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House Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing on Inter-American Foundation. Representative Gerry Studds (D - Massachusetts) says, the finest thing we ever did in this hemisphere was the Inter-American Foundation and it was working magnificently. And that for God s sake, I think the Chairman will agree with me, the one thing we were always cautioned to do is don t fiddle with it.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 27, 1973
[00.12.27-GURNEY questions DEAN about his dealings with HALDEMAN, EHRLICHMAN, the Prosecution] Senator GURNEY. Well, then, you really never advised them at any time that you were meeting with the prosecutors, is that correct? Mr. DEAN. That, is correct, sir. Senator GURNEY. When you did see the President on April 15, though, you told him that you had engaged counsel and that you had been meeting with the Federal prosecutors IS that correct? Mr. DEAN. Well. on--I believe it was late in the evening, on the 14th. Mr. Shaffer had a call from the, prosecutors saying that, it was going to be necessary to breach the privacy of the conversations that were, being held because they had been asked to report to Mr. Petersen and in turn to the Attorney General as to where the grand jury -was going and what, was likely to come out of it. [00.13.19] I think you should also remember that I testified that I, on the preceding Friday or Saturday, that same day, earlier that day, had tried to make it very clear to MR. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman with a list I had prepared that I was not playing any games and that they were very much involved and they should understand it. [00.13.40-GURNEY chides DEAN for bad manners? Evidently oblivious to all of the testimony about HALDEMAN and EHRLICHMAN attempting to set up first MITCHELL, and potentially DEAN, for the blame in the coverup] Senator GURNEY. Well. since you had made your decision to come clean, as we might call it, and engage attorneys and go to the Federal prosecutors and tell them everything you knew about the case, why didn't you tell Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman? Don't you think that, would have been a decent thing to do, to let them know that you were doing? Mr. DEAN. [has to suppress a big chuckle before answering this absurd question] My answer to that is that I had watched a flank-protecting operation commence before they went to California, I had seen subsequent signs of that, as well as I had seen preceding signs of it. Whenever I would, for example, raise testimonial points with Mr. Ehrlichman regarding things that might be asked me before a grand jury, for example when I went over the "deep six" conversation with him, he told me, well, he said, you don't have to testify quite, that way. You can say you were making an inventory. And I said, well, I didn't make an inventory. He said, well, I am sure you will think of something. [00.14.39-GURNEY questions the ethics of the immunity deal struck by DEAN.] Senator GURNEY. Well, was not yours really a protecting operation so you could get to the Federal prosecutors first with a bargain for immunity? Mr. DEAN. I would not say it was a protecting opportunity. I would say I had made my decision as to what, I was going to do and went to counsel to find out how best to proceed. Senator ERVIN. There is a vote on. I expect we had better take, a recess to vote, [Recess.] [00.15.13-MacNEILL in studio] [PBS Network ID-title screen "SENATE HEARINGS ON CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES"] [00.18.40-MacNEILL] MacNEILL states that DEAN is being asked in minute detail about his White House meetings. Sam DASH has a technical question as the hearing resumes. [00.18.55]
CONGRESS: WE THE PEOPLE
01.20.29-Shots of Rep. Kaptur in meetings, speaking in well of House, in committee, former Rep. Ashley says that in the past, seniority rules prevented Freshmen from speaking or being leaders in committee, discusses the style of doing business under Speaker Sam Rayburn who ruled Congress along with a handful of committee chairmen. C/S Tip O'Neill, says that Sam Rayburn couldn't identify more than 20 members of Congress by name. Still of Sam Rayburn. Still of a Committee in the Rayburn era. C/S Rep. TOM FOLEY, recalling the autocratic nature of seniority in the old days. Shot of Rep. Ashley, says that it used to require about ten years to get to any kind of influence in Congress. Tip O'Neill says that new members used to have few rights. V.O.-seniority broke down in 1974 after Watergate swept 75 new Democrats into House and the system was reformed. Stills of 1974 Congressional yearbook with stills of the rookie members. Shot of Tim Wirth, discusses being part of the reforming class of Congress. Rep FOLEY says that new members can quickly have influence, resulting in established members actively courting the rookies. 01.24.54-Rep. KAPTUR says that the Congress is relatively young now, so even the ranking members respect Freshmen. Newman discusses the further learning process of a Congressman's career. Signs off. 01.26.14-closing credits/WETA credit/funding credits/PBS ID 01.27.51--OUT
"Operation Abolition": HUAC Film on U Cal Protest
Gordon H. Scherer, Congressman from Ohio speaks against communists. One of the top Communist agents, assigned to Operation Abolition, is Frank Wilkinson, recently convicted for contempt of Congress for refusal to answer questions concerning his Communist party membership and activities. Frank Wilkinson s job for the Communist party consists of one prime duty - incite resistance for the House Committee on Un-American Activities in any given location where the committee is to conduct hearings. Frank Wilkinson was in San Francisco during the May hearings. He arrived in the city, prior to the hearings to organize the so-called spontaneous public demonstrations against the committee and the hearings. Moreover, he was actually in the corridors issuing instructions, inciting hostile actions against the committee during the hearings. Frank Wilkinson was interviewed by newsmen shortly after he had been educating among the student demonstrators. Listen to this interview closely, because in it you will hear Frank Wilkinson, Communist Agent, explain his Communist jargon, his function for Operation Abolition. Shots of crowds in the corridors outside of the HUAC hearing room in San Francisco, CA.
