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JFK Assassination HSCA Hearings
House Select Committee on Assassinations hearing on the assassination of U.S. President John F. Kennedy, Committee Deputy Chief Counsel Gary T. Cornwell continuing to take testimony of Professor Mark Weiss and Ernest Aschenasy on acoustic analysis of the Dallas Police audio transmission tape from the assassination. Cornwell and Weiss discuss the shooting sound locations and the location of the police motorcycle.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 27, 1973
[00.42.20-DEAN gets a little shot back at GURNEY, questioning his involvement in the ITT scandal] Senator GURNEY. Not my office. I think- we met in Senator Hruska's office, the Republican members of the committee; isn't that correct, with you? Mr. DEAN. Well, Senator, I recall one time that Mr. Fielding and I came up to your office, on the, matter and Mr. Fielding provided some material for your staff. It was that, type of thing that would come to my office for assistance and aid. Senator GURNEY. What does that have to do with the Watergate? Mr. DEAN. Well, I was explaining the type of thing that would come to my office and my office -was a firefighting office and would got into various-- Senator GURNEY. Did you do other firefighting before June 18? Mr. DEAN. Yes, sir. Senator GURNEY. At the committee to reelect? Mr. DEAN. Not to my knowledge, no. That was the only fire I recall over there, and it, was the biggest one. Senator GURNEY. Now, then, you mentioned in your testimony yesterday in response to Mr. Dash that you inherited the coverup. Would you tell how you inherited the coverup? Mr. DEAN. I didn't hear the Senator. Inherited? Senator GURNEY. You said yesterday in response to questioning from Mr. Dash, you said that you inherited the coverup of Watergate. Mr. DEAN. I had heard or inherited? Senator GURNEY. I understand inherited. Mr. DEAN. That is correct. When I came, back to the office on the 18th and talked to Mr. Strachan, I realized that the coverup was already in effect, in being, and I realized that when Mr. Strachan told me of the documents that he had destroyed and Mr. Haldeman's instruction, that there certainly wasn't going to be a revelation of the White House involvement in the matter. I didn't at that point in time, know the potentials of the White House involvement. [00.44.12--DEAN has said that he executed others' orders after they-Mitchell, Haldeman, Ehrlichman-had set the policy. GURNEY wants to suggest that DEAN was the architect] Senator GURNEY. Was not one of the first meetings of the coverup held in John Mitchell's apartment on the 19th of June?, Mr. DEAN. Senator, I would say that the day of, to my knowledge, the day of the 19th at the, White House was a, very busy day. That the calls I received from Mr. Ehrlichman, from Mr. Colson, the meetings I had with Mr. Ehrlichman and then again later with Mr. Colson about the safe were long before I went to the meeting at Mr. Mitchell's apartment, which I do not recall was on the, 19th or 20th. I do recall a meeting in Mr. Mitchell's office, but I do not recall specifically which day it was. I recall arriving late at the meeting, and I cannot recall with any specificity any of the discussions at the meeting. [00.45.07-GURNEY continues the line of questioning] Senator GURNEY. Well, what you are saying is then that these several phone calls you had -with all of these people really had to do with at least the beginnings of the coverup, is that right.? Mr. DEAN. That is correct. Senator GURNEY. Well, you were in on it from the beginning, -were you not? Mr. DEAN. Yes, sir. Senator GURNEY,. You really did not inherit anything. You -were in on the sort of hatching of it, were you not? [00.45.28] Mr. DEAN. Senator, I might explain what often happened in my relationship with my superiors at the White House, and I think I alluded to this yesterday, is that others -would set the policy, for example with the Calley case or the, Lithuanian defector, how to deal with it, what was to be done. Senator GURNEY. Who set the policy on the, coverup Mr. DEAN. I -would say the policy was just--I do not think it was a policy set. There was just no alternative at that, point in time. Senator GURNEY., It sort of grew like Topsy, and you were a part of it, is that not right? Mr. DEAN. That is correct. [00.46.05-GURNEY wants to put a sinister spin on DEAN not directly telling NIXON of all these actions-DEAN murders this question] Senator GURNEY. Now, Now, since this thing started out with such a flurry and a spate of phone calls and meetings between everybody, did you advise the President of -what was going on? Mr. DEAN. Senator, the first time I ever talked to the President was On September 15. There was one occasion that I recall before September 15, which was in late August, to the best of my recollection, and that certainly was not an occasion to talk to the President about anything because his former law partners were in the office, Mrs. Nixon was in the office, there were several notaries or one notary there, some other members of the staff and it had to do with the signing of the President's testamentary papers and it was--just was not a very appropriate occasion to even give, a, whisper to the President that I would like to talk to him. So I must say that, any time between June 19' and September 15 I had no conversations with the President, and nor did I approach the President at any time, other than through reporting to Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman about what I was doing. [00.47.29]
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 14, 1973
