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Capitol Journal - Perceptions of Congress
Hodding Carter, But the President is the Commander and Chief and did he call you up and say Congressman I need your vote? How do you reply to that when you start arguing about whether you need this missile or that missile and the President has said I need you? Representative Joseph DioGuardi (R - New York), Well there were some very persuasive arguments made by the President himself, as you probably know I was here to see him on Friday, and also by Mr. Kampelman. But I campaigned in a very tough district. I was elected by a slim margin. I made the case against MX and I think a keyword for me is credibility. Hodding Carter, But what about credibility of the nation for instance? Isn t that a hard argument to overcome? Now you undoubtedly used it when you were at the White House in that defense. What is a Congressman supposed to say to a President, Mr. Rumsfeld, when the President says the nation depends on you and the Congressman is saying no? Donald Rumsfeld, I think that the nation expects that the President is generally going to be given the benefit of the doubt. And I think that Presidents need to be given, generally, the benefit of the doubt. We can t have the foreign policy and national security policy of the United States of America run by a committee of 535 members of the House and Senate. There has to be the ability to provide some steerage way for the country. That doesn t mean that the President is always right. It doesn t mean that there aren t gong to be votes against him. But I think that in answer to your question for the most part the country is well served if members tend to give him the benefit of the doubt.
Lawmakers - Oct 29, 1981
Charles McDowell Commentary. First, a warning Tobacco can be dangerous to health and to consistent politics. Tobacco is grown mostly in the South. And the South is full of conservative zeal for President Reagan s mission to get the federal government off of the backs of the people. You might think that would tell us where southerners in the House of Representatives would stand on a farm program, quite apart from the health issue, that subjects tobacco farmers to severe regulation, quotas, bureaucratic red tape and interference in the market place. Don t be mislead, actually the South lead the victorious effort in the House last week to keep the government on the backs of the farmers. The reason was of course that the programs keep tobacco prices artificially high. What keeps prices up is restricting the supply. It s done through a scheme of allotments that were assigned to individual farmers in the 30s. Many of the allotments are now in the hands of absentee landlords who lease them to farmers for big money. So the program is a mixture of almost futile privilege and federal regulation to ensure high prices. None of this phased most of the tobacco built Congressmen; and it didn t faze the Republican or Democratic leaderships, both of which endorsed the tobacco program, partly to repay assorted southerners for past favors. One southerner invited frustrated liberals to vote for the program on the theory it was virtually a social program, as he put it, for poor rural folks. Now the Senate gets another look at the program before it goes to the President. But don t expect an outbreak of free enterprise. Jesse Helms of North Carolina, Chairman of the Senate of Agriculture committee, is in charge of keeping the government on the backs of his grateful tobacco farmers and landlords.
President Carter Press Conference : Aug 9, 1980
U.S. President Jimmy Carter takes more questions from the press. Adult Caucasian male reporter asks President Carter what information U.S. intelligence agencies gathered when they investigated his brother Billy’s oil deal with the Libyans. The reporter also asks Carter if it was believed the Libyans were trying to influence the U.S. through his brother. Carter says the intelligence gathered on Billy has been sent to the Senate Intelligence Committee; the intelligence is of a highly sensitive nature and he is not at liberty to discuss it. Adult Caucasian female reporter asks Carter if it is true the U.S. is working with other terrorist organizations to help return the American hostages in Iran. Carter says this is not true.
August 1, 1994 - Part 2
(12:40:40) Senator RoTH. The Office of Government Ethics sets standards of conduct regulations for all Executive Branch employees and defines "nonpublic information" to "include information that the employee knows or reasonably should know is designated as confidential an agency, has not actually been disseminated to the general public, and is not authorized to be made available to the public On request," So, Mr. Roelle, RTC criminal referrals do constitute nonpublic information under the Office of Government Ethics definition. Mr. ROELLE. I would assume so, yes, sir, based on what you've just read to me. . Senator ROTH. And those same Office of Government Ethics standards of conduct regulations prohibit a Federal employee from improperly using "nonpublic information to further his own private 40 interest or that of another, whether through advice or recommendation or by knowing unauthorized disclosure." Mr. Roelle, isn't it correct, then, that this regulation prohibits an employee from disclosing nonpublic information that would further the private interest of another person, even if that person is ill another agency of Government? Mr. ROELLE. Based on what you've read to me, that would be the case, sir. Senator ROTH. Did the Clintons have a private financial interest in Madison Guaranty, which was the subject of these referrals? Mr. ROELLE. I can t get into what I know as a result of the criminal referrals, sir, one way or the other. And other than that, I don't know, Senator ROTH. Let's assume that could be the case. Do you think it was proper for Mr. Altman The CHAIRMAN. Senator Roth, if you will permit me just to say that this falls on the scope screen in terms of, in effect, asking Mr. Roelle either to get into the substance of this, which he's reluctant to do and should not do, or to speculate about the substance of it, and I'm not sure he should be asked to do that. You may want to consider whether you really want to ask him to do that here. Senator ROTH. I have no desire to exceed the scope of the inquiry. Let me ask, Mr. Ryan, are you familiar with Mr. Nussbaum's February 22, 1993, memorandum prohibiting White House staff contacts with independent agencies? Mr. RYAN. No, I'm not, Senator ROTH. Mr. Chairman, I'll reserve the balance of my time. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Roth. Senator Boxer. OPENING COMMENTS OF SENATOR BARBARA BOXER Senator BOXER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Ms, Kulka, you have a reputation as a very tough and independent litigator and many have told this Committee that in the depositions. Did anyone at any time try to influence you in your job as General Counsel here, vis-a-vis, anything to do with Madison, Whitewater, or any of the areas this Committee is looking at? Ms. KULKA. Other than the correspondence from various Congresspeople, the answer is no. Senator BOXER. If I might pick up on that, you have received letters from various Congresspeople on this matter? What did they suggest in their letters to you? Ms. KULKA. I think early on before I got there and continuing for the next several weeks, there were, first of all, requests for information that was part of our investigation and part of the criminal referrals, repeated requests and demands for that. There were also indications that it was the desire of those Congresspeople that we obtain tolling agreements from a wide variety of people. Senator BOXER. Outside of Members of Congress, no one from the White House or the Treasury tried to influence your handling of this case? Ms. KULKA. That's correct. 41 Senator BOXER. Mr. Ryan, in terms of people trying to influence you, did you ever brief anyone in the White House bout this case. Mr. RYAN. No, I didn't. Senator BOXER. Did an one in the White House ever ask you to be briefed about this case? Mr. RYAN, No, Senator. I've never spoken to anyone in the White House,
August 2, 1994 - Part 6
(00:45:56) Senator BOND. How was the White House notified of the referral? Is it from your agency? Mr. ALTMAN. They were not notified by the RTC to the best of my knowledge. Senator BOND. Nobody, nobody 'In your agency to Your knowledge advised the White House staff that this was going to be a major-thing could be a major source of concern. Mr. ALTMAN. Not to my knowledge. Senator BOND. Ms. Ford, do you know if the White House was notified by the RTC? Ms. FORD. No, we have had no involvement at the Oversight Board whatsoever. [Videotape ended.] The CHAIRMAN. The next person in order of question. We may all have questions here. Senator Sarbanes. Mr. ALTMAN. Mr. CHAIRMAN. may I thank you for showing that. I appreciate that very much. The CHAIRMAN. I think it was necessary to show it. I think we would have shown it even if you hadn't asked, we had a mutual interest in seeing it, but I think that's important for us to put that up front here. Senator SARBANES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Altman, I'd like to direct you to page 8 of your statement, You were working from a reading copy, weren't you? Mr. ALTMAN. I have it, Senator. Senator SARBANES. From the Committee. At the bottom of the page, you say, "then she and I had lunch together afterwards," meaning Jean Hanson; is that correct? Mr. ALTMAN. Yes, sir. Senator SARBANES. Do you mean together after the bearing? Mr. ALTMAN. After the testimony, which was very lengthy, a group of those who had helped me on it, several came to my office and I provided sandwiches to everybody and Jean was there. Senator SARBANES. This was back at the Treasury? Mr. ALTMAN. Yes, sir. Senator SARBANES. Did she say anything to you at that meeting about the testimony you had just given? Mr. ALTMAN. No, sir, she did not. Nor, -may I add, did anyone else. Senator SARBANES. Did you go back to the Treasury together with Ms. Hanson? Mr. ALTMAN. I don't recall, Senator. I don't remember whether we did or we didn't return together. Senator SARBANES. When you responded to Senator Bond in that question we just saw, he asked you bow was the White House notified of the referral. We now know the White House was notified of the referral by Jean Hanson; is that correct? Mr. ALTMAN. That's my understanding. Senator SARBANES. Now, you said to him in responding to that question, "not notified by the RTC to the best of my knowledge. 427 Mr. ALTMAN. Yes, sir, I did. Senator SARBANES. Jean Hanson is not part of the RTC is she? Mr. ALTMAN. No, sir. Senator SARBANES. So if that answer was correct, but it did not cover Jean Hanson notifying the White House, is that the case? Mr. ALTMAN. That certainly can be interpreted that way, yes, sir. Senator SARBANES. And when you carefully said "not notified by the RTC to the best of my knowledge," were you excluding out notification by the Treasury people? Mr. ALTMAN. I can't recall what was precisely in my mind, but I wasn't aware of any notification of any kind to the White House on the criminal referral at that time. Senator SARBANES. Well now Mr. ALTMAN. Or any meeting, I guess I should say. Senator SARBANES. You said last fall I was advised that a referral was about to be made, didn't you, in that segment? Mr. ALTMAN. Yes, sir, I was advised. Senator SARBANES. And then what happened with that advice, who advised you?
