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Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 28, 1973 (1/2)
[00.07.40-BAKER continues to question DEAN about his meeting with NIXON on Sept. 15, 1972, to determine when NIXON was aware of the coverup] Senator BAKER. Stop, before you get to the status, and let's lay that aside just for a second because I do -want to hear about that, too, but this really, and I don't mean to be melodramatic, but this is really a terribly important moment in history. As you know, this meeting was in the afternoon in the oval office in Washington on September 15, 1972, and you were there, the President was there, and Mr. Haldeman. Mr. DEAN. Mr. Haldeman was there. Senator BAKER. What was the President's demeanor, what -was his attitude, what was the expression on his face, the quality of his voice? Mr. DEAN. Well, as I said, when I walked in it -was very war, very cordial. They were smiling, they were happy, they -were relaxed. The President, I think I said earlier this morning was about to go somewhere and I think that actually was delaying his departure to have this conversation with me. The fact that I had not been in to see the President other than on a rather mechanical activity before that dealings with his testamentary papers, indicated so clearly that Haldeman had thought that the President should compliment me for my handling of this matter, and that that was one of the reasons I probably had been called over, and the President had done it at Mr. Haldeman's request. [00.09.07] Senator BAKER. All right. Now, tell us about,, as you started to say before I interrupted you, the status of the case. Mr. DEAN. All right. He was interested in knowing if it -was likely--well, let me, before I go on to that, let me say something else that I recall. When we talked about the fact that the indictments had been handed down, at some, point, and after the compliment I told him at that point that we had managed, you know, that the matter had been contained, it had not come into the White House, I didn't say that, I said it had been contained. Senator BAKER. Did you say anything beyond that it had been contained? Mr. DEAN. No, I did not. I used that, I recall very clearly using that expression that it had been contained. Senator BAKER. That is an important word, it has been contained. Mr. DEAN. That is right. [00.10.00] Senator BAKER. What -was the President's or Mr. Haldeman's reaction to that word because, that is a rather significant word. I think. Mr. DEAN. Well. I have got, to say this, I wasn't studying the President's face or Mr. Haldeman's face at this time. I had not ever had a one on one with the President, before and must confess I was a little nervous in there. They were trying to make me as relaxed as possible, and make It as cordial as possible, but I was quite. naturally nervous. There was a man who is the most important man in the Western World, and here I am having a conversation with him for the first time one on one, so I was not studying his reactions and it wasn't until I started meeting with him more frequently later that the tenor of our conversations changed and---- [00.10.55] Senator BAKER. You see what I am driving at I am sure, Mr. Dean. If someone had said that the investigation has been contained it might evoke a question, that might create a startled look on one's face, it might be taken for granted, and that might be important to shed light. Mr. DEAN. That is right. Senator BAKER. On the state of the knowledge with the person with whom you were having the conversation. [00.11.16] Mr. DEAN. Everyone seemed to understand what I was talking about. It didn't evoke any questions and I was going on to say that I didn't think it could be contained indefinitely. I said that this is, you know, there are a lot of hurdles that have to be leaped down the road before it will definitely remain contained and I was trying to tell the President at that time that I was not sure the coverup even then would last indefinitely. Senator BAKER. This once again is a terribly important area of inquiry, SO let, me interrupt you again and take you over it one more time. You told the President, I don't think it can continue to be contained? Mr. DEAN. That is correct. Senator BAKER. Are those close to Your exact words? Mr. DEAN. That is very close to my words, because I told him it had been contained to that point and I was not sure that it would be contained indefinitely. Senator BAKER. What was his reaction to this? Mr. DEAN. As I say. I don't recall any particular reaction. Senator BAKER. Was there any statement by him or by Mr. Haldeman at that point on this statement? Mr. DEAN. NO, not to my recollection. Senator BAKER. All right, go ahead. Mr. DEAN. It, was then we turned to the status of the litigation. The criminal case, as I recall the sequence of the conversation and he wanted to know when hen this, matter was likely to come to trial. I told him very much would depend upon which judge the case was assigned to. [00.12.57]
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 29, 1973 (1/2)
[00.49.14-DEAN discusses making his "CANCER ON THE PRESIDENCY" appeal to NIXON to end the COVERUP before it ruined his Presidency] Senator BAKER. Where did you meet with the President? Mr. DEAN. This was in the Oval Office. Senator BAKER. And who was present? Mr. DEAN. NO one Other than the he President and myself. Senator BAKER. And it was at 10 o'clock in the morning. Mr. DEAN. That, is correct, approximately 10 o'clock, as best, I can recall. Senator BAKER. Would you proceed with as much exactitude as you Can. [00.49.30] Mr. DEAN. I then told the President that what I would like to do is give him a broad overview and let him come back and ask any questions he might like to ask. I wanted to explain to him how the continued Support would be necessary how continued perjury would be necessary to perpetuate the coverup. Senator BAKER. Did you use those terms? Mr. DEAN. Yes, I did use those terms. Senator BAKER. All right, sir. go ahead. [00.50.01] Mr. DEAN. That was my definition to him of how the cancer was growing in other words that more people would have to perjure