[00.08.20] Senator ERVIN. But was there not a complement of fear in the White House with respect to the crime problem. as well as the demonstration problem? Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes, sir, I think the whole, atmosphere, relating to these, events was particularly difficult for many people who worked in the White House and were in day-to-day contact with these problems. Senator ERVIN. Now, Mr. Coffin just came down and demonstrated did he not? Mr. MAGRUDER. I am sorry, Senator, Mr.- Senator ERVIN. You spoke about your former professor- Mr. MAGRUDER. The Reverend Coffin. Yes. Senator ERVIN. He just came down and demonstrated There, were a great many demonstrations, weren't there? Mr. MAGRUDER. He did quite a bit more than demonstrate Senator ERVIN. He, was supposed to try to frustrate the draft. Mr. MAGRUDER. He did and he participated in many activities that were considered illegal. Senator ERVIN. You were disturbed at the demonstrations, were all you, the people at the, White House? Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes, sir; we were, Senator ERVIN. The reason I asked the question, I have had to spend my time fighting such laws and legislative, proposals as no-knock, preventive detention laws, and the claim that there was an inherent right, of the President to bug anybody suspected of domestic subversion, and things of that, kind. And I just, could not understand Why people got so fearful., Now, it. has come out., lately that even in 1970, when you were at the, White Rouse, didn't Mr. Tom Charles Huston come Up with a plan which was based on the fear of dissenting groups, even to a Plan that would involve burglarizing and electronic surveillance and the examination Of people's mail because of this fear? Mr. MAGRUDER. Senator, I have, read what you have read in the papers and I was not, aware of that plan. but that, I assume, is correct, Senator ERVIN. Well, you do know that there was a climate in which many people in the White -House and later many Of the people in the, Committee To Re-Elect the President were absolutely afraid of things. Isn't that so? Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes, Senator, I would say so. Senator ERVIN. Even of the Democratic national headquarters. Mr. MAGRUDER. I would characterize that at least my reaction was stronger after years of working in that atmosphere than it had been strong before'. [00.10.52] Senator ERVIN. I am familiar with that kind of atmosphere. I came up here during the days when Joe 'McCarthy saw a communist hiding under every rose bush and I have been here fighting the no-knock laws and preventive detention laws and indiscriminate bugging by people who've found subversives hiding under every bed. In this Nation, we have had a very unfortunate fear. And this fear went to the extent of deploring the exercise of First Amendment rights for those who wanted to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances,. Some of it happened before you got into the White House and I am not blaming you. Because even under a Democratic administration I had an investigation here where they became so afraid of People that they used military intelligence to on civilians whose only offense was that they were dissatisfied with the policies of the Government and assembled and petitioned for relief. Now. I think that all grew out of this complement of fear. did it not. the whole Watergate incident ? Mr. MAGRUDER. I think from in my own personal standpoint, I did lose Some respect for the legal process simply because I did not see it working as I had hoped it would when I came 'me here. But that, I would like to make sure you understand Senator, is my own feeling and I do not, want to attribute that motive to other individuals Senator ERVIN. Well. I have been able to sense it here a long time. I am glad you brought it up. NOW. to summarize this thing very briefly On January 27 and February 4, 1972, John Mitchell was the highest legal officer in the United States. was he not ? Mr. MAGRUDER. That is correct. Senator ERVIN. And on those -2 days, he held meetings in his office with you, John W. Dean III, and Gordon Liddy, in which he planned some spying operations which involved among other things, the spying on the Democratic national Headquarters. Mr. MAGRUDER. That is correct. Senator. [00.13.09]
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, July 10, 1973
[00.02.00-MITCHELL testifying about his decisions not to tell NIXON about the illegal activities in the White House] Mr. MITCHELL. Well, I am sure it occurred to me and probably on hindsight I probably should have. I do not think there is any doubt about, it. Mr. DASH. Did you not think it was the President's prerogative to know what to do about these matters? Mr. MITCHELL. The decision had to be made, and it is a tough one, whether or not he is not. involved in it but he does not know about them, will this go away. I knew they were going to change the personnel in the White House and hopefully they would be gone and he would not have to deal with it and he could go on to his second term, the second Presidency, without this problem. [00.02.35] Mr. DASH, But you were taking a major risk. were you not. Mr. Mitchell? Mr., MITCHELL. I think you are taking a major risk any time you have to deal with the White House horrors under any circumstances. Mr. DASH. 'Now, you spoke to the President quite frequently on the telephone. you met with him, your logs indicate, so you did have plenty Of opportunities. and on no occasion. I think it is your testimony. did you speak to the President a bout these matters? Mr. MITCHELL. Now. which matters are we talking about? Mr. DASH. Again, the White House--- Mr. MITCHELL. About disclosing these, matters. Mr. DASH. Disclosing the matters, the White House horrors, the break-in. [00.03.12] Mr. MITCHELL. I did not--well, let US not pass this over to the point where--on the 20th of June when I talked to him I apologized to him for not knowing what the hell had happened and I should have kept a stronger hand on what the people, in the committee were doing, et cetera. And then, further on down the road in these political meetings that are shown on the, logs. there were discussions about appointing a commission of the type of the Warren commission to Investigate this matter. and special prosecutors and things like that. I do not want to leave the, impression that it was never touched under any circumstances. [00.03.50] Mr. DASH. I