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U.S. Rep. Jim Wright Speaks at DNC Orientation
United States Representative Jim Wright (D-TX) speaks to new Democratic National Committee (DNC) members coming into the House of Representatives. US Congressman Wright talks about decision making and "disagreeing without being disagreeable." Wright discusses being on different sides of political issues. Wright discusses using your conscience.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 29, 1973 (1/2)
] [00.18.44-title screen "SENATE HEARINGS ON CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES-PBS network ID-title screen] [00.22.09-LEHRER] LEHRER introduces the final hour of DEAN'S testimony, states that Fred THOMPSON has questions about campaign money. [00.22.24-DEAN, checking briefcase for a document pertaining to THOMPSON'S query about DEAN'S finances and use of funds entrusted to him] Mr. DEAN. No, I don't have a copy, I am sorry. Mr. THOMPSON. This is a matter of confusion to me, I believe you indicated yesterday that you had a $26,167 credit. Is that not--the Copy is not, clear. Mr. DEAN. May I say something about these documents? I had a standard practice of not opening these, in fact originally they were not even Sent, to me, they were, sent to my ex-wife's house whore they remained and I would collect them in bulk, unopened and take them to my secretary and she, would just, file them. This Is a margin account we are talking about and I have not a lot, of expertise In the market. The arrangements I had with my broker is that he had a total discretion in all handling of all trading. I would sign at the outset of all, I think periodically he would send me a shoot to sign that he would have total discretion on all trades. I have never been able to fully interpret these, sheets so that is why I hope somebody else can look at them to do the interpretation when I turn all this information over to the committee. [00.24.00] Mr. THOMPSON. Would it be accurate to say that is a debit instead of a credit? Mr. DEAN-. Well, I don't--I think what it indicates to me is that-it is a credit, I am sure there were at least $26,000, in fact I am sure there is more than $26,000 in the account. Mr. THOMPSON. Could it possibly be, that, that was a debit but the value of your stock at that time was such that if you sold your stock you would have a $20-something thousand credit? Mr. DEAN-. Well. I think that if you were to--when your investigators do an entire audit of this entire matter which is of interest to you, that they will find that there were ample, funds including more than $26,000. 1 think this indicates merely one transaction that had occurred in this period of time. Mr. THOMPSON. So you had ample funds there to take care of the honeymoon expenses? Mr. DEAN. That is correct. Mr. THOMPSON. I believe You stated that you placed some, of the, money back at one time and then you took some money out again later? Mr. DEAN. That is correct. Mr. THOMPSON. Again you did not go to your stock account although you had, as you say $20,000 either in stock value or readily available cash whichever that might be. Was this again because you had forgotten to do that or -why didn't you go to the stock account on that occasion? [00.25.35-DEAN answers the question extremely bluntly] Mr. DEAN. It was merely a matter of convenience. I had already made some use of the funds, and I merely decided to make more use of them, [Conferring with counsel.] Mr. THOMPSON. You 'received in what, June of 1972? Mr. DEAN. That is correct. Mr. THOMPSON-. And then you took $4,850 on October 11 of 1972. The remaining what, $10,350, did you ever use any of this money for any other purposes? Mr. DEAN. The other cash that was in there? Mr. THOMPSON. Yes. Mr. DEAN. As I said when I-at one time I recall I put some money back in, and I could have very -well at that time commingled other money that I had. I sometimes did carry cash with me, and I have told the committee I will do my best to go through my entire records and reconstruct this, with the committee investigators. [00.26.37]
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 27, 1973
[00.34.36-GURNEY challenges DEAN'S assertions that NIXON, through HALDEMAN and EHRLICHMAN, knew of the COVERUP, even though DEAN didn't tell him-it's a crucial point for the WHITE HOUSE'S "BLAME IT ON DEAN" strategy] Senator GURNEY. Did you discuss any aspects of the Watergate at that meeting with the President. For example, did you tell him anything about what Haldeman knew or what Ehrlichman knew? Mr. DEAN. Well, given the fact that he told me I had done a good job I assumed he had been very pleased -with what had been going on. The fact that the indictments, he was pleased that the indictments had stopped at Liddy because the only other link into the, White House. as -we had discussed earlier in sessions with Ehrlichman and Haldeman was Magruder. Senator GURNEY. Did you discuss what Magruder knew about Watergate and what involvement he had? Mr. DEAN. No. I didn't. I did not get into any--I did not give him a report at that point in time. Senator GURNEY. Did you discuss the coverup money that was being raised and paid? Mr. DEAN. No, sir. Senator GURNEY. Did you discuss Strachan bringing wiretap information to Haldeman? Mr. DEAN. No, I did not. Senator GURNEY. Did you discuss Haldeman instructing Strachan to destroy all of these materials? Mr. DEAN. No, I did not. Senator GURNEY. Did you discuss the CIA coverup idea? Mr. DEAN. I did not. Senator GURNEY. Did you talk about coaching Magruder on his perjured testimony in August? Mr. DEAN. No, I did not. [00.35.55-the questioning intensifies-split screen shows DEAN and GURNEY simultaneously] Senator GURNEY. Well -now how can you say that the President knew all about these things from a, simple observation by him that "Bob tells me you are doing a good job." Mr. DEAN. Well, Senator, I assume you know how your staff operation I assume members of your staff understand how you operate, how reporting requirements proceed, I was aware of the fact that Mr. Haldeman had often made notes, Mr. Haldeman has a good memory. Mr. Haldeman does not leave details aside. This was the hottest issue that was going in the campaign. I can't believe that the fact that we were going to contain this matter would totally escape the President's attention and it was, to me a confirmation and a compliment to me that I had done this. [00.36.45-GURNEY continues to play "devil's idiot"-DEAN has the response.] Senator GURNEY. Don't you think the President might have been Complimenting you on the, I will use the -word, investigation even if -you don't desire, that word, of the involvement of the people in the White House, the FBI interviews, all of that business, don't you think he might have been discussing that? Mr. DEAN. I would think be would say something to the effect that "Well, your investigation has been very accurate" rather than "Bob's been telling me everything you have been doing and you have been doing a good job." Senator GURNEY. Did he say that "Bob has been telling me everything you have been doing." Mr. DEAN. He said "Bob has been reporting to me," something of this nature. Senator GURNEY. I thought you said that he said that "Bob has been telling me, what a good job you have been doing." [00.37.26-GURNEY gets agitated] Mr. DEAN. Well, we are quibbling over words but I remember--- Senator GURNEY. GURNEY. We are not; quibbling over words. We, are. talking about something very important, whether the President of the United States knew on September 15 about the Watergate and the coverup. Mr. DEAN. I am totally aware. Senator GURNEY. This affects his Presidency and the Government, of the United States. Mr. DEAN. I am quite aware of that and I have told you I am trying My best to recall. My mind is not a tape recorder. It does recall impressions of conversations very well, and the impression I had was that, he had told, he told me that Bob had reported to him what I had been doing. That was the, impression that very clearly came, out. [00.38.02-GURNEY takes a stand to defend NIXON] Senator GURNEY. In other words, your whole thesis on saying that the, President of the United States knew about, Watergate on September 15 is purely an impression, there isn't a single, shred of evidence that, came out of this meeting. Mr. DEAN. Senator, I don't have--- Senator GURNEY. That he knew anything about--- Mr. DEAN. Senator, I don't have a thesis. I am reporting the facts as I am able to recall them to this committee. [00.38.29] Senator GURNEY. Let's turn to Segretti. I understand you talked to him in June and advised him about his pending interview with the FBI, is that correct? Mr. DEAN. I had a, call from Mr. Strachan who asked me, if I would Meet with Mr. Segretti. Senator GURNEY. I presume that you learned at that, time his participation in the dirty tricks department. Mr. DEAN. He Was not fully explicit at that time and that is why, it was not until November that I went out and had a full interview with him to find out the dimensions of the involvement of Mr. Chapin and Mr. Strachan, a copy of that tape, of that interview, I turned over to the committee and that was the first time I really knew of the full dimensions of his involvement. [00.39.12-GURNEY continues to emphasize DEAN'S failures to report directly to NIXON his knowledge of improprieties, DEAN continues to counter with the argument that he reported to Haldeman as part of the chain of command at the White House] Senator GURNEY. But did you know, he was up to dirty tricks in June? Mr. DEAN. Yes; I did. Senator GURNEY. Did you tell that to the President of the United -States? Mr. DEAN. I think I have explained my reporting times to the President, and this I might also add that the--- Senator GURNEY. In other words, you did not tell it to the President of the United States? Mr. DEAN. No, sir. The coverup on Segretti was sort of a mini coverup -as opposed to the rather large and extensive coverup -that was going on with the other matters. Senator GURNEY. The purpose of the meeting with Mr. Segretti was to advise him to withhold information from the FBI about Strachan, Chapin, and Kalmbach, isn't that right? Mr. DEAN. Unless pressed.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 27, 1973 (1/2)