JFK Assassination Hearings - Dr. Michael Baden (Part III)
The infamous bullet 399 is introduced by Klein as an exhibit and passed to Baden who is asked to identify it (11:24:35) Baden tells the committee what experience the panel has in identifying a bullet as having caused particular damage and says that with the exception of Dr. CYRIL H. WECHT that the panel unanamously agreed bullet 399 is the single bullet theory bullet (11:25:45) Baden lists deficiences panel agreed upon concerning the JFK autopsy - it is an extensive list, and is to be documented in a panel report (11:28:00) Chairman LEWIS STOKES thanks four members of the National Archives who are in attendance for their helping the committee (11:29:30) Representative RICHARDSON PREYER is recognized to question Baden, asks Baden why the doctors at Parkland hospital identified the bullet wound in JFK's throat as being an entrance wound - Baden gives an explanation, mainly consisting of the fact that the doctors' main concern was treatment of JFK and not paths of bullets, they did not flip him over to see the bullet hole in his back so probably assumed that the neck was a one way entrance hole - Baden adds that the tracheotomy these doctors performed on JFK's neck later had the opposite effect of confusing the autopsy doctor's as to where the bullet through the back's point of exit was (11:30:22) Preyer wants to know why there is a discrepancy between the panel's findings and those of the autopsy doctor's as to the location of the bullet's entry point into JFK's head - Baden gives a long explanation which ends with the conclusion that since the autopsy report was written the day after the autopsy that a measurement mistake was made as there was no longer any visual reference (11:35:33) Preyer wants to know what the autopsy doctors said of the entrance wound the panel identified as being 4 inches higher - Baden responds that the doctors when interviewed think that this spot is some dried blood, Baden goes on however to defend the panel's conclusion saying that this point of entry matches the X-rays (11:38:35)
August 4, 1994 - Part 3
(12:00:37) Ms. WILLIAMS. Senator Campbell, may I add to that Mr. McLarty generally, as a way of dealing with situations where there is a lot of press interest, will put together White House response teams. This was not an unusual method of working, getting people together. Senator CAMPBELL. That is a normal process and you have done it before? MS. WILLIAMS. On different issues, yes. Senator CAMPBELL. On different things, OK. Mr. McLarty, you apparently ordered your staff, i.e., Mr. Podesta to work with the Treasury people to prepare Roger Altman for the February 24th Senate hearing. The newspapers, at least one account I read, indicated that you did not want them to concentrate solely on Whitewater. Was there anything to that? Mr. MCLARTY. We wanted the hearings to cover the scope that this Committee felt was proper, There was a lot going on and we did not think it was proper for the hearings to be based on a very narrow issue and that to dominate the hearings. The RTC was performing quite well in their activities. This was" to be a regularly scheduled hearing and we wanted it, to be a broad, 321 and full hearing, and not a forum for (12:01:53)(tape #10088 ends)
Watergate Hearings - Testimony of Gordon C. Strachan, July 23, 1973
Correspondent Robert MacNeill provides judgement on the day's testimony and legal developments. By refusing to release the tapes, U.S. President Richard Nixon is taking a big risk that threatens to backfire on him. U.S. Senator Sam Ervin holds the high ground by asking for the White House tapes and implying that refusal to release them shows evidence of guilt. President Nixon thinks the tapes could put him in hostile light. To this point, the evidence most hostile to him was the testimony of former Counsel to the President John Dean, who testified Nixon knew of the cover-up the year prior as well as the pay-offs and promises of executive clemency this year. The President denies this. The Senate Committee wants the tapes on those subjects. The President does not trust anyone to decide the matter of what he did or did not know, and is putting up his credibility against that of Dean. MacNeill mentions a Gallup Poll showing erosion of the President's credibility and growing support of impeachment. MacNeill wonders if the American people will "get bored and go away," or will support for impeachment continue to grow. It feels like a race of tortoises and President Nixon is betting on which one will get tired first.
Capitol Journal - Political Ads
Mark Shields. Senator Mitchell looking at contemporary campaigns you re involved as Chairman of the Democratic Senate Campaign Committee. We talked to Congressman Zschau, Republican nominee for the Senate of California, he told us he had 500 meetings with major contributors to raise the two million dollars necessary for television budget. What about this money in politics? I know the Democrats are consistently out spent so therefore they complain a lot. Senator George Mitchell (D - Maine) The cost of American political campaigns is excessive. I call it obscene. It is corrupting the process and we ought to change the system. We ought to have campaign spending limits, reasonable enough to give challengers a chance to become known. And the only way you can do that now legally is though some form of public financing. We elect Presidents in that manner. I know of no American who favors repealing the law as to Presidential elections and going back to the old days when people carried sacks with hundreds of thousands of dollars in the back door of the White House. Nobody favors that. If it s good enough to elect Presidents - if it s important enough for that election, than why isn t it good enough for Senators?