Watergate Hearings - Testimony of Gordon C. Strachan, July 23, 1973
U.S. Senator Edward Gurney (R-FL) asks former White House aide Gordon C. Strachan to go into detail on his contact with deputy campaign director Jeb Magruder at the Committee to Re-Elect the President. Strachan says that most memoranda submitted to John Mitchell had to go through Magruder, his signature affixed to the documents. Senator Gurney asks how often Strachan received memoranda from Magruder. Strachan says daily and that the shared testimony is correct in that there was no mention of wire-tapping, bugging, or surveillance mentioned in those memoranda. Senator Gurney asks for an explanation as to why $350,000 was picked up by Strachan, who gave to a Mr. Lilly (middle man) before reaching its intended target/use. Strachan says the money was intended to pay pollsters and neither he or White House aide Alexander Butterfield could physically travel far from the White House. Senator Gurney asks why a friend of Mr. Butterfield, Mr. Lilly, is entrusted with that sum of money. Strachan replies it was because of his ability to travel and pay the pollsters. Senator Gurney, upon hearing that Mr. Lilly is not a White House official, asks how many people are officially White House staffers. Strachan puts out an estimation of 400 people. Senator Gurney asks if would be possible to find one of the 400 people who could be entrusted with money and task. Strachan says yes and that it was one of the alternatives posed to Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman in a memoradum. Senator Gurney asks why the money was not given to someone connected to the White House.
JFK Assassination Hearings - E. Aschkenasy & Mark Weiss, H.B. McClain
Ernest Aschkenasy walks back to witness table as U.S. House Representative Robert Edgar (D-PA) and Mark Weiss discuss the 95% probability that their results are accurate.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 28, 1973. Testimony of John Dean.
Senator Sam Ervin (D North Carolina). As a lawyer do you know of any statute which gives the White House the power to set up interagency units of this kind? John Dean. I do not know of any statute, no, sir. Senator Sam Ervin (D North Carolina). Now, the memo from Mr. Haldeman to Mr. Huston is dated the 14th day of July and states that the President has approved the recommendations made by Mr. Huston does it not? John Dean. That is correct. Senator Sam Ervin (D North Carolina). The President made a statement on May 20, I believe, to the effect that he rescinded this approval after 5 days. Do you recall that that? John Dean. It was late July when I came on and I do not recall whether it was rescinded or not.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 29, 1973 (1/2
[00.28.56-Sen. GURNEY thinks he has DEAN trapped in a lie about his meeting with KALMBACH] Now, as I recall, you have testified three times very positively that you met with Mr. Kalmbach in the coffee shop of the Mayflower hotel. Mr. DEAN. Absolutely. That is correct. Senator GURNEY. And then retired to his room in the Mayflower. How, do you account for or these records here? Mr. DE AN. The Only thing I can suggest is that Mr. Kalmbach may have been registered under another, Let me elaborate on that. Mr. Kalmbach often discussed matters in a code name. For example, after our discussion, he began referring to Mr. Hunt as "the writer." He began referring to Mr. Haldeman is "the brush." He began reefering to Mr. Mitchell as "the pipe." These would be, the nature of our discussions and this might explain the fact that he decided not to use his own name in registering in the hotel. [00.29.56-DEAN stands on his story in spite of Sen. GURNEY'S questioning] I think the person that could answer that best is Mr. Kalmbach, because I have a very clear recollection of walking into the coffee shop, meeting in the coffee shop, going to his room. It was a small room. He had not really had a chance to get a good night's sleep because he had been flying all night. To maintain further privacy, I recall him also turning on the television next to the adjoining door and we sat on the other side of the room and had the conversation in which I relayed to him everything I knew at that point in time. So I think Mr. Kalmbach will have to answer that question as to why his name does not appear an the register. [00.30.33-Sen. GURNEY REALLY thinks he's got DEAN now!] Senator GURNEY. Well, it also occurred to me that that could be the case, that he, was using an assumed name, but then when we ran into this other record at the Statler-Hilton Hotel, it just does not make sense, If he was coming into the, city under an assumed name so that no one would know he was here and no later record could be found, why in the world would he register under his own name at a nearby hotel, the Washington Hilton, and then engage another room over in the Mayflower to meet with you? It just does not add up. [00.31.04-DEAN appears a bit flustered, and has to admit he's not sure of the location of the meeting] Mr. DEAN. I see what you are saying. I have testified the Mayflower and I am never sure, which is the Mayflower and which is the Statler-Hilton. The hotel I recall, Is the one that is on 16th Street up from the White House, I know I walked up from the office to his room. Senator GURNEY. How long have, you lived in Washington? Mr. DEAN. I have been hereabout 10 years, Senator GURNEY. And you don't know the difference between the Washington-Hilton and the Mayflower Hotel? Mr. DEAN. I continually get them confused, I must confess. [00.31.50-GURNEY takes a potshot at DEAN. GURNEY is very smug saying this] Senator GURNEY. Well, I must say I am reminded of your colloquy with the, chairman yesterday. 