[00.55.52] Senator INOUYE. [QUOTING W.H. MEMO ATTACKING DEAN'S TESTIMONY] "On March -21 Dean gave, the President a more complete, but still laundered version of the facts and so surprised the President that according to press accounts of what Dean is saying 'the President came out of his chair."' Mr. DEAN. I do not know where that press account came from. The President did not come out of his chair. I have never seen the President come out of his chair other than very easily and slowly, [Laughter] at the time that he got up on April 15 to walk around to the corner of the EOB office and then raise something with me. The President of the United States does not come flying out of his chair. Senator INOUYE. [QUOTING W.H. MEMO ATTACKING DEAN'S TESTIMONY] "At this meeting Dean indicated that Magruder was involved but that he did not know about Mitchell." Mr. DEAN. That is correct. As I have said before this committee I have never had a direct conversation with John Mitchell to ask him what his involvement was. On the 28th, when I came down from Camp David after there was this discussion about whether I would be willing to perpetuate the story that there had been one meeting in Mitchell's office there had been a discussion of the election laws and that that was the reason for my presence and it, was to introduce Mr. Liddy, at the end of that discussion I Said to Mr. Mitchell "I have never asked you of your involvement and I will not ask you of your involvement but I want to hypothesize what I see to be the situation," and I then gave them my hypothesis of the situation and as a result of that hypothesis Mr. Mitchell said "that is not far from accurate, but we thought it would be two or three times removed." [00.57.44] Senator INOUYE. If you did not know about Mitchell why did you advise the President that Mr. Mitchell could be indicted? Mr. DEAN. Because based on the information Mr. Magruder had given me, which was inferential and my -general assumption of the fact, I was aware of the fact that he had received the information from the electronic surveillance. Senator INOUYE. Did you so advise the President ? Mr. DEAN. Did I so advise the President? I do not recall that, I got into a detailed discussion. I was giving the President what I would say was a general overview and letting him come back and ask any specific questions he might wish to ask. [00.58.26] Senator INOUYE.' Do You not feel it was important enough to advise, the President of the United States that his former Attorney General was involved -and implicated? Mr. DEAN. Well, I told him I thought he could be indicted but I told him I did not have the facts for certainty myself that he was indictable. Senator INOUYE. I thought you had just testified that Magruder, Mitchell, and Dean were indictable? Mr. DEAN. No, no. You are talking about the meeting that occurred on the 21st? Senator INOUYE. The 21st of March, sir. Mr. DEAN. That was in the afternoon after I had earlier met with the President and I said that Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Dean were indictable for obstruction of justice. [00.59.00] Senator INOUYE. [QUOTING W.H. MEMO ATTACKING DEAN'S TESTIMONY] "He mentioned the Ellsberg break-in and possibly a second-story job at, the Brookings Institute. He told about the attempt by Hunt to blackmail Ehrlichman over the Ellsberg break-in. He, suggested that Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Dean might all have some problem about the financial transactions with the defendants but that he thought they were more technical and political than legal." Mr. DEAN. I do recall saying that I thought that some of the obstruction problems were technical. I said some of them are more serious than others. As far as discussion of the Ellsberg burglary, Senator, I don't recall raising that at that point in time with the President as the reason for Mr. Hunt's threat. In fact I was--when I raised it with Mr. Ehrlichman as to what these, seamy things were, Mr. Ehrlichman said, "Well, you know I just have no idea what he could be talking about." [01.00.08] i
NPACT coverage of Church Committee Hearings - CIA Director William Colby
(00:51:43) Back to Duke in the studio who segues to an interview he conducted with Church in the hearing room right after the day's session ended (00:52:25) Shot of Duke interviewing Church, Duke asks Church if there was a direct refusal not to follow orders on the part of the CIA, if there was any wink by White House administration not to destroy the CIA toxins, if the CIA might have kept the poisons to use in assassination plots, what's to prevent this from happening again
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 14, 1973
[00.02.00--in to Jeb MAGRUDER testifying about links between the CRP and the White House] Mr. MAGRUDER......Mr. Mitchell agreeing. In fact, I think that is one reason Mr. Mitchell agreed to run the, campaign because he, knew Mr. Haldeman would be his chief day-to-day contact at the White House, I disagree with that statement. That has been bandied about, I know. I do not agree with that. Senator INOUYE. Is there a possibility that one group of people, are trying to make another group the scapegoats for this? Mr. MAGRUDER. I cannot--i do not think so. I do not see any evidence of that specific type of activity. Obviously, everyone now is basically on his own and consequently, it is difficult to say anything is Of coordinated, concerted effort, at this time. I would think most individuals are operating independently of each other at this time- Senator INOUYE. Several people have been involved in the Watergate and its aftermath, and in most cases, those, involved or identified have Come forth and spoken, either voluntarily or involuntarily. But one, man stands out. He has remained silent. No one seems to be able to move him. Mr. Liddy. Why is he keeping silent, do you know? Mr. MAGRUDER. I have no idea. He is under appeal. I assume he feels he has a better opportunity under appeal than he does by speaking Out now. Senator INOUYE. In your testimony, you discussed Executive, clemency taking care. of the family, paying expenses. Was Mr. Liddy promised anything? Mr. MAGRUDER. My assumption is that he was promised what all the others -were. Senator INOUYE. What were they promised, sir? Mr. MAGRUDER. I do not, know. I only know what I talked about relating to myself Senator INOUYE. What were you promised. sir?, Mr. MAGRUDER. Well, as I indicated before, I talked about, salary, taking care of the family. legal cost. potential Executive clemency, assistance in getting a job, and so on--that type of thing. [00.04.05] Senator INOUYE. We have, received testimony that Mr. Strachan was a very important conduit. that. he -was the. liaison between the committee and the White House., that on the, other end was Mr. Haldeman. Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes, sir. Senator INOUYE. Did you receive any indication that Mr. Strachan did in fact convey those memos and messages that you have been sending to him through Mr. Strachan? Mr. MAGRUDER. Well. Mr. Strachan had a method of working with Mr. Haldeman I am unaware of. because I have seen some of the, documents and that was. he would do a summary sheet capsulizing activities of the campaign, I do not know how often he did it but it was a straightforward memo that condensed much of the information that we would give Mr. Strachan. That was his typical method of dealing with 'Mr. Haldeman I think. Of course, he could give you more information directly. and I gather he usually sent back material when he, thought it was appropriate Senator INOUYE. Did you get any feedback from Mr. Haldeman indicating that he had in fact received memos? Mr. MAGRUDER. No, sir. [00.05.12] Senator INOUYE. You spoke of a conversation with Mr., Charles Colson in February or March 1972 in which -Mr. Colson urged you to approve the Liddy plan, Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes, sir. Senator INOUYE. HOW many Liddy plans were in existence at that time? Mr. MAGRUDER. Well, to my knowledge, there was only the one plan that continually was revised downward. Senator INOUYE. So there was no question as to which plan Mr. Liddy was talking about? Mr. MAGRUDER. In that context. I would assume that that is correct. Senator INOUYE. There was no other Liddy--- Mr. MAGRUDER. I knew of no other Liddy plan, no, sir. He was, let me make it clear, doing other minor projects in the intelligence-gathering field but they were, basically of a minor nature. Senator INOUYE. But this was the Liddy plan?, Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes, sir. Senator INOUYE. We have received testimony which indicated that you made early morning calls to Key Biscayne right after receipt of the news of the break-in, in fact, a witness testified that you made a call at 4 in the morning. Mr. MAGRUDER. That is incorrect, sir. The only discussion I had with Key Biscayne. was on Sunday with Mr. Haldeman. I talked to the White House, in Washington that day on Saturday. Four in the morning.... Senator INOUYE. Sunday. Mr. MAGRUDER. Sunday, -well, my wife is here and I think she could testify we were, both in bed at that time. We--now, Sunday morning we were, at a fund-- well, a celebrity dinner and it was late when we, got back, late but I do not recall talking to Key Biscayne at that at time in the, morning. Senator INOUYE. You have testified that Mr. Moore and Mr. Liddy met with Mr. Kleindienst at the Burning Tree Country Club. Mr. MAGRUDER. I was told that, sir, yes. Senator INOUYE. . By whom, sir?