am not talking about when you talked about Watergate as such. I am talking about the so-called coverup, the White House horrors and what your own knowledge, based on information given you, as to who was involved in the he break-in of the DNC. Mr. MITCHELL. I answered that I did not talk to him about it. Mr. DASH. I know, but on the 20th----- Mr. MITCHELL. I also answered in hindsight it probably would have been a better idea if I had. Mr. DASH. Now, also on March 27 did Mr. -Magruder come to see you in New York? Mr. MITCHELL. Yes. sir, he did. [00.04.23] Mr. DASH. And do you recall that he testified that he came, because he began to be aware or concerned that things might, unravel and, therefore'. wanted assurances from you that he be taken care of. Do you recall that? Mr. MITCHELL. I recall very well, Mr. Dash. because, of the fact that there Was, based In the McCord letter to Judge Sirica, and -Mr. Magruder wanted to talk to me about the potentials of his being brought back before the grand jury on a perjury count. [00.04.54] Mr. DASH. Did you promise him at that time, as he testified, that to the best of your ability, though you no longer were in office, you would help him to either get Executive clemency, support, or rehabilitation, any of the things we have been asking about? Mr. MITCHELL. Let us take Executive clemency. No, I have never promised that to anybody. Obviously, there is no basis upon which I could. With respect to, you were talking about support and so forth, what I told Jeb Magruder was that I thought he was a very outstanding young man and I liked and I worked with and to the extent that I could help in any conceivable way, I would be delighted to do so. And this was exactly the same conversation that we had the next day down at Haldeman's office. [00.05.45] Mr. DASH. Did Mr. Magruder then ask for that meeting with Mr. Haldeman? Mr. MITCHELL. Oh yes. Mr. DASH. Did he feel he needed that assurance from somebody still in the White House? Mr. MITCHELL. That is right. Mr. DASH. And met with Mr. Haldeman on the 28th of March? Mr. MITCHELL. 28th of March, that is correct. Mr. DASH. What kind of assurances were being sought by Mr. Magruder there and what was being given to him? [00.06.00] Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. Magruder was again concerned--well he did not express it too directly--that he thought he might become the fall guy. It seems to me that everybody around this town involved in this all thought they -were going to become a fall guy. Mr. DASH. Did you, Mr. Mitchell? Mr. MITCHELL. Did I? No. Contrary to the story that I have read I did not believe that, to be the case, I AM quite, anxiously waiting to see if there is some possibility of that other than some misguided counsel who wrote a piece of paper from which cross-examination was to be made. [00.06.43] Mr. DASH. Getting back to Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Magruder's meeting with you on March 28--- Mr. MITCHELL. Yes, it was the same general discussion, "I may have problems with my perjury, I don't have any money, am I going to be deserted, -are you people still going to be friends, will I be able to get counsel," this type of conversation. [00.07.12]
More Opening Day 98th Congress, 1983
Opening Day 98th Congress, Majority Leader Jim Wright (D-TX) enumerating proposed rule changes up for debate: 6. Allow for a new point of order to be raised against any bill which contains a tax or tariff measure, unless that measure was reported by the Committee on Ways and Means. 7. Extend from current seven days to fourteen days the time in which the committee would be required to report a proper resolution of inquiry, once that resolution has been referred to said committee. 8. Provide Speaker with discretionary authority to declare House resolved into the committee of the whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of a piece of legislation without a specific vote in the House, but under only limiting circumstances. This power would only go into effect after the House voted on a rule that would bring such a matter under review. 9. A conforming amendment to accompany the first rule change which Rep. Wright had already spoken for.
August 3, 1994 - Part 5
(15:30:00) Testimony of JEAN HANSON, JOSHUA STEINER, DENNIS FOREMAN, and JACK DEVORE before House Banking Committee
August 3, 1994 - Part 6
(16:57:52) Testimony of JEAN HANSON, JOSHUA STEINER, DENNIS FOREMAN, and JACK DEVORE before House Banking Committee
August 3, 1994 - Part 9
(02:03:58) Testimony of JEAN HANSON, JOSHUA STEINER, DENNIS FOREMAN, and JACK DEVORE before House Banking Committee
LAWMAKERS - October 8, 1981
House Foreign Affairs Committee meeting on the sale of AWACs (Advanced Warning and Control AirCraft) to Saudi Arabia.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, July 10, 1973
[00.54.06-Sen. TALMADGE interrogates MITCHELL, asking MITCHELL to comment on DEAN'S previous testimony] Senator TALMADGE. Mr. Dean testified that on March 28, 1973, he met with you and Mr. Magruder and that you indicated to Mr. Dean that his testimony could cause problems. Did that meeting take place? Mr. MITCHELL. There was a meeting on March 28, but I believe that the phrase that you have quoted has come out of a, memorandum that Dean has submitted to this committee dealing with a meeting that, we had on April 10. Now, I may be mistaken in connection with that but the meeting I had with Dean on March 28 there was Magruder present at the meeting, and really what the, discussion there was the recollection of the meeting in the Justice Department, the one where the, statement -was made that there, was a possibility of Dean testifying before the grand jury could provide problems for the President, I believe was at the April 10 statement. [00.55.14] Senator TALMADGE. Did you make a statement that his testimony could cause problems for the President? Mr. MITCHELL. I would believe that I would have put it in that frame. because this would provide. the, entire unraveling of all of the Plumbers activities and all of