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Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 25, 1973 - Testimony of John Dean.
Following this brief telephone skirmish regarding Hunt's traveling plans, the meeting turned to Hunt's status at the White House. I had learned from Fred Fielding, who I had asked to check on it, that Hunt had not drawn a check from his White House consultantship since late March of 1972. But as far as I knew the records indicated that Hunt was still a White House consultant to Colson. After discussions of this by Colson, who at this point was disowning Hunt as a member of his staff, Ehrlichman called Mr. Bruce Kehrli and requested he bring Hunt's personnel records up to Ehrlichman's office. Before, Kehrli arrived, Colson raised the matter of Hunt's safe. Colson without getting specific said it was imperative that someone get the contents of Hunt's safe. Colson suggested and Ehrlichman concurred that I take custody of the contents of the safe. When Kehrli arrived he was quizzed by Ehrlichman and Colson on Hunt's status at the White House. Colson was arguing that Hunt should have been removed from the White House as of March 31, 1972. Kehrli's records, however, did not so indicate. I have submitted to the committee, exhibit 13A, memorandums that Colson forwarded to me on June 19, presenting his argument. This was later resolved between Colson and Kehrli pursuant to Colson's argument. I always assumed that this required some alteration of the records, but I do not know this for a fact.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 28, 1973 (2/2)
[01.08.49-Sen. INOUYE continues to ask DEAN the questions prepared by the WHITE HOUSE, on the subject of DEAN'S relationship to WHITE HOUSE intelligence activities and the "HUSTON PLAN" for surveillance of domestic "subversives".] Senator INOUYE. Immediately after you were appointed counsel to the President, did you not take over the responsibilities of Mr. Tom Huston in connection with intelligence activities? Mr. DEAN. I think that you would have to know Tom Huston and my relationship -with Tom Huston to know that there was no way I would take over anything regarding Mr. Tom Huston. He is a very brilliant, independent man. He would not, I did not even know what he was doing half the time. In fact, it was some months after he had joined my staff that I learned he, had some sort of scrambler phone locked in a safe beside him and he made a lot of calls. Mr. Huston did an awful lot of things that I have -no idea what he was doing in the intelligence field. The only thing I know is that at that point, he was the liaison for receipt of FBI information regarding radical groups and he would be the distribution throughout the White House and he put me on a distribution list. Most of this material was not even to me, worth reading because, I was not particularly interested, unless it was a, very current demonstration. So I inherited Mr. Huston. Mr. Huston and I worked with a friendly relationship. As I say, he is a very- independent man and he and I think a little differently and handle memorandums a little. differently. I recall one rather interesting occasion when he prepared a rather strong and blunt memorandum for my signature to the Attorney General on a very minor request, for something. The memorandum was in my mail stack. I read it quickly and didn't think much about it; I was signing the mail. Two days later, I had a call from Mr. Kleindienst and he said, in short, who in the hell do you think you are writing a Memorandum like that to the Attorney General of the United States? Now that you are up at the White House, you think you are high and mighty. So I pulled the memorandum back out and realized that it is not the kind of memorandum I would send to Mr. Kleindienst. I apologized for the memorandum, because it was a rather strong and harsh memorandum for or me to send to anybody. [01.11.20] Senator INOUYE. You did testify, did you not, Mr. Dean, that political intelligence was routed to you in the White House? Mr. DEAN-. Political intelligence? I had requests for Political activities to embarrass people. I think I have turned over in exhibits 34-5, 34-6, 34-7, and 34-8 a fair sampling of the sort of things. If the committee would like to go through those at some point, I would like to explain that most of those ended up in my file, with no action. I did reefer to one yesterday with regard to commencing a tax audit on Mr. Gibbons, I did not start that tax audit. [00.12.00] Senator INOUYE,. Mr. Dean, I believe that you were the author of the memorandum to the Attorney General which led to the establishment of the Intelligence Evaluation Committee. Did you hold the first meeting of that committee in Your office? Mr. DEAN. Yes, I believe that is correct. Senator INOUYE. Were you not the one on the White House staff -who levied requirements on and received reports from the Intelligence Evaluation Committee? Mr. DEAN. That is correct--well. I didn't--I asked them to suggest areas they would like to go into. This would get into a couple of areas that they wanted to get into that directly relate to national security under the rulings of the Chair, so we will have to defer from those. But they would often suggest areas that they would like to be into and I would have to check them with others on the White House staff, particularly the foreign areas, which I didn't think was appropriate for this group, but they had domestic implications. I went to Mr. Haig and he in turn checked with Mr. Kissinger and he would decide there was nothing to be done in this area. We would receive regular calendars from them of events. I would have a man on my staff, initially, Mr. Caulfield and subsequently Mr. David Wilson, who would decide if there was a demonstration coming, based on these regular calendars they would send to us, was this a demonstration that we would need intelligence on, And then I would in turn either summarize or send a direct report to Mr. Haldeman or any other member of the staff that the IEC report would relate to. [01.13.38]
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 27, 1973
[00.35.02-more documents concerning the ENEMIES LIST are introduced] Senator ERVIN. Those -will be received and marked for identification but will not be, admitted into evidence at this time because I am not sure that this committee has jurisdiction to investigate the matters to which that was related. You might let them be marked. Senator ERVIN. Let's see the confidential document. Mr. McCANDLESS. It is coming right up. Mr. DEAN. Counsel has also advised me that the one sheet is not complete. There were other lists when we went through last night, and the only thing I can say is it must have, gotten back into another file, and we will reexamine it and find it. [00.35.53] Senator ERVIN. This confidential document is a thing that is a memorandum for H.R. Haldeman, Charles W. Colson, "Eyes Only." Mr. DEAN. That is correct. Senator ERVIN. What does this "Eyes Only" mean on- the document? [Laughter.] Mr. DEAN. That is one, of the classifications that, was used around the White House to mean that it was for the eyes of the recipient only. Senator ERVIN. And he, was not to copy it, is that what it means? Mr. DEAN. Well, often you will know there are carbon copies or blind carbon copy indications on it. The use of this classification developed when we started reducing the rather overabundant use of what really were security classifications, national security classifications that related to matters that, were not, national security. Senator ERVIN. I -will also have these marked for identification because it is not clear yet that they relate to matters that the committee is authorized to investigate. Mr. DEAN. I say they came in response to Senator Weicker's question of yesterday. Senator ERVIN. Have them marked for identification and not as exhibits here. Thank you. Mr. McCANDLESS. Just one, more request. I have been handed a 3-page list of opponents priority. and there are 20 names on it, the document that were, turned over this morning and marked by Mr. Dean in several places, contain more than just these 3 pages. Mr. DASH. That has already been received. That is what I was asking Mr. Dean to identify in connection with the June 24 memorandum signed by Mr. Bell. But all that was received from You this morning was that particular memorandum of a list of names. It is the only names we received. Senator ERVIN. I am going to request the staff to make. requests of the, White House for copies of the, document, decision memorandum of the White House July 15, 1970, and the White House, document organization and organizations of the interagency group on domestic intelligence and internal security. and also for the document entitled "Domestic Intelligence Review" which was a part of the memorandum for H.R. Haldeman from Tom Charles Huston. I believe you called the name Huston? Mr. DEAN. Yes, I believe that is the way he pronounces his name, Senator. Senator ERVIN. Senator Gurney, you may proceed. [00.38.47-GURNEY continues] Senator GURNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I will try to be a-, brief as possible and close, up my testimony. Senator GURNEY. So far as the chairman is concerned I think you are rendered a real service to the committee and the country and I don't want you to feel rushed at all. [there is some snickering at this from the audience] Senator GURNEY. I appreciate the courtesy of the chairman and the Members of the committee. I just wanted to clear up one little point on the coverup money which I didn't touch on this morning. When you had your meeting with Mr. Kalmbach on June 29 did you ask him for a certain sum of money that you would need to have him raise? Mr. DEAN. At that time I didn't know how much -was to be raised and I believe I discussed with him the fact that he would get this information from Mr. LaRue. Senator GURNEY. Where did you have this conversation? Is that in the coffee shop or up in his hotel room? Mr. DEAN. Well, the bulk of the conversation took place in his room and not in the coffee shop. We only talked for maybe 5 minutes in the coffee shop. Senator GURNEY. And then you adjourned up to his room in the Mayflower Hotel? Mr. DEAN. That is correct. Senator GURNEY. But you don't recall that any figure was mentioned at that time? Mr. DEAN. No, Senator, I don't.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities - Testimony of Robert Odle.
Senator ERVIN. Well, in a normal course of events, a man who or organization which is proud of it's good deeds and wants some recorded in history, preserves documents doesn't it? Mr. ODLE. Yes sir. Senator ERVIN. And has no use for a shredder? Mr. ODLE. Well, um I don't know that I could agree with that. I for example, lets say I was preparing a document to a, for the budget committees review and analysis and in the course of preparing that document I made a lot of notes and then those notes went into the thing and I threw those notes away. Senator, in the middle of that campaign I would have not wanted those notes on the front page at the Washington Post, because that would have given away some of our campaign strategy. Senator ERVIN. Well, you could have locked them in a filing cabinet, couldn't you? Mr. ODLE. Waste paper? You could have. I've known a senate campaign that did that, they rented a warehouse and they stored all of their waste paper in the warehouse.... Senator ERVIN. But, you're not going to do anything with a record except throw it in the waste paper basket or put it in the shredder, why do you make it? Mr. ODLE. These were notes, I was talking about a case where I might have a, where I might be writing a memorandum or making up a something that I would be sending to the budget committee, and I would be having all these notes and taking things from the notes and putting them in and I throw the notes away. I'm talking about now about the waste paper, the basic purpose of the shredder senator was not to dispose of documents or records, it was to destroy dispose of waste paper. Senator ERVIN. And to destroy waste paper in such a matter that it's contents could not be resurrected? Mr. ODLE. Yes sir. Senator ERVIN. Now, um I believe you said on the 17th that G. Gordon Liddy came into the offices of the committee to re-elect the president and asked whether there was a shredder. Mr. ODLE. Yes. He asked where the large shredding machine was located, yes he did. Senator ERVIN. Was he the man ordinarily charged with the duty of disposing the waste paper? Mr. ODLE. No sir. (WS courtroom, laughs) Senator ERVIN. Well, you told him where the shredder was you say. Mr. ODLE. Yes sir. Senator ERVIN. And he took the shredder and he shredded some documents, didn't he? Mr. ODLE. Yes. Senator ERVIN. Do you know where the documents came from, that he shredded? Mr. ODLE. No. Senator ERVIN. Did he shred any documents that were under your, in your custody? Mr. ODLE. Absolutely not. Senator ERVIN. Now he was a man that was supposed to be the, in charge of intelligence operations wasn't he? Mr. ODLE. That is what it appears to be. Senator ERVIN. Do you think it's reasonable to draw the influence that the documents he was shredding were documents that related to intelligence activities. Mr. ODLE. I do now sir, today. I did not then.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee Hearings on Presidential Campaign Activities, May 17, 19
Senator ERVIN. Senator Gurney. Senator GURNEY (R-FL). Thank you Mr. Chairman. Mr. Kehrli, I want to talk a little bit about the White House organization and especially those people closest around the President. Who saw the President the most of the time, more frequently than others? Mr. KEHRLI. Mr. Haldeman. Senator GURNEY. Who else? Mr. KEHRLI. Mr. Ehrlichman. Senator GURNEY. Who else? Mr. KEHRLI. I would say .... Senator GURNEY. Would Mr. Ziegler have seen him? Mr. KEHRLI. Well Mr. Ziegler that's right, but beyond that it would be a toss up as to the rest of the staff. Senator GURNEY. What about Mr. Chapin? Mr. KEHRLI. Mr. Chapin dealt primarily through Mr. Haldeman. Senator GURNEY. What was Mr. Haldeman's previous employment? Mr. KEHRLI. Pardon me sir? Senator GURNEY. What was Mr. Haldeman's previous employment? Mr. KEHRLI. He was with the J. Walter Thompson advertising company. Senator GURNEY. Where did Mr. Chapin come from, before he came .... Mr. KEHRLI. The same company. Senator GURNEY. Was he brought in by Mr. Haldeman? Mr. KEHRLI. Yes he was. Senator GURNEY. Who was Mr. Ziegler with before he came to the White House? Mr. KEHRLI. He was also with J. Walter Thomas and company. Senator GURNEY. Was he brought in by Mr. Haldeman? Mr. KEHRLI. Yes he was. Senator GURNEY. What about Mr. Ehrlichman, was he ever with J. Walter Thompson? Mr. KEHRLI. No, I don't think so. (smiling) Senator GURNEY. Was he a very close friend of Mr. Haldeman's? Mr. KEHRLI. Yes he was. Senator GURNEY. What was that past friendship and association? Mr. KEHRLI. Well, the only I can relate is what I have read and they were evidently friends during their college days. Senator GURNEY. Who were you previously employed by? Mr. KEHRLI. I was with J. Walter Thompson and Company. (courtroom laughs)
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee Hearings on Presidential Campaign Activities, May 17, 19
Senator GURNEY. Were you responsible for the assigning of office space in the White House and also in the Executive Mansion? Mr. KEHRLI. Yes sir. Senator GURNEY. What was the disposition of the office space assigned to Mr. Liddy and Mr. McCord and Mr. Hunt, after they were removed from the White House payroll, do you recall? Mr. KEHRLI. Mr. Hunts office was in a block of space that it had been assigned to Mr. Colson, what we don't assign specific offices within a staff, we assign a block of space to a staff and let them divide it up as they wish. Senator GURNEY. And what about Mr. McCord and Mr. Hunt? Mr. KEHRLI. I never knew Mr. McCord. Senator GURNEY. How about Mr. Hunt? Mr. KEHRLI. Mr. Hunt had an office in room 338. Senator GURNEY. Was that the executive office building? Mr. KEHRLI. Of the executive office building, that's right. Senator GURNEY. And what happened to his office after he was removed from the federal payroll? Mr. KEHRLI. It was left within the Colson operation and I don't know who was sitting in there now. Senator GURNEY. Was that part of the block of the offices that Colson was .... Mr