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 27, 1973
[00.27.24-Sen. GURNEY continues his pro-WHITE HOUSE questioning, trying to imply that DEAN brought LIDDY to the CRP and orchestrated his spying activities] Senator GURNEY. Would that not be important in finding out his qualifications, his previous employment? Mr. DEAN. Well, I was told, for example, when I met him--when I talked to Mr. Krogh about him, I can recall Mr. Krogh very specifically telling me that he had written some of the best legal memorandums that he had run across in a long time. He explained that Gordon had taken some rather complex subjects and analyzed them in a very precise way. One of these -memoranda had gone in to the President and the President had complimented Mr. Liddy through Mr. Krogh on the quality of the document that he had prepared. Senator GURNEY. Was it understood that part of his duties -would be in charge of security or things like that? Mr. DEAN. That is correct. Senator GURNEY. Well, did you ask any questions of him as to what he had had been doing in the area of security? Mr. DEAN. I was told that he had an FBI, Treasury Department, law enforcement background. There, was not a, great focus on that at that time. I know Mr. Krogh had worked in the past before, I came to the 'White House and partially after I was still at the White House with the demonstrator problem. Mr. Krogh was very knowledgeable in the area, and -when he told me that he thought Mr. Liddy had these qualifications I thought that Mr. Krogh's judgment was good and in fact, it was partially Mr. Krogh's working with me from my position at the Department of Justice that resulted in my coming into the White House. Senator GURNEY. You never did go into -what he had been doing with Krogh and Hunt? Mr. DEAN. No, I did not. [00.29.02-DEAN'S role in planning the WATERGATE-GURNEY wants to make DEAN'S role seem significant] Senator GURNEY. The January 27 meeting occurred and as I recall, you testified that the original plan--and I do not know what the word was that you used to describe it, but--- Mr. DEAN. I think I called it a mission impossible plan. Senator GURNEY. I think that is probably a, good description. Did you ever talk to Mr. Mitchell or Mr. Magruder after this horrendous plan, about whether Liddy really was competent, to stay on and work for the, Committee, To Re-Elect the. President? Mr. DEAN. As I recall, the only conversation I had was a very brief conversation. Mr. Liddy was taking the charts off the easel and they were preparing to leave the office when I paused in front of Mr. Mitchell's desk and he told me that, this was certainly out, of the question I do not, think anyone knew that a plan of that dimension was going to be presented at that time. Senator GURNEY. Well, did it worry you that this man came up with kidnapping prostitution, mugging, and all the rest, of it? Mr. DEAN. Yes, sir, it did. Senator GURNEY. But you never really discussed it with Mitchell and Magruder as to his capability, Liddy's capability of staying on at the job? [00.30.20] Mr. DEAN. Well, sir, you would have had to have been there to believe it and I might say that, it was so far out that there -was no hope, in my mind that anyone was ever going to approve any plan like this. So I just assumed that it was going to die, a, natural death. Senator GURNEY. Now we come, to the second meeting that occurred on February 1. My recollection is that you came in a little later this day. Mr. DEAN. That is correct. Senator GURNEY. My recollection also is that you testified that you -were, again disturbed. My Very disturbed at what he was proposing. Is that true? Mr. DEAN. That is correct and I was injecting myself into the meeting in an effort to terminate the meeting, which I did. Senator GURNEY. Well, did you have any discussion after the meeting with Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Magruder about his continuing? Mr. DEAN. I had a direct discussion with Mr. Liddy at, that time. I might add. after the first meeting I had told Mr. Liddy he should destroy the charts. After the second meeting, as we were leaving the office, I told him that I would not discuss this with him any further. I indicated to him that it still was not what was necessary and it was a rather brief discussion, I must say I felt very sorry for Gordon Liddy during much of this because of the fact that he had received no guidance from anybody that, I could tell-certainly none from me--as to what was expected of him. It is not my nature to be hard on somebody. Rather I was trying to tell him that I felt this was not what was contemplated. [00.32.09]
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 27, 1973
[00.40.06-GURNEY continues questioning DEAN. Focuses on the existence of cash funds, and DEAN'S use of the funds] Senator GURNEY. Let us go to the $350,000 fund that came into the White House. My recollection is that Mr. Strachan picked up that amount of money from over at the Committee To Re-Elect the President When did that occur? Mr. DEAN. When did Mr. Strachan pick it up? Senator GURNEY. Yes. Mr. DEAN. To the best of my knowledge, and I was told this after the fact, in more detail, -was prior to April 7. The first time I was aware of the fact that he was receiving money before April 7 is when Mr. Strachan came to me and asked me if I could suggest the name of somebody outside of the Government that would have a, or could open a safety deposit box. I told him I could not, and did not know the amount of the money at that time. Senator GURNEY. Now, as I understand there was some money used out of the $350,000. Do you recall what that figure was? Mr. DEAN. Yes, I do. It was--I am trying to recall -when I first learned it, it was sometime, oh, within 2 or 3 or 4 weeks after the June 17 incident that I was told that, $22,000 had been expended out of that amount. And that, there had been that much taken out of apparently the. safety deposit box and that money, in turn, was to be used for advertisements or something of this nature. Senator GURNEY. Do you know what it actually was used for? Mr. DEAN. The $22,000? Senator GURNEY. Yes. Mr. DEAN. I know that the, $15,000---- I learned later that the $15,200 that was returned to me was a part of the $22,000 that had not been, that was returned to me was a part of the $22,000 that had not, been expended and I was told that the part that had been expended had been used for political ads. Senator GURNEY. So I guess $6,800, then- Mr. DEAN. $6,800--- Senator GURNEY [continuing]. Then would have been used? Mr. DEAN. Yes, correct. Senator GURNEY. Now, did you have, a conversation with Mr. Stans about restoring the $22,000 to this fund and making it whole again? Mr. DEAN. Yes, I did. Senator GURNEY. When did you have that conversation? Mr. DEAN. Well, there, were a number of conversations on this, Senator, that, commenced late July, August, September, because there was a desire to get the entire $350,000 back out of the White House. Simultaneous with these conversations, there was -also a desire to accumulate any cash that could be found to pay for the support and silence of the individuals who had been involved in the Watergate, I can recall on several occasions discussing this with Mr. Stans and Mr. Parkinson on how to deal with the $350,000. One, of the problems was where would it go that, it wouldn't be reported and if it were reported before the election, it, would appear to be a secret slush fund at the White House. Senator GURNEY. Well, did you discuss it after the election with Mr. Stans? Mr. DEAN-. Yes, I did. In fact, after the election, at one point, Mr. Stans advised me that he had the money to replenish the $350,000 fund and called me and told me. I tried to reach Mr. Strachan, was unable to reach Mr. Strachan. Mr. Stans, for a reason I do not recall now, told me there was some immediacy in the money being picked up. I in turn called Mr. Fielding and asked -Mr. Fielding if he would go and pick up a, package from Mr. Stans and give it to 'Mr. Strachan as soon as he could locate Mr. Strachan. Senator GURNEY. When -was that? Mr. DEAN. That was in--I believe it was November 28. [00.44.39-GURNEY implies some shady dealings on DEAN'S part with regard to the money that he held] Senator GURNEY. Well, now Mr. Dean, why did you ask Mr. Stans for $22,000 at this time, when you were holding $15,200 of this money in trust? Why didn't you simply ask him for $6,800 to make that $22,000? Mr. DEAN. Well, Senator, as I have indicated, from the very outset, there was a request for all the available cash. I was quite aware of the fact that I was holding cash. I had also made a decision that the cash that I was holding I didn't want to be used to pay for the support, for the silence of these individuals, and I was not going to become involved in that with actual cash that I was passing for that purpose. Senator GURNEY. But you were, requesting $22,000 from Mr. Stans just for that purpose, were you not? Mr. DEAN. No, I was as not. It -was to make the, fund whole and there was resistance at that point from the White House. [00.45.26]
