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Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities - Testimony of James McCord.
Senator Joseph MONTOYA (D-NM). Thank you Mr. Chairman. Mr. McCord, going back to the time that you were hired, I'd like to ask you if you had a personal acquaintance with the President? Mr. McCORD. No sir. Senator MONTOYA. Had you worked with him in any capacity either while he was Vice President or before? Mr. McCORD. No sir. Senator MONTOYA. Had you done any work in his behalf while you were working for the CIA? (Fensterwald speaking to James McCord about response) Mr. McCORD. I was a staff member of CIA while he was Vice President. He may have had access to material or reports which I wrote. Senator MONTOYA. Did you ever speak to him during those assignments? Mr. McCORD. I don't recall it, no sir. Senator MONTOYA. Who was the person who recommended you for this particular job assignment? Mr. McCORD. Mr. John Caulfield. Senator MONTOYA. And where did you meet him? Mr. McCORD. At the executive office building in Washington D.C. Senator MONTOYA. And where is that executive office building with respect to the White House? Mr. McCORD. It adjoins it, it's on the White House grounds. Senator MONTOYA. How many visits did you have with Mr. Caulfield before you were hired? Mr. McCORD. I believe it was three or four sir. Senator MONTOYA. And why did you have three or four visits, were they extensive interviews and did you go into the details of your assignment? Mr. McCORD. Yes sir, they were two-fold purposes, they were an opportunity for Mr. Caulfield to interview me personally and learn more about me and my background (video distortion) campaign. Senator MONTOYA. Did Mr. Caulfield at that time discuss with you the clandestine nature of your assignment? Mr. McCORD. No sir. Senator MONTOYA. When did you and Mr. Caulfield, if you did, engage in such a conversation? Mr. McCORD. I believe it followed the June 17th break-in. Senator MONTOYA. That's when he was discussing with you the possibility of clemency? Mr. McCORD. Yes sir. Senator MONTOYA. Or shortly after the June 17th break-in and before the trial, which was it? Mr. McCORD. My first conversation with him was shortly after June 17th, sometime in July or August. Senator MONTOYA. And was he an employee of the White House at that time? Mr. McCORD. No sir. Senator MONTOYA. Where was he employed? Mr. McCORD. He was either employed or due to be employed at the Treasury Dept. in the position I mentioned earlier. Senator MONTOYA. And what was that conversation about? Mr. McCORD. This was a conversation in which, about which I referred this morning. A telephone call in which he stated that he was making a trip overseas and if I needed to reach him, to call his home and leave word and he would call me back. Senator MONTOYA. Now, after you had the three interviews with him, who else did you see prior to being hired on a part-time basis in October of 1971? Mr. McCORD. Mr. Robert Odle, at the Committee for the Re-Election of the President who made an initial interview with me, with Mr. Caulfield present. Senator MONTOYA. And were you hired pursuant to this interview? Mr. McCORD. Yes sir. Senator MONTOYA. And you became a part-time employee of the operation there? Mr. McCORD. I did.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 14, 1973 - Testimony of Jeb Magruder
Samuel Dash, attorney. Now, also concerning this altercation you had with Mr. Liddy and your decision to terminate his employment did you receive, any communication from any other person from the White House concerning Mr. Liddy? Jeb Magruder. Yes, evidently Mr. Liddy, after he left my office, went and saw Mr. Dean and then Mr. Strachan. I received a call from Mr. Dean encouraging me not to become personally concerned about Mr. Liddy that I should not let my personal animosity and his get in the way of this project. And then I went over to the White House and was working with Mr. Strachan on normal campaign matters and he brought up the same subject and as we walked back to the committee it was a Friday afternoon I recall and it was raining. He indicated that although he had the same personal difficulties with Mr. Liddy that probably Mr. Liddy was quite professional in this intelligence gathering and we should retain him in this area.
