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WETA "LAWMAKERS" 3/24/1984 IN 15.30.03-WETA credit/sponsor credits/title sequence 15.30.57-PAUL DUKE/COKIE ROBERTS/LINDA WERTHEIMER-DUKE-before recess, SENATE joined HOUSE to endorse major SOCIAL SECURITY REFORMS, and both houses embraced compromise on a JOBS BILL. New head of EPA, WILLIAM RUCKELSHAUS seems a shoo-in to be approved. Congress will probably also give REAGAN the MILITARY AID he wants for EL SALVADOR. WERTHEIMER-will profile one Senator with personal memories of VIETNAM and doubts about REAGAN'S course of action in EL SALVADOR. DUKE-REAGAN doesn't like the HOUSE DEMOCRATS budget plan which limits increases in DEFENSE SPENDING to less than half of what REAGAN wants. ROBERTS-DEMOCRATS finally got a BUDGET that they wanted in opposition to REAGAN. 15.32.35-C/S Rep. ROBERT MICHEL (minority leader) in debate in well of House, attacks the DEMOCRATS' budget, says it's just for REVENGE against REAGAN. C/S Rep. WILLIS GRADISON (R-OH) in office, says DEMOCRATS' strength makes it impossible for REAGAN or REPUBLICANS to get a budget through HOUSE. Shot of REAGAN and NANCY REAGAN at White House podium, shots of Congressmen in audience. ROBERTS v.o.-this year, DEMOCRATS can afford to lose the votes of CONSERVATIVE SOUTHERN DEMOCRATS and still have a majority. C/S REAGAN giving press conference, asking Congress to continue his economic plan, says "recovery" is beginning already (ha ha ha). Clip of 1981 appearance by REAGAN before Congress, REAGAN urging Congress to vote for REAGANOMICS as presented by PHIL GRAMM. 15.34.48-Rep. GRADISON in office, says REAGAN can't woo DEMOCRATS since the ECONOMY has stayed in the toilet after two years of REAGANOMICS. Clips of 1981 BUDGET DEBATE, TIP O'NEILL complains that REAGAN is trying to steamroll Congress. C/S TRENT LOTT in 1983 budget debate, arguing that the DEMOCRATS are imposing their will on the REPUBLICANS unfairly. Clip of Rep. ED JENKINS (D-GA) in 1981 budget debate, arguing against REAGANOMICS. C/S Rep. TOM LOEFFLER (R-TX) in 1983 budget debate, says the DEMOCRATS' budget was offered with no time for REPUBLICANS to read it before a vote. 15.36.49-Rep. CHARLES SHUMER (D-NY) says that the REPUBLICANS are complaining about the DEMOCRAT budget, but they don't have a competing proposal. C/S Rep. JAMES JONES (Chair of BUDGET COMMITTEE), says that REPUBLICANS shouldn't be obstructionist without offering an alternative. C/S GRADISON in office, says that REAGAN wants MILITARY SPENDING increases that are too high for REPUBLICANS to support in bad economic times. C/S Rep. LEON PANETTA (D-CA) argues that no one wants to "stay the course" of REAGANOMICS, or else REPUBLICANS would have offered up the REAGAN budget to oppose the DEMOCRATS' budget. C/S GRADISON, says that the REPUBLICANS now have the opportunity to attack the DEMOCRATS on their budget.
Watergate Hearings - testimony of James McCord (Jim McCord) May 22, 1973
Mr. James McCORD. Now, the above letter to Caulfield brings to mind another set of communications of mine on Dec 6, 1972. On Dec 4, 1972, Judge Sirica had stated in open court, that the jury in January 1973, would want to know who had hired the men for the Watergate operation & why. On December 6, 1972, the Washington Star carried an article which appeared to me to be an administration planted story answering Judge Sirica's query stating that "Reliable sources state that McCord recruited the four cubans and that they believed that they were working for the President on an extremely sensitive mission." This was untrue. This appeared to me to be laying the groundwork for a false claim at the trial that I was the "ringleader" of the Watergate plot. This would draw attention away from Hunt & Liddy, and I believe possibly away from the White House since both of them had formerly worked at the White House and I had not. That same evening, Dec 6, 1972, I sent telegrams to William 0. Bittman, attorney for Hunt, and Bernard Barker's residence in Miami, Fla., stating that the Star story was untrue as they both knew, and I asked for comments by return mail from Barker. I also wrote Hunt a letter on the matter stating that as he also knew, the story was untrue & he could either correct it, or I would do so. Copies of the telegrams can probably be obtained from the Western Union Co. With the letter to Caulfield in late Dec 1972, I was trying a to head off an effort to falsely lay the Watergate operation off on CIA. In the telegrams and letter to Hunt and the others in Dec 1972 that I have just referred to, I was trying to head off an effort to falsely lay the recruitment of the Cubans off on the writer which would in turn shift the focus of the trial off of those formerly connected with the White House, namely, Liddy and Hunt than from those who in effect had actually recruited them, namely Mr. Hunt. I have some other memorandum in the statements that I have here to read, and I can answer your questions at this point or proceed to the reading of the statement, as you would prefer. Senator Howard BAKER. If it's agreeable to the Chairman Mr. McCord, I'd prefer you go ahead and read the material that you have.
1980s - CONGRESS: WE THE PEOPLE - M.A.D.D.
M.A.D.D. President Candy Lightner describing the group's TV appearances. Men and women attending a ribbon-cutting for a M.A.D.D. center; over-sized scissors. Woman taking photograph. House Rep. Jim Wright (D-TX) with Lightner. Rep. Barnes says M.A.D.D. has done a good job of attracting media attention and getting people involved locally. U.S. House Representatives rostrum and well. Caucasian and African American Congressmen speaking. M.A.D.D. President Lightner testifying in Congressional hearing campaigning a national drinking age of 21. Congressmen and one Congresswoman on the dais' Congressman speaking. Lightner says having Rep. Barnes on her side is essential, and has led to more attention from Congress. Zoom out from computer to adult African American women sitting at computer terminals; host Ed Newman, standing in data processing room within the N.R.A. headquarters, wraps up by discussing the ingredients of successful lobbying, then signs off.
