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Watergate Hearings - testimony of James McCord (Jim McCord) May 22, 1973
[cut shot of DASH conferring with an aide while BAKER stares at witness and ERVIN takes notes.] James McCord (Jim McCord) continues reading statement: Now, we also had word from CRP sources alleging that the McGovern committee had "a pipeline" directly into the offices of the Committee To Re-Elect the President in Washington; allegedly, they were feeding out, on a regular basis, policy position papers, that is plans & strategy, which were rather important to the success of a candidate's campaign. If the other side is reading your poker hand, he can negate your plans. We had word that one of the volunteers at the Committee To Re-Elect the President had in fact prior to coming aboard the committee, threatened the life of John Mitchell & other persons. This was about the same time Governor Wallace was almost killed in an assassination attempt. There were numerous threats in writing & by phone against John Mitchell & his wife. One such call came to the Unlisted telephone of Mrs. Mitchell at their apartment & got her greatly upset, as it would any woman, b/c it appeared that even the unlisted telephone number appeared then no longer safe, we certainly had sufficient indications that violence -oriented groups were out to endanger both life and property. With some 250,000 demonstrators planning to go to the convention in early 1972 & there were statements that some would be out to commit violence. The questions were, Who are such people? Who is funding them-encouraging them? Who is In collusion with them? What are they planning next and where? Are any of them being supported and encouraged by any staff members of the McGovern committee or DNC? I had no indication whatever that Larry O'Brien or Senator McGovern had either any knowledge of or part in such-- just to the contrary, I was completely convinced that they did not. But I was not so sure that, w/o their knowledge, other staff members might not be working behind their backs to quietly encourage such groups as the VVAW. McGovern's early political base was w/ some of the radical groups. My questions were, What was the extent of such encouragement, if any, and how far did it go? Did they let such groups use their telephones and work in their offices? There were indications later 1972, that such groups actually did just that in California and in DNC headquarters in Washington. These then were some of my concerns in my role as security chief of the CRP; I felt that the Watergate operation might produce some leads answering some of these questions, and I had been advised that the operation had the sanction of the White House and of the Attorney General, while he was AG. In hindsight, I do not believe that the operation should have been sanctioned or executed, nor should I have participated. However, you've previously asked some of my motivations & what some of the atmosphere at that time. Those are some of the things that make up my atmosphere & some of my motivations.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 28, 1973. Testimony of John Dean.
Senator Howard Baker (R Tennessee). What did the President know and when did he know it? Is it possible for you to say, based on direct knowledge or circumstantial information, and you ve given us an indication of circumstances or even hearsay, can you tell us whether or not you can shed any further light on whether the President knew, or in the parlance of tort law, should have known, of the break in of the Watergate complex on June 17? John Dean. You mean could he have had prior knowledge of it? Senator Howard Baker (R Tennessee). Yes. John Dean. I cannot testify of any firsthand knowledge of that. I can only testify as to the fact that anything that came to Mr. Haldeman's attention of any importance was generally passed to the President by Mr. Haldeman. And if Mr. Haldeman had advance knowledge or had received advance indications, it would be my assumption that that had been passed along. But I do not know that for a fact. Senator Howard Baker (R Tennessee). So that would fall into category 2 of my organization. That is an inference that you do draw from the arrangements of the organization of the White House and your knowledge of the relationship between Mr. Haldeman and the President. John Dean. That is correct. Senator Howard Baker (R Tennessee). But it does not fall in category 1 or 3 which is to say direct knowledge or hearsay information from other parties. John Dean. That is correct.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 28, 1973. Testimony of John Dean.
Is there any other circumstantial evidence? You have alluded to the organization and relationships at the White House. Is there any other circumstance that would give us any further insight or is there any category 3 information. That is, is there anything anyone has told you that would shed further light on what the President knew and when he knew it in this time frame from June 17 to September 15? John Dean. Yes. As I say, on a number of occasions when I was in meetings with Mr. Haldeman or Mr. Ehrlichman, sometimes together, I can recall that the President would call for Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Haldeman would send a message back to tell the President that he was meeting with Dean, getting a report and he would see him after that. This was always rather startling to me that my report was more important than Mr. Haldeman going right into the President's office. Senator Howard Baker (R Tennessee). So the unusual nature of that arrangement, and circumstance led you to believe that there was some knowledge of the subject matters attendant to the Watergate affair by the President? John Dean. That and another circumstance that I might add. Is that this, the coverup, consumed a great amount of time of Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman. They were spending a great deal of time in discussion with me, discussions amongst themselves and this was probably the major thing that was occurring at this point in time.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 26, 1973 - Testimony of John Dean.