August 3, 1994 - Part 5
(16:19:35) Hearings host NINA TOTENBERG segues back to House Banking Committee Hearings - testimony of JEAN HANSON, JOSHUA STEINER, DENNIS FOREMAN, and JACK DEVORE
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 14, 1973
[00.02.00--in to Jeb MAGRUDER testifying about his dealings with White House staff before Watergate and during the Coverup] Mr. MAGRUDER......send the raw reports to Mr. Haldeman. I know that. He always capsulized it in a memo form because I saw that report numerous times during the campaign. Senator TALMADGE. AS I understood it. the President had two counselors one was Mr. Colson and the other was Mr. Dean. Mr. MAGRUDER. Mr. Colson. I think. was special counsel to the President. That is not a legal position, Mr. Dean's role was counsel to the President, and was a legal position. Senator TALMADGE. You testified this morning that Mr. Dean was intimately involved in both the planning the execution, and the coverup? Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes, sir, Senator TALMADGE. Now, to what extent was Mr. Colson involved? Mr. MAGRUDER. To my direct knowledge only through the telephone conversations that he had with me and some references to that matter that his assistant, Mr. Howard, had relating particularly to Howard Hunt. We did not discuss the specific Watergate wiretapping directly, I did not, with Mr. Colson, other than his admonition his to me to in effect get On the stick and get the Liddy project approved so we can get the information from Mr. O'Brien, something to that effect, Senator TALMADGE. I believe you testified that he urged immediate execution go forward at an early date. Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes. sir. Senator TALMADGE. Now, to what extent was Mr. Kleindienst then Attorney General, involved ? Mr. MAGRUDER. To my knowledge to no extent. I never had any discussions with Mr. Kleindienst on this matter. Senator TALMADGE. YOU have no personal knowledge of his involvement either by hearsay, memorandum. or otherwise Mr. MAGRUDER. No, Sir. Senator TALMADGE. Now, to what extent was Mr., Stans, involved? Mr. MAGRUDER. To my knowledge, to no extent before April--before June 17. Other than as chairman of the committee being aware of the cash disbursements that were being made to Mr. Liddy. Now, on June 24, 1 think it was, on a Saturday we did meet and discuss the, Watergate problem with him and my best recollection is we didn't 'go into specifies that Mr. Mitchell and I were involved but that simply Mr. Liddy was involved and we thought there would be, problems that would create a situation -where Mr. Stans would probably be--eventually have to terminate, Mr. Liddy, and that there were problems with Mr. 'Sloan as to the amounts of money that Mr. Liddy had received, and we asked for his help -in dealing with Mr. Sloan. Senator TALMADGE. What 'was Mr. Stans' comment On that? Mr. MAGRUDER. That he, would assist, us in these matters and if after Mr. Sloan Senator TALMADGE. Assist you in what, way now, financially ? Mr. MAGRUDER. Well, Sloan, as you know, was going on his vacation. Senator TALMADGE. Yes, Mr. MAGRUDER. And that when he came back Mr. Stans hoped to talk with him and try to have him work with us as to the amounts of funds that were disbursed to Mr. Liddy. We did not know at that time. the amount that is noted on that board-$100,000---be disbursed to Mr. Liddy. As I indicated earlier we thought it was much less than that. Senator TALMADGE. Do you know of any other officials in the Government then or remaining in the Government who were, involved in either the planning, discussion, or the coverup of this affair.? Mr. MAGRUDER. NO, I think I mentioned other officials, Senator. Do you -want me to go--we have already discussed them. Mr. LaRue-- Senator TALMADGE. If It is already in the testimony I have no desire for you to repeat it. 'But, do you know of any who have Dot been heretofore named in your statement or in cross-examination? Mr. MAGRUDER. To the best of my recollection I think we have covered the officials fairly comprehensively [00.05.34] Senator TALMADGE. Now, you testified that you asked for and discussed payments to your family, salaries, potential Executive clemency in return for your silence in this matter. You were a White House staff assistant to the President. Should this Select, Committee and the American people believe that you can count on receiving these rewards from the administration and the administration had the ability and desire to deliver these promises in return for your refusing to implicate its officials by hiding the, truth? Mr. MAGRUDER. Well, Senator, by this time, of course, I was aware that, in effect, we were doing some -of that activity already. in other words, by that time we had already supported seven defendants. Senator TALMADGE. Call you tell US-- Mr. MAGRUDER. Of course, on the Executive clemency issue obviously no one had been given Executive clemency so that is pure speculation on all of our parts so far as I know, because the people who mentioned it to me were not the President, of the United States. Senator TALMADGE. Can you tell us everything that was said to you or in your presence to others about Executive clemency? Mr. MAGRUDER. Well, specifically, Mr., Dean on one afternoon before the, August 16 grand jury came into my office to indicate to me, that everybody knew how well I was doing and that--not to worry. that even if the worst happened everything would be taken care of, including Executive clemency. I, having been at the White House, took that only as a PR attempt on his part, to make sure I felt comfortable about my forthcoming appearance before the grand jury. I was, not very comfortable obviously, and I think he was simply trying to make me feel Comfortable about that appearance. [00.07.39]
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 28, 1973 (2/2)
[01.03.54-title screen "SENATE HEARINGS ON CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES"] [01.04.49-LEHRER in studio] LEHRER states that Sen. BAKER has questions related to the break-in of Daniel ELLSBERG'S psychiatrist's office [01.05.02-gavel] Senator BAKER. The committee will come to order. I understand that Senator Talmadge left to avoid missing this last rollcall vote with possibly a question left unanswered. I was not here so I can't say but is there anything further you wish to add, Mr. Dean. Mr. DEAN. He -was asking me about people who had taken the blame for their superiors at the White House from some examples, and I had cited two examples. Mr. DASH. Yes, but you had not completed--I think Senator Talmadge as he was leaving, I think the last words said was the person taking the blame was Chuck Colson and the follow-up question would have been, who was he taking the blame for? [00.05.48-H.R. HALDEMAN is evidently not used to taking blame himself] Mr. DEAN. He Was taking the blame for Mr. Haldeman who had authorized the ads. There is one, other example that gets into an area I believe you indicated you were, going to question me on, and that is based on information that I have directly from Mr. Krogh, that it appears to me that based on a conversation I had with Mr. Krogh that he is taking the blame for something. Senator BAKER. Do you know who? Mr. DEAN. I believe the President of the United States. Senator BAKER, Maybe you ought to elaborate on that, a little. [Laughter.] [01.06.30-DEAN discusses KROGH keeping silent about ELLSBERG break-in to protect NIXON] Mr. DEAN. Well, it Was On either the 28th or 29th of March that Mr. Krogh came to my office, he stopped by to express his sympathy for the adverse publicity I had received as a result of the Gray hearings and asked me how I was holding up and I said, "Fine, it is not very pleasant but my hands are tied and I Can't speak." He said, he then began a discussion about how he had been haunted ever since he left the White House about his own experiences there, and then we got into a discussion of the fact that there was evidence within the files of the Department of Justice indicating leads that might let the investigators from this committee discover the fact of the Ellsberg burglary and we began