the White, House. horrors. Senator TALMADGE. What did you mean by that, statement? Mr. MITCHELL. Just what I said now. Senator TALMADGE. That you wanted it kept concealed? Mr. MITCHELL. I was not anxious to volunteer any information with respect to the White House horrors or the Plumbers operations that would hurt this President. [00.55.45] Senator TALMADGE. Mr. Dean also testified before the committee that he gave you a hypothesis, that the plan to break in the Watergate had been approved -without anyone, fully understanding its importance, he stated that you said his theory was not far wrong, only that it would be three, or four times removed from the committee. Did you make that statement and, if so, what did you mean by it? Mr. MITCHELL. I testified this morning that there was no such statement made. This has been over the past year in discussion of this and theorization as to who was involved and how we were doing but, it certainly wasn't made at that meeting of March 28 because Magruder, Dean, and I were, at the meeting and I left to go into the office to say goodbye to Haldeman to go back to -New York so if he had said it, he would have, said it in front of Dean and Magruder, and I am sure Magruder would have remembered it but, to my knowledge, to the best of my recollection, no such statement. was ever my made. [00.56.52] Senator TALMADGE. You resigned, I believe, as campaign director, July 4, 1972? Mr. MITCHELL. July 1. sir. Senator TALMADGE.; July 1 1972. Why did you resign , Mr. Mitchell? Mr. MITCHELL. Well, Senator, I thought this was probably the, Most publicized resignation that ever took place in this country. Senator TALMADGE. I haven't heard you say it. I have heard others say it. Mr. MITCHELL. I had some long-range telephone threats that if I didn't out of politics, I was going to lose my marriage. Senator TALMADGE. What you are, saying then, I don't want to get into that, aspect of It,, NO what at you are saying then---- Mr. MITCHELL. Everybody else has-, Senator. You might just as well. Senator TALMADGE. It had nothing whatever to do with the Watergate matter? Mr. MITCHELL. None whatsoever. Senator TALMADGE. The sequence of events there,, as they unraveled were so similar in dates that, I wondered if that had anything to do with it? Mr. MITCHELL. Well, Senator, I can't, conceive the President would have, anything to do with the Watergate and -we would have continued to have all of these meetings both social and campaign meetings and all the rest of it if it had anything to do with the Watergate. Senator TALMADGE. You discussed your resignation---- Mr. MITCHELL [continuing]. 'It didn't. What we discussed with the President, we had lunch on Friday, the announcement was made. on Saturday--we had lunch on Friday. and we discussed who the successor was going to be. The President asked me to, urged me to stay on, I said I could not, under the circumstances it would be impossible for me to function properly, and I don't want to Characterize his attitude but, it seemed to me, he reluctantly consented to the fact that I was going to leave, and we discussed a successor and implemented this rather rapidly. If you are aware of my logs that, I had been spending the better part, of the previous week trying to smooth this situation over to the point where that I could stay as husband -and wife regardless of whether I resigned or not, so eventually it was so worked out. [00.58.59]
Capitol Journal - Indiana Elections - Newt Gingrich
An unidentified Representative speaks passionately on the House floor about voting one's own consciousness, loser Dan McIntyre stands on the Capital Building steps surrounded by Republican congressmen who sing the National Anthem, an unidentified Representative cuts off the speech of another unidentified representative on the House floor, Speaker Tip O'Neill presides over a vote on the House floor, various shots of Congressmen walking to and up the steps of the Capital Building. Carter narrates a summary of the chain of events leading up to the swearing in of Frank McCluskey - shots of Dan McIntyre after the election being celebrated by a crowd as the winner, long shot of the House in session, shot a three person election task force set up to recount the vote sitting at a table in Indiana, Representative WILLIAM THOMAS complains about unfair play to other members of the election task force, Speaker Tip O'Neill says he is shocked by the tactics of the Republican leadership, Representative ROBERT MICHEL complains passionately before the House about the Democratic leadership, at a meeting of the House Administration Committee Representatives LEON PANETTA and William Thomas scream across a table at one another about the vote count.
RABIN / HUSSEIN Coverage of Israel Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and King Hussein I of Jordan (Hussein bin Talal) speaking to a Joint Session of Congress.
High angle WLS of House of Representatives floor. High angle TLS House floor, politicians ambling for seats. Announcement of escort committee and procedure from House Speaker Tom Foley and Vice-President Al Gore. High angle 3/4 view LS of House floor, joint meeting being called to order.
JFK Assassination HSCA Hearings
House Select Committee on Assassinations Chief Counsel G. Robert Blakey continues opening remarks at hearing on the assassination of U.S. President John F. Kennedy. Blakey continues remarks on findings of the Warren Commission. The discovery of three spent cartridge cases were found on the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository was considered convincing proof of only three shots, and the Warren Commission concluded its investigation disclosed no credible evidence that shots were fired from anywhere else. The work of the House Select Committee on Assassinations on the number of shots fired has been based almost entirely on scientific evidence. The Committee has had access to a motion film record of the assassination made by Abraham Zapruder, forensic and medical testimony, ballistic and neutron activation analysis, a trajectory reconstruction, and an analysis of a recording of sound transitions from a police motorcycle radio. The hearing will be concerned for the most part with the scientific evidence and its implications, with particular attention paid to new analysis of data previously developed in the Committee’s acoustics project, conducted by independent consultants whose findings were recently submitted to the Committee. Predominantly Caucasian adult male and female audience.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 6, 1973
