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August 2, 1994 - Part 8
(19:05:47) We have here two versions of Ms. Hanson's recollections. One of them is her own from her own computer where she made questions a and answers to herself, and that was done on March 4 in anticipa- tion, I assume, of perhaps being called back before this Committee because the Ranking Member and the Chairman were not pleased with the way the testimony went. And in that she writes in her own words "who in the Treasury or the RTC knew that you had this conversation?" That is the conversation she had with Nussbaum. She said "I don't recall that I told anyone of this conversation." Question: Did you tell Mr. Altman? Answer: No. Quesiton: Did anyone ask you to have this conversation? Answer: No. Question: Did you have any further conversations with anybody from the White House? She goes on, but in this version of her memory of March 4 she says clearly, without an question, she never told you about this. Now comes July 11, she's talking to the ethics people. She says, "Did Mr. Altman advise you to do that, meaning talk to Mr. Nussbaum?" She says, "I don't recall exactly how the conversation developed, but it was clear to me I bad the responsibility of notifying Mr. Nussbaum that these referrals were likely to be leaked and I believe Mr. Altman asked me to do it." And the questioner says, "your best recollection is Mr. Altman asked you to contact Mr. Nussbaum?" She said "I believe so." I think in this situation, your credibility rises a little bit. Here she says you believe you told her. Here she says in her own writing, without equivocation, no, I never told anyone, no one knew about it. And specifically asked about you, she says no. So the situation to me is very confusing. Now, do you have any explanation, because I have a problem with Ms. Hanson's testimony, I'll be honest with you. I guess my first question is, can you possibly reconcile these two different stories? Mr. ALTMAN. No, Senator, I can't. But if I can say, the part of this whole hearing that's most important to me is the issue of my testimony before the Committee. Senator BOXER. Well, I haven't gotten to that yet. I'm going to ask you about that, but I want to get to the basis of this. you explain to me why she would put in her own personal computer when there wasn't any investigation that she never talked to you and then later on in the investigation she said she got her orders from you? Can you explain that in any way? Mr. ALTMAN. No, I can't, but what made the biggest impression on me was that I talked to Senator Riegle the day 1 learned of the 473 meetings and informed him of that also, talked to Senator Bond, and I prepared a letter to Senator Riegle. The letter says I just learned of these meetings. Senator BOXER. Sorry? Mr. ALTMAN. The letter says I Just learned of these meetings and a number of people looked at it including Ms. Hanson and she signed off on it. Senator BOXER. I understand that. Let me go further. I want to understand your management style Vis-a-vis your official capacity over Ms. Hanson's activities. This is a woman who is General Counsel. I consider that to be a pretty powerful position. Did you supervise her activities every single day? Mr. ALTMAN. No, Senator. Senator BOXER. Did you have anything in writing in terms of a manual, because in our office we have a manual where we lay out who people report to and what they can and cannot do without getting specific authority. Did 0 have any such manual or an agreement with her that she would have to, for example, when she spoke to another attorney, be it the White House or any other agency, she had to ask you? Mr. ALTMAN. Senator, if I may just put it in a moment's perspective. No one in the Treasury except 3 people, my secretaries and special assistant, no one in the Treasury reports directly to me. If you look at the organizational chart, everyone reports to the Secretary of the Treasury, and my job is essentially defined as an alter ego job. So Ms. Hanson did not report directly to me, nor does anybody else. Senator BOXER. So she had no instruction from you that she could never go to the White House, unless you told her to do it; is that correct? Mr. ALTMAN. Yes, and I think Mr. Nussbaum testified that he had lots of conversations with Ms. Hanson. They were in regular interaction.
August 4, 1994 - Part 12
(22:40:12)(tape #10097 begins) testified last week before the House Banking Committee, I made the same point, Since then, the nonpartisan Office of Government Ethics issued a report which supports this position. The OGE wrote [on page 20 of its report]: (22:40:28) The impartiality provisions of the standards of conduct may not be relied upon by an employee as the basis for recusing himself from a matter because he simply does not wish to be involved or to exert the effort required. Under the standards of conduct, employees are expected to per-form their duties fully, unless there is a reason that their participation in a matter will result in an actual conflict, including an inability to act impartially or will result in an appearance of conflict significantly detrimental to the public's legitimate perception of the fairness of the governmental processes involved. What the OGE is saying, in simple language, is that a public official has a duty to do his or her duty. And that official has no right to retreat behind ethics rules- when those rules do not apply-to avoid doing his or her job. It would be improper to do so. I want to repeat that. What the OGE is saying in simple language is that a public official has a duty to do his or her duty and that official 472 has no right to retreat behind ethics rules when those rules do not apply to avoid doing his or her job. It would be improper. It would be unethical to do so. The public policy issue raised by what Mr. Altman said regarding a possible recusal was not merely an academic one or matter of some high falutin principle. It was then a matter of immediate concern to the Administration. Just a day before this February 2nd meeting, a nominee for the Chair of the FDIC, Ricki Tigert, had been asked by certain Senators on this Committee to agree to commit in advance to recuse herself on any issues connected to Madison or Whitewater. She was asked to do so for the stated reason that she knew the Clintons and was being nominated by the President. Ms. Tigert had taken the position that, if she were confirmed and asked to address Madison./Whitewater-related questions, she would consult the appropriate agency ethics officer and follow his or her advice. The inquiring Senators indicated that Ms. Tigert's response was not sufficient. They told her if she would not agree to recuse herself in advance, regardless of whether she was legally or ethically required to do so, they would block her nomination. At the time of the February 2 meeting, I and others in the White House believed it was important for the Executive Branch to resist efforts to force nominees to agree in advance to recuse themselves in situations where recusal was not legally or ethically required. We felt that those seeking Ms. Tigert's commitment to recuse herself were tampering with the agency adjudicative process. So when Mr. Altman said, sort of out of the blue without any advance notice, that he was inclined to remove himself from the RTC investigation, without a legal or ethical basis for doing so, I felt he might create an unfortunate precedent for our Administration and future Administrations and would make a shambles of our position in the Tigert nomination. As White House Counsel, as an Executive Branch official, I was concerned about what Mr. Altman was considering doing. But I did not tell him to remain in the matter, This is what I said to him. I said that if he was legally or ethically required to recuse himself, he should do so promptly. That's the first thing I said. Obviously, if Mr. Altman had a disqualifying financial interest, or if he believed that he could not decide the matter impartially, or if his continuing to act created an appearance of favoritism within the meaning of the relevant ethics code, any of which was a ground requiring recusal, it would be necessary for him to remove himself. But he had already told me that he received ethics advice that he did not have a legal or ethical obligation to recuse himself So I went on to say, that if recusal was not legally or ethically required, he should consider-he should consider
July 19, 1995 - Part 2
(12:05:32) Mr. HUBBELL. I can only speak for me as one of the lawyers who was advising the transition. There were already lawsuits being filed against Betsey and the Clintons that could be used as a fishing expedition for personal files of the Clintons. We wanted, to the extent those files contained attorney-client privileged materials, to protect that privilege and keep it in a chain of custody. That was my thinking, Senator. I can't speak for the other lawyers who were involved, Senator FAIRCLOTH. Did you have any discussion at any time with the President or the First Lady or anyone else relating to the transfer of these files? 119 Mr. HUBBELL. I never had a discussion with the President or the First Lady about the files other than that I had taken them into my possession. I told the President that, Senator FAIRCLOTH. Yesterday I believe you testified that David Kendall came to your house to get the so-called Betsey riles. I believe earlier you said that you took the Betsey files to David Kendall. Would you clarify how the Betsey files got to David Kendall? Mr. HUBBELL. Yes, I will. Once David was hired, I met with David. I did bring to him a few of the files that he asked for prior to that meeting. So I did deliver to David, on that day that I had a meeting with David, a few files. That Saturday David came with an employee of Williams & Connolly and removed all of the files from my house with me. Senator FAIRCLOTH. So you delivered some and then he came and Mr. HUBBELL. I delivered a stack that may have been a couple of inches high of files that he had asked about, and then that weekend he came and got the Senator FAIRCLOTH. Got the remainder? Mr. HUBBELL. Yes, Senator FAIRCLOTH. Mr. Hubbell, in your deposition you said that Jim Blair was helping to, and I quote, "wrap up Whitewater," Now, Jim Blair is General Counsel for Tyson Foods and, as you testified yesterday, one of the closest friends of the Clintons. Hillary Clinton has publicly stated that Jim Blair advised her on her commodity trades which resulted in her $100,000 profit. Jim Blair even spent the night of President Clinton's inauguration at the White House. Mr. Hubbell, why was Jim Blair involved in wrapping up the Whitewater deal? Mr. HUBBELL. Jim assisted in the campaign, as did his wife, and one of the issues that he worked on was Whitewater. He had volunteered, I believe, to negotiate the transfer of the Clintons' interest in Whitewater. Senator FAIRCLOTH. Is that what we mean by "wrapping up Whitewater"? Mr. HUBBELL. Yes, I believe the thought was that they would try to transfer it to Mr. McDougal and end the relationship. Senator FAIRCLOTH. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sarbanes. Senator MURRAY. Mr. Chairman, may I just ask a question on scope, just for my clarification? Is the commodities trading issue within the scope of this Committee? The CHAIRMAN. We are not looking into the commodities matter. We are looking into only those matters that are touched upon in the resolution and/or that come in as a related matter. I don't think the Senator was looking to go into that, but certainly there is nothing that precludes one from mentioning areas. To go into it, to examine it, that is not the scope of this Committee, nor do we intend to go into it, That certainly doesn't preclude somebody from identifying by saying so-and-so who was involved in X, Y and Z, because it is a complex picture, so Members will, at times, have the ability to do that. We are not going to look into the commodities matter. 120 Senator Sarbanes. Senator SARBANES. I yield to Senator Simon. I should say the scope is very carefully spelled out in the resolution that was passed by the Senate and does not encompass that particular subject. Senator Simon. OPENING COMMENTS OF SENATOR PAUL SIMON Senator SIMON. Thank you, Senator Sarbanes and Mr. Chairman. The good news, Mr. Hubbell, is you are getting toward the end. There's just a few summarizing questions. First, it's fairly clear that Bernie Nussbaum is developing into a heavy in this whole question period. You have testified that he was like a brother to Vince Foster, that he was a pallbearer at the funeral.
