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1980s - CONGRESS: WE THE PEOPLE - M.A.D.D.
VS of Sydney Lamb caring for her quadriplegic infant who was injured by a drunk driver. She gives a speech about the frequency with which drunk drivers kill and maim people. M.A.D.D. President, Candy Lightner, speaking behind dais. U.S. House Representative Michael Barnes (D-MD). U.S. Senator Claiborne Pell (R-RI) with Lightner in a Congressional hearing room signing something on podium. Anti-Drunk Driving bill which was considered in the House. Rep. Barnes calling for laws to punish drunk drivers. Rep. Barnes leaving podium as Sen. Pell comes to podium. Adult Caucasian men and women attending the hearing; television cameras on tripods. M.A.D.D. newsletter with a photograph of U.S. President Ronald Reagan meeting M.A.D.D. members. Men and women standing in a line, participating in candlelight vigil at night. One candle lighting another. Women picketing the White House with signs before President Reagan assumed the Presidency. Lightner walking with sign: "My Daughter is Dead. Why?"
JFK Assassination Hearings - Dr. Michael Baden and Captain James J. Humes M.D.
Opens with councilman MCKINNEY asking witness what effect it would have if the bullet hit JFK's spinal column - Dr. MICHAEL BADEN, Forensic Pathologist and representative of panel of pathologists assigned investigation by House Committee, answers that fragments of bullets found in the initial investigation satisfied them as being responsible for all the damage to the head of JFK (14:28:42) McKinney wants to know how much of bullet was found - Baden answers "a great portion of it" - McKinney asks about the other bullet - Baden answers that it was found completely intact because it traveled through soft tissue (14:29:21) Baden explains that it is bone that would deform a bullet but whether or not the bullet hit any bone within JFK cannot be determined because a proper dissection of the body was not done, if it hit the spinal cord it could have affected JFK's movement (14:30:30) Baden mentions the metal fragment found around JFK's neck but discounts this as a fragment of bullet come off as the result of contact with bone in the president's back, however Baden says cavity created by bullet through back could have had repercussions for the spinal cord (14:31:30) McKinney asks what the difference was between the bullet that killed Martine Luther King and was badly deformed and that which passed through JFK - Baden answers that the one hitting King hit a lot of bone vs. the one in JFK which might have at most grazed JFK's spinal cord, also King's bullet was soft nosed vs. the full metal jacket of JFK's (14:32:44)
JFK Assassination Hearings - Dr. Cyril H. Wecht
Opens with Professor ROBERT BLAKEY, chief council, introducing and giving the credentials of Dr. CYRIL H. WECHT the only dissenting member of the Committee's forensic pathology panel (15:26:56) Committee/Chair, Mr. STOKES, call and swear in Wecht (15:27:40) Chair recognizes staff council DONALD A. PURDY, Purdy asks if Wecht requested to testify - Wecht answers yes - Purdy asks what conclusions of the forensic pathology panel Wecht is in disagreement with (15:28:15) Wecht tells the court he is in disagreement with the single bullet theory which merely corroborates the Warren Commission findings and eliminates the possibility of any other contributing assassin (15:28:31) Wecht is also dismayed that the panel did not insist on conducting tests with the Mannlicher-Carcano rifle and ammunition, tests to conclude whether the same bullet could break a rib and wrist bone and emerge in such good condition, further he was disappointed a more intense effort was not made to recover important bits of medical information (15:29:20) Wecht has raised the remote possibility of a second synchronized shot from the right side but needs the brain for examination to substantiate such a possibility (15:30:05) Purdy asks if it is the opinion of Wecht that bullet 399 (of the single bullet theory) could not have done all the damage to JFK and Governor JOHN CONNALLY - Wecht responds yes (15:30:45)
August 4, 1994 - Part 3
(11:50:13) Ms. WILLIAMS. No, Senator. Senator BOXER. Did the First Lady ever entreaty you in such a fashion? Ms. WILLIAMS. No, Senator. Senator BOXER. Well, Mr. Chairman, I am not going to use up all my time, but I have to say this to the two of you: I think that you are really good public servants. I have never really talked to you before. But I want to say to you that your strong focus and your strong purpose on what you are in your job comes through to me, and I think you served the First Lady well, the President well, and the country well. And I do wish-I do wish-that everyone else in the Administration had that focus. Because, had they had that focus, I do not think we would be here right now. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Boxer. Senator Hatch. Senator HATCH. In your prepared testimony you stated that "no one" attempted to influence the RTC's decision on whether or when to bring claims against individuals with regard to the failure of Madison. Would an attempt by the White House or Treasury staff to shift civil iurisdiction from RTC and give it to the independent Counsel, OPENING COMMENTS OF SENATOR HATCH Senator HATCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. McLarty, welcome. It is good to see you and Ms. Williams. Mr. MCLARTY. Good morning, Senator Hatch. Senator HATCH. Mr. McLarty, do you know of any communications between the White House staff and the Department of Justice concerning the scope of the Independent Counsel's charter? Mr. McLARTY. No, I do not. 317 were it to have occurred, in your view qualify as "an attempt to influence the RTC's decision"? Mr. McLARTY. Well, Senator, my statement was I am not aware of any efforts on the part of the White House to influence an RTC decision. And it is my understanding that other career members of the RTC have expressed a similar view. Senator HATCH. I understand you are not aware of it, but if that actually happened would that qualify as an attempt to influence Mr. MCLARTY. I do not know, Senator, that it would, but to the best of my knowledge it has not happened. Senator HATCH. OK. Ms. Williams, let me spend a few minutes with you. OK? Your position is Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff to the First Lady? MS. WILLIAMS. Yes, Senator. Senator HATCH. In this position, you attend all senior staff meetings, right? Ms. WILLIAMS. Some. Senator HATCH. As many as you can? Ms. WILLIAMS. Yes. Senator HATCH. "All" may be too all inclusive. You came to Washington after having worked for Mrs. Clinton. I think you were with the Children's Defense Fund, as well? MS. WILLIAMS. Yes, sir. That is correct. Senator HATCH. I have a lot of respect for them, as you know. How long did you work for Mrs. Clinton before you came to Washington? MS. WILLIAMS. From September to December. Senator HATCH. Let me turn to Mr. Altman's diary for a few minutes. You are familiar with those entries? Ms. WILLIAMS. Yes, sir, I AM Senator HATCH. In fact, Mr. Cutler, the White House Counsel, asked you about those diary entries prior to your deposition before this Committee? Ms. WILLIAMS. Yes, sir. Senator HATCH. You were provided a copy of those diary entries? Ms. WILLIAMS. I was provided Senator HATCH. In other words, prior to your deposition, I guess? Ms. WILLIAMS. Prior to my deposition. Senator HATCH. Right. In fact, Mr. Altman provided you with a copy, did he not? Ms. WILLIAMS. Yes, he did. Senator HATCH. OK. When we deposed Mr. Altman, he explained that the reason he gave you a copy is because he felt "badly" about Providing the Committee with copies. Is that your recollection? Ms. WILLIAMS. Of Mr. Altman's testimony? Senator HATCH. Well, that he felt badly that lie had provided the Committee with copies. I guess what I am asking you is: What would Mr. Altman have felt badly about, if you know? Ms. WILLIAMS. I am not sure I quite understand this question. 318 Senator HATCH. Well when we deposed him, he said he felt badly about providing the Committee with copies, and that is why he provided you with one. I was just wondering if you knew why he would feel badly about that. Ms. WILLIAMS, About providing the Committee with copies? Senator HATCH. Right. MS. WILLIAMS. No, I do not know why he felt badly about that. Senator HATCH. Could you see where providing you a copy of the diary entries could be seen as another one of Mr. Altman's famous "heads up" decisions? Ms. WILLIAMS. Well I did not necessarily view it in that context because Mr. Cutler had earlier asked me questions about the diary, which was the first time I ever heard about it. Senator HATCH. All right. During your deposition when you were asked about being provided a copy of the diary entry, you did not inform the Committee that Mr. Altman had provided you with a copy. Right? Ms. WILLIAMS. I did not, but let me say, having reviewed my deposition, that the questions as I recall did not make it necessary at that time. The way the questions were being asked, it was: Who was the first person to inform you.? And then later questions were: Who read you the copies of the diary? So, I did not, Senator HATCH. And in fact when you were asked by the Committee if you "had any idea" where the diary pages your attorney had came from, your response was "I have no idea." Ms. WILLIAMS. That is still correct, because my attorney did not receive copies of Mr. Altman's diary from -me, Senator HATCH. Well, but the important point is that you had an opportunity to review those diary entries prior to your deposition, and that they were provided to you by Mr. Altman. Right? Ms. WILLIAMS. Well, I believe the point is twofold, actually.
