59.06]
Watergate Impeachment Hearings. House Judiciary Committee, July 27, 1974. Vote on Motion to delete charge of false public statements
Peter Rodino (D New Jersey). All time has expired and the question now occurs, on the motion of the gentleman, from Alabama. All those in favor of the motion, please say aye. [Chorus of "ayes."] Peter Rodino (D New Jersey). All those, opposed. [Chorus of "noes."] Peter Rodino (D New Jersey). The noes appear to have it. Charles Sandman Jr. (R New Jersey). Mr. Chairman? Peter Rodino (D New Jersey). The gentleman from New Jersey. Charles Sandman Jr. (R New Jersey). On this I demand the ayes and nays.
Watergate Impeachment Hearings. House Judiciary Committee, July 27, 1974. Vote on Motion to delete charge of false public statements
Peter Rodino (D New Jersey). Call of the roll is demanded and the clerk will call the roll. All those in favor of the motion please signify by saying aye. All those opposed, no. The Clerk. Mr. Donohue. Harold Donohue (D Massachusetts). No. The Clerk. Mr. Brooks. Jack Brooks (D Texas). No The Clerk. Mr. Kastenmeier. Robert Kastenmeier (D Wisconsin). No. The Clerk. Mr. Edwards. Don Edwards (D California). No. The Clerk. Mr. Hungate. William Hungate (D Missouri). No. The Clerk. Mr. Conyers. John Conyers (D Michigan). No. The Clerk. Mr. Eilberg. Joshua Eilberg (D Pennsylvania). No. The Clerk. Mr. Waldie. Jerome Waldie (D California). No. The Clerk. Mr. Flowers. Walter Flowers (D Alabama). Present. The Clerk. Mr. Mann. James Mann (D South Carolina). No. The Clerk. Mr. Sarbanes. Paul Sarbanes (D Maryland). No. The Clerk. Mr. Seiberling. John Seiberling (D Ohio). No. The Clerk. Mr. Danielson. George Danielson (D California). No. The Clerk. Mr. Drinan. Robert Drinan (D Massachusetts). No. The Clerk. Mr. Rangel. Charles Rangel (D New York). No. The Clerk. Ms. Jordan. Barbara Jordan (D Texas). No. The Clerk. Mr. Thornton. Ray Thornton (D Arkansas). No. The Clerk. Ms. Holtzman. Elizabeth Holtzman (D New York). No. The Clerk. Mr. Owens. Wayne Owens (D Utah). No. The Clerk. Mr. Mezvinsky. Edward Mezvinsky (D Iowa). No. The Clerk. Mr. Hutchinson. Edward Hutchinson (R Michigan). Aye. The Clerk. Mr. McClory. Robert McClory (R Illinois). Aye. The Clerk. Mr. Smith. Henry Smith III (R New York). Aye. The Clerk. Mr. Sandman. Charles Sandman Jr. (R New Jersey). Aye. The Clerk. Mr. Railsback. Tom Railsback (R Illinois). No. The Clerk. Mr. Wiggins. Charles Wiggins (R California). Aye. The Clerk. Mr. Dennis. David Dennis (R Indiana). Aye. The Clerk. Mr. Fish. Hamilton Fish Jr. (R New York). No. The Clerk. Mr. Mayne. Wiley Mayne (R Iowa). Aye The Clerk. Mr. Hogan. Lawrence Hogan (R Maryland). No. The Clerk. Mr. Butler. Caldwell Butler (R Virginia). No. The Clerk. Mr. Cohen. William Cohen (R Maine). No. The Clerk. Mr. Lott. Trent Lott (R Mississippi). Aye. The Clerk. Mr. Froehlich. Harold Froehlich (R Wisconsin). Aye. The Clerk. Mr. Moorhead. Carlos Moorhead (R California). Aye. The Clerk. Mr. Maraziti. Joseph Maraziti (R New Jersey). Aye. The Clerk. Mr. Latta. Delbert Latta (R Ohio). Aye. The Clerk. Mr. Rodino. Peter Rodino (D New Jersey). No.