Church Committee Hearings - Tom Charles Huston
Baker asks Huston why everyone was so scared of Hoover - Huston responds it was because Hoover was a very influential man in the government and for the plan to go forth it was necessary to have his approval, Huston goes on to talk about how he had wanted Hoover to be invited to the White House where Nixon would personally talk to him about the plan's approval
JFK Assassination HSCA Hearings
Commentator Paul Duke introduces Jeremiah O’Leary of the Washington Star and Carl Oglesby of the Assassination Bureau. Duke opens discussion on the upcoming House Select Committee hearings on the assassination of U.S. President John F. Kennedy. O’Leary believes the Committee, “born” in controversy, will “die” in Controversy, saying the testimony today will lead the Committee into an executive session and will tell the world what they believe happened: whether there were four shots or three; whether there were two gunmen; whether the Warren Committee was right all along. O’Leary says the Committee will have witnesses helping to reach their conclusion, including a new witness the Committee has located, Dallas Police Officer H.B. McLain, the motorcycle cop who had an open microphone recording the shootings. O’Leary says trajectory and medical examiner witnesses will be recalled to testify on the validity of the three and four shot theories.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 29, 1973 (1/2)
[00.07.01-Sen. INOUYE continues to question DEAN about IRS harassment being initiated against persons on the ENEMIES LIST] Senator INOUYE. Do you know from your own personal knowledge, Mr. Dean, if any Member of the U.S. Congress was ever subjected to an Internal Revenue Service audit or surveillance by the FBI? Mr. DEAN. The only--I do not know from my own knowledge of any audits being commenced on any Member of the U.S. Congress. I know that there was extensive, surveillance on Senator Kennedy, which I have testified to. Senator INOUYE. Was this for political purposes? Mr. DEAN. Yes, sir, it was. Senator INOUYE. Who else?, [00.07.38-Senator KENNEDY a principal ENEMY] Mr. DEAN. Senator Kennedy was the principal one. I would say the greatest amount of surveillance was conducted on Senator Kennedy, and subsequently, politically embarrassing information -was sought on----- Senator INOUYE. Was the FBI aware that this surveillance was for political purposes? Mr. DEAN. The FBI did not perform this. This was performed directly by the White House. Now, -whether any information was re, requested from the FBI, I do not know on this. Senator INOUYE. Are you a-ware of any member of the press being subjected to a special audit or surveillance by the FBI? [00.08.17] Mr. DEAN. I am aware of one member of the press being subjected to an audit, and this was an audit that was initiated as a result of an adverse story he had written regarding a friend of the President. Senator INOUYE. Who is this person? Mr. DEAN. I would have to check my records on this, which are unavailable to me still, as I have said. I do recall it was a reporter from Newsday, who had worked on a story on Mr. Rebozo. Senator INOUYE, Thank you. Who do you think could assist this committee in testifying as to whether these lists were ever used for purposes described in your memo? [00.09.05-DEAN suggests that COLSON was the man at the center of the ENEMIES PROJECT] Mr. DEAN. Well, I would say that the man who is most knowledgeable is the man who has described them as social lists, so I do not know if you will find out what was done there. Also, it is possible that Mr. Caulfield may be able to provide some assistance to the committee in this regard, and I feel Mr. Caulfield would be very honest and forthcoming with the committee. [00.09.36] Senator INOUYE. Then, your testimony is that with the, exception of this columnist and this television commentator and Mr. Chet Huntley and Senator Kennedy, you are not aware of how these lists were ever used? Mr. DEAN. No, sir. I am also aware, and I would have to again be able to look through my files on this, there were, a number of requests from various members of the White House staff to see if tax exemptions and alteration of the tax status could be removed from various charitable foundations and the like, that were producing material that was felt hostile to the administration or their leaders were taking positions that were hostile to the administration and on occasions I checked this out, and their activities Were deemed to be perfectly proper within the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, and nothing -was done on these. [00.10.42] Senator INOUYE. These files are presently available in the White House? Mr. DEAN. Yes, I believe they would be in my files in the White House. Senator INOUYE. Mr. Chairman, may I request that these files be made, available, sir? Senator ERVIN. Mr. Dash will communicate-- Mr. DEAN. I will have to at, some point, there have been a number of requests for material, that I would hope that the committee would put the White House on notice or they may -well not be there when I get there. [00.11.15] Senator ERVIN. In this connection, you have testified the other day that when you went to the White House to see some. of your files that you were required to write them out, as I understand, in longhand, and somebody would not allow you to make. copies like Xerox? Mr. DEAN. That is correct. Presently I am not allowed to Xerox any copies of anything and I would hope, particularly with the request of Senator Gurney for my financial records, that I not have to sit and copy all my own financial records. [00.11.50-Sen. ERVIN allows DEAN to tell further the story of how the WHITE HOUSE is making it as inconvenient as possible for DEAN to access his files] Senator ERVIN. I believe you also stated you had to stand up and copy it? Mr. DEAN. I was able to sit in a chair and write on a, safe that was several feet above the chair. Senator ERVIN. Did you make a request of anybody for the opportunity to have these copied on a Xerox? Mr. DEAN. Yes, I did and my counsel did. and I wrote a, letter to the President requesting it, and I was denied. Senator ERVIN. Do you have a copy of the letter to the President? Mr. DEAN. My counsel can supply the letter that, -was written, yes, sir. [00.12.25]
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities - Testimony of James McCord.