'Mr. Dean, when you said what an excellent memory you had right from schooldays, right on down; that is why you were able to Reconstruct--- Mr. DEAN. That, is right, my memory is good, but I confuse some names often. I don't pretend to have a perfect memory. I think I have a good memory, Senator. Senator GURNEY. But you can't remember really now, after testifying three times very positively, whether it -was the Statler-Hilton or the Mayflower? [00.32.27-DEAN calmly points out that GURNEY is splitting hairs and missing the big picture] Mr. DEAN. Well, Senator, the point in substance here is the fact that the, meeting did occur. We met in the coffee shop. We, went from the coffee shop to his room. We had an extended discussion of the matter, and that is very clear in my recollection the substance of the event. Senator GURNEY. And one of the reasons I am curious about this, really, it, is less ,in attempt to try to confuse you than it is an attempt to try to pin you down. You haven't tried to conceal the meeting, and Mr. Kalmbach, of course, knows all about it, too, Mr. DEAN. That is correct. Senator GURNEY. And he is going to testify before this committee, there is no question about that. But, I cant understand the confusion in where, it took place, because it is an extremely important meeting, obviously This is where the coverup, as far as the financial part of it, first started. Are you sure the meeting didn't, occur somewhere else? Mr. DEAN. I can recall very clearly meeting Mr. Kalmbach in the coffee shop. The coffee shop was crowded, it was busy. We could not find a booth that was quiet. We went from the coffee shop to his room and as I say, I recall very clearly him turning the, television on, because there was a door, an adjoining door next to the room. Then we proceeded to have our conversation. It was a rather lengthy conversation. [00.33.52]
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 13, 1973 (2/2)
[01.28.31] Senator BAKER. Was there any discussion with Mr. Mitchell of the allegations being made by the press at that time of Republican involvement in the Watergate break-in? Mr. STANS. I have no recollection of the substance of the discussions. I just cannot tell you. I had many meetings with Mr. Mitchell in the course of the time that he was with the campaign. As I said, in each case, I had a list of four, five, or six subjects we talked about that were current at the time, and I do not know which par-- particular ones we talked about on any particular day. Senator BAKER. This was the same day, June 23, when I believe Mr. Sloan went to the White House to, according to his testimony, tell Mr. Ehrlichman of his concerns. Do you have any information or of Mr. Sloan's conduct on this same day? Mr. STANS. Well, shortly before 10 o'clock on this day, Mr. Sloan shows on my calendar as having met with me. It, was at that time that he gave me his accounting for the cash funds and that we discussed.' I believe, the disposition of the balance that he had on hand. I am not aware and was not aware at that time, of his discussions with Mr. Ehrlichman or others and I learned about them from reading his depositions. Senator BAKER. Did you have a meeting with Mr. Mitchell on the 24th of June? Mr. STANS. The 24th was a Saturday. I had no recollection of any meeting with Mr. Mitchell and my record does not show any. I had several other meetings on that day. I was in the offices apparently a good part of the day, until, at, least until early afternoon, but I have no recollection or record of a meeting with Mr. Mitchell on that day. Senator BAKER. Did you have a meeting with Mr. Magruder on the 24th? Mr. STANS. Similarly, there. is no record of it and I have no recollection of it. Senator BAKER. Was there a, series of meetings on The 24th with Magruder Dean, Mitchell, or any of the major figures, in the campaign or finance situation at that time, on the 24th? I think it is important that you try to recall as best, you can Mr. Stans. Mr. STANS. Well, Senator, I have. no recollection. 1 can only go by what my record shows and I do not want to be unfair, but, I would like to know what you did on March 24, 1972, 1 think you would have a hard time remembering Senator BAKER, I am certain I would. Mr. STANS. And I talked to people like John Mitchell a great Many times in the course of the campaign and I have no doubt, that, Some, of them did not, get on my time sheets. Senator BAKER. I think it is worth digressing long enough to say that anyone would have difficulty establishing what they did on a particular day, but, these are not ordinary and usual circumstances. Mr. STANS. Correct. Senator BAKER. And we are dealing here with your best efforts to reconstruct, what happened at a critical time and juncture in these proceedings. Now, that is why I urged you to give particular and careful attention to what happened on June 24 with respect to, meetings or conversations less formal than meetings with any of the principals in the so-called Watergate affair. Mr. STANS. I have tried my best to reconstruct that situation, I have gone through my correspondence and memorandums with all of the principals that have been discussed in connection With this matter, and to the extent that they refresh my memory, I have testified to them but I Would have to say that I had many meetings With the people that I considered quite routine. I can only say to you with absolute finality that I did not discuss any espionage or sabotage operations, with anyone prior to June 17 and I really did not learn about them except as', I learned about, them in the Public press. Senator BAKER. That anticipates most of the questions, I could ask on that subject with the exception of one thing. That is with whom did you discuss the Watergate so-called coverup I after June 17 and when did you do it? Mr. STANS. I did not discuss the Watergate coverup with anyone after June 17 and I did not know there a coverup until I read about that in the press. Now, I know of incidents that obviously. in the light of subsequent events, had a relationship to the coverup. for example, the $75,000 that. I gave to Kalmbach, I gave it, to him in good faith, with no knowledge at the time, and I am sure that when Mr. Kalmbach comes before, this committee, he -will testify that, he did not tell me what the purpose of The money was for and would not tell me what the purpose Of the money was for. But except for an incident of that type, I had knowledge of a coverup activity that may have taken place. [01.34.24]
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 13, 1973 (1/2)