Senator Lowell Weicker (R Connecticut). All right. Any other instances that you recollect as to the use of the FBI by the White House along these lines? Let me give you a broad range, you just might mark these down so you do not have to go over each one. This is type of situation that either involved the FBI or the Internal Revenue Service, CIA, Military Intelligence, Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, Secret Service. John Dean. Let me start from the bottom of the list back. I do recall, and I mentioned in my statement, a rather broad reference to the fact that that intelligence came from surprising sources sometimes. At one point one of the top officials at the Secret Service brought me a small intelligence printout regarding Senator McGovern and just left if with me and said I thought that this might be of interest to you." It had to do with Mr., with Senator McGovern attending a fundraising function, I believe in Philadelphia. And apparently there were some references in the intelligence statement to the fact that either Communist money or former Communist supporters were going to attend the fund raiser. I took the document to Mr. Colson and I said, "Are you interested in this? I assume it was given to me not to bury in my files," but I said, "I do not think you can reveal the source of the information." He said, "I am very interested in it." He took it and later told me he had made arrangements to have it published.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 26, 1973 - Testimony of John Dean.
Senator Lowell Weicker (R Connecticut). All right. Are there any other instances of which you have firsthand knowledge in this? John Dean. As I say, if I were to spend a week or so in my files, I could probably on chapter and verse everything that had come to my office in this regard. But I am trying to come off the top and tell you what I can recall off the top. Senator Lowell Weicker (R Connecticut). I would hope Mr. Dean, and Mr. Chairman, that Mr. Dean would do just that and refresh his recollections as to whether there is anything further that he has been unable to come forth with at this time. John Dean. The White House has made an arrangement whereby I can go to my files, but I must say it is a rather awkward arrangement. There are some five file cabinets that are all safes and there is no desk in the room to work and I must work under the supervision of a Secret Service agent and there is no place to sit down with any comfort in write. So it s a little difficult to get in there and do anything. Hopefully if I were to do that, we can make arrangements so I could get in and spend the time that would be necessary to go through the files. The other thing is of course, I have to do this all by handwriting because I am not allowed to make any copies of anything in my files.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 6, 1973 Testimony of Hugh Sloan
Hugh Sloan. In the Ehrlichman meeting Samuel Dash, attorney. When did that occur? Hugh Sloan. That happened around, I believe it was a 12 o'clock meeting on the 23rd. The Ehrlichman meeting, which be the Friday, the Ehrlichman meeting at 2. I started into generally the same discussion of problems. Samuel Dash, attorney. Mr. Sloan, when you say problems, did that include any statements by you about cash disbursements that had been made to Mr. Liddy? Hugh Sloan. I don t believe I at that point in time was pointing fingers. I don t believe I mentioned the Magruder remark. I don t believe I mentioned the money to Liddy or Liddy s remark. I was just saying that somebody external to the campaign has to look at this because the concern had risen in my mind at that point of the possibility of the entire campaign being involved and therefore it couldn t investigate itself. Samuel Dash, attorney. What was Mr. Ehrlichman's response? Hugh Sloan. His response, I believe he interpreted my concerns, and I d expressed to him my personal concerns with regard to the money, I believe he interpreted my being there as personal fear and he indicated to me that I had a special relationship with the White House, if I needed help getting a lawyer he d be glad to do that, but do not tell me any details, I don t want to know, my position would have to be until after the election that I would have to take executive privilege.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, May 23, 1973. Testimony of Anthony Ulasewicz.