Fred Thompson, attorney. Do you recall anything that Mr. Hunt said to you about Mr. Colson's involvement or did you just get the general impression that Mr. Colson was involved in some way from what Mr. Hunt told you. James McCord. I believe my previous testimony, which I will re-state before this committee, was to the effect that when I had met Mr. Hunt in his offices at 1700 Pennsylvania Avenue with Mr. Liddy that he had referred to his previous work at the White House for Mr. Colson, referring to him as his superior. That during the session that Mr. Hunt, Mr. Liddy and I had in Mr. Hunt's offices, Mr. Hunt had a typed plan that he had typed himself, step by step, for the entry of the Democratic National Committee Headquarters that at one point he held this plan in his hands and his words were, he interjected the name of Mr. Colson into the conversation at that point. Words to the effect, "I will see Colson" and he held the paper in his hand in this sense. And from that statement, I drew the conclusion that he was going to see Mr. Colson and discuss or give him the operational plan. That was a conclusion, but this is also the words as best I recall in which Mr. Hunt raised the name of Mr. Colson.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 27, 1973 (2/2)
[01.17.34-MacNEILL in studio] MacNEILL states that one thing is clear after the third day of DEAN'S testimony, that there is no longer a plan to save all persons involved in Watergate from the White House by simply denying it all. States that "lines are clearly drawn", that those remaining at the White House lay blame for the coverup on DEAN, Jeb MAGRUDER, and John MITCHELL. [screen behind MacNEILL shows b/w photos of each principal as named:] MacNEILL states that, in return, DEAN has made it clear that he thinks the PRESIDENT, EHRLICHMAN, and HALDEMAN, are responsible. MAGRUDER has already testified, MITCHELL, scheduled to testify, could provide more information. MacNEILL describes MITCHELL as former ATTORNEY GENERAL and former law partner of NIXON, and says he has yet said very little, except for issuing blanket denials, MacNEILL mentions that Mitchell's Wife had opined that MITCHELL was the fall guy chosen by the White House. Since MITCHELL won't testify until July 10, it will be interesting to see what the White House does, indications that it's posture toward DEAN will become much more aggressive, also interesting to see if the Prosecutors limit the investigation by filing more charges. [01.18.50-LEHRER] LEHRER states that there were two major happenings at the hearings that day, first, Sen. GURNEY made a long and intense examination of DEAN, and then Sen. INOUYE read the White House memo "a strong Anti-DEAN statement". Introduces guest commentators Bill GREENHALGH of Georgetown University law school and Steven HESS, former NIXON staffer currently at BROOKINGS INSTITUTION. LEHRER asks for assessment of Sen. GURNEY'S interrogation. [video out-01.19.37] GREENHALGH says he thought GURNEY'S examination was quite intense and methodical, indicated by the fact that most of the time, he was forcing DEAN to give yes or no answers, but the best part of the cross-examination was that, in his opinion, GURNEY was successful in introducing some doubt about the September 15, 1972 meeting in which NIXON told DEAN "good job"-GURNEY was successful in forcing DEAN to concede that it was possible that he misinterpreted NIXON'S remark, and that NIXON was complimenting him on investigating and not covering up. [01.20.09-video back] This would therefore not be evidence as far as a conspiracy charge was concerned. HESS states that GURNEY'S questioning was some of the subtlest to date, and in sharp contrast to GURNEY'S questioning of some previous witnesses. HESS states that if the questioning was not successful in portraying DEAN as the mastermind of the coverup, it was successful in raising concerns about DEAN'S character. More importantly, HESS concurs with GREENHALGH in saying that GURNEY'S raising of the issue of interpretation of Presidential conversations is important, and will possibly change public reaction to DEAN. LEHRER asks GREENHALGH about the White House memo attacking DEAN. GREENHALGH says that it was a legal disaster, and he can't imagine having a ten-page memo that is based entirely on depositions by other principals in the case, EHRLICHMAN and HALDEMAN, or third-party sources, even newspaper accounts, and that it was so easy for DEAN to counter the memo that he can't figure out the reason why the White House even bothered to introduce it, it was a mistake. HESS says he doesn't know if it was necessarily a mistake, but it was certainly an all-out counterattack "with both barrels". It's some of the toughest language yet in the committee, making startling claims such as that DEAN was the co-author with LIDDY of the original $1 million plan, the White House's position