August 2, 1994 - Part 6
(01:00:40) Mr. ALTMAN. For example, Senator, I saw a transcript of a depo. sition she gave. And if I have it right, she was asked whether I instructed her to go to the White House She said, I can't recall. It was my sense that he may have wanted me to, Then she was asked a second time, did he or did he not instruct you to go to the White House and as I recall the deposition, doing my best to recall it, she said I can't recall, it was my impression. So she hasn't said, at least' in those responses, be asked me to go. She's saying I can't recall. The CHAIRMAN. We've got to stop there in the interest of time. I know you are right in the middle of this and I think it's very important and I trust that there will be an opportunity to finish that line of questioning to your satisfaction, Senator Sarbanes. Let me now call on Senator Gramm. Senator GRAMM. Could I ask a very quick question? How did you see her deposition? Mr. ALTMAN. I believe-and I may want to double-check this, Senator-but I believe we were permitted to Senator GRAMM. Ours are confidential. Mr. ALTMAN. I didn't see yours. Senator GRAMM. How did you see hers? Mr. ALTMAN. I have seen the Inspector General's depositions which have been made public now. I believe I'm correct on that. I want to reserve that that's the best of my belief. Senator GRAMM. I may come back to that. But I want to go back and try to nail down this whole question of the veracity of your statement before this Committee, because I think when you get down to the bottom line, that's the major reason you're here. It's going to take me a minute, but I want to go through it because what is happening in going back and forth, part of our 5-minute rule, unless we look at all this together we lose continuity, so I want to read you several questions, your answers, and then refer to the facts as we now know them. On February 24, as we all know, you were asked before this Committee by me: Have you or any member of your staff had any communication with the President, the First Lady, or any of their representatives, including their legal counsel, or any member of their White House staff, concerning Whitewater or the Madison Savings & Loan? I then asked, as a follow-up to that: I would like to know what the substance of the communication was, when it occurred, who initiated it, and what you were asked to do. You said two things in response to that. You said, "I have had one substantive contact." Now I think, in his diary, your Chief of Staff was referring to that when he talks about your graceful duck of the question. You 431 said, "I've had one substantive contact, " and that the sole purpose of that contact was to talk about the statute of limitations. It was the whole conversation, you said. It was the sole purpose. Then Senator Domenici asked you a question, and you go back to what Mr. Steiner calls in his diary, I think, this "graceful duck." You say, "one substantive or meaningful contact, and then Senator Domenici says, "well, I assume we're not arguing there that you had-you are not suggesting that you bad more than one, are you?" Obviously, more than one "contact." You then , Mr. Altman, say, no." You say, "No. I am just saying that if you run into someone in the hall, if you see that thing in the paper this morning, I'm not including that." Now that's what you said. And Mr. Domenici's question broke through this graceful duck. You said, "No. I've bad on] one contact." We now know-and, in fact, the question was about your staff and you. We now know that there were over 40 contacts that we have verified. We now know that you made four of those contacts personally. We now know that the sole subject matter was not the issue of statute of limitations. In fact we know, and I have reason to believe as I'll raise in another question, that the real objective of the meeting was the whole recusal issue. But we know it was at the very least a
August 2, 1994 - Part 6
(01:05:55) Here is my question: You were asked point blank-first of all, you were asked a question which you didn't answer. You chanted the question. The graceful dodge. You were asked in detail what at happened. Then, when it became Senator Domenici's turn, he posed the question point blank, "you are not saying that there has been more than one contact," and you say "no." We now know there were 40 contacts. We now know 4, at least 4 of them, you were engaged in yourself, and we know that other subject matter was discussed. Now how do you reconcile that? Mr. ALTMAN. Senator, as I said in my statement, I had one substantive contact on the case, and I used the term "substantive" as to relate to the RTC investigation of Madison, and that I believe was true then and that I believe is true today. Senator GRAMM. It wasn't the question then and it isn't the question now. The question then and the question now was contacts, and, in fact, Senator Domenici noted that you keep saying, "substantive." "You're not saying you had more than one contact are you, Mr. Altman," and you say, "no." Mr. ALTMAN. Senator , my response to Senator Domenici, I believe, clearly indicates that there may have been other contacts, clearly indicates that. Senator GRAMM. How does it indicate it, you say, "no"? Mr. ALTMAN. Because I say I'm not counting these other contacts. Senator GRAMM. And these other contacts were passing somebody in the hall. Let me ask you a question. February 2 was the one contact you disclosed to us. The day after this one contact you had, -this one substantive contact you bad was February 3. You go to the White House. Ms. Hanson is out having lunch with somebody, and you beep her and tell her to hurry down to the White House. She gets up, leaves her dessert, and scurries down to the White House. She gets there, you're done, but Mr. Ickes is there. 432 and he says to Ms. Hanson, how many people have you told about Altman thinking about recusing himself, and he in essence-and then he says to her it's a good thing-let me be sure I have the language right. Ickes says to Hanson, how many people know that she recommended you recuse yourself and refers to the fact that it's good there were only a few of them. Now you were at that meeting. You pull her out of her lunch to come there. They say to her it's a good thing that she's told only a few people that you're thinking about recusing yourself. This happened the next day and you say this is not substantive? Mr. ALTMAN. Senator, when I used the word "substantive" I meant in relation to the RTC investigation of Madison. So you may disagree Senator GRAMM. Let me just stop you right there. Is not the recusal related to the fact that you are a friend of the President of the United States and that these referrals refer to him, isn't that what the recusal is all about? Mr. ALTMAN. Senator, recusal bad nothing to do whatsoever with the RTC investigation of Madison. Whether I recused myself or I did not recuse myself would have no bearing on that. Senator GRAMM. Why would you recuse yourself if it weren't for conflict of interest? Why else would you do it? Is it not that the whole discussion about recusal came originally from the Congress back in January, wasn't that whole discussion about the fact that you are an FOB, Friend of Bill? As we get further into this I'm going to go back and discuss what the were saying at the White Ouse about who were they going to be left with if you recused yourself, that this is a tough prosecutor. Was that not a substantive meeting? Not that it matters, because you made up your own question. But the point is, not only didn't you answer my question, not only didn't you tell the truth, you didn't tell the truth on the question you made up, because the February 3 meeting was a substantive meeting, was it not, Mr. Altman? Mr. ALTMAN. Senator, I told the truth. I testified truthfully before this Committee. Members of this Committee, some of them at least, have known me for quite a few years. I might have made mistakes and I may have done things wrong, but I've never come before the Congress and not done my very best to answer forthrightly and honestly and I did that that day.
August 9, 1995 - Part 4
(13:25:32) Mr. NUSSBAUM. A conversation undoubtedly occurred between Mr. Heymann and I on the night of the 22nd because Mr. Heymann says it occurred, and I have no reason to deny it occurred. But, Mr. CHERTOFF. Yes? Mr. NUSSBAUM. But Mr. Heymann was not bitterly angry at me on the night of the 22nd. He may have expressed some displeasure with respect to getting back to him. This is sort of coming from the hearings, rather than my independent memory, but I do remember no bitter disappointment, no vicious conversation, no statements about misuse of the Justice Department. I remember those things did not happen. Mr. CHERTOFF. Did he ask you, are you hiding anything? Mr. NUSSBAUM. That I don't remember. I don't remember one way or another asking. If he did ask it, I would have answered exactly the way he said I answered, I am not hiding anything. But I don't remember him asking that, Mr. CHERTOFF. That's not the kind of thing that would stick in your memory? The Deputy Attorney General of the United States, someone who you worked through Watergate with together, says to you, as White House Counsel, are you hiding anything. Memorable or not memorable? Mr. NUSSBAUM. You know, it's not the kind of thing Phil would say. Mr. CHERTOFF. You don't think he said it? Mr. NUSSBAUM. I don't think, my best memory is that he didn't say it, but if he says he said it, he said it. Mr. CHERTOFF. He was under oath here, right? Mr. NUSSBAUM, I'm sure he's giving his best memory. Mr. CHERTOFF. I would like to put up the note. In his own handwriting, he has a note, I'm going to put it up here, of this conversation. I understand the note was written months later, Mr. NUSSBAUM. That's right, it was. Mr. CHERTOFF. But do you have any reason to believe that he was lying to his notes? Mr. NUSSBAUM, No, of course not. I think he was putting down his best memory. Mr. CHERTOFF. This was his own conversation, not second hand, not third hand, his own recollection. Mr. NUSSBAUM. Yes, Mr. CHERTOFF. Nine o'clock PH to BN, "you misused us." Mr. NUSSBAUM, But he testified, didn't he, he didn't think he used the words with me, "you misused us." Did he say that here? Mr. CHERTOFF. Let's not confuse your testimony here with your recollection, which is all we're interested in, with your having followed the hearings. I don't want to pollute your memory with your trying to kind of match it up. Mr. NUSSBAUM. I appreciate that. 1262 Mr. CHERTOFF. It's for the finders of fact to match up. It's for you to give your testimony. So the question is this. Looking at this note, PH to BN, quote "you misused us," close quote, written in' Phil Heymann's own handwriting. Did lie say this to you, either exactly or in substance? Mr. NUSSBAUM. No. Mr. CHERTOFF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. We have a vote. Senator SARBANES. Mr. Chairman, 'before we break, I want to correct the record in one respect. Mr. Chertoff said that Mr. Nussbaum and Mr. Heymann worked together through Watergate. I was around at that time, and I think we ought to get it clear on the record, because there was an earlier suggestion that Mr. Nussbaum had worked with Mr. Ben- Veniste. Mr. Heymann and Mr. Ben-Veniste both worked for the Special Prosecutor for Archibald Cox and then it was Leon Jaworski. Mr,, Nussbaum worked for the House Judiciary Committee in the course of the impeachment. So in a sense, they all worked on Watergate, but I don't think it's accurate to say they worked to ether. Mr. Nussbaum worked in a significant position on the staff of the House Judiciary Committee, which was headed up by John Doar and Al Jenner, and Mr. Ben-Veniste and Mr. Heymann worked in the Office of the Special Prosecutor. The CHAIRMAN. That's correct. Mr. CHERTOFF. For the record, I was in college, Mr. Chairman, and I watched it all on television. [Laughter.] The CHAIRMAN. Let the record note all of those facts. We are concluding a vote. We will return. We will stand in recess for the next hour. We will return at 2:30 p.m. (13:29:15) [Whereupon, at 1:30 p.m., Wednesday, August 9, 1995, the hearing was recessed, to reconvene the same day at 2:30 p.m., in the same place.] (13:32:08)(tape #10138 ends)
August 2, 1994 - Part 9