discussing that, [00.07.26] I asked him then if that had been authorized by Mr. Ehrlichman, and he told me--knowing Mr. Krogh pretty well and knowing Mr. Krogh had a similar level I as myself and didn't, would not start something of that dimension without clearing it with someone, and he told me, no. that to his knowledge Mr. Ehrlichman had not learned about it until after the fact and told me that his orders had come directly from the Oval Office, and I was, somewhat surprised and so surprised I said, "You have got to be kidding," and he repeated again, no. he said, they came from the Oval Office. Senator BAKER. This was Mr. Krogh Speaking? Mr. DEAN. Yes, sir. And subsequently, of course, he has under a Sworn statement said that, he was totally responsible for the matter. Senator BAKER. Mr. Dean, it is now a little after 4:30 and in deference to my colleagues, I am not going to try to finish with the list of questions and topics that, I thought I outlined to you earlier. What I would like to do for about 10 minutes, almost 15 minutes, say, to 4:45 is to go once again to the narrow focus of what the President knew and when he knew it, relative to Watergate. So would you please, move then to the, next situation. Mr. DEAN. Yes, sir. Senator BAKER. That would shed any light on that. [01.08.57]
JFK Assassination HSCA Hearings
House Select Committee on Assassinations hearing on the assassination of U.S. President John F. Kennedy, Professor Mark Weiss discussing a specific echo point within the soundwave printouts from the acoustic analysis of Dealey Plaza. Committee Deputy Chief Counsel Gary T. Cornwell interrupts to ask Weiss to adjust his microphone. Young adult Caucasian male assistant adjusts Weiss’ mic. Weiss discusses the process of locating specific echo surfaces in Dealey Plaza corresponding with specific echoes recorded in the acoustic analysis.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 14, 1973
[00.13.09] Senator ERVIN. Then after those two meetings. there was -a third meeting held in Key Biscayne In Florida, you went down to talk to Mitchell about this -With LaRue and you and LaRue and Mitchell participated in a meeting there where the plan was formalized and where they finally agreed to spend to enable Liddy to carry out the plan? Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes, Mr. Mitchell approved the plan. Senator ERVIN. As a matter of fact, Mr. Mitchell had charge of the political branch of the Committee To Re-Elect the President, did he not? Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes, I had worked for Mr. Mitchell from the beginning. He and I were very close personally and he was in charge and responsible, for all of the authorizations and--- Senator ERVIN. Now, to summarize it, as a result of these matters, these discussions and the, determination to bug and surreptitiously enter the Democratic national headquarters, Liddy was employed and Liddy employed Hunt and Hunt, or Liddy or both of them employed McCord and Barker and Martinez and Gonzales and Sturgis. Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes, Sir. Senator ERVIN. And five of these, men that were caught in the Watergate, entered the Watergate as a result and pursued to carry out this plan which you and Mitchell and Dean and LaRue had approved. Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes, sir, although I think that we should say that it was, the approval only was in one individual. Mr. LaRue had no authority nor did I nor Mr. Dean. Senator ERVIN. Well, he was in the meeting -where the plan was discussed and the decision to bug the, Watergate and to surreptitiously enter the Watergate were made? Mr. MAGRUDER. That is correct, Senator. Senator ERVIN. So these people were arrested in the Watergate carrying out the plan, -weren't, they? Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes, sir. Senator ERVIN. Then after that was done, some of those who were interested in the election of the President, some of those who had been associated in the White House, and some of them in the Committee To Re-Elect the President, became fearful that if the truth was revealed to the American people, it might have a bad effect on the chances of the President to be reelected? Mr. MAGRUDER. That was my feeling, Senator. Senator ERVIN. Yes. And it resulted that in order to avoid. that happening, then they agreed upon a coverup; did they not? Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes, sir. Senator ERVIN. And the coverup had two aspects. One was based on the realization that Liddy, who had been arrested, Hunt, who had been arrested, McCord, who had been arrested, Barker, who had been arrested, Gonzales, Sturgis, and Martinez, who had been arrested, might spill the beans, so the expression is, unless they were taken care of. Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes, sir. Senator ERVIN. So those who were interested in the election of the President, used funds that, were raised for his reelection in part and other funds that, were raised for that purpose, to provide them attorney fees and provide, them, compensation and to take, care of their families; did they not? Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes, sir, Senator ERVIN. And the, object of that was to keep these people from revealing the truth about the IV Watergate, was it not? Mr. MAGRUDER. That is correct; yes, sir. Senator ERVIN. Yes. Then for fear that, the trail might be pursued by the prosecuting attorney and the Committee To Re-Elect the President they devised a coverup story to the effect all of this money had been given to Liddy for him to engage in legitimate intelligence operations? Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes, Sir: that IS correct Senator ERVIN. That, Matter was discussed by you. with Mitchell, Dean, LaRue. Strachan, Mardian, and all of those, was it not? Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes, sir. Senator ERVIN. And they all acquiesced in it and encouraged it? Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes, sir. Senator ERVIN. And after they had agreed on the story for the coverup, they told it to Parkinson and O'Brien, attorneys for the committee? Mr. MAGRUDER. Senator, I would like to clarify that. I only spoke to Mr. Parkinson about the true story. I did not discuss it, with Mr. O'Brien. Senator ERVIN. I may have misunderstood you. Mr. MAGRUDER. Mr.. Parkinson I think in fairness to Mr. Parkinson had different stories form other people so that, he may not have been aware of what was occurring. Senator ERVIN. I may have misunderstood the testimony but, I understood you to say first that you talked to Mr. Parkinson and that at that time, you told the true story. Mr. MAGRUDER. That is correct, Mr. Mardian asked me to tell the truth to Mr. Parkinson, I told him the truth. Senator ERVIN. You told him who was implicated in it? Mr. MAGRUDER. That is correct. sir. Senator ERVIN. And then, I understood you to say that, later you had another conversation with Mr. Parkinson and Mr. O'Brien'? Mr. MAGRUDER. That was after the coverup story had been developed and as far as I know, Mr. O'Brien thought that was the legitimate, story and to be fair. to Mr. Parkinson, I think he was, told by others that, Magruder's true story was not true, that the coverup story was the true story and that was the story to be used. Senator ERVIN. I want to be just -to everybody. The story you are telling me, in effect, is that Mitchell. Dean, LaRue. Strachan, Mardian and yourself were the only ones who participated in the coverup Story or acquiesced in it Mr. MAGRUDER. I think that would be the list that I had direct dealing with myself. Senator ERVIN. And Parkinson and O'Brien were not involved in the coverup? Mr. MAGRUDER. As I said, I think I told Mr. Parkinson the truth but to my knowledge, he was then told that the truth was not the truth. That the coverup story was the truth and he and O'Brien worked on that basis. [00.19.06]
History of the U.S. Congress
U.S. House Representatives Daniel Rostenkowski (D-IL) and Barber Conable Jr. (R-NY) seated beside each other on House Ways and Means Committee Meeting, as Chairman and Ranking Minority Leader; Rep. Conable speaking. U.S. Senator Charles Percy (R-IL) among members in Senate meeting with other adult Caucasian, predominantly males. Edwin Newman (o/s) narrating the difference in the amount of committee assignments between U.S. House Representatives and Senators, thus impacting the level expertise they may have in the field of their assignment. Sen. Percy: “In the Senate, we say you must know something about everything and everything about something.”
