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August 2, 1994 - Part 5
(16:10:50) On February 2, Jean Hanson and I went to the White House. She attended because, as Treasury's senior lawyer, she had been helping me on various RTC legal matters, and the subject matter was inherently legal. She saw nothing wrong with providing this information to the White House. I later learned that she also bad the good judgment to check the ethical issues with Dennis Foreman, Treasury's Chief Ethics Officer, who also saw nothing improper. Mr. Foreman, I might add, is a career appointee who preceded the Clinton Administration. In other words, Mr. Chairman, Treasury's General Counsel and its Senior Ethics Officer both approved this meeting. And as you know, the Office of Government Ethics has also rendered its verdict on that meeting, which is a favorable one. The meeting lasted no more than 20 minutes. Initially, Ms. HanSon and I described the generic procedures which the RTC used in this or any other case facing an expiring statute of limitations. We recited the three alternatives, following talking points which she had prepared. And this Committee, of course, has a copy of those. This was the total information provided which related to the RTC investigation of Madison, We provided no information on the status or outlook for the case. That would have been impossible because we possessed none. The Office of Government Ethics, which took testimony under oath from all participants. said in its report 410 that "nothing suggests that this part of the -meeting involved a disclosure of nonpublic information." Toward the end of the February 2 meeting, I also raised the question of recusal. And let me now address that. Mr. Chairman and Members of this Committee, the issue of recusal is a false one. Whether I recused my self or not would have had no impact on the investigation, none whatsoever. The facts are that I began thinking about recusal around February 1. And that on February 25, 1 did recuse myself. No matter came to me for decision on any case including Madison in that period. Moreover, prior to recusing myself, I was de facto recused. Deci. sions on cases never came to me at any time during my RTC tenure. And I had specifically reaffirmed to the RTC General Couns el before the February 2 meeting that she would be making all deci- sions related to Madison, not me. Indeed, I had told her that more than once, and with others present, and as you know, she testified before you to that effect. On February 2, when I informed the White House that I was thinking about recusal, I told them that it was irrelevant because the RTC General Counsel would be making all decisions on Madison, not me. The Office of Government Ethics confirms my de facto recusal. It states in its report that "recusal is just another word for nonparticipation " and I had already chosen nonparticipation. Nine days after the February 2 meeting, Congress passed a 2-year extension of the statute of limitations on Madison Guaranty9 days later. That made recusal entirely moot. My term as RTC Chairman was to expire and did expire on March 30. And with such additional time, it was almost certain that the RTC would not be making any Madison decisions by my March 30 termination date. In retrospect, I perhaps should have recused myself right off the bat. Some of this controversy would have been avoided. But before February 2, 1 had been advised that there was no legal or ethical requirement to recuse myself. I later receive two written opinions from ethics officers to that effect. Two written opinions
August 3, 1994 - Part 1
(09:50:43) This entire issue revolves around meetings that I understood were on the issue of handling press inquiries about the Madison Guaranty referral, or on the procedures that the RTC would follow in pursuing civil claims. There are differing recollections, but they are about actions that two independent investigations tell us broke no criminal law and violated no ethical standard. I have turned the Treasury Department upside down. I have turned my memory inside out. We went through thousands and thousands of documents. And I cannot find one written briefing to me on these White House meetings, not one. It was not until March 3rd that I learned the extent of these meetings. I issued a statement about the meetings and said that I had not attended them and did not know about them. I maybe walled off from most RTC matters, but I am responsible for what happens at the Treasury Department and I accept that responsibility. And that is why I asked immediately for the Office of Government Ethics to examine these contacts. They are a nonpartisan agency. They are the experts. And preparing for this hearing, I agreed to the Committee request to avoid looking at materials regarding the case until I gave my deposition to the Committee Staff. I agreed to that request, although it sure frustrated me, because I wanted to wade into this and find out all I could. I had to wait over 4 months to start looking at these papers. After I gave my deposition last week, I sat down and began to read through the material. I saw nothing that changes my recollection. Let me lay out for you what my basic recollection is about these matters. First, I read in the press, some time in October, about criminal referrals and Madison Guaranty. Second, on February 1st, Roger Altman and Jean Hanson came to my office. Roger told me he was thinking of recusing himself. And the other subject that came up was the legislation on extending the statute of limitations, Later that month, Roger told me he decided not to recuse himself On February 23rd, I met with Roger and Jean Hanson briefly, in advance of the RTC Oversight Hearing the 24th. I again told Roger Altman the recusal issue was a personal issue for him. On the 25th of February, I learned that Roger had testified the day before as to one meeting with people from the White House, 7 I had been at that meeting. I left to go to a working lunch with some CEO's. I did not hear his testimony because I was not here at that point. On March 3rd, I read in the press about two additional meetings, It was then that I asked for the OGE examination of the contacts and issued my statement. Now I would like to review the subsequent events. Our Treasury Department Inspector General's office was asked to support the Office of Government Ethics examination. Mr. Fiske, the Independent Counsel, was already looking at this from the standpoint of criminal statutes. After I asked the Office of Government Ethics to examine the ethics issues involved, Mr. Fiske asked the Treasury Inspector General to suspend his work while Mr. Fiske's investigation was underway. And the Office of Government Ethics also independently decided it would hold off until Mr. Fiske's work was complete so as not to interfere. Now I want to point out the lengths to which Treasury Department, at my direction, went to cooperate with Mr. Fiske, with the Inspector General, and with the Congressional Committees. Every scrap of paper that remotely looked like it might conceivably have some relation to the Madison Guaranty Savings and Loan or to contacts with the White House was turned over to various investigators, something on the order of 6,500 pages.
Hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committe on the Nomination of Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court
Senator Joseph Biden (D - Delaware). Well, let me tell you what I am going to do, and then I will yield to my colleagues. I am going to speak. Let me tell you what I am going to do. It is appropriate to ask Professor Hill anything any member wishes to ask her to plumb the depths of her credibility. It would be appropriate to ask her about Mr. Singleton, but it is inappropriate to represent what Mr. Singleton says via an affidavit. There is a distinction. So you can ask anything you want. You can ask her what Santa Claus said or didn't say, whether she spoke to him or not, but it is inappropriate to introduce an affidavit from Santa Claus prior to every member on this committee having an opportunity to check it out, for the following reason: We may find out that Santa Claus is not real. Therefore, it may not be very relevant whether or not Santa Claus said something or not. So we are all lawyers on this committee, with one or two exceptions. There is a fundamental distinction between being able to ask a question, between being able to ask a question to determine the credibility of a witness and representing what an individual said they said or said they offered or said they thought about the motivation of the witness. There is a distinction. And so the Chair will rule you can ask anything you want about credibility; you cannot represent, via an affidavit or a sworn statement or a statement, as to what the individual being asked about thinks. If that is the case, ask the committee to bring that witness forward, and then we will sit down and renegotiate among ourselves and with the White House how many witnesses we are going to have. But as pointed out here, this is another way of getting in 2, 5, 7, 10, 20 witnesses without their being able to be cross- examined representing what they said. Now, that is the Chair's ruling. Did my friend want to say anything? Senator Paul Simon (D - Illinois). I would just buttress that by saying there is one other reason, Mr. Chairman, and that is, if we don't abide by the rules, we are going to end up in these wrangles constantly every time a new affidavit is brought up. Senator Joseph Biden (D - Delaware). And I assure my friend from Wyoming that I will impose the same exact rule on anyone questioning Judge Thomas. Now, the Senator from Pennsylvania has the floor. Senator Arlen Specter (R - Pennsylvania). Mr. Chairman, am I accurate that I only have 29 minutes left? Senator Joseph Biden (D - Delaware). You have whatever time was -let me ask. Let me ask Senator Simon. Senator Arlen Specter (R - Pennsylvania). Twenty-nine minutes on my 30-minute round. Senator Joseph Biden (D - Delaware). Pardon me? Senator Arlen Specter (R - Pennsylvania). Is it accurate that I only have 29 minutes left on my 30-minute round? Senator Joseph Biden (D - Delaware). It is accurate you can have as much time as you want, Senator. Senator Arlen Specter (R - Pennsylvania). Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Watergate Hearings - Testimony of Gordon C. Strachan, July 23, 1973
U.S. Senator Herman E. Talmadge (D-GA): "Now, you said Mr. H.R. Haldeman would let you know in no uncertain terms if you ever did anything incorrectly. Would you please explain what you meant by that, by some illustration?" Former White House aide Gordon C. Strachan: "Well, one illustration that will forever stick in my mind, after the Republican National Convention, a decision had been made to send certificates to all those who had attended. That was quite a number of people, and I had been working with several members of the White House staff trying to get the various certificates for the various levels of people out, and the gifts, and so forth. Mr. Haldeman learned, somehow, that the project was not complete and one morning, about 4 A.M., called me from Air Force One and told me very clearly that I had not performed and that the project should be handled immediately. I'd be on the phone late that night and thought it was a bad dream so I called the signal operator back, and I said, 'Did I just get a call from Mr. Haldeman?' He said, 'Yes, and it was over the radio and I can tell you what he said in the morning.'" Senator Talmadge: "Did you ever consider leaving?" Strachan: "Yes, sir. I did consider leaving, but when I was hired for job, he hired me through the election, and I gave him my commitment to stay through the election." Senator Talmadge thanks Strachan for being a forthright witness. He announces a vote recess, lets Strachan know U.S. Senator Lowell P. Weicker Jr. (R-CT) has a few more questions for him.