[00.25.10] Senator ERVIN. YOU also knew that Liddy had been charged with complicity the Watergate break-in? Mr. STANS. Well, before that Mr. Liddy had refused to answer questions to the FBI and on advice of counsel I fired him. Senator ERVIN. Did you ask Liddy anything about the matter yourself? Mr. STANS. No. I did not because Mr. Mardian was handling the whole of the legal matters involving the Watergate. Senator ERVIN. Well, Liddy had been serving as general counsel of your committee? Mr. STANS. Yes. Senator ERVIN. Why did not you ask him questions? Mr. STANS. Because Mr. Mardian showed me a memorandum addressed to me stating that Mr. Liddy had failed to cooperate with the FBI, asked my approval to fire him, and said, "Do -not discuss the matter with him" or do not discuss anything with Mr. Liddy, so that was the end of it. I shook hands when Mr. Liddy came to my office, at the close of the day. I shook hands with him, said good-bye and that was it. Senator ERVIN. And you knew that at and, in fact act, Mr. Sloan told you that he had so many misgivings about the money that he had been giving to Liddy at Magruder's request that he was, thinking about resigning. Mr. STANS-. Yes. That happened right around the first of July. Senator ERVIN, And he first gave you that message by telephone, did he not? Mr. STANS. I am not sure. I think he gave it to me in person in the office. Senator ERVIN Well, anyway, you told him to come and talk to you in person about it, did you not? Mr. STANS. That was somewhat later, that was 2 weeks:,, later. Senator ERVIN. Yes. When he came to talk to you about his resigning you told him that you had already informed the FBI that he had resigned? Mr. STANS. No, I did not tell him that, but, it evolved in that manner. I was certain that Mr. Sloan was resigning, There was no question, but that that was his intention. He had not submitted it in writing but when I met with the FBI I said Mr. Sloan burl offered to resign 2 weeks ago and was undoubtedly resigning and that was the record: Senator ERVIN, Well, did not Mr. Sloan tell you at any time that Mr. Magruder had sought to persuade him to commit perjury in respect to the amount of money that had been given to Mr. Liddy. Mr. STANS. Yes, he did. He told me that after he had had the several conversations with Mr. Magruder and after he had told Mr. Magruder that he was going to tell the truth. Senator ERVIN. Mr. Stans, didn't all of this knowledge that you acquired one way or another about these matters that I have enumerated engender in your mind a feeling that you ought to communicate or talk to the President about this matter? Mr. STANS. Mr. Chairman, this did not all happen on one day, as you know. It was a growing thing. Senator ERVIN. Yes, sir. Mr. STANS. As one circumstance after another developed, it was evident that it was entirely possible, that Mr. Liddy was implicated in was no indication that anyone else was outside of this matter, There was those who were arrested. Mr. Mardian had been appointed as counsel to investigate the situation presumably' to report to Mitchell and the President, and it was outside of my domain so I did not go beyond, go any further. Senator ERVIN, You did know about, Magruder since Sloan had told you about Magruder trying to persuade him to commit perjury? Mr. STANS. I had heard that from Sloan but Sloan had-- Senator ERVIN. Yes. Mr. STANS. But, Sloan himself had carried that story to others- Senator ERVIN. And you knew Mr. Mitchell had told you that Mr. Magruder was authorized to direct -Mr. Sloan to make these payments to Liddy? Mr. STANS. Yes, of course, I knew that. Senator ERVIN. -You knew all of this before you talked to the President in August, did you not? Mr. STANS. Oh, yes . Senator ERVIN. Now, you were not only a personal friend but, a political friend of the President, were you not? Mr. STANS. Yes, I believe I was. Senator ERVIN. And wished him well, Mr. STANS. I certainly did. Senator ERVIN. And You knew that under the Constitution one of his principal obligation obligations was to see that the laws be faithfully executed? Mr. STANS. No question about it. Senator ERVIN. Did it not, occur to you that as a friend of the President, as one who wished him well and one who was endeavoring to procure his reelection, that you should have talked to the President and suggested to him that he come, out, and make it, clear that he was going to enforce the law regardless of what happened? Mr. STANS. Mr. Chairman, the President, had far more resources than I did. It was known that the White House was conscious of the problem. I had no knowledge that was not common knowledge at the. time, I had nothing to tell the President that would have been unusual. [00.30.35]
LAWMAKERS
IN 01.00.00 01.00.00-WETA credit/sponsor credits 01.00.23-PAUL DUKE-on program-report on 10th anniversary of WATERGATE, and the conclusion of the "legislative yearbook". 01.00.37-Title sequence 01.01.03-DUKE, seated in SENATE CAUCUS ROOM-intro retrospective on 10th anniversary of WATERGATE, the SPELLBINDING hearings in the same room, describing "dynamite" testimony by highest officials of the country. 01.01.47-Clip of JOHN DEAN testifying about giving NIXON his "cancer on the Presidency" speech, and NIXON'S odd reaction to the speech. Clip of JOHN MITCHELL (NIXON'S close friend, former ATTORNEY GENERAL, and campaign director for the 1972 election) testifying that he was not about to let anything stand in the way of NIXON'S 1972 re-election campaign. Clip of H.R. HALDEMAN testifying that he's confident that NIXON didn't do anything wrong or know about WATERGATE or the COVERUP. Shot of SAM ERVIN banging gavel to open a hearing, shots of the SENATE SELECT (ERVIN) COMMITTEE. Shot of CHARLES FERRIS, a former Senate Aide, says that in 1973, Senator MANSFIELD thought it crucial that the SENATE go on the record by investigating WATERGATE. 01.03.10-Shot of Caucus Room, with SELECT COMMITTEE and reporters seated. Shot of SAM ERVIN giving his opening statement, says the American People look to the Committee for the truth about the perversion of the Democratic and Electoral processes. DUKE v.o.-descr. of the members of the Committee, ERVIN, HOWARD BAKER, HERMAN TALMADGE (D-GA), DANIEL INOUYE (D-HI), JOSEPH MONTOYA (D-NM), ED GURNEY (R-FL), LOWELL WEICKER (R-CT), says that the Senators chosen weren't very well known, and no one could have foreseen how explosive the investigation would become. Shot of FRED THOMPSON, former MINORITY COUNSEL for WATERGATE HEARINGS, in office, says he expected only a month of hearings, didn't expect television. Shot of TV CAMERAS and reporters scurrying around hearing room. 01.04.35-Clip from WATERGATE HEARINGS, FRED THOMPSON asking former WHITE HOUSE staffer ALEXANDER BUTTERFIELD if he was aware of the WHITE HOUSE TAPE RECORDING SYSTEM. BUTTERFIELD pauses, says he was aware of such devices, placed there in 1970 or so. THOMPSON v.o.