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 27, 1973
[00.45.20-GURNEY continues to interrogate DEAN] Now, then we come to the year 1973 and from what I have been able to gather in the questioning I have Just finished, your testimony is that on February 28 You did discuss this matter of obstruction of justice and then you also testified to what you did here on March 13, and then, of course, we come to the meeting on March 21 when You told him most of what Watergate was all about. [00.45.53-GURNEY wants to get the last word and assert that NIXON did not know of the coverup until March 1973] And the summary that I can see from the testimony, the President of the United States certainly didn't know anything about all this business, to this one Senator, until this thing on February 28, according to your testimony, and on March 13 but especially of course, the meeting on March 21 where you did discuss with him at great length the Watergate and he at a later press conference Said that he learned about it on that date. Thank you for your patience, and, Mr. Chairman, especially I thank you for your patience and the rest of the members of the committee. I am sorry I have taken so long. Mr. DEAN. I thank the Senator for his questions. I think they were very good. Senator ERVIN. I want to thank the Senator for his examination of the witness. We will take a, recess for a vote and come back after the vote. [00.47.14-LEHRER v.o. comments that the senators are spending all their time going to the floor to vote, as Senators stand to leave] [00.47.25-cut to after recess, ERVIN gavels meeting to order] Senator ERVIN. The, committee will come to order. Mr. DASH. Mr. Chairman, Senator Inouye, prior to asking his questions has asked me to have Cleared up by Mr. Dean some more identification of the materials which he has submitted to us which We have just received back from the Xerox machine. This is the second batch. What I would like to do, Mr. Dean, if I could give, you this batch of papers which are in approximately the order you gave them, and if you could go through them to the extent you can, identify the source of each one if you can. Some of them, for instance, are a list of names without any letterhead or any indication. Who drew up the list of names? There is no indication as to whether or not the memorandum was attached. The way they presently appear, the identification of each of these documents is obscure, and I think for our Purposes, if We use them for the committee's work, it would be important if you looked at, them and to the, best of your recollection, tell us what each list is and who drew it up and who received it, to the best of your recollection. Mr. DEAN. Are we working from the same stack, the same order I have? Mr. DASH. If you could identify for the record from what you are reading, not read the entire record. [00.49.04-DEAN commences identifying for record more White House documents concerning the ENEMIES LIST] Mr. DEAN. I have the first document from Gordon Strachan to John Dean, dated September 17. And the, source of this list is Mr. Strachan and sent to me. I do not know where he got the list. The next document I have is a memorandum dated October 26 from Mr. Strachan to me. subject, "Political Enemies." Mr. DASH. Mr. Dean, is the prior list also supposed to be included in political enemies? Mr. DEAN. Yes, sir, it was. Mr. DASH. Could you identify it? If you already have, all right. But when you speak of the list, if it is a contributors' list, identify it as such; and if it is supposed to be an opponents list, an enemies list, would you please characterize it? Mr. DEAN. The list I have--the first list I was referring to has a reference on the cover not that came to me: "The attached should be of interest to you and the political enemies project." Attached to it is a partial list of fat cats attending a Muskie fundraiser. [00.50.23] The next document, the memorandum of October 26 from Mr. Strachan to me, subject "Political Enemies," indicates that, Mr. Nofziger sent the, attached information on Chet Huntley to Mr. Haldeman "Since you have the action on the political enemies project. would you make your determination of what should happen, advise Nofziger and mention your decision to me." Attached to that is a memorandum from Nofziger to Haldeman re Chet Huntley. I think that the notations on there, which are mine, are self-evident. [00.51.14]
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, July 10, 1973
[00.24.54-THOMPSON questions MITCHELL about MITCHELL'S awareness of LIDDY'S background in intelligence and other clandestine activities. MITCHELL claims that he was not aware of such, which fits in with the "Blame it all on DEAN" strategy] Mr. THOMPSON. I believe you testified that you did not know at the time of your meeting on November 24 what -Mr. Liddy had done at the White House, any involvement he had with the Plumbers group In the White House or anything of this sort; is that correct,? Mr. MITCHELL. That is correct. It was 6 months later before I learned of the so-called Plumbers activities. Mr. THOMPSON. Were you even aware that he worked at the White House at that time? Mr. MITCHELL. Yes, because he was brought over with Mr. Krogh--- Mr. THOMPSON. I am talking about November 24? Mr. MITCHELL. Yes. I was aware he was at the White House because it was so represented at that meeting. Mr. THOMPSON. Whose office did you understand that he was working in? Mr. MITCHELL. He was Working, under Mr. Krogh's aegis in connection with the drug program over them Mr. THOMPSON. All right. Did you know of' any other activities that Mr. Liddy had at that time? Mr. MITCHELL. he Was very much involved in the White House relationship with the District of Columbia here. In fact, he was their prime contact. But as far as his activities in the area which has since been developed and become common knowledge I had no such ideas. [00.26.00] Mr. THOMPSON. I see. When you met with Liddy and Krogh in December did you inquire of Mr. Krogh then or did you have my discussion as to the nature of Liddy's -work at the White House involving any Of the Plumbers? Mr. MITCHELL. None whatsoever. We discussed entirely the DALE program. to the best of my recollection. Mr. THOMPSON. That seems like Mr. Krogh knew what he was doing and it seems like you were being placed in a potentially embarrassing position by even allowing Mr. Liddy to he presented to you, considering the nature of his prior activities. Did not anyone, who know Mr. Liddy's prior activities Mention the fact to you that you were, about to take a man in an important position of the campaign who had engaged in some of these---- [00.26.45] Mr. MITCHELL. None whatsoever As a matter of fact, Mr. Liddy Was quite actively involved in the establishment of this DALE program which. as you probably know, relates to law enforcement through the use of the courts, grand juries, and so forth and. as I understood that at the time that was one of the reasons that Liddy was brought into the Krogh operation and the Ambrose operation and helped setting that up was because he had been a former assistant prosecutor who did have knowledge with respect to the functioning of grand juries. [00.27.21] Mr. THOMPSON. I believe you made the decision there on November 24 that if it was all right with Magruder that it was all right with you for---- Mr. MITCHELL. I think that is the general tenor in which it was represented. THOMPSON. Whose representations were you relying on, you didn't know the man before, you just met him; Mr. Dean's? Mr. MITCHELL. I was relying on the representations that wore made to me with respect in the background of the individual involved. Mr. THOMPSON. Who made those representations? Mr. MITCHELL. I am sure they were made by Mr. Dean and by Mr. Liddy with respect to what his background was then. Mr. THOMPSON. -Neither of then, mentioned anything having to do with his previous Plumbers activities. Mr. MITCHELL. No, sir, I can assure you of that. [00.28.00] Mr. THOMPSON. All right. Mr. Mitchell, you mentioned in your testimony this morning or implied I believe would be a fair way to state it that, perhaps someone prevailed upon -Mr. Magruder to supersede your orders. I believe you have made public statements that you would like to know who sent Mr. Magruder back again and again 'with this thing that you didn't want to come about. I know you don't like to engage in speculation with regard to other people but, these are things that you volunteered. I was wondering if you could enlighten us a little bit more based upon your prior experience in your relationship with the people in the White House, and things that have occurred since the break-in as to this being a case-of course, Mr. Magruder was a young man, an individual who was a team player evidently--can you shed any light on who it might have been who was doing this? [00.29.02-MITCHELL doesn't want to name the names (Colson) in the White House who he thought pushed MAGRUDER to get the LIDDY plan in operation] Mr. MITCHELL. Well, Mr. Thompson, this would be purely an opinion and would involve people's reputations. I think if you go back to the testimony of Mr. Dean relating conversations that he had both with Mr. Magruder and otherwise I think that that probably is a better answer to the question than my hypothecation or guesstimate at this particular time. Mr. THOMPSON. What part of Mr. Dean's testimony are you referring to? Mr. MITCHELL. Well, there are quite a number of areas and I cannot give you the page numbers, but, they have in two areas. No. 1, what Mr. Magruder told Mr. Dean personally and -what Mr. O'Brien told Mr. Dean that Magruder had told him. And then, of course, there, are, the statements that Magruder himself made about the telephone, calls from Mr. Colson, Mr. Howard, et cetera, I think that those areas of: testimony would probably be a, great, a better source, of information than my conjecture. [00.30.17]
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 28, 1973 (1/2)