themselves--- Senator BAKER. Did you say these things as an advocate, that is, that, other support and perjury should continue--or as, examples as to why it should not continue? Mr. DEAN. As to why it should not continue. Senator BAKER. Did you make this clear to the President? Mr. DEAN. Absolutely. Senator BAKER. In what terms? [00.50.24-DEAN does not leave much doubt as to his intentions and possible interpretations-no one knows at this point that the conversation was TAPED] Mr. DEAN. As I say, I tried to make it as dramatic as the fact that this type of cancer was going to kill him and kill the Presidency if this type of thing was not stopped by surgery and ending that type of activity. Senator BAKER. Go ahead, sir. Before you do, what was the President's reaction to that? [00.50.45] Mr. DEAN. The President, if I recall--and I was not looking for reactions at that point as much as trying to be as forceful and dramatic in my presentation--it is like asking me what was reaction to they answer to any member of this panel to a particular question. In my now sitting here and answering these questions, I really haven't watched for the, reactions of the Senators and the like. I think you can understand that circumstance. Senator BAKER. I understand. It is fair to say, then, that you do not recall the reaction? Mr. DEAN. I do not recall the, reaction, no. Senator BAKER. Go ahead, if you would. [00.51.28] Mr. DEAN. I then proceeded to give the President the broad overview of what I knew of the entire situation--where it started. Senator BAKER. You might take us through that, if you will. 'Tell us as close as you can what you him. Mr. DEAN. Well, as I recall, I told him about the meetings that had occurred in Mr. Mitchell's office; that the fact that I had come back from Mr. Mitchell's office--- Senator BAKER. Is this the first time you told him of the meetings in Mitchell's office? Mr. DEAN. It is. Senator BAKER. Go ahead sir. [00.52.09-- A key point is whether DEAN informed HALDEMAN-such would make it a strong likelihood that NIXON was informed immediately thereafter by HALDEMAN] Mr. DEAN. That I had come back to Mr. Haldeman and told him of the circumstances of those meetings, what, had been presented. Senator BAKER. Just, for clarity, these. were the meetings at which the plan for bugging and Mr. DEAN. Mugging---- Senator BAKER [continuing]. And illegal entry were discussed in Attorney General John Mitchell's office? Mr. DEAN. That is right. There, were two meetings, the, second meeting at which I don't know the full extent of the discussion there, but I know that, you know, what at I did here was Senator BAKER. All right, but you began telling the President of those meetings, and would you continue from that point? Mr. DEAN. When I was telling him the broad overview, I did not get into an awful lot of specifies, because I told him, I said any point that you want to either question me. or if -we can come, back and have, I will answer any of your questions subsequently. Then I told him of the fact that I had reported this to Mr. Haldeman, that, I had been distressed by the situation myself, had told Mr. Haldeman what I had seen and advised Mr. Haldeman that I didn't think anybody in the White House should have any involvement at all in this, and that I told him I was not going to have any involvement in it, -and Mr. Haldeman had agreed that I should not have any involvement, in it. [00.53.35] Senator BAKER. Did you tell the President when that conversation with Mr. Haldeman took place? Mr. DEAN. Yes, I did. I told him it occurred shortly after the meeting in Mr. Mitchell's office, after the second meeting in February. Senator BAKER. All right, sir; go ahead. Mr. DEAN. I also recall that I told him I did not know how the plans had been finally approved; I didn't know -what precisely had happened as to the final decision to sign off on some phase of the plan. [00.54.10]
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 29, 1973 (2/2)
[01.21.26-BAKER questions DEAN about his conversations with NIXON at a point when the COVERUP was, according to DEAN'S warnings, in serious jeopardy of unraveling] Senator BAKER. But It was your--it is your recollection that the President conveyed to you the information that he knew of the McCord letter to the court? Mr. DEAN. Yes, and then he told me, he Said, "Well, John, your prediction was right." Senator BAKER. All right, sir, go ahead. Mr. DEAN. That did stick in my mind very clearly. It was after that we entered into a discussion about going to Camp David. He suggested I go up and relax. Senator BAKER. I thought you were at Camp David. Mr. DEAN. NO, Sir; I was at my home. Senator BAKER. I am sorry. Go ahead, sir. Thank you, [01.22.05] Mr. DEAN. I had been surrounded by the press that, morning as a result of the preceding day's comment by Mr. Gray. I have not, made myself carefully available to the press during any time in this matter and my house has been, I might say, staked out almost 24 hours a day by the press. [01.22.26-A FUNNY LINE OF QUESTIONING] Senator BAKER. Was this the time when a newspaper or television reporter tried to interview you through the mail slot? Mr. DEAN. NO; that was rather recently when I refused to open the, door and she kept pounding on the door and so I finally, opened up the mail slot and, to correct the record On that, I was not on all fours, I was merely on my, bending down [laughter]. Just to keep accuracy in the media' [laughter]. Senator BAKER. And just for the sake of chivalry. -we will not, say who that was. All right, Mr. Dean, go ahead please. [01.23.08-A young woman, presumably the reporter in question, is shown, laughs--DEAN discusses NIXON telling him to go to Camp David, which in hindsight appeared to be a ploy to get DEAN out of town so that HALDEMAN and EHRLICHMAN could plot to get DEAN to take the blame when the coverup unraveled] Mr. DEAN. We entered into a discussion about going to Camp David, and I told him Yes, that sounded good. because I told him that I was surrounded by the press and he again repeated what he had repeated to me earlier, that I had been under a lot, of press coverage as a result of