LAWMAKERS
01.20.40-DUKE-notes the passing of two members of Congress over summer recess, LARRY MCDONALD (D-GA) who was killed in the KOREAN AIRLINER INCIDENT [shot down by Soviet Air force]. Still of Rep. McDONALD, described as a hardline conservative who opposed Communism and Government spending. Second member was a "giant", Senator HENRY JACKSON (D-WA). 01.21.17-Linda Wertheimer in front of Capitol, describes Sen. JACKSON as a lifelong politician with a reputation for domestic generosity and toughness in Foreign Affairs. Shots of Sen. JACKSON'S funeral, mourners. Sen. TED KENNEDY gives a eulogy. Pundit GEORGE WILL gives a praiseful eulogy of JACKSON as a hero. Sen. PAT MOYNIHAN (D-NY) urges that remembering what JACKSON did should lead the rest of the Senate to remember work yet to be done. Stills of JACKSON. C/S Sen. JIM SASSER (D-TN), says JACKSON was in the mold of other great Senators like JFK. Clip of 1972 JACKSON PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ad. WERTHEIMER v.o.-JACKSON'S support for Vietnam War killed his 1972 candidacy, his "insider" status hurt him in 1976 as Democrats tried to distance themselves from the image of corruption in Washington. 01.23.21-C/S Sen. JACKSON on panel of SENATE COMMITTEE. M/S JACKSON approaching microphone stand outside WHITE HOUSE. v.o.-JACKSON believed in strong DEFENSE, support of ISRAEL, and distrust of SOVIET UNION, all integral parts of U.S. foreign policy. Shot of Committee hearing, 1979, JACKSON questioning AL HAIG about the Russian's plans to achieve military superiority. C/S JACKSON entering a room to give a press statement, JACKSON speaking to denounce the SOVIETS for shooting down the KOREAN AIRLINER. C/S Sen. JOHN TOWER (R-TX), says that JACKSON'S loss will hurt the Senate in trying to maintain adequate DEFENSE. C/S Sen. SAM NUNN (D-GA), says that JACKSON was a stalwart in DEFENSE area. C/S Sen. SASSER, says he'll miss "Scoop" Jackson as a person. Sen. NUNN says JACKSON had the enthusiasm of a freshman Senator, a big influence on the others. B/W Still of JACKSON, title reads 1912-1983. 01.25.38-DUKE-The Press will miss JACKSON, who was always professional in taking criticism from the press. DUKE offers a personal assessment of JACKSON as a man of high integrity. Signs off. Closing credits/transcript information/WETA credit/sponsor credits/PBS ID. 01.27.45--OUT
Iran-Contra Hearings - Testimony of Colonel Oliver North.
It was very clear that you testified that he didn t have to ask. He already knew everything you were doing in Central America. The CIA helped. You testified you talked to Director Casey several times a week, worked closely with him. The CIA bought the missiles from the DOD and sold them to Iran. CIA operatives assisted in setting up and running air supply to Nicaragua. And of course you were not the only one at the National Security Council involved. You testified that everything you did, all of the imagination, the operations, the phone calls, the traveling was supported by your superiors: Mr. McFarlane, Admiral Poindexter. You Secretary Ms. Hall testified that your travel was authorized by someone higher than you. And you ve testified repeatedly that you even thought you had the help of the President of the United States. Now Colonel North, you ve added a great deal to our knowledge about the involvement of a large number of people in these events. Most of these activities could have been carried out by these same people in the normal course of their duties. They would have had to comply with a certain amount of accountability. Provisions like written findings as provided by the President s own National Security decision directive of 159. Reporting to the House and Senate Select Committee s on intelligence as required by the intelligence oversight act. Reporting to the Foreign Affairs committee as required by the Foreign Military Sales Act; and I guess they would have had to deposit the proceeds into the US Treasury since those missiles were paid for with taxpayer s money. Now instead this elaborate scheme was to carry out these activities which worked out to be a government within a government. And it s a very interesting variation of now you see it now you don t. The US government was acting as a party when needed and it was a private citizen when it came to reporting to Congress or counting the profits. And I believe Colonel north, you testified that Director Casey really wanted a more or less off the shelf, stand alone, self sustaining operation for covert activities. Was that your understanding of what he requested? Colonel Oliver North-Yes.
August 10, 1995 - Part 2
(11:40:00) Mr. NUSSBAUM. I have to talk about it to answer your question, Senator. In Watergate, the White House resisted, bitterly resisted until the Supreme Court ordered it to turn over the tapes and other documents. In this case, in the Clinton White House, what happened was, while I protected the right to assert privilege, no privilege was ever asserted. So contrary to the Nixon White House, the Clinton White House-number one, preserved every document, there's no 181/2 minute gap; number two, turned over every document that law enforcement requested; and number three, cooperated fully with law enforcement. That's the difference, Senator, between Watergate arid what is now known as Whitewater. Senator SHELBY. How could you assert what you just said, knowing that you helped orchestrate the dispersal of the documents everywhere, the papers everywhere, stonewalled a real investigation 1340 until there was no need for a real investigation because there's probably not much there? How could you do that? Mr. NUSSBAUM. You know something? I agree with you There's not much there. Senator SHELBY. After you got through with it, Mr. NUSSBAUM. No, no, before it began. There was not much there before I started and there's not much there now. Nor there be much there if yoSenator SHELBY. Did you preserve the index to Mr. Foster's file' that the secretary talked about here as missing? Mr. NUSSBAUM. I know, Senator Shelby, of no index. I know per:; sonally of no index, but apparently you do have an index contained on a computer disk with respect to the files in Mr. Fosters office., Senator SHELBY. It's missing, though, and you said nothing wag missing, and that was obviously missing. Mr. NUSSBAUM. Nothing is missing as far as I know. Senator SHELBY. Sure, that was missing. That's in dispute- We had sworn testimony before this Committee, saying that she made an index and it's missing, and it could be central to what people are looking for. Mr. NUSSBAUM. But she also testified that she used her computer and her index, that there is apparently an index on her computer, Senator SHELBY. Well, we're not sure about that. I wanted to ask you some other things. I want to put some notes up. Are you familiar with Mr. Gearan at the White House? Mr. NUSSBAUM. Yes. Senator SHELBY. I'm sure you've seen these notes, that he testified under oath that he contemporaneously made, at 11:45 a.m. , July 29, 1993, dealing in a party call, conference call with Phil Heymann, Dave Gergen, and himself. You're familiar with this, are you not? Mr. NUSSBAUM. No, I'm not. I mean, I know there are notes. I wasn't involved in that phone call. Senator SHELBY. Would counsel give him a copy of these? It's just four pages, if they would, I just want to refer to parts of it, if I can. These are notes that Mr. Gearan testified under oath that he made, as I said, in a conversation with Mr. Heymann. I'll refer you to page 3. These are Phil Heymann's words that he took down, basically in all stages, if we can go to page 3. Basically in all stages, controlled in all ways. In other words, he was talking about you, the White House Counsel. They don't feel they can say, and that is the Park Police and the FBI, they've conducted an inquiry. Much too much control from the beginning of investigation, Mr. Nussbaum. This is Phil Heymann again. It was a mistake to rely on silence on low-level investigators when dealing with a high-level case like this. Mr. Heymann, who you said was a man of principle, integrity, and intellect. Mr. NUSSBAUM. That's correct. Senator SHELBY. These are his words and his observations of what you were doing at the White House, controlling or thwarting the whole investigation. Now I'll go on to page 4, if I can. The Gearan notes-Dave Gergen, D.G. We need, if and when Park Police releases notifica 1341 tion for response. Phil Heymann, absolutely. I'll set it up. Then at the end, Phil Heymann, documents have been distributed over my objections. This is the Deputy Attorney General of the United States. And you're saying now you didn't control this investigation? Mr. NUSSBAUM. Yes, Senator, I'm saying I didn't control this investigation. All that proves is that a person of great principle and integrity can sometimes be wrong, Senator SHELBY. Even this morning, do you, searching your memory, not recall Phil Heymann's conversation with you when you said, I'll call you back? Will you let me know? And you didn't recall that, a man of your intellect? You don't recall that, seriously?