-BUTTERFIELD was an unknown witness, discusses the process of finding out that BUTTERFIELD had information to tell. THOMPSON says BUTTERFIELD reluctantly admitted that he did know, hoped that he wouldn't be asked. DUKE v.o.-many witnesses were confronted with questions they hoped wouldn't be asked by SAM ERVIN. Shot of ERVIN questioning a witness. Shot of JOHN EHRLICHMAN (FORMER NIXON advisor) testifying, ERVIN confronts EHRLICHMAN with the statement that NIXON was justified by CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS to steal the personal papers of DANIEL ELLSBERG (Pentagon Papers affair), EHRLICHMAN says he thought that the action against Ellsberg was justified. ERVIN gets all worked up, EHRLICHMAN is indignant, ERVIN declares that EHRLICHMAN'S views would justify terrible abuses of power. The audience laughs. EHRLICHMAN gets indignant, ERVIN wins the argument, draws applause. 01.08.09-Shot of HOWARD BAKER from WATERGATE HEARINGS. DUKE v.o.-BAKER was also a tough interrogator. Clip of BAKER asking JOHN DEAN "What did the President know, and when did he know it". Shot of LOWELL WEICKER, DUKE v.o.-WEICKER was the toughest questioner of all. Clip of WEICKER asking HALDEMAN whether it's true that HALDEMAN, under NIXON'S authority, issued a directive linking the McGOVERN campaign to COMMUNIST INFILTRATION and subversion, asks why the hell HALDEMAN didn't find out first whether that was true. HALDEMAN'S excuses are rather lame, and this notorious tough-guy of the Nixon White House looks like he's about to cry. WEICKER in office, says that the ERVIN committee's job wasn't to prosecute, but to determine what would be the standards of American government. DUKE v.o.-the WHITE HOUSE tried to discredit WEICKER during the hearings. Clip of WEICKER giving angry speech, says that he's angry that his own political party is accusing him of disloyalty for investigating the facts of such gross acts. Shot of audience applauding WEICKER. DUKE v.o.-the hearings were a TV ratings smash hit, Senators became celebrities, with TALMADGE turning down a $10,000 speaking engagement and GURNEY turning down several proposals of marriage and talk of HOWARD BAKER for PRESIDENT.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 26, 1973 - Testimony of John Dean.
Samuel Dash, attorney. Let us examine, Mr. Dean, your denial of your own complicity in the Watergate itself in May and June of 1972. Is it not true that although you expressed amazement at the mind-boggling, as you described it, Liddy plan remembered in a show-and-tell meeting in the Attorney General's office on January 27, 1972, you along with Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Magruder, did encourage Liddy to scale down this plan and budget and you didn't tell him to stop the activity? John Dean. That s correct. And I might add that with hindsight, as I think I indicated in my statement yesterday, I probably should have been much more forceful in trying to stop the plan at that point when I in fact myself realized it was something that should not occur. Samuel Dash, attorney. Well, Mr. Dean, after the scaled down Liddy plan was presented in Mitchell's office In February 4, 1972, which did not include the activities of mugging, kidnapping, or prostitution, but primarily electronic surveillance or break ins, although you say you disassociated yourself from it, as the White House representative, you did not in fact tell Liddy to stop it. John Dean. That is correct. Samuel Dash, attorney. And although you say that you told Haldeman that the White House should not be involved with the plan, you did not recommend that Haldeman put a stop to it which you knew he could have done if he wanted to? John Dean. Well, again I must rely on hindsight. Given the circumstances that were existing at the time, I felt that someone wanted this. I knew I didn't want it. I knew I had put those on notice involved that I was going to have no part in it. I had similarly and with regard to Operation Sandwedge, let it die a natural death. I assumed the same thing was going to happen. Quite obviously it did not happen.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 25, 1973 - Statement of John Dean.
Phone conversation on the President on March 20th. When the President called me and we had a rather rambling discussion. I told him at the conclusion of the conversation that evening that I wanted to talk with him as soon as possible about the Watergate matter because I did not think that he fully realized all the facts and the implication of those facts for people at the White House as well as himself. He said that I should meet with him the next morning about 10 o'clock. Before going in to tell the President some of these things, I decided I should call Haldeman because I know that his name would come up in the matter. I called Haldeman and told him what I was going to do and Haldeman agreed that I should proceed to so inform the President of the situation.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 6, 1973 Testimony of Hugh Sloan
Fred Thompson, attorney. Let me ask you one or two other lines of questions. You mentioned you went to Mr. Ehrlichman after the break in with your concerns and he in effect said he did not want to hear the facts at that time. Is that correct? Hugh Sloan. Yes, sir. Fred Thompson, attorney. Statements have been made publicly to the effect that Mr. Ehrlichman at one time told Mr. Dean to make a report about this matter. Did Mr. Dean ever contact you from June 17, 1972, up until the time he left the White House, about the Watergate matter? Hugh Sloan. I had numerous conversations with Mr. Dean over a period of time, but with regard to your specific question, in terms of an investigation, I would have to describe the transmittal of information essentially as my forcing it on him, rather than him soliciting it from me.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 25, 1973 - Testimony of John Dean.