Whitewater Hearings August 1, 1994 - Part 1
(10:45:43) The RTC is also cooperating fully with Special Counsel Fiske, the House Banking Committee, the Treasury Office of Inspector General, the RTC Office of Inspector General, the General Accounting Office, and the Office of Government Ethics in their investigation of various aspects of this matter. During my deposition before Counsel for this Committee and before Special Counsel Fiske, I have been asked a number of questions which generally fell into the following categories: No. I. how I came to be selected for this job; No 2 my authority as Deputy CEO, which was my position when most of the events that are the subject of this hearing occurred; No. 3, my relationship with Mr. Altman and the Administration; No. 4 my knowledge of and/or participation in the White House Treasury contacts; No. 5 , whether I was ever instructed or pressured by the TreasurY or the White House to influence the investigation or the outcome Of the investigation into Madison Guaranty Savings & Loan; and 4 No. 6, whether I have done anything to impede or change the results of the RTC's investigation. For example, did I tell the RTC Staff that I preferred a finding that Whitewater did not cause a loss to Madison? I will cover for the record, briefly, my summary of the answers to these questions. First of all, concerning how I was selected for this job, I can only report what I know. I received a hone call in December 1993, while I was in Atlanta with the OTS, from Frank Newman, Under Secretary of the Treasury, whom I had known professionally when he was with Bank of America and I was at the Federal Reserve. Mr. Newman's call came not long after the nomination of Mr. Stanley Tate, as CEO, had been withdrawn, and he asked if I would consider a temporary assignment at the RTC, I traveled to Washington for two interviews, one with Mr. Altman and one with Secretary Bentsen. Those interviews were the first time I had met either of those gentlemen, either Mr. Altman or Secretary Bentsen. I don't believe the subject of Madison Guaranty came up during the course of those interviews, as most of the discussions dealt with morale problems at the RTC and what could be done about them. At those interviews, I agreed to serve as Deputy CEO of the RTC. The position of Deputy CEO is a statutory one enacted in the RTC Completion Act. There was no Deputy CEO before me and, as a result, the existing RTC organizational structure and delegations of authority did not provide for a Deputy CEO when I arrived. In fact, some of the senior officials of the corporation, by law, were required to report directly to the CEO, The lack of clear authority in the RTC's corporate structure, together with the temporary the fact that the Deputy CEO, created a very challenging nature of my appointment Secretary of the Treasury remained environment in which to assume operating responsibility. Obviously, much of my time in the early days was spent trying to gain an understanding and some control over an organization that is surprisingly decentralized with functional units operating independently of each other. The precise decisionmaking responsibility is not only difficult to explain under such circumstances, but my observation is that it is often not clear to those working at the RTC as well. During my tenure as Deputy CEO, I reported directly to Mr. Altman, who was the Interim CEO. It should be noted that Mr. Altman essentially withdrew from active RTC management following the February 24, 1994, Senate Banking Committee's RTC Semiannual Oversight Board bearing, some 7 weeks after my arrival. During the period preceding the hearing, regular meetings were scheduled to discuss RTC matters. But due to Mr. Altman's busy schedule, many of these meetings never took place.
August 4, 1994 - Part 7
(16:30:57) Senator D'AMATO. I agree with my learned friend. Mr. Ickes? Next page, page 122, line 15. This is your testimony: "The purpose of this meeting and the focus of his discussion was the relationship of time that he felt this investigation might be wrapped up at and he said in so many words that it was his understanding"-being Altman--"that the investigation probably would not be concluded and that a determination could not be made by the RTC's General Counsel as to whether there was a basis for a civil claim until after the expiration of the statute of limitations has applied to the particular investigation." is your testimony true? Mr. ICKES. That is my testimony. Senator D'AMATO. Is it true? Mr. ICKES. Yes. Senator D'AMATO. Would you turn to page 124 , line 9. "I don't know whether it was public knowledge or not. I assumed that it was- when you say 'public,' did the public in general, I didn't think it was. I didn't know whether it was but it was my assumption that this was information that was not known to the public in general and probably very few people inside the Administration Is your testimony true? 369 Mr. ICKES. That is my testimony. Senator D'AMATO. It is true. Is it true? Mr, ICKES. Yes. Senator DAMATO. Thank you very much, and I thank my col- leagues. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sarbanes-is Senator Sarbanes just in the back room or has he stepped away? Senator Shelby. Senator SHELBY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Podesta, did you help prepare Mr. Altman for the February 24th oversight hearing for this Banking Committee? Mr. PODESTA. No, Senator, Senator SHELBY. You were not involved in briefing notes or in volved in any way? Mr. PODESTA. Other than the statement I gave, which is that Senator SHELBY. What was that? Mr. PODESTA. I had a very brief conversation with Mike Levy who is the Assistant Secretary of Treasury, saying that they'll probably get questions about recusal and he should be prepared to answer them, and I believe I had a brief conversation with Josh Steiner, fairly shortly after I learned of the February 2nd meeting saying that he was likely to be asked about any contacts he had with the White House on Madison, and that he should be prepared to answer a question about it. Senator SHELBY. Mr. Podesta, you called Mr. Altman about the White House concerns about his testimony before this Committee? Mr. PODESTA. I did. Senator SHELBY. When did you call him? Mr. PODESTA. March 1. Senator SHELBY. How many days after his testimony? Mr. PODESTA. He testified on Thursday. That would be the following Tuesday. Senator SHELBY. What did you relate to him about the concerns? What did you say to him, basically what did you say? Mr. PODESTA. We had a 5- or 10-minute conversation. We talked briefly about setting up the February meeting. I think we both concluded that the testimony didn't need to be supplemented in that regard. We talked about recusal at some greater length, and then finally we talked-we approached the subject of Senator Bond's questions on how the White House became aware of the RTC criminal referrals. Senator SHELBY. Specifically, what did he say about his failure to mention the recusal issue before this Committee? Mr. PODESTA. He said-to the best of my recollection, he said that it had been inadvertent, it had been in his briefing notes-let me start earlier. I believe he said that it had been raised with him at Treasury. Senator SHELBY. Were you aware of Mr. PODESTA. And it had been inadvertent. It had been in the note, and that he was thinking about it.
July 18, 1995 - Part 1
(10:50:28) Finally, what they do submit is censored and, the word of the day, redacted. Take, for example, Vince Foster's phone logs. The Committee asked for 2 weeks of phone logs, What we got was four pages of censored material with a total of seven phone calls in 2 weeks. If this is cooperation, I call it obstruction. I would like to just show you the phone calls, in 2 weeks the phone calls the White House says Vince Foster made. This is 2 weeks, seven calls they'll give us. [Pause.] Mr. Chairman, if that's cooperation, I would like to see if they failed to cooperate what they might do. I thank you. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator. Senator Sarbanes. Senator SARBANES. Mr. Chairman, I do think we ought to, in response to the question Senator Faircloth put to you, indicate to him", that you and I joined together in sending a letter to the Special Counsel requesting information and the results of the polygraph.. test to which he made reference. That was a test not administered as we understand it, by the White House. It was administered by the Special Counsel, and we jointly sent a letter requesting that material. Senator FAIRCLOTH. Did you say you had requested? The CHAIRMAN. Yes. We have requested of the Special Counsel the results and the questions of the polygraph test. So we have requested that. Senator FAIRCLOTH. But we haven't gotten them'. 21 The CHAIRMAN. No, we have not. Senator SARBANES. There were press reports that she had voluntarily taken this test and passed it with the Special Counsel and, therefore, Senator D'Amato and 1, in light of that, sent a letter to the Special Counsel requesting the results of that. Senator FAIRCLOTH. You did request it, but we have not received it. The CHAIRMAN. We have not received it, and we will take the liberty of saying Senator FAIRCLOTH. How many tests, Mr. Chairman, how many tests did she take? The CHAIRMAN. We don't know. It appears there were two tests, but we have not confirmed that. We don't know exactly if the Special Counsel administered both, but we have requested them, and we will renew that request. Senator FAIRCLOTH, Thank you. Senator SARBANES. Good. Senator KERRY, The record also better reflect the Senator's opening suggested it was an alleged test or an alleged passing, and I think the record is also clear as to the fact of the test, is it not? The CHAIRMAN. We really want to ascertain, I believe-I think we've been given to believe there was one test administered by the Special Counsel. We are attempting to pursue that, ascertain exactly how many and if they will give us the results or the questions and answer that question. That is still an open question. Senator SARBANES. Senator Bryan. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR RICHARD H. BRYAN Senator BRYAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me say at the outset I had urged unsuccessfully that Members not make opening statements so we could dispense with the rhetoric and hear directly from the witnesses, so my comments will be very brief I'm committed to joining with my colleagues in a thorough investigation of the events surrounding the tragic suicide of White House Deputy Counsel Vincent Foster and subsequent Whitewater related issues that will come before this Committee. Last year, this Committee conducted itself in a responsible, bipartisan manner that reflected well on the Senate. Given the highly political nature of the subject material, it is extremely difficult to keep this from turning into a partisan squabble. I, for one, am committed to an impartial investigation of the facts in public view. Public hearings are an integral part of the workings of Congress, and I fully support these public proceedings.