(22:40:31) Senator DAMATO. Let me say this to you Senator KERRY. I think we should get the answer. I'm not saying we shouldn't but lees do it in an orderly fashion. senator D'AMATO. Mr. Altman, when I asked you, were there any other meetings that may have been requested, you answered no. In light of what you know now, in light of what you have beard testified to, that you called at least two people to set up a meeting on the 3rd that 's what Maggie Williams says, that's what Ms. Hanson. says, Mr. Ickes verifies the meeting, and Mr. Eggleston verifies the meeting. Is it not true that that answer was not responsive and not accurate? Mr. ALTMAN. No, Senator, it isn't. That question was responsive to the question as I understood it. Senator D'AMATO. Let me tell you, the question as you understood it, that you make reference to, didn't take place until after you answered. I then pursued that when you said no, I then asked you about other contacts. Mr. ALTMAN. But I think it's a reasonable thing to see how I might have come to that conclusion because you say you mean there were no other meetings requested by the White House? You were explaining your own question. Senator D'AMATO. I only raised the question after you said precisely no to the question as to were there any other meetings? You said no. I have to tell you, it is hard for this Senator to see how "You could have forgotten the meeting of February 3. 1 then went -further to say: Dig other people possibly set them up? Did the White House set it up, et cetera. I nave to tell you, are you saying :,now that because maybe Ms. Williams set it up or because Ms. Hanson set it up that there was no meeting? Mr. ALTMAN. No, Senator, I believe I called Mr. Ickes. Senator D'AMATO. So the difference is because you called Mr. Ickes that it means you didn't have to tell us about the meeting February 3? ALTMAN. No, Senator. I'd like to try to make one thing as clear as I can. I Senator D'AMATO. Yes, please. Mr. ALTMAN. I've testified the same way I've always tried to tes- when I come before the Congress, and I've had the privilege of doing that many times, and there are some Members on this Committee known me for some time, and they think of me do, but I just want to assure this Committee that I up here on February 24 as a different person, as a dif- ferent person than I've been every other time. Senator Riegle-Sen- ator Riegle knows me very well. I thought he always had a high regard for me. I hope that's true. 506 Senator DAMATO. Mr. Chairman, I don't mean to. Mr. Altman, YOU re now not being responsive to the question and I understand your answer. I don't accept it, but reasonable people may disagree. Let me move on to something else, Mr. Ickes testifies about the meeting in his deposition on July 24. Among other things he was asked, are a number of questions about the details of the statute of limitations and the progress of the inquiry being conducted. He goes on and he says: What he discussed was whether there was an inquiry underway and that, in his View based an information from his sources--I don 't think he delineated them, but I assumed one of them was the General Counsel of the RTC-that investigation was going to take a longer period of time to conclude and that it might not conclude until after the expiration of the statute of limitations Now, that's Mr. Ickes, a trained lawyer, Deputy Chief of the White House. That's his recollection. Let me go on to page 122. Mr. ALTMAN. Senator, that is false. Senator DAMATO. He says the purpose of the meeting Mr. ALTMAN. That is false, Senator DAMATO. OK You disagree with him. Mr. ALTMAN. Not only do I disagree with him, but the facts disagree with him. The facts disagree with him, and I can tell you in the strongest terms that that is false. Senator D'AMATO. Let me continue. Mr. Ickes says the purpose of this meeting and the focus of his discussion, and I think this goes to the essence of being responsive to the Committee, was the relationship of the time that he felt this investigation might be wrapped up, and be said, at least in so many words, that it was his understanding that the investigation probably would not be concluded and that Et a determination could not be made by the RTC's General Counsel as to whether there was a basis for a civil claim until after the expiration of the statute of limitations had ap- lied to this particular investigation. And I'll note that, thereafter, he says that be informed both Mrs. Clinton and the President of the gist of this conversation. Now, would Mr. Ickes go to the President and to the First Lady and inform them of this, if it didn't happen? Mr. ALTMAN. Senator it is false. The Office of Government Ethics, the independent Office of Government Ethics evaluated that. That's not a Clinton body. That's an independent Office of Government Ethics, and it concluded that no nonpublic information was provided. Senator DAMATO. Let me say Mr. ALTMAN. Just a moment, Senator. Senator D'AMATO. I don't want to hear about the Office of Government Ethics-that's not a responsive question, to have him come
August 3, 1994 - Part 5
(16:10:40) The CHAIRMAN, That's what I'd like to hear, is your recollection Mr, EGGLESTON. Sir, my recollection and, again, where this out was in Mr. Altman's first sentence when he turned to recusal issue. I didn't know and I don't think anybody there knew 93 he was going to start talking about this issue. My recollection is not that he told us that he had decided to recuse himself. My recollection is that he told us he was considering recusing himself. He was thinking about recusing himself. I think I saw his testimony yesterday. I think he says that he said he was inclined to recuse himself It was not my recollection that he told us he had decided to recuse himself. The CHAIRMAN. I asked earlier if we had last night's transcript. Because we went so late, it's not typed up in an index in the way we can refer to it, but my memory, his testimony was to us that he had reached a decision before he went to that meeting and did communicate that decision, so there's a bit of a difference of opinion as to what happened. We'll have to try to pursue that. Mr. EGGLESTON. In any event, as I say, whatever he said, it came out in the first sentence and I don't think any of us knew that sentence was coming. The CHAIRMAN. You mean that was the first thing up in the meeting? Mr. EGGLESTON. No, that was the first thing up when he finished the statute of limitations issue. He turned to a new issue we were not anticipating. The CHAIRMAN. I don't want to go past my time. Senator DODD. Just a point of inquiry because I'm curious as to whether or not we're going to go into this. I Last evening, I believe you indicated that this memo going to the Rose Law Firm was beyond the scope when the issue was raised last evening, and I'm just curious as to whether or not it is still ,beyond the scope of this hearing or not. The CHAIRMAN. We did discuss that and that issue was presented last evening in detail by Senator Domenici, but the feeling was that because it dealt with the line of succession as to who would make the decisions in the event of a recusal, that that in effect brought it within the scope of the general charter that we have on this issue. That was the argument. Senator DODD. If I'm not mistaken, and I want to check the record, but a similar question was raised last evening-and the Chairman can correct me if I'm wrong on this-but you made a determination that it was beyond the scope. I stand to be corrected not the case, but I thought that was the decision last evening. CHAIRMAN. I don't have that recollection but, unfortunately, we don't have the transcript here at the present time. Senator D'AMATO. I think clearly it would be incredulous if we were to take a position that this memo written by the White House relates to the line of succession and who will make the ulti- ion, which is really the scope of this memo, is beyond the Committee. Senator DODD. Senator, I'm not arguing about lines of succession. There was a decision last evening when this matter was raised. I'm repeating what I thought the issue was last evening Senator KERRY. Was not the full document made part of the 94 The CHAIRMAN. I thought it was. My recollection is that it was, but I can't be certain of that because it would have happened late at night and it was Senator KERRY. I was the one who was inquiring about it and I think afterwards Senator D'Amato followed up and Senator DAMATO. That's right, and I asked that it be placed in the record in its entirety. Senator DODD. I understand the point of succession but this goes into the matter of the scope of the hearing based on the resolution we agreed. This is the Rose Law Firm issue. That's not what the resolution talks about. That's that whole memo and I think we're going to face these issues. Senator DAMATO. We're not going into the Rose Law Finn orthis is a memo, among other things that touches on Whitewater. It says FDIC and RTC, Rose Law Firm issues. We're not going into the issues. The question this Committee will be attempting to ascertain is why is it and how is it that White House Counsel is providing this kind of legal documentation. Senator DODD. I'm asking a procedural question, Senator procedural question. I'm not challenging your right to ask questions. It seems to me this memo includes matter, the Rose Law Firm issue) which was beyond the scope of the resolution which defines our job. I'm merely asking the question as to whether a procedure, a parliamentary question is it within or beyond the scope. The CHAIRMAN. Let me say to the Senator, this document arrived late in the document production period. And it was not part of it, but when we became aware of it, we discussed it with the White House, and they were willing to make it available to the Committee, Now, my own view would be and my own questions have been, limited solely to the items that are within the scope of our inquiry. If somebody were to try to take it off into another area, then I think the scope issue would arise in terms of our getting into the discussion here, but that has not happened thus far. I would hope that would not happen. Senator DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
August 4, 1994 - Part 9
(19:05:46) Senator MOSELEY-BRAUN. I appreciate that. Now, the final question, and again I would put this question with regard to each member and it's a generic question, but I think it's important, again, just to make sure that from your perspective this issue has been covered. The White House Counsel, as you know, issued a series of ethics memoranda detailing the procedures that White House staff should follow when contacting members of other Executive Branch agencies. And I would ask each of you', did you follow those procedures in this case? Mr. ICKES. Well, I think, Senator, that as Mr. Stephanopoulos and I have discussed earlier that in some cases, we should have gone through the White House Counsel, did not, but the fact is we should have done it. But I think that there was an explanation for that, but the fact is I don't think that we followed them to the letter and the spirit in each and every case. Mr. STEPHANOPOULOS. Madam, I think we tried to follow them. I think I've learned two big things in this case. Number one, do your best to control your temper at work and, number two, whenever something like this comes up, go to the Counsel before you make any phone calls at all. Mr. PODESTA. Senator, I believe I was in compliance with those memoranda. Mr. LINDSEY. I was, Senator. Senator MOSELEY-BRAUN. Thank you very much. I believe the record will show that you were also and I appreciate it. I have' no further questions, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator MOSELEY-BRAUN. Senator D'AMATO. Senator Hatch. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hatch. Senator HATCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to continue on where we were talking, Mr. Stephanopoulos. You said you weren't familiar with the sworn tes- 414 timony before the Committee about your efforts to get the RTC to fire- Mr. STEPHANOPOULOS. I made no efforts, sir, Senator HATCH. Well, about accusations that you made efforts to get the RTC to fire Mr. Stephens. Let me review it with You and we'll put it to bed. Mr. STEPHANOPOULOS. Sure. Senator HATCH. This is Ms. Hanson and this is in the U.S. Senate transcript of hearings before the U.S. Senate hearing on the Whitewater matter. This is Monday, August 1st, Mr. STEPHANOPOULOS. May I see that, sir? May I have a copy in front of me? Senator HATCH. I don't have a copy Mr. STEPHANOPOULOS. I'd like to look at the whole page to make sure of the context. Senator HATCH. I'll send it to you. "Senator HATCH. In fact, Mr. Steiner told you the people at the White House wanted to see if they could get rid of Jay Stephens; isn't that correct? "Ms. HANSON. That is correct. He did say that. He said what I recall saying is do you believe they wanted to see if they can get rid of Jay Stephens." The second one is also the transcript of hearings, our hearings here, and this is Tuesday, August 2-he's got it. I didn't tell you the page, though, on that. Did they give you the page? Mr. STEPHANOPOULOS. What page is it? Senator HATCH. Page 404, at the bottom. The one I'm referring to now is, if you have a copy of it, it's Tuesday, August 2, 1994, on page 436. Actually, it starts on page 435. It's the bottom line on page 435. Are you with me on that? Mr. STEPHANOPOULOS. No, not yet, sir. Hold on. Senator HATCH. Bottom line on page 435, where I'm asking a question. "Senator HATCH. And in fact, you said to Mr. Steiner words to the effect that those guys at the White House must be crazy to try and fire Mr. Stephens; right? "Mr. ALTMAN. I don't remember my exact words, but I told them I thought it was an unwise thing to have done. "Senator HATCH. That pretty well sums it up. "Mr. ALTMAN, The essence of what you said is what I felt. "Senator HATCH. And you were referring to Harold Ickes and Mr. Stephanopoulos when you made that statement. "Mr. ALTMAN. Not as human beings. I have the highest regard for them. I thought bringing that subject up"-and I apparently interrupted him. "Senator HATCH. I'm not trying to get you in trouble I want to get the facts down as far as I can. Were you referring to anyone else besides Ickes and Stephanopoulos? "Mr. ALTMAN. No, sir."