July 25, 1995 - Part 4
(14:25:10) Mr. WATKINS, I recall specifically Mrs.-Vince Foster's sister's husband, Lee Bowman, in Little Rock, and also some-a minister, Presbyterian minister in Hope, Arkansas, and also a Mr. George Frazier in Hope, Arkansas. Mr. BEN-VENISTE. Is it fair to say, then, that in order to get in contact with Ms. Thomasson, that it would have been easier for you if you had a phone number where she could be reached so that you could phone her because it might be very difficult to get through to you either on the Foster phone Mr. WATKINS. Right. Mr. BEN-VENISTE, -or on the cell phone that was being passed around? Mr. WATKINS. It makes-yes. Mr. BEN-VENISTE. Therefore, does that refresh your recollection as to why you may have left a message on the pager that Ms. Thomasson ought to report with a phone number at whatever location she was at? Mr. WATKINS. As I said earlier, I don't recall specifically, but it very well could have been the reason. The phone was awfully tied up. I didn't have a dependable phone, as far as my cellular phone, so it may very well have been the case. 291 Mr. BEN-VENISTE. Now, you weren't canvassing the countryside to find who was closest to the White House or who was furthest away or anything like that at the time? Mr. WATKINS. No, sir. The only person I was interested in was Patsy. Mr. BEN-VENISTE. YOU weren't standing there with a stopwatch trying to record who got back to you in what time? Mr. WATKINS. No, not at all. Mr. BEN-VENISTE. So that your recollections of the time intervals involved are, at best, an approximation. Mr. WATKINS. Yes, and that's what I've said, I believe. Mr. BEN-VENISTE. So, if we accept the electronic records that reflect that the pager message was left at 10:34 and that Ms. Thomasson entered the White House approximately 15 minutes later, would that do great violence to your understanding of what occurred that evening? Mr. WATKINS. Not in general, no, no. Mr. BEN-VENISTE. So she got back to you, you had the conversation, and she headed off to the White House arriving there within minutes. Mr. WATKINS. Yes. Mr. BEN-VENISTE. I have nothing further. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hatch. OPENING COMMENTS OF SENATOR ORRIN G. HATCH Senator HATCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wish to focus on any obstruction of justice that may have occurred during the White House's actions immediately following Mr. Foster's death. Now, I recognize that the Justice Department decided not to prosecute any White House officials for obstruction. However, because the Department chooses to exercise its discretion to prosecute in this manner does not mean that there was no obstruction, that no Federal laws were violated. This is especially true in light of the information that has come forward today and last week that possible evidence in Mr. Foster's burn bag was destroyed, that Government officials searched Mr. Foster's office before Federal officials or Federal investigators could arrive, and that White House officials prevented Justice Department lawyers from searching Mr. Foster's papers. This Committee, it seems to me, must explore whether there has been an effort to impede the enforcement of the law by White House officials. Now, it's important that these hearings make clear the exact facts surrounding the events around Mr. Foster's death. But we must ask the White House officials who took these steps whether they sought to "influence, obstruct, or impede the due and proper administration of the law" by the Justice Department in violation of Federal obstruction of justice Statute 18, U.S.C. section 1505. We must also ask whether those who burned bags or searched Mr. Foster's office or excluded Federal investigators from the office were ordered, persuaded or misled into doing so by their superiors. We must also ask whether, those superiors may have ordered these actions with the intent- one, to withhold documents and records from the Justice Department; two, to "alter, destroy, mutilate 292 or conceal" these documents or other objects needed for the inves- tigation; or, three, "to hinder, delay or prevent the Communication to a law enforcement official of information relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense" in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 1512.
JFK Assassination Hearings - Larry Sturdivan (Part II)
CHARLES MATHEWS asks LARRY M. STURDIVAN what happens to bullet when it passes through a more dense material than air - Sturdivan answers that it can cause the bullet's yaw or angle of spin to increase dramatically, as much as 270 degrees (10:03:18) Mathews wants a further explanation with exhibits that he introduces (10:04:30) (Sound goes fuzzy at exhibit easel with portable mic) Sturdivan explains the bullets' paths with exhibits of photographs of bullets passing through gelatin and how their yaw changes upon passage through the material (10:05:22) Someone interrupts to adjust Sturdivan's microphone and cuts off the fuzz (10:07:58) Sturdivan continues with new mic but fuzz returns, he explains more exhibits which also show bullets passing through gelatin and fragmenting and changing yaw (10:08:45) Sturdivan explains exhibit of tests done on bullets fired through gelatin from a Mannlicher-Carcano rifle, the first image shows a bullets path which shows almost no yaw and goes straight through 15 inches of gelatin after it had already gone through another 4 inch gelatin target - Sturdivan again makes mention that the Mannlicher-Carcano rifle had one of the stablest shots of any rifles he's ever tested (10:10:40) Sound issues emerge again, apparently the committee cannot hear Sturdivan (10:11:20) Host SANFORD UNGAR's voice comes over shot of committee to anounce they have pause because of the sound difficulties (10:11:55) Sturdivan decides to hold the mic up to his mouth to solve the problem (10:12:18) Mathews asks Sturdivan to explain the Mannlicher-Carcano test exhibits - Sturdivan explains they were conducted at the request of the Warren Commission and that they show the different possibilites of the bullet going straight or of it curving in path according to the plains that it encounters within the gelatin (10:12:20) Mathews asks if this exhibit supports the path of the single bullet theory to which Sturdivan answers that it depends on the stability of the bullet upon impact and the thickness of the materail it is passing through, he adds the Mannlicher-Carcano is very stable and its bullet could travel unaltered in course through 4 or 5 inches of material (10:14:10) Mathews asks why a bullet in another exhibit broke up in the gelatin - Sturdivan answers its the force and explains (10:15:11) A new exhibit is added comparing bullets fired from three different rifles through gelatin and Sturdivan explains the specifics, one is a bullet from a Mannlicher Carcano rifle and it is the only one that traveled in a straight path through (10:15:46) Mathews asks if Sturdivan is able to predict the drag force on a bullet - Sturdivan explains a drag force equation and after being asked by Mathews says that the velocity at which deformation would occurr in soft tissue is 2000 feet per second, the muzzle velocity of the Mannlicher-Carcano and bone for the same gun would be 1400 ft/s, and if the bullet turns sideways it will deform at an even lower velocity (10:18:30) A projector is set up to show films of bullet deformation and during this pause Ungar's voice comes in to sum up the testimony and explain the significance of the films and introduce them - DAVID LIFTON, a Warren Commision critic on the host panel corrects Ungar about the reason the films are being shown and criticizes the decision made by this committee not to conduct re-creation tests of the assassination with the rifle (10:23:00) Lights in hearing room turned off (10:26:57) Lights back on, committee remains in recess because there is a vote taking place on the house floor (10:27:17) Ungar introduces his panel David Lifton and Professor JACOB COHEN - shot turns to them and they discuss what these tests are supposed to show us (10:28:14) Committee comes back into session (10:31:57) Lights on, film image appears of gelatin block with ruler above it and Sturdivan explains the footage, it is of a military bullet being fired through the gelatin, first the film is shown at normal speed, then in slow-motion with Sturdivan explaining the bullet's effects and change of yaw frame by frame - a second block of gelatin is then shot with another bullet at a higher velocity which causes it to break up within the gelatin -both jello blocks exlode in gyrating waves upon impact (10:32:25) Lights back on, Sturdivan defines the difference between radial velocity and a shock wave for Mathews (10:40:05) New exhibits are introduced by Mathews, they are exibits from Dr. CYRIL H. WECHT's testimony and show positioning of JFK and CONNALLY in the car and an image of the various deformities suffered by Mannlicher-Carcano bullets fired in Warren Commission tests - Mathews asks Sturdivan as a scientist if he would say these exhibits are accurate or speculative ( a close up is shown the exhibit which depicts the men's positioning in the car and the v-hold temporarily goes bad followed by a fuzzy picture which continues) - Sturdivan says that the Zapruder film alone would not be enough determine the illustration positioning the men in the car and that in general Dr. Wecht did not produce enough evidence to allow a trust worthy recreation of the assassination - there are much more factors involved than he presented (10:41:24) Sturdivan addresses another of Wecht's exhibits, this one the image of the deformed bullets, explaining the bullets one by one he discounts Wecht's testimony that they proved the impossibility that bullet 399 could have done so much damage and emerged in as good condition as it did (10:46:05) Exhibits of stills of the Zapruder film are introduced and of JFK's skull, one an X-ray the other a recreation of the bullet's impact (10:48:15) Sturdivan in response to Mathews explains that regardless of the type of ammunition, frangible or full metal jacket, the head of JFK would be expected to explode as it did - Sturdivan, then analysing the X-ray contends that the skull's damage was characteristic of a jacketed bullet (10:49:50) Sturdivan provides his perception as to the bullets path through the skull, then explains for Mathews that skull exploded because of the radial velocity imparted by the bullet (10:53:20) Sturdivan introduces film of tests he helped conduct on request by the Warren Commission of skulls being fired upon and explains the test set up (10:55:35) Lights are dimmed and Ungar's voice comes over hearing room footage to introduce skull films (10:57:31) Another film, other than that of the skull must be played first, Sturdivan explains it is of a can of tomatos which is shot, it shows the effects of radial velocity and impact on exploding the target - the image is dark and black and white (10:58:00) The first skulll appears - the image is very dark and black and white, film cuts off before anything happens to it (10:59:57)
July 18, 1995 - Part 1
(10:15:50) Many of the questions that have been raised, I think, are obviously subject to differing interpretations, and that's one of the things this Committee will have to carefully examine in the days to come. It's also important to recognize that as Deputy White House Counsel, Vince Foster dealt with a range of matters. In effect, there are important privileges with respect to those papers: executive privilege and attorney-client privilege. For instance, we know there was a file dealing with Supreme Court nominees. That's a file over which the executive clearly can assert privilege. Also, attorney-client privilege, since Foster was using some of the personal papers of the Clintons in order to prepare some of their official statements as the Chairman indicated at the beginning, can be asserted. For example, there were mandatory financial disclosure statements that were required. So, as we look at the handling of these documents, I think we need to keep that dimension also in mind. Now, it's my expectation that the Committee will be able to work through the witnesses in the days to come in a very careful and appropriate manner, so as to place ourselves in a position to evaluate the testimony. As I said, the Independent Counsel has indicated that his inquiry has passed beyond this issue and, therefore, we were given the green light; not that we are necessarily bound by that, but it's an important consideration. We've been trying to harmonize our activities with those of the Independent Counsel. Finally, let me just say in closing that these hearings have a tremendous potential to become highly emotional. I've already outlined the fact that much of the conduct we've been examining occurred in the aftermath of the suicide, in the nature of that stressful incident. I think it's very important for the Members of this Committee to try to maintain this inquiry in a civil, rational way. We're here to try to find out what the facts are, to hear the witnesses out, to try to resolve differing recollections and differing interpretations and then to evaluate that. But I think it's extremely important, both for us and for the public, to hear the testimony in full before we undertake the evaluation. I was always taught that's how you're supposed to do it, and I'm hopeful that's what this Committee will do as we now set upon the task of carrying through the fair, impartial and thorough hearings with which we have been charged by the Senate. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Dodd. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CHRISTOPHER J. DODD Senator DODD. Thank you, Senator Sarbanes. Is there about 10 minutes left? 12 The CHAIRMAN. I think it's about 10 minutes. If the Senator needs additional time Senator DODD, I thank the Chairman. Mr. Chairman, let me just begin by saluting you and Senator Sarbanes for the very fair and balanced way that I think you've gone about setting up these hearings. The matters before us, as you have pointed out and Senator Sarbanes has suggested, are far too important, I think, to be turned into a political football, and I think it is to your credit that this has not yet happened. Mr. Chairman, I hope we will conduct these hearings, as Senator Sarbanes has just said, in the same spirit of fairness that has characterized their planning.