this. [01.23.30-DEAN'S trip to CAMP DAVID was NOT intended as a chance for DEAN to issue a report on the coverup, to "get the facts out" to the public-the COVERUP was going to continue] But the, important thing, that you are interested in, he told me not to go to Camp David to write a report. Rather, he, told me to go up, relax for a couple of days, take my wife. He told me he does his best thinking at Camp David and that, -what I should do is go up and assess the entire situation and figure out where we go from here. I told him I would do that. I told him I would go up and think over the entire matter. Senator BAKER. This was on March 23? Mr. DEAN. That is correct. Now, when I arrived at Camp David on March 23, we had some incidental conversation about that as a result of the fact that some other of the First Family was up there. But I do not think that is relevant at all. I do not even think it is relevant to my testimony this point. [01.24.29-DEAN smells a setup] When I arrived at Camp David, the phone was ringing in the cabin that my -wife and I were staying in and the operator came on and said, it is the President calling. I waited and the President did not come on. Rather, Mr. Haldeman came on the phone. Mr. Haldeman said--we had a little further conversation, brief conversation about McCord's letter because I had not spoken with him during the day on the McCord letter. I had talked to Mr. Ehrlichman earlier that day about the McCord letter. I recall Mr. Haldeman saying that he had understood that McCord basically had hearsay and I said, that was my understanding. So I assumed from that that Mr. Haldeman had obviously talked to somebody also about the matter. [01.25.20-DEAN states that HALDEMAN wanted DEAN to write a report, but DEAN suspected that if he did, the report would be used by HALDEMAN and EHRLICHMAN to pin the blame for the coverup on DEAN] Then he said, while you are up there, -why don't you write up a report on this matter? And I asked him -was it for internal or external use? And he said that would be decided later. So I was very much in a quandary as to how to write what he wanted to write. But I had also, by the time I got to Camp David, had well evidenced to everybody I was dealing -with that I was thinking far differently about the continued coverup than I think others were. Senator BAKER. This was -a conversation with Mr. Haldeman? Mr. DEAN. That is correct. [01.25.56]
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee Hearings on Presidential Campaign Activities, May 24, 1973 - Testimony of Gerald Alch
Senator ERVIN. You participated in the trial and heard the evidence. Mr. ALCH. Yes, sir. Senator ERVIN. And you know that it was proved on trial as shown on the trial or at least evidence tended to show that the notebook of Mr. Hunt which was introduced into evidence had the White House phone number on it, didn't you? Mr. ALCH. If it was, I certainly don't recall. Senator ERVIN. You don't recall it? Mr. ALCH. Because Mr. Hunt's local counsel - I don't recall. Senator ERVIN. Anyway when you asked Mr. Bittman what kind of sentences the clients might get if they were convicted he said, "Well, it might be Executive clemency," didn't he? Mr. ALCH. He didn't say it that way. Senator ERVIN. Well, he said Christmas was coming. Mr. ALCH. That is right. [Laughter.] Senator ERVIN. And he at least indicated that he thought parts of executive's hearts became kinder around Christmastime than any other season of the year. Mr. ALCH. Senator, let me say this. He did not respond in this type of way, he did not say, "Now, look, Christmas is coming, they are going to get Executive clemency." It wasn't that type of conversation. What he said to me was in sort of a theorizing way, "Well, just as Christmastime comes around there may be Executive clemency," I immediately responded as I told you yesterday that "There is no chance of that happening, in my opinion."
1982 - LAWMAKERS - El Salvador
U.S. Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) chairing Foreign Relations Subcommittee Hearing where Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Enders was called to testify; Duke, in a voiceover, calls Sen. Helms a supporter of Reagan policy in Latin America. Sen. Helms says that the reports of human right abuse is "orchestrated propaganda" by communist sympathizers, though some of it may be true. However, the Hemisphere must be defended against communism. U.S. House Representative Clarence Long (D-MD) presiding over a House Committee Hearing where. Enders seated as witness table. Rep. Long speaks on the complexity of the El Salvador situation, saying either the government is deceiving the public or is truly ignorant of the potential for "a bottomless pit of U.S. aid".
Testimony of Bernard L. Barker - Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee Hearings on Presidential Campaign Activities, May 24, 1973
Senator BAKER. Did you ever find any such documentation? Mr. BARKER. No, we did not find these documents; no, sir. Senator BAKER. Did you have any reason to believe that such documentation existed? Mr. BARKER. The fact that the Castro government was aiding the Democratic Party had been rumored and had been spoken of freely in Miami from different organizations of personalities that I had confidence in. However, I have no hard evidence at all that this was true. Senator BAKER. This played some part in your motivation for making the entry into Watergate? Mr. BARKER. Part, yes. Not the whole motivation. Senator BAKER. What other part? Mr. BARKER. As I explained before, we were assisting Mr. Hunt, who was a known factor m the time of the liberation of Cuba. We had hopes that Mr. Hunt's position in the White House would be a decisive factor at a later date for obtaining help in the liberation of Cuba. Senator BAKER. Mr. Barker, are these reasons that you have just stated the basis for your previous statement a moment ago that you believed what you did was correct? Mr. BARKER. That is true, sir. Senator BAKER. Are there other reasons? Mr. BARKER. No, there are no other reasons that I can think of.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 28, 1973. Testimony of John Dean.