Senator INOUYE. Thank you very much. According to Mr. Caulfield s testimony you were a member of a "private security entity in Washington D.C. for the purposes of providing investigative support for the White House", is that correct? Mr. ULASEWICZ. That's correct. Senator INOUYE. You worked under Mr. Caulfield, but was on the payroll of Mr. Kalmback? Mr. ULASEWICZ. That's correct. Senator INOUYE. What were you receiving as salary from Mr. Kalmback? Mr. ULASEWICZ. Twenty two thousand dollars a year plus expenses. Senator INOUYE. Are you still on Mr. Kalmback's payroll? Mr. ULASEWICZ. No sir. Senator INOUYE. When were you taken off the payroll? Mr. ULASEWICZ. In 1971, well to the end of the year '72. Senator INOUYE. What was the nature of your work? Mr. ULASEWICZ. It was supporting, outside supporting investigative to Mr. Caulfield. Senator INOUYE. Can you describe some of your activities? One of the newspapers described you as the "super spy", is that a correct definition? Mr. ULASEWICZ. The newspapers have painted quite a few pictures of me recently, but I was no spy of course of any kind. I did investigative work and support of whatever Mr. Caulfield related to me, I did no slanderous spying as newspapers, allegations etc. I can best put it in it's category probably supporting anybody that s conducting legitimate investigations, I used no wire-taps, I never used any surveillance, etc. Senator INOUYE. You consider your work to be legal? Mr. ULASEWICZ. Absolutely legal, yes sir. I took the, when I left the police department, I left a fine ongoing career not to get involved in anything illegal and I made that a stipulation with Mr. Ehrlichman at the time the job was taken. Mr. Caulfield would certainly know that I wouldn't go for it. Senator INOUYE. But in this very special assignment which you received from Mr. Caulfield to serve as contact with Mr. McCord, were you aware that you were an accessory to the commission of the crime to obstruct criminal investigation? Mr. ULASEWICZ. Yes sir. I knew that it was wrong. Senator INOUYE. You knew that you were an accessory to a crime? Mr. ULASEWICZ. Yes sir. Senator INOUYE. But as a matter of friendship you proceeded? Mr. ULASEWICZ. Yes sir. Senator INOUYE. Did you have another assignments of similar nature? Mr. ULASEWICZ. No. Senator INOUYE. I have no questions senator.
August 4, 1994 - Part 4
(12:10:30) Mr. McLARTY. No, Senator, I have not. Senator SASSER. Mr. Chairman, I am at a posture here where think I can yield back to Senator D'Amato some of his time, which he so generously yielded to me. Thank you, Mr. McLarty, and thank you, Ms. Williams. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Sasser. Senator D'AMATO. Well, Mr. Chairman, if I might suggest, know a vote has just started. The witnesses have been on the table for about 21/2 hours. Might this be a time, so that we can go down and break, and she might take 15 minutes or so, so that we could vote, and then we will start? I do not know what tile Committee thinks. The CHAIRMAN. I think that is a good idea. The vote has started, and so the Committee will recess for about 15 minutes so that we can go and vote, and the witnesses can take a break as well, and then we will resume at approximately 12:30 The Committee stands in recess. (12:11:22) [Recess.] (12:11:24) Hearing hosts DON BODE and NINA TOTENBERG segue to coverage of House Banking Committee Hearing at which Secretary of the Treasury LLOYD BENTSEN is testifying (12:29:04) Commentary of Hearing hosts DON BODE and NINA TOTENBERG
JFK Assassination Hearings - Day One Introduction & John & Nellie Connally
(01:37:40) Fuzzy image of PBS funding credit to the Ford Foundation (01:38:14) Shot opens from back of gallery of hearing room where people are congregating, hearings host SANFORD UNGAR voices over an introduction to the first day of the hearings which will be the testimony of former Texas Governor John Connally and his wife Nellie, the shot changes to him during this introduction, he then introduces his panel JEREMIAH O'LEARY of the Washington Star and PAUL HOCH of the Assassination Information Bureau, they discuss the conspiracy aspect of the investigation and if it will be laid to rest by these hearings (01:45:00) Shot returns to the hearings room where Ungar identifies the Chairman of the Committee Representative LOUIS STOKES and fellow member Representative RICHARDSON PREYER and panel discusses fact that certain government documents regarding the assassination were not made available for the committee to review (01:46:26) Shot returns to the panel which discusses the possibilty that the hearings could be cut off abruptly because of lack of funds which is to be later voted on (01:47:50) Shot retuns to hearing room and committee where Stokes kicks things off with an introduction of the committee's objectives in holding the investigation: to identify JFK's assassin, to determine the performance of Federal agencies in their investigation and protection of the president, to determine if there was a conspiracy to assassinate JFK - Stokes then talks about how the committee will approach the hearings with an objective stance suspending judgement until examining all the evidence and not coming to a decision until December of '78 when they will convene to write a report as to their conclusions (01:50:58) Stokes gives the differences between these hearings and criminal procedings: there is no defendent, there is no prosecuter, there is no specific burden of proof, there is no pending