is that "all roads lead to DEAN." [LEHRER adds "and Mitchell", HESS agrees] HESS states that with DEAN, it may be a dubious strategy, because it is well known that the NIXON White House does not delegate power outside of a close circle, and DEAN was a relative latecomer to the White House, and was on staff for a year and a half before ever having a working discussion with the President, DEAN was "clearly not an insider". So, the question becomes, will the strategy boomerang. LEHRER states that DEAN'S credibility is sure to be a subject of debate, replacing "grocery prices and football", and that anyone watching with a spouse or friend may already know this. States that eventually a jury or a congressional committee will make an official judgment, but until then, everyone is involved in the verdict, and popular debate on the matter will continue for "days, weeks, months, even years to come." Calls the implications of DEAN'S testimony "staggering", Signs off. [01.25.06-sponsor credits-NPACT credit-PBS network ID] [01.25.37-TAPE OUT]
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 28, 1973. Testimony of John Dean.
Senator Sam Ervin (D North Carolina). The committee will come to order. Under our usual routine, it would be the time for Senator Baker to interrogate the witness. However, he has kindly agreed to allow me, to do so on account of certain obligations I have. Mr. Dean, there are one or two exhibits I want to ask you about and one of them is exhibit No. 34-5 which is a Shearson and Hamill Co. statement. Do you have a copy of that there? John Dean. I do not, no sir. Senator Sam Ervin (D North Carolina). Can someone supply him with a copy of that? And another is our exhibit No. 2 of what I call the Dean papers that is the papers that were turned over to this committee at the order of Judge Sirica. Do you have a copy of that? John Dean. I do not. Senator Sam Ervin (D North Carolina). And another is our exhibit No. 3 of the Dean papers, a memorandum for Mr. Huston from Mr. Haldeman. I would like for you to have a copy of those three documents before I begin. John Dean. I have some of the documents that were turned over to me yesterday for identification relating to Judge Sirica. I don't know what you are referring to with regard to the Shearson and Hamill statement.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 5, 1973
[00.38.12] Senator BAKER. Did you destroy the Gemstone invoice? Mrs. HARMONY. Yes, I did. Senator BAKER. Why? Mrs. HARMONY. Mr. Magruder asked me to destroy it. Senator BAKER. Did he tell you why? Mrs. HARMONY. No, he didn't have to tell me why. Senator BAKER. Then I would like to know why, Mrs, HARMONY. Because Mr. Liddy had been discharged from the committee, it had the word "Gemstone" on it. I was familiar with the word "Gemstone" and the way I had used it, I thought probably a lot of the members of the committee were not aware of that. [pregnant pause] Senator BAKER. Mrs. Harmony, why would you be concerned for the destruction of this material? You knew, that Mr. Liddy was no longer there. You knew from newspaper accounts of the break-in at, Vie Watergate complex. You knew that this invoice had reference to Gemstone which had to do with clandestine, although, as you put it, not necessarily illegal, activity. You knew, apparently, that it was so sensitive that it Ought to be destroyed. Mrs. HARMONY. Yes, sir. Senator BAKER. Now, what in the total concept of your perception of Gemstone as an operation what, led you to believe independently or led you to concur in the, judgment, of Mr. Magruder that that information ought to be destroyed, ought to be shredded? What were you thinking of when you thought that? Mrs. HARMONY. Senator Baker, after I had been aware of the break-in at Democratic National Committee headquarters, I know that the telephone conversations that I had typed had come from there. They I identified with Gemstone. Senator BAKER, Were there any other Gemstones involved, other than Ruby 1, Ruby 2 and Tuesday- I mean Crystal? [Laughter.] Mrs. HARMONY. Those are the only ones I recall, sir. Senator BAKER, I am sorry, tell me again. Mrs. HARMONY. Those were the only ones I recall. Senator BAKER. There were no other gems involved? Mrs. HARMONY. I don't recall that: there were. Senator BAKER. Did you destroy any other information, any other document besides your stenographic notepad which you have testified to, and the Gemstone invoice? Mrs. HARMONY, And some material when Mr. Liddy and I cleaned out his files, that, he asked me to destroy that had his handwriting on. Senator BAKER. Do you know, what the contents of those documents were? Mrs. HARMONY. I do not. As I said, they would have been drafts and something retyped and probably just put back in the folder for no particular reason. Senator BAKER. He did not express or state a reason for the destruction of these particular