August 1, 1994 - Part 6
(17:59:45)(Beginning of tape #10061) Senator SHELBY. No, did he use that word, that phrase? Ms. HANSON. As I've stated, I don't recall the specifies of the conversation but that was the purpose of my task. Senator SHELBY, Did you make some notes about this for your records? Ms. HANSON. No. Senator SHELBY. Did you make some notes about this conversation? Ms. HANSON. With Mr. Altman? Senator SHELBY. Yes. Ms. HANSON. Not to my recollection. Senator SHELBY There is nothing you recollect from your notes about that conversation? Ms. HANSON. No, sir. (18:00:13) Senator SHELBY. I want to ask you this. Did you ever, ever think it was improper, as General Counsel, to brief the White House on something from the RTC that was basically confidential, something of this importance, dealing with a Justice Department-a referral to the Justice Department involving criminal behavior, possible criminal behavior? Ms. HANSON. Sir, I knew Senator SHELBY. I'm not talking about now, but before. (18:00:53)(Tape #10060 ends) Ms. HANSON. The conversation that I had with Mr. Nussbaum related to press inquiries that he was likely to receive. He was bound by the ethics regulations, and, in fact, was the Chief Ethics 115 Officer for the Office of the President. I was bound by the ethics rules as well. It never occurred to me that he would use that information for any purpose other than the governmental purpose that I intended it to be used for. Senator SHELBY. As General Counsel there at the Treasury and also working with the RTC in that role, did it ever occur to you that the information, once it left the RTC, could be left for many purposes, or could be leaked past the White House? Ms. HANSON. I was under the impression, and, in fact, I turned out to be right, that the information was going to be leaked. It was leaked out of the RTC to a number of news reporters. Senator SHELBY. Ms. Hanson, did you ever, ever check with Treasury or RTC ethics officers before meeting with the White House? Ms. HANSON. I didn't have to do that. I was familiar with the ethics rules. I understood how they operated. I understood that I was doing this for a governmental purpose, a proper governmental purpose, Senator SHELBY. Have you had second thoughts on that? Ms. HANSON. Excuse me? Senator SHELBY. Have you had second thoughts on that? Ms. HANSON. No. The Office of Governmental Ethics has said the same thing. Senator SHELBY. In your meeting at the White House, this has been touched on in your deposition and here, too, I suppose, but could you tell us for the record, again, what you basically told Mr. Nussbaum and the other gentleman. There was someone else there, too. Ms. HANSON. Mr. Sloan. Senator SHELBY, Mr. Sloan. Ms. HANSON. As I stated, I don't recall the specifics of the conversation. I don't recall exactly what I said. I Senator SHELBY. Did you take notes with you when you went down there? Ms. HANSON. I don't recall that I did. Senator SHELBY, You don't recall whether you took notes down there and you don't recall the specific conversation, but you do recall briefing him regarding the RTC information that was imparted to you? Ms. HANSON. That's right. Senator SHELBY. But, of your own recollection, you don't remember any of it now? Is that what you're saying to the Committee? Ms. HANSON. I don't remember, specifically, what I told him. Senator SHELBY. Could you, generally tell us what you told him? Ms. HANSON. Going back to Mr. Sloan's notes-which was a question I was asked Senator SHELBY. Are you referring to Mr. Sloan's notes now? Ms. HANSON. I'm referring to Mr. Sloan's notes of September 30, 1993. In looking at Mr. Sloan's notes, they do not refresh my recollection of having had a conversation with him on that date. There Is some information in here that I don't recognize, but the bulk of the information in Mr. Sloan's notes is what I recall having been told by Mr. Roelle. Senator SHELBY. Do you differ with his notes in any way? 116 Ms. HANSON. There are some things in here I don't remember. Senator SHELBY. What do you, differ with? Ms. HANSON. As I say, I don't remember. Some of the things in here I don't remember. I don't remember, for example, the water Co. I just don't remember that. Senator SHELBY. Yes ma'am. Ms. HANSON. The bulk of what is here is my recollection of. what I was told by Mr Roelle. Senator SHELBY. Do you have any reason-although you might not remember everything about what transpired in the meeting, do you have any real reason to differ with his notes? Ms. HANSON. No, no, sir. Senator SHELBY. Ms. Hanson, did you check with the Treasury' ethics officers before the February 2, 1994, White House meeting." I asked you, and you said no. Was that right? Ms. HANSON. I thought you asked about the September meeting. Senator SHELBY. Ok the first one. Did you check with the White House-did you check with the Treasury ethics officers before the February 2, 1994, White House meeting? Ms. HANSON. Yes, I did. Senator SHELBY. You did. What did they tell you, if anything? Ms. HANSON, We discussed, generally, the topics that Mr. Altman intended to discuss. Senator SHELBY. Did they talk to you about the propriety of the meeting and the perception of it? Did you go into that?
July 29, 1994 - Part 1
(10:47:52) OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CHRISTOPHER J. DODD Senator DODD. Thank you very much, Mr, Chairman. Let me join Senator Sarbanes and Senator D'Amato in commending you in the manner in which you prepared this Committee for these hearings. It's not an easy task and I think you've done a very, very fine job. I'm struck at the outset, Mr. Chairman, having listened to two of our colleagues and friends on the other side and getting ready for these bearings, that they seem to be following the advice of Judge Roy Bean, the famous old hanging judge, who once said that we'd have a fair trial for the defendant and then we'd hang him. In listening to opening statements, that seems to be the case here. Mr. Chairman, I want to make it very clear why We're here today and I want to lay out what I see as our role. The scope of these bearings, as you pointed out and Senator Sarbanes has stated, is rather narrow, pursuant to a Senate resolution adopted by the U.S. Senate. The question before this panel is not whether the laws have been broken. The Independent Counsel, Robert Fiske, and the courts would be the proper people to answer those questions. I believe Mr. Fiske has a staff of 10 attorneys, some 25 FBI agents, and countless others, and hundreds of hours. He has done his job to look into and identify if there are any illegal activities and then to seek punishment for the perpetrators. I believe be has done that job for the issues that we will review in this phase of our bearings: The investigation of Vincent Foster's suicide and the contacts between the White House and the Treasury Department. The answer as to whether or not there have been any illegal activities, I think, has been answered resoundingly and that is no. As Senator Sarbanes has pointed out, the report from Mr. Fiske concluded that no one within the White House or the Department of the Treasury acted with the intent to corruptly influence an RTC investigation. They also concluded that the evidence does not justify a criminal rosecution for any other Federal statute. I think that deserves being repeated and being repeated firmly. I'd also like to point out at this particular . juncture, if I could, Mr. Chairman, I understand we're under a resolution from the Senate to look into the suicide of Vincent Foster. I regret that. We watched-a Committee report, some 170 pages here-while some 125 people were interviewed. Countless others were examined 14 and the conclusion was, tragically, this was a suicide, and that the suicide had nothing to do with Whitewater. This panel is a Banking Committee, not a medical board of inquiry. We're Senators, not coroners. There are legitimate questions that ought to be examined but probing in a macabre way into a family tragedy will conclude that it was tragically a suicide and nothing more. I hope we can move very quickly and get to the issues that are more serious in my view. At any rate, Mr. Chairman, there's been a definitive statement as to the legality of questions. The only outstanding question, it would seem, is whether or not there was any improper conduct, and I'm not going to prejudge that question. We are neither defense attorneys nor prosecutors on this panel. Our role as Members of the U.S. Senate, our coequal but separate branch of Government, is to find out what happened and if what happened was improper. That's our responsibility. We don't want to minimize what is at stake here. But we also don't want to exaggerate beyond all proportion what has happened here. To compare Whitewater with Watergate and Iran-Contra, as some have done, borders on the ridiculous. Watergate led to more than 30 criminal convictions and the resignation of an American President. Iran-Contra yielded 11 criminal convictions. Both scandals arose from direct and conscious attempts by high Government officials to subvert democratic Government in this Nation. That's clearly what is not at issue here. As I said previously, at least on the matters before us in this bearing, there is no evidence of illegality. There is no evidence of obstruction of Justice. There were contacts between Administration officials and the regulators over investigations that concern the President. It has been alleged that those contacts were improper. That's a proper question, and we ought to examine that and we will. But as we examine that question, we must remember that nothing actually came of those contacts. Government officials may have discussed the status of an investigation. That may have been improper, and we should examine that, but did they do anything to actually change that status? There is no evidence, none whatsoever, that that was the case. Several of those
August 4, 1994 - Part 8
(16:55:39) Mr. ICKES. I'm not sure of your question, Senator. Are you saying did he read from his talking points? Senator KERRY. No; I'm asking you whether or not you may have misinterpreted or may have not heard him or that your testimony may be incorrect. That's what you testified to, but in fact what you testified to may not be correct. I don't know. Mr. ICKES. Senator, all I can do is say I have testified to the best of my memory. Senator KERRY. Well, then, I guess the rest of the evidence will stand and we'll have to sift through it. You say you believe that's what the testimony was; is that correct? Mr. ICKES. Senator, all I can say, I've testified to the best of my memory with respect to that meeting. I do not recall word for word what people said. I can only-but I've testified to the gist of it. Senator KERRY. Is it possible you didn't hear it or had a problem hearing it or anything? Mr. ICKES. It is possible. I'm completely deaf in my right ear. I don't remember the positions that we were sitting in so is it possible? It is possible. Senator KERRY. I'm just trying to sort this out. This is a very, very important contradiction and choosing on how people choose to interpret what the Senator has put forth is a very legitimate line of questioning based on what's in front of the Committee. It is a really central issue that we have to try to determine. I think it is one of the only sort of remaining ones to try to sort through this. Let me shift for a moment. On the recusal issue, I think all of us are still wrestling with this question of a de facto recusal. I understand, Mr. Stephanopoulos, your opinion as of several weeks earlier was that you thought he ought to recuse? Mr. STEPHANOPOULOS. I wasn't really involved in this, Senator. Senator KERRY. I realize that, but you had an opinion he ought to recuse, Mr. STEPHANOPOULOS. Since it's something I wasn't really involved in, I usually look to try to reduce controversy; anything that would distract from the President's major work, to do away with it. So if anybody asked me at the time, just recuse yourself, don't worry about it. Senator KERRY. Mr. Podesta, after Mr. Altman testified you were surely given the immediate sense that something was wrong, because a White House aid picked up a cellular phone right out Of the hearing and called to say this testimony is incorrect. Then you folks had the foresight and I might say the sense of difference between right and wrong to call Mr. Altman and say, hey, you've got a problem with your testimony, Accordingly, I would assume that when you saw the letter, you would have known that his attempt to clarify to the Committee was still lacking in the very point that you had first been notified about and were concerned about? Mr. PODESTA. Senator, I'm sure we're going to pursue this, but I didn't see that letter for some time after that, after it had occasion to be sent here, so I wasn't sure what was in that letter. Senator KERRY. When did you see it, just out of interest? Mr. PODESTA. I think in April or May. Senator KERRY. Fair enough. I appreciate that. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Senator Bond. Senator BOND, Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Podesta, you testified you were involved in the preparation of Roger Altman for the February 24 hearings; is that correct? Mr. PODESTA. No, that's the opposite of what I testified to. I testified that I was not involved in the preparation of Roger Altman for the preparation-for those hearings. Senator BOND. You were involved only in the follow-up after the hearings? Is that the extent of your activity with Mr. Altman as respects Mr. PODESTA. That's the only time I spoke with Mr. Altman and I did not-I was not involved in his preparation or, as it were, I testified to the two things I did that might be responsive to your question. One was I did have a conversation the week of the 14th with Mr, Levy saying Mr. Altman needed to be prepared to answer a question on recusal. I think that was in light of the fact that Ricki Tigert had been pressured the week before on that in this Committee. And second, I believe I said to Mr. Steiner, Mr. Altman had to be able to answer a question about whether he had contacts with the White House on Madison, and that he had to be able to answer a question with reference to that February 2 meeting. Senator BOND, Did you do any preparation or did you make any inquiries about the Madison matter prior to your discussions or in the course of your discussions with Mr. Levy or Mr. Steiner? Mr. PODESTA. No, Senator. About the Madison matter? No.