indictment - Stokes goes on to say that the committee is there to evaluate evidence and leaves its ultimate decision to the public hearings in December (01:53:50) Stokes says the hearings are held to form a historic record (01:54:30) Stokes sets up this week of the hearings: to examine the facts and circumstances surrounding JFK's trip to Dallas and scientific analysis of the facts of JFK's death (01:55:00) Stokes recognizes Preyer who explains the hearing will revolve around three themes: the involvement in the death of JFK of LEE HARVY OSWALD, an evaluation of federal agencies who were involved in events surrounding the assassination and the investigation that followed, and a review of conspiracy theories (01:57:50) Preyer explains what has gone on in the House investigation up to this date, namely in their securing and evaluation of evidence, he goes on to give statistics on the number of locations around the world visited in pursuit of information, the number of people interviewed, the number of agency files perused, the number of consultants consulted, all of the numbers are extremely large (02:01:04) Stokes recognizes Minority Leader of the Committee Representative Samuel L. Devine who says that even after the hearings are over the work will continue for the committee (02:02:35) Stokes explains that he and other members of the committee will have to leave at 10 am today to consult with the House about continuing the funding of the committee, Stokes then recognizes Professor G. ROBERT BLAKEY, Chief Counsel, who gives a flattering, lengthy history of JFK's presidency and the major issues he contended with: the Soviet Union, Cuba and the Cold War, Civil Rights, the mob and JIMMY HOFFA (02:23:00) Blakey gets into JFK's political traveling logisitics, as far as security - Blakey goes on to discuss why JFK would go to Dallas and why have a motorcade there (02:25:40) Blakey introduces former Texas Governor JOHN CONNALLY and his wife NELLIE (02:26:40) Chairman Stokes calls the Connallys and swears them in (02:27:15) Stokes gives the historical context of the Connallys' relationship to the JFK assassination - why they were called to testify (02:29:00) Stokes turns chair position over to Representative CHRISTOPHER DODD as he and other committee members have to leave (02:29:38) Dodd turns the floor over to Deputy Chief Counsel GARY T. CORNWELL to question the witnesses, he asks John about his role in JFK's trip to Dallas - John gives a lengthy explanation of the beginning of his contact with JFK and Vice President LYNDON JOHNSON and how they had originally wanted to come to Texas in '62 when he was in the midst of running for governor (02:33:20) Cornwell asks why, if John was not initially Govenor, JFK would contact him about visiting Texas - John gives a long account of their long friendly relationship up to this time (02:35:00) Cornwell asks why JFK wanted to go to Texas - John answers to raise money and to increase his political fortunes in Texas, he then goes on to discount the press speculations as to why he came and further explains why JFK would come to increase his popularity in Texas, he also adds that he himself did not want JFK to come at that time and explains why (02:38:31) Cornwell asks why JFK didn't just come on his own, without the support of John, if John had been so persistent in delaying the trip - John answers that it was his constituency that JFK was interested in reaching, the rest of his response is cut off by the end of the tape
JFK Assassination Hearings - H.B. McClain
U.S. House Representative Christopher Dodd (D-CT) asks H.B. McClain: "...if you were in the Dallas Police Department receiving calls, if one person were on that channel transmitting, would it be possible for other people to transmit on that same channel at the same time and also be received by the headquarters?" McClain says it would be possible and answers a follow-up question by saying that more than one transmission would be hard to understand. There would be overlapping voices and the dispatcher would have to let people know that too many are speaking at once. Rep. Dodd also asks if McClain was familiar with "carillon bells or church bells in the vicinity of Dealey Plaza." McClain says he was not. Committee Chairman, Rep. Louis Stokes (D-OH) asks if anyone else wishes to be recognized, then belatedly recognizing Deputy Chief Counsel Gary T. Cornwell. Cornwell begins to ask a clarifying question regarding the position of McClain in the photographs.
Interview with Rep. Tip O'Neill
U.S. Speaker of the House, Rep. Tip O’Neill (D-MA) continues talking about his political history and rise to Speaker of the House of Representatives. Speaker O'Neill talks about the difficult decision to leave his home and family to go to Washington; his wife, Millie, was unhappy. Speaker O'Neill thought he would go to Washington for a couple years, come back and run for Governor of Massachusetts. He won his hard fought race, as did John F. Kennedy for Senate. Speaker O'Neill remembers the friendly nature of Rep. John William McCormack (D-MA) who placed him on the Rules Committee in the House. He got "the ol' Potomac fever" and lost interest in running for Governor, and believed he could become Speaker of the House. Paul Duke (o/s): "So it's been a good life?" Speaker O'Neill says it has been and he's met all sorts of heads of state, and has been fortunate to travel all over the country --- like farms in South Dakota and cotton fields in the South --- and all over the world.