Senator Howard Baker (R Tennessee). In any of this, and I am not trying to construct an edifice that will end up defending the President. I have stated before it is not in my purpose to defend or prosecute the President or any witness, but only for the purpose of establishing the quality and the scope of the testimony. In any event, your personal feelings that the President knew something between June 17 and September 15 is based on category 2. That is circumstantial evidence and inferences based on your knowledge and relationships in the organization. John Dean. Given the events that had occurred over the weekend while I was not there and the events that occurred on Monday and before I met with the Attorney General on either late Monday or Tuesday, whenever I had my First meeting with him, I was deeply concerned initially that this went right to the President or certainly to other persons above myself on the White House staff. Senator Howard Baker (R Tennessee). I understand your concern, and I think it was an understandable concern. But what I am struggling to establish is that concern was based on something other than what you have just testified to. John Dean. As I have testified, you know, I had not talked to the President at this point In time and did not talk to him until September 15th. So all of the knowledge I have between June 17 or June 19 actually, when I came back, and September 15 was through the fact of the things I was reporting to Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Ehrlichman. My awareness of the fact that they were meeting with the President, the fact that Mr. Haldeman often took notes. That is the basis of my knowledge at that point in time.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 26, 1973 - Testimony of John Dean.
Senator Lowell Weicker (R Connecticut). All right. Let us move on to your comment on page 14 where you refer to your conversation with Mr. Mardian, "It was not until almost a year or so later that I learned the reason for Mardian's trip to see the President. Mr. Mardian later told me in a social conversation that he had gone to see the President to get instructions regarding the disposition of wiretap logs that related to newsmen and White House staffers who were suspected of leaking." Now call you expand on the conversation which you had with Robert Mardian at that time? John Dean. To the best of my recollection, the conversation was a very very minor part of a very rambling conversation when I recalled the fact that we had gone to San Clemente together and had gone to visit a friend of his in San Clemente and spent some time together. I was out there for one purpose that was to turn off a burglary of the Brookings Institute. He told me that he couldn t tell me what he was out there for. I recall he went down to San Clemente at the same time I did and I waited for him to have his meeting. He did not tell me after the meeting what had occurred. Then it was in recounting the fact that our visit with this friend of his out in California, when I finally asked him, I said, Well, what in the world were you doing out in California? He said, well there were some wiretaps and I had gotten the logs from Sullivan and I had to get instructions on what to do with them and I was told to give them to Ehrlichman. It was a very fleeting conversation, but it stuck in my memory.
CONGRESS: WE THE PEOPLE
07.56.04-Newman and Norm Ornstein discuss the process of approving the Rules Committee's rulings on the jobs bill. Rep. BOB WALKER (R-PA) urges rejection of the rules, says that the bill is in dire need of amendment. Rep. JAMES QUILLEN (R-TN) says that the rules should be adopted. Rep. BONIOR agrees, moves question on the rules. Speaker Pro Tem reads the votes on the rules. Rep. WALKER [of course] request rollcall vote. V.O.-Ornstein walks through the ins and outs of parliamentary procedure. 07.59.10-Newman/Ornstein-discuss the progress of this bill and the operation of the rules of debate. The House will set up a fictitious "Committee" composed of all of the members to get around the higher Quorum requirements of the full House and other rules. 08.00.20-Speaker Pro Tem opens the work of the "Committee of the Whole House". Rep. BONIOR in office talks about being selected to govern debate of the Jobs Bill in the House. Rep. BONIOR in Speaker's chair on the rostrum. Reading clerk reads the text of the bill. Bonior introduces debate, recognizes Rep. JAMIE WHITTEN and Rep. SILVIO CONTE as floor managers. Rep. WHITTEN in debate says the Jobs bill is going to help the country. Rep. WALKER says the bill is stupid spending. Shots of various Congressmen in debate. Rep. DELBERT LATTA (R-OH) says the bill is unwise Pork spending. 08.04.30-Rep. JIM WRIGHT (Majority Leader) reads a poem in debate, noting that everyone thinks spending in other districts is pork until it helps their district. Urges the bill to be passed. Rep. CONTE animatedly says that most people aren't getting any pork but have to settle for pretzels. Rep. CHALMERS WYLIE (R-OH) says the Jobs Bill is not excessive spending. Rep. ROBERT MICHEL says that the bill is not an adequate response to the needs. Rep. GEORGE MILLER (D-CA) says that he supports the bill, but it should go to show how much of an economic disaster the first two years of Reaganomics (tm) have been. Rep. PHIL GRAMM says that the Congress is trying to screw things up "on the verge of recovery". Rep. WILLIAM NATCHER (D-KY) says the bill is good. 08.08.20
CONGRESS: WE THE PEOPLE