After I informed Mr. Magruder that Mr. Fielding was not available, he requested that I suggest someone else because he was desperately in need of an in-house lawyer. Accordingly, I next went to Mr. Krogh and asked him if David Young might be available and interested. Krogh told me that Young was very much involved in the declassification project and could not be spared. The reason Young had occurred to me is that I had spent several days traveling with him in mid-October interviewing prospective candidates for nomination to the Supreme Court. I might add that during those days of traveling around the country together he never told me what the Plumbers Unit was doing or had done. But I felt that Mr. Young was a bright and extremely capable lawyer who would make an excellent general counsel and could handle the security and demonstration problems of the campaign.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 25, 1973 - Testimony of John Dean.
When Petersen arrived at Kleindienst's office he gave a status report of the investigation. Kleindienst then related my concern to Petersen. Petersen was troubled by the case and the implications of it. Kleindienst had another meeting so Petersen and I believe the other meeting was in his office. So Petersen and I went into Mr. Kleindienst's back office and talked further. To the best of my recollection we did not discuss specifics, rather it was a general discussion. I told him I had no idea where this thing might end, but I told him I didn t think the White House could withstand a wide-open investigation the sum and substance of our conversation was that I had no idea how far this matter might go. But I had reason, without being specific, to suspect the worst. The meeting ended on that note that I hoped I was wrong.
LAWMAKERS (10/06/1983)
U.S. House Representative Silvio Conte (R-MA), in his office, vows to "placate" any Democrat who voted for the bill and was attacked by being called a "communist sympathizer". Linda Wertheimer interviewing Rep. Newt Gingrich (R-GA), National Republican Committee Chairman. He thought the wording was a bit tough, but the principle was right. Rep. Tony Coelho (D-CA), Democratic Campaign Committee Chairman, says calling someone a "communist sympathizer" is a step too far. Rep. Gingrich counters that whenever the liberals hyperbolize, it isn't criticized, but when conservatives state facts, it is considered inappropriate. Rep. Conte says it was poor strategy in a House where they don't have enough members and rely on compromise. Letter to U.S. President Ronald Reagan from Democrats asking the President to disown the press release by the NRCC; signed by Rep. Howard Wolpe (D-MI). Rep. Wolpe says the President needs to repudiate the NRCC letter and show solidarity with those attacked by it.
LAWMAKERS (10/06/1983)
U.S. House Representative Silvio Conte (R-MA), in his office, explains how U.S. President Ronald Reagan can "mollify" Democrats that voted for the bill. Rep. Newt Gingrich (R-GA), National Republican Committee Chairman, think that President Reagan needs to be careful how he protects Democrats who voted for the bill. Hard to explain how to be tough on Russia, but give them a loan. Rep. Tony Coelho (D-CA), Democratic Campaign Committee Chairman, states the administration is caught between the right wing of their party and doing the right thing. VS of President Reagan speaking at Annual Meeting of the Boards of Governors of the World Bank Group and the International Monetary Fund, criticizing the "partisan wrangling and political posturing"; Treasury Secretary Donald Regan sitting, Linda Wertheimer, in voiceover, stating the President's need for Democratic support. Speaker of the House, Tip O'Neill (D-MA) responding, saying the President needs to write a letter of gratitude to Democrats.
JFK Assassination Hearings - E. Aschkenasy & Mark Weiss, H.B. McClain
U.S. House Representative Robert Edgar, off camera (D-PA): "Would you answer the question I wanted to ask?" Ernest Aschkenasy explains how sound waves are measured in relation to a fired bullet.
Watergate Hearings - Testimony of John J Caulfield May 22, 1973
Senator Sam ERVIN. (pounding gavel) Committee will resume. Mr. Sam DASH. Alright, Mr. Caulfield you were in the midst of reading your statement, I would suggest you go back a sentence or two so we have continuity with what you're saying. Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes sir. Mr. DASH. Actually perhaps to the last full thought that you wanted to express in your statement. Mr. CAULFIELD. (continues reading prepared statement) I'll pick it up a couple sentences back Mr. Dash. I told him that the White House officials with whom I was talking were complaining, because they felt that Mr. McCord was the only one of the watergate burglary defendants who was refusing to co-operate. At no time on this occasion or on any other occasion do I recall telling Mr. McCord to keep silent if called before the Grand Jury or any Congressional Committees. His response to my conversation was that he still wanted his immediate freedom and he felt strongly that if the White House had any interest in helping him secure that freedom that they could do something about the two calls which he was sure had been intercepted. I told him I would check on this matter again and get back to him. I was not attempting to exert pressure on Mr. McCord by telling him of comments I was hearing from the white house, merely I was attempting to let him know the kinds of things I was hearing from Mr. Dean concerning the White House's attitude towards him if that would be of any assistance to him. Later on Sunday I telephoned Mr. Dean to report of my meeting with Mr. McCord. I told him that in my opinion Mr. McCord had absolutely no interest in the offer of executive clemency. I told Mr. Dean that Mr. McCord was still adamant in his belief that the white house had the power to have the charges against him dismissed if it would merely pursue the wire-taps which he had mentioned. (drinks more water) Mr. Dean said that I should tell him that there wasn't much likelihood that anything would be done about the wire-tap situation and in response to my comments about McCord's refusal to consider executive clemency he said something like, "well, what the hell does he know anyway."