[00.30.39] Mr. DASH, With regard to the $350,000 or any other cash, could you tell us what denominations generally the, cash was in? Mr. SLOAN. I would say generally the cash was in $100 bills, although though at times, there were $50's, $20's, $10's. At one point, I think we even' had some $1,000 bills. Mr. DASH. Now, with regard to Mr. Porter. Mr. SLOAN. I might, add one further remark about the $350,000. To the best of my recollection, after having the authority from Mr. Kalmbach to do this, there was a meeting in Secretary Stans office in which he was present and 1 was present. I do not, believe this was the subject, of the meeting. think it was a very brief reference. My recollection is that Mr. Kalmbach indicated to Mr. Stans that he had had this request for $350,000, that he had asked me to get it together. MY best recollection is that, Mr. Stans said fine. Mr. DASH. Now do you know Of Your own knowledge the purpose, or reason for the $350,000 being sent to the White House? Mr. SLOAN. No sir, I do not. Mr. DASH. GO to the next person, please. Mr. SLOAN. Mr. Herbert Porter, Who was a member of the staff of the Committee to Re-Elect, the President,. He was in charge of scheduling surrogates, speakers for the President, in place of the President. This $100,000 covered a period probably starting in either December 1971 or January 1972. He had a blanket authority to draw cash funds from Mr. Magruder he would come to me and indicate on various occasions, I need $10,000, would you have it ready for me. This $100,000 is not a single disbursement The, increments of disbursement or distribution were probably in the range of $10,000 to $15,000 over a period of time, running up to April 7 and beyond. To the best of my recollection, I turned over approximately $6,000 to Mr. Porter following the April 7 date under my understanding that these were committee funds. In that, case, he--excuse me. Mr. Porter, I understand from his testimony to the General Accounting Office, puts the figure higher, at, $11,000, So I say, this is from memory. I would not, dispute his recollection. I believe he also recollects the total figure to be somewhat less. I had instructions and I forget from whom--possibly -Mr. Magruder- that a Mr. Porter would receive no further funds after April 7. When Mr. Porter came to me with that request,, I went to Mr. Stans. I asked him--I indicated to him that my clear understanding was that _Mr. -Porter -would no longer receive any cash funds. He indicated to me at that time that that was his understanding as well, that he would take the matter up with 'Mr. Mitchell and let me know. On his return, he indicated to me that I should continue making payments on request from Mr. Porter. Mr. DASH. I think you have. Indicated that Mr. Porter had a blanket authority from 'Mr., -Magruder and that later you checked or it was checked with _Mr. Mitchell. Generally, who had the authority to approve your making cash payments to anybody? Mr. SLOAN. In the earlier period, it -would have been Mr. Kalmbach alone He did not physically spend much time in Washington, D.C. He would be in and Out every week or two He would visit, with Mr. Mitchell. At some point in time, fairly early, he indicated to me-and I believe that initially, it was with regard to funds--that I was not to disburse any money without 'Mr. Mitchell's approval. Mr. DASH, This is what period you tire now talking about? Mr. SLOAN. This would be prior to Mr. Mitchell leaving the Justice Department. It would be in probably the summer of 1971. Mr. DASH. Did you check with Mr. Mitchell to get his approval on making cash payments? Mr. SLOAN. What happened in this regard was essentially that I don't believe any cash payments came up before the authority issue was resolved. What had been done prior to my assuming the disbursements side of the campaign, going back to the Citizens Committee, when we first moved into the campaign, before there was a division of finance and political arms of the campaign, Mr. Harry Flemming was handling the disbursement side and I was handling the receipts side. During I that period of time, he had established a procedure with Mr. Mitchell of sending down a monthly budget in writing. I inherited that procedure from him and with regard to the operating expenses of the committee, each month, I would send down to the Justice Department a memorandum outlining the projected expenses of the campaign at that point for the following month. Generally, his secretary would call back and say fine. So that anything that fell within that budget would be approved in that kind of way. Any extraordinary item- I would have to call him, or call his secretary, and ask him.. [00.36.32]
Capitol Journal - Iran and Campaign Financing Reform
Senator BOB DOLE at a press conference condemns negotiating with Iranian terrorists, Senator SAM NUNN appearing on "This Week in Washington" calls for an investigation of the White House operations, shot of the Senate floor, shots of the House floor, shot of Representative LEE HAMILTON - Chair of the House Intelligence Committee, shot of Senator RICHARD LUGAR presiding over a meeting of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, shots of congressmen heading toward their respective limousines after a special briefing meeting held by President Reagan
Watergate Hearings - Hugh Sloan
Ervin and Sloan discuss Sloan's consultation of the White House after Watergate - he went there to solicit an investigation of the committee by the White House to find out what was going on.