August 1, 1994 - Part 3
(13:35:43) The CHAiRMAN, Did you communicate it to Mr. Altman? Mr. RYAN. I think it was communicated to Mr. Altman. I'm not that I ever specifically said I think you ought to recuse Yourself, but I can recall that in the meetings where we were going 58 over questions and answers for the Committee bearing on oversight it was clear Mr. Altman was aware of our views. Ms. KULKA. Mr. Riegle, may I expand on my answer as I sit here thinking about it? The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Ms. KuLKA. I think I made those remarks and held those feelings in the context of Mr. Altman repeatedly saying to Mr.- Ryan and myself, I expect to follow your recommendation, whatever it is in this case. I cannot conceive of not following your recommendation, except if you don't make a recommendation, and I can't imagine that you won't make a recommendation, and in that context, I think, were my thoughts and questions. The CHAiRmAN. The other side of this, as we've gathered these facts, is there's information-some you may have gathered and some to be presented-that there was some pressure on Mr. Altman to not recuse himself coming from people in the White I-louse who expressed a view upon it. It seemed to me-in fact, in your deposition, you were asked the question did Ms. Hanson, who we're going to hear from later today, ever indicate to you or give you the impression by anything she said that there was any pressure being put on Mr. Altman by the White House not to recuse himself.? Why don't you tell us what your view was on that. Ms. KuLKA, I don't think I responded that I thought there was pressure, but at one point in one of our conversations, I walked down the ball with her, and I said, "I just can't believe that he's willing to put himself in this position to take all this political heat when it's clear be's not going to make the actual decision. Why would he ever do it?" And she said to me, Think about it." I a have said to her-I don't know if I said it back to her or I internal ized the thought, that it may have been because the White House did not want him to, but that was it. I don't recall if she responded to me at all. I never had a direct confirmation that there was any White House involvement. The CHAIRMAN. Did you ever understand that there was a point at which Mr. Altman bad reached the point of deciding that he would, in fact, recuse himself? Ms. KULKA. No. The CHAIRMAN. Were you in the Committee room the day-on February 27, 1994-on February 24, 1994, when we had the hearing? You were there, were you not? Ms. KULKA. Yes, sir. The CHAIRMAN, As you know, there was a series of questions put to Mr. Altman, to which he responded. It's a matter of concern to many people, whether the answers were as clear and complete as they should have been. Were you listening to that exchange at the time? Ms. KuLKA. Yes, sir. The CHAIRMAN, Did you have any information, based on your experience and your involvements, that would have caused you to feel that the answer was less than complete at the time? Ms. KULKA. No, sir. The CHAiRmAN. Did you think about it that way at the time? Ms. KuLKA. I was listening to all of these answers. There were a number of Q's and A's that were prepared and Mr. Altman said 59 when we were preparing them, "I can't read from things. I'll have to be familiar enough on a huge variety of subjects that might have dealt with the operation of the RTC as well as this. I'll just have to be able to remember enough of that or enough of any one that's appropriate to respond." In that context, there were many things in which we had prepared longer Q's and As where be did not cover the whole ground, I had no more feeling about this, that the answer he had prepared to the question, if it were to come, about White House meetings did go beyond this, specifically to refer to the fact that he had mentioned considering his recusal to the White House, didn't trigger anything in my mind at the time. The CHAIRMAN, How long did you spend ahead of time in the preparation for those answers, those Q's and A's, those prep sessions before the testimony of Mr. Altman? Ms. KULKA. We spent the 6 or 7 days before, on and off, working on it and we had at least two long sessions with Mr. Altman. The CHAIRMAN. How long would those sessions have lasted with Mr. Altman? Ms. KULKA. I would say 2 or 3 hours at a time. The CHAIRMAN. You probably spent 5 or 6 hours with him alone in addition to the other time the staff bad spent working everything up on this. Is that correct?
August 4, 1994 - Part 2
(10:30:52) Mr. MCLARTY, I believe the questions about Mr, Altman's testimony were after he testified here February 24th. Senator KERRY. I am saying in terms of a question, it raises a question in terms of his credibility before the Committee. Mr. McLARTY. I am sorry. I understand the question. Senator KERRY. But it was a Treasury-initiated meeting? Mr. McLARTY. That is correct, Senator Kerry. Senator KERRY. So in all of this hullabaloo about Whitewater/ Madison, there are only four meetings over the space of 5 months, all of them initiated by Treasury and that is the full measure of your knowledge or involvement in this. Is that not accurate? Mr. McLARTY, Senator, I believe it is. I have not recast the meetings quite as precisely, but I believe you are correct in how you outlined them. Senator KERRY Well, that is certainly not a sign of a White House obsessed by this issue. Mr. McLARTY. Senator, I agree with that, and that is why, in my opening comments, why I tried to appropriately point out what we were focused on in the White House from September through the March time period. Senator KERRY, Now, despite the fact that you are as close as you are to the President, there was no, there is nothing in the record, no conversation, anything that indicates that somehow the President asked you to monitor this or stay in touch with it closely or anything, is there? Mr. McLARTY. That is correct, Senator, Senator KERRY. Now I want to come back to an issue that does concern the Committee, and see if I can maybe ask a question, and Ms. Williams, you can maybe help me. If it is an opinion you do not want to offer, then do not. Obviously, the Treasury was initiating an awful lot of outreach on this and many of us think much of that was inappropriate. I would think you, in hindsight, would probably have that judgment I hope that that may come up. On this meeting where Mr. Altman comes to the White House, I conclude that there was clearly a lower-level White House view, an individual view expressed by some people working in what they thought may have been the best interests of the President, and who felt that Mr. Altman did not need to recuse, for whatever reasons. Mr. Altman goes home, makes a decision, comes back and it seems is rather anxious to kind of let people know that he is going to stay on. I guess we are all sort of left wondering, I mean, is it your sense that he was trying to please people, or curry favor, or something by letting everybody know if this was not, in fact, a big-deal meeting? Why else would he call and get a group together in order to notify them of this non-recusal? 296 MS. WILLIAMS. Once again, I am hesitant to speculate because,. know speculation -just blows up on you, but I will say it was not my sense that he was in any way currying favor. I would not think that. Senator KERRY. Was there any rational reason for doing it? I am sorry, my time is up. The CHAIRMAN. Yes, we can come back to this. I will certainly see that you get a second round. Mr. MCLARTY. Mr. Chairman, if I may inquire of the Chair? thought Senator Kerry noted, and I should have clarified it during his comment, that the October meeting, as I understand it DeVore perhaps called, was in my office. That is not correct. Senator KERRY. Oh, I am sorry, I apologize. Mr. MCLARTY. That is not correct. Senator KERRY. It was the February 2nd meeting in your office? Mr. MCLARTY. Yes. Senator KERRY. I apologize and stand corrected. Mr. McLARTY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Faircloth. OPENING COMMENTS OF SENATOR FAIRCLOTH Senator FAIRCLOTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. McLarty, we have talked a lot here about the RTC criminal referrals that name the Clinton's and about the so-called, "Heads Up, that was first given to the White House on September the 29th of last year. But that was not the first time a Clinton appointee knew about these criminal referrals. In fact, a Clinton appointee not only knew that those referrals existed, she knew what was in them. Early in the Administration, President Clinton asked for the resignation of every U.S. Attorney in America, even those in most cases he did not have a replacement for. But one place he was ready, and that was Little Rock. He immediately appointed Paula Casey, a campaign worker, former law student of Bill Clinton, who became the U.S. Attorney in Little Rock. She not only had the criminal referrals in Little Rock, she knew what was in them. Mr. McLarty, do you know Paula Casey? Mr. McLARTY. I am acquainted with Paula Casey.