Whitewater Hearings August 1, 1994 - Part 1
(11:15:37) Ms. KuLKA. I'm sorry. Would you repeat the date, sir? Senator DAMATO. From January through mid-February. Ms.-KuLKA. Yes. senator D'AMATO. OK. Were there any other specific cases in which you gave a briefing to Mr. Altman during that period of time when he was the bead of the RTC? Ms. KULKA. The only other case that I remembered was the Diamond litigation. Senator DAMATO. OK. What is the Diamond litigation? Ms. KuLKA. This is litigation where the RTC, as receiver, has property that is subject to the rent control laws in New York. The RTC has carried this case through the circuit court successfully to 13 pre-empt the State rental control laws and to free certain of the units from the application of that law. This was another case where we had a lot of congressional inquiry and the Deputy Secretary and Interim CEO were interested in it. Senator D'AMATO. Is that the only other case you ever spoke to Mr. Altman about? Ms. KuLKA. That's the only other case I recollect speaking with him about. Senator D'AMATO. OK Thank you very much. The CHAiRMAN. Senator Dodd. OPENING COMMENTS OF SENATOR CHRISTOPIIER J. DODD Senator DODD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Let me thank all of you, by the way, for being here today. I think it's important to pick right up on the line of questioning that Senator D'Amato has raised with Ms. Kulka. Let me ask you very directly, did you tell anyone that the RTC would not bring a case because of the inability to put documents together prior to February 28, 1994? Ms. KULKA. No, sir. Senator DODD. You talked to no one about that, at the White House? The Treasury? Ms. KULKA. I never said that to anyone at the RTC because that was not the case. Senator DODD. Nor at the White House? Ms. KULKA. I've never spoken to anyone at the White House. Senator DODD. Nor at the Treasury Department? Ms. KuLKA. No, sir. Senator DODD, Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, I think it's important for the purpose of clarity here to lay out exactly where we are with regard to this phase of the investigation. Let me quote from Mr. Fiske regarding this particular question the Committee is asked to address-that is, whether or not any illegal activity occurred surrounding the so-called contacts issue. I the quote from the Fiske statement. He says: The evidence is insufficient to establish that anyone within the White House or the Department of the Treasury acted with the intent to corruptly influence an RTC investigation. Therefore, the evidence of the events surrounding the contacts between the White House and the Treasury does not justify the prosecution of anyone for the violation of Section 1505, which is obstruction of Federal proceedings. We have also concluded that the evidence does not justify a criminal prosecution for violation of any other statute. I think it's very important that that statement by Mr. Fiske be included in the record. Second, Mr. Chairman, I think it's important to note that the Office of Government Ethics concluded in the last 24 or 48 hours that there were no ethical violations in this matter at all, I think it's important to note that. . Now this Committee may draw a different conclusion, but I think its important that the record reflect that, at this particular juncture. I think it's also important to note who the Office of GovernMerit Ethics is run by---- Stephen Potts, who was appointed by President Bush. This is not a Lloyd Bentsen appointee. It's an independ 14 ent agency that Secretary Bentsen asked to examine this issue on March 3, 1994, and at the request of Mr. Fiske, delayed that investigation until June 30, 1994. They spent the last month going over all the documentation and that independent agency, under the direction of an appointee of President Bush, concluded there were no ethical violations in this particular matter. Now, if I may The CHAIRMAN. Senator Dodd, before you go on, that report is out and I think we ought to make it a part of our own records just for reference purposes. Senator DODD. I would move that that be the case. The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it is so ordered. Senator DODD. I would point out as well that they pointed out some troubling contacts and this Committee ought to examine those troubling contacts. I think it is important. When I first heard about it, I thought, well , maybe this is just a Treasury Department group. I discovered it was an independent agency under the direction of Mr. Potts and career people, not political people, looking at these issues. Now, I'd like to ask each and every one of you to respond to the following question, and I'll begin with you, Mr. Roelle. Did any official at the White House ask you to take, or instruct you to take any action to obstruct or impede the Resolution Trust Corporation's handling of either the criminal or civil cases against Madison Guaranty? Mr. ROELLE. No, sir. Senator DODD. Ms. Kulka? Ms. KuLKA. No. Senator DODD. Mr. Ryan? Mr. RYAN. No. Senator DODD, Mr. Katsanos? Mr. KATSANOs. No, sir. Senator DODD. What is it? Mr. KATSANOS. No, sir. Senator DODD. Did any one of you take any action to obstruct or impede the Resolution Trust Corporation's handling of either the criminal or civil cases against Madison Guaranty? Mr. Roelle? Mr. ROELLE. No, sir. Ms. KuLKA. No. Mr. RYAN. No, sir. Mr. KATSANOS. No, sir. Senator DODD. I thank all four of you. Mr. Chairman, I'll yield back the balance of my time to others who may have some questions.