July 18, 1995 - Part 2
(10:50:28) Finally, what they do submit is censored and, the word of the day, redacted. Take, for example, Vince Foster's phone logs. The Committee asked for 2 weeks of phone logs, What we got was four pages of censored material with a total of seven phone calls in 2 weeks. If this is cooperation, I call it obstruction. I would like to just show you the phone calls, in 2 weeks the phone calls the White House says Vince Foster made. This is 2 weeks, seven calls they'll give us. [Pause.] Mr. Chairman, if that's cooperation, I would like to see if they failed to cooperate what they might do. I thank you. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator. Senator Sarbanes. Senator SARBANES. Mr. Chairman, I do think we ought to, in response to the question Senator Faircloth put to you, indicate to him", that you and I joined together in sending a letter to the Special Counsel requesting information and the results of the polygraph.. test to which he made reference. That was a test not administered as we understand it, by the White House. It was administered by the Special Counsel, and we jointly sent a letter requesting that material. Senator FAIRCLOTH. Did you say you had requested? The CHAIRMAN. Yes. We have requested of the Special Counsel the results and the questions of the polygraph test. So we have requested that. Senator FAIRCLOTH. But we haven't gotten them'. 21 The CHAIRMAN. No, we have not. Senator SARBANES. There were press reports that she had voluntarily taken this test and passed it with the Special Counsel and, therefore, Senator D'Amato and 1, in light of that, sent a letter to the Special Counsel requesting the results of that. Senator FAIRCLOTH. You did request it, but we have not received it. The CHAIRMAN. We have not received it, and we will take the liberty of saying Senator FAIRCLOTH. How many tests, Mr. Chairman, how many tests did she take? The CHAIRMAN. We don't know. It appears there were two tests, but we have not confirmed that. We don't know exactly if the Special Counsel administered both, but we have requested them, and we will renew that request. Senator FAIRCLOTH, Thank you. Senator SARBANES. Good. Senator KERRY, The record also better reflect the Senator's opening suggested it was an alleged test or an alleged passing, and I think the record is also clear as to the fact of the test, is it not? The CHAIRMAN. We really want to ascertain, I believe-I think we've been given to believe there was one test administered by the Special Counsel. We are attempting to pursue that, ascertain exactly how many and if they will give us the results or the questions and answer that question. That is still an open question. Senator SARBANES. Senator Bryan. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR RICHARD H. BRYAN Senator BRYAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me say at the outset I had urged unsuccessfully that Members not make opening statements so we could dispense with the rhetoric and hear directly from the witnesses, so my comments will be very brief I'm committed to joining with my colleagues in a thorough investigation of the events surrounding the tragic suicide of White House Deputy Counsel Vincent Foster and subsequent Whitewater related issues that will come before this Committee. Last year, this Committee conducted itself in a responsible, bipartisan manner that reflected well on the Senate. Given the highly political nature of the subject material, it is extremely difficult to keep this from turning into a partisan squabble. I, for one, am committed to an impartial investigation of the facts in public view. Public hearings are an integral part of the workings of Congress, and I fully support these public proceedings.
LAWMAKERS
03.23.59-ROBERTS in studio, intro profile of SYLVIO CONTE (R-MA). 03.24.25-Shot of CONTE in CHEF'S HAT, grating Parmesan, opera plays, compares making things happen in CONGRESS to cooking. CONTE removes lid of large tray of hot pasta. Shot of CONGRESSMEN entering a luncheon in CONTE'S offices. Shot of CONTE in a committee hearing. ROBERTS v.o.-CONTE supported first round of REAGAN budget cuts, but refused to support later cuts of SOCIAL PROGRAMS. 03.26.14-Shot of CONTE on HOUSE FLOOR, arguing vociferously against new BUDGET CUTS, says "These are the only antipoverty programs that are left. What do you want to do, hit [the poor] in the head?" Shot of CONTE in office, says that REAGAN ADMINISTRATION doesn't understand how CONGRESS works, wants to dictate to CONGRESS, Congressmen are elected to serve the people, have to be free to do the job. Shot of a traffic light at an intersection, pullback shows a bluecollar town street in western Massachusetts, pan over a small town hall and an old TEXTILE MILL. ROBERTS v.o.-most people who vote for CONTE are DEMOCRATS, CONTE is expected to vote for social programs. Shot of workers in a GASWORKS. 03.27.42-Shot of front of TOWN HALL in GRANBY, MASS., ROBERTS v.o.-only the real Yankee blueblood stock in Mass. Regularly votes REPUBLICAN, but CONTE wins anyway. Shot of man in a polling station casting his ballot. Shot of CONTE seated in office, says he thinks his constituents recognize his independence in Congress, says that three times he got nominated by both REPUBLICANS and DEMOCRATS in his district. Shot of DEER HEADS and a stuffed TURKEY on wall of CONTE'S study, also a rack of ANTIQUE HUNTING RIFLES. Shot of CONTE in heated debate in HOUSE, the CLERK seated behind CONTE is cracking up with laughter, CONTE gets more and more riled up over the cost of some canal program, another Congressmen jokingly asks him to yield, then asks CONTE to repeat himself. Draws applause. 03.29.21-Shot of another Congressman arguing against CONTE, CONTE goes ballistic in response. CONTE v.o.-he does tend to get out of hand in debate, but after it's over, he usually takes whoever he was debating back to his office for drinks. CONTE says he doesn't really get mad in debate, he just gives it his all, and after he's done, he usually laughs. 03.30.30-Shot of CONTE on field for CONGRESSIONAL BASEBALL GAME, CONTE wearing the uniform of the BOSTON RED SOX. ROBERTS v.o.