July 18, 1995 - Part 2
(11:20:40) We must get to the bottom of the Whitewater affair, and we must begin today. That's why these hearings are so important and why we can delay them no further To do otherwise would result in a failure by the United States Senate to carry out its responsibility in representing the American people It would mean more public distrust of government and create a nation of cynics and that, Mr. Chairman, would be the final tragedy to the chapter in story of Vince Foster. Thank You. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator. Senator Moseley-Braun- 29 OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CAROL MOSELEY-BRAUN Senator MOSELEY-BRAUN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Chairman, Whitewater seems sometimes like a very large and complicated subject to most Americans, It's been referred to even this morning as a web of interconnected scandals, but, quite frankly, the focus of this phase of the Committee's work is -much more limited and much more simple. Was there improper conduct in the handling of the papers in Vincent Foster's office after his death? At the outset, I think it's worth noting that there is substantial evidence that the applicable law was complied with in this situation. No one has even alleged that there was any interference with the Park Police investigation that constituted a violation of law. It is worth noting that the Park Police, if they thought they needed any documents from the Foster office, which was not where he committed suicide, could have asked for a search warrant or sought a subpoena duces tecum. They never made any such requests. Of course, it is very unlikely that a judge would have ever issued a search warrant for Vince Foster's office because probable cause for a search would have been very difficult, if not impossible, to establish. The best evidence for that conclusion is found in the Park Police's own guidelines issued after this case. Those guidelines do not provide for sealing of any workplace where the death did not occur at that workplace. Even prior to the Foster case, the Park Police did not routinely request that the office of any person that committed suicide at another location be sealed. It is also worth keeping in mind that the Park Police never re- quested an opportunity to go through the Foster home. But, Mr. Chairman, if the law was not violated, or likely not violated, what about ethical standards? Vincent Foster was a lawyer, and as such the canons of ethics governing lawyers imposes a duty of confiden- tiality, a duty that did not die with Vince Foster. The attorney-cli- ent privilege is one of the foundations of our system of justice and justifiably so. Could any American consult an attorney if they thought that their communications with their lawyer were not pro- tected? This duty is a formidable one and there are special consider- ations that apply to a Presidential lawyer like Mr. Foster that make that duty even more formidable, I think the reference has been made that there was information regarding Supreme Court nominees in that office, Bernard Nussbaum and other Members of the White House Counsel's Office) therefore, had a duty to protect confidentiality in Mr. Foster's office. Seeking to protect the confidentiality of the files in his office was, therefore, at a minimum, not an obvious violation of applicable ethical standards. Those standards, in fact, called action to protect the confidentiality of the files in that office. Mr, Chairman I would point out that even the requests for information by this Committee, which the Chairman and the Ranking Member signed, has in it language that recognizes the existence of that confidentiality, the attorney-client privilege. It says: In connection with the above request, particularly with regards to documents in Vincent Foster's office at the time of his death we recognize that these materials are likely to include documents subject to claims Of privilege, and if any documents 30 are withheld based on the assertion of any privilege, please provide a log identifying the date, et cetera, and the basis for the privilege asserted. That has been done and complied with in this case. The White House has cooperated fully in that regard. That leaves, however, a third area of inquiry. Even if the handling of the documents in Vince Foster's office comported with all applicable legal and ethical standards, was there, nonetheless, an appearances issue, a question involving the penumbra of ethics rules that is worth considering? That, it seems to me, is where this Committee's inquiry will really be focused, once it is firmly established that there were no violations of law involved and no violation of applicable ethics rules. Mr. Chairman, in your statement, you said, and I quote, "the Senate Whitewater hearings will be fair, impartial and thorough."
August 10, 1995 - Part 5
(14:35:17) Some of these contradictions may be able to be explained away. But I think that we have an obligation to get to the bottom of that, And so in an effort to do that, and in an effort to hopefully get a little more clarity as to how many phone calls were made and where they went, from Ms. Thomases to Ms. Williams to the First' Lady and vice versa, I believe it is necessary to get those records from the telephone company. So we will proceed along that line. Other-Members have suggested different things. But I would prefer not to have to bring back witnesses, and the Ranking Member and I have discussed this. In order to expedite and move these hearings, I think that we could do it on this basis. I just want- to conclude this aspect Senator SARBANES. I want to speak on this. The CHAIRMAN. Certainly. I wanted to conclude this aspect by thanking Mr. Nussbaum for his cooperation--oh Let me also say this, because I think it's very important, We have requested, and there is a very real question, as it relates to whether there were indices more complete than the one that we have seen. Mr. Chertoff has raised that today, but it really goes to an issue that I believe that Senator Bond had spoken to. He was interested in seeing whether they can, from the hard drive, the computer that Ms. Gorham used, recreate or get additional information. I have been advised by Judge Mikva, the White House Counsel, that he has asked the FBI to examine the hard drive of the computer of Mr. Foster's Executive Assistant. They have agreed to provide the Committee with the results of the FBI's examination of the hard drive. So I think we want to let that be known. Senator SARBANES. Mr. Chairman, let me just make this observation. First of all, the effort that's going on with respect to the computer was in response to a joint letter that you and I sent. The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes. Senator SARBANES. On the telephone records, as I understand it, all the parties are voluntarily prepared to provide us this information. And it seems to me that, as we have done heretofore, we ought to proceed on that basis. If, in fact, there proves then to be a problem, I think we can examine the question of issuing subpoenas. But when you have people that are in effect saying, we're willing to work with you and cooperate with you and get these records, I think we should follow that path. I have no reason to expect any problem, but if for some reason a problem arises, then we could address the question of issuing the subpoena. The CHAIRMAN. Here's the problem. In the Past, Senator, we have asked exactly for that. We have not received cooperation from recipients of this request. We've been told records are unavailable, et cetera. Now, I believe that in order to. expedite this-and by the way, if the parties agree, and I think that it can be done relatively--it would have to be done before we leave today-to send a letter; we can draft a letter, both counsel, which would indicate that those records by the telephone companies be made available to this Committee Senator SARBANES. I thought they had sent us that as indicated 1395 The CHAIRMAN. No, they have not. I don't need or want a conditional response. I have agreed and I think both counsels-we have agreed that we're not looking to find out every phone call that was made, but we are interested in phone calls that were made to people in official positions, the White House, those people whom the Committee are examining, et cetera. But we're not interested in phone calls made to people -outside of the scope of this investigation. Now, if counsels can agree to the methodology to provide that production in a reasonable fashion-not that it's going to be made subject to someone's attorney reviewing it and then deciding, but rather the attorneys here-that's fine. But up until now, we have not been able to have that, or at least get the parties to agree. Therefore, before we leave for the next 3 weeks, I want to be in a position to say that if we can't do that, that we're going to vote subpoenas out. Senator SARBANES. Well, let's do this, because my perception of the letters that we got from people was that they were more forthcoming than you have just indicated. Why don't we have counsel work on that, along the path of getting a voluntary compliance, which I think is always preferable. And then we can address the issue you've raised in the aftermath of that.
JFK Assassination Hearings - Dr. Michael Baden and Captain James J. Humes M.D.
Chair, Mr. STOKES, recognizes committee member FLOYD J. FITHIAN, Fithian wants to know if bullet fragments were left in Governor JOHN CONNALLY - Baden answers that it is questionable whether bullet hit Connally's rib or the cavity circle following bullet caused rib to break, however there were no fragments found in his chest (14:34:55) Fithian asks is fragments found in Connally's thigh or wrist - Baden responds a pin head sized fragment was seen in an X-ray of hip but not recovered but that a fragment was recovered from Conally's wrist (14:36:03) Baden tells the court fragments found could be accounted for as missing pieces of bullet 399 (14:38:00) Fithian asks about the claim that foreign material was found in JFK's brain (14:38:12) Exhibit of brain appears on the exhibit easel (14:38:47) Close up of brain exhibit with Baden using pointer to indicate where foreign material thought to be seen in photos and images of brain, an oblong blue discoloration, which he discounts as displaced blood vessels - X-rays of the brain detected no metal objects (14:39:20) Chair recognizes EDGAR to question Baden, he requests 3 exhibits be displayed (14:41:20) Shot returns to exhibit easels and Edgar asks if different reactions of JFK's chest and head to bullets fired from the same gun is a normal response - Baden answers yes, the head cavity is different from the chest cavity, hard tissue vs. soft tissue (14:42:00) Chair recongizes Representative HAROLD S. SAWYER to question Baden, Sawyers asks Baden if he noticed JFK move his hands to his throat before Connally had reacted at all and if this can be discounted - Baden answers that yes he notices the hands move but that there is no way to compare how people react to injury, JFK's spinal cord may have been shocked by the shot thus causing the quicker reaction (14:45:30)
August 3, 1994 - Part 2
(11:25:26) Senator SHELBY. But they were shared prior to his testimony yesterday, were they not? Secretary BENTSEN. Well I would assume so. Senator SHELBY. OK. Secretary BENTSEN. The point is, I have forgotten your experience as a trial attorney, if you were. I have never been, but my understanding is that this is comparable to a trial. And my understanding is these depositions are not something that are then held in secret but they are shared. Senator SHELBY, Swapped. Secretary BENTSEN. And that is not something like sprung on them as a surprise. Gotcha, for example. Let me further state that this Committee asked me to share with them the deposing of our witnesses and that these sworn depositions then come back to this Committee. 29 I do not think the law requires that of me. But I did that because I want to comply and I want to cooperate with this Committee. And as I understand it, this Committee still has those and has them under lock and key. Senator SHELBY. Mr. Secretary, do you recall when Mr. Cutler requested these depositions? Secretary BENTSEN. No, I do not recall. I would be happy to get you the date. Senator SHELBY. Would you furnish that for the record? Secretary BENTSEN. I would be happy to. Senator SHELBY. I want to now go to the diary or parts of the diary of Mr. Steiner, who is your Chief of Staff, and get back into something that is been asked many times, and that is the recusal of Roger Altman. Did you ever recommend to Roger Altman that he should recuse himself? Secretary BENTSEN. I do not recall that I did, but I must tell you, Senator, I was very sympathetic to him, because I thought he was in a tough spot, and he well might have interpreted that. I do know that I emphasized over and over that the decision had to be his, that he knew the facts, that I did not. Senator SHELBY. Was he in a tough spot because of the wearing of two hats? I mean, it was inevitable? Secretary BENTSEN. What? Senator SHELBY. Was he in a tough spot because of the wearing of two hats, or was he in a tough spot because of the wearing of two hats plus the connections to the White House? Secretary BENTSEN. Well I think that he was in a tough spot because the question, he was being charged by some Members of Congress, of having a conflict there that had to be resolved. On the other hand, there was a decision to be made, and whether or not to recuse himself was, from his standpoint, a difficult call. I must say that when he did recuse himself, I was quite relieved, and I might say further that if I had known all the facts that I now hear, I would have certainly recused myself. Senator SHELBY. Secretary Bentsen, did you ever have a conversation that you recall in bits or pieces or in whole, where Mr. Altman talked with you about the problem of recusal? Secretary BENTSEN. Oh, yes. Senator SHELBY. He talked with you about it? Secretary BENTSEN. Yes, he did. Senator SHELBY. But you do not recall whether you recommended at that time that he recuse Secretary BENTSEN, I do not recall recommending him to do it. But once again, I very much sympathized with his problem, and he might have interpreted it that way. Senator SHELBY. Could you have recommended it to him and not recalled today? Secretary BENTSEN. I do not have total recall, and I do not really know anyone that does. Senator SHELBY. So the answer is, you do not know whether you recommended that he recuse himself or not? Secretary BENTSEN. I told you I do riot recall that. 30 Senator SHELBY. You just remembered a conversation regarding this? Secretary BENTSEN. Yes. Senator SHELBY. Are you familiar- The CHAIRMAN. Senator Shelby, excuse me, your time has run, and I do not want to cut you off. Senator SHELBY. I am sorry. I did not know my time was up. The CHAIRMAN. Excuse me. Senator Faircloth. OPENING COMMENTS OF SENATOR FAIRCLOTH Senator FAIRCLOTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to yield one minute of my time to Senator Mack, and then I have some brief questions. Senator MACK. Mr. Secretary, I kind of diverted you off into another direction after I asked you a question, and it had to do with, what are you going to do as an administrative matter to resolve the conflicts between Mr. Altman's testimony and that of many other officials. There are lots of people who are saying different things, which you are well aware of, and I was interested in how are you going to proceed with that as an administrative matter in solving those problems?