July 29, 1994 - Part 1
(10:54:43) OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CHRISTOPHER S. BOND Senator BOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As most of the Nation knows, Madison Guaranty was a Little Rock savings and loan which went belly up, at a cost of nearly $50 million to the U.S. taxpayers. It was owned by James McDougal, the business partner of the Clintons in the Whitewater real estate deal. Madison Guaranty was the classic S&L story of insider dealing, reckless loan policies, and ultimate failure, with the U.S. taxpayers picking up the tab. This Committee has followed closely the $105 billion cost of the S&L debacle and in that way this is a story repeated in many communities around the country. But one part of this case has made it famous. Many of its borrowers, directors, and Counsel were prominent figures in Arkansas politics and government. The tangled web of Madison, Jim McDougal , and the Clintons has led to two sets of criminal referrals, an ongoing civil liability investigation by the RTC, a potential conflict of interest for the First Lady's former law firm, a conviction of a Little Rock judge who improperly loaned Small Business Administration money to the McDougals and to Whitewater, and a range of subpoenas of top level White House and Treasury officials. I have said over and over that the American people have a right to know what happened to the millions of dollars we lost. We in Congress must fulfill our obligations to get the facts out in the open. To carry out this duty, on February 24, 1 asked Clinton Administration officials during the RTC oversight board bearings whether there bad been improper or illegal tip-offs of confidential material, whether the Clintons received special treatment or whether there had been interference or obstruction of ongoing investigations, In doing so, I asked Roger Altman, a friend of the President, who then was running the S&L bailout agency in charge of investigating Madison Guaranty, a series of basic questions. I asked Mr. Altman if there are any special measures taken when high- profile people are involved. On February 24, 1994, Mr. Altman assured me, the Senate, and the American people that his agency was treating the Madison case in an identical manner to other cases. And that his staff was directed to treat the criminal referral "in the exact same fashion" with "no deviation whatsoever, 16 I also asked about the criminal referral: "How was the White House notified of the referral?" Mr. Alt-man replied, "They were not notified by the RTC to the best of my knowledge." Mr. Chairman, we heard just 5 months ago these repeated assurances that the RTC did not treat the Madison case differently from any other case, that the head of the RTC bad instructed his people, from the moment that they were aware of Madison's new criminal referral, to treat the case no differently than any others, and it was not his people who had divulged confidential information to the White House and subsequently to the President. But we now know this is simply not true, from contemporaneous documents and sworn depositions secured by our investigative staff, in the course of next week, we will show that not only did Mr. Altman not tell the Senate the truth, but even after the White House had a several hour meeting over what White House press spokesman, Dee Dee Myers, called "Altman's misleading statements," that no effort has been made to get the full truth out. Based on the evidence we've gathered, we will show that Mr. Altman, as well as the White House, knew that Mr. Altman's testimony to the Senate, not only was untrue but it also violated the so-called high ethical standards that President Clinton had set for his Administration. In fact, it violated the ethical standards that any Administration must set in order to preserve and retain the confidence of the American people. At the same time, the White House should have called on Mr. Altman to resign immediately. It did not. It should have insured that the truth of the meetings, tipoffs, and efforts to influence should be exposed. It did not. Instead, even today, the White House continues to defend its actions. Mr. Cutler, in his testimony before the House, stated that Mr. Altman has been a very effective Deputy Secretary of the Treasury and that be "personally hopes be continues in that job."
August 2, 1994 - Part 3
(12:40:30) Senator ROTH. Now, in your deposition, you testified that no one from the Treasury Department consulted with you in advance of the September 29, 1993, meeting, at which Mr. Altman instructed Treasury General Counsel, Jean Hanson, to brief White House Counsel, Bernard Nussbaum, on the confidential RTC referrals regarding Madison Guaranty; is that correct? Mr. FOREMAN.Yes, Senator, it is. Senator ROTH. Now, Mr. Foreman, three Treasury Department officials, Ms. Hanson, Mr. Steiner, and Jack Devore, attended the October 14, 1993, meeting at the White House, at which there was further discussion of confidential information re regarding the RTC referrals regarding Madison Guaranty. Did any of these three officials or anyone else from the Treasury Department consult with you to seek out your ethics opinion prior to that meeting? Mr. FOREMAN. To the best of my recollection, Senator Roth, they did not. Senator ROTH. So despite the fact that the September 29 and Oc- tober 14 meetings involved Treasury officials discussing confiden- tial information regarding RTC criminal referrals with White House officials, you , Mr. Foreman, as the Agency Ethics Officer were not consulted in advance regarding the propriety of these meetings; is that correct? Mr. FOREMAN, Senator, I'm sorry, I don't know the facts behind your first phrase, but as to the second phrase, I was not-that is, the despite, as you mentioned. I don't know the facts there. But certainly, as you say, I was not consulted. Senator ROTH. Mr. Foreman, you also testified in your deposition that as Agency Ethics Officer, you were not consulted regarding the propriety of any telephone conversations or other contacts between Ms. Hanson and Mr. Altman and anybody in the White House prior to February 1, 1994. Mr. FOREMAN. Yes, Senator, that's correct. Senator ROTH. On February 2, Mr. Altman and Ms. Hanson met with White House officials, including those outside of the White House Counsel's Office, to further discuss the RTC criminal referrals regarding Madison. Mr. Altman has said that you met with Ms. Hanson prior to the meeting and provided your ethical clearance. Yet, in your deposition, you stated that neither the words "ethics" or "clearance" were ever used in your brief discussion with Ms. Hanson prior to the February 2 meeting; is that correct? 362 Mr. FOREMAN. Senator, I must have misunderstood. I though I thought you began your question with saying that they went to the White House to further discuss the criminal referrals. Not to my knowledge edge. I believe that February 2 meeting only related to procedures about the civil claims, if I may. Senator ROTH. But let me ask, in your deposition, you did state that neither the words "ethics" or "clearance" were used in your brief Mr. FOREMAN. That's correct, Senator. Senator ROTH. You also testified, in your deposition that, in fact no formal ethical review was conducted prior to the February 2, 1994 meeting; is that correct? Mr. FOREMAN. No formal ethical review in terms of research, analysis, and hours of thought, that's correct. Senator ROTH. Now, you did have a meeting with Ms. Hanson about 90 minutes before Ms. Hanson and Roger Altman went to the February 2, White House meeting; is that correct? Mr. FOREMAN. To the best of my recollection, Senator Roth, it was midafternoon. If that turns out to he 90 minutes, then that's correct. Senator ROTH. Roughly that time. Mr. FOREMAN. Yes, Senator. Senator ROTH. As I understand it, this meeting lasted 2 or 3 minutes and neither the word "ethics" nor "clearance" was used? Mr. FOREMAN. That's correct, Senator. Senator ROTH. At the February 2, 1994, White House meeting, Mr. Altman apparently claimed that be had received a verbal opinion from Ethics Counsel that be did not legally have to recuse himself Did you give such a verbal opinion? Mr. FOREMAN. I don't recall doing so, Senator, no. Senator ROTH. Or did you tell Ms. Hanson before that meeting that you thought Mr. Altman should recuse himself? Mr. FOREMAN. Yes, Senator, I did. Senator ROTH. Mr. Foreman, in your deposition, you. were read the following quotation from Mr. Altman's, March 3, 1994, letter to the Banking Committee, and I quote: Treasury General Counsel who had also attended the meeting has advised me that before the meeting, she sat down with this Department's Designated Ethics Ofricer. She informed him of the purposes of the meeting and asked his view. He advised her that he saw no problem.
July 29, 1994 - Part 1
(11:01:09) OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JIM SASSER Senator SASSER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to compliment you, Mr. Chairman. You~ve well laid out the issues that are under scrutiny in this hearing, and the boundaries that should govern our inquiry, It's pretty clear that the subject before us today can be put to various political uses. Nevertheless, I cling to the hope, however faint, that we can do our jobs without political rancor here over the next few days. We all have a mutual interest in getting the facts. There are some legitimate questions of Government here but I believe we can get to the truth and keep the matters before US in perspective and also bring to them some ordinary standards of human decency. I hope, we can all agree, that there's no place in this hearing room for lurid speculation about the tragic circumstances surrounding the suicide of Vincent Foster. The Special Counsel has spoken on this issue. The Justice Department and the Park Police have concurred. The Foster family has suffered enough. Now, with regard to the contacts between the Resolution Trust Corporation, the Department of Treasury, and the White House concerning Madison Guaranty, there are some questions to be answered. Documents and depositions contain conflicting accounts of who talked to whom, about what, and when they talked with each other. I think we can begin with at least one fundamental certainty. The criminal referrals involving Madison Guaranty proceeded on schedule, without interference, through the regulatory and criminal justice system, These criminal referrals are now in the hands of the Republican Independent Counsel and before a grand jury. So any contact that might be alleged or even confirmed, we should be clear did not hinder this is process. Now, this is the bottom line. The Independent Counsel found no obstruction of justice and no criminal behavior at all in these contacts, As my distinguished colleague, Senator Dodd, said, this isn't Watergate. This isn't Iran-Contra. No direct abuse of Presidential power is at issue before this Committee in these hearings. Now, our charge under statute demands, however, that we go deeply. We're to determine whether or not "improper behavior" occurred in any of the matters under review. Obviously, there's no bright line task for ascertaining whether so vague a standard has indeed been breached. But Lloyd Cutler, the White House Counsel, has already acknowledged that mistakes have been made and I believe this Committee must examine dispassionately the circumstances surrounding these mistakes in judgment and get to the bottom of what happened. 18 We face issues, perhaps serious, about whether Congress bad been misled in the testimony before this Committee. We do have conflicting statements from high Treasury officials about what contacts were made and at whose direction they were made. But most important, our inquiry will be conducted in the ambiguous area of overlap between the Executive Branch's regulatory powers and its other responsibilities and interests. Now, this is uncertain terrain, to say the least. But clearly, we have reason to question the sensitivity of some in this affair. The bar on matters of this kind, as has been stated earlier, is set very high. People in positions of power must avoid even the appearance of conflict of interest. But having said that, let's not pull this matter out of proportion. The subject of this hearing is not comparable to the abuses of Executive Power we've seen in the recent past. As we move through these bearings, we should keep clearly in -mind the conclusions of the Independent Counsel, and I think it's worthwhile to quote them here. He said, and I quote: The evidence is insufficient to establish that anyone at the White House or the Department of Treasury acted with the intent to corruptly influence an RTC investigation. So Mr. Chairman, I look forward to bearing from the witnesses as these hearings unfold, and I thank you for your leadership in this hearing. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Senator Mack.