-CONTE was the manager of the REPUBLICAN team in the baseball game, beat the DEMOCRATS. Shot of CONTE in RED SOX uniform, smoking big cigar. Shots of CONGRESSIONAL BASEBALL GAME, congressmen wear uniforms of their local MAJOR LEAGUE TEAMS. CONTE v.o.-they sent too many "intellects" to congress, so the REPUBLICANS had a losing streak in the annual game. Shot of CONTE in office discussing a past brawl in the Congressional Baseball Game. 03.32.12-CONTE discussing changes in CONGRESS, says that there's more personal rivalry now, less sense of humor. 03.33.21-DUKE/WERTHEIMER/ROBERTS in studio-discussion of the power of the HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE, and of CONTE AND WHITTEN as ranking members of the parties-all committees have to go through Appropriations to get their funds. Discussion of the time required to put a budget through committee. DUKE intro commentary by Otis PIKE. 03.35.27-PIKE with commentary on foreign aid-a political bombshell, TIP O'NEILL wants to force REAGAN'S increase in proposed FOREIGN AID to the floor, so either REPUBLICANS will be scared to vote for it, or the DEMOCRATS can use it against REPUBLICANS in elections. Ironic twists and turns of FOREIGN AID debate. 03.37.22-DUKE-signs off. Closing Credits (roll over shots of SYLVIO CONTE in chef costume, serving a luncheon to members of Congress)/transcript information/WETA credit/Sponsor credits/PBS ID. 03.39.37--OUT
Congressional Hearing - Alexander Haig
U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig at Congressional hearing before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, on East/West Foreign Relations. Secretary Haig begins his opening remarks. Haig discusses the Reagan Administration’s foreign assistance package for the 1983 fiscal year. Haig says President Reagan seeks a constructive and mutually beneficial relationship with the Soviet Union. Haig says such a relationship must be based on Soviet restraint, especially in the use of force or the threat of violence. Haig discusses Soviet actions in Poland, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and the flood of Soviet arms into Cuba. Haig says Poland was the subject of his recent conversation with Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Gromyko, and they reviewed the situation in Afghanistan, Cuba, and Southern Africa. Haig says coercion, subversion, and repression pose great dangers to the relation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Haig says he also discussed arms control with Minister Gromyko. Haig says the U.S. is preparing for "start" negotiations. Haig cites Reagan's call for clear communication between the Soviet Union and the United States. Haig hopes better relations will not silence the U.S. in regard to Soviet transgressions, especially in Poland and Afghanistan.
U.S. Congressmen Speak Out Against NCPAC
U.S. Congressmen speak out against the NCPAC (National Conservative Political Action Committee). U.S House Representatives Paul Simon (D-IL), Thomas Downey (D-NY), and Raymond Kogovsek (D-CO) gathered in meeting room; adult Caucasian male seated in the BG behind the dais. Rep. Kogovsek states that he concurs with his colleagues remarks and adds that he sees NCPAC as something that will become more mainstream among extreme conservatives within the country. Their answer to the legislative process is to throw money at a district, "buy a congressman", and have that congressman vote on their positions. He believes that the Democratic tax plan is ideally suited for the constituents in his Colorado district. He doesn't represent people who make $100,000, $200,000, or $300,000, but that's who the Reagan tax plan will primarily benefit. He sees U.S. President Ronald Reagan, working through NCPAC, to scare people or buy votes. The "take it or leave it" approach is not how the legislative process works. He will work towards a legislative compromise and for the people of his district. Rep. Kogovsek will not let an outside group influence him otherwise.
Watergate Hearings, June 25, 1973 - Testimony of John Dean
John Dean. Pursuant to the request of Mr. Ehrlichman that Mr. Mitchell determine whether continued funding should be provided for Mr. Ulasewicz, Mitchell asked me what Ulasewicz had been doing. I told him that I did not know, but would have Caulfield prepare a summary of the activities. On January 12, 1972, I informed Mitchell that Caulfield had prepared such a list and suggested he meet with him. I refer the committee to exhibit no. 11. I would also note at this point that there is no list covering that exhibit because while I initially thought I did have a list I have searched my records that are available and I have no such list available. There is a possibility there might be a list in my files that remain at the White, House. I do not recall how this matter was resolved, but I believe some arrangement was made to compensate Mr. Ulasewicz, but to my knowledge, he was not used in any manner other than that to which I shall refer later in my statement. Mr. Caulfield and Mr. Kalmbach would know about the arrangements that were made.
1973 - Watergate Hearings - James McCord
Video disruptions. James McCord continues reading his statement: "Now, a few days before the White House had tried to lay on C.I.A., and now it was clear that I was going to have to find out what was up now. To do so involves some risks. To fail to do so was, in my opinion, to work in a vacuum regarding White House intentions and plans, which involved even greater risks, I felt. Around 4:30 p.m. that afternoon, January 8th, while waiting for a taxi after the court session, Bernard Barker asked my attorneys and me if he could ride in the cab with us to Burton's office, which we agreed to. There, he got out of the cab and went up towards [Walter O.] Bittman's office. I had been under the impression during the cab ride that Bittman was going to talk to both Barker and me jointly, and became angered that, what seemed to me...." McCord states what follows is opinion, and can finish here if opinion isn't wanted. He is given permission to proceed. Video repeats portion of testimony.