LAWMAKERS
WETA "LAWMAKERS" 5/19/1983 IN 20.00.00-WETA credit/sponsor credits/title sequence 20.00.57-PAUL DUKE/LINDA WERTHEIMER/COKIE ROBERTS-Senate considers IMMIGRATION REFORM, House not likely to approve it, WILLIAM RUCKELSHAUS approved to head ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, Both Houses negotiate the BUDGET debate. A profile on BOB DOLE and report on approval for building of MX MISSILE. 20.02.18-C/S REAGAN giving White House Press conference, congratulates the "bipartisan" approval of the MX "PEACEKEEPER" MISSILE by appropriations committees. Side angle medium shot of REAGAN showing the press corps in room. C/S Rep. TOM DOWNEY (D-NY) in front of Capitol, says that in addition to CONSERVATIVE DEMOCRATS, some "good Democrats" have gon over to REAGAN'S side on the MX MISSILE. He thinks it's wasteful and dangerous. M/S Rep. LES ASPIN (D-WI) with Rep. ROBERT MICHEL speaking to press outside White House. C/S ASPIN, says he would not have voted for the proposed MX plan, but it's the best plan possible. M/S ASPIN, DICK GEPHARDT, and AL GORE in a "backroom" meeting, counting committee votes for the MX plan. ROBERTS v.o.-this group of "moderate to liberal" Democrats has been trying to lobby other DEMOCRATS to support the MX MISSILE. C/S ASPIN in office, says the MX is neither good nor bad in itself, but the SCOWCROFT COMMISSION recommendation to deploy the MX should influence the SOVIETS to move toward ARMS CONTROL 20.04.36-L/S ASPIN exiting Capitol, pan follow ASPIN down steps and across street. ROBERTS v.o.-ASPIN had been critical of MILITARY BUILDUP and fought for the NUCLEAR FREEZE, his switch is puzzling to colleagues. C/S Anne McBride, lobbyist against MX for COMMON CAUSE. Says the switch was a total surprise. C/S Rep. ROBERT MATSUI (D-CA), says he's surprised by ASPIN, maybe ASPIN began negotiating with REAGAN too soon. C/S Rep. DOWNEY, says he jokes with ASPIN that the MX is going to be renamed the "Les Aspin-Al Gore-Norm Dicks Memorial First Strike Warhead". He thinks the mistake is tragic. M/S ASPIN meeting with group of people. ROBERTS v.o.-these people all have MISSILE SILOS on their property. One older woman gets very agitated that she doesn't want the MX on her property. C/S of a priest who was part of the group, says he disagrees with Aspin and hopes he will change his mind. C/S a Woman id'ed by titles as Anti-MX activist, says she wonders if ASPIN is being bought out. 20.06.36-C/S ASPIN in meeting with a colleague, trying to line up votes for the MX. C/S Rep. DOWNEY, says LIBERALS don't "love to hate" the MX, but believe that ARMS CONTROL is not served by building more weapons. C/S Rep. DAN GLICKMAN (D-KS), says that ASPIN'S support makes it easier for Democrats to vote for the MX. C/S Rep. MATSUI, says ASPIN'S support is good for REAGAN. M/S ASPIN and colleagues in office meeting, AL GORE entering. M/S ASPIN in office, interviewed by ROBERTS, who asks whether ASPIN believes all the dire predictions made by REAGAN about the ARMS RACE and SOVIET SUPERIORITY/AMERICAN VULNERABILITY. ASPIN says he's been convinced after a long time that REAGAN believes it to be true [never really answers the question, whether ASPIN believes REAGAN].
July 25, 1995 - Part 3
(11:40:31) Senator SHELBY. On the third page, your notes from this conversation say "I'm reluctant, I don't feel I can tell you, and then you've got "complaints." Now, this, again, is Mr. Heymann relating to you and Mr. Gergen how to handle this and also some of his judgments; is that right? Mr. GEARAN. Yes. He was, again, giving us his judgment as to what we should do about disclosure of the contents of the note. Senator SHELBY. What's your next words there, is it "reactions of suspicions"? Would you read that? Mr. GEARAN. Yes. It says "reaction of suspicions." I would take that to mean revealed to us, meaning the Department of Justice, I would take it. Senator SHELBY. In other words, the Justice Department was concerned about the reactions of suspicions? Mr. GEARAN. I think that could be a reading of it. I think it could also be that he was aware of the concerns that he had previously expressed to Mr. Nussbaum. Senator SHELBY. Your next note, does that mean basically in all stages, White House has controlled the investigation in all ways? Mr. GEARAN. It says "basically in all stages controlled in all 71 ways. Senator SHELBY. It would be an inference that it was talking about the White House Counsel? Mr. GEARAN. That would be-that's my recollection. Senator SHELBY. That would be the way you would read this? Mr. GEARAN. Yes, sir. Senator SHELBY. "They don't feel they can see, is that "say"? Mr. GEARAN. That would be a fair reading. Senator SHELBY. "They don't feel they can say they've conducted an inquiry." Is Mr. Heymann speaking about the investigators, the Park Police and the FBI, up to then and the Justice Department? Mr. GEARAN. I don't know. Senator SHELBY. "They don't feel they can say they've conducted an inquiry." In other words, it was a sham up to now? Mr. GEARAN, Senator Senator SHELBY. Isn't that what he's saying to you? Mr. GEARAN. I would read it as the concerns that he had previously expressed twice about the nature of the search and the concerns that he had expressed to Mr. Nussbaum. Senator SHELBY. He's talking about the investigators, isn't he? Mr. GEARAN. Yes, I would assume "they" are investigators. Senator SHELBY. Your next words say "much too much control from beginning." Could that clip be interpreted as the White House had too much control from the beginning of the investigation? Mr. GEARAN. Senator, it doesn't- Senator SHELBY. How would you interpret your notes there? 275 Mr. GEARAN. It doesn't say White House, but I think, again, it supplements his broader point about the concerns about the nature of the way the investigation was conducted from the beginning, Senator SHELBY. And who was involved in controlling the investigation, the White House Counsel. So you couldn't read it any other way, could you? Mr. GEARAN. I think Senator SHELBY, This is Mr. Heymann who is telling you how concerned he is , as the Deputy Attorney General, about how the investigation has occurred up to now? Isn't that the context of this? Mr. GEARAN. Yes, sir. Senator SHELBY. The next words, as 1 interpret your handwriting-you go ahead and tell us what it says, "it was a mistake" Mr. GEARAN. "It was a mistake to rely on silence"-I would assume that's "of low-level investigators when dealing with a highlevel case." Senator SHELBY. In other words, Mr. Heymann was telling you again it was a mistake to rely on the silence of low-level investigators, in other words, the Park Police and others to keep their silence on what kind of investigation they did, which they didn't they're already saying they didn't do much of an investigation. They weren't permitted to do one. In other words, it was a mistake to rely on them to keep quiet about Mr. Nussbaum's not letting them do an ordinary investigation into the White House Counsel's Office. Isn't that what Heymann was saying? Mr. GEARAN. I would read that as the concerns that, again, he had expressed about the search on the 22nd with the various law enforcement officials. Senator SHELBY. Absolutely. That's just what I'm referring to. Senator BOXER. Could I get my time at some point? Senator SHELBY. Drop down just a little more and it says "DG"; is that right? Is that David Gergen? Mr. GEARAN. That would be David Gergen. Senator SHELBY. "PH" is Phil Heymann? Mr. GEARAN. That's correct. Senator SHELBY. By "DG," what do your notes record? Mr. GEARAN. My notes record that David said "we will not release on the recommendation of the Department of Justice. It will be by the Park Police." Again, this was the release of the contents of the note. Senator SHELBY. The contents of the note? Mr. GEARAN. Yes, sir. Senator SHELBY. What does Phil Heymann say? The CHAIRMAN. Senator, let me do this: The Committee has, because you have undertaken a very thoughtful manner of this examination, gone well over the time limit. I'm going to ask unanimous consent, because I think the Senator only has a few more minutes, and if anybody objects, why, then, we'll go to this side. You've already been very gracious, but I think it's-we want the yfacts and so Senator SHELBY. Mr. Chairman, if I could, I'm just trying to finish this. It's not going to be long. I think it's important.