15.00.33--Rep. DAN GLICKMAN (D-KS) says that a Congressional salary isn't much when you consider the cost of two residences, travel, and other expenses. Shots of some Congressional homes in Georgetown. Shots of Rep. GLICKMAN and his wife doing the grocery shopping. Mrs. GLICKMAN says most people don't understand that some Congressmen and their families have trouble getting by on the $61,000 salary. Rep. GLICKMAN says that Congressmen shouldn't get rich in their jobs, but salaries should be adequate to attract and retain competent and dedicated members. V.O.-however, CONGRESSIONAL PAY RAISES always generate controversy. Rep. DON YOUNG (R-AK) says that Congress should just be courageous and vote itself a pay raise up front. V.O.-discussion of outside income sources for Congressmen, limits on the total. 15.02.57-Rep. OBEY in debate attacks the Senate for opposing a House pay raise when Senators are allowed to earn unlimited income outside the Senate. Senate lawyer says that there are some speeches which can raise potential conflicts of interest. Rep. OBEY says that simple disclosure isn't enough to solve the ethical problems, because the questionable integrity of a member isn't just a problem for that Congressman's constituents, but for the integrity of the whole Congress. Newman-describes Ethics Committees and Codes of Conduct maintained by both Houses, and the willingness of the press to cover any potential scandal. 15.05.05-Rep. VIC FAZIO (D-CA) discusses the issues that come before the House Ethics Committee. Shots of the House committee in a meeting. Shots of House committee hearings on "Koreagate". Rep. BRUCE CAPUTO (R-NY) says that there are serious implications to the scandal. V.O.-Description of the scandal. Shot of Korean businessman Tongsen Park testifying, shot of Special Prosecutor LEON JAWORSKI, stating that evidence suggests that Park and the Korean government were involved in attempting to buy off Congressmen. JAWORSKI interrogating PARK about gifts to Congressmen in the high 5-figure range, evidently mostly in cash. V.O.-the lack of evidence to indicate that Congressmen were compromised by the gifts led the scandal to blow over, with one criminal prosecution and three resignations. 15.08.28
JFK Assassination Hearings - E. Aschkenasy & Mark Weiss, H.B. McClain
Ernest Aschkenasy uses sound wave graphs to explain echoes, impulses, before and after muzzle blasts that produces shockwaves. U.S. House Representative Robert Edgar (D-PA) asks if the first shot, represented in the graph, impinges on the second shot at all. Aschkenasy says no. Rep. Edgar asks, when seeing the whole tape, how many muzzle blasts were seen? Asckenasy responds that they did not look at the whole tape.
Watergate Hearings - Testimony of Gordon C. Strachan, July 23, 1973
U.S. Senator Lowell P. Weicker (R-CT): "In other words you're not allowed to bring any paper, pencil in the room with you, or make any notation while you're trying to pull together the facts prior to your appearance before this committee." Former White House aide Gordon C. Strachan: "That is correct." Senator Weicker: "And this has been the situation and continues to be the situation?" Strachan: "That is correct." Senator Weicker: "Was it the same situation before the grand jury?" Strachan: "I don't believe I even went into the room to reconstruct my recollection before I went to the grand jury. It has been the situation ever since it became important to be able to re-construct facts accurately." Senator Weicker asks if Strachan thinks this is a fair set of conditions; Strachan would prefer a different set. Senator Weicker has no further questions, except to comment that for someone who has been as extremely involved in these matters as Strachan has been, there has been no unfairness exhibited by the Committee; but as to the conditions in which Strachan has been given to prepare for his appearance before the Committee, Weicker considers it to be grossly unfair.
Washington Week Show - WW 4242 - "U.S. Domestic Issues"
Alan Murray of CNBC discusses Congress being unable to pass legislation (Bush tax cut plan and Medicare reform). Mention of Senator Chuck Grassley (Chairman of Senate Finance Committee) saying that President Bush’s tax cut bill was too large. Mention of Bush’s call for a 550 billion dollar tax cut plan. Senator Grassley will not accept a tax cut plan over 350 billion dollars. Jeanne Cummings of The Wall Street Journal discusses how the White House lost touch with what was going on in the House and the Senate while they were focused on the war in Iraq. Discussion of the House approving Bush’s 550 billion dollar tax cut plan, then the Senate halting it. Tom Gjelton of NPR discusses the war in Iraq, mentions how in 1991 troops were pulled out of Iraq as soon as the Gulf War was over. Gjelton brings up the question of whether the Bush administration can put the war behind them, with U.S. troops still in Iraq.
1983 - LAWMAKERS - Opinion Piece
Paul Duke says the New Jersey primary will be in June, and regardless of who wins, the Economy will be the biggest issue of the year. Intro. Commentary. Duke segues to commentary by Otis Pike, who laments the "purity" of the current Congress. Although he may have been a drunk, former Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn (D-TX) never would have let a budget stall in Congress. Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee may have been flawed, but he would not have allowed the nation's economy to "travel the bumpy road it is on". Congressional purity has cost the ability of Congress to make laws. Pike provides a rundown of passing a budget in the House of Representatives. Pike says that if instead of eight budgets, Congress got one budget, three Bourbons and a splash of branch water, the job would have gotten done. Duke, sitting on table, signs off.