August 4, 1994 - Part 12
(22:45:12)(tape #10096 ends) whether he should remove himself. I also said that, even if he ultimately determined to rely on his staff recommendation [as he said he would], the fact that his staff knew there would be a review of its recommendations would help to ensure the fairness and professionalism of the process. I was particularly concerned about the numerous leaks which seemed to accompany RTC actions. 473 The next thing and the last thing I said to Mr. Altman-I concluded by saying to Mr. Altman that, in any event, the decision on recusal was for him and him alone to make. He said he would give the matter further thought, The only other discussion I can recall at the February 2nd meeting is Ms. Williams asking if the private lawyers for the parties, including the Clintons' lawyers, would be briefed on the statute of limitations process. Ms. Hanson or perhaps Mr. Altman said that they would consider it. On the way out of the meeting, I asked Ms. Hanson if Mr. Ryan's and Ms. Kulka's nominations had been submitted to the White House for clearance. [We were normally consulted before agency nominations were approved and I could not recall having heard of their nominations.] Ms. Hanson had, in fact, told me they had been submitted to the White House. During questioning by Committee staff, I was asked whether I had negative feelings about Ms. Kulka. I responded that I did. I explained that, while I had never met or dealt with Ms. Kulka personally, when she was at the OTS she had been peripherally involved in a case brought by the OTS against a respected law firm in New York, In private practice, I had represented that law firm. I believed then and I believe now that the OTS acted unfairly and unprofessionally in that matter. It seized all of the assets of the firm at the outset of the litigation, thereby effectively preventing the firm from defending itself. In the period after February 2nd, I expressed some of these views to members of my staff perhaps in vigorous terms, but I did not do so during the meeting on February 2nd. Nor, indeed, did I do so to any Treasury or RTC official or to any other official outside the White House. In this connection, at this time, I want to be fair to Ms. Kulka. I watched some of her testimony before this Committee. It was quite impressive. And on March 30, 1994, she and her colleague, Mr. Ryan, wrote what I consider to be a highly professional, independent, even courageous letter to Congressman Leach. After noting that they were not political appointees, they wrote: "No pressure has been exerted by the Treasury, the White House, or any other source in the Executive Branch concerning the performance of our responsibilities with respect to Madison Guaranty or Whitewater since either of us joined the RTC." Before leaving the February 2 meeting, I want to respond to one claim that was made at the start of this hearing. It was said in an opening statement: That the reason the White House urged Roger Altman to stay on the case was the fear that the RTC General Counsel who would take over the decision would be too "tough" on the Clintons. To the extent that this statement was intended to refer to me, my answer is this: First, I did not urge Roger Altman to st ay on the case. I do not believe it would have been improper if I had urged him to stay on. But I did not do so, I asked him only to consider whether he should remove himself if he had no legal or ethical obligation to do so. I 474 said the decision was his to make. If I wish to urge someone to do something, I am usually not at a loss of words to do so. And second-my second answer to this contention made at the opening of the hearing-the reason I requested Mr. Altman to consider the matter of recusal further was not a fear that the RTC General Counsel would be too tough. I would have made the same statement no matter who was General Counsel of the RTC. I made it because of the principle I previously discussed, that a public offi- cial has a duty to do his or her duty. I also made it because an Altman recusal would undermine our position on the Tigert, nomination. On February 3, Ms. Hanson faxed me a letter Mr. Altman had received from Congressman Leach urging Mr. Altman to consult an ethics officer concerning recusal. She left a message asking me to phone her. When I returned the call that evening, Ms. Hanson told me that Treasury was continuing to research the ethical issues involved in recusal.
Waco Hearings - DAY 3
WACO HEARINGS: 1:30 - 2:32PM - Master Number 10932 - INTRODUCTION: The following footage from the Waco Hearings consists of the questioning of the seventh group of panelists. The panelists are: Lloyd Bentsen; Former Treasury Secretary, Steve Higgins; former Director of the ATF, John Simpson; former Acting Assistant Secretary of the Treasure, Christopher Cuyler; ATF Liaison for the Assistant Secretary and Michael Langan; former Acting Assistant Secretary Deputy of the Treasure. The following Representatives present questions, and or statements to the panelists: Heineman, Bryant, McCollun, Barr and Shadegg. 13:30:11 Old footage from Master Number 10931 shows Chairman Zeliff recessing the Sub-Committee Chamber. 13:33:11 Fresh footage still shows the Sub-Committee Chamber in recess. 14:11:42 Chairman Zeliff is shown bringing the Sub-Committee Chamber back to order. 14:12:10 Congressman Heineman begins his time by praising Congresswoman Jackson-Lee's recent round of questioning. Turning then to Mr. Cuyler, he asks where he derived his information from for his inter-office memorandum. He replies from a briefing on February 11th and from talking with Division Chiefs at their headquarters. Referencing from the memo, Congressman Heineman asks if it is an inaccurate statement for him to have stated, "a well reasoned, comprehensive plan has been approved which allows for all contingencies." Mr. Cuyler replies that, at the time he wrote it, no. Rep. Heineman states that he also believes the document to be accurate. Congressman Heineman then asks the panelists if any of them are familiar with the disciplinary policies of the Federal Government. Secretary Bentsen replies by quoting from a document. He states the ATF did not destroy ATF personal records. Rep. Heineman then asserts he does not believe Mr. Sarabyn and Mr. Chojnacki should have been fired, but rather sanctioned, and then asks if due to the enormity of the raid, if there where any high-ranking officers from the ATF on the scene. Mr. Higgins replies that someone was, but doesn't recall who that person was. Referencing to the testimony from possibly author Mr. Reavis or editor and writer Ray Yon, Congressman Heineman inquires about Mr. Sarabyn and Mr. Chojnacki being told to keep their mouths shut. Mr. Higgins states it is department policy for them not to discuss any incident with anyone unless they have a right to know. Rep. Heineman then yields his remaining time. 14:17:57 Congressman Bryant begins his time by asking Mr. Higgins who appointed him as ATF Director. He replies it was the Secretary of the Treasury under then President Reagan. Mr. Higgins is then asked who his boss is, and replies that the Secretary of the Treasury Department is, but states that at the time of the raid his supervisor was Mr. Simpson, then the Deputy Secretary and next the Secretary. Congressman Bryant then inquires about the terms length and appointment dates of those individuals. Continuing with Mr. Higgins, Congressman Bryant asks when he first meet with Secretary Bentsen to discuss the ATF. Mr. Higgins replies he doesn't recall there being such a meeting, and adds that all communication between him and the Treasury would have gone through Mr. Simpson. Looking for clarification, Rep. Bryant asks Mr. Higgins if he ever meet with Secretary Bentsen prior to the raid. He replies no. Mr. Higgins is then asked if he knew Mr. Altman prior to the raid, and again he replies no. Looking for clarification again, Rep. Bryant states to Mr. Higgins that as Director of the ATF, you never meet with the Secretary during the first 30 days of his appointment. He replies no. Mr. Higgins is then asked who the highest-ranking officer was at Treasure that he spoke with concerning the raid, and he replies Mr. Simpson. Keeping with Mr. Higgins, Rep. Bryant then asks him if there was a formal briefing process he was obligated to so as to inform ranking Treasure officials of his department's dealings. Mr. Higgins states high-ranking officials were accessible, but states that regular meetings were not scheduled. 14:22:19 Congressman McCollun begins his time by asking Mr. Higgins if any high level meetings occurred which focused on devising ways to arrest David Koresh off the compound. Mr. Higgins replies he asked the planners if Koresh should be arrested off the compound, but states that he was told that wasn't a sound option. Rep. McCollun then asks Mr. Simpson and Mr. Cuyler if Mr. Higgins had discussed that issue with them, or if the issue was ever brought up at all. Both men state no. 14:23:55 Congressman Barr begins his time by asking Mr. Langan to refer to a document dated April 14, 1993. It is a memorandum from Mr. Macnamera to him and Mr. Simpson concerning the ATF investigations being stopped. Rep. Barr asks him if the purpose of conducting a Shooting Review is to obtain the truth. Mr. Langan states that it is unless there is an under-riding interest. Inquiring further, Congressman Barr asks him if that would mean a search for something other than the truth. Mr. Langan replies that he was only the receiver of the memo, and that he would surmise that the authors of it had their reasons for stating what they have. Continuing with Mr. Langan, Rep. Barr then asks if it is normal for when ever time a Shooting Review takes place, that a memo like this is released. Mr. Langan states no. Pushing the question, Congressman Barr then asks if this memo was sent because extraordinary circumstances occurred at Waco. Mr. Langan attempts to answer the question but is cut off by Rep. Barr who states he is yielding back the remainder of his time. 14:27:43 Congressman Shadegg begins his time by stating the Minority has repeatedly stated that the hearings are not producing any new information. He then states to Secretary Bentsen that Treasury has conducted an interview, and that ATF Agents have testified it is only 70% accurate. Secretary Bentsen interjects to state that he doesn't agree with that, but adds he can see why the agents would say that. 14:29:35 Congressman McCollun begins his time by asking Mr. Higgins if he had spoke with Mr. Hartnett about arresting David Koresh off the compound. He replies that he did, in addition to, other raid planners on February 12, 1993. Continuing on, he states it was at this meeting that they concluded arresting Koresh was no longer an option. Rep. McCollun then asks if he ever questioned the planner's decision. He states that in hindsight he would have questioned many things. Pressing the issue, Congressman McCollun asks if he left the planners believing this was not a major issue. Mr. Higgins that that the notion Koresh should be arrested off the compound was dropped after that meeting and that the raid that went forward as planned. Continuing on with Mr. Higgins, Rep. McCollun asks if he was aware the ATF had an undercover house. He replies yes. 14:32:00 TIME OUT.