[00.45.55-DEAN discussing talking points of Feb 27, 1973 meeting with NIXON] "(5) Getting the A.G. back- on the reservation: "A.G. is merely biding his time until he returns to the private sector. "A.G. is extremely loyal to the President and if asked to take, an active concern in these hearings (and their fallout) would do so--Otherwise, he 'will probably do what is best for his own self-interest. "A.G. should be asked to remain in office at least 1 full year from this date (i.e., until hearings have passed) because hearings may well result in request for additional action by DOJ. A.G. can get Henry Petersen-who has the greatest loyalty for the A.G.--to handle sensitive problems with ease. We can't afford bitterness in the DOJ nor can we risk a new A.G. being able to grapple with some of the potential problems." Senator BAKER. Mr. Dean, this was dictated by you? Mr. DEAN. This was as the result of a meeting I had with Mr. Haldeman discussing the agenda. These were matters that had come up in--some of them had come up in LaCosta. I was asked to boil them down into a paper to go in to discuss with the President. Senator BAKER. All right. When was this -paper prepared? Mr. DEAN. This was prepared the 19th or 20th of February of this year. Senator BAKER. All of these things, or at least some of them, never occurred that are dealt with in here. Mr. DEAN. I got a response from each of the points on here. As I will subsequently tell you, there was a subsequent agenda prepared for the meeting between yourself and the President. Senator BAKER. Which one is this? Mr. DEAN. That would be exhibit No. 34-35. Mr. Stans--I was asked to talk to him to see if he was interested in being sent up for a confirmable post and to explore to see if there was any post that he was interested in. He and I discussed it and he didn't have any particular post in mind and didn't particularly want to do it after he gave it some consideration. There was a Presidential decision that Mr. Magruder could not return to the White House staff. There was also a decision by the President that Mr. Buchanan could not be used as an observer spokesman because the President, I was told, felt that Mr. Buchanan was too close to him, had been with him too long, relating back to even pre-1968. Finally, there was a meeting and there is a subsequent agenda I have in the exhibits for the meeting with the Attorney General. [00.48.30] Now, as I say, these all led up to what later occurred in my discussions on the 27th and 28th with the President. Let me turn to the next exhibit. This was again requested by Mr. Haldeman. He said, "Prepare it, do not send it through normal channels because it was to be a totally off the record meeting, between 30 and 45 minutes. Originally there was to be staff, Mr. Dean, or alternatives. It was decided there would be no staff present, so that was crossed out on the record. [00.49.05-DEAN discusses the White House plan to get Sen. BAKER on their side] General description is: Potential Matters for Discussion with Senator Baker. General: Take Baker's pulse and find out bow much he wants to help--keep this from becoming a political circus. Baker can be assured that no one in the White House had any knowledge that there was going to be a break-in and bugging of the DNC. If Baker appears to be truly desirous of cooperating and the fact he, is seeking guidance may so indicate--he might be told that there are matters unrelated to the, bugging incident per se (e.g., Segretti, Kalmbach) that could be embarrassing and tarnish good people whose motives were the highest. Surely he can appreciate that things which occur at the White House have a degree of sensitivity that occur no where else in Government. [00.49.51] 1968 Bugging: Tell Baker that J. Edgar Hoover personally informed the President shortly after taking office that his campaign had been bugged. Presently seeking to obtain documentation and evidence of the 1968 incidents. Appearances of White House Staff Members Before, Senate Committee Statement coming out shortly on the matter of executive privilege. [Draft attached.] [00.50.22]
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, May 23, 1973
Mr. ALCH. In December of 1972 I attended one of several meetings of defense council, the purpose for which was to discuss various aspects of trial strategy. I proceeded to explain the defense that I was contemplating duress. A discussion ensued, where in some of the other defense attorneys reasoned that this security motive, and by that they were referring to my contemplated defense of duress based upon what Mr. McCord had told me would be applicable only to Mr. McCord in view of his position as Chief of Security for the Committee to Re-elect the President. In the general discussion that followed, (MS Senator Baker and Fred Thompson seen listening to Mr. Alch) the question arose as to whether or not the CIA could have been involved. It was pointed out by others and I emphasize by others because at this point my defense of Mr. McCord had been formulated, based upon what he had told me and with his concurrence. It was pointed out by others that all of the individuals apprehended in the Watergate complex had some prior connection with the CIA and that one of the cuban americans had been in possession of what appeared to be CIA forged documents. Before the meeting went onto to other topics, it was agreed that each lawyer would ask his respective client whether or not he had any knowledge of any CIA involvement. When the meeting terminated I telephoned Mr. McCord at his office by pre-arrangement and asked him to meet with me and my local council Mr. Bernard Shankman at the Monocle Restaurant for lunch. During lunch, which lasted for approximately 45 minutes I asked Mr. McCord whether to his knowledge the CIA was in anyway involved with the Watergate venture. He did not directly respond to this specific question, but did become quite upset at what he believed to be the antagonism of the White House against the CIA. He cited the dismissal of Mr. Helms as CIA Director and the appointment of Mr. Slesinger in his place as an attempted "hatchet job" by the administration against the CIA. He did venture his observation that if any CIA officials were subpoenaed, that they would not and could not comply with said subpoena.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 26, 1973 - Testimony of John Dean.
Fred Thompson, attorney. The reason I am making these inquiries is that his name was mentioned and I think it was rather unclear at least to me anyway. As I understand your statement now is that just based upon your knowledge you know of no impropriety in conducting his part of the investigation on Mr. Petersen's part? John Dean. I know of no impropriety. I think he tried to be very fair with the White House in dealing with the White House and the fact that we had an investigation going on in a political year that could result in embarrassment on countless occasions. The entire arrangement to have the White House staff, for example, appear at the Department of Justice rather than go to the courthouse was merely designed to save the fact of the embarrassment that would arise politically of members of the White House staff appearing at the courthouse, all the cameras and pictures and speculation that are likely to run from that. That was avoided by simulating the grand jury situation in Mr. Petersen's conference room.
Watergate Hearings, June 25, 1973 - Testimony of John Dean
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 25, 1973 - Testimony of John Dean. The Atmosphere at the White House prior to June 1972
U.S. Rep. Jim Wright Speaks at DNC Orientation
United States Representative Jim Wright (D-TX) speaks to new Democratic National Committee (DNC) members coming into the House of Representatives. Attendees are predominately adult Caucasian men. US Congressman Wright discusses constituents and legislation. Wright tells a story of helping one of his constituents in the US Military.
LAWMAKERS
03.17.40-DUKE/ROBERTS/WERTHEIMER in studio. Discussion of the BUDGET DEBATE. REAGAN may want to veto the BUDGET so he can go on TV to pitch his reasoning to the public. Budget process inevitably results in a last-minute scramble. 03.19.08-DUKE intro report on CONGRESS approving two expensive pieces of DEFENSE SPENDING, the MX MISSILE and B-1 BOMBER, says CONGRESS has sided with REAGAN on all issues of DEFENSE and passed the largest DEFENSE BILL of all time, $200 BILLION [that could buy a lot of KETCHUP for school lunches!] on way to passage. 03.19.25-Shot of Sen. MARK HATFIELD (R-OR), expresses concern that "Russians are coming mentality" has canceled out common sense. Shot of SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE. Shots of SENATORS. DUKE v.o.-the committee actually produced a bill that EXCEEDED REAGAN'S request by $7 billion (even that buys a lot of ketchup). Shot of Sen. TED STEVENS (R-Alaska), says CONGRESS reflects constituencies, and his constituency wants more DEFENSE SPENDING, top priority, says DEFENSE is always underfunded. Shot of meeting of HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE, pages handing out documents to Congressmen. 03.21.27-Shot of DAN ROSTENKOWSKI presiding over House. Shot of Rep. RONALD DELLUMS (D-CA) arguing the decision to fund 100 B-1 BOMBERS is too expensive, unnecessary, wasteful, and political. (just wait until they find out that the B-1 has a nasty tendency to crash as a result of sucking flying birds into its engines!!!) Shot of Rep. ANTHONY MOFFETT (D-CT) says if CONGRESS gave the B-1 the same scrutiny that it gave to W.I.C. assistance program, SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM, it would never pass. Shot of Rep. C.W. BILL YOUNG (R-FL), saying that the B-1 is needed to fill the gap until STEALTH BOMBER is built, holds paper airplane up to dramatize the theoretical status of the STEALTH BOMBER (years away from discovery that the radar-cheating coating on the Stealth Bomber has a nasty tendency to wash off in the rain-whoops). 03.22.40-shot of podium of House chamber, Shots of CONGRESSMEN in debate, DUKE v.o.