August 2, 1994 - Part 2
(12:15:57) Mr. DEVORE. It may be defensible, but it's certainly not the advice I would give a client. Senator BENNETT. What advice would you give in this cir- cumstance where there's confidential information that has this kind of legal thing? Forget what was done. Put your hat on and you're in a seminar now, Communications 101 at George Washington University, instructing people who want to go into your profes- sion. What would you advise them to do? 357 Mr. DEVORE. Well, let me distinguish between the situation we were actually in and the theoretical situation you're setting up. As I understand it, there were-I'm not aware of any questions being asked of the White House at this point by reporters that required an answer from the White House. Senator BENNETT. That's true. There were none. This was in anticipation, Mr. DEVORE. That's right. But let's assume that it had moved to the next stage, the stage at which the reporters were going to the White House and asking for a comment. At that point, if I were flacking, I would urge whoever is responsible for press activities in the White House to call the RTC and get the correct informationthe information, by the way, that really is not all that confidential since the reporter has it-to be sure the re reporter's facts are correct so they can devise an answer that is as forthcoming as possible, Senator BENNETT. I accept that as forthcoming as possible. Butas my time is running down, I postulate to you this articular problem. We are dealing with legal information here that could conceivably lead to an indictment. What is the President, or the White House Communications Director, or you in your role at the Treasury going to do when the reporter says- "We understand that there is a confidential-there is a criminal referral that proposes the following things and misstates the circumstances?" Would you comment? We got that from Ms. Hanson yesterday. She said it might be misstated and they must have a complete briefing so they could handle it. Do you then say oh, you've misstated what the confidential thing is, this is what's really going to happen in court? You can't do that. When you're dealing with matters that are going to end up in court, your posture is, I have to say, no comment because this is a matter under the jurisdiction of the Justice Department, and it will end up in court. I have no problem with notifying the White House that a call came from the reporter and, therefore, the White House is alert to the fact that the reporter is trolling around. I have no problem with telling the White House what the reporter told you. There's nothing confidential there. I do have a problem with a group of Treasury officials, not in cluding the flack going over to the White House, sitting down with the Counsel to le President and spending time in what appears to me to be a strategy session on the overall issue and not a headsUP on the question of "gee, we I 've got a reporter trolling out there and we need to be prepared for whatever he or she might say." I see that my time is up. The CHAIRMAN. Let me say, Senator Bennett, as you finish, we are on the second bells of still another vote and we all must go now in order to make that vote. Senator Boxer will be next in the order and I've asked her to go ahead so she can come back and resume the hearing. We must ail go now or we'll miss this vote. The Committee stands in recess for about 10 minutes. I'd ask the witnesses not to go far from the room so we can resume promptly. (12:19:47) [Recess.] (12:19:49) Commentary of hearings hosts DON BODE and NINA TOTENBERG, they also talk to MARY MCGRERY (?) of the Washington Post (12:27:32)(end of tape #10066)
August 5, 1994 - Part 4
(14:26:00) I don't think that's what we're dealing with here, in some of these instances, so that is part of the reason why we're here. But, if nothing else is clear out of this, it's clear we can't have that. If this Government's going to work, we've got to have a situation where the information we get the first time is reliable. It's full, complete, honest, and direct. People can't go through graceful ducks or anything else, or whatever phrases anybody else wants to pick. Whether they're questions asked by someone on this side or on that side, every Senator's questions are important and every one needs to be answered fully and directly by every witness. Any other system just is not a working system in terms of democracy as I understand it. So, with that, I want to finally thank my colleagues. There 's no way in the world we could do this job without the tremendous commitment and talent of Senators like Senator Sarbanes and the others, going right down the aisle on our side, and Senator D'Amato and all of the rest of the Members on his side, and their staff. I think every Senator worked as hard on this assignment, in a short timeframe, as I have seen during my time in the Senate. It's not uncommon, by the way, for Senators to work that hard. I think every Senator works that hard, on a variety of issues, virtually every day. People bad a chance to see it here. They saw that when we had to go until late into the evening to fit this compressed timeframe problem that we had, everybody stepped up to the assignment and did it. I'm very grateful for that. 801 This is a team effort and this team, I think, performed in a way that I certainly feel proud about and I thank everyone for that cooperation. So, with that, unless there is anyone else seeking recognition, I'm going to indicate that we've concluded this phase--we've concluded our work, under Senate Resolution 229, in terms of the part that we could deal with at this stage. I thank all concerned. The Committee stands in recess. (14:27:59) [Whereupon, at 2:27 p.m., the hearing was concluded.] (14:28:00) Commentary of DON BODE and STEVE ROBERTS from tv studio
August 1, 1994 - Part 8
(21:50:28) 173 Senator KERRY. I am referring to your working document that came out of your file, which was on your computer, in which you asked yourself a question, "Was anyone else present," and, then, gave yourself the answer, "I believe Cliff Sloan another White House attorney, was there." This was a lawyer--to--lawyer conversation You, asking your own question to yourself. Question: What else did you tell him? Answer: I don't recall I told him anything else. Do you remember that document? Ms. HANSON. Could I have a copy of the document, if you're going to question me on it? Senator KERRY. It's number 4466 and 4467, Exhibit 19. Senator GAMM. What was the date on that, do you know? Senator FERRY. It is a March 1, 1994, document, and it comes out of the computer file. Do we have a copy of it? Do you recognize that now? Ms. HANSON. I don't recall ever seeing the document, in this format, before. Senator KERRY. Do you recall writing these questions to youself? pretty fundamental stuff. This is on March 1, 1994. On This is pre your computer, you're sitting there asking yourself questions which are really a play right off of the Committee. This occurs one day before a letter comes to this Committee, supposedly correcting the record, and two days before Special Counsel Fiske issued a subpoena for all records. As I react this, you ask yourself a question: Question: Who in the Treasury or the RTC knew you had this conversation? Your own answer to yourself, just months before this happening, you say: Answer: I don't recall I told anyone of the conversation. We now know that's not true. You did tell somebody. You told Mr. Altman. Ms. HANSON. Which I still don't recall, but my September 30, 1993, memorandum reflects that I did, that I got back to him. Senator KERRY. You don't recall that you told him that? Ms. HANSON. This is the question Senator KERRY. You do recall that you were asked to have the conversation, because you testified to Senator Gramm that indeed, you never would have gone to the White House if you hadn' been asked. Correct? Ms. HANSON. What I've said is-if I could clarify, please--I wouldn't have spoken with Mr. Nussbaum, about this kind of information, without having been authorized to do so. I did not, however, just so I can clarify, go to the White House to see Mr, Nussbaum on this issue. I went to the White House for a prebriefing, of Mr. Nussbaum and some other people, on the Treasury report on the Waco situation, which was going to be released the following day. So, it was a brief conversation following a meeting on Senator KERRY. I understand that, but in fact, according to the depositions, you bad been asked to call Mr. Nussbaum. You did call Mr. Nussbaum. Mr. Nussbaum was not in. You left a message, so were trying to reach him. You then went to the White he knew you we House. You took advantage of the meeting. You pulled him aside afterwards, and you informed him and, then, wrote a memorandum to Mr. Altman that you had informed him. 174 Here, in your own answers to yourself, not coincidentally, I suspect, at the same time that Mr. Altman sends his first correction to this Committee, you're saying to yourself, "No, you didn't no." No one asked you to have this conversation. You're saying that you had little to add because you knew nothing more about the issue and that you weren't involved in the handling of the press, which is absolutely untrue, because you've testified here all day that you were there to help them deal with the press. So you've got-I'm incredulous that the Counsel to the Treasury is writing herself a series of questions and answers which are so incorrect, so contrary to the testimony, and which flow almost as if you're setting yourself up to take the fall for Mr. Altman or to provide some series of answers that, then, got cut short because of the transference of events. Ms. HANSON. If I could explain, sir. Senator KERRY. That's why I The CHAIRMAN. Before you do--and I'm going to have you explain it. The time has expired. Senator DAmato has said that he'd like Senator Kerry to finish this, so well make that allowance. Why don't you go ahead and give your response. Senator DAMATO. If I might, Ms. Hanson, I have to tell you Senator Kerry has struck with this Senator a very, very responsive chord. I think you ought to think about how that memo came about. What were you trying to do when you were preparing that memo? I stop, I yield there, because it really raises a question in my mind. The CHAIRMAN. You were about to respond, so why don't you go ahead.
Watergate Hearings - testimony of James McCord (Jim McCord) May 22, 1973
James McCord (Jim McCord) continues statement: Questions were on my mind such as : Who are these people who bombed in New Hampshire, in Oakland, the Pentagon Building, the Capitol Building? How are they funded? Who are they working with? Is anyone in collusion with them, encouraging them, or funding them? The Vietnam Veterans Against the War was one violence-oriented group that was already saying in the spring of 1972, that they were going to cause destruction to life and property at the August Republican Convention, using in their own words, their own bodies & other weapons as the spearhead of the attack there--these are their exact words & some of them have since been indicted in Tallahassee, Florida, w/ additional plans to damage the life & property in the convention. Later in the summer of 1972 the VVAW did in fact have offices in the DNC in Washington, as I understood. I had also received information from the Internal Security Division of the Department of Justice in May 1972, that some individuals in Florida planned to forge college press credentials to get into both the Democratic & Republican Convention sites & blow up the communication centers of both parties there & cause havoc on the convention floor. That information was part of the basis for my going to Miami in June 1972, w/ members of the White House staff to survey and strengthen the security of the Doral Hotel where both the White House staff & the CRP staff were to have both offices & quarters for July & August 1972. Some 30 recommendations were made as a result of that survey, to help protect against such violence & I believe that most were put into effect before the convention.