JFK Assassination Hearings - The Weapons Experts Panel (Part III) and Dr. Vincen
(15:38:04) Fithian asks about the amount of usage the Mannlicher-Carcano rifle of Oswald has gotten since the assassination day in order to confirm that this usage would have altered it in such a way as to not allow the current panel's bullets fired from it to be matched to those fired from it in '63 and '64 by the FBI and Oswald - Champagne responds that is has been fired a lot since then (15:39:26) Stokes recognized the panel's right to suppliment their testimony - Lutz answers that the panel feels it has done the most comprehensive job it could and goes on to thank the respective states of the panel members employment for letting them come to testify and to thank the committee (15:41:23) Stokes thanks and dismisses the panel (15:42:03) Chair recognizes Professor ROBERT BLAKEY who gives a history and explanation of scientific techniques used by the Warren Commission to analyze the bullet and fragments found after the assassination: Emission Spectography and Neutron Activation Analysis, both of which produced inconclusive results, the conducting of the later test was not made public until 1973 - Blakey then goes on to introduce Dr. VINCENT P. GUINN, give his credentials and explain breifly the higher degree of sophistication his Neutron Activation tests had
August 1, 1994 - Part 2
(12:05:27) Senator FAIRCLOTH. Mr. Ryan, the editorial alleges that you have provided the Minority staff of the House Banking Committee with documents regarding other thrift scandals. But you refused, even before Robert Fiske was named as Special Counsel, to give Representative Leach the same documents about Madison Guaranty. Why would you treat Madison Guaranty documents differently than other thrift documents? 29 Mr. RYAN. I don't believe we have, Senator. It's my understanding that our position has been, and remains, consistent with respect to the provision of information to individual Congressmen. We followed the position that an individual Congressman is entitled to information that is available under the Freedom of Information Act, unless it comes as part of a Committee request. That has been our position. That is the position taken by other Government agencies and that's the position taken by the Department of Justice. We are involved in litigation with the Congressman. Senator FAIRCLOTH. You made no distinction between providing these documents on Madison and any other failed thrift? You gave out just as much information on Madison? Mr. RYAN. We believe that we have been consistent. We are involved now in litigation with Congressman Leach over that very issue. I would submit for the record a copy of our brief in that regard. Senator FAIRCLoTH. The question is, you're negotiating with him now. But back when this first-before Fiske was appointed, did you give information on other failed savings and loans and withhold inFormation on Madison? Mr. RYAN. No, sir. We think we have been consistent in the provision of information, The other information given was in connection with a Committee inquiry. Senator FAIRCLOTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, The CHAIRMAN. Why don't you go ahead and give us that brief you spoke about and we'll put it in the record. Mr. RYAN. I will. The CHAIRMAN. Just briefly, Senator Sarbanes. Then I want to go to Senator Kerry, Senator SARBANES. You made the suggestion I was going to make, that the Committee should receive for the record the brief that Mr. Ryan and the RTC have filed in that case, which lays out their position as to why they believe they have been consistent in the ding of this information. I = that would be very helpful. The CHAiRmAN. Without objection, we'll make that a part of the record, I Senator Kerry. OPENING COMMENTS OF SENATOR JOHN F. KERRY Senator KERRY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, in the 7 minutes that I have, I'm not going to be able to-nor can any of us go through in depth-lay out the full Measure of what I want to try to establish here. But let me clarify a couple of points, if I can, quickly. A number of colleagues have made a point about this information going to the White House being privileged information at that particular moment. In fact, Senator Faircloth just mentioned it. Mr. Katsanos, isn't it a fact that at the very moment this discus$ion was taking place, Mr. Roelle sent a copy of an E-mail message that came from the RTC office, which actually bad reporters' inqueries about the criminal referrals? 30 STATEMENT OF STEPHEN J. KATSANOS, DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF CORPORATE COMMUNICATIONS RESOLUTION TRUST CORPORATION, WASHINGTON, DC Mr. KATSANOS. I'm not familiar with Mr. Roelle's E-mail. Senator KERRY. There is-and we can the documents. In fact I'll find it, if you want, and we'll come back to you later on that' But there, in tact, is an E-mail message office. .Fe that came into your We have a copy of it, which is why I had able to say this. It refers: to the inquiry, and it's now a matter of record, that in the early bird publication 2 days later, there was reference to the criminal I referrals. So that's what prompted everybody's notion, uh oh, this is out In the press, Isn't that accurate? Mr. ROELLE. Are you asking me, sir? Senator KERRY. If you can answer it, fine. Mr. RoELLE. The E-mail I think you are referring to was sent to me by Mr. Katsanos. It was forwarded, I believe. It was an E-mail that had been sent from our investigator in Kansas City . there was an Senator KERRY. All I'm trying to establish is that E-mail. Correct? Mr. ROELLE. Yes, sir. Senator KERRY. And there was a reporter who's already inquiring about the criminal referrals? Mr. ROELLE. Yes, sir, but that wasn't at the same time that I had briefed. It was after. But I don't remember exactly when. Senator KERRY. Correct. This was on September 27, 1993. Senator D'AMATO. The E-mail ' I think ' was on October 6, 1993. Senator KERRY. The E-mail--September 30, 1993, was the date of the early bird, September 27, 1993, right around that time.
LAWMAKERS
15.39.11-DUKE-discussion with ROBERTS about the shift in support away from REAGAN'S ideology in HOUSE, but SENATE REPUBLICANS might force some increases in DEFENSE spending over what the DEMOCRATS want. WERTHEIMER-both houses agreed on a JOBS BILL, bipartisan support and support by REAGAN. Not clear how much further Government support for the UNEMPLOYED will go. DUKE-REAGAN won a preliminary battle in SENATE to shift FOREIGN AID FUNDS to go toward MILITARY AID to EL SALVADOR. WERTHEIMER-intro report on Sen. DANIEL INOUYE (D-HI), an active DEMOCRAT in FOREIGN AID arena. 15.42.53-exterior of Capitol. INOUYE v.o.-says that he has concluded that REAGAN'S policies are irreconcilable with goals of DEMOCRACY and PEACE in CENTRAL AMERICA. C/S INOUYE in office, reading this statement from the Senate record. He opposes REAGAN'S plan for shifting aid funds to EL SALVADOR. Shot of front page of CONGRESSIONAL RECORD with INOUYE'S remarks. C/S Sen. CHRISTOPHER DODD (D-CT), says that INOUYE is no "knee-jerk liberal", so his break from the REAGAN agenda is a serious setback for REAGAN. Shot of INOUYE entering his offices. Shot of Senate committee panel with INOUYE, ROBERT BYRD, and ALAN CRANSTON. C/S INOUYE in office, says he believes his colleagues took the speech seriously because he's not generally a speechmaker and because he's supported Presidents on FOREIGN POLICY in the past. 15.45.00-Clip of REAGAN press conference, REAGAN at podium with large map of North and Central American on easel, dated March 10, 1983. REAGAN announces his plan for EL SALVADOR. C/S INOUYE, says that the EL SALVADOR request for $60 MILLION and later for $50 MILLION MORE was the proverbial "straw that broke the camel's back, he realized that U.S. policy on EL SALVADOR was out of control. M/S INOUYE with Senators DODD and NANCY KASSEBAUM (R-KS) at press conference to announce competing plan. C/S INOUYE in office, says the rumors from the White House that REAGAN was considering increasing the number of U.S. advisors in EL SALVADOR was eerily reminiscent of VIETNAM, incremental increases to a gigantic level.