documents? Mrs. HARMONY. No sir. Senator BAKER. Did he, later? Mrs. HARMONY. No. Senator BAKER. At any time? Mrs- HARMONY. NO. Senator BAKER. After the break-in? Mrs. HARMONY. This was the day he left the committee. Senator BAKER. Did he come to your house and pick up some material? Mrs, HARMONY, Yes sir, he did. Senator BAKER. Did be tell you anything then about why he came to your house to pick lip material? Mrs, HARMONY. Senator, I took the things home because it was late- late in the evening. He had been discharged from the committee. I think probably I offered--I know I offered to take the things out for him. I mean, you know, rather than go through the whole thing with everbody that night, which might have proved a little embarrassing at that particular time, he said, you know, I have been fired, I said, why dont you let me take it and you can pick it up. Senator BAKER. When be did pick it up, did he tell You Why he' wanted certain material and why he wanted other material destroyed? Mrs. HARMONY. No sir. Senator BAYER. I hate to press you on this, but you understand that Mr. Liddy has so far not testified, either in court or before this committee, and I am struggling more than I ordinarily would to try to get at this subject matter. But did Mr. Liddy tell you, assign you any reason for wanting to reclaim certain of that? Mrs. HARMONY. They were his personal articles. Senator BAKER, Can you verify that they were in fact personal), articles? Mrs. HARMONY. Yes sir, I think so. Senator BAKER. Can you tell us of what nature? I Mrs. HARMONY. There was a personal file folder that I am aware of, There were pictures from his wall, his law degrees. There was a Couple, of volumes of the Criminal Law Reporter that you put in a binder whatever that is; his gun control files, which were quite voluminous. They belonged to him. They were his personal possessions. Senator BAKER. I have a lot of other questions, Mr. Chairman, I think that the witness has been very patient. I understand, Mrs. HARMONY, if we need you to return, you will return. [00.43.09]
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, Testimony of James W McCord (Jim McCord)
Samuel Dash, attorney. Now, what were your duties in that position as Security Chief? James McCord. The duties were essentially the function of the protection of the property and the lives of the personnel of the committee in their facility there and subsequently in the facility at Miami, Florida that the Committee and some of the White House staff were to occupy during the Republican National Convention in August of 1972. The duties were primarily those of physical security protection, personnel security, some document security, and some protective work for the family of John Mitchell. Samuel Dash, attorney. Now, for those duties and that assignment that you have just described under whose direction did you work? James McCord. Primarily under the direction of Mr. Robert Dole who was my immediate supervisor in the committee. The responsibilities with Mr. Mitchell and his family, I received directions from him, from Mrs. Mitchell, from Robert Dole and Fred LaRue from various times. Samuel Dash, attorney. Did there come a time when you worked under the direction of Gordon Liddy? James McCord. Yes, there did. Samuel Dash, attorney. What was Mr. Liddy's position at that time? James McCord. He was at first from December until about March 19, December 71 to about March 1972, general counsel for the Committee to Re-Elect the President. Thereafter he was occupied the same position with the finance committee for the re-election of the President. Samuel Dash, attorney. When did this arrangement begin which you worked under his direction begin, Mr. McCord, with Mr. Liddy? James McCord. The first discussions of the arrangements began sometime in January 1972, early January. Samuel Dash, attorney. Could you briefly state for the committee, Mr. McCord, what it was that Mr. Liddy wanted you to do? James McCord. I can give a bit of a background if you want that. When he first came aboard the committee in December 1971 he began to, we struck up an acquaintance. We had had a common background and he began to question me regarding the state of the art of certain technical devices, for one thing, listening devices and so on. This appeared to be at that point in time a professional interest, a normal professional interest, of someone who had worked in the field of law enforcement. We discussed as well the common topic of common interest to he and to me and to others who were senior on the staff, of the anticipated demonstrations and possible violence that might be coming up in San Diego, California which was originally scheduled to be the convention site for the Republican Convention in 1972 in August. The discussions
House Representative Trent Lott Taking Questions