JFK Assassination Hearings - Dr. Cyril H. Wecht (Part IV)
Dr. CYRIL H. WECHT, dissenting forensic pathologist, responds to question put forth by Representative HAROLD S. SAWYER that he does not believe bullet 399 cause all the wounds received by Governor JOHN CONNALLY (17:34:31) Sawyers asks Wecht what happened to the bullet that hit Connally - Wecht does not know but points out the sloppiness of the original investigation (17:35:20) Sawyer asks how Connally could have held hat after being shot in the same wrist - Wecht says he doesn't know but doesn't believe Connally to be shot at this point - both men agree it seems unreasonable that hat could have been held on to (17:35:55) Representative RICHARDSON PREYER, taken over at the chair (apparently many members of the committee have left to take a vote on the House floor), asks if Wecht did in fact say the other members of the panel were unwilling to conduct bullet firing tests because they new what the results would be - Wecht confirms he did say this and explains that he thinks the panel was reluctant to do the tests in light of the ones done in 1964 which showed how hard, if not impossible, it would be to produce a bullet in as good shape as 399 - Preyer asks how other "eminent" panel members could not conduct tests if they are as professional as they claim - Wecht suggests they are biased and goes on to explain how easy it would be to conduct tests (17:38:25) Preyer says listening to the day's testimony has helped him realize the limits of common sense, as common sense would dictate that a bullet could not do all the things that bullet 399 supposedly did, however he adds common sense also tells us "the earth is flat" (17:41:15) Representative DODD asks Wecht about Dr. MICHAEL BADEN's claim that in tests there would be a difference between a bullet's path through live and dead tissue - Wecht responds this not true with bones, summarizes Warren Commission's experiments in 1964 (17:42:08) Representative Floyd J. Fithian asks if the angle of trajectory was determined by the bullet's path through JFK and if it is possible that were JFK leaning forward when the bullet hit if this would allow for the bullet to then be in line to pass through Connally - Wecht responds that JFK would have to lean very far forward for this to work and that from the Zapruder film we can see that he is no where near this position, he also adds that the horizontal trajectories also do not line up (17:44:08) Representative ROBERT W. EDGAR confirms that Wecht stated he wanted to access to JFK's brain and that he had criticized the committee for not getting the brain, he then confirms that Wecht is aware of all the steps that the committee has taken to secure the brain and asks what Wecht would he have done had he been in charge - Wecht gives a long response which includes criticisms of other forensic pathologists of him for wanting access to the brain, and why he considers it so important to the investigation, in part he mentions because of the "ridiculous" autopsy that was performed (17:46:12) Edgar asks Professor C. ROBERT BLAKEY to give a summary for the record of the steps the committee has taken to get the brain (17:50:05) Blakey at the podium gives a summary of the brain's movement from hand to hand after the assassination as far as the committee could figure it out, at a point they can no longer figure out where the brain went and after deposing all the people in the chain have turned up nothing other then the suggestion that ROBERT KENNEDY had it destoyed - Blakey asks Wecht if he can suggest any further leads (17:50:14) Chairman STOKES (who has returned from the vote) asks Wecht if he is a ballistics expert - Wecht responds no - Stokes asks if most the past cases the Wecht has diagnosed involved hand gun wounds rather than rifle wounds - Wecht responds yes (17:53:41) Delegate WALTER FAUNTROY confirms Wecht believes another bullet, other than 399 did the damage to Connally, and could this other bullet have done all the damage - Wecht responds that he does belieive there was another bullet involved and that it is possible it did all the damage (17:55:25) Fauntroy asks what sort of test does Wecht invision to see if a bullet could have shattered Connally's wrist and then lodged in his thigh - Wecht explains it would only take a human cadaver - The two men come to an agreement on where the bullet was fired from and how it hit and passed through the wrist (17:56:54) Fauntroy asks for an explanation of the test that Wecht would conduct to test single bullet theory - Wecht gives a detailed description of the tests and what he would be looking for in the results which is mainly to see that one bullet could break both a rib and a wrist bone and emerge in such good shape (17:58:26) Fauntroy points out the extreme difficulty of exactly recreating the situation, it would take a very accurate shot and set up - Wecht responds that only bones are really needed in the test and that accuracy is not an issue with a professional marksman (18:01:08) Sawyer confirms Wecht's suggestion that Connally's wounds could have been from fragments of bullet that hit JFK's head and then exposes this as an impossibility, as according to the Zapruder film Connally has reacted to being shot before JFK's head was hit - Wecht is very visibly embarrassed and stumbles to save himself (18:02:35) Chairman Stokes recognizes Wecht's opportunity to suppliment his testimony (18:04:01) Wecht thanks members of the committee, especially Professor Blakey who let him testify, and goes on to say that he is sorry this sort of investigation was not carried out in '63 or '64 and that there is much still to be explained about what happened (18:04:18)
Waco Hearings - DAY 3
WACO HEARINGS: 9:30AM - 9:52AM 1 of 2 - Master Number 10939 - INTRODUCTION: The following footage from the Waco Hearings consists of a WETA talk panel discussion. Program host, Kent Bowdi, discusses day three of the hearings with ABC's Julie Johnston. Compilation footage from Master Number 10928 is also shown. 09:30:01 The program's title, "House Hearings On Waco," appears set against a surreal representation of the Capitol Building. 09:30:28 Footage shows former Secretary Bentsen speaking with Congressman McCollum, Schumer and Congresswoman Jackson-Lee while the Sub-Committee Chamber is in recess. 09:31:15 Program host, Kent Bowdi, introduces Julie Johnston, and then presents her with questions. 09:31:32 Mr. Bowdi asks Ms. Johnston what panelists Mr. Altman Secretary Bentsen and Mr. Higgins have to do with Waco. She replies. 09:34:16 Footage transitions to show a monitor where Diana Fuentez is reporting from San Antonio, Texas. Mr. Bowdi asks her a series of questions about yesterday's testimony. He first asks about Governor Richards's involvement in issuing the Texas Air National Guard to the ATF. She answers. Second, Mr. Bowdi asks about the raid's planning. She answers. Ms. Johnston then asks about the presence of a meth lab. Ms. Fwentz answers. Mr. Bowdi asks if remains of a meth lab were discovered in the ashes of the compound. Ms. Fwentz replies no. Mr. Bowdi then inquires about the DEA opening a case on the Branch Davidians two days prior to the fire. Ms. Fwentz answers. 09:40:04 Cut away footage shows Congressman Lantos making a point of parliamentary inquiry concerning the NRA. Congressman Mica also makes a point. Chairman Zeliff then introduces the seventh group of panelists, and then makes an opening statement. 09:51:05 Congressman McCollum makes his opening statement. 09:52:43 TAPE OUT.
Hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committe on the Nomination of Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court
Senator Howell Heflin (D - Alabama). Do you know a Congressman by the name of Scott Kluge, a Republican Congressman who was defeated by Robert Kastenmeier of Wisconsin, who now serves in Congress, who back in the early 1980's, 1983 or something, was a television reporter for a channel here in Washington and that he at that time disclosed this as indicating that, after the recommendation of dismissal, that you did not move in regards to it for some 11 months and let him retire? Do you know Congressman Kluge? Judge Clarence Thomas. I do not know him. Again, remember, I am operating on recollection. There was far more to it than the facts as you set them out. His rights had much to do with the fact that he was as veteran and that we could not simply dismiss him. If we could, that was my recommendation, he would have been dismissed. Senator Howell Heflin (D - Alabama). There was no political influence brought to bear on you at that time to prevent his dismissal? Do you recall if any political - Judge Clarence Thomas. There was absolutely no political influence. In fact, it was my policy that no personnel decisions would in any way be changed or influenced by political pressure, one way or the other. Senator Howell Heflin (D - Alabama). Now, it is reported to me that Congressman Kluge, after your nomination, went to the White House and told this story and, I hear by hearsay, that the White House ignored his statement, that Congressman Kluge further came to the Senate Judiciary Committee and made it known here. As far as I know, I attempted to check - I have not been able to find where it was in the Judiciary Committee, if it was, and I think the Chairman has attempted to locate it - but the point I am asking is, in the whole process pertaining to the nomination and the preparation for it, were you ever notified that Congressman Kluge went to the White House in regards to this? Judge Clarence Thomas. I do not remember that, Senator. Senator Howell Heflin (D - Alabama). Nobody ever discussed that? Judge Clarence Thomas. No. Senator Howell Heflin (D - Alabama). Well, that is the way it has been reported to me and it is very fragmented relative to it, but I have asked that all the records of the EEOC be subpoenaed by subpoena duces tecum pertaining to that, in order that we might get to the bottom of it.