LAWMAKERS, May 24, 1984
21.05.02-ROBERTS with report on CONGRESSIONAL CARTOONS. 21.05.19-shot of print comic strip "WASHINGTOON" featuring "CONGRESSMAN FOREHEAD"-bears suspicious resemblance to TRENT LOTT [although the cartoonist says it was inspired by JACK KEMP, which I can also see]. Shot of WASHINGTON POST EDITORIAL PAGE EDITOR, Meg GREENFIELD, discusses hiring the cartoonist for political commentary. Shot of Mark STAMATY, the cartoonist. Shot of STAMADY drawing human figures in ink. ROBERTS v.o.-discuss STAMADY'S process of researching the major WASHINGTON players for his cartoon. Shot of DAVID STOCKMAN (REAGAN'S chief book-cooker and BUDGET advisor, the man who gave you REAGANOMICS), addressing a BUDGET COMMITTEE meeting of HOUSE. 21.06.38-Shot of STAMADY, discusses casting his strip, modeling central figure on "Kennedys of the Right". Shots of NEWT GINGRICH, TRENT LOTT, other CONSERVATIVE REPUBLICANS. Shot of GREENFIELD, discusses praise by CONGRESSMEN to POST for the cartoon. Shot of JACK KEMP, speaking animatedly in well of HOUSE. ROBERTS v.o.-the main character in the strip loosely based on KEMP. KEMP not commenting. 21.07.56-Shot of Rep. THOMAS PETRI, (R-WI), says the cartoon shouldn't be interpreted as a direct image of any particular politician. Shot of NEWT GINGRICH outdoors on CAPITOL grounds. GINGRICH says sometimes "Washingtoon" is very funny, sometimes it doesn't make sense at all. Shot of Rep. Dan GLICKMAN (D-KS), says the cartoon is a good way to make sure CONGRESSMEN stay levelheaded and modest. Shot of STAMATY, discussing "life imitating art" in D.C.. STAMATY reads from the dialogue in a strip satirizing the gibberish spouted in CONGRESS about ARMS CONTROL. 21.09.17-exterior of CAPITOL, STAMATY walking down CAPITOL STEPS. Shot of STAMATY discussing his respect for CONGRESS as a reflection of the total insanity of the whole country. 21.09.45-ROBERTS in studio. DUKE introduces commentary by Mark SHIELDS. 21.10.09-SHIELDS seated in library setting. Commentary on disparagement of CONGRESSMEN by their former occupations, i.e. JACK KEMP. Notes that former NIXON press aide Ron ZIEGLER was a former JUNGLELAND CRUISE guide at DISNEYLAND. "Former" is acceptance, "ex" is sign of snobbish contempt. 21.11.50-DUKE in studio. Signs off. 21.12.03-closing credits/transcript order information/WETA credit/sponsor credits/PBS ID. 21.13.34-OUT
LAWMAKERS
20.09.23-DUKE-intro report on SPACE PROGRAM, having to fight for funding. REAGAN wants to have a permanent, manned space station. 20.09.37-C/S REAGAN giving State of the Union, asks NASA for development of a permanently manned SPACE STATION within ten years. Sketch of a proposed design of such a SPACE STATION. C/S NASA administrator in Senate committee hearing. Sen. FRANK LAUTENBERG (D-NJ) criticizes the high cost of SPACE STATION. Clips from old NASA films showing ASTRONAUTS (including JOHN GLENN) with model Saturn rocket, ASTRONAUT training in gyroscope-thingy. Clip of JFK speech pledging to land a man on the moon. Clip of NEIL ARMSTRONG'S moonwalk, ASTRONAUT driving MOONBUGGY on MOON, launch of GIANT ROCKET. 20.11.00-C/S Former Rep. EMILIO D'ADDARIO, says the legacy of NASA funding will be viewed as rewarding and justified in the long term. Series of drawings and simulations of orbiting satellites and surfaces of faraway planets. C/S Dr. George Wetherill, National Space Science Board, says that the U.S.'s scientific agenda does not require a space station but is more based on missions to other planets. Exterior of Capitol. C/S Sen. WILLIAM PROXMIRE (D-WI) says that NASA BUREAUCRACY and AEROSPACE INDUSTRY are the only ones who want the SPACE STATION, which is too expensive for the benefits. C/S Sen. SLADE GORTON (R-BOEING, er, WA) urging moving forward on SPACE STATION, cites the "American Desire" to push back frontiers, says the SPACE STATION will "pay for itself". Rep. D'ADDARIO says the long-term legacy of exploration is part of "manifest destiny". Shots of ASTRONAUT using rocket pack on SPACEWALK. 20.13.54-ROBERTS-several Senior REPUBLICANS in House are stepping down at end of term. C/S Rep. BARBER CONABLE (R-NY), says he doesn't want Congress to become his whole life. Stills of young CONABLE with NIXON and Gerald Ford, and Rep. DAN ROSTENKOWSKI. C/S CONABLE, says that the House has become more closed and less Democratic. C/S Rep. JACK EDWARDS (R-AL), says he's burnt out after a long career. He doesn't thrive on the legislative battling. C/S Rep. JED JOHNSON, former Congressman, says it's a very tough job and has gotten tougher and more all-consuming.
CONGRESS: WE THE PEOPLE
15.08.28-Newman/Ornstein-discussion of sanctions that can be levied by an Ethics committee-Censure, a public rebuke with loss of Chairmanships, or Expulsion. Discussion of 1980 investigation of Rep. CHARLES WILSON (D-CA) for financial misdealings. Rep. WILSON gives a speech declaring his innocence, attacking the press for feeding hype and the rest of the Congress for being prejudiced and acting in its own interest. Rep. WILLIAM CLAY (D-MO) defends Wilson, attacks the rest of the Congress for not paying close attention to the proceedings. Rep. KEN HOLLAND (D-SC) says that it's wrong to assume that all allegations against a Congressman are true. Rep. WYCHE FOWLER (D-GA) says that Congress has to be strict and aggressive in punishing ethics violations to preserve its integrity. 15.12.30-Voice vote, TIP O'NEILL announcing the vote to Censure Congressman Wilson. 15.13.06-Clip of undercover FBI agent in surveillance video for "Abscam" sting operation, sets the scene for two Congressman to be caught taking bribes. Rep. FAZIO says that motivations must be considered. Clip of the surveillance video and shot of pile of headlines about "Abscam". Rep. MIKE MYERS assures the FBI agents that he will exert his influence for $50,000. Another clip of surveillance video where Rep. MYERS complains about not getting a bigger bribe. 15.14.55-Rep. MYERS in Well of House pleading his case. V.o.-although convicted in criminal court, Myers was not automatically expelled, until the House approved a resolution to expel him. Rep. CHARLES BENNETT (D-FL) presents the case against Myers. Rep. MYERS says he was given a script and was "play acting", and other generally improbable excuses. BENNETT says that MYERS' conduct, using his influence as a Congressman to take money for personal gain, is unacceptable. MYERS urges other Congressmen not to take part in a "lynching" due to "political pressures". Rep. BENNETT says the most painful tragedies are the self-inflicted ones, and Myers must pay, demands the expulsion of MYERS. TIP O'NEILL leads voice vote, which is handily passed. 15.17.24-Newman-wraps up with a summary of the Ethics review processes of Congress. 15.18.01-closing credits/WETA credit/funding credits/PBS ID 15.19.23--OUT
July 25, 1995 - Part 4
(14:30:21) Mr. WATKINS. Yes, sir. Senator HATCH. At the time of Mr. Foster's death, you were the Director of Management and Administration in the White House; correct? Mr. WATKINS. Yes, sir. Senator HATCH. You are now employed in California, as I understand it? Mr. WATKINS. Yes, sir. Senator HATCH. You knew the Park Police officers were treating this death as a suicide; right? Mr. WATKINS. Yes, Senator. Senator HATCH. You knew the Park Police would probably be searching for a suicide note, correct, or at least you assumed that? Mr. WATKINS. Yes, and on my ride over to the Foster house I was notified that there was not one-or learned that there was not one at the death scene. Senator HATCH. Now, Mr. Watkins, you ordered Patsy Thomasson to search Mr. Foster's office for a note, that's right, isn't it? Mr. WATKINS. I did. Senator HATCH. Did anyone tell you or suggest to you that you order Ms. Thomasson to do so or that you, through any means, should try to find any suicide note or other materials? Mr. WATKINS. As I have stated earlier, there was general discussion at the house about a suicide note, and there was-we knew there was not one at the scene. There had-not one had been found at the scene. In looking for one at the house, there was not one at the house. I discussed it with Lisa Foster and Mr. McLarty. Senator HATCH. Those were the only two you discussed it with? Mr. WATKINS. As I recall. I don't recall specifically anyone else. Senator HATCH. OR Did you consider that your order or your request to Ms. Thomasson and the search by Ms. Thomasson might interfere with an investigation into Mr. Foster's death? Mr. WATKINS. It never occurred to me, Senator. Senator HATCH. But you never told the Park Police that you directed Ms. Thomasson to search for the note, isn't that right? Mr. WATKINS. Consistent with what the Park Police said to Lisa Foster, like if you find anything or find a note, please let us know, that's what I would have done. I did not consider it to be anything other than my-our interests in helping the family find out why and to see if there was a note, Senator HATCH. OK. It disturbs me, though-I'm disturbed by the fact that the White House was aware that the Park Police were looking for a note, but somehow you failed to tell the police that you sent Ms. Thomasson to search for the note. Mr. WATKINS. It didn't occur to me, Senator, that-the fact of the matter is that the manner in which-and with no disrespect to the Park Police, but when- they were very casual about the request of 293 Mrs. Foster-to Mrs. Foster that if she found a note please, please let them know. Senator HATCH. What's troubling to me is that not only did you authorize a search for the note, but, as we will hear in later testimony, Mr. Nussbaum failed to turn the note over to the Park Police for over 24 hours. So some people are deducing that the White House wanted to clear the note before it was released. That's what's Mr. WATKINS. Senator, my only thought was to try to give an answer to why and to help Mrs. Foster. That was the only thought that occurred to me at all. Senator HATCH. OK. Mr. Watkins, did you seal the office, Mr. Foster's office that is? Mr. WATKINS. As I've stated earlier, I was not requested to seal the office. Senator HATCH. You didn't tell Ms. Thomasson to seal it either, did you? Mr. WATKINS. I did not. Senator HATCH. In your deposition to this Committee you stated that you thought that the police would seal the office as part of their normal investigation, isn't that right? Mr. WATKINS. I don't recall specifically, and I don't have that in front of me, but my recollection is that I said that if the police had wanted the office sealed, they'd been in contact for several hours with the Secret Service, they would have requested that of the Secret Service. Senator HATCH. You didn't even dwell, then, on Mr. WATKINS. 1 never dwelt on sealing the office. It never entered my mind, Senator HATCH, Did anyone suggest to you that the office did not need to be sealed? Mr. WATKINS. I-no, I do not recall anyone saying that. Senator HATCH. Ms. Mathews, in spite of the fact that you thought it was a good thing to preserve the trash that you talked about-the burn bag, in other words-you've told this Committee that you were ordered to burn Mr. Foster's burn bag by Bernie Nussbaum, is that correct? Ms. MATHEWS. Just to clarify, the trash which was what was preserved and was put aside. Senator HATCH. But the burn bag Ms. MATHEWS. The burn bag-when we found out the information that there was not-I was told there was not a burn bag in Vince Foster's office. That was the time I was told to process it as we normally process burn bags. Senator HATCH. But you saw references on the bag that it was from Mr. Foster's office. Ms. MATHEWS. Absolutely not. On the burn bag? Senator HATCH. Yes. Ms. MATHEWS. No, sir. Senator HATCH. Was it the trash bag Ms. MATHEWS. No, sir. As I learned this morning, which I didn't know, I was told this morning that I think there was a Secret Service-I apologize because I don't remember specifically, but that there was 294 The CHAIRMAN. You did very well, so don't worry. Go ahead. MS. MATHEWS. There was a Secret Service agent that said they had never dumped the burn bag from that off-ice in any way. At no time did I have any indication that there were any documents at all from the Counsel's Office in the burn bag.