Siege: US Ousts Soviet Commission in Germany
Siege: US Ousts Soviet Commission in Germany Frankfurt, Germany After refusing to leave the American zone after a deadline had been set by General Clay, eight members of Soviet repatriation committee are blockaded by MP's in their Frankfort quarters. After thirty-four hours they had enough and left. TLSs Soviet commission house, American guards patroling outside wall. MS US Army colonel watching soldier dig hole outside fence. MS guards sending street peddlers away. MS guard standing watch in falling snow.
LAWMAKERS - LM 019 - "Veterans"
Congressional hearing room. Congressman Robert Edgar (D-PA) leading a meeting for the House Veterans Affairs Sub-Committee for Employment. Congressman Edgar discusses the need to secure more funding for veterans’ programs. James Dourie of the American Legion speaking before Congress. Dourie discusses community-based Veterans programs that have closed down due to President Ronald Reagan’s spending cuts. Congressman Edgar speaking to reporter, off screen. Congressman Edgar believes that Veterans groups will gather together to defend their programs against budget cuts.
The Lawmakers 127 - " Sen. Jennings Randolph"
U.S. Senator Jennings Randolph (D-WV) riding in a convertible during a local West Virginia parade. Predominately Caucasian adult men, women and children watching parade. Senator Randolph talking with adult Caucasian men and women. Cokie Roberts (VO) discusses Randolph’s political history; Randolph lost his seat in the U.S. House of Representatives during the Republican Sweep of 1946, but was elected to the U.S. Senate in 1958. Randolph became Chair of the Senate Public Works Committee and built the interstate highways.
JFK Assassination Hearings - E. Aschkenasy & Mark Weiss, H.B. McClain
U.S. House Representative Robert Edgar (D-PA) posits the idea that an analysis done in "test tube" settings, environmental factors at the time of the assassination would impact the calculations and conclusions. Mark Weiss responds that he and Ernest Aschkenasy feel that they accounted for all factors necessary.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 25, 1973 - Statement of John Dean.
Following my meeting with Mitchell and Magruder on March 28th, I realized that I was under pressure from both within the White House and without to either not testify or falsely testify. I had earlier discussed with Ehrlichman that if I was called upon to testify that I would probably be asked questions about the Dean investigation, my dealings with the FBI, the handling of the material in Hunt's safe, and the like. I recall testing Ehrlichman's reaction to my testimony and I got the result that I expected. He had asked me for an example of a problem area. I then told him that I would probably have to explain the delay of turning materials over to the FBI from Hunt's office. I said that the reason I had delayed was because of his instructions that I deep six and shred the evidence. Ehrlichman told me that he didn't think that I would have to explain the delay that way rather that I could say that I was making an inventory. I told him that I had not made an inventory and he said, "Well, I'm sure you can think of something." I have mentioned that I had received what I considered an indication from Haldeman when I had met with him preceding the Magruder and Mitchell meeting on the 28th that he was protecting himself. I also realized that when Ehrlichman had called me after my conversation with Mr. Krogh that, he was trying to tell me that what Krogh had earlier told me might not be correct. And I felt that he was somewhat unhappy that Krogh had given me the information he had.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 29, 1973 (1/2)
[00.07.26-DEAN discusses his meeting with NIXON in April, 1973, after DEAN'S decision to go to the prosecutors] And I might add that that came up again on -Monday afternoon, when he told me he had checked and determined that indeed, that it was the 21st. Senator BAKER. Was it the -21 21st? Mr. DEAN. Yes, it was the 21st. Senator BAKER. What else, sir? Mr. DEAN-. We had some discussion about the fact, that I had discussed no national security matters with the prosecutors, or he instructed me that, I could not deal with national security matters or any matters with regard to executive privilege, assured him that I had not at that, point had any such conversations with the prosecutors. [00.08.22-DEAN relates a story that seems like NIXON'S attempt to get on the record (and the White House TAPE RECORDERS) denying complicity in making the PAYOFFS to the WATERGATE BURGLARS for their silence at trial] It 'was toward the end of the conversation