Washington Week Show # 4012 - Al Gore's Return
Host Gwen Ifill in studio w/guests Ceci Connolly, Michael Duffy, Joan Biskupic & Jeffrey Birnbaum discussing Al Gore's new political focus. The panel jokes about his new look and then gets down to business. They talk about Gore's return to the political spotlight, w/his newly designated workshops, action committee, campaign efforts & acceptance to speak at a democratic dinner in Iowa. There is a debate whether Gore is good or bad for the democratic party. Gore's attributes include his public support, financial network & White House experience.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee Hearings on Presidential Campaign Activities, May 24, 1973 - Testimony of Gerald Alch
Senator Sam ERVIN. I believe Sir Edward Coke, keep time on ten minutes strictly, all senators ten minutes. I believe Sir Edward Coke said that one scratch of a pen is better than the slippery memory of a multitude of witnesses. Hasn't that been proven true in your practice as trial lawyer? Mr. Gerald ALCH. I'm not sure I understand the significance of the remark.... Senator ERVIN. Well, isn't there a hazard where two men communicate with each other by word of mouth, isn't there a two fold hazard in that communication and first that the man who speaks may not express himself clearly and may not say exactly what is in his mind, and if he does the man at hazard might not, may put a different interpretation on the words in the man that spoke them. Mr. ALCH. Yes sir. Senator ERVIN. Yeah, (laughter) that's well illustrated by something that came out here this week. Mr. McCord testified that Mr. Caulfield told him that the President was interested in this order of executive clemency and Mr. Caulfield said he never mentioned the Presidents name he merely said the highest levels of the White House. So, Mr. Caulfield meant one thing and Mr. McCord understood another. Mr. ALCH. Yes sir. Senator ERVIN. I believe you made a little mistake yourself in your statement, you talked about, you said that you understood Mr. McCord say Caldwell well he was obviously talking about Caulfield. Which is quite a natural mistake... Mr. ALCH. Yes sir, that's my recollection.
JFK Assassination Hearings - E. Aschkenasy & Mark Weiss, H.B. McClain
Deputy Chief Counsel Gary T. Cornwell states that the exhibit just entered into the committee's record were the plans for the police motorcycle escort of U.S. President John F. Kennedy's motorcade. Cornwell asks H.B. McClain if the motorcade's initial plans were altered on the day of the escort using less motorcycles. Cornwell asks for McClain's position in the motorcade and McClain states that he was riding in the vicinity of the Vice-President's car. Cornwell asks who was riding behind McClain on his side and who was right in his position to the left side of the motorcade, and McClain gives the names: J.W. Courson and M.L. Baker. Cornwell discusses the positioning and spacing of motorcade from Love Field to Dealey with McClain.
Watergate Hearings - Hugh Sloan (Part III)
(04:44:30) Opens to HUGH SLOAN, Former Treasurer of the Committee to Re-elect the President, answering the questions of Committee Chairman SAM ERVIN about the finances of the Committee, namely the amount and movement of money in the Committee's safes (04:45:48) Ervin questions Sloan about the chain of command as far as authorizing money disbursements - Sloan lists the men involved JEB STUART MAGRUDER, Mr. KALMBACH, and then Attorney General JOHN MITCHELL and how this authority switched among them (04:46:58) Ervin asks about the Committee Secretary Mr. Stans' role and knowledge involving the payments to Committee members - Sloan says that Stans knew about the disbursements but played no part in their approval (04:47:52) Ervin asks about the record Sloan kept of the payments he made - Sloan said he kept a book with aggregate totals of monies paid to individuals in the Committee and that, after Watergate, Kalmbach recommended the book be destroyed, Sloan did so but passed another copy of this data to Stans (04:50:18) Ervin asks Sloan about two large sums of money which Kalmbach recieved, one of which get had delivered to the White House (04:51:27) Skip in footage - Sloan and Ervin discuss how Sloan ended up questioning Stans about the payments he was making, Sloan had Stans confirm with Mitchell the payments were still to be made on request even though Sloan and Stans had no information as to what they were going to - Ervin confirms that Sloan was told by Stans regarding the payments' purpose: "I don't want to know and you don't want to know" (04:53:15) Ervin and Sloan discuss at length the source of the Committee's funds, in particular they talk about funds that came to the Committee in the form of Mexican casheir's checks and personal checks that were delivered to the Committee by a ROY WINCHESTER, the Vice President of Pensoil, Sloan identifies these checks as coming from a campaign fund raiser in the Southwest (04:58:00) Ervin and Sloan have an extensive discussion about how the above mentioned checks were cashed and moved from Florida then to the Committee in order to avoid being reported as was mandated as of April 7, 1972 by a new campaign law (05:00:01) Good brief close up of stenographer in action (05:01:50) Sloan explains how Liddy laundered the above mentioned cash - In response Ervin makes the comparison: "Mr. Liddy is like the Lord, he moves in mysterious ways his wonders to perform" which gets a hearty hearing room laugh (05:02:30) Ervin discusses with Sloan the fact that money that came from the above mentioned checks, after they were deposited and cashed in Florida was found on the persons of those people involved in the Watergate break-in
CONGRESS: WE THE PEOPLE