LAWMAKERS
WETA "LAWMAKERS" 7/21/1983 IN 20.00.00-WETA credit/sponsor credits/title sequence 20.00.55-PAUL DUKE/COKIE ROBERTS/LINDA WERTHEIMER-on program-Controversy over LATIN AMERICA POLICY and the MX MISSILE, the censure of two Congressmen for Sexual Misconduct, and REAGAN'S effort to change leadership of CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION. REAGAN announcing that it wants much more aid to EL SALVADOR and CONTRAS in Nicaragua-House went into a very rare SECRET SESSION to debate COVERT AID to CONTRAS. 20.02.10-M/S TIP O'NEILL on rostrum of House, announcing the Secret session, shots of HOUSE security workers closing and locking the doors of House Chamber. DUKE v.o.-this kind of session, for which members had to take oath of secrecy, has happened only four times. Shots of Congressmen entering the House. C/S Rep. HENRY HYDE (R-IL) outside Capitol, says the secrecy wasn't warranted by the small volume of classified info discussed. C/S Rep. CLARENCE LONG (D-MD) says he wishes that it was conducted in PUBLIC, since the taxpayers' money and the reputation of the U.S. is involved. Rep. GEORGE MILLER (D-CA), says the evidence of COVERT ACTIVITIES presented by the HOUSE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE was compelling, and many members weren't previously aware of the nature of COVERT AID to CONTRAS. 20.03.24-C/U newspaper clippings regarding Rep. MILLER'S visit to NICARAGUA, DUKE v.o.-MILLER among 4 DEMOCRATS who went to NICARAGUA on fact finding mission. C/S Rep. MIKE LOWRY (D-WA) in debate, says NICARAGUAN people all agree that the CIA'S actions with CONTRAS was aimed at OVERTHROWING SANDINISTA GOVERNMENT. Regardless of opinion of Sandinistas, this is intolerable. C/S Rep. MILLER outside Capitol, says voting to cut off the secret war in NICARAGUA will be his most important vote since VIETNAM. DUKE v.o.-opponents of COVERT CIA ACTION don't seem to have the votes to cut it off. C/S HENRY HYDE, discusses partisan polarization, says the issue should transcend "politics" [obviously HYDE'S definition of "politics" is pretty narrow]. 20.04.55-C/Us of newspaper articles. L/S-M/S exterior of WHITE HOUSE. DUKE v.o.-REAGAN beginning media offensive to reverse PUBLIC OPINION. Clip of CNN footage, C/S REAGAN giving address, asking for a "bipartisan commission" to study ways to promote anticommunism in LATIN AMERICA. C/S HYDE, says that the commission method has helped resolve other acrimonious debates in past. Still HENRY KISSINGER, DUKE v.o.-KISSINGER is controversial. C/S Rep. CLARENCE LONG, says the Administration made a mistake by packing the commission with REAGAN SUPPORTERS. C/S Sen. CHARLES MATHIAS (R-MD), says KISSINGER is reputed figure, he can be independent and objective based on his reputation. C/S Rep. MIKE BARNES (D-MD), hopes commission will calm the debate, but KISSINGER is making things more heated. 20.07.10-CLIP of REAGAN address, defends choice of KISSINGER to lead commission. DUKE v.o.-REAGAN having similar problems with MX MISSILE. M/S well and rostrum of House chamber. C/S Rep. RON COLEMAN (D-TX) says he's reconsidering his position on MX MISSILE because it's too expensive. C/S Rep. ROBERT MICHEL (MINORITY LEADER), says the MX must be built regardless of cost. 20.08.54-DUKE-House did endorse MX, but only by 13 votes. Senate MX DEBATE is being FILIBUSTERED by DEMOCRATS. ROBERTS-REAGAN'S appointment of KISSINGER to the CENTRAL AMERICA commission worries even REPUBLICANS it might be a political blunder.
LAWMAKERS
WETA "LAWMAKERS" 7/14/1983 IN 20.51.50-WETA credit/sponsor credits/title sequence 20.52.42-PAUL DUKE/COKIE ROBERTS-on program, Senate approves REAGAN DEFENSE PROGRAMS, including CHEMICAL WEAPONS [evidently only evil if owned by Reds?]. House approves Carribean economic aid and Housing assistance. Two members of Congress cited for sexual misconduct with Congressional pages. ROBERTS-introduces review of ECONOMIC POLICY debates and JOBS PROGRAM initiatives. 20.54.07-C/S Sen. JENNINGS RANDOLPH (D-WV), says that Congress must do more to fight UNEMPLOYMENT, the decline in jobs in last 27 months has been terrible. Shots of SOUP KITCHENS, UNEMPLOYMENT OFFICES. C/S Rep. FRED BOUCHER (D-VA) advocating a large JOBS BILL. C/S REAGAN giving press conference, no audio. C/S page of JOBS BILL. C/S REAGAN giving press conference, tries to take some credit for the JOBS BILL. C/S TIP O'NEILL on House rostrum, C/S Rep. JIM JONES (D-OK), says the provisions of the House BUDGET are reasonable, with fair consideration given to DEFICIT REDUCTION and DOMESTIC SPENDING and a moderate amount for DEFENSE. Shots of SENATE BUDGET COMMITTEE, shows Sen's. BOB DOLE, BILL BRADLEY, others. ROBERTS v.o.-the HOUSE DEMOCRATS hope to make political points by either passing the budget or forcing SENATE REPUBLICANS to defeat it or REAGAN to veto it. 20.56.16-C/S of an UNEMPLOYED COAL MINER, testifying to SENATE BUDGET COMMITTEE that he won't be able to afford HEALTH INSURANCE for his pregnant wife once his UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFIT runs out. ROBERTS-some improvement in the ECONOMY has taken steam out of drive to increase benefits for UNEMPLOYED. 20.56.44-DUKE/ROBERTS-discussion of TAX INCREASES and DEFICITS as political footballs, concern about DEFICITS is cutting down RECESSION RELIEF. REAGAN resisting TAX INCREASES and DOMESTIC SPENDING, threatening vetoes. Discussion of relations between REAGAN and Congress, as Economy starts to improve, the battles will shift to DEFENSE and FOREIGN POLICY. DUKE intro review of FOREIGN POLICY battles in 1983. 21.00.15-C/S REAGAN in press conference, says he's never said "never" about sending troops to CENTRAL AMERICA, but right now they're not needed. C/S Rep. DANTE FASCELL in office, says Congress is concerned about REAGAN'S belligerent stance on COMMUNISM in LATIN AMERICA, prospects of war. Shots of REAGAN'S address to CONGRESS to advocate LATIN AMERICAN ASSISTANCE (1982). C/S REAGAN, asks for contribution for "freedom" in Central America for $600 Million, notes this is less than Americans will spend on VIDEO GAMES. C/S Rep. BOB LIVINGSTON (R-LA) repeating the assertion that the security of the U.S. is threatened by COMMUNISM in LATIN AMERICA. C/S Rep. DAVID BONIOR (D-MI) in debate, says he's disgusted by REAGAN'S presentation of the issue, it's biased and disgraceful misrepresentation of facts. DUKE v.o.-REAGAN did not get his full request for aid to EL SALVADOR.
August 3, 1994 - Part 1
(09:30:04) PBS funding credits (09:30:12) Whitewater hearings coverage title screen (09:30:24) Hearings hosts NINA TOTENBERG and DON BODE introduce day's hearing from tv studio and they also speak over footage of the Senate hearing room where people are congregating (09:35:10) Hearing begins: HEARINGS RELATING TO MADISON GUAR- ANTY S&L AND THE WHITEWATER DEVEL- OPMENT CORPORATION-WASHINGTON, DC PHASE VOLUME IV WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 3,1994 U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. The Committee met at 9:30 a.m., in room 106 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Donald W. Riegle, Jr. (Chairman of the Committee) presiding. OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN RIEGLE The CHAIRMAN. The Committee will come to order. Let me welcome everyone in attendance today. It seems like it was not very long ago we were right back here in this room. I think we adjourned last night shortly after 2:00 a.m., so we are back at it this morning, Today we start the fourth day of the hearings being conducted here by the Senate Committee. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs on the so- called Madison Whitewater matter authorized by Senate Resolution 229. I want to just indicate what our plan for the day will be before we go to our first witness today. We will have four panels that will appear before us in the course of the day. The first one will of course consist of hearing wig the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Lloyd Bentsen, who is here us now. The second panel will involve hearing Mr. Eugene Ludwig, who is the Comptroller of the Currency of the United States. The third panel will consist of Mr. Joel 10ein, who is Deputy Counsel to the President. Mr. Neil Eggleston, who is the Associate Counsel to the President. Mr. Clifford Sloan, also Associate Counsel to the President. And Beth Nolan who serves in the same capacity. The final panel will consist of Thomas "Mack" McLarty, the Senior Advisor to the President of the United States Former Chief of Staff to the President. And Ms. Margaret Williams, who serves as Chief of Staff to the First Lady of the United States. As with our prior hearings, we are looking forward to hearing from these witnesses so they can elaborate on the events relating 2 to that aspect of the resolution that we are operating under dealing with the question of whether any improper conduct occurred regarding communications between officials of the White House and the Department of the Treasury, or the Resolution Trust Corporation, relating to the Whitewater Development Corporation and Madison Guaranty Savings & Loan Association. Senator BOND. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Senator Bond. OPENING COMMENTS OF SENATOR BOND Senator BOND. Before you start, I have a parliamentary inquiry that has to do with the schedule. Yesterday, of course, you know for the first time, we heard Mr. Altman accuse Ms. Hanson of misleading him and the Committee and he told us, for the first time yesterday, that when he was asked if there were any contacts with the White House, after I asked him about the criminal referral, he turned to Ms. Hanson and she nodded her agreement with his answer. Now as far as I know this was not brought out in any of his sworn depositions, When he called me to tell me that there had been other contacts that he had known about, he did not mention that. It seems to me that the Committee ought to consider, in light of this new factor, whether it would be appropriate to bring Ms. Hanson back to comment on that, because we do have a conflict between the testimony of Mr. Altman and Ms. Hanson. And since this has just come up, I would just offer for your consideration, along with that of Senator D'Amato, whether it might be worth bringing Ms. Hanson back for follow up questions to see if her recollection squares with that of Mr. Altman as to what he asked her and what her nod in the negative implied at that time. That may have something to do with how we try to resolve the irreconcilable positions that Ms. Hanson and Mr. Altman had in that testimony. The CHAIRMAN. Well Senator Bond, I think it is a reasonable question, and particularly so because it was cited by Mr. Altman yesterday as part of his presentation, and we of course do not know at least her version of what that exchange was about. My initial instinct on this is to suggest-she was here for the better part of 6 or 7 hours, a long period of time. I would be inclined to want to have our-she has been deposed before-to have our Committee investigators depose her on this point, and to draw her out to let her tell her observations or her version of that situation, and then based on that deposition addition or that new deposition on that point, then make a judgment as to whether we need to have her back in here or not? Senator SHELBY. Mr. Chairman.