that he raised on his own and asked me, if I remembered when he, had mentioned the fact, that it would not be any problem to pay $1 million and I said. "Yes, I recall that conversation. " He said, "Well, of course, I was joking, I was only joking when I said that." Then shortly after that. I recall that he got up from his chair and walked behind his chair to the corner of the office. I don't know if it is the chair he normally sits in when he Is in the Executive Office Building but he has one favorite chair over beside his desk. [00.09.11-avoiding the tape recorders?] He got up and went around the chair and in back of the chair find in a barely audible tone to me, but I could hear what he was saying. he said, "I was foolish to talk with Colson about Executive clemency for Hunt, was I not?" I don't recall making any statement or response to that. It was sort, a declarative statement and I said nothing. Senator BAKER. What else? [00.09.45-DEAN discusses the wrapup of his April 15, 1973 meeting with NIXON] Mr. DEAN-. Well, as I say, shortly after he got out of his Chair, I don't recall him getting back in his chair and we began exchanging some Pleasantries, as I was leaving the office. As I was leaving the office, he said to me, "say hello to your pretty wife" and some things of this nature, which I came home and conveyed to her, because she always liked to hear those things. [Mrs. DEAN, smiling] Then also, as I was standing by the door, I remember I had the door open and I turned to the President, who was standing not 10 feet, away from me, and told the President that I certainly hoped that the fact that I -was going to come forward and tell the truth did not result in impeachment of the President. And I told him that I hoped the thing would be handled right, and he assured me that it would be handled right. And the meeting ended on that note. [00.10.40] Senator BAKER. Is that the last meeting or conversation you had with the President? Mr. DEAN. -No, sir; I met with him the next Monday morning, in which he called me and asked me to come in the office. I received a call while I was, before I really left to come in. Senator BANTER. Hold it just 1 minute The next meeting would have been April what? Mr. DEAN. April 16. Senator BAKER. And is that the last meeting? Mr. DEAN. No-, sir-- well, there were two meetings on the 16th, one call on the 17th and then a call on Easter morning. [pan over audience, all faces looking rather grim at hearing DEAN'S testimony] Senator BAKER. It is 3:15 and I promised to take 20 minutes and I have taken an hour. I am, sorry for that and I haven't the slightest intention of proceeding even to my second question, which was to ask your assistance in identifying the probable areas, of conflict between your testimony and that of other witnesses. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for this time and I am willing to yield at this point. [00.11.39-DEAN acknowledges that his testimony will be strongly contested] Mr. DEAN. Mr. Vice -Chairman, I might just comment briefly on your second question. I am quite aware of the fact that in some circumstances, it is going to be my word against one man's word, it is going to be MY word against two men, it is going to be my word against three men, and probably in some cases, it is going to be my word against four men. But I am prepared to stand on my word and the truth and the knowledge and the facts. I have. I know the truth is my ally in this and I think ultimately, the truth is going to come out.
JFK Assassination HSCA Hearings
House Select Committee on Assassinations Committee Chief Counsel G. Robert Blakey introduces JFK exhibit F-648, the Warren Commission testimony of U.S President John F. Kennedy assassination witness S.M. Holland, who saw sign of a shot coming from a group of trees on the Grassy Knoll. Holland was standing on the overpass above Elm St. Holland indicated he heard four shots; after the first shot Holland saw Texas Governor John Connally turn around, then heard another report. Holland said the first two shots sounded like they came from the upper part of the street, the third shot was not as loud as the other shots. Holland said there was a report and a puff of smoke 6-8 feet above the ground right out from under some trees (in the Grassy Knoll); Holland said the sound wasn’t as loud as previous shots. Warren Commission Counsel Samuel A. Stern asked Holland if he had any doubts about hearing a fourth shot; Holland had no doubt about hearing a fourth shot and seeing a puff of smoke. Holland commented on the activity after the shooting, one of the motorcycle police officers in the motorcade threw his bike down and ran towards the grassy knoll.