July 25, 1995 - Part 5
(15:30:29) The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Thomasson, would you stand. Do you swear or affirm that the testimony that you are about 0 give is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God? Ms. THOMASSON. I do. SWORN TESTIMONY OF PATSY L. THOMASSON FORMER DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION AND SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Thomasson, I don't know if you have a statement that you'd like to give to the Committee, or any remarks. We'd be happy to take any. Ms. THOMASSON. Thank you, sir. My name is Patsy Thomasson. I was born in Arkansas. I grew up in a small town called Rison. I went to a small college, State supported, in Arkansas. My first job after college was to work for former Congressman Wilbur Mills, who's now deceased. After a 2-year tenure on the Congressman's staff, I left to go to graduate school at the University of Missouri in Columbia. After graduation in 1972, 1 returned to the staff of the Congressman in the district office in Little Rock. In 1977, then-Governor, now-Senator David Pryor appointed me to the Arkansas Highway Commission, Highway and Transportation Commission in the State of Arkansas for a 10-year term. During the Clinton/Gore campaign and just before I joined the White House, I was Executive Director of the Democratic Party of Arkansas. I moved to Washington and joined the Clinton Administration on March 1, 1993. 1 was Director of the Office of Administration and Special Assistant to the President. In May 1993, 1 became a Special Assistant to the President for Management and Administration, and my office was moved into the West Wing of the White House. On July 20, 1993, 1 had dinner with a friend from Arkansas, her children, her sister and her sister's family. We ate at a restaurant at Washington Harbor. As we left the restaurant after dinner, I received a page from the White House operator telling me to page David Watkins with my location, I later learned from the pager records that that page happened at 10:34 p.m. on the night of July 20, 1993. 1 went into the restaurant and called from a pay phone. The White House operator asked me to give her a phone number so that Mr. Watkins could call me. I told her that I was at a pay phone and that I would prefer to hold while she got Mr. Watkins on the phone for me. After a wait of several minutes, the operator connected Mr. Wat kins and me. He told me at that time that Vince Foster had killed himself. I was in shock. I was in disbelief. I could not believe that my friend and colleague had killed himself. I asked Mr. Watkins at the time to repeat that message to me. I immediately asked David how I could help. He asked me to go to Vince's office to See 311 if Vince left a suicide note. He told me to page him after I looked and let him know what I found. When I walked out of the restaurant, my friends were waiting for me. When my friend looked at me, she immediately asked me what happened. I said Vince Foster killed himself. She also knew Vince and his family from Little Rock. We were both in tears. We hugged each other. We consoled. It was a terrible moment, I had never personally known anyone before who had committed suicide. It was just totally unthinkable, inconceivable to me. I told my friends I had to go to the White House to see if he left a note. My friend said you don't need to be by yourself, let me go with you. We then looked for a cab, got a cab, went up through Georgetown, M Street, to Pennsylvania Avenue and to the White House. I told my friend she couldn't go with me because it was too much trouble to clear her through the security process at the White House, They dropped me off at the northwest staff gate at the White House. I got out of the cab. She got out for a minute with me. We consoled each other. I went into the White House, into my office on the lower level of the West Wing, unsecured my office, left my things, my purse in my office and went up to the first floor. I saw a number of people that I knew. I stopped to talk, to console and to be consoled. I saw Bernie Nussbaum. I told him that David Watkins had asked me to look in Vince's office for a suicide note. I asked him to go with me. We went to the White House Counsel's Office on the second floor. As we went into the reception area, the cleaning lady was coming out of Vince's office. Bernie and I went in.
August 1, 1994 - Part 5
(17:05:07) At the outset, I indicated that I only know one way to do things: With honesty, and consistent with, legal and ethical requirements. I testified extensively before the staff of this Committee, and this is the seventh day that I have given sworn testimony before a governmental investigative body. I have tried to give this Committee, albeit in abbreviated form today, my best recollection of what occurred and why. I am satisfied that I have given you my best recollection, as I have done on each prior occasion that I have testified and the numerous additional times that I have been interviewed. I have no doubt about the propriety of my actions, and I have no reason to doubt the propriety of anyone else's. I thank the Committee for the opportunity to make this statement and I welcome any questions that the Committee may have. The CHAIRMAN. Lees start if we may Senator SARBANES. Mr. Chairman, can I ask-are there copies available of Ms. Hanson's opening statement? The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Sarbanes. No, we were not given copies. If I may--do you have copies or could we-if you'll let us have what you just read, we'll Xerox it, so we can circulate it to Members of the Committee. Ms. HANSON. We sent 120 copies at 9 a.m. The CHAIRMAN. Apparently, they haven't arrived. Until they're located, it would be helpful if we could just take your statement and make some copies. They're probably somewhere making their way here. In any event, we do want to have copies in front of us. I want to go to the testimony before this Committee on February 24, 1994, that you've made some reference to and which other witnesses today have talked about. As I understand it, there was very careful preparation done ahead of time for that meeting. Several hours were devoted on at least 3 or 4 different days leading up to that hearing. Material was put together, a group met, you were part of the group, Mr. Altman was part of the group, the questions were discussed, and all of this was gone through in some detail. Is that correct? Ms. HANsoN. That's correct. It was a massive amount of material. The CHAIRMAN. In any event, is it fair to say that Mr. Altman was well-briefed by the time that hearing started? It sounds to me as if everybody really focused on getting ready for that bearing. Is that a fair conclusion? Ms. HANsON. There was a focus on----clearly, there was a focus 01, preparing for the hearing. As I said, there was a massive 'mount of work to do, a tremendous scope of issues to be covered. Although we did our best, on many, many issues there was not as in-depth a review as we would have liked. The CHAIRMAN. But you testified today, and also in your deposi- on that, as you were listening to Mr. Altman answer questions 104 that day, questions you yourself have cited from Senator Bond Senator Gramm, that-and ve been careful as to how you put it, but that you were -- the answers in and of themselves were not complete, and in your mind, in effect, you thought, well, those can be amplified later. Is that a fair conclusion for me to draw from what you've just said? Ms. HANSON. Yes, I thought the entire testimony needed to be re- . viewed. The CHAIRMAN. On the recusal issue, it seemed to me, you also seemed to be saying you were somewhat surprised that, when Mr. Altman was asked to summarize anything that was of an consequence, he omitted any discussion of the recusal even though that was in the preparation document that you'd helped put together Were you surprised that he left that out? Ms. HANSON, Yes. The CHAIRMAN. Did you say something to him about it after you left the Committee room? Ms. HANSON. No. I didn't The CHAIRMAN. Why? Ms. HANSON. He left before I did and I didn't go back with him. The CHAIRMAN. How about in the days that followed, did you have any occasion to mention that to him. MS. HANSON. Not that specific issue. As I stated, I knew during the course of the testimony-the course of the hearing that there were a number of issues that needed to be followed up. I did not have a copy of the transcript until substantially later, and it was my intention to go through the transcript carefully and raise all of the issues with Mr. Altman at once. The CHAIRMAN. Didn't I hear you say in your prepared statement, though, that when you went over to the meeting at the White House, Mr. Altman went over with the idea in mind of saying be was going to recuse himself and then encountered some pressure, some resistance to that, and decided not to recuse himself? Didn't I hear you say this a minute ago? Ms. HANSON. I wouldn't characterize it as pressure. There was a discussion of the issue, and I understood Mr. Altman to have listened to the discussion and considered it, but I wouldn't have