Watergate Impeachment Hearings. House Judiciary Committee, July 27, 1974. Vote on Motion to delete charge of false public statements
Clerk counting the votes. The Clerk. Mr. Chairman? Peter Rodino (D New Jersey). The clerk will report. The Clerk. Mr. Chairman. 12 members have voted aye 25 members have voted no, one member has voted present. Peter Rodino (D New Jersey). And the Motion is not agreed to.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 27, 1973
[00.35.22-GURNEY continues to interrogate DEAN about his meetings with the President] Senator GURNEY. Well, you had a meeting with him the 14th of March, did you not? Mr. DEAN. That is correct. Senator GURNEY. I mean, the 15th. Mr. DEAN. On the 15th after the press conference I met with him, yes. Senator GURNEY. WHAT did you discuss? Mr. DEAN. The President after the press conference called Dick Moore and I over to his office and I call recall very vividly that the President was very relaxed, he completed the press conference, and he was--his initial comment to both Moore, and I was he was surprised that after having made a rather historic announcement about the, opening up of liaison offices with Peking and the announcement of the appointment of Ambassador Bruce to fill that post, that the first question that the press had asked after he had read this announcement was whether or not Dean would appear before the Senate Judiciary Committee in the Gray hearings. From there the discussion became rather rambling. It was the President's recollection of his handling of the Hiss case, Mr. Moore's recollection of how the President, had handled the Hiss case, and it was -what I would call more of a social conversation than a working conversation, [00.36.45] Senator GURNEY. Then, you did not discuss anything about Watergate at that meeting? Mr. DEAN. No, sir. Senator GURNEY. All right. March 16. You had a meeting with him on March 16? Mr. DEAN. On the 16th we discussed matters on how Mr. Ziegler should follow up on matters that had arisen during the press conference. I recall that one of the things the President had tried to accomplish--- Senator GURNEY. GURNEY. I am just trying to shorten it up. Did you discuss Watergate with him at all? Mr. DEAN. Not specifically, no. Senator GURNEY. All right, March 17. You had a meeting that day? [00.37.19-funny stuff] Mr. DEAN. March 17? Yes, that was St. Patrick's Day and I recall the President had a green tie on [laughter] and sitting in the oval office. Senator GURNEY. Well, that is probably true. [00.37.29-DEAN'S account indicates that NIXON was aware of the program to interfere with the GRAY hearings as part of a coverup plan] Mr. DEAN. He was very relaxed and be had his feet up on the desk and was very--the thing that stuck in my mind from that, particular conversation' was that he wondered if the Senate -would bite the bait that he had put out at his press conference on litigating over the question of Dean and executive privilege because he was convinced if they did you would never see, any of the White House staff before the Senate. Senator GURNEY. Well, if he was all that relaxed, I guess you didn't discuss Watergate. Is that, a fair thing to say? Mr. DEAN. I think that is correct, Yes. Other than as I say -we. were, just following a consistent theme that, had been developed at La. Costa regarding dealing with Watergate issues, he was continuing during these meetings where I referred to Gray discussing the fact that he was very distressed that, Gray was turning over FBI files that, related to Watergate. Senator' GURNEY. Well, now, what about March 19, there, was a Meeting -with him then, as a matter of fact, two meetings. Did you discuss Watergate on those meetings? I am not sure of whether there were two or not, were, there one or two, do you recall? It looks like, two on this log. Mr. DEAN. Well, what happened on that, as I recall, I don't know what records you are, reading from. Senator GURNEY. I am reading from a White House log which was furnished the committee. Mr. DEAN. All right. Now what I recall there, is I came, to the President's office and he wanted to discuss, it was a discussion of the media problems related to the Gray hearings, and some of the postures he, had taken on executive privilege and as the conversation proceeded I realized it was a media-type area he was getting into. Senator GURNEY. Again if I can help shorten it, that is what it says here, too. that you discussed these judiciary problems. Mr. DEAN. That is right. Senator GURNEY. You did not discuss Watergate? Mr. DEAN. No, and the, reason--I don't know, the meeting was interrupted when I had suggested that Dick Moore come down and join the discussion, and the President indeed called for Dick Moore and Dick Moore came in to the meeting. Senator GURNEY. Now what about March 20 here, there were one, two--no, three phone calls at one meeting as I see it here. Do you recall what they were about? Mr. DEAN. Yes, I do. On the 20th--the preceding evening, on March 19, we, had discussed the matter of the fact that a number of charges were -being made that related to my involvement in the. Watergate that were coming out of the Senate confirmation hearings of Mr. Gray, and -we discussed whether I was--I was very anxious to send written interrogatories as we had offered the committee at that time. [00.40.31]
Congress: We The People 8/23/1983
Representative Charles H Wilson (D California) speaking in House it was if my whole career in this House was meant to be reputed. But it really couldn t be otherwise base on the 5 months of extensive press, and media, and opposition pronouncements. At every turn of the committee process to the day before the committee voted to start its proceedings, I was tried and convicted time and again.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee Hearings on Presidential Campaign Activities, May 24, 1973 - Testimony of Alfred C. Baldwin III
Mr. BALDWIN. I have one other thing. I am still relying on that promise today as I testify here and from the beginning of my decision to cooperate on June 25 to now, I have attempted to tell the whole truth of this incident to the Government. I believe that as I do now there is only one Government that I have talked truthful to the U.S. attorney, as I will do to this committee. I do not regret this decision, although my life was at that time shattered. I cannot now find employment and I have been without funds. My family has been disgraced. I believe that since I was working for the former Attorney General and White House officials I would not question to do what I was asked to do. Now, I regret only that decision. Regardless of this, I shall now follow through with my commitment to tell the Government and the American people the truth.