-B-1 passed easily, indicates mood of CONGRESS favors DEFENSE INCREASES. Shot of NEWT GINGRICH, arguing that the U.S. position in dealing with "The Russian Empire" is precisely that from which CHAMBERLAIN'S BRITAIN dealt with NAZI GERMANY, argues that peace requires preparation for war. 03.23.18-DUKE/WERTHEIMER/ROBERTS in studio-discussion of REAGAN'S victories on DEFENSE. WERTHEIMER says that REAGAN'S speech on TV probably was a major factor. 03.23.25-WERTHIEIMER-HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE did some field research on impact of SOCIAL SERVICE BUDGET CUTS-REPUBLICANS thought the field trip was a setup, so they stayed in Washington. 03.24.32-Shot of BALTIMORE official discussing past use of FEDERAL FUNDING in the city. Shot of BALTIMORE man says FEDERALLY FUNDED projects have been "great for the city". Aerials of BALTIMORE downtown, shots of INNER HARBOR area with new buildings. Shot of a BUS arriving at BALTIMORE HOTEL. Shot of DEMOCRATIC CONGRESSMEN getting off bus. Shots of a CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL, severely disabled children's ward, CONGRESSMEN (including PAUL SARBANES, CHARLIE RANGEL, DAN ROSTENKOWSKI) listen to staff discussing their efforts to treat one patient. Shot of CHARLIE RANGEL (D-NY), says that the cases are the most persuasive argument to fight BUDGET CUTS in SOCIAL SERVICES. 03.25.51--Shot of HOSPITAL ADMINISTRATOR discussing the 30-40 percent reduction in patients that the hospital could serve under BUDGET CUTS proposed by REAGAN. EXTERIOR of BALTIMORE CITY HALL. Shot of Rep. PAUL SARBANES (D-MD) testifying to DEMOCRAT MEMBERS OF WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE that he can't believe that American People want to turn away from building a just society. Shot of DEMOCRATS on committee bench. Shot of Rep. BARBARA MIKULSKI (D-MD), arguing vehemently against BUDGET CUTS. 03.26.42-Shots of REPUBLICAN members of WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE entering House chamber back in D.C.. Attempts by REPUBLICANS to force votes while DEMOCRATS are absent. Aerial of BALTIMORE DOWNTOWN. Shot of Maryland Governor HARRY HUGHES, telling DEMOCRATIC WAYS AND MEANS members that BUDGET CUTS will deprive people of medical care. Shot of BALTIMORE MAYOR BILL SCHAEFER, saying that BUDGET CUTS will destroy all the progress BALTIMORE has made, urges not to cut BUDGET "On the back of the Poor". 03.28.01-Shot of podium in HOUSE chamber, Shot of Rep. TOM FOLEY asking for adjournment, voice vote, REPUBLICANS whine that it's improper, etc. Shot of BALTIMORE CITY HALL. Shot of MAYOR SCHAEFER, says REPUBLICANS were wrong not to come, indicates they don't care. Shot of Rep. BARBER CONABLE (R-NY) outside CAPITOL, says that REAGAN has been winning in CONGRESS, says that the DEMOCRATS are resorting to GRANDSTANDING. Shot of DAN ROSTENKOWSKI and rest of committee DEMOCRATS returning to House chamber, greeted by TIP O'NEILL. Shot of Rep. GEORGE DANIELSON (D-CA), says the REPUBLICANS demands for rollcall votes out of spite were costly to TAXPAYERS. Shot of Rep. BOB WALKER (R-PA), asks how much the BALTIMORE "road show" cost taxpayers. 03.29.35-Shot of ROSTENKOWSKI in office, says that the trip was a legitimate investigative trip, people have legitimate concerns. Shot of BARBER CONABLE, says that the REPUBLICANS were entitled to protest the DEMOCRATS' stunt.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities - Testimony of Robert Odle.
(Mr. Odle continued reading memorandum) Mr. ROBERT ODLE. It says Confidential Eyes Only, Memorandum for Jeb Magruder, from Fred Malek, subject Co-coordinating Functions for the Campaign Organization, stated February ninth 1972. I have given further thought to our conversation of last night and to your February 7th memorandum to the Attorney General. Since I do not yet have an in depth knowledge of the campaign operation, it is difficult for my observation as to be precise. Never the less, I do have some reservations about the recommendations contained in that memorandum which can best be expressed in writing. Planning: My reservations on your recommendations pertain mainly to the suggested planning process, but also to the responsibility for implementation (sudden noise) Mr. Dash, you want me to read the entire memorandum here? You want me to read the substance and the entire memorandum, is that right? Mr. SAM DASH. Yes please, it's not that long. Mr. ODLE. Planning process, as you know the Attorney General has asked me to devise a management audit system by which he can track overall progress and identify major problem areas for corrective action. Naturally, an integral part of such a system is the establishment of bench marks by which progress is to be judged, or insured a plan. Based upon my preliminary thinking on this, I've tentatively concluded that the planning system should incorporate the following characteristics: The principal focal point of the planning should be the states, with the emphasis given to key states, rather than the functional areas such as voter block activities, telephone, direct mail, etc. Planning by state will help to highlight and direct management attention to progress on building voter support to carry individual states, the key to victory. Planning of the functional activities within a state should be based upon a clearly defined strategy for obtaining the needed votes for carrying that state. Spelling out for example, the needed vote margin by distinctive geographical areas, and the organizing and persuasion tactics which will be utilized. As is implicit in the above two points, the planning should provide a sound basis for tracking progress and identifying problem areas for a corrective action. The line officials who will be held accountable for results, principally the state chairman, should feel as though they have the lead in developing the plans effecting the areas of responsibility. Naturally, exercising quality control the national campaign organization must insure the plans, fit the overall re-election strategy and capitalize on polling information. From our conversation I would say you generally agree with this. However, from reading your memorandum, your position on these principals is not clear. I believe they should be clarified prior to proceeding with the development of a planning system. Responsibility for implementation, I believe there is a strong argument for having Bob Merick perform this function in view of his sound knowledge of the campaign operations and his access to research information. However, it is important for the controller to be intimately involved since these plans would provide the basis for tracking progress and identifying problems. To do this effectively, the controller must insure that the plans provide a sound basis for monitoring campaign effectiveness. Also, he must thoroughly, also he must be thoroughly familiar with their content. Perhaps we can meet the needs and capitalize on the strengths of both individuals by also giving the controller a definite part of this responsibility. Formal decision making progress, process. I really wonder whether the sort of staff secretariat operation which you suggest is necessary. Since a procedure has undoubtedly been helpful until now, since the attorney general is not yet present and his responsabilities have been shifting with the growth of this organization. However, with the attorney general coming on board full time soon, with him taking a more direct supervisory role over the field operations, and with the divisionary responsabilities between the principals being clarified, I question the need for a staff secretariat system. In fact, it may be counter productive. Such systems are inevitable cumbersome and therefore not conducive to the need for fast decisions as the campaign heats up. Also due to the sensitivity of the information and the need for speedy action, many of the decisions will undoubtedly be handled verbally. Particularly toward the end of the campaign. This would undermine the staff secretariats ability to coordinate effectively. I recognize the abuse which can be perpetrated without such a system. However, given the nature of the campaign management, the answer lies in appointing competent division managers, and making sure they have a clear understanding of the respective responsabilities rather than creating a cumbersome staff secretariat system. Of course the attorney general should and will decide this matter. I believe it would be a disservice however to try to persuade them to lead on a staff secretariat system, rather than bringing in the most competent managers possible. Clearly laying out the responsabilities and then holding them fully accountable for results. These are of course my initial reactions based on quite limited knowledge. Please note I am not now stating how it should be done, but merely laying out possible problems that need to be addressed before we get locked in. Because of the above reservations I recommend you either pull back the memorandum or ask the attorney general to delay acting on it pending a further coordination with me. An other option would be for me to inform the attorney general of my reservations and ask him to differ the decision. (WS courtroom) However I do not think this is desirable, and prefer that you and I work it out in the spirit of cooperation that must become our trademark. Frankly I was taken by surprise last night, after our discussion on Friday about the need for teamwork and at openly discussing my role, I was surprised that you unitarily submitted to the attorney general recommendations having a profound impact on my area of responsibility in my working relationships with him. This was the reason for my rather vigorous reaction. In any case, we covered that ground fairly thoroughly last night, and I'm confident that in the future we can work together on matters this sort and resolve or spell out any differences prior to submitting recommendations.
FOCUS ON THE 1940s
Newsreel of House of Un-American Activities Committee hearings (MSs crowd, reporters, committeemen including RICHARD NIXON, and actors such as RONALD REAGAN being sworn in for testimony).