13.31.54-Rep. TOM DASCHLE (D-SD) speaking on a farm, talking about the Depression conditions for farmers. Shots of Farmers listening to Daschle. Daschle in a D.C. press conference showing a scrapbook of hundreds of farm auctions. DASCHLE in office discusses his plan to enhance farm income through subsidies and crop limits. Shots of Daschle staffers on phones. Rep. DASCHLE talks on the phone. Shots of House Agriculture Committee meeting. Farmers as witnesses introduce themselves, one says that farms are in a state of Depression. Daschle v.o.-sometimes farmers are preaching to the choir when talking to the Agriculture Committee since almost all the members are close to farm interests. Shot of a farmer lamenting the low turnout in the committee hearing. Rep. ED de la GARZA (D-CA) says that the farmers should know that the committee members are interested in their problems even if they're not sitting in the room. 13.34.34-Ornstein-some members take committee assignments to further a personal or ideological agenda. Shot of Sen. Jeremiah Denton (D-Ala.) in a committee hearing in which Republicans claim that Planned Parenthood is using federal funds to contribute to moral degeneracy among the youth. Short clip of a P.P. video titled "About Sex". Shots of Senators Denton and Orrin Hatch with a display of Sex Ed materials. Sen. ORRIN HATCH describes the "immoral tone" of the Sex Education materials. V.O.-committee hearings like this are mostly about making public statements on issues rather than making policy. Shot of Sen. HOWARD METZENBAUM in committee, Sen. HATCH denies that the hearing is a vehicle for Conservatives to hammer their viewpoints, says the panel is "balanced", everyone in the audience laughs loudly, Hatch testily calls for order. 13.36.36-Ornstein-members of Congress use committees to pontificate on issues like teen chastity on a regular basis. Newman-Committees often overlap, Committees battle for jurisdiction over different issues. Shot of Anne Gorsuch, EPA director, talks about the scope of committees that oversee her agency. Shot of Gorsuch testifying to a committee. Shot of Gary Hart interrogating her. V.O.-Democrats in 1981 and 1982 were suspicious of Gorsuch's leadership of the EPA, thinking that she was slack on Toxic Waste cleanup [which she was]. Sen. Pat Moynihan tells Gorsuch that her agency needs to follow Congress' direction. Gorsuch insists that the EPA is following regulations, Moynihan says that EPA budget is constantly being reduced, so Gorsuch must have some role in flouting the Congress' directions. 13.39.12
August 2, 1994 - Part 5
(15:55:46) Three independent investigations have addressed these questions. First, we had the results of the legal investigation by the Independent Counsel, Mr. Fiske. All issues involved in his investigation were fully and thoroughly investigated including a review of my testimony -before this Committee. And we are all familiar with his conclusions. There was also the report of the Office of Government Ethics, which Secretary Bentsen released on Sunday. This concluded that there bad been no unethical activities on the part of any Treasury personnel, The Office of Government Ethics is an independent body. As with Mr. Fiske, it had access to all documents and took testimony under oath from all those involved, including your witnesses. There is also the report of Mr. Cutler, White House Counsel, on the question of any unethical behavior by White House staff, He concluded there was none. These investigations have confirmed that the Clinton Administration did not interfere in any aspect of the Madison Guaranty case. There is no evidence, Mr. Chairman-I repeat-no evidence that either the criminal or civil aspects were compromised, delayed, or altered in any way. Simply none. I believe that the conclusions of these three separate investigations are absolutely correct. And I ask the Committee to bear in mind the larger context of my involvement in the handling of the Madison matter by the RTC. Most importantly, I never made any decisions of any kind with respect to the Madison case. I was committed, as I told the White House staff and others, to have the RTC General Counsel, Ellen Kulka, make whatever determination was necessary with respect to any civil claims arising from Madison. My meeting with the White House staff on February 2 was cleared by both Treasury General Counsel and the Designated Treasury Ethics Officer. I obtained two written ethics opinions stating that my recusal was not required, and I recused myself from the Madison matter on February 25 without ever having made any decision in that case. Second, let me turn to what I believe is the most important issue between this Committee and me, namely my testimony before you on February 24. Mr. Chairman, I do not have perfect recall, and I may have heard or understood questions in a way that was not intended by the Senator asking the question. And if I did so, I sincerely apolologize to all Members of the Committee. But I do want to be clear. In no way did I intend to mislead or not to provide complete and 407 forthright answers. I have too much respect for this Committee, for our system of Government and for the need for full and forthright communications between the Executive and the Legislative Branches. Let me add here that I understand how a reasonable person reading my testimony and listening to all the testimony which has come before this Committee could believe I was not as forthcoming as I should have been. The burden is mine to explain that I was doing the best I could at the time and I intend to do that today. Let me turn to describing the interaction between the Clinton Administration and the RTC. First, when Mr. Casey resigned as CEO in March 1993, the Administration had only taken office 5 or 6 weeks beforehand and had not yet chosen its nominee for this position. Indeed, only two U.S. Treasury officials had even been confirmed, Secretary Bentsen and me.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 28, 1973. Testimony of John Dean.