Watergate Hearings, June 25, 1973 - Testimony of John Dean
John Dean. I shall turn now, pursuant to the committee's request, from leaks to the matter of political intelligence, with the hope, that my voice will hold up through this entire statement. The pre-reelection White House thrived on political gossip and political intelligence. I knew of the type of information they sought even before I joined the White House staff. During the summer of 1969, while I was working at the Justice Department, the then Deputy Attorney General, Richard Kleindienst, called me into his office and told me that the White House wanted some very important information. Mr. Kleindienst instructed me to call Mr. DeLoach, then Deputy Director of the FBI, and obtain from him information regarding the foreign travels of Mary Jo Kopechne. I was told that Mr. DeLoach would be expecting a call from me and once I had the information in hand I was to give it to Jack Caulfield at the White House. The incident stuck in my mind because of the rather sensitive nature of the information being obtained from the FBI and the fact that I was made the courier of the information. To this day I can only speculate that I was asked to convey the information so that others could deny they had done so should the matter become known. It was not until I joined the White House staff and Caulfield was placed on my staff that I learned that Caulfield was assigned to develop political intelligence on Senator Edward Kennedy. Mr. Caulfield told me that within some 6 hours of the accident at Chappaquiddick on July 18, 1969, he had a friend named Tony on the scene who remained on the scene conducting a private investigation of the matter and reporting pertinent information back to him. It was not until this spring that I knew or could remember Tony's full name, Anthony Ulasewicz. Caulfield told me that Mr. Ulasewicz posed as a newspaper reporter and always asked the most embarrassing questions at any press gathering related to the Chappaquiddick incident. Caulfield also informed me that his instructions were to continue surveillance on Senator Kennedy and that he was doing so on a selected basis. I was told by Caulfield that although he had been assigned to my staff that he would continue to perform various intelligence gathering functions assigned to him by Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Haldeman.
Watergate Hearings - Testimony of Gordon C. Strachan, July 23, 1973
U.S. Senator Edward Gurney (R-FL) asks former White House aide Gordon C. Strachan to recall other meetings where political intelligence was discussed. Strachan says he created a talking paper for a December 17th, 1971 meeting for Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman and Director of Committee to Re-Elect the President and former Attorney General John Mitchell, which he did not personally attend. Senator Gurney asks if he remembers hearing anything about the meeting's discussions. Strachan only recalls the questions posed on the talking paper, one of which was: Should John Dean become the control point rather than merely the White House contact for political intelligence? Haldeman's answer was that Dean should continue to be the White House contact. The other question that went unanswered: Should G. Gordon Liddy be the one responsible for political intelligence? Senator Gurney asks if Strachan knew of any wiretapping or bugging discussed at that meeting. Strachan says those subjects were not on the talking paper and he has no way of knowing if it was discussed. Senator Gurney asks if Strachan recalls any other meetings where political intelligence was discussed. Strachan says no. Senator Gurney recalls morning testimony where Strachan stated he monitored a phone between Haldeman and Mitchell after the Key Biscayne meeting and asks how often he monitored phone calls for Mr. Haldeman. Strachan says he kept a file and made a note of each phone call monitored. There are about about 40-50 pieces of paper in that file. Senator Gurney asks if Strachan monitored any calls about Watergate. Strachan says no. Senator Gurney asks if he monitored any calls to do with gathering political intelligence. Strachan only recalls a phone call after a June 30 meeting in which Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Mitchell discussed the Daniel Ellsberg matter at length, but there was no reference at that time to political intelligence.
August 9, 1995 - Part 1
(10:10:30) This Committee is looking into the following question: Did improper conduct occur regarding the way in which White House officials handled documents in Mr. Foster's office following his death? I have an answer to that question, Mr. Chairman. It is a categorical no. There was nothing improper in the way White House officials handled documents in Vince Foster's office following his death. As this Committee has heard, there were differences of opinion with the Justice Department as to how a search of Vince's off ice for a suicide note or similar such documents should be conducted. That office contained numerous confidential files, as well as sensitive documents, such as briefing reports on Supreme Court nominees and other high Administration officials. Before any review by me of the documents in that office, Justice Department officials wanted to read a part of each document. They wanted to decide if a document was privileged or relevant to their search, That is perhaps understandable from their institutional point of view, which Philip Heymann defined here as maintaining the credibility of Federal law enforcement." As White House Counsel, I was also concerned with maintaining the credibility of Federal law enforcement, but I was bound to act in accordance with my obligations as a lawyer, and I did not believe that doing so, that acting accordance with my obligations as a lawyer would undermine the credibility of Federal law enforcement. It was my ethical duty as a lawyer and as White House Counsel to protect a client's information and confidences and not to disclose them without a prior review by me. It was my duty to preserve the right of the White House of this President and future Presidents to assert executive privilege, attorney-client privilege, and work product privilege. It was my duty to do nothing that could result in an inadvertent waiver of these privileges. It was my duty to protect the confidentiality of other 1203 matters as well, including sensitive Government documents in that office. These were solemn professional obligations that I was sworn as a lawyer to uphold, The fact that law enforcement agents wanted to see if there was a suicide note in Vince's office before I could review the documents in that office did not give me the right to ignore these obligations and throw open the door to that office. It did not give me the right to permit others, including Justice Department officials, to read the documents in Foster's office or even a part of them without a prior review by me. I believe that each of you-and each of you, like the President, is a major public figure-would want your counsel to respond in the same way to a request by the Justice Department or anyone to examine your confidential documents in your counsel's office. You would not want the door to your counsel's office thrown open to even a first-page examination of your confidential files without a prior review by you or your counsel. You might waive and I'm sure you would waive-whatever confidences and privileges you had, and you might cooperate- and I'm sure each of you would cooperate fully with investigators, but you and each of you would want your documents in your counsel's office reviewed first before you would let anyone take a look at them. You would want-and I know you would want-any decision to waive confidentiality and privilege respecting your documents to be reached carefully and deliberately. The President of the United States was entitled to at least the same protection, to at least the same right regarding documents in his Deputy Counsel's office after that lawyer, Vince Foster, died in July 1993. As I said, I did not believe in July 1993 that my acting in accordance with my obligations as a lawyer would undermine the credibility of Federal law enforcement. I still do not believe it after hear ing Mr. Heymann's testimony before this Committee.
August 2, 1994 - Part 5
(16:20:18) And let me buttress this point in this way. Ms. Hanson helped prepare the questions and answers for my testimony about White House contacts. Ms. Hanson sat directly behind me during my testimony. Just after my response to Senator Bond, if you watch the videotape I turn to her and she confirmed my answer, Then she and I had lunch together again afterwards. A week passed before Mr. Podesta's call, which alerted me to the fall meetings. Ms. Hanson, Mr. Chairman, then precleared my letter to Senator Riegle which stated that I had no prior knowledge of these meetings. She signed off on it. At none of those times did she suggest not one of those times did she suggest that my recollection was faulty. 412 We also know that Ms. Hanson earlier prepared Q's and A's indicating that I had not asked her to brief the White House last fall. And the Office of Government Ethics Report, released Sunday, indicated that she also answered "no" to a similar question which OGE or its representatives asked. I believe, Mr. Chairman, and I want to especially address myself to Senator Bond, that these facts confirm my testimony on February 24 that I had no knowledge of those meetings at the time of my testimony. The Office of Government Ethics Report concluded that no nonpublic information on the case was provided to the White House at the February 2 meeting. No nonpublic information was provided. Its investigation included testimony, taken under oath from all participants in that meeting. Mr. Cutler's report, based on a separate set of interviews with the same individuals, reached the same conclusion. In addition, had sensitive information on any aspect of the case been conveyed, perhaps Mr. Fiske would have reached a different conclusion than the one he did. Last Friday, Senator D'Amato charged that we had somehow advised the White House that the RTC would be unable to complete its investigation of Madison by the February 28 statute of limitations deadline. And that this somehow signaled the President that he need not enter into a tolling agreement because the deadline otherwise would lapse. That charge, Senator D'Amato, is categorically false. Senator DAMATO. That's not what Mr. Ickes says. Mr. ALTMAN, Senator D'Amato is wrong on this point. Senator DAMATO. Well, Mr. Ickes may be wrong, sir. If he says I'm wrong, I'm going to respond. Mr. ALTMAN My testimony on this point was wholly accurate and I want to emphasize that to you, Mr. Chairman. My testimony on this point was wholly accurate and the record makes that clear. Let me review the record. What I told the White House about RTC procedures is documented in my talking points for that meeting which, I know that you have. Those talking points say: It is not certain when the analysis will be completed, but it will be completed before February 28. And the OGE report, as I said, which is the most recent report, testimony taken under oath, found no nonpublic information was disclosed on February 2. Mr- Cutler's report and the chronology state that no such information was given on February 2. Ellen Kulka, the RTC General Counsel, made perfectly clear that no matter what, she and the RTC would be ready to make a decision by February 28. 1 believe, and you can ask Mr. Ickes yourself when he appears before you, that he did not intend to say I had told the White House the investigation could not be concluded by February 28. Now, much has been made of my supplements to the record after the February 24 hearing. I do not entirely understand this. The Chairman said at the conclusion of the hearing that the record was open for additional information. It has always been my impression that supplementing the record was a constructive act, not a bad act. 413 I want to stress to this Committee that there was not a pattern of withholding or concealing information. It's really the opposite. As soon as I learned or received information, as in the case of the two fall meetings, I immediately provided it to the Committee. It could not all have been provided in the first letter, because I didn't have it all then. Only through a comprehensive review of files and logs was more information uncovered. And ultimately an exhaustive review by Counsel turned up the final information. I believe that providing such information to this Committee, as soon as it was available, was the right step to take. It was not a case of dribbling out information which I had all along. Let me be specific.