August 9, 1995 - Part 5
(14:29:17)(tape #10139 begins)Opens to various shots of Senate Hearing room where Committee, media and audience are assembling and mingling (14:39:48) Hearing resumes: 1263 AFTERNOON SESSION The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sarbanes, Senator SARBANES- I yield to Mr. Ben-Veniste. Mr. BEN-VENISTE. Thank you, Senator Sarbanes. Good afternoon, Mr. Nussbaum. Mr. NUSSBAUM. Good afternoon. Mr. BEN-VENISTE. One of the things that Mr. Heymann and Mr. Adams testified to that concerned them was that following the search of the office on July 22, the next day a Washington Post story that appeared stated that the Department of Justice had supervised the search in Mr. Foster's office. Now, let me ask you first whether you or anyone at the White House to the best of your knowledge put out a statement that said that the Department of Justice had supervised the search? Mr. NUSSBAUM. I did not, nor to my knowledge, did anyone else at the White House. Mr. BEN-VENISTE. Indeed, we have reviewed the briefing and the statement released by Dee Dee Myers on the evening of the 22nd, and that statement did not reflect that the Department of Justice had supervised the search. But I am curious to know whether you had heard from any other source as to whether this was simply a jump that the reporter had made or whether there was anyone at the White House who had actually suggested that the Department had supervised the search? Mr. NUSSBAUM. To my knowledge, no one at the White House suggested that the Department had supervised the search. Mr. BEN-VENISTE. So this could be another circumstance where, from the Department of Justice's standpoint or the individuals involved-Mr. Heymann, Mr. Adams, and Mr. Margolis-they could have been justifiably concerned that someone may have tried to spin or manipulate what had actually occurred, but in fact this was nothing attributable to you or people at the White House? Mr. NUSSBAUM. That's correct. Mr. BEN-VENISTE. Before our luncheon break, there was a suggestion that in connection with the actual procedure that was employed during the afternoon of July 22, that no one had testified that the law enforcement or Department of Justice personnel involved had had any input into what should be segregated for later review and consideration by law enforcement. Do you recall that? Mr. NUSSBAUM. Yes, sir. Mr. BEN-VENISTE. Over the break, we have, Mr. Chairman, reviewed the testimony that we have received so far either by testimony here in the hearings or testimony in prehearing depositions. May I say that Mr. Adams, Mr. Spafford, Mr. Neuwirth, Mr. Sloan, Mr. Burton, Agent Salters, Captain Hume, Sergeant Markland, and Special Agent Flynn of the Secret Service have all testified that, indeed, during the search they made various requests to review materials and that those materials were put aside in a segregated pile for later review. If the Chairman so wishes, we can make reference to the specific pages at which that testimony was given. So, hopefully, that does clarify the matter. Mr. NUSSBAUM. That is consistent with my memory as well. 1264 Mr. BEN-VENISTE. Let me go to the 22nd. Direct your attention thereto, May I ask that the diagram that was marked as Exhibit I of August 7 be placed on the Elmo machine? Mr. Nussbaum, can you see that? Mr. NUSSBAUM. I can. Mr. BEN-VENISTE, This is a somewhat more-to-scale rendition of Mr. Foster's office than we had been operating with previously. Does that layout comport with your recollection of Mr. Foster's office on the 20th of July 1993? Mr. NUSSBAUM. It does. Mr. BEN-VENISTE. Do you see where the two X's are?
Watergate Hearings - Testimony of John J Caulfield May 22, 1973
Mr. CAULFIELD. Although this is a lengthy statement, I wish to make two further points. At no time in any conversations with Mr. McCord did I advise, pressure or threaten him in an attempt to make him accept the offer of executive clemency. I viewed my role simply as one of a messenger, now while I tried to give both Mr. Dean and Mr. McCord the full flavor of what was going on at both ends of this message transacting process, I actively refrained from injecting myself into the process at either end. I realized at the time of my first conversation in January that I was involved in questionable activity, but I felt that it was important for me to carry this message for the good of the President. I have previously testified before the grand jury and I've spoken on two other occasions with the United States Attorney's office and have spoken on two occasions as well with Senate investigators. Although I have discussed the matter of whether any of my actions could be viewed as violations of the criminal law with my attorney and have been advised of the availability of privileges and possible attempts of securing immunity from prosecution, at no time have I refused to answer any question in regard to my conduct and I have felt that it is more important that I be able to speak freely about my involvement in actions herein then to have whatever protection might be rightfully mine under my constitutional and executive privileges. I hope that what I have to say here today will assist the committee in it's investigations and if upon a hearing of all the facts it is thought that I am guilty of some wrong doing, I will still feel that the truth is my best defense.
LAWMAKERS
WETA "LAWMAKERS" 12/02/1982 IN 01.00.00-WETA credit/sponsor credits/ 01.00.24-in to c/s TRENT LOTT (R-MS) in debate in House, says Congress must act on some legislation 01.00.34-Title Sequence 01.01.00-COKIE ROBERTS-On program, report on the "lame duck" session of Congress at the end of 1982. REAGAN might be sorry he called for the session, since HOUSE DEMOCRATS are energized by the ELECTION RETURNS. LINDA WERTHEIMER-Congress now convinced that JOBS and EMPLOYMENT are key issues, working to increase EMPLOYMENT, DEMOCRATS propose a $5 BILLION PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAM. 01.02.16-Rep. JIM WRIGHT (D-TX) in debate in House, says the Elections prove that the people expect Congress to take action, should work to promote EMPLOYMENT. C/S Rep. BILL ALEXANDER (D-Ark.), says the elections were the people "saying no to REAGANOMICS". Still of Conference of REPUBLICANS and REAGAN. V.o.-REPUBLICANS addressed their concerns to REAGAN, that REAGANOMICS is hurting the party with the voters. REAGAN has proposed a HIGHWAY CONSTRUCTION program financed by 5 cent/gallon GASOLINE TAX. Shot of numbered wheels turning on old style GAS PUMP. Shots of HIGHWAY TRAFFIC, highway workers. V.o.-Administration says the HIGHWAY PROGRAM will help recovery by providing some direct jobs and stimulating the economy. 01.03.51-C/S TRANSPORTATION SECRETARY DREW LEWIS testifying to Congressional Committee, says the program will fix the interstate system. Shots of SENATORS on panel. C/S Sen. JOHN HEINZ (R-PA), says the program is not just about fixing HIGHWAYS, but also for JOBS. Says program is good because it does two things. C/S Sen. BOB PACKWOOD (D-OR), says he doesn't care what the bill is called, he thinks it's good. A DEMOCRAT SENATOR asks the Secretary how many WOMEN will get JOBS through the program. The SECRETARY says it's not a JOBS bill, but jobs that result will be mostly in CONSTRUCTION and consequently favor MEN. Sen. BILL BRADLEY asks if it's the Administration's position that INFRASTRUCTURE REPAIR is a primary goal and JOBS only an incidental benefit. Secretary agrees. Concedes that the Administration doesn't expect it to alleviate much unemployment [a perfect time to institute a highly regressive new tax!]. 01.06.48-WERTHEIMER-DEMOCRATS expected to support the bill, but have problems with the REGRESSIVE TAX on GASOLINE that hurts POOR DRIVERS disproportionately. TRUCKING INDUSTRY objects to tax, and STATES concerned that they may pay more in GAS TAX than they get back in REPAIRS. ROBERTS/WERTHIEMER discussion of the DEMOCRATS JOBS BILL, REPUBLICANS surprisingly receptive to the ideas. ROBERTS-LAME DUCK CONGRESSES often the dying ground for controversial bills. This year, such a bill concerns NUCLEAR WASTE. ENVIRONMENTALISTS who won support in the election lobbying to delay consideration of NUCLEAR WASTE BILL until 1983. 01.08.18
LAWMAKERS