Lawmakers Feb 23 1984 Congressional Absenteeism
Paul Duke intro guest Senator Wendell Ford (D - Kentucky) and discussion of absenteeism. Paul Duke, Senator, must the members be away so much, so early in 1984? Senator Wendell Ford (D - Kentucky), Well Paul, you have to look at the situation. You have all of the House members that are up. You have one third of the Senate is up. And most of them are Republicans this time, 19 to 14. Well Paul, you have to look at the situation. You have all of the House members that are up. You have one third of the Senate is up. And most of them are Republicans this time, 19 to 14. You have a Presidential year. A senator is Chairman of the Republican Campaign Committee, so that becomes involved. The leadership on the Senate side, I will not talk about the House side, but the leadership on the Senate side has already told us we ll be out 65 days. That means 13 weeks and they control the Senate as it relates to when we re in, when we re out, when we vote and when we don t because they have 55 Republican votes and 45 Democratic votes. So it appears that with the President saying if you want to balance the budget, you cannot touch the defense appropriations. You cannot increase the income to the federal government. Those two things being out, we might as well pass a continuing resolution, go back home, and allow the people to see us more often than they do now. Paul Duke, Are you saying then it s going to be non-business as usual in this election year? Senator Wendell Ford (D - Kentucky), Well I m afraid so, but hopefully it will not be. The deficit of $200 billion, the budget we have now, it would be devastating to the country if we allow it to continue. We have to do something about the budget. If the President is going to sit there and veto it, then we have to send him something to veto. That s my opinion.
Watergate Hearings - Testimony of Gordon C. Strachan, July 23, 1973
U.S. Senator Herman E. Talmadge (D-GA) asks former White House aide Gordon C. Strachan if he was interviewed by the FBI in August 1972. Strachan says he was. Senator Talmadge asks about the scope of that inquiry. Strachan says it revolved entirely around the Donald H. Segretti matter. Senator Talmadge asks if there were any questions about Watergate; Strachan says no. Senator Talmadge asks if the FBI inquired about Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman's involvement or lack of involvement; Strachan says no. Senator Tamadge asks if Strachan was surprised those matters did not come up. Strachan says he was surprised the FBI did not ask him more probing questions, even about Segretti. Talmadge notes that in his testimony, Strachan believed Counsel to the President John Dean would be handling the Watergate matters for the President, but Talmadge wants to know whether Strachan was aware of any Watergate investigation being carried out by Dean. Strachan said he talked with Dean and explained what he knew about Segretti and that deputy assistant to the President Dwight Chapin did the same, but he did not know whether Dean's investigation went further than that or not. Those matters were discussed in the summer of 1972. Senator Talmadge confirms that Strachan cannot, with certainty, answer yes or no; Strachan says that is correct. Senator Talmadge states that White House aide Alexander Butterfield testified that Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman and his assistant Lawrence Higby knew the White House was bugged. Did Strachan know that? Strachan says he did not know. Talmadge asks if it is reasonable to think that John Ehrlichman did not know that either; Strachan thinks it is reasonable. Talmadge asks if there is anything else that might have been withheld from Ehrlichman's knowledge. Strachan says there are, though he can only remember one or two occasions where Ehrlichman would have access to any of the polling information. Senator Talmadge asks if there is any other instance that comes to mind; Strachan cannot think of any other examples.
August 4, 1994 - Part 7
(15:55:43) I also recall speaking to the President at some point about the RTC's retention of Jay Stephens. The President expressed concern that such a highly partisan individual could have received such an appointment, but he did not ask me to contact Treasury or the RTC, or to take any other action with respect to the Stephens appointment, nor did I take any. I have outlined for you the essence of any conversations that I presently recall having with Mr. Altman concerning the RTC's inquiry into Madison. There was nothing in any of my contacts with Treasury officials that was intended to influence or that had the effect of influencing any RTC decision with respect to Madison. Independent Counsel Fiske concluded that there was nothing illegal about these contacts. In addition, both White House Special Counsel Lloyd Cutler and the Office of Government Ethics reviewed the record on these contacts and have concluded that there was nothing unethical about them. I will answer any questions you may have about these events. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Lindsey, why don't you go next here, please. BRUCE IL LINDSEY, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND SENIOR ADVISOR, WASHINGTON, DC Mr. LINDSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, my name is Bruce Lindsey. I am Assistant to the President and Senior Advisor. I am also from Arkansas and have known President Clinton for over 25 years. I am therefore the person in the White House who generally handles press inquiries related to Arkansas issues. I welcome this opportunity to share with this Committee and with the American people the facts as I know them concerning communications I had with Treasury Department officials in which the RTC investigation of Whitewater or Madison Guaranty was discussed. These conversations occurred after information about RTC referrals involving Madison Guaranty were leaked to the press. My conversation with Treasury officials centered solely around what the 358 press was reporting and how, if at all, we should respond. It was always my understanding that the Treasury officials were simply passing along what they were hearing from the press. In fact, to this day, I do not know the contents of the criminal referrals. Mr. Chairman, I am not aware of any law, ethical rule or principle of common sense that suggests that one Administration official cannot alert another Administration official to the contents of reporters' questions. To suggest that something improper occurred is simply to ignore the facts. Let me briefly state those facts. In late September or during the first few days of October 1993, had a short conversation with Associate White House Counsel Cliff Sloan, and perhaps Associate White House Counsel Neil Eggleston, in which I learned that there had been RTC referrals relating to Madison Guaranty and that the Clintons were incidentally mentioned in the referral document, but not as targets or subjects. I have no notes of this first conversation, but my best recollection is that it was quite brief and that Cliff Sloan alone spoke with me. It was my understanding that leaks had occurred or were imminent and that members of the press were or would be asking about the referrals. I assumed that they wanted me to know this information so that I would not be surprised if I received calls from the press about these referrals. In fact, I did receive such press calls in the coming days and did respond to them. A few days later, on or about October 4, 1993, 1 received a call from Jim Lyons, a Denver lawyer who had been involved in the 1992 campaign, reporting on press inquiries he and others had received which referenced the criminal referrals. I was traveling with the President at the time and briefly mentioned the information to him. I didn't suggest, nor did the President ask, that any action be taken, and none was. The next conversation I had about this matter occurred on October 7 or 8, 1993, a few days after my discussion with the President, and was with both Cliff Sloan and Neil Eggleston. My notes, which have been provided to the Committee, reflect that I was informed in this conversation of specific press inquiries, including information from the press that the apparent criminal referrals included a reference to Arkansas Governor Jim Guy Tucker. I did not have any conversation with the President regarding this conversation.