August 2, 1994 - Part 4
(11:40:40) Mr. FOREMAN. Yes, Senator, I think you're very much on track with that. I thought that was a very interesting commentary from the Office of Government Ethics. It's hard to do any better job than what you've just said and what they said in the report . I would only comment that in my years as a Government lawyer, in various Executive Branch agencies, that I have talked with the White 393 House Counsel's Office on a number of previous situations involving criminal and civil allegations against the President, the Vice President, and others. I specifically refer to situations like Iran Contra, to BNL, to BCCI, to POW/MIA, to October Surprise, all of which I have had some legal work on and in each case, we have worked in some manner with the White House Counsel's Office. Senator DODD. In every one of those cases, there were contacts with the White House for a variety of different reasons because it was the unique institution of the President. Mr. FOREMAN. Yes, sir. Senator DODD. Let me tell you from my own point of view, and, each Senator and Member can express themselves on how this was managed. If you accept the threshold issue of whether or not the contact was correct, both legally and ethically, then when you get into the number of contacts, the number of meetings, that's where you begin to lose me a bit. I can understand a contact being made with Mr. Nussbaum, to give him the proverbial heads-up on the possibility of press inquiries. That to me would have satisfied the notification, and then if the White House wants to have its meetings about bow to handle that, I accept that. Where the difficulty arises is that it appears there were a lot more contacts between the Treasury and the White House in handling that matter. Am I off base in that analysis? Mr. FOREMAN. No, sir, I think that's correct, and it's bard to believe that anyone could argue with the idea that all of these things could have been handled more thoughtfully, looking in hindsight from here. Senator DODD. So as a management practice, this was sort of a sloppy - operation. Mr. FOREMAN. I guess I'd have to agree with that. We should all be learning from this I think, for the future. Senator DODD. But not unethical or illegal? Mr. FOREMAN. Sir, it would appear that Mr. Fiske and the Office of Government Ethics have made their independent judgments that it's not illegal or unethical. Senator DODD. Let me ask you because I've asked this of all of the witnesses and although my time has expired it's an important question. Youve all been sworn witnesses here and so I'm going to ask each one of you to respond to this because it's critically important to the threshold or meat issue, as far as I'm concerned. Did any official at the White House or Treasury ask you to take or instruct you to take any action to obstruct or impede the Resolution Trust Corporation's handling of either the criminal or civil case against the Madison Guaranty? Mr. Nye. Mr. NYE. No, sir. Senator DODD. Mr. Devore, Mr. DEVORE. No, sir. Senator DODD. Mr. Foreman. Mr. FOREMAN. No, sir. Senator DODD. Mr. Steiner. Mr. STEINER. I want to be very clear on this. I made it clear that Mr. Stephanopoulos asked me if Mr. Fiske's apparent-Mr. Ste 394 phens' apparent conflict of interest should preclude him from workin on this case. Beyond that, the answer to your question is no. Senator DODD. Did you take any action? Mr. STEINER. No, Sir. senator DODD. The last question, did you take any action to obstruct or impede the Resolution Trust Corporation's handling of ei ther the criminal or civil case against Madison Guaranty? Mr. Nye. Mr. NYE. No, sir. Senator DODD. Mr. Devore, Mr. DEVORE. No, sir. Senator DODD. Mr. Foreman. Mr. FOREMAN. No, sir. Senator DODD, Mr. Steiner. Mr. STEINER. No, sir. Senator DODD. Now, the last piece of advice I would have is, Mr. Steiner, I think you ought to spend an evening drinking six-pack with Mr. Devore, You could learn a lot in terms of how things, ought to get handled in this town, [Laughter.] The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gramm. Senator GRAMM. Mr. Chairman, I know we want to get on to the next witness so let me Just make a couple of observations. First of all, I'd like to say of this whole debate about diaries ver- sus testimony before this Committee, it seems to me, Mr. Steiner that your problem is that the power of your written word expressing your heartfelt feelings in a diary that the world was never to see is so powerful that it destroys your testimony today. Whoever, in all those years that your parents paid all that high tuition taught you how to write, and reason, and think, and express, and use words like daggers created a situation where you cannot, with what you're trying to say to us and the message you ' re trying to convey here today, undo what you have written, because your diary speaks so much more clearly in pure terms that clearly you felt than anything you could ever say today.
July 18, 1995 - Part 2
(11:35:26) With that in mind, I have examined the depositions and reviewed the documents. I will say, Mr. Chairman, there are some inconsistencies in various recollections of what happened on the night of July 20, 1993 and the next few days. Based on those inconsistencies, I think we can draw one of two broad conclusions from the testimony. One alternative is that within one single hour of finding out that their beloved friend and co-worker had committed suicide, White House staff plotted an elaborate conspiracy which they executed in 45 minutes, a conspiracy which no investigator to date has yet been able to uncover. Or, Mr. Chairman, we can conclude that a grief stricken and distraught collection of very human people made some decisions which we, in hindsight, might question. There is one aspect of the depositions that was especially poignant to me: The number of times witnesses testified to the emotional distress at the Foster family home and the White House. Words kept recurring: "Visibly upset," "distraught ... .. sobbing," "exhausted," "physically spent," "grief stricken," "total shock" and "shaken." One seasoned police official described the scene at the White House as one of "total disbelief and nearly nonfunctional." That is how people react when they lose a loved one. As I read those depositions, I asked myself, how would we react if one of our most trusted and loyal staff members committed suicide? Would we demand that their issue files about the Banking Committee be searched for a suicide note? Would we disregard their family's concerns about the privacy of their loved one's personal papers? We would not do that, Mr., Chairman, Real people in real places with real grief do not behave that way. That is how I approach this unhappy situation. Mr. Chairman, I hope that we can keep some perspective as we go through these hearings and hear the testimony. Lets not add to the chilling thought that, here, ruining people is considered sport, The CHAIRMAN, Thank you, Senator. Senator Bennett. 34 OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROBERT F. BENNETT Senator BENNETT Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have enjoyed the opening statements and the scope that we seem to be getting into here. I was interested when Senator Boxer quoted from The New York Times and that stimulated me to go to the editorial that appeared in this morning's Times, and I would like to quote from it because it summarizes my view of the scope of this thing. The Times begins: When the matter now known as Whitewater first arose during the 1992 Presidential campaign, candidate Bill Clinton called it no big deal, hut he and his staff in the campaign, and later at the White House, stonewalled on the details that would have revealed whether he and Mrs. Clinton were telling the truth about their finances. Today's renewed Senate hearings on Whitewater are the bitter- fruit of those original evasions. For reasons known but to them, the Clintons have offered tricky answers that brought confusion rather than clarity to their land deals with the high-rolling Arkansas banker and campaign supporter named Jim McDougal. The editorial goes on to say: For 3 years now, the Clinton team has acted as if anything connected to Whitewater was a can of worms that no one had a right to open. It has denounced as political enemies anyone who expressed reasonable curiosity about who paid what moneys and for what purpose. Some of those in charge of the inquiry are indeed their political enemies, yet they are only seeking what should have been offered- voluntarily. The editorial summarizes this with a single sentence that, in the classic line, I wish I had been able to write myself- One of the enduring mysteries of this Presidency is why Mr. Clinton has been willing to absorb such tremendous political damage rather than authorize a full accounting of the Whitewater deal. Senator Sarbanes summarized it well, however, when he said to-, day's focus is not on this overall aspect that we've heard so much about in the opening statements. Today's focus is on the proper handling of the documents in Vince Foster's office. Some have asked why we need to do that so long after the fact, as the death of Mr. Foster was a personal tragedy of a man who was well respected and well liked.
LAWMAKERS
01.12.36-ROBERTS in front of V.A. building-says Congress isn't likely to allow VETERANS BENEFITS to be lost, especially in election year. DUKE/WERTHEIMER-discussion of ILLINOIS congressional redistricting, results of an ILLINOIS primary, GEORGE O'BRIEN defeating ED DERWINSKY after REDISTRICTING put both veteran Congressmen in the same district. 01.13.51-DUKE intro report on CENTRAL AMERICA POLICY DEBATE in Congress. Congress probably willing to send money, but not to increase U.S. involvement in EL SALVADOR, memory of VIETNAM. 01.14.26-Shot of Rep. GERRY STUDDS (D-MA), speaking against EL SALVADOR involvement, says it's very close to "another Vietnam". Shot of Rep. DANTE FASCELL (D-FL) in office, says he doesn't know if the comparison is valid, but people are afraid to risk it. Clip of news report from LBJ era, LBJ at press conference. DUKE v.o.-describes situation of 1965 as Vietnam conflict escalates. Still of front page of WASHINGTON EVENING STAR, banner headline on attacks on "Red PT Bases", smaller headline on the discovery of the bodies of three CIVIL RIGHTS WORKERS in MISSISSIPPI. Still of NAVAL OFFICERS charting an attack plan. Clip of LBJ press conference announcing GULF OF TONKIN RESOLUTION escalating U.S. presence in VIETNAM. 01.15.32-TIP O'NEILL in office, remembering the GULF OF TONKIN RESOLUTION, says he had his doubts about whether the alleged V.C. attacks actually occurred, but was pressed to go along. Shot of roster of HOUSE for vote, with no votes against RESOLUTION. Stills of DEMOCRATS EUGENE McCARTHY, ED MUSKIE, and GEORGE McGOVERN, named as voting for Resolution, only two Senators vote against it. Shot of Rep. SAM STRATTON (D-NY) in office, says he'd make the same vote, under the same circumstances. Shot of Rep. FASCELL, says that in that age, the President made FOREIGN POLICY. 01.16.59-Clip of news report, LBJ signing GULF OF TONKIN RESOLUTION. B/W shot of ARMY MEDICS carrying wounded G.I. out of HELICOPTER. Still of LBJ with MILITARY BRASS at NAVAL AIR BASE, F-4 jets in background. Shot of Rep. BEN ROSENTHAL (D-NY) remembering his feelings about learning that the events leading to the GULF OF TONKIN RESOLUTION had been EXAGGERATED by MILITARY INTELLIGENCE-says that misinformation led to "my biggest legislative mistake". Rep. FASCELL-discusses the broad powers given to LBJ without any formal declaration of WAR. Rep. ROSENTHAL says the lesson should be that there should be caution about getting involved militarily, and not to blindly follow the lead of a President. 01.18.09-Shot of REAGAN shaking hands with SENATORS. Shot of REAGAN reading a statement about the "crisis" in Caribbean basin, says Congress must move swiftly, "our security can't wait". Shot of rostrum of House chamber. Shot of Rep. ROSENTHAL in debate, introduces a resolution to prohibit MILITARY AID to EL SALVADOR. Shots of a House Committee hearing, AL HAIG taking hard questioning from a young Congressman on REAGAN'S EL SALVADOR policy-HAIG won't guarantee that troops won't be sent. Shot of Rep. DAVID BONIOR (D-MI), says public is very uneasy about the parallels with VIETNAM in EL SALVADOR. Still of BONIOR in College Football uniform. Shot of BONIOR in debate in HOUSE, says that U.S. is headed for "disaster" in CENTRAL AMERICA, and unless Congress acts, there will certainly be soldiers sent there. 01.21.22-SHOT of PROTESTERS on sidewalk in front of CAPITOL, holding signs opposing REAGAN'S policy on EL SALVADOR. Shot of Rep. FASCELL, says that many people have probably learned lessons from VIETNAM. Shot of TIP O'NEILL, says that Americans will always remember the shady and deceptive nature of the U.S. getting involved in VIETNAM, they will resist getting involved in EL SALVADOR. 01.22.09-DUKE-intro Commentary. Commentary by CHARLES McDOWELL about CENTRAL AMERICA. Says he's wary of the similarities between EL SALVADOR and VIETNAM, but maybe it's not so simple-maybe it would be worse to allow a SOVIET foothold in Central America, but in any case, negotiation would be better than the rash use of force. 01.24.20-DUKE-signs off. Closing credits/transcript order info/WETA credit/sponsor credits/PBS ID 01.26.02--OUT