July 29, 1994 - Part 1
(10:16:38) OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ALFONSE M. DAMATO Senator D'AMATO Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, 2 years ago, the American people first heard of an Arkansas company called Whitewater; of an Arkansas savings and loan called Madison; and of the mysterious web of relationships surrounding Arkansas Governor Bill I Clinton. When Mr. Clinton came to the White House, the Whitewater cloud trailed behind him. Now, regrettably the White House has sacrificed the proper administration of justice on the altar of Whitewater. This Committee has learned, and the American people will see, that the White House has concealed, disguised, and distorted the truth, all in the service of politics and the President's self-preservation. To these ends, this Presidency has taken advantage of confidential agency information, To these ends, this Presidency has fought to keep control of an investigation affecting the President personally. To these ends, high officials of this Presidency have deceived this very Committee, or have countenanced that deception. The New York Times observed earlier this week, the central question for these hearings is a question posed by the Senate 20 years ago: "Whether people in positions of public trust manipulated the machinery of Government to deflect the truth." Mr. Chairman, I'm sorry to say that even now the Committee has not been given the necessary authority and latitude to examine the facts of Whitewater and Madison Savings & Loan-the facts that some have worked so desperately to bide. But we have learned some important things. We know that the RTC was examining Madison Savings & Loan in 1992, and made a criminal referral to the Department of Justice in the fall of that year. We know that in the fall of 1993, the RTC sent nine more Madison criminal referrals to the Department of Justice. And we know that the RTC was investigating whether to bring a civil case involving Madison, Whitewater, and the Clintons. Most important, in mid-February of this year, we knew that the statute of limitations on the civil case against Madison was scheduled to run out on February 28, 1994. Had the limitations period expired as scheduled, the Clintons and their partners in Madison would have been home free--beyond the reach of the civil law. Mr. Chairman, I first requested Committee hearings into the RTC's investigation of Madison last December. Each day closer to February 28 was a day the Clintons were closer to escaping an RTC case against Madison. Then at the last minute, to the complete surprise of the White House, Congress voted overwhelmingly to extend the statute of limitations. The White House strategy was thwarted. What will these hearings show? As early as the spring of 1993, Roger Altman, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury and acting head of the RTC, was keenly focused on the issue of Madison and Whitewater. As soon as Mr. Altman was informed in September that the RTC criminal referrals might be forwarded to the Justice Department, he directed his subordinate, Treasury General Counsel Jean Hanson, to disclose that fact to the White House Counsel Bernie Nussbaum. White House Counsel Nussbaum and Treasury Counsel Hanson agreed to create a channel through which multiple further communications on Whitewater would flow. The information Altman and Hanson revealed to Nussbaum, and through him to the rest of the White House in September 1993, was highly confidential and involved criminal referrals that bad not yet even reached the Department of Justice. This was sensitive information which may not be revealed under the RTCs own rules, because of the danger that such a disclosure may alert possible subjects or witnesses and frustrate a criminal case. What's the justification offered for this gross breach of trust? Time and time again, the American people will bear witnesses try to excuse this behavior by claiming that they thought press leaks might occur in the future. Nonsense. Mr. Chairman, there's no "spin control" exception to the RTC rules of secrecy. Mr. Cutler told the House Banking Committee earlier this week that there was no ethical breach in the disclosure of the confidential criminal referrals to the White House, because as far as he could determine, no White House official took improper action based on tills nonpublic information. It is absurd to say that we must rely oil White House assurances that this confidential information was not misused by the White House itself. In January 1994, the Clinton Administration was dragged kicking and screaming into agreeing to having Attorney General Reno appoint a Special Prosecutor, Now we know, through Roger Altman's diary, the Administration was frustrated because they couldn't arm-twist the Attorney General to limit the scope of that prosecutor's investigation. In the words of Mrs. Clinton's own Chief of Staff, the First Lady "doesn't want the Counsel poking into 20 years of public life in Arkansas." Why were they so afraid? What did they want to hide?