LAWMAKERS
12.08.29-DUKE in studio. Comments that more than twice the usual number of REPUBLICANS voted for the FARM BILL. REPUBLICANS also closed ranks with REAGAN on FOREIGN AID to save REAGAN from embarrassment. 12.09.01-Shot of Rep. JOHN ROUSSELOT (R-CA), seated in an office, scornful of general concept of FOREIGN AID. Shot of large bags of GRAIN being craned off a ship. Shot of piles of GRAIN in bags on dock. Shot of group of Sub-Saharan African villagers (ethiopian or sudanese?), receiving grain. Shot of African men loading loose grain into sacks, throwing sacks in back of a truck. Pan of AFRICAN VILLAGE, villagers cluster around a food truck. Shot of REAGAN entering a press conference in White House. Shot of Rep. EDWARD DERWINSKI (R-IL), says that becoming PRESIDENT usually tends to make one more generous with FOREIGN AID. Shot of AL HAIG entering HOUSE CHAMBER to pitch for FOREIGN AID. Shot of Rep. DERWINSKI in well of HOUSE, arguing that REAGAN as president is working with the realistic facts of the world today. 12.10.37-Shot of Rep. JERRY LEWIS (R-CA), giving a very liberal-esque speech about helping fix the problems of the people of the world. Shot of Rep. PETER PEYSER (D-NY) responds that the DEMOCRATS have been saying the same thing for years. Shot of JACK KEMP in debate, pleading for REPUBLICANS to vote to sustain funds for INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AGENCY. Shot of Rep. ROUSSELOT, arguing that IDA loans are always default, bad investment, blah blah blah. Shot of JACK KEMP butting heads with ROUSSELOT, Shot of ROUSSELOT in office, saying KEMP got stuck supporting the REAGAN ADMINISTRATION position against his own beliefs. 12.13.59-DUKE in studio. Notes that REPUBLICANS give more support to REAGAN on foreign aid than they gave to JIMMY CARTER. Discussion with ROBERTS/WERTHEIMER of the end of the session-MODERATE REPUBLICANS started to break away from CONSERVATIVES at end of session. Newcomers in Congress played a role, many newcomers very CONSERVATIVE, also inexperience makes it easier for REAGAN. 12.16.21-DUKE intro report on OIL INDUSTRY MERGER, with MOBIL seeking to buy out MARATHON. 12.16.46-Shot of crowd of people on street in FINDLAY, OHIO, carrying signs supporting MARATHON OIL. High School marching band wearing MARATHON logo caps. Shots of DEMONSTRATORS at MARATHON headquarters, opposing merger. DUKE v.o.-MARATHON a relatively civic-minded company, big supporter of local institutions. DISCUSSION of FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION efforts to stall merger, MOBIL'S efforts to evade FTC rules. 12.18.18-Shot of Sen. BOB PACKWOOD in committee, says he doesn't like MOBIL'S tactics in merger effort. Shots of JOINT COMMITTEE to investigate MOBIL'S acquisition practices, concern about slackness of the FTC under REAGAN ADMINISTRATION. Shot of AL GORE (then a congressman), says that REAGAN'S FTC was acting as a flunkie for MOBIL to the point of actually helping Mobil plan a strategy to avoid antitrust regulations. Shot of Rep. JOHN DINGELL (D-MI), calling the FTC'S actions inappropriate in MOBIL matter. Shot of THOMAS CAMPBELL, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSIONER, defending the committee's practices in a very convoluted and technical way. 12.20.03-Shot of Rep. CLARENCE BROWN (R-OH), introducing motion to bar largest 9 OIL COMPANIES from acquiring any other OIL COMPANIES in the top 20 to delay the merger until CONGRESS has a chance to examine it. Shot of Rep. BOB LIVINGSTON [R-LA], arguing that the bill is unfairly submitted. Shot of BROWN saying every Congressman knows the content of the bill, he would be happy to go ahead and vote. Shot of TIP O'NEILL slowly standing up. Shot of Rep. BROWN offering an extra minute to LIVINGSTON. LIVINGSTON, ever the diplomat, showing the graciousness that would have made him a fine speaker, tells BROWN to "take the time and shove it." Shot of TIP O'NEILL calling for voice vote, chaos ensues when O'NEILL declares the motion passed. (DUKE v.o.-eventual rollcall, motion passed to delay MOBIL merger 6 months) 12.21.36-DUKE-SENATE may or may not approve, it's certain that the OIL LOBBY will regroup to pressure SENATORS. Intro commentary. 12.22.08-Otis PIKE delivers commentary. Subject of CONGRESS taking longer and longer to finish its business-under Speaker SAM RAYBURN, House used to finish in September, now takes until mid-December. Wonders whether Congress doesn't drag it's feet to avoid going home and catching hell from constituents. 12.23.56-DUKE-signs off. Shot of TIP O'NEILL lighting the CAPITOL CHRISTMAS TREE. Closing credits/WETA CREDIT/Sponsor Credit/PBS ID. 12.26.07-OUT.
Watergate Hearings - Statement of John J Caulfield May 22, 1973
John Caulfield. During the summer of 1971 I had high hopes that my proposal would be accepted and had one other direct conversation at lunch about its contents with Mr. Dean and with Mr. Jeb Magruder. Between the end of June and October of 1971, I inquired of Mr. Dean as to the status of my proposal on numerous occasions, but ultimately was told by Mr. Dean that he didn't think that my suggestion was going anywhere. I was disappointed my memorandum had been refused, I next spoke with Mr. Dean concerning obtaining a position as a personal aid to John Mitchell when he became campaign director. Mr. Dean agreed to ask Mr. Mitchell if such a position was available, he did so and on November 24, 1971 he accompanied me to an interview at Mr. Mitchell s office. I explained to Mr. Mitchell that what I wanted was a position similar to that occupied by Dwight Chapan in relation to the President and that in addition to handling the kinds of activities that Chapan handled for the President I could be of value to Mr. Mitchell as a bodyguard. Mr. Mitchell listened to what I had to say, but was non-committal as to what status I would occupy with him. He said however, that we would get that all straightened out when I arrived at the re-election committee. He was unsure as to when he would join the re-election committee, but thought that it would be sometime in January or February of 1972. I left his office and walked back to the White House by myself. Mr. Dean remained and as I was walking through Mr. Mitchell s outer office, I noted Mr. Gordon Liddy sitting with Mr. Dean evidently waiting to see Mr. Mitchell. At that time, I was sure I had a position with Mr. Mitchell, but the nature of my duties was quite unsettled.