JFK Assassination Hearings - E. Aschkenasy & Mark Weiss, H.B. McClain
Committee Chairman Louis Stokes (D-OH) recognizes U.S. House Representative Robert Edgar (D-PA). Rep. Edgar discusses with Mark Weiss the effect that different temperatures would have on his and Ernest Aschkenasy's conclusions. Rep. Edgar uses the variable of ten degrees to say that the motorcycles placement would be moved "plus or minus two feet". Weiss says, though he would want to re-do the calculations before giving a firm answer, it would be in the correct range. Weiss provides details of how sound is measured and the effect temperature has on sound.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 28, 1973 (1/2)
[00.50.22-DEAN discussing meeting with NIXON to give him an AGENDA for dealing with Sen. BAKER, Feb. 1972] I recall that when I first, sent this document in to the President, the draft was not attached. It was, in his Executive Office Building--I don't know if that is where you met with him or not, but I had a call, a frantic call-to get a copy of that draft down to him. Senator BAKER. BAKER. On executive privilege? Mr. DEAN-. On executive privilege. Senator BAKER. Do you know why? Mr. DEAN. . I don't know why. Senator BAKER. Go ahead. Mr. DEAN. I assumed maybe you were meeting with him or it was imminent you were going to be in a meeting with him. Cannot State at this time if such witnesses will be provided to committee. Must wait to determine how the issue develops. A possible resolution of the problem may be that that when the committee believes a White House staff member is essential as a witness, we can compromise and agree upon sworn written interrogatories, that should be instead of interrogation. General Guidance: Seek to get hearings over as quickly as possible because they really are a potential witch hunt. The President can note that hearings of this type damage all Government officials and the institutions of Government. The public wants to believe the worst about all politicians and hearings of this type are going to damage all elected officials. Committee procedures should protect the rights of minority members to information, calling its Own witnesses, notice Of meetings et cetera. Minority counsel should be tough, aware of the Way things Operate in Washington and able to handle a fellow like Sam Dash who has been selected as majority counsel. Dash is a partisan. Communication with White House: Wally Johnson should be initial contact point. but if Baker feels he Wants to raise something that he chooses not to discuss With Wally, then arrangements can be made to meet with Dean. (NOTE: Frankly, the naming of Dean as the man who deals with the President on such matters preserves Our posture on executive privilege, should Dean be called as a witness.) Note at the bottom : Have just learned that Baker has publicly announced the appointment of Fred Thompson as chief minority counsel. Timmons has recommended George Webster as our candidate. Senator BAKER. Just out of curiosity, Mr. Dean, since this agenda was prepared at some length first, did you dictate it? Mr. DEAN. I did and again, this is based on the meeting that occurred at La Costa and the discussions I had with Mr. Haldeman and Ehrlichman. [00.52.35-BAKER gets DEAN to report that BAKER was not cooperative in the way the White House had hoped] Senator BAKER. Can you enlighten us; How much of this agenda was covered at such meeting? Mr. DEAN, I only know what came out, was reported to me by the President and Mr. Haldeman that the thrust of the meeting really was your calling upon the President to--- Senator BAKER. To waive executive privilege? Mr. DEAN [continuing], To waive executive privilege is correct. And I also--the President told me that you agreed that the hearings should be over as soon as possible. If they lingered, it would be damaging. Senator BAKER. It also is your information that there was not a suggestion as to minority counsel which had been announced on the same day. [shot of THOMPSON smoking pipe] Mr. DEAN. Had been announced, that is correct. Senator BAKER. All right, go ahead, Mr. Dean. Mr. DEAN. The next significant document leading up to my meetings that some of these things were discussed on the 27th and 28th was a request again by Mr. Haldeman. Senator BAKER. Do you have an exhibit number? Mr. DEAN. Yes, sir. This is exhibit No. 34-36. And I have a cover note on this. I hand-carried the, other agenda over to Mr. Haldeman, whereas this one there was a little more- time, He had asked me not to send it through normal channels, so there is a cover note on "Memorandum for H.R. Haldeman from John Dean. I did not use the prescribed format because I understand you do not want this to pass into channels." [00.54.09] TALKING POINT FOR MEETING WITH THE ATTORNEY GENERAL. Senator BAKER. I think we just talked out, Mr. Dean. I think that is another rollcall vote. Would the committee like to try to alternate, we are on 10-minute voting cycles, I do not think we can--- Senator TALMADGE. If the chairman desires, I have one or two very brief questions. I think I can complete them in about 5 minutes while you go vote, and when you return I will go vote. Senator BAKER. Does that suit you, Mr. Dean? Mr. DEAN. Whatever pleases the Chair. Senator BAKER. Thank you. [00.54.50] Senator TALMADGE. Mr. Dean, you have been in the chair now for 4 days, and I know how weary you must be, and I will be extremely brief. There are one or two things I would like some clarification on. You have testified repeatedly that even though you were counsel to the President, you had no direct access to the President except going through Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman; is that correct? Mr. DEAN. That is correct. In fact, Senator, I think the documents I have just referred to were talking about direct meetings with the President I am asked to prepare an agenda showing the very pattern that exists in and of itself where I sent everything I did through either Ehrlichman or Haldeman for anything of this nature. [00.55.30]
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 13, 1973 (1/2)