LAWMAKERS
WETA "LAWMAKERS" 7/21/1983 IN 20.00.00-WETA credit/sponsor credits/title sequence 20.00.55-PAUL DUKE/COKIE ROBERTS/LINDA WERTHEIMER-on program-Controversy over LATIN AMERICA POLICY and the MX MISSILE, the censure of two Congressmen for Sexual Misconduct, and REAGAN'S effort to change leadership of CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION. REAGAN announcing that it wants much more aid to EL SALVADOR and CONTRAS in Nicaragua-House went into a very rare SECRET SESSION to debate COVERT AID to CONTRAS. 20.02.10-M/S TIP O'NEILL on rostrum of House, announcing the Secret session, shots of HOUSE security workers closing and locking the doors of House Chamber. DUKE v.o.-this kind of session, for which members had to take oath of secrecy, has happened only four times. Shots of Congressmen entering the House. C/S Rep. HENRY HYDE (R-IL) outside Capitol, says the secrecy wasn't warranted by the small volume of classified info discussed. C/S Rep. CLARENCE LONG (D-MD) says he wishes that it was conducted in PUBLIC, since the taxpayers' money and the reputation of the U.S. is involved. Rep. GEORGE MILLER (D-CA), says the evidence of COVERT ACTIVITIES presented by the HOUSE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE was compelling, and many members weren't previously aware of the nature of COVERT AID to CONTRAS. 20.03.24-C/U newspaper clippings regarding Rep. MILLER'S visit to NICARAGUA, DUKE v.o.-MILLER among 4 DEMOCRATS who went to NICARAGUA on fact finding mission. C/S Rep. MIKE LOWRY (D-WA) in debate, says NICARAGUAN people all agree that the CIA'S actions with CONTRAS was aimed at OVERTHROWING SANDINISTA GOVERNMENT. Regardless of opinion of Sandinistas, this is intolerable. C/S Rep. MILLER outside Capitol, says voting to cut off the secret war in NICARAGUA will be his most important vote since VIETNAM. DUKE v.o.-opponents of COVERT CIA ACTION don't seem to have the votes to cut it off. C/S HENRY HYDE, discusses partisan polarization, says the issue should transcend "politics" [obviously HYDE'S definition of "politics" is pretty narrow]. 20.04.55-C/Us of newspaper articles. L/S-M/S exterior of WHITE HOUSE. DUKE v.o.-REAGAN beginning media offensive to reverse PUBLIC OPINION. Clip of CNN footage, C/S REAGAN giving address, asking for a "bipartisan commission" to study ways to promote anticommunism in LATIN AMERICA. C/S HYDE, says that the commission method has helped resolve other acrimonious debates in past. Still HENRY KISSINGER, DUKE v.o.-KISSINGER is controversial. C/S Rep. CLARENCE LONG, says the Administration made a mistake by packing the commission with REAGAN SUPPORTERS. C/S Sen. CHARLES MATHIAS (R-MD), says KISSINGER is reputed figure, he can be independent and objective based on his reputation. C/S Rep. MIKE BARNES (D-MD), hopes commission will calm the debate, but KISSINGER is making things more heated. 20.07.10-CLIP of REAGAN address, defends choice of KISSINGER to lead commission. DUKE v.o.-REAGAN having similar problems with MX MISSILE. M/S well and rostrum of House chamber. C/S Rep. RON COLEMAN (D-TX) says he's reconsidering his position on MX MISSILE because it's too expensive. C/S Rep. ROBERT MICHEL (MINORITY LEADER), says the MX must be built regardless of cost.
July 18, 1995 - Part 2
(11:15:15) So, whether we put these notes on a screen and hint around that there's a problem, let's get back to the question here, the papers of Vince Foster. Where did we get that note? They were turned over to this Committee by President Clinton's lawyers. They were not kept from this Committee. I think that's an Important point, and when we see documents that say redacted, which means something has been left out, that is part of the procedures under which we are operating, where information may be redacted if it covers other questions and isn't relevant, whether it's a phone call or another comment. So let's not put endless papers that say redacted, redacted, redacted. We have a procedure for dealing with redacted documents. So I hope that what I can do is just look at these documents because they're shown on these screens, and maybe some will give us something we don't already know and that would be very useful to the Committee. Mr. Chairman, I am done with my comments, and I look forward to our witnesses. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Grams. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROD GRAMS Senator GRAMS Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for, of course, calling this important round of hearings. Some may ask why the hearings we conduct today and over the next few weeks are relevant to the lives of the average American. The first answer to that question is that the failure of Madison Guaranty Savings & Loan cost the American taxpayers $60 million, and there is evidence that the investments of America's First Fam- ily in the Whitewater Development Corporation played a major role in Madison's failure. We owe it to the American people, the people who work hard and pay their taxes to keep Government operating, to get to the bottom of this whole affair. More importantly, however, the testimony we will hear over the next 3 weeks on the events surrounding the death of White House Associate Counsel Vincent Foster will unmask a side of Government we don't like to see: arrogance, abuse of power, obstruction of justice, lack of accountability to the people. These are the real subjects of our hearings. While all of us would prefer not to think that these things go on at the highest levels of our Government, we suspect deep down inside that they do The story you're about to hear is simple, often troubling, some times unbelievable, but in the end reveals why the American peo- ple don't trust their Government anymore. I have just one chapter in this story to tell, but like the rest of this unveiling tale, it contains conflicting testimony, failures to recollect important events and questionable accounts of what really happened in July 1993. Specifically, I am referring to the events surrounding the uncontrolled rummaging by White House officials in and out of Vince Foster's office the night of his death. Or more 28 simply put: Who came and left, when, why, with whom, and what did they take with them? As conflicting as the accounts we are about to hear may seem, there are things we do know to be true. Fact: Vince Foster was deeply involved in President and Mrs. Clinton's handling of Whitewater, Fact- On the night of Mr. Foster's death, the White House Counsel's suite was opened by a member of the Secret Service at 10:42. Fact- On the same night, the White House Counsel's suite was closed by that same member of the Secret Service at 11:41. Fact: During that hour, three Administration officials, Bernard Nussbaum, then White House Counsel; Maggie Williams, the First Lady's Chief of Staff-, and Patsy Thomasson, then Deputy Director of Administration at the White I-louse entered Mr. Foster's office for some period of time. Fact: Despite requests from the Park Police to secure Mr. Foster's office for the purpose of protecting the integrity of the contents therein, Mr. Foster's off-ice was not secured until the next morning. Those are the facts which leave us with a number of troubling questions. Why wasn't the office of Mr. Foster, a high-ranking Government official, secured on the night of his death, especially when the circumstances of his death were not fully known? Why were three White House officials given free rein to go in and out of Mr. Foster's office that night when the Park Police were refuse entry the next day? Why were these officials so intent on rummaging through Mr. Foster's office that night? Why do the accounts of that night by Mr. Nussbaum, Ms. Williams and Ms. Thomasson, conflict with each other? Why did Mr. Nussbaum, by all accounts, other than his own, leave Ms. Williams and Ms. Thomasson alone in the White House Counsel's suite? Finally, were any documents from Mr. Foster's office removed in the middle of the night? Now, these are just a few of the questions left unanswered answered by the depositions this Committee took over the last few weeks, questions that still need answers. It is my sincere hope that we unearth these answers to these questions, Mr. Chairman otherwise I'm afraid that our Government may never again regain the full confidence of the American people. The American people are generally willing to give Government the benefit of the doubt, but when the people learn about how their public officials have abused their trust and assumed the power to Cover up questionable actions their faith in government disappears, We can't allow that to happen
July 18, 1995 - Part 2
(11:25:21) I want to commend you for that statement and for that commitment. This is not a time for trying to score partisan political points, and these hearings should not be a forum for rumor and innuendo that are not supported by fact, nor should these hearings be allowed to become another battleground for the kind of culture wars that characterized the handling of Dr. Foster's nomination. Frankly, that seems to have an unfortunately growing role in our politics. Rather, this is a time to try to ascertain the facts and to try to understand what happened. That can only happen if we go where the evidence takes us and avoid any attempts to demonize people because we disagree with their views on policy issues, We must avoid any temptation to suggest that wrongdoing has occurred here because we don't like what someone stands for or because we think that person is too influential or we want to cut him or her down to size. Allegations made merely to seek advantage in upcoming elections that are unsupported by the evidence have no place here. The hearings we are conducting must be fair and impartial) and that involves keeping closely in mind what precipitated the events we are examining in this phase of the Committee's work. Again, that is the tragic death of Vincent Foster. We are not here today to review the cause of his death. We looked at that issue last year. Moreover, every official agency of government that has examined the cause of death has reached the same conclusions that Vince Foster's death resulted from suicide. Despite the cottage industry that has arisen to offer bizarre alternative theories as to what happened to Mr. Foster, there, frankly, is no reasonable doubt on that score. Fairness demands that we keep constantly in mind that Vince Foster's death had a devastating effect on those with whom he worked. He was very popular. He was both respected and liked What is more, as a Member of the White House staff, he shared the long hours, the frantic pace and the huge amount of work that characterizes those jobs. This kind of working environment and the closeness that it engenders -made his death hit other White House staffers very hard. Most Of them, frankly, were not just co-workers; many of them were friends, even good friends. Vince Foster's death affected them all very deeply. We sometimes act as if people who enter public service give up at least part of their humanity when they do so, but that is not the case. Vince Foster's co-workers and friends were not just members of the White House staff; they were human beings, they were peo- 31 ple who grieve and cry and act just like any other American facing a similar situation. That, I believe, is an important thing for us to keep in mind. The American people, justifiably, do not want the White House or Congress or any other part of Government treated any better than they are, We want the same rules to apply to ev- eryone. We all expect a suicide involving a member