Capitol Journal - Campaigns 1986
Back in the studio the panel discusses the signficance of committee chairman changes, what the new Democrat controlled Senate is going to do, and the possible presidential candidates in the Senate
CONGRESS: WE THE PEOPLE
WETA "CONGRESS: WE THE PEOPLE" IN 13.00.44-WETA credit/funding credits/title sequence 13.01.28-Shots of Federal Office buildings in Downtown D.C.. Host Ed Newman describes the massive bureaucracies housed in the buildings and their influence on policy decisions, and the struggle between Congress and White House to control the bureaucracies. Newman in offices of Social Security Administration. Says the bureaucracies have considerable power to shape policy. The program will look at how Congress relates to the bureaucracy. Shots of a press conference announcing REAGAN'S 1981 cabinet appointments. The nominees take places on a stage, include WILLIAM FRENCH SMITH [JUSTICE], CASPAR WEINBERGER [DEFENSE], DONALD REGAN [STATE]. Shot of INTERIOR SECRETARY nominee JAMES WATT in Senate Committee confirmation hearing. V.O.-description of controversy surrounding WATT'S nomination. Sen. MALCOLM WALLOP (R-WY) gives WATT a glowing introduction. WATT jokes that the committee can now adjourn, laughs at his own joke. 13.04.43-Shot of a REAGAN CABINET MEETING. Shots of a Congressional Committee meeting. V.O.-President uses loyalty and appointments to control the bureaucracies, Congress uses its oversight and appropriations functions to control them in a tug-of-war. Shots of ENERGY DEPARTMENT officials testifying that REAGAN tried to force them out of their jobs for political reasons. One bureaucrat says that she was unfairly demoted for contradicting the agenda of Reagan's appointee. Rep. Richard Ottinger in committee. Shots of ENERGY DEPARTMENT head Paul Trible, grilled by Rep. OTTINGER. TRIBLE denies making politically motivated personnel decisions to help REAGAN break the power of Congress over the bureaucracies. 13.07.50-Political scientist discusses the urge for Presidents to try to use appointments to wrest power away from Congress. Shot of Special Counsel, hired to investigate personnel moves, testifies that the executives are accountable to the President and can be pressured. V.O.-the Special Counsel determined that the administration had violated personnel practices. Rep. PATRICIA SCHROEDER in committee, asks the counsel how disputes between Congress and the President over the bureacracies should be resolved. The special Counsel basically says that if a new executive wants to clean house for political reasons, they are free to do so because staffing the bureaucracy is an Executive Branch prerogative. 13.09.36
Lawmakers - April 26, 1984
Otis Pike seated in front of shelf of books. Discusses controversy over CIA operations in Nicaragua. There has been a great brew-ha-ha in the Congress lately about whether the Central Intelligence Agency has properly briefed the Congress about operations they were conducting in Nicaragua. Senate Intelligence Chairman Barry Goldwater says his committee was not properly briefed. The CIA says it was, but apologized anyway. House Intelligence Committee Chairman Edward Boland says his committee was properly briefed. The CIA agrees. It really doesn t matter much. Neither the proper briefing, given to the House Committee nor the dubious one give to the Senate Committee stopped US participation in the mining of Nicaraguan waters. Leaks - and nothing but leaks - stopped the mining. Once it became public in the United States, there was a loud outcry against what we were doing, so we stopped. This is an area in which Congress truly represents the American people and the American people have very ambivalent feelings about covert actions. Our people, our media and our Congress swing from one extreme to the other - from wanting to do everything possible to prevent the spread of Communism or terror to attacking everything we are doing to attack the spread of Communism or terror. There is certainly a mighty difference in degree between the terror and brutality involved in using Soviet bombers against Afghan rebels and civilians and using noisy but non-lethal mines against shipping in Nicaraguan waters. Most Americans like to believe however, that we re separated from the Soviets and certainly from the Iranians, Iraqis and Libyans by more than a degree of terror and brutality we are willing to use. Our ambivalence is evidenced in our stock piling of nuclear weapons, we say we want only to prevent nuclear war - or of chemical weapons we need only to prevent other from using chemical weapons. It is especially evident in our feeling about covert actions. We want brutality and terror stopped. We aren t sure how much terror and brutality we should use to stop them. Neither is the Congress, nor do we or they always want to know what we are doing lest we should feel compelled to stop it.
President Carter : Gas Rationing Plan
U.S. President Jimmy Carter begins press conference on Gas Rationing Plan: "I have a brief opening statement concerning one of our most important domestic issues, and that is energy. Last month, I sent to the Congress, as requested by the Congress, a standby gasoline rationing plan. This plan would give us the opportunity to anticipate and to plan for possible gasoline shortages in the future. Without the plan, it would take us six or seven months to prepare such a plan if we were faced with a severe shortage of gasoline brought about by an interruption in supplies. Tomorrow, the House Commerce Committee will have another very important vote to determine whether or not we will even have a standby plan to deal with such an emergency. It's imperative for our nation's energy preparedness that the committee approve this standby gasoline rationing plan."
LAWMAKERS - October 8, 1981
Representative Henry Hyde (R - Illinois), bench of House Judiciary Committee. Shots of people testifying before committee, including Vernon Jordan. Hyde speaking over these shot, describes how he was convinced to vote for the bill. It started off with the celebrity witnesses, the Vernon Jordans and the Benjamin Hooks and the Jesse Jacksons and it s interesting to hear their perspective and get to know these people firsthand. But the real nitty-gritty came from the individuals in the South whose voting rights had been denied. We heard statistics about South Carolina where they have about a 39% Black population and not a single Black State Senator. These things have a cumulative effect and after a while you say the 15 Amendment which guarantees the people s right to vote, regardless of their color or race was really not being enforced.