Capitol Journal
01.10.53-RUDMAN says that NORTH'S representation of himself as carrying out White House policy doesn't mean that the policy originated in the White House. Discussion of other countries involved in the IRAN-CONTRA deals, Shields asks how it's possible that other countries could know all this and not the Congress or the public. BAKER and RUDMAN say they didn't know it was going on. BAKER says that sooner or later, given the number of people involved, the story will come to light. 01.13.01-Carter asks Rudman and Baker about the possibilities of the Select Committees and their investigations. BAKER says that Senators and Congressmen should stick to the high road, the selection of chairmen was prudent. Says there could be problems with the two different committees if the House and Senate fight each other for the glory and publicity. Discussion of the impact of the IRAN ARMS SALES on U.S. relations with moderate Middle Eastern states. RUDMAN says that selling Arms to Iran was a miserable idea, and whoever advised REAGAN to do it gave poor advice. Discussion of how far the investigation might lead-"facts", prosecutions, impeachment? RUDMAN says the institutions of Government are strong enough to withstand scandal, as Watergate proved, and the committees must investigate as fully as appropriate. 01.16.14-Shot of Senators RUDMAN and INOUYE at press conference to announce the Senate Select Committee to investigate IRAN-CONTRA. A reporter asks INOUYE about his Watergate experiences, INOUYE says he doesn't forsee a WATERGATE-type scandal, although it's possible. 01.16.41-Shields-intro guest journalists Steve Roberts and David Broder. Broder says that the allegations go to the heart of REAGAN'S strength, the public's view of his honesty and integrity. Roberts says REAGAN was already losing strength, as the last elections confirmed. Neither of the journalists suspected any of the actions of IRAN-CONTRA, Broder says it sounds like the premise of a novel, too incongruous with REAGAN'S public image. Roberts says that the diversion of funds to the CONTRAS is consistent with the latent ideology of ANTI-COMMUNISM and RED-BAITING in REAGAN. Discussion of whether the press has trumped up the whole issue. BRODER says that the press didn't start the story, they picked it up from the LEBANESE press and pursued it out of duty and trying to curb their excesses, as most commentary has been restrained. The volume of coverage is due to the fact that journalists don't yet know which story lines are the productive ones and which are red herrings. Roberts-"Post-Watergate" phenomenon that the press feels the need to get maximum coverage. 01.20.22-Asks if the IRAN-CONTRA story will inevitably lead to the conclusion that REAGAN was either GUILTY or INEXCUSABLY IGNORANT of the activities. Broder says that it's not clear what REAGAN knew or didn't know, whether he had a vague idea of the operation or no idea at all. Roberts says that even if innocently ignorant, REAGAN should have known what was going on, it's even worse than REAGAN'S general disregard for knowing the specifics of policy. Broder says that even so, ignorance on REAGAN'S part is less politically damaging than willful deception. Discussion of how IRAN-CONTRA will impact REAGAN'S reputation, Roberts says that it's feeding into REAGAN'S reputation for being a bit SENILE [Reagan senile??? No!!!]. Discussion of how Congress will approach the investigation. Broder says that it's not clear how bipartisanship and moderation will hold up between the House and Senate committees, but the membership of the committees is slanted toward the Conservative side. Roberts says that the Republicans will be divided over who tries to protect REAGAN and who wants to investigate him vigorously. Discussion of when the committees will conclude their business. It's not clear. 01.24.45-Shields signs off, with speech about the nature of politics as the resolution of conflicts, hope that IRAN CONTRA will be resolved by reason and not by money, influence, or grandstanding rhetoric. Carter signs off, this is the final program for Capitol Journal, gives shouts out to tha staff. 01.26.51-closing credits/WETA credit/funding credits/PBS ID 01.27.48--OUT
LAWMAKERS, May 17, 1984
20.08.49-DUKE in studio. REPORT on SCHOOL PRAYER. HOUSE took up legislation on voluntary PRAYER GROUP meetings in school buildings. 20.09.11-Shot of exterior of a HIGH SCHOOL. Shot of BAND ROOM, 25 students in band practice, shots of BRASS and STRING sections. DUKE v.o. identifies as suburban Baltimore, Catonsville, MD, site of controversy over a BIBLE STUDY group. 20.09.32-Shot of High School girl, reading verses from BIBLE. Shot of group of Students in a classroom. DUKE v.o. gives history of BIBLE STUDY group at school, grounds of controversy. Shot of boy student, says CONSTITUTION trumps SCHOOL BOARD decision, and guarantees "freedom of religion, not freedom from religion". Shot of girl student in hallway, says Founding Fathers would be appalled that prayer isn't allowed in school. Shot of second girl student, compares BIBLE STUDY to other school clubs that are allowed. 20.10.14-Shot of teacher at front of classroom, shot of students in hallway. TITLES show text of ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION clause in the FIRST AMENDMENT. Stills of NEWSPAPER articles on subject. Shot of CATONSVILLE school principal-argues BIBLE STUDY is not the same as other school clubs. Shot of CONGRESSIONAL PAGE delivering DRAFT BILL to a CONGRESSMAN'S office. 20.11.03-Shot of Rep. Don BONKER ??? (R-WA), argues that gov't shouldn't be hostile to voluntary prayer meetings. Shot of Rep. DON EDWARDS (D-CA), argues that children are impressionable, half of CALIFORNIA high schoolers have been solicited by CULTS, and the bill would allow any cult to enter schools and recruit. Shot of HIGH SCHOOL CAFETERIA. Shot of group of adult men in suits. DUKE v.o. says most mainline CHRISTIAN groups, including CATHOLIC CHURCH, in favor of the bill to allow prayer group meetings. DUKE discusses parliamentary restrictions on bill. 20.12.21-Shot of Rep. GARY ACKERMAN (D-NY) arguing against bill. Shot of Rep. CHARLES SHUMER (D-NY) says RELIGION should not become "fourth 'R'" in schools. Shot of Reps. BONKER and ROD CHANDLER (R-WA), argue the bill is moderate and Constitutional. Shot of HOUSE CLERK reading count of vote. DUKE summarizes results of vote, fail to get two thirds majority. Shot of Rep. BONKER in office, says that eventually the COURT will rule on the issue. 20.13.44-DUKE with series of brief reports. SENATE approves slate of BUDGET CUTS. SENATE COMMITTEE turns down an appointee for US INFORMATION OFFICE. Shot of Sen. CHARLES PERCY outside of CAPITOL building. PERCY discusses the nominee's evasiveness in hearings. OLYMPIC torch reached CAPITOL HILL, shot of Rep. MEL LEVINE in running clothes carrying torch. Rep. LEVINE standing with CAPITOL in background, discusses importance of OLYMPICS to SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA. VISIT to CAPITOL by MIGUEL DE LA MADRID, President of MEXICO, warned CONGRESS against U.S. involvement in CENTRAL AMERICA. Shot of de la MADRID speaking in SPANISH, members of CONGRESS looking on.
August 4, 1994 - Part 2
(10:05:25) Let me also ask you this. Senator Gramm just made reference the words in the diaries. We have heard some rather florid language in diaries over these last several days. I almost think someone were an understudy for Louis Lamour to hear some of the language. Are you in the habit of talking about Mrs. Clinton's moods with people in the White House, friends of yours, and how she is doing, from day to day, or feeling? 1. Is that something you are likely to share with even close friends? MS. WILLIAMS. It is not something that I would share with close, friends. It is not something that I would share with anyone, maybe my immediate staff. Otherwise, I think it just amounts to gossip. Senator DODD. Well, I happen to agree with you, and I presume you would not be in your job long if that were the case. I certainly would not tolerate it in my office, and I presume the First Family". would not be particularly anxious to have someone discussing their' moods with people. So I accept your answer in that matter as being fairly good. Mr. McLarty, welcome to the Committee. Mr. McLARTY. Thank you, Senator. Senator DODD. Let me run through a series of questions for you. When did you first learn about the RTC's criminal referral regarding Madison? Mr. McLARTY. Some time in November. Senator DODD. Of? Mr. McLARTY. 1993. Senator DODD. And when did you first learn that Jean Hanson had spoken with Mr. Nussbaum on September 29, 1993? Mr. McLARTY. After Mr. Altman's testimony to this Committee, after February 24th. Senator DODD, After February 24th? Mr. MCLARTY. Yes, sir, that is correct. Senator DODD, Let me ask you this. Do you believe it was appropriate for Ms, Hanson to have had that discussion with Mr. Nussbaum and others at the White House? Mr. Chairman, I am having a hard time Mr. Chairman, I am just having a hard time hearing. [Pause.] Do you believe that it was appropriate for Ms. Hanson to have had the discussion with Mr. Nussbaum? Mr. McLARTY. I asked Mr. Cutler, the White House Counsel, to look into all of the matters in this time period, and I believe that he concluded that he felt this meeting was appropriate, and I, would rely on his judgment. 287 Senator DODD. Do you have any knowledge, Mr. McLarty, as to whether or not Ms. Hanson received instructions? We have heard a lot of different words used to describe how she was, how that meeting occurred. I gather it was around the Waco discussion, and at the end of that, sort of an aside. We have had enough testimony, I think, to probably establish that was the case. Do you have any knowledge as to whether or not Ms. Hanson was sent to that meeting by Mr. Altman? Mr. McLARTY. No, I do not, Senator. Senator DODD. Now, you did not attend the February 2, 1994, meeting? Mr. MCLARTY. That is correct, Senator Dodd. Senator DODD. But you received a call after that meeting from Mr. Altman? Mr. MCLARTY. Yes. Mr. Altman called me a couple of days after that meeting, and I returned his call. Senator DODD. Well, as it pertains to the subject matter before this hearing, did any part of that conversation touch on Mr. Altman's discussions during the February 2nd meeting? Mr. MCLARTY. I do not know that he characterized them that way. He called me, I returned his call a couple of days later. When we made connections, he noted he was weighing the matter of recusal. I listened. Senator DODD. Let me stop you there. This was a couple of days after, this is like maybe February 4th, then? Mr. MCLARTY. Somewhere in that time frame. Senator DODD. So it is after February 3rd, it is after the February 3rd meeting, as well? Mr. MCLARTY. Senator, as I recall it, it was a couple, three days after the February 2nd date that we made connections. Senator DODD. He is weighing recusal at this point? Mr. MCLARTY. He told me he was weighing recusal. I listened to him, told him I was sympathetic with the situation, and encouraged him to make the judgment he felt was the right one. It was a brief conversation. Senator DODD. Did you get the sense from him in that conversation that he was sort of agonizing over this decision somehow? Mr. McLARTY. I do not know that I would use the word agonizing. He said he was weighing the matter, as I recall the telephone conversation, Senator. Senator DODD. Did he mention to you at all what had happened at the February 2nd meeting regarding conversations with Mr. Nussbaum and others about reasons why he should not recuse himself? Mr. McLARTY. No , it was not a lengthy conversation and I do not recall that kind of detail in this telephone visit. Senator DODD. I presume you have explored the issue, since it has now been a matter of public discussion for some time about what happened at that February 2nd meeting regarding the recusal discussion. Can you share with the Committee what you know about what was said at that meeting and whether or not, in your opinion, what was said by Mr. Nussbaum and others constituted pressure, for 288 lack of a better word, since that one's been used the most around here in the last several days? Mr. McLARTY. Well, Senator, it is my understanding that Mr. Altman, I believe, has testified he did not feel any pressure and it is my understanding that the other people that attended that meeting felt they were not applying pressure, In terms of my own opinion, I think there has been a number of views expressed about the matter, and Mr. Cutler and others can speak to that. I am of the view, really, very much like Secretary Bentsen, that it really is up to the individual to make his own judgment and that is what I encouraged Deputy Secretary Altman to do.