[00.47.30] Senator MONTOYA. Were you in touch on or about the 6th of July with anyone connected with the White House or with the committee? Mr. STANS. I was out of town then. I do not recall any phone calls until I got to Florida. I had a phone call from Bob Mardian. Senator Montoya. And what wit-, that telephone call about? Mr. STANS. About the importance of my going to California. Mr. Mardian had been in charge of that region of States. There was a very difficult budget, problem with the California, Campaign Committee that had not been resolved and he wanted very much for me. to go to California and try to work it out. Senator That was the only telephone call with Washington or anyone connected with the CRP or with the White House on that day? Mr. STANS. Senator, I really do not know who I talked to. This is only one I can recall, it was the important one because I tried to get out of the trip, I wanted to go directly to Seattle. Senator MONTOYA. To the best of your recollection, was that the only call? Mr. STANS. To the best of my recollection now, yes. Senator MONTOYA. And to the best, of your recollection, was the conversation confined just to the very subject and urgency of going to California? Mr. STANS. It was confined to that subject and to the suggestion that Mr. Sloan join me in California. Senator MONTOYA. That, is what, I was getting at. Now, who suggested to you that Mr. Sloan join you in California? Mr. STANS. I think it was Mr. Mardian. Senator MONTOYA. Did anyone else call you? Mr. STANS. Well, you are testing my recollection now but I do not recall anyone else telling it. Senator MONTOYA. Had you requested that Mr. Sloan join you? Mr. STANS. No; I had not. Senator MONTOYA. Did you ask Mr. Mardian why he should join You? Mr. STANS. I do not recall any discussion on that. He thought it would be a good idea if Sloan were in California. It was one of our biggest States. The budget problem was serious, and whatever his reasons were for Sloan going along I do not recall them at this time. I do not know that he even told me. Senator MONTOYA. Did you ever use Mr. Sloan in California during that trip for budgetary problems? Mr. STANS. Mr. Sloan sat in the meeting. Senator MONTOYA. Did he contribute anything to those meetings, any input? Mr. STANS. I do not recall that he did. Senator MONTOYA. Did he stay with you in your room or somewhere in the, same hotel next to your room? Mr. STANS. I think he was in the same hotel in a room somewhere but I do not know where it was. Senator MONTOYA. Did he discuss the fact, that, Magruder had been trying to get him to perjure himself with you? Mr. STANS. Well I really do not know whether he discussed it on that trip or not or whether that, had come out, earlier. Senator MONTOYA. Well, you must, have discussed something about the Magruder involvement during that trip. Did you? Mr. STANS. I do not think we did. I do not recall it. Senator MONTOYA. Did you discuss anything about Watergate with Mr. Sloan during that trip? Mr. STANS. Well, again, I think there were some discussions with Mr. Sloan toward the end of the trip but let me tell you what we were doing. We had a bud 'get meeting with the California people that lasted quite late. I flew that, night quite late. It was midnight, before I got, to Seattle. The next day I had a series of meetings beginning with breakfast, then private meetings, a luncheon meeting and a series of other meetings during which time Mr. Sloan met with the treasurer of the Washington finance committee. We left that afternoon late or evening, I guess it was either late that, evening or early the next: morning for Portland, Oreg., and I had a similar schedule. Mr. Sloan again met and talked with the treasurer of the Oregon State committee, so far as I can recall. We had a very busy time, and it was not until---- Senator MONTOYA. I know. Well, you had a little social conversation together, did you not? Mr. STANS. Yes, we did but the one, the only ones I recall were--- Senator MONTOYA. Did you socialize about Watergate? Mr. STANS. Senator, I really- do not recall. We talked about it, we talked about, it in terms of general interest, the nature of his concerns, but I do not know anything fundamental or new that came out in the course of that, trip.' [00.52.25]
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 26, 1973
[00.39.22] Senator TALMADGE. What was the President's reaction when you told him about the complicity of the, individuals in the, White House? Mr. DEAN. Well, I felt he had not gotten the. message that I -was trying to convey through to the President, and I think that the subsequent meeting that afternoon and the meeting the. next day with the President indicated to me that there was more concern about this committee and its hearings than doing anything- affirmative about What I told the President. In fact the strategy was then developing that John Mitchell should step forward and if he did that there would be lack of concern and interest in the postactivity as opposed to the preactivity and hopefully they would all go away. Senator TALMADGE. What did the President say -when you told him about these individuals? Mr. DEAN. About which individuals, Senator? Senator TALMADGE. 'Of you and Ehrlichman and Haldeman all being subject to indictment. Mr. DEAN. I don't recall the President's reaction as much as I recall Mr. Ehrlichman's reaction when he expressed displeasure. There was a general discussion, and I was at Just amazed at the discussion going on and I just kept shaking my head because, the President -would say to me "Do you agree with this?" And I would say "No, I don't," and finally I said "the reason I don't agree with this is because I think that Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Ehrlichman, and I are indictable for obstruction of justice,." Senator TALMADGE. Did the President seem surprised when you gave him this information ? Mr. DEAN. No, Sir, he did not. Senator TALMADGE. I believe at the same time he discussed with -you that he should not have, talked -with Mr. Colson about Executive clemency did he not ? Mr. DEAN. No, sir, that, -was a meeting--that occurred on two times. On March 13 when -he had asked me where, the pressure, was coming from for the money he told me about the fact that Colson had come. to see him despite Ehrlichman's instructions that 'he not do so, and be expressed an annoyance at that occasion. Then, on April 15 of this year at the very end of the conversation I remember very vividly the President getting, up out of his chair, walking behind 'the chair to the, corner and in a very audible, almost inaudible tone, turned to me and said, "I was probably foolish to talk to Colson about clemency for Hunt, wasn't I?" That, -was his statement. Senator TALMADGE. Now, to turn to another matter. Do you have any idea, why it -was you that Mr. Ehrlichman asked to check into the after the Watergate entrance? Mr. DEAN. I Would only assume because I had become the White House firefighter at that time, and I was given assignments of this nature whether It was the, as I say, the Lithuanian defector or any conflict of interest problem that came up. I investigated a lot of those. I dealt with all of the Presidential appointees before they were appointed to clear them for conflict, problems or any problem that came up, ,in any improprieties that had come, to our attention was sent to my office so -we could investigate them and find out. if they could be embarrassing to the President so it was very natural, of course, for it to come to me. Senator TALMADGE. Did you really believe Mr. Liddy when he told you that no one in the White House -was involved? Mr. DEAN. Well. given the nature of my statement, in reflecting back that time he did not, even mention to me Hunt's involvement, and how much Mr. Liddy would know about White House involvement in this I do not know. I think that he would only have probably hearsay knowledge from Mr. Magruder in his dealings with Magruder as to who in the White, House. would or would not