of the White House staff to be fully investigated. In fact, given that the White House is involved, most Americans would expect that a higher in- vestigative standard would be used than in other cases. However, the American people are also a compassionate people. Most Americans know how they would react if a good friend died tragically and unexpectedly and they can empathize with the situation that the friends of Vince Foster faced. Most Americans view a death of this kind not just as a matter for the police, but a moment for friends and family to come together to support one another. While there is dispute as to whether the Park Police officer was momentarily kept from Mrs. Foster the night that Vince Foster died, I would think it would not be at all strange if it happened because, quite frankly, no American wants to share the moment of greatest grief with strangers, and that includes the police. I want to conclude, Mr, Chairman, by making one final point, This Committee has a responsibility to be thorough, but it also has a responsibility to finish, Most, if not all, of the witnesses we will hear from in this phase of the Committee's work have been deposed as many as half a dozen times before, if not more. We are asking many of them who knew Vince Foster well, people who were close to him both professionally and personally, to relive a Very painful part of their lives. We are inevitable dredging up painful memories for Mrs. Foster and the Foster family. I hope that this Committee, therefore, will not lose s sighy of the need to be expeditious, as well as thorough and of the need to allow all of these people to come to closure with the death of Vince Foster. In short I hope that we will meet both our professional obligation and our human obligation. If we work together we can forgo the opportunity for partisan gamesmanship, and I'm sure that we could meet both Of those critically important obligations and put this issue to rest once and for all. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. Thank YOU, Senator.
JFK Assassination Hearings - Ida Cox, Dr. Lowell Levine, Calvin S. McCamy
Opening shot of Hearing room from back, people beginning to congregate in audience and committee stand (00:00:18) SANDFORD UNGAR introduces hearing as second day - shot switches to him and panel who he introduces: DAVID LIFTON, critic of the Warren Commission, and JEREMIAH O'LEARY, of the Washington Star - Ungar gives a summary of the testimony to follow: forensic pathologists will scrutinize the original JFK autopsy - the panel discusses the original autopsy and it's short comings, namely that it did not recognize that JFK had been shot through the back and out the neck and that many of the measurements differ between illustrations and the autopsy reports - Ungar explains that the Chairman of the committee LEWIS STOKES and two other members will have to petition for more funds during today's hearings (I 09:00:20 - O 09:09:30) Committee convenes - Professor G. ROBERT BLAKEY introduces day's testimony, he says that autopsy the biggest source of controversy over the assassination and goes on to give a very detailed account of JFK's medical treatment from the moment he arrived at Parkland hospital through to his autopsy back east by Captain JAMES J. HUMED M.D., important issues he brings up in this account are that the doctors at Parkland did not notice the entry wound through the back and that they performed a tracheotomy through the wound in JFK's neck, obscuring the wound so that it was not recognized in the autopsy, also the discovery of the infamous bullet 399 on a stretcher that was thought to have passed through both JFK and Governor JOHN CONNALLY (09:09:32) Blakey brings up that because autopsy doctors had to keep their findings secret, the press went nuts with speculation, the effect of which must be taken in consideration as a force behind conspiracy theories Blakey tells the committee and then sites New York Times' articles with contradictory and incorrect information about the bullet's points of entry and passage through JFK (09:17:12) Blakey talks about the Warren Commission and the single bullet theory, mentioning that no member of the commission really investigated the autopsy (09:18:00) Blakey gives the Warren Commission findings which supported the single bullet theory, Blakey goes on to list in detail the serious criticisms of the Warren Commission findings and subsequent research and investigation to go on since then and now (1978) (09:19:20) Blakey lists all the medical issues the committee determined it needed to investigate: the number of bullets that struck JFK and Connally, the number, type and location of wounds each man received, the ten centimeter discretion between the autopsy reports and illustrations in the wound in the back of JFK's head, the course of the single bullet through both JFK and Connally, the apparent backward motion of JFK's head, the possibility that the president was hit in both the rear and the front of the head, the statements of the Parkland doctors concerning JFK's wounds, the authenticity of the autopsy's X-rays and photographs, and the competency of the autopsy and the consideration that it was ordered to be incomplete (09:23:10) Blakey explains the panel of forensic pathologists, two groups, one that had previously reviewed the X-rays and photographs and one that had not, lists thier names and positions (09:24:45) Blakey lists the assignments of the forensic pathologist panel (09:26:00) Blakey mentions that the committee has done its own investigation to come up with missing autopsy materials including JFK's brain - but could not find these materials, it is thought that ROBERT KENNEDY had them destroyed (09:27:00) Blakey introduces and lists the credentials of IDA DOX, medical illustrator (09:28:27) Dox is sworn in, Representative ANDREW PURDY is recognized to question Dox and asks her how she was chosen and how she decided what to illustrate - Dox answers that she was Georgetown's pick when the school was contacted by the committee and that the decision of what to illustrate was chosen based on what best showed the injuries and represented the medical panel's findings - Dox goes on to explain her technique in replicating the photographs and gives details to Purdy of her access to the original photographs and her use of duplicates (09:29:10) Dox explains in detail how she did other illustrations for panel that were not replicas of photos but illustrations of their their conclusions - much of this was done superimposing images of interior stucture over the photos of JFK, very meticulous, detailed work (09:34:27) Dox is excused and Profesor Blakey introduces Dr. LOWEL LEVINE and CALVIN S. MCCAMY to testify as to the authenticity of the autopsy photos and X-rays who are then simultaneously called (09:37-50) Levine and McCamy sworn in, Purdy asks Levine to explain the process of dental identification and how he can conclude that the autopsy X-rays are actually of JFK - Levine explains in detail (09:39:36) Levine walks over to exhibit of dental and autopsy X-rays shows the comparison and confirms that the autopsy X-rays are of JFK (09:43:57) Purdy's questioning turns to McCamy who he asks about the authenticity of the autopsy photographs (09:49:17) A new exhibit is introduced explaining paralax of human vision - McCamy explains how he can conclude photos are authentic and unaltered (09:52:30) McCamy and Levine are excused (09:56:18) Blakey introduces and calls Dr. MICHAEL BADEN, the chairman of the forensic pathology department (00:56:28) Baden is sworn in and tape cuts off (09:57:42)
August 4, 1994 - Part 12
(22:50:31) I suggested to Ms. Hanson that whoever was doing the research might find it useful to speak to Beth Nolan. Ms. Nolan was an Associate White House Counsel on my staff who dealt with ethic issues. She is a former ethics professor at George Washington Law' School and is well known and respected for her expertise. (Ms, Nolan later told me she did in fact have a discussion with the Treasury ethics official, Dennis Foreman.) I also suggested to Ms. Hanson that to the extent there might be ultimately be some concern at the Treasury or the RTC about an appearance of lack of independence of the decisionmakers on the Madison/Whitewater investigation, she might take a look at the civil jurisdiction in the recently appointed Independent Counsel's charter and consider the advisability of the RTC referring these matters to the Independent Counsel. On February 3, or shortly thereafter, I recall running into Mr Altman in the hallway of the West Wing of the White House. Mr. Altman told me in a brief conversation that he had given the recusal issue more thought, and he probably would not recuse him self But I also knew at the same time as I just said, that Treasury Later in February, either Mr. Eggleston or Ms. Hanson told me that Mr. Altman would leave the RTC at the end of March when his term expired and that he either could not or would not seek renewal of his appointment. I also believe that Mr. Altman told me later in February, in another brief conversation, that a Washington lawyer, Larry Simon, was likely to be nominated to head and he hoped Mr. Simon's nomination would be confidence There is also an additional conversation, an internal one the White House not with Treasury or the RTC or anyone the White House-which I believe will help the Committee understand that there was no attempt on our part to influence outcome of the RTC's investigation. In mid-February 1994, one of the lawyers on my staff told that the RTC had retained Jay Stephens to conduct its investigation of Madison. Mr. Stephens, as you know, had expressed bitter political opposition to the President in the past. When he resigned 475 as U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia in early 1993, he did so with a political blast at the Administration. In response to this news, when I heard Mr. Stephens was hired by Ms. Kulka and Mr. Ryan, I shook my head in dismay and disbelief I said internally in the White House, the appointment of Mr. Stephens was ridiculous and unfair. I also said there was nothing we should or would do about it. The meetings and contacts I have described have given rise to considerable controversy. In my view, however, they were appropriate. I was acting to facilitate the proper functioning of the Exec- utive Branch and to enable the White House to perform its official duties. I was acting in the pursuit of legitimate public purposes. First, with respect to the September 29 meeting, Ms. Hanson provided the White House with notice of a referral that she predicted--quite correctly-the White House would be required publicly to address in the near future, Treasury understood that neither the President nor the First Lady was a subject of the referral. They were potential witnesses. 'There was obviously a concern that a partial or inaccurate leak might lead the uninformed to believe that because the Clintons were mentioned-or "named"--in the referral, they were somehow ,implicated in some improper conduct. In preparation for these hearings and those in the House, I have been questioned about whether I thought Treasury officials had provided the White House with so-called nonpublic information as if there was something illegitimate about an executive agency sharing nonpublic information With the White House. The White House receives nonpublic information all the time. The real question is whether the information is being properly transmitted and properly used for an official purpose and not for private gain or some other illegitimate purpose.