JFK Assassination Hearings - Dr. Cyril H. Wecht
Shot turns to host and panel, JEREMIAH O'LEARY a Washington Star reporter and DAVID LIFTON a researcher and writer on JFK, they recap the day's testimony and comment upon it (I 15:59:03 - O 16:24:00) Committee reconvenes and chair recognizes Purdy to question Wecht (16:24:00) Purdy asks why don't men line up in vertical trajectory - Wecht answers bullet on slight incline coming though JFK but was originally fired from the sixth floor of a book depository obviously at a downward angle, then upon leaving JFK the bullet takes a downward angle through Connally (16:24:15) Wecht complains that the forensic pathology department is hung up on how we can't know how men were positioned when the car was behind the sign, this is used to explain how the bullet's path possible even though the horizontal trajectories also do not match up (16:27:00) X-ray of Connally's wrist is introduced by Purdy, Purdy asks if bullet could have done the damage shown in X-ray - Wecht explains (16:28:10)
LAWMAKERS
WETA "LAWMAKERS" 3/03/1983 IN 16.02.12-WETA credit/sponsor credits/title sequence. 16.03.06-PAUL DUKE/COKIE ROBERTS/LINDA WERTHEIMER-the ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, SOCIAL SECURITY, and the ECONOMY at heart of CONGRESSIONAL AGENDA for the week. WERTHEIMER-a bill for SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM passed the HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE with only three dissenting votes and moves to a floor vote. ROBERTS intro profile of JIM WRIGHT, (D-TX, House Majority Leader). 16.04.27-Shots of a fundraiser luncheon for JIM WRIGHT, Texas barbecue style. C/S WRIGHT discoursing on the range-riding origins of the barbecue. Shots of diners loading up on barbecue. Shots of WRIGHT gladhanding. A former Congressman marvels at WRIGHT'S ability to shake hands with everyone in the crowd. Shot of WRIGHT holding a harmonica, talks about learning to play from hoboes in a "Hooverville" in the Depression, starts to play. M/S of WRIGHT taking podium to play a c+w tune on the harmonica. C/S of two young boys (7 and 5 years?), say that WRIGHT is the boss of the DEMOCRATS in Congress. 16.07.14-M/S front of House chamber, O'NEILL giving floor to WRIGHT, C/S WRIGHT in well, taking the speaker's seat. C/S WRIGHT, says he took job thinking a majority leader should be "part parish priest, part evangelist, part prophet" to take care of business. M/S WRIGHT in meeting of new DEMOCRATS. C/S Rep. MICKEY LELAND (D-TX), says when he came to Congress WRIGHT'S accessibility and cordiality made a big impression on him, it's important to getting freshmen to act decisively. M/S of SPEAKER O'NEILL'S office, WRIGHT, TOM FOLEY, and O'NEILL. C/S WRIGHT in office, says he has to bridge many divides among DEMOCRATS to be an effective leader. 16.10.10-C/S Rep. CHARLES STENHOLM (D-TX), says WRIGHT manages to aggravate almost everyone in the party at some point. WRIGHT in office, says that this is part of the job. Tells anecdote about raising pheasants in his youth, says he feels like the hen trying to corral and control the young pheasants. Shot of meeting of CONSERVATIVE DEMOCRATS including PHIL GRAMM and CHARLES STENHOLM. ROBERTS v.o.-DEMOCRATS from WRIGHT'S own region broke from the party coalition in the last Congress to support REAGANOMICS. C/S WRIGHT in well of House, WRIGHT arguing that REAGAN is exceeding his rights to bully the Congress to support his plans. C/S WRIGHT in office, says 1981 was hard year, if he thought every year would be like that, he'd quit. C/S Rep. ROBERT MICHEL (minority leader) in office, says the DEMOCRATIC defeats of the last congress weren't WRIGHT'S fault, all the votes were closely contested.
CONGRESS: WE THE PEOPLE
14.39.04-Newman-discusses the role of party leaders in organizing the votes. The minority leader needs to win not only his own party votes, but the votes of defectors. Rep. MICHEL in office, says he'd like to experience the feeling of having all his ducks in a row from committee to Rules to the floor vote instead of having to scramble around to get votes. Shots of 1980 Republican conference where MICHEL is named Minority Leader. MICHEL speaks in favor of his candidacy as Jack Kemp looks on. Political scientist compares Michel to his Republican competitor Guy Vander Jagt of Michigan. Shot of Michel accepting the leadership, lays out a Republican agenda to be unified behind the Reagan program and running "commando raids" for Democratic votes. MICHEL in the well of the House, railing against a Rule that is unfavorable to Republicans. Rep. LYNN MARTIN (R-IL) in office, says MICHEL is a great leader of the GOP. Shot of MICHEL in lunch meeting with REAGAN and TIP O'NEILL. Shot of MICHEL in meeting with other GOP members. MICHEL in his home, says he advocates the Reagan program, but he also needs to be frank about letting REAGAN know when his policies are bad for REPUBLICANS-part of his job is giving Reagan the bad news. 14.42.41-Shot of MICHEL taking the Well of the House. TIP O'NEILL in office praises MICHEL'S skill as a leader. MICHEL in uniform as manager of the Republicans in the House baseball game, MICHEL in straw boater hat singing in a barbershop quartet, in WWII uniform, with his family. MICHEL in his home, talks about growing up in the Depression, and being fortunate to have the chance to do what he does, feeling that he has to honor that trust. 14.43.55-Majority Leader Rep. JIM WRIGHT (D-TX) playing harmonica at a fundraiser. Shots of people loading up on Barbecue at Wright fundraiser. Stills of WRIGHT in WWII uniform, with other Texas Congressmen. WRIGHT in office, speaking about former speaker SAM RAYBURN. WRIGHT says that Texas politics are diverse within the Democratic party, so it's good practice for working to keep liberal and conservative Democrats in line. Portrait of the 1982 Texas Congressional delegation. Shot of Wright in Tip O'Neill's office. Political scientist discusses Wright's leadership qualities. Wright in meeting of Freshmen Democrats. WRIGHT in Well of House, running down the Democrats' agenda. Wright in Well, giving a theatrical speech that draws cheers from Democrats and hoots from Republicans. 14.46.45-Wright says that a Majority Leader needs to fill different roles to keep the party together. WRIGHT says he'd like to become Speaker. 14.47.48
LAWMAKERS
20.09.57-DUKE/WERTHEIMER-discussion of NEW RIGHT'S failures to pass their CONSERVATIVE SOCIAL AGENDA-Compromises and Coalitions don't work well with NEW RIGHT policies, SCHOOL PRAYER and ANTI-ABORTION constituencies didn't totally overlap, strong lobbying against NEW RIGHT. 1982 elections a message that the NEW RIGHT SOCIAL AGENDA isn't going to play in bad economic times. NEW RIGHT not likely to be dominant, and JESSE HELMS can take the blame for being a poor legislative tactician. 20.12.50-REAGAN also determined to be a HARDLINER against COMMUNISM in FOREIGN POLICY. DEFENSE was increased, except for the MX MISSILE. REAGAN won a big battle in 1981 to sell AWACS RADAR PLANES to SAUDI ARABIA. Shots of Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, Sen. JOHN TOWER (R-TX), CASPAR WEINBERGER and some PENTAGON BRASS TYPES, a SLIDE PRESENTATION of AWACS system. Sen. HENRY JACKSON (D-WA) says the PENTAGON is lying that AWACS is a piece of junk to alleviate fears of destabilizing the MIDDLE EAST. M/S Sen. BOB PACKWOOD (R-OR) entering White House. PACKWOOD v.o.-REAGAN'S sales pitch to the Senators overwhelmed PACKWOOD'S opposition to the sale. 20.14.55-PROTESTERS on a sidewalk, holding signs protesting TORTURE and HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS by RIGHT WING DICTATORSHIP in EL SALVADOR, protesting REAGAN'S plan to AID THE RIGHT WING DICTATORSHIP. Rep. STEVEN SOLARZ (D-NY) in committee meeting, asking a REAGAN ADMINISTRATION spokesman if fighting COMMUNISM would involve U.S. TROOPS. AL HAIG, the witness, says that no one plans to send U.S. TROOPS. C/S GEORGE SHULTZ at Confirmation hearings. DUKE v.o.-DEMOCRATS and REPUBLICANS welcomed SHULTZ as a replacement of the crusty HAIG. C/S JOHN GLENN asks SHULTZ his opinion of the policy dispute that led to HAIG'S resignation. SHULTZ says he's not concerned with that. 20.16.55-DUKE v.o.-a NUCLEAR FREEZE movement gained strength in both Houses. Shots of Congressmen in debate. TIP O'NEILL says the ARMS RACE is madness. ROBERT MICHEL (minority leader) argues that the U.S. must have a strong NUCLEAR DETERRENCE. Rep. ED MARKEY (D-MA) says that this is the same old bunk, the arms race must be stopped. 20.17.58-DUKE-discussion of FOREIGN POLICY battles in Congress-REAGAN hurt by the near passage of NUCLEAR FREEZE RESOLUTION in House, and refusal to fund MX MISSILE construction. Discussion with ROBERTS and WERTHEIMER-now cutting DEFENSE SPENDING is starting to be politically safe and advantageous. Discussion of general turnover from 1981-"REAGAN gets whatever he wants" to late 1982 when REAGAN was on the defensive. Most SENATE REPUBLICANS were young and inexperienced, grew to learn how to resist REAGAN. REAGAN'S BUDGET in 1983 likely to be D.O.A. in Congress, but then CONGRESS must come up with it's own plan. 20.22.09-DUKE signs off Closing credits/transcript order information/WETA credit/sponsor credits/PBS ID 20.24.26-OUT