U.S. House Representative Trent Lott (R-MS) seated at table with Rep. Olympia Snowe (R-ME) and Rep. Tom Loeffler (R-TX) answers questions from the press. Rep. Lott: "Well, it will still be one of things that Tom Loeffler works on, and frankly, that I work on. And yes, the fact is Phil Gramm still has some very close friends on that side of the aisle, and I'm sure that he won't have to be told to go work with them. He'll be doing it all along. They have an unofficial leadership group. I think that leadership will basically continue very quietly, but I think he can be very effective still on that side of the aisle. But, where he can be most effective is using his knowledge of the budget and the budget process to try to advance his views, and what, I think, will be our views, generally speaking, on the budget. He's one of the most intelligent members we have when it comes to the budget process, and we're looking forward to taking advantage of that knowledge, which will blend in quite well with the other members on the budget committee: Del Latta (R-OH), Bill Frenzel (R-MN), Jack Kemp (R-NY), Bud Shuster (R-PA). It'll be quite a group on the Republican side of the aisle." Adult male reporter (off-camera) asks question and Sen. Lott responds: "I'm sure there will be be occasions when we're in strategy sessions when we're talking about substance or talking about purely strategy, that he'll be included, because we make a real effort on our Republican side of the aisle to include as many members as we can. In fact, in our budget efforts last year, we couldn't hardly all get 'em in one room. We had about 26 people in there. I'm sure there will be times where I will suggest that maybe he talk to some of his friends over there. I daresay Tom and I have just about as many friends as he has, not to belittle him, but a lot of our friends that are in that group are from our region, and they are our friends. It'll just depend, but I'm sure he'll be included in our effort. Any other questions? Thank you very much for coming."
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 28, 1973 (2/2)
[01.03.33-DEAN responding to WHITE HOUSE-drafted questions that insinuate DEAN was very active in gathering intelligence, contrary to DEAN'S testimony about his role] Mr. DEAN.----I just merely want to tell you the results of my negotiations. So I was not involved in intelligence from the outset. Now, as I testified, I did become aware from time to time of requests from the White House because of my proximity to the decisionmaking processes for various intelligence that would relate to political figures in their associations with the demonstrations and also, I was hearing complaints that the White House staff was unhappy -about the quality of this intelligence. But my role was merely -a conduit from the demonstration leaders back to a major committee that would make decisions and talk about what I would report. In fact, I would often put myself, in that I could be most effective in this capacity, in the role of advocating the position of the demonstrators. Because many times, I thought they had a good point. For example, one I thought that the Government was taking a terrible beating on was in the November moratorium on this big issue of Pennsylvania Avenue versus no Pennsylvania Avenue. I thought that the demonstrators got $1 million worth of publicity or $2 million worth of publicity out of the Government's posture on refusing to give Pennsylvania, Avenue. Instead, they insisted that they go down Constitution Avenue. I did not see that it made all that much difference in the long and short of it. [01.05.01-MacNEILL in studio] MacNEILL announces a break from the video replay, reminds that none of the testimony will be abridged. [PBS network ID-title screen "SENATE HEARINGS ON CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES"] [01.08.37-MacNEILL] MacNEILL states that INOUYE will now ask DEAN questions about his relationship with Tom Charles HUSTON and White House intelligence operations] [01.08.49-hearings room]
Impeachment Hearings. House Judiciary Committee, July 30, 1974. Cambodia Bombing Article of Impeachment. John Conyers
Now, my colleagues, I suggest that the consequences of that conduct are so enormous that for us assembled here not to seriously consider this as an additional Article, not to merely add Articles upon Articles, but as one of the most important that go to the perhaps most important duty that befalls us in the Congress. You know, many people don't know or have forgotten who has the authority to declare war in 1974 in the United States. Many people have forgotten that the Congress constitutionally has that sole authority. And so I would urge that we in an attempt to reassert those powers which we consider to be vital and precious, if the constitutional form of government is to prevail and continue and improve that we give the gravest consideration to this Article.