July 29, 1994 - Part 1
(11:06:32) OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CONNIE MACK Senator MACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I believe we're here today to protect the rights of the American people. They have a right to know the truth and no individual, no matter what his or her position, is entitled to infringe upon that right: The public expects Government officials to conduct themselves with honesty and integrity. Government officials strike a bargain with the American people. The people confer power and authority upon them and in return, they are supposed to exercise that power within clearly defined limits. Unfortunately we have seen that this Administration has appointees that have not upheld their end of that bargain. When this happens, Congress can and must look into the matter. For some, I realize that muddying the waters, confusing the facts, and generally putting a lid on things is the goal. Some say that engaging in this kind of inquiry may prove harmful to the Presidency and will do damage to the public's perception of the Executive Branch. In the name of protecting against such harm, we have witnessed extraordinary efforts to limit this investigation and withhold the facts. I find these efforts deeply disturbing. While others may be willing to overlook the enormous number of inconsistencies and serious questions of impropriety in this matter, I am not. No matter bow disturbing this may turn out to be, I want to know all the facts. I simply do not accept that we shouldn't be doing this because it may damage the Executive Branch. Any damage that is done is 19 a result of the actions during the past year and a half by the people we will bringing before us. Our proper role as Members of this Committee is not to act as advocates for one side or the other, but rather to seek the truth. I view these hearings as a painful but necessary responsibility of our system of Government. To dismiss them as mere partisan exercise is both short- sighted and irresponsible. The documents and depositions before us prove that this, indeed, may be a difficult experience. We know that Mr. Altman's accounts of events during the spring and fall of 1993 differ sharply from that of a number of other witnesses. Notwithstanding his insistence to this Committee that be did not want to get "within 100,000 miles of the Madison case," he has become the eye of the storm. A storm so furious it stripped away the independence of the RTC when it came to a case involving the President of the United States. Contrary to his public statements, we can prove that Mr. Altman was briefed about the first criminal referral on Madison within days of his arrival at the Treasury Department, We know that he was briefed a second time in detail in the fall of 1993 regarding nine new criminal referrals involving Madison. We know that Mr. Altman directed an RTC official to brief Jean Hanson, the General Counsel to the Treasury, regarding the specifics of these referrals. We also know that Mr. Altman directed Ms. Hanson to speak to the White House about these referrals and she did what she was told. At a September 29, 1993 meeting, and again the following day, she gave confidential information about the referrals to Bernie Nussbaum and Cliff Sloan of the White House Counsel's Office. What that means is the Clintons had information at their disposal telling them in advance that they were going to have to testify under oath about their dealings with Madison. White House aides knew about what kinds of crimes were alleged in the referrals and who was alleged to have committed them. What alarms me most, about this fact, is that the Clintons bad all this information before the Justice Department ever received the referrals. This is just dead wrong. The White House's justification for these contacts is that they needed the information in order to respond to potential press inquiries about the criminal referrals. In *my mind, this raises a very significant question. Since when do we toss aside our standards regarding confidentiality and conflicts of interest just because the press might later have a question? The White House has said the Washington Post was inquiring at that time about the referrals. Well, according to yesterday's paper, The Post had no specific knowledge of what was contained in the referrals, and, in fact, printed no significant story on the matter until October 31, 1993. We want a credible explanation of these events. Finally, and more generally, I also want to know why Government employees were tasked with responding to questions concerning a purely personal matter to the First Couple. This blurring of personal matters and public duties recurs all through this controversy and to me, it is -simply improper, 20 We have White House lawyers doing the President's private business. We have White House interference with the investigation of the very private matter of Vince Foster's death. We have White House interference with the confidential RTC investigation of a small savings and loan in Arkansas with which the First Couple was formerly associated. All of these improper interferences raise very serious questions for me. The questions are very real and they must be answered. The American people deserve no less The CHAIRMAN. Senator Shelby.
Watergate Hearings - H.R. Haldeman (Part II)
(10:12:07) Opens to Majority Counsel SAM DASH questioning Presidential Advisor H. R. HALDEMAN (10:12:16) Skip in footage - Dash and Haldeman have a detailed discussion about Haldeman's access to White House tapes of meetings, Haldeman claims he did not/would not listen to meetings he was not present at (10:14:45) Dash and Haldeman discuss how Haldeman listened to a tape of a meeting between him, NIXON, and Presidential Counsel JOHN DEAN to check up on Dean's testimony about that meeting (10:17:45) Dash asks why Haldeman, under subpeona, did not turn over the tape or his notes from it (10:20:29) Skip in footage - Dash is in the midst of questioning Haldeman about money being requested by Whitewater associate HUNT (10:22:30) Dash questions Haldeman about the Lacoste meeting at which was the possibility of preventing the Senate Investigative Hearings was discussed by White House aides (10:24:38) Skip in footage - Vice Chairman HOWARD BAKER asks Haldeman how he could run such a "tight ship" and not know what was going on with Whitewater - Haldeman shuffles about saying he knew something was up but did not know the particulars (10:27:00) Bakers asks Haldeman, as the man closest to the President, what Nixon knew and when did he know it - Haldeman responds with the routine answer that Nixon found out about the Watergate after the fact through normal channels and that he knew that these were the autonomous actions of those involved (10:30:40) Baker asks Haldeman, more particularly what was Nixon's reaction upon finding out that two members, GORDON LIDDY and JAMES McCORD, from the Committee to Re-Elect the President were involved - Haldeman says Nixon could not comprehend how or why they would be involved in such a situation
LAWMAKERS
WETA "LAWMAKERS" 3/31/1983 IN 20.00.02-WETA credit/sponsor credits/title sequence 20.00.58-PAUL DUKE/NORMAN ORNSTEIN/COKIE ROBERTS-On program-a look at approval of JOBS PROGRAM and SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM by HOUSE and SENATE, other pending Congressional business. Discussion of SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM-crucial to put all reforms in one inseparable package. 20.01.58-m/s ALAN GREENSPAN testifying to congressional committee as part of SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION. C/S Rep. CLAUDE PEPPER (D-FL) in office, says that no one likes all of the REFORM PLAN, but everyone likes some part of it, it's the best compromise possible. ROBERTS-even with the support of influential SENIOR CITIZEN PEPPER, plan faced opposition. M/S Sen. BILL ARMSTRONG (R-CO) speaking to audience of SENIOR CITIZENS, says the Commission plan won't solve the problems of SOCIAL SECURITY, he's opposed to TAX INCREASES to finance. Shots of SENIOR CITIZENS hearing speech. Shot of workers on sidewalk by a federal building. ROBERTS v.o.-FEDERAL WORKERS objected to being included in SOCIAL SECURITY system. Shot of chief of FEDERAL WORKERS ASSOCIATION, says adding federal workers won't make much difference to the system's financial problems. 20.03.50-C/S Rep. STENY HOYER (D-MD) in debate in House, says it is wrong to penalize FEDERAL WORKERS for the mistakes of previous political administrations. C/S Rep. PEPPER in debate, C/S Rep. ROBERT MICHEL (MINORITY LEADER) in debate to support the Commission reform plan-there is no choice but compromise if SOCIAL SECURITY is to be saved. 20.04.29-DUKE-discussion with ROBERTS of opposition to the plan-TAX INCREASES, delay in COST OF LIVING ADJUSTMENT opposed by SENIORS, TAXES on SOCIAL SECURITY INCOME for wealthier recipients, higher PAYROLL TAXES, Federal Worker inclusion all controversial, Gradual increases in RETIREMENT AGE. Congress wanted to get the Reform passed before the heat of 1984 CAMPAIGN SEASON got started.