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 29, 1973 (1/2)
[00.38.07-DEAN discusses meeting NIXON on Feb. 28, 1973] Mr. DEAN. I believe that we stopped yesterday with the, meeting on the 28th ,it which time I was told. I mentioned to you the fact that I had told the President that I thought he ought to know of my involvement in the matter. and then I will have to move along. Now, again, it is hard for me to separate in a sense what is defined as involvement because there was an evolving pattern that came out of the La Costa meetings when I began having my direct dealings with the President and many of these things related directly to that. [00.38.53] Senator BAKER. But even though the, pattern of activity- Mr. DEAN. I understand. Senator BAKER. [continuing]. And the circumstances involved are, important for the purpose of this abbreviated interrogation, would you please tell me what you told the President, the President told you, was said by the President in your presence or was said by you to the President. I guess that third one is unnecessary, but would you please do that, limiting it only to direct first-hand information for the purpose of this interrogation? [00.39.20] Mr. DEAN. Well, I think we ought to go to the next, as I say, the testimony. Senator BAKER. Yes, sir. Mr. DEAN [continuing]. Speaks for itself on a number of these matters I just referred to and we ought to move then to the meeting on March 13 at which the, toward the conclusion of that meeting. Senator BAKER. All right, would you stop just a moment, Mr. Dean. Mr. DEAN. Yes. [00.39.43] Senator BAKER. Mr. Chairman, there is a vote in progress and I would like very much to finish this line of inquiry, and I would hope that the Chair would permit me to continue and, if the rest of the committee will go vote, I will continue with this interrogation. Senator ERVIN. Fine, [00.40.00-DEAN testifies about his conversation with NIXON about raising $1 million dollars for PAYOFF to keep the BURGLARS silent about MAGRUDER, MITCHELL, HALDEMAN, EHRLICHMAN, AND DEAN'S involvement in WATERGATE] Mr. DEAN. During the conclusion of the meeting on the 13th, the, question of money and how to pay this support, silence money came up, and I explained to the President--I was telling the President of the problem. Senator BAKER. Where were you ? Mr. DEAN. I was in the President's office. Senator BAKER. In the oval office? Mr. DEAN. In the oval office. Senator BAKER. Who else was present? [00.40.21] Mr. DEAN. Mr. Haldeman was present. Senator BAKER. Anyone else? Mr. DEAN. That is all. Senator BAKER. All right, go ahead, sir, [00.40.28] Mr. DEAN. I was telling the President--I don't believe Mr. Haldeman was present, during the entire meeting to the best of my recollection but he came into the meeting at some point, at the point he, came in it was on an unrelated matter, the meeting was interrupted to resolve his particular problem and he stayed in while I was finishing my discussion of this because it had come up shortly before he came in, and he sat and listened for just a moment while we were talking and then he took care, of his business with the President and then stayed because, it was quite obviously toward the end of my meeting with the President. [00.41.05-DEAN testifying about his March 13 meeting with NIXON, and the "MILLION DOLLAR" CONVERSATION.] Senator BAKER. It might be useful to know how the meeting was arranged, at your request, at the President's request, or through Mr. Haldeman, or how? Mr. DEAN. The meeting was arranged per the request of the President. Senator BAKER. All right. Would you continue please? Mr. DEAN,. As I have testified the question of--I got into the discussion of the fact because I had had countless cross pressures and the like. as to who was going to raise this money that was being demanded, and Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman were unwilling to do it, Mr. Mitchell was unwilling to do it. [00.41.40] Senator BAKER. Are these the things you were saying to the President? Mr. DEAN. I will get to that. I am prefacing what the circumstance was that resulted this coming up with the meeting with the President. Senator BAKER. I don't mean to hamper you, but would it be possible to tell me of the conversation first and then to explain the background. [00.41.59-DEAN directly discusses his conversation with NIXON.] Mr. DEAN. All right. I told the President at some point that, toward the end of the conversation of the meeting, that the individuals who had either been convicted or pleaded guilty were continuing to make their demand on the White House and that it would be some time in the not too distant future, that these individuals would be, up for sentencing and the demands were at, this point again growing toward a crescendo point. [00.42.31-DEAN testifies that NIXON was aware and complicit in the PAYOFFS of the defendants] The President asked me. "Well, how much are they demanding and how much is it going to cost?" And I said, "Well. to the best of my estimation it will cost a million dollars or more to continue The, payment. At that point, the President, I can recall this very vividly, leaned back in his chair and he sort of slid his chair back from the desk and he said to me that a million dollars was no problem at all. In fact, I have a very clear visual picture even of the President of the fact that he had his hands somewhat in a position like this Is when he repeated it, when he looked over at Mr. Haldeman and said, "A million dollars is no problem to raise."