WETA "LAWMAKERS" 3/31/1983 IN 20.00.02-WETA credit/sponsor credits/title sequence 20.00.58-PAUL DUKE/NORMAN ORNSTEIN/COKIE ROBERTS-On program-a look at approval of JOBS PROGRAM and SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM by HOUSE and SENATE, other pending Congressional business. Discussion of SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM-crucial to put all reforms in one inseparable package. 20.01.58-m/s ALAN GREENSPAN testifying to congressional committee as part of SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION. C/S Rep. CLAUDE PEPPER (D-FL) in office, says that no one likes all of the REFORM PLAN, but everyone likes some part of it, it's the best compromise possible. ROBERTS-even with the support of influential SENIOR CITIZEN PEPPER, plan faced opposition. M/S Sen. BILL ARMSTRONG (R-CO) speaking to audience of SENIOR CITIZENS, says the Commission plan won't solve the problems of SOCIAL SECURITY, he's opposed to TAX INCREASES to finance. Shots of SENIOR CITIZENS hearing speech. Shot of workers on sidewalk by a federal building. ROBERTS v.o.-FEDERAL WORKERS objected to being included in SOCIAL SECURITY system. Shot of chief of FEDERAL WORKERS ASSOCIATION, says adding federal workers won't make much difference to the system's financial problems. 20.03.50-C/S Rep. STENY HOYER (D-MD) in debate in House, says it is wrong to penalize FEDERAL WORKERS for the mistakes of previous political administrations. C/S Rep. PEPPER in debate, C/S Rep. ROBERT MICHEL (MINORITY LEADER) in debate to support the Commission reform plan-there is no choice but compromise if SOCIAL SECURITY is to be saved. 20.04.29-DUKE-discussion with ROBERTS of opposition to the plan-TAX INCREASES, delay in COST OF LIVING ADJUSTMENT opposed by SENIORS, TAXES on SOCIAL SECURITY INCOME for wealthier recipients, higher PAYROLL TAXES, Federal Worker inclusion all controversial, Gradual increases in RETIREMENT AGE. Congress wanted to get the Reform passed before the heat of 1984 CAMPAIGN SEASON got started. 20.07.09-Clip of 1982 Congressional CAMPAIGN AD, candidate Bruce Morrison (D-CT) with a very stereotypical "little old lady", who chews out incumbent LARRY DeNARDIS. M/S MORRISON in common room of SENIOR CITIZEN center, speaking to group of SENIOR CITIZENS to gauge reaction to SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM. Most seniors think the reforms are fair if it means keeping SOCIAL SECURITY alive. One old lady tells MORRISON that she's going to be watching him closely in Congress. C/S loser DeNARDIS, says that he will watch MORRISON carefully because MORRISON used the SOCIAL SECURITY issue to beat him over the head in the campaign. C/S MORRISON, says DeNARDIS can run again if he wants, says that he will vote against the Commission proposal because "we can do better". 20.09.22-Rep. MORRISON in debate in House. C/S MORRISON in office, says that the Commission plan prevented debating alternatives and won't solve the problems.
Watergate Hearings - Testimony of John Caulfield. May 23, 1973
Mr. DASH. (continues) Mr. Dean also expressed his concern over this matter as a grave situation that could threaten the President and could become a national scandal. That none of the other defendants in the Watergate case were any problem, and Mr. McCord was not co-operating with his attorney. You again met with Mr. McCord at the second overlook on the George Washington Parkway on January 14 for a short while and conveyed the message of concern over a national scandal which could threaten the President and that McCord was the only one of the defendants not co-operating. Again McCord expressed his interest to you in securing his freedom and wanted you to do something about the wire-taps he had mentioned to you earlier. You telephone Mr. Dean that same day and told him that Mr. McCord was not interested in executive clemency (Mr. Caulfield writing on notepad) and that Mr. McCord believed that the White House could help him get the charges dismissed by supplying proof of the wire-taps for him. You had a final meeting with Mr. McCord on a date you cannot recall but about the third week in January, where you picked him up in your automobile on the second overlook on the George Washington Parkway and drove for about an hour or two. At this time you told him that the White House could not do anything for him about the wire-tap problem and there was a lengthy conversation which for the most part involved other subjects than Watergate. You concluded during that conversation that Mr. McCord was definitely going to make a statement on the Watergate Burglary and it would probably involve allegations against people in the White House and other high administration officials. You gave him what you indicated to the committee as friendly advice to the effect "Jim, I have worked with these people and I know them to be as tough minded as you and I, when you make your statement don't underestimate them. If I were in your shoes I would probably be doing the same thing." But, you also had received from Mr. McCord some reference or request to do something about bail, and you were not able to accomplish anything on the bail issue on further contacts with him. That at no time did you talk with the President about this matter or mention the President to Mr. McCord concerning the offer of executive clemency, but that you carried this message to Mr. McCord because you felt that it was for the good of the President. Is that basically a fair summary of the gist of the contacts with Mr. McCord and Mr. Dean as contained in your statement? Mr. Caulfield. Yes sir.
Whitewater Hearings August 1, 1994 - Part 1
(10:50:27) The subject of Madison Guaranty, as I recall, may have come up 3 or 4 times during the course of those meetings. The discussions were procedural in nature and I'm quite certain that the substance of any allegations was not discussed. Let me note that Mr. Altman's instructions to me and to the other RTC staff always was to deal with Madison Guaranty the same as the RTC would deal with any other similar institution. 5 Regarding the meetings and/or contacts between Treasury and the White House, I first learned of the February 2, 1994, White House meeting in Mr. Altman's office during a question and answer session being held shortly before and to prepare for the February 241 1994, Senate oversight bearing. I bad no prior knowledge of this meeting and was unaware of any other contacts with the White House until I read about them in the press. As the Committee is aware, there have been press reports that a Kansas City investigator was told by a visiting RTC Washington lawyer that I would like to show that Whitewater did not cause a loss to Madison because it would "get us off the book." I have never instructed anyone to do anything but find the truth and work to see if the RTC had a cost-effective civil case, as is our regular procedure, In the final analysis, any judgment on the conduct of this investigation should be based on what is actually being done and on the results of the investigation that is underway. During my tenure, the RTC has taken the following steps: First, the reopening of the Madison investigation in light of the extension of the statute of limitations and additional information; second, the request of the Office of the Inspector General to -review the RTC generated report of the Rose Law Firm, as well as billings of that firm with respect to Madison; third, the retention by the legal division in early 1994 of Pillsbury, Madison, and Sutro to serve as outside counsel to help with the investigation; and fourth, the full cooperation the RTC has given to Special Counsel Fiske, When the RTC has completed its investigation and taken appropriate action, a full report of this matter will be made to the Congress. We fully expect to be judged by our actions at that time. Finally, I wish to state that no one at the Treasury has exerted any pressure or instructed me to do anything to influence the outcome of RTC's investigation of Madison Guaranty and I have never talked to anyone at the White House about Madison Guaranty or anything else, for that matter. I would be happy to answer any questions the Committee might have. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Ryan. Ms. Kulka, I understand you have a statement to make. Ms. KULKA. Yes, I do, The CHAIRMAN. We'd be pleased to bear from you now, and Maybe I can ask you to move the microphone just a little closer, too, so people in the back of the room are able to hear you clearly. STATEMENT OF ELLEN B. KULKA, GENERAL COUNSEL, RESOLUTION TRUST CORPORATION, WASHINGTON, DC Ms. KuLKA. My name is Ellen Kulka. I have been the General Counsel of the Resolution Trust Corporation since January 17, 1994. Before that, from February 1991 to January 1994, 1 was the Regional Counsel for the Northeast Region of the Office of Thrift Supervision in New Jersey. My first Government employment was in this capacity, Other than this period of Government service and a few years as assistant professor at the Graduate School of Management at Rutgers University, my entire professional career bad been in the pri 6 vate sector, where I practiced corporate, securities, and banking law. I have been frequently asked how I could possibly have accepted the job I now bold because of the widespread perception that the RTC operates in a difficult environment and might even be characterized as having bad a history as a very troubled agency in which anyone associated with it is subject to disparagement or worse. And it is true that many urged me not to accept the position because of its thankless, grueling nature. I would like to share with you my reasons for doing so because they are relevant to my perception of my responsibilities. I was first interviewed for the position of General Counsel in the spring of 1993, 1 year after the death of my husband following a 4-year illness.