August 4, 1994 - Part 12
(23:45:12) Senator DODD. I guess I don't have to ask about the February 2nd meeting, now do I? Let me run down there, This is a-the dates, September 29th, October 14th, February 2nd, February 3rd, 490 the 24th, March 1st, these are all the dates we've been hearing about now for the last 5 or 6 days. It's obviously the brackets here in time. We've heard a lot of people talk about where they clearly felt significant mistakes and bad judgment calls occurred. My own view is that the contacts, there were so many and too many people, were sloppy, The March 1st and 3rd ones, I thought, were irresponsible, to put it mildly, in terms of not getting back when there was clearly debate over what was said, and what was not said at this Committee's hearing on the 24th. I think that the whole notion of two hats, as Senator Sarbanes just said, invited its own set of problems. I'd like you quickly-because I see the light on here-but quickly to go back down here and identify where you think the principal mistakes were made. If you could redo this thing, where were the major mistakes made, where should we as a Committee be looking to say here are the things that should have been done differently? Mr. NUSSBAUM. Let me tell you there are two areas. One, as I said in my statement, we made mistakes in the White House. Mr. Cutler's report indicates some of those mistakes. There were too many meetings, too many people. I wrote a series of memos designed to prevent contacts between people in the White House and other agencies-regulatory, independent, Department of Justice, Department of the Treasury-with respect to investigative matters. I didn't want people from the White House communicating with any other agencies with respect to those matters unless the Counsel's Office was involved so we could make sure that it was an official, proper, public purpose. That system, I believed, worked well, by and large, from January 20, 1993, until about February 2, 1994. It broke down. It broke down, to some extent, in February 1994 when too many people in the White House were having too many conversations with people over at Treasury and RTC, with respect to this matter, without Counsel present. I should have been more vigilant and more alert and I take some of the responsibility, maybe most of the responsibility, for that. It broke down, Mr. Cutler's proposed rules with respect to all conversations shall just be Counsel to Counsel on these issues and no one else is involved, when there are issues with regard to investigations or adjudication, is a good rule. It means, now, even if Counsel is present you can't have such a conversation. The conversation has to be only Counsel to Counsel because if you have other people in on the meetings, then they think they can go out and talk on their own. So Mr. Cutler's suggestion is a good suggestion. That's where we made one mistake, which I'm sorry about, which Mr. Cutler and others in the White House I'm sure will correct as they should correct. There is one other area I must throw out to you that this Committee should exercise oversight and it would be hard to do things, and that is these enormous leaks that come out of these agencies, the RTC particularly, which are under your oversight supervision. Something must be done with respect to that issue. This is a serious problem in the United States, these leaks that come out of RTC and come out of other agencies, Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney's offices around the country from time to time., This is a serious 491 problem in our society and part of the reason we had these meetings was basically to defend ourselves against this kind of thing. This doesn't justify doing everything or anything because somebody is leaking but nonetheless, this is a serious problem. When you get a good man like Louie Freeh to head the FBI and he announces a policy that there shall be no leaks, anybody who is ,caught leaking will be fired-that's what I believe Director Freeh has said-I think he's going to take control over the Bureau in that sense and prevent leaks. That can be done by him. I I think Janet Reno is trying to make efforts in the Department of Justice, too. But there are too many agencies with investigative responsibilities such as the RTC, which do leak. Too many innocent people are hurt. And that is something this Committee, I think, with all due respect should consider. senator DODD, Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Dodd. senator Bennett. Senator BENNETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You're quite a refreshing personality, Mr. Nussbaum.
Whitewater Hearings August 1, 1994 - Part 1
(11:45:50) Senator MOSELEY-BRAUN. Mr. Chairman? Senator MACK. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make one last comment. The CHAIRMAN. Please. Go ahead. Senator MACK. Ms. Hanson had some very confidential information regarding the criminal referrals after she spoke to you, information which people involved in the case should not have access to. Mr. ROELLE. Again, Senator, without trying to be an expert on the law or ethics regarding this matter, I believe that it would have been better had no one known about these criminal referrals. Senator MACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. What I want to try to do here is to in the order of the Members. Then, if others want to get in, I'd ask you to ask Members to Yield and they may or may not wish to do so. But I want to try to go back and forth to the Members. I know you're seeking recognition right now. If there's a parliamentary issue, I'll recognize it. But I'd like to go ahead to Senator Shelby. Senator MosELEY-BRAuN. If Senator Shelby would yield for a moment. I just wanted to clear up-Mr. Roelle said something that, without clarification, I think can be misleading. If the Senator would just yield for a single question of Mr. Roelle. Senator SHELBY. Wit out losing any time. OPENING COMMENTS OF SENATOR CAROL MOSELEY-BRAUN Senator MOSELEY-BRAuN. Certainly. Mr. Roelle, when you said, when you discussed the referrals, you referred to the President and First Lady. You did not clarify whether you meant as witnesses in the referral or as targets of the referral. I think it's important for the record that you make clear in which regard your reference was made. Mr. ROELLE. I would prefer-I don't want to cross this line, Senator. I mentioned-I am willing to completely be forthcoming that the Clintons' names were mentioned. I think how they're mentioned would be getting into the details of the referrals. I will seek your guidance. I will be totally forthcoming, if somebody will just tell me where they want me to be on this issue. The CHAIRMAN. I'm not sure it's your job to answer that question. I think it's generally understood, from a host of information that's out in the public arena, that they were mentioned as witnesses, 23 which is not the other inference. So, I'm going to just leave that there for now. Senator MOSELEY-BRAUN. I have no further questions. The CHAIRMAN. I don't think Mr. Roelle ought to be the one asked to step across that line. I think your question was an appropriate one. Senator Shelby. OPENING COMMENTS OF SENATOR RICHARD C. SHEL13Y Senator SHELBY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ryan, I believe you testified in your opening statement, basically saying that Mr. Altman wanted Madison treated the same as any other case. If that was true, was there a committee set up to deal with Madison/Whitewater? Mr. RYAN. There was, yes, sir. Senator SHELBY. Is this ordinarily done in the RTC? Mr. RYAN. No, sir, it wasn't ordinarily done. It was set up because we were getting-the RTC was receiving a large number of informational requests from the Congress and from the press. Senator SHELBY. From everybody? Mr. RYAN. From everybody. We felt that we had to be consistent in the way we responded to those inquiries. Senator SHELBY. In other words, basically, you thought this was an extraordinary case. Mr. RYAN. It was an extraordinary case. Senator SHELBY. Possibly involving some people at the White House. Mr. RYAN, That's correct. Senator SHELBY. OK. How did this committee come to be formed? Did you put it together? Mr. RYAN. I put it together, yes, sir. Senator SHELBY. And who was on the committee? Mr. RYAN. Three members were on the committee. Mr. Collishaw from our legal division, Peter Knight, and Jim Dudine from our investigations unit. The reason I'm hesitating in trying to recall the answers to those questions is that this committee remained in use for a very short period of time. Senator SHELBY. How long did the committee last? A week? Ten days? Mr. RYAN. Probably 2 or 3 weeks. When our General Counsel, Ellen Kulka, arrived on January 17, 1994, she formed a working group that assumed much of what this committee Senator SHELBY, Superseded the committee all together or assumed some of the responsibility? Mr. RYAN. Assumed some of the responsibility and the rest was dealt with in our regular fashion. Senator SHELBY, And what was that, regular fashion? It's a very good question.