Watergate Hearings - Testimony of Gordon C. Strachan, July 23, 1973
U.S. Senator Howard Baker (R-TN) continues his line of questioning regarding the payment of private polling and asks if a bank account would have been a better for that purpose. Former White House aide Gordon C. Strachan says, "I imagine that's correct." Senator Baker asks if $350,000 was used to pay the polling company. Strachan says the funds were not used for polling and that, over the course of the campaign, the Nixon Re-Election campaign incurred around "$100,000 or $110,000" in private polling expenses. Then-chief fundraiser Maurice H. Stans and the committee had substantial assets in the end, and Counsel to the President John Dean arranged with Stans to pay incurred expenses via ordinary campaign funds and not use any part of the $350,000. Senator Baker: "So if I understand the picture, the Committee to Re-Elect the President was doing polling, maybe the National Republican Committee was doing polling, and [Chief of Staff H.R.] Haldeman was doing polling...and that the $350,000, initially, was for Haldeman's private purposes, that is, to be kept secret from the Committee to Re-Elect the President or the Republican National Committee". Strachan confirms, adds that the secrecy extended to almost all members of the White House staff. Senator Baker asks if the President's assistant and adviser, John Ehrlichman, knew about this. Strachan: "Not to my knowledge." Senator Baker asks if C.R.E.E.P. director and former AG John Mitchell knew about this. Strachan can only give conjecture that Mitchell knew that Haldeman wanted the money for private polling. Senator Baker asks if the President knew about this. Strachan says the President knew that extensive private polling was conducted, but cannot speak to whether he concerned himself with how it was paid. Senator Baker asks if the President knew or did not know about the $350,000 in cash that was in White House aide Alexander Butterfield's possession. Strachan says he has no information about that. Baker contends it is Strachan's best impression that President Nixon did know that private polling was taking place, separate and aside from C.R.E.P. and the Republican National Committee. Strachan agrees, states that many times he walked into the Oval Office with polling results and handed them to Haldeman. Senator Baker still doesn't understand why separate polling needs to be done.
JFK Assassination Hearings - H.B. McClain
Committee Chairman, U.S. House Representative Louis Stokes (D-OH) recognizes Rep. Christopher Dodd (D-CT) who asks Chief Counsel, Professor Robert Blakey if any effort was made to compare the brand of tape disc with the brand the Dallas Police Department used. Blakely responds that the "Dictabelt that was found among this material is the same kind of Dictabelt that the Dallas Police Department was using at that time," and that "what appears on the Dictabelt and the tape recording of the Dictabelt are indeed the same sounds, the same information that we have based on the transcripts that we had of channel one and channel two that go back to 1963-64." Rep. Dodd asks whether other voices on the tape identified or confirmed, and Blakey says: "No". Deputy Chief Counsel Gary T. Cornwell adds that the transmissions on the tapes do correspond with Warren Commission testimony of various officers.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 25, 1973
[00.02.00-DEAN discussing his dealings with the FBI to gain information about the process of the Watergate investigation, which information was given to the principals in the case to aid in the COVERUP] RECEIPT OF REPORTS FROM THE FBI And I will begin by summarizing and saying to the best of my recollection it was in early July when I called Gray to discuss the, matter of receiving reports from the FBI. Gray indicated that, he was going to be, in his office on Saturday and that, I should come to his office and take a look at the reports in his office. I told him that I thought it was unwise for me to be coming in and out of the Justice Department, particularly since most of the guards and people at the Justice Department knew me. Accordingly, we arranged to meet later at his apartment and he said that he, would discuss the matter with me then. I recall we took a stroll to the side of his apartment building and sat, on a, bench in front of the river and talked generally about the case and I raised with him the matter of my receiving some of the raw FBI data regarding the investigation. Gray said that he would have to check but wanted an assurance from me that this information was being reported to the President and that was the principal purpose of the request, I assured him that it, was being reported to the President. Even though I was not directly aware of the fact, at that time, I was aware that Ehrlichman or Haldeman had daily discussions wit), the President, and I felt certain, because Haldeman often made, notes of my reporting back about the information I was, bringing to their attention that this information was given to the President. I do not recall when actually I received the first written information from the FBI, but I believe it was after July 21 when I received a summary report that had been prepared on the investigation to that stage. I would also like to now summarize to the bottom of the page, and indicate that when--- Mr. DASH. Bottom of page 72. Mr. DEAN. Seventy-two correct, and indicate that after I did get possession of the documents the FBI files, I found them not very meaningful and later Mr. Mardian, Mr. Parkinson, Mr. O'Brien came over to my office and read I the reports, and Mardian, they all reached the same conclusion and [00.04.15] I recall Mardian's reaction was that the documents indicated that the investigation was too vigorous and he was quite critical of Gray and asked me to tell Gray to slow down but I never made such a call. It was after I showed a copy of the July report to Mr. Mitchell that Mardian insisted that he be permitted To see the FBI report-,. Mitchell agreed. and thought that Paul O'Brien and Ken Parkinson should also see them. I recall that when Mardian, O'Brien and Parkinson finally came to my office to look at the reports they realized that they were, not very meaningful. It was Mr. Mardian, however who became very excited because Of the scope of the investigation that Gray was conducting and the tone of the cables he was sending out of headquarters. Mardian clearly thought that Gray was being too vigorous in his investigation of the case and was quite critical of Gray's handling of the. entire matter. He demanded that I tell Gray to slow down, but I never did so. Summarizing the first paragraph on page 73. I would also note that that I never showed any of these reports to any persons who were interviewed by the FBI and they were only given to Mr. Dick Moore of the White House Staff when he was working on the Segretti matter for Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Haldeman. [00.04.50-LEHRER in studio] LEHRER states that DEAN will next explain attempts to involve the CIA in the coverup] [PBS network id-title screen "SENATE HEARINGS ON CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES"] [00.07.19-LEHRER in studio] LEHRER states that DEAN will next explain an attempt to blame WATERGATE on the CIA. [00.07.34]