Senator Howard Baker (R Tennessee). All right. Is it fair to say, and I really am not trying to put words in your mouth, but rather to digest this information for my own purposes, that the documentary evidence that we have been referring to now, exhibit 17, indicates some knowledge by the President of an effort, to establish counter measures in terms of the total impact of Watergate, i.e. countersuits, allegations for misuse of the discovery process, and other things of that sort? John Dean. Well, he didn t. These were conceived, these were not actions that he conceived. He asked that counteractions be taken. The request came to me. I in turn passed it on to the lawyers who were closest to it because some of the suggestions were just, you know, start filing suits. And I had advised Mr. Colson that I wouldn t suggest filing any suit that was not well founded. Rather than rushing into court with some action that was not an action that would tie things up. This was particularly true of some of the statements of some of the individuals whose names were being speculated that they file for libel. Now, libel results in both countersuits and counter discovery. Some of these people obviously could not withstand discovery. So that was why the suits, I thought, had to be well founded and had to be suits that counter discovery would not be a problem. Senator Howard Baker (R Tennessee). So if I understand what you are saying now, while these documents do not bear on the isolated issue of the President's knowledge of the Watergate and what I call the coverup of the Watergate post June 17th, they do shed some light on at least the willingness to commence counteractions to avoid further prying into the situation at the White House. Is that a fair statement? John Dean. Yes that is, Senator.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 26, 1973 - Testimony of John Dean.
Senator Sam Ervin (D North Carolina). Senator Montoya. Senator Joseph Montoya (D New Mexico). Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Dean, you mentioned in yesterday's testimony about the briefings that were being given to Mr. Ziegler, prior to his making public statements with respect to this situation, the break in at the Watergate. Now, will you please give me a little more information as to the intensity or the extent of those briefings? John Dean. I think that the intensity would depend upon the subject matter at a given point in time. The one I have pointed out was the October 10 Situation when the Segretti story began breaking. I was not always present when Mr. Ziegler was being prepared but was often asked questions by him on how to handle a question or the like. When stories started leaking in various areas at that point in time, I was particularly asked what we may expect next. At one point in time, I recall when Mr. Baldwin's testimony was printed in the Los Angeles Times. I read the FBI interview of Mr. Baldwin to see if in fact, everything that he had told the Times had yet been printed. We talked about that. Often Mr. Moore was present when I was with Mr. Ziegler and preparing him for his morning briefing. Often, he would check with Mr. Haldeman if the story related directly to him or particularly with Mr. Ehrlichman. Senator Joseph Montoya (D New Mexico). Mr. Dean, I am referring specifically to the briefings that Mr. Ziegler received with respect to the responses which he made about White House involvement in the Watergate affair. John Dean. Well as I say, I believe I cataloged many of those in my statement. Now, some of those occurred before Mr. Ziegler and I had even talked about the matter. Senator Joseph Montoya (D New Mexico). Who would ordinarily brief him? Would it be Mr. Haldeman or Mr. Ehrlichman or who would approve his statement? John Dean. It would be Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Ehrlichman, or the President.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee Hearings on Presidential Campaign Activities, May 24, 1973 - Testimony of Gerald Alch
Mr. DASH. Then, therefore, since it was you, Mr. McCord's lawyer, who transmitted to Mr. McCord his first notice of a telephone call, he was to receive on the night of January 8, and that Mr. McCord knew you were conveying a message from Mr. Bittman, and it was that call which ultimately resulted in a meeting where an offer of Executive clemency was made to your client, presented as coming from the highest levels of the White House. Really, was it so unreasonable for Mr. McCord to conclude that you were involved in setting him up for such an offer of Executive clemency? Mr. ALCH. If he made that conclusion it was factually false. But let us suppose he did make that conclusion. This was in a period of time, as the trial was just about to commence, where I enjoyed with him what I considered to be a very fine relationship. Why wouldn t he not have come up to me and asked me about it or told me something to the effect that pursuant to your message to me I got a call last night? That never happened. Mr. DASH. Well, at that time perhaps he had begun to distrust you, Mr. Alch - that he needed you as counsel for his trial but after that call perhaps he had lost confidence in you. Mr. ALCH. In response to that, Mr. Dash, from what I know of Mr. McCord, it would seem to me rather or highly unlikely that he would go to trial with a lawyer whom he did not trust.
Watergate Hearings, June 25, 1973 - Testimony of John Dean
John Dean. During the months that followed. I devoted most of my time to regular office functions, keeping abreast of the new campaign legislation, and familiarizing myself with existing election laws, the Hatch Act, and related laws. It was not until after the proposed Operation Sandwedge had been shelved and Magruder had left the White House to from the reelection committee, that I began receiving calls from Strachan and Magruder that I was expected to suggest a lawyer to head up the demonstration intelligence operation at the reelection committee and to serve also as general counsel. On several occasions Magruder told me that he would like to have Mr. Fred Fielding, my principal assistant, for this job. Fielding and I discussed it but rejected it for several reasons. First, Fielding was aware of the fact that I was considering leaving the White House at, that time. I was actually interviewing for jobs outside of government and he knew that I would recommend that he succeed me as counsel. Secondly, if I stayed I would need his assistance during the months ahead. I might add parenthetically, as I look back if I had accepted the job I was interviewing for at that time I would not be sitting here today.