Impeachment Hearings. House Judiciary Committee, July 30, 1974. Cambodia Bombing Article of Impeachment. Elizabeth Holtzman.
Harold D. Donohue (D Massachusetts). The Chair will I now recognize the gentlewoman from New York, Ms. Holtzman, for 6 minutes and 15 seconds. Elizabeth Holtzman (D New York). Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would like to speak in support of this Article, as a matter of great conscience and of the utmost seriousness. I think that those who would argue that this is a matter of policy misunderstand the thrust of this Article of Impeachment because this article goes to this system of government and this article goes to the words of the Preamble of the Constitution, "We the people"' and this article goes to a system of self -government where the people of this country through their elected representatives, the Congress, can participate in decisions of substance to this country. There is no question that the decision to go to war or the decision to conduct a major war effort, the decision to spend tax dollars, the decision to commit American lives, is a substantial decision. And for a People who are a free people, a decision for the People ultimately to be involved in.
Impeachment Hearings. House Judiciary Committee, July 30, 1974. Cambodia Bombing Article of Impeachment. Elizabeth Holtzman.
The decision with respect to the secret bombing of Cambodia was a decision in derogation of this system of free government and the participation of Congress. I am not saying that if the secret bombings were made public that the Congress would not have approved it. Congress may very well have approved it. But it was the right of Congress to have approved it and it was the right of Congress to have known and it was the right of the People to have approved it. That is the point that is made here and that is the reason for the seriousness of this Article and the seriousness of the President's actions.
Impeachment Hearings. House Judiciary Committee, July 30, 1974. Cambodia Bombing Article of Impeachment. Elizabeth Holtzman.
I think it is very significant that there are many facts here that are undisputed. There is no question that the President himself ordered the secrecy of the bombing. General Wheeler has testified to that. There is no question about it. There is no question also that the bombing took place, the secret bombing, was of a massive nature, 3,695 B-52 sorties, 105,000 tons of bombs dropped. There is no question that the President ratified and confirmed the concealment of this bombing from the Congress. On April 30, 1970, the President stated, after we had already been bombing for over a year, "The American policy since then has been to scrupulously respect neutrality of the Cambodian people." And then again on June 30, 1970, the President reiterated that for 5 years American and allied forces have preserved Cambodian neutrality.
Impeachment Hearings. House Judiciary Committee, July 30, 1974. Cambodia Bombing Article of Impeachment. Elizabeth Holtzman.
But even more serious, on February 25, 1971, after the bombing had gone on for almost 2 years, the President, in his foreign policy report submitted to the Congress, stated that in Cambodia, 'We pursued the policy of previous administrations until North Vietnamese action after Prince Sihanouk was deposed, made this impossible." So there is no question of the President's authorization of the secrecy. There is no question of the President's failure to tell the truth to the American people. There is no question that he ratified the submission of false reports to the Congress. And there is also no question that there was no justification for this. The only justification offered by this administration was that somehow we would affect Prince Sihanouk's administration in Cambodia. Well, let us assume for the moment that that justification is warranted. But Prince Sihanouk was deposed on March 18, 1970 and for 3 years thereafter, this administration, including the President, lied to the Congress and lied to the American people without any justification.
Impeachment Hearings. House Judiciary Committee, July 30, 1974. Cambodia Bombing Article of Impeachment. Elizabeth Holtzman.
It seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that the issue here is of great gravity and great seriousness. And the issue here is whether or not the Congress can participate in decisions which it is given power over under the Constitution, the power to make appropriations and the power to raise and support armies, and the power to declare war. And there is no question that this President acted in derogation of that. And if we are to remain a free people, and if we are as a People to govern decisions over our lives and death, then we have to be able to participate in such decisions. And we must give notice to this President and other Presidents that deceit and deception over issues as grave as going to war and waging war cannot be tolerated in a constitutional democracy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Impeachment Hearings. House Judiciary Committee, July 30, 1974. Cambodia Bombing Article of Impeachment. Lawrence Hogan
Harold D. Donohue (D Massachusetts). The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Maryland, Mr. Hogan for 3 3/4 minutes. Lawrence Hogan (R Maryland). Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I oppose this Article and I might say it is comfortable being back in the bosom of my friends. My friend from Michigan, Mr. Conyers, said that whoever heard of anyone approving getting bombed? Now, implicit in this statement is that the bombs were dropped on Cambodian citizens and that is not the case. Some of us have been there to see the jungle areas sometimes triple canopy jungle, and there is no way to really see where the Vietnam border and the Cambodian border and the Laos border end or begin. Now we should not lose sight of the fact that for 5 years the Communists, both the North Vietnamese soldiers and the Viet Cong, were using these Cambodian sanctuaries to attack the allied troops in Vietnam. For five years we let them get away with it. Now there is no testimony from any source indicating that Prince Sihanouk did not approve these bombings. They weren't bombing his civilians. They weren't bombing his villages. They were bombing Cambodian jungles just over the border from Vietnam where Communist soldiers were using launching bases to further the war. If the Cambodian Government had opposed this, they had every right to go to the United Nations and protest it.
Impeachment Hearings. House Judiciary Committee, July 30, 1974. Cambodia Bombing Article of Impeachment. Lawrence Hogan
Members of Congress, as has been indicated by my friend from Virginia, knew about this from the beginning. But let's recall that virtually every single President has engaged in military activities without the prior consent of Congress. The Korean War was called a "Police Action." There never was a declaration of war. And I don't think it would have been justifiable to impeach President Truman on that basis. All the military experts agree that the Cambodian bombing helped to accelerate the end of the war and the return of the prisoners of war. But even if we do conclude that the President's actions in this instance did exceed his constitutional authority, no one can say that he did not act except in what he perceived to be the best interests of his country. There was no gain. There was no coverup. There was no effort to evade responsibility for actions of he and his associates as we have seen in some of the other material coming before us. He was doing his duty as be saw it to protect American troops, to end the war, and to use bargaining power to get our prisoners of war home. I think it would be an American tragedy if he were impeached on this basis.
Impeachment Hearings. House Judiciary Committee, July 30, 1974. Cambodia Bombing Article of Impeachment. Delbert Latta
Peter Rodino (D New Jersey). The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Latta, is recognized for 3 minutes and 45 seconds. Delbert Latta (R Ohio). Thank you. Mr. Chairman. Let me say that first of all. I think that we have to recognize that when Mr. Nixon took office he had a very serious problem. We had over 500,000 American troops in South Vietnam. The casualties were heavy. We had hit-and-run activities by the enemy going into sanctuaries that were not being hit. Action had to be taken to save American lives.
Impeachment Hearings. House Judiciary Committee, July 30, 1974. Cambodia Bombing Article of Impeachment. Delbert Latta
Listening to the gentleman from Michigan, I noticed that he overlooked mentioning the fact that we didn't have very much dissent from the Cambodian Government. In fact, they indicated that publicly they couldn't say anything but they were giving us passive consent. And I think this is important to note. They were not opposed to what we were doing inwardly even though they might have expressed outwardly their displeasure.
Impeachment Hearings. House Judiciary Committee, July 30, 1974. Cambodia Bombing Article of Impeachment. Delbert Latta
We had a situation, a military situation that had to be taken. And I think the American people, especially the mothers and the wives of servicemen who are alive today because of the action he took, would be asking us tonight not to vote an Article of impeachment because this President took a decisive action to save the lives of their loved ones. And I think this is the crux of the matter. There are a lot of things that go on in time of war, and this was a time of war, that you don't put on the front pages of every newspaper. I can recall back in World War II that there were a lot of things that went on that we didn't like after we learned about them that weren't put on the front pages of every newspaper. This wasn't peacetime. This was wartime. And we had a President who was concerned about it, concerned about our losses. A President who wanted to get us out and to cut those losses, to use an expression of his. And now are we about to condemn him because he brought those troops home. He even brought home the prisoners of war. I wonder whether or not they would be home today or whether we would still be losing American men in Vietnam if he had not taken this decisive action.
Impeachment Hearings. House Judiciary Committee, July 30, 1974. Cambodia Bombing Article of Impeachment. Delbert Latta
It seems to me that we ought to stop, look and listen. That we don't bring up these Articles just to inflame the minds of the American people as has been alluded to just recently in the Washington Post, that we really consider these items on their merit, and this is not a meritorious article for impeachment.