August 4, 1994 - Part 7
(16:00:24) The next communication I know about between White House and Treasury officials on this subject occurred on October 14, 1993, On that day, I and several of my colleagues met with officials from the Treasury Department at the White House to discuss additional press inquiries. This meeting took place after Jack DeVore, a press official at the Treasury Department, had received a call from Jeff Gerth of The New York Times about the alleged criminal referrals,. including a suggestion that the referrals were being "bottled up " in Washington, rather than going to the U.S. Attorney's office in Little Rock. My understanding was that Mr. DeVore was seeking guidance on how to respond to the press inquiry. He told us that he had checked and found that the referrals had initially been sent Washington, but that, well before the reporter inquired, they had, been forwarded to the U.S. Attorney's office. Mr. DeVore wished to 359 confirm these facts to the reporter before an incorrect story was written on the subject. He indicated it was standard practice for the RTC to confirm the existence of a criminal referral. I expressed some surprise at this and suggested that Mr. DeVore, rather than confirming the existence of the referrals, should simply respond to the reporter by stating that whatever had been sent from the RTC had been forwarded to the U.S. Attorney's office prior to the reporter's inquiry. No one discussed or suggested that any action should be taken to try to influence the matters that were the subject of the referrals. To my knowledge, other than my checking campaign records with regard to one of the questions the reporter was asking, nothing further was done after October 14, other than Mr. DeVore responding to the reporter's inquiry. In early December 1993, 1 received faxes from two Treasury Department officials of press-generated Freedom of Information Act requests for Madison documents. These came to me without comment, and I took no action in response to them. The final so-called Whitewater-Treasury contact in which I was involved occurred sometime in February 1994, and again was precipitated by a press inquiry: A reporter contacted the press office at the Treasury Department about a meeting between White House and Treasury officials at which there was a briefing on the RTC civil statute of limitations. The reporter said that she understood that, at the meeting, a White I-louse official attempted to pressure the Treasury Department to give a similar briefing to the private attorneys involved in the matter. The press inquiry to the Treasury Department was passed along to the White House press off-lee who passed it along to me. Since I had not attended any White House-Treasury meeting, I called Roger Altman, whom the reporter indicated had attended the meeting, and asked him whether such a meeting had occurred and, if so, what had happened. Mr. Altman told me there was a meeting in early February at which he and other Treasury officials briefed White House officials on the statute of limitations issue. Mr. Altman told me that a White House official had asked him whether a similar briefing would be given to the private attorneys in the matter. Mr. Altman said that he had checked with an RTC attorney who indicated such a briefing would be given at an appropriate time but not now. Mr. Altman told me that no one at the meeting instructed him to do anything. I advised Mr. Altman to respond to the press inquiry accordingly, and I took no further action. I have now informed this Committee of all White House--Treasury Department communications in which I was involved. I have also produced my contemporaneous handwritten notes and memoranda relating to these matters, which I believe fully reflect what I have just recounted. Before I conclude, Mr. Chairman, let me restate as clearly as I can: None of these conversations, nor any other action that I am aware of, involved any effort by anybody to influence the conduct of any investigation. They were discussions advising us of press inquiries and discussions about how to respond to them. Nothing improper occurred. I will be happy to answer any questions the Committee may have, 360 GEORGE R. STEPHANOPOULOS, SENIOR ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT FOR POLICY AND STRATEGY, WASHINGTON, DC Mr. STEPHANOPOULOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, my name is, George Stephanopoulos and I serve as Senior Policy Advisor to the President. My testimony concerning matters which are the subject of these hearings will focus mainly on two brief telephone conversations, both of which occurred on February 25th. The first occurred with Josh Steiner, Treasury Chief of Staff, concerning Roger Altman's decision to announce his recusal from decisions concerning Madison Guaranty. Mr. Steiner was my regular point of contact at Treasury for obtaining information that affected Administration policy. In the course of that conversation, I asked about the decision to hire former U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia, Jay Stephens-a vocal, persistent and public political opponent of the President-to handle the RTC inquiry of Madison. I was puzzled at how he could be hired, given his obvious inability to be impartial, and I asked how that decision was made.
LAWMAKERS
20.06.27-C/S of a woman, says CONGRESS should not be dealing with ABORTION ISSUE at all. Shot of line of protesters, most women, carrying PRO-CHOICE signs and chanting on sidewalk. Shot of bearded ANTI-ABORTION MAN (PRO-LIFE) holding up large banner with grotesque picture of aborted fetus. L/S PRO-CHOICE protesters. WERTHEIMER v.o.-PRO-CHOICE side got off to a bad start in 1981 with Sen. JOHN EAST (R-NC) introduced a "human life" bill that declared the SUPREME COURT to be in error in ROE V. WADE. C/S Sen. EAST in Committee hearing, announces that ROE V. WADE would be erased by his attempt to define Conception as the beginning of life. WERTHEIMER-EAST damaged his cause by being high-handed and overconfident of victory. C/S ORRIN HATCH in committee. 20.07.28-Exterior of Capitol. WERTHEIMER v.o.-tactical squabbles (statute vs. Constitutional Amendment) divided Conservatives until 1982, JESSE HELMS finally took an anti-abortion bill to the floor. C/S HELMS in office, says life would be easier if there was no ABORTION ISSUE, but he can't compromise on his beliefs. C/S of page with HELMS proposed ANTI-ABORTION bill, v.o.-bill included SCHOOL PRAYER provisions also. M/S Sen. BOB PACKWOOD speaking to a crowd outdoors. C/S HELMS giving press conference. HELMS says the closeness of the vote is proof that the ANTI-ABORTION side is getting stronger. 20.08.30-WERTHEIMER-the NEW RIGHT also lost on VOTING RIGHTS ACT reforms. Shots of a House committee hearing with CIVIL RIGHTS ADVOCATES demanding extension of a tougher VOTING RIGHTS ACT. VERNON JORDAN (of Zippergate fame) testifying, says he doesn't trust SOUTHERN WHITES to be left alone to protect his rights. Rep. HENRY HYDE (R-IL) trying to justify the gutting of the VOTING RIGHTS ACT by saying that the Senate won't pass a tough law-"If you can't get dinner, you get a sandwich". Shot of HELMS with colleagues walking down Capitol steps. C/S EAST in office, says conservatives caved to pressure and realized they couldn't get away with gutting VOTING RIGHTS ACT [not East's words].
August 1, 1994 - Part 9
(23:10:40) Ms. HANSON. I can't say what was in Mr. Altman's mind, at that time, about that letter. I have testified as to how I viewed the letter and what I understood the letter to be. Senator GRAMM. In your mind, because you were going to do another letter later, you thought that this was an adequate, acceptable response to give? Ms. HANSON. With respect to putting the Committee on notice of the two fall meetings-but, again, sir, it was not intended to fully answer +I%,- question or to be a complete supplement, by any means, to the transcript. Senator GRAmm. Maam, let me just read you what this says. I don't understand this whole! logic. Let me just read you this, give you the answer, and then, pose a couple of quick questions. With regard to the second paragraph of the letter, the situation is that you've been asked, "Were there any other communications between the RTC and the White House?" and that Mr. Altman says, in the letter in which he had answered, "Not to my knowledge." Forget the fact that we know-and I could give you 20 or more examples where-that's not true. Just forget that. Then, this letter comes down and says, "I have learned, today, of two conversations which did take place between Treasury staff and White House personnel on this matter. Ms. Hanson, you have answered questions, in the last hour, in which you said that you, not just anybody that worked for the Treasury, but you, had conversations with the White House on February 3, 1994, 49 1994, February 8, 1994, and two conversations with two different people on February 23, 1994. In fact I three different people on February 23, 1994, one day before the testimony. When you read this letter, when you had, personally, had one, two, three, four, five, six communications yourself , as a member of the Treasury Department, didn't you think about it and say "Mr. Altman, you write here that you said at the Committee you had no knowledge of any communications between Treasury staff and the White House, but that you have learned about two"? Did you think about saying, 'Mr. Altman I have, personally, myself, had a mini-mum of six communications, and three of them were the day before you testified"? I don't understand why-when you read this letter, why you didn't say to him, "Mr. Altman, this is clearly not true." Ms. HANSON. This letter was intended to respond to Senator Bond's question that asked how the White House was notified of the referrals, because the first conversation that he refers to, of the two conversations, was my conversation with Mr. Nussbaum. This was not intended to answer-in fact, at the time this letter was written, I hadn't even-the only questions that I had before me 195 were the two questions of Senator Bond as to how the White House had been notified. Senator GRAMM. To try to save time, and not to be impolite, when Senator Bond asked him, at the hearing, whether any other conversations had taken place, he answers, "Not to my knowledge." Then, he writes in this letter that he's learned, today, of two conversations. My point is, you yourself, by testimony you've given today, have told us that you were involved in one, two, three, four, five, six conversations, three of them the day before he testified. How could you not say, "Mr. Altman, this letter is verifiably false"'? I can't conceive-it's almost as if,. Ms. Hanson, you can compartmentalize, in your mind, this question, and limit it down to just what Mr. Altman wants to say, and that he is saying he is giving a limited response when he says he would appreciate the ability, through this letter, to amend the record.