be involved. I do not know what, dealings he had with the White House other than the dealings he had had with me. Senator TALMADGE. Let us see if I have the sequence on the immediate aftermath of the break-in correct now. Immediately upon your return to Washington after the break-in in June., you saw Mr. Liddy, whom you knew had provided massive intelligence plans to Mr. Mitchell, is that correct? Mr. DEAN. Well. Sir, I will give you the sequence. As I arrived back on Sunday night the 18th. I was informed by my assistant that McCord had been arrested, one of the individuals arrested and that one of the Cubans had a check from 'Mr. Hunt. The next morning I had a conversation -with Mr. Caulfield. who repeated the same thing to me. I then had a call from Mr. Ehrlichman or I had a call from Mr. Magruder who told me that this whole thing is Liddy's fault and I should look into it. I then had a call from Mr. Ehrlichman who, I reported to him that this was, had been, told me and he said "I think you ought to meet with Liddy." I then -met with Mr. Liddy about noon and he gave, me his report. It was in that afternoon that 'Mr. Strachan came into my office and told me that he had been instructed by Haldeman to destroy documents. [00.44.32]
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, Testimony of James W McCord (Jim McCord)
About 5 p.m. we went up to Bittman's office. There Alch disappeared with Bittman and I sat alone in Bittman's office for a period of time, became irritated, and went next door where Bernard Shankman and Austin Mittler, attorneys for me and Hunt respectively, were talking about legitimate legal matters. I might add at this point parenthetically, I have no knowledge whatever that either Bernard Shankman or Austin Mittler had any knowledge whatever of the events which I am discussing in this memorandum. Alch finally came back, took me aside and said that Bittman told him I would be called that same night by a friend I had known from the White House. Senator Howard Baker (R Tennessee). Now, at that point, I take it that, that is secondhand information? Senator Sam Ervin (D North Carolina). That is testimony of what he says that his lawyer told him Mr. Bittman said. Of course, as far as Bittman is concerned and the White House is concerned, it is hearsay, but his own lawyer s knowledge. Senator Howard Baker (R Tennessee). I entirely agree, Mr. Chairman. The point I am making is I want to separate the wheat from the chaff and what his lawyer told him clearly is primary evidence. What his lawyer told him that someone else told him is clearly hearsay evidence. And once again, I am not trying to exclude it, I wish simply to identify it as we go along. James McCord. I believe I stated it, sir, as it occurred, which was this was a statement by Mr. Alch. My statement was that: Mr. Alch finally came back, took me aside and said that Mr. Bittman had told him that I would be called that same night by a friend I had known from the White House. I assumed this would be John Caulfield who had originally recruited me for the Committee for the Re-election of the President position.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 26, 1973 - Testimony of John Dean.
Senator Sam Ervin (D North Carolina). Senator, you may proceed with the interrogation. Senator Joseph Montoya (D New Mexico). Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Dean, now I ask you about the press conference of October 5, 1972, held by the President and I quote from his press conference as follows, Incidentally, I conducted the investigation of the Hiss case. I know that is very unpopular subject to raise in some quarters, but I conducted it. It was successful. The FBI did a magnificent job, but that investigation involving the security of this country was basically a Sunday school exercise compared to the amount of effort that was put into this, meaning the Watergate. I agreed with the amount of effort that was put into it. I wanted every lead carried out to the end, because I wanted to be sure that no member of the White House staff, and no man or woman in a position of management responsibility in the Committee for Re-Election had anything to do with this kind of reprehensible activity. Now, would you say that the President was correct in making those statements at that time? John Dean. I can say this, Senator. I certainly did not brief him or prepare anything for the briefing book that would have led him to make that statement. And I can also say, once the indictments were handed down, it became what I would have to call the PR technique of the White House to say that well, everybody in the White House is clean. And this was repeated by Mr. Ziegler and in turn used by the President. Senator Joseph Montoya (D New Mexico). Well, would you agree with his appraisal that his job in the Hiss case was a Sunday school exercise compared with this effort? John Dean. Well, I am not that familiar with his effort. It s true that the FBI investigation was extensive but it obviously was not complete.
JFK Assassination Hearings - H.B. McClain
Committee Chairman, U.S. House Representative Louis Stokes (D-OH) asks Chief Counsel, Professor Robert Blakey to establish the chain of evidence for the Dallas Police tape. Blakey can only verify that the tape is of the police transmissions for the day of the assassination. He cannot trace it to McClain's motorcycle.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 25, 1973 - Statement of John Dean.
On either March 28th or 29th, Mr. Krogh came to my office because he happened to be in the Executive Office Building. He said he had come to express sympathy for me as a result of the adverse publicity I had received during the Gray hearings. He then began telling me that he had not himself had a good day since his own confirmation hearings and that he had been haunted by his experiences at the White House. I told Krogh that I thought that there was a very likely possibility that the Senate Watergate committee could stumble into the Ellsberg burglary. I told him that there were documents in the possession of the Justice Department which had been provided by the CIA in connection with the Watergate investigation which contained pictures of Liddy standing in front of Mr. Ellsberg's doctor's office in California. I told him that I had learned from the CIA that these pictures had been left in a camera returned by Hunt to the CIA and the CIA had developed the pictures. I said I did not believe that the Justice Department knew what the pictures were all about but that any investigator worth his salt would probably track down the incident as a result of the pictures. I told him that Ehrlichman had requested that I retrieve the documents from the Justice Department and got them back to the CIA where they might be withheld from the committee investigators but the CIA had been unwilling to do so. Krogh was very distressed to hear this news but said that maybe it was for the best in that he had personally been haunted by this incident for so long that he would like to get it out in the open.