Capitol Journal - "Immigration Debate"
Cokie Roberts standing outside the Capitol Building, segues to footage of House hearings on immigration. Colorado Governor Richard Lamm testifies before House Sub-Committee about why illegal immigrants are bad for the economy and social services.
CONGRESS: WE THE PEOPLE
01.10.24-Shot of the statue at top of Capitol dome, pan down to House wing of Capitol. Shot of interior of the House chamber. Shot of Rep. SILVIO CONTE in debate in Well of House. V.O.-discussion of the rules designed to keep order in the House. Rep. CONTE does some linguistic gymnastics in debate to follow the rule prohibiting disparaging a Senator by name or even mentioning the Senate itself by name in debate. Shot of Tip O'Neill on House Rostrum. Rep. DAN ROSTENKOWSKI says that most of the time, if the Speaker really wants a bill, he gets his way. Shots of a committee hearing. Shot of Rostenkowski in meeting of Ways and Means Committee. Rosty talks about the importance of Ways and Means, says that people develop confidence in a Congressman over the long term that can override one contradictory vote. Shot of Rostenkowski taking the podium of a Chicago political rally. Graphic shows outline of Rosty's district in map of Chicago. 01.14.16-Shot of St. Stanislaus Polish Catholic Church, Chicago. Rosty talks about his old church and his family roots there. Rosty in speech tells the audience to stick with the neighborhood and he will help to bring it back to prosperity. Ornstein says that this local accountability is "just as the framers envisioned it" [but I'd have to imagine that the framers didn't exactly envision the figure of the machine politician, Chicago-style]. Rostenkowski denies that his style of addressing and serving his local constituency is just demagoguery or opportunism. 01.15.35-Ornstein-if the House was expected to be occasionally impetuous and subject to the whims of the masses, the Senate is intended to be more deliberative. Shots of interior of Senate chamber. Shots of restored Old Senate Chamber, including Spittoons. A political scientist notes that the Senate is less bound by rules because it has so many fewer members than the House. Sketches of Senate proceedings. 01.18.28--Sen. Charles Percy (R-IL) says that Senators don't like to be railroaded into passing bills. Percy says that Senators can't be as specialized in expertise as Congressmen. Shots of Percy chairing Senate Foreign Services Committee interrogating a nominee for an Arms Control post. V.O.-discussion of the Senate's power of "Advise and Consent" on Presidential appointments. Percy says that the Senate must confirm all such appointments. V.O.-discussion of the 17th Amendment, which made the Senate elected by popular votes rather than by the State legislatures. 01.20.39
JFK Assassination HSCA Hearings
House Select Committee on Assassinations hearing on the assassination of U.S. President John F. Kennedy, Committee Deputy Chief Counsel asking Professor Mark Weiss if he can quantify the findings of his acoustical analysis of Dealey Plaza. Weiss uses his waveform chart to further explain data generated from his experiment. Weiss says his team focused only on what matched the noise level of gunfire and the proceeding echoes in Dealey Plaza.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities Sept 26, 1973 - Testimony of Pat Buchanan
Senator Weicker continues to grill Mr. Buchnan on the language and rhetoric used by him and the White House during the election. He also wonders if Watergate is not being taken as seriously by the White House, as it falls under something much larger than political hardball, dirty tricks, or pranks.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 28, 1973. Testimony of John Dean.
Senator Sam Ervin (D North Carolina). Now, on yesterday, Senator Weicker interrogated you about one of the documents that you turned over to Judge Sirica and Judge Sirica turned over to this committee. One dated September 18, 1970 which consisted of a memorandum from you to the Attorney General. John Dean. Yes, sir. Senator Sam Ervin (D North Carolina). In which you recommended the setting up of this interagency evaluation unit. John Dean. That is Correct. I might add that when Mr. Mitchell and I talked about that we decided that with Mr. Haldeman and others being aware of this, we thought this might satisfy the needs and the requests at the time to do something. I also recall that the liaison between the FBI and other intelligence agencies had really broken down. I believe Mr. Hoover had withdrawn all of his liaison relationships with everyone except the White House. And Mr. Mitchell hoped that this might be a vehicle to start getting the FBI dealing with the agencies because there are, of course, quite proper and natural reasons to have liaison amongst the intelligence community.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 26, 1973 - Testimony of John Dean.
Samuel Dash, attorney. Therefore, in addition to your testimony about the President and the White House staff members obsession over demonstrators and leaks, is this then a brief and fair summary in a nutshell of the kind of practices the President to some extent and White House officials such as Haldeman and Ehrlichman, had approved or considered to crush internal dissent or obtain political intelligence? John Dean. I think that this is indicative, Mr. Dash, attorney, of the fact that the White House often took it upon itself to obtain information or resolve a problem when it felt that an agency of the Government was incapable or unsatisfactory in dealing with the problem that the White House itself felt that they were quite capable of handling the problem and thereupon would handle the problem.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 29, 1973 (1/2)
[00.55.30-DASH questions DEAN on his recollection of discussing with NIXON the issue of PAYOFFS to keep the BURGLARS silent at trial] Mr. DASH. Now, is that to your recollection, a correct statement of how, that conversation took place, or is your statement the correct--- Mr. DEAN. No, sir; my recollection is there was no discussion of the--it appears to me what they have done is take what I did raise on the 21st regarding Mr. Hunt's direct threat of a blackmail nature to John Ehrlichman and confused it with an earlier meeting which occurred on March 13, when the $1 million conversation came, up, and put the two together some way. [00.56.00] Mr. DASH. Now do you recall the. President ever telling you that it was wrong to pay this $1 million? [00.56.08] Mr. DEAN. To the contrary. He said it would be no problem to raise, the $1 million. Mr. DASH. Now, also, the next item in this memorandum states that the, President spoke to--I think that was Mr. Dean spoke to Haldeman's return of the $350,000, He said that Haldeman and Ehrlichman possibly had no legal guilt with regard to the money matters. Did you make such a statement? Mr. DEAN. No, sir. Mr. DASH. Let me go back again: [00.56.39-DASH returns to the White House statement, which asserts that DEAN in March 1973 did NOT inform NIXON of his activities in the coverup] [READING] Mr. Dean said nothing of his role with regard to the coverup money. He -said nothing about his discussions with Magruder helping him prepare for the grand jury. He said nothing of his instructions to Caulfield to Offer executive clemency, Mr. DASH. Was that true, on the 21st? Mr. DEAN. I think the contrary is true and I will rely on my statement, Mr. Dash. Mr. DASH. Now, there is another reference on that meeting on the 21st which we have from this oral communication from the White House. It says "Dean said Colson had talked to Mr. Hunt about executive clemency." Is that the way you had put it to the President? [00.57.31-the issue of EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY discussed] Mr. DEAN. No, sir. As I recall, this initially came up on--the 13th was the first time it, came up and the second time it came up was on the 15th I believe I have testified several times to the. way that did occur and I respectfully disagree with that interpretation. [00.57.49-COMMON SENSE INDICATES THAT NIXON MUST HAVE KNOWN ABOUT THE CLEMENCY OFFER] Mr. DASH. Well, but, as stated, if in fact Mr. Dean had said that Colson had talked to Hunt about Executive clemency, and there is nothing further in this memorandum, if the President had not authorized Executive clemency, would you have expected the President to have raised a question about that and called upon you or somebody who had authority to have Mr. Colson retract that? Mr. DEAN. Only the President can promise Executive clemency and Mr. Colson was quite aware, of that. I think that the facts are that, in fact, Mr. Colson had talked to the, President, who in turn had--then Colson talked to Mr. Bittman, who in turn talked to Mr. Hunt. [00.58.40] Mr. DASH. Well, I just want the, record to show that in this submission by the White, House, to the committee, the reference, to the Executive clemency merely shows that Mr. Dean said Colson had talked to Hunt about Executive clemency. There was no reference to any action of the President, whether he had said that he had not authorized that and whether in fact, he indicated that, whoever had done that, especially Mr. Colson, with Mr. Hunt, that that was to be retracted. The, submission does not have that in it in a reconstruction of the so-called White House log. Mr. Chairman, I would like to just have, this introduced as part of the record, which I have already identified as a memorandum based on a call. [00.59.24] Senator ERVIN. Without objection, it will be, so identified. and made, a part of the record. Senator BAKER. Mr. Chairman, I think that is appropriate to make that a part of the record, but I think its character ought to be understood. This does not, as I understand it, represent a definitive "White House position," but rather are the transcribed notes of a telephone conversation between Mr. Buzhardt an attorney of the White House, and Mr. Thompson, which were turned over to Mr. Dash and reviewed subsequently by Mr. Garment and Mr. Buzhardt. [00.59.57]
Focus on the 70s - The Nixon Years - PT5
EST shots of Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities. TLS former White House aide ALEXANDER BUTTERFIELD taking oath; MSs Senator Herman Talmadge (D-GA) questioning Alexander Butterfield regarding the White House recordings and the installation of bugs.