Watergate Hearings, June 25, 1973 - Testimony of John Dean
John Dean. After I informed Magruder that Mr. Fielding was not available, he requested that I suggest someone else because he was desperately in need of an in-house lawyer. Accordingly, I next went to Mr. Krogh and asked him if David Young might be available and interested. Krogh told me that Young was very much involved in the declassification project and could not be spared. The reason Young had occurred to me is that I had spent several days traveling with him in mid-October, interviewing prospective candidates for nomination to the Supreme Court. I might add that during those days of traveling around the country together he never told me what the plumbers unit was doing or had done. But I felt that Mr. Young was a bright and extremely capable lawyer who would make an excellent general counsel, and could handle the security and demonstration problems of the campaign. During my conversation with Mr. Krogh about Young, he suggested that Mr. Gordon Liddy might be available in that he had just about completed his work. Krogh spoke very highly of Liddy's legal ability and said that his FBI Treasury Department background in law enforcement would qualify him to handle a demonstration intelligence and security operation for the reelection committee. I did not know Mr. Liddy, but I respected Krogh's judgment, both as to his judgment of other lawyers and his knowledge of law enforcement. Bud had dealt with the demonstration problems for the White House before I joined the staff. I asked Mr. Krogh to find out if Mr. Liddy was interested. Several days later Krogh informed me that Liddy was interested and asked me to come to his office, Krogh's office, and meet Liddy and describe the job. I did this. I told Liddy that the primary responsibility for the job was to serve as the lawyer for the reelection committee, but among the responsibilities of the general counsel would be keeping abreast of the potential of demonstrations that might affect the campaign. Liddy said he was interested. Krogh said that he would first have to clear it with Ehrlichman. I advised them that Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Magruder would be making the decision on filling the post and if Krogh got the okay from Ehrlichman, I would set up a meeting for Liddy to be interviewed by Mr. Mitchell. When Mr. Krogh gave me the okay from Ehrlichman, I called Mr. Mitchell and told him that Krogh, with Ehrlichman's approval, had suggested Gordon Liddy for the general counsel post and I arranged for Liddy to meet with Mitchell on Nov 24, 1971, after Mr. Caulfield met with Mr. Mitchell.
August 4, 1994 - Part 2
(10:35:42) Senator FAIRCLOTH. I do not, Mr. Chairman, plan to go outside the scope of these hearings, so I will not ask why Paula Casey failed to act on the criminal referrals that the Special Counsel now has. I do want to ask some other questions. Did anyone in the White House have any communication of any kind with Paula Casey or any of her staff? Senator DODD. Mr. Chairman, that is out of order. 297 This is far beyond the scope. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Faircloth, we discussed that the other day and the problem with that area, it does cross the line into the areas that we have been asked not to go into by the Senate an the Special Prosecutor himself. I know you have strong feelings about the Special Prosecutor and I understand that, but that would take us into a zone that is going to have to be dealt with at a later time and cannot properly be dealt with by us here now under the instructions that we have been given. Senator DAMATO. Let me, if I might, Mr. Chairman, say to my colleague, Senator Faircloth, that there are a lot of disturbing as ects. The question of documents in Vincent Foster's office that we have now learned of. We were supposed to be able to go into the document area of the Whitewater papers that were initially found in Mr. Foster's office that were held at the White House apparently for 5 days. That is a subject we are going to have to wait on, that issue and others, that are beyond the scope of this hearing at this time. so I would ask my friend and my colleague to pursue it through an other line. Senator FAIRCLOTH. Well, are you saying that Paula Casey is out of the realm? Senator D'AMATO. Yes. As it relates to the criminal referrals at this time, yes. As it relates to any meetings that she may have had with the White House, I would have to say at this time, we should not. It's permissible to press inquiries, etcetera, but as it relates to the meeting specifically in September, etcetera, I think we have to be very careful. Senator KERRY. Mr. Chairman, I do not think it bears-I do not want to take from my colleagues time but senator D'AMATO. I hope we would restore his time. Senator KERRY. Absolutely, I think so. But every time these questions are dropped, and then there is a sort of statement about well, we cannot go into these things or something, then the listening public says, we will, what is going on, what is going on. And I think it bears repeating, in fairness, that this Committee is not trying to not go into something. We are not preventing the Senator from pursuing these at some point. We are simply adhering to the standards established by the Committee and the Senate to protect the investigation of the Special Prosecutor. There is going to be a second go around and we will all have an opportunity to do this. I do not want to leave an impression that somehow the White House, the Administration, this Committee are involved in not pursuing something, and so we are not just leaving questions hanging. There will be a time. The CHAIRMAN. Well, it should further be said, every White House person is appearing here voluntarily. All the documents have been turned over voluntarily. We have not subpoenaed anybody, and have not had to. So everything that we can properly look at at this time that we have asked for, we have been given. But the things that are outside 298 of what we can do now we will just have to it until another time. Senator KERRY, But most importantly, the reason we are not pursuing them now is to protect the integrity of the process and not for any other reason, The CHAIRMAN. That is correct, and in fact, we have been requested in writing by the Prosecutor to do that? Senator D'AMATO. Mr. Chairman, can I The CHAIRMAN. I want to restore-yes? OPENING COMMENTS OF SENATOR DOMENICI Senator DOMENICI. Mr. Chairman, might I just-without charging this to anybody-make a comment? If you want to, take it off of me, if I have some questions, that is fine. I just want to make a comment regarding Senator Kerry's observation. I think the flip side of what he says is true also. I think it is important for the public to know that there is a lot more to this than we are able to ask about. Some of these answers lead to some very logical follow ups but we are not able to ask them. Senator KERRY. Mr. Chairman, that is not true with respect to the portion that we are now looking-that is just not-that leaves an impression there is a lot more to this. Senator DOMENICI. Well, we are only looking into the Washington component: anything that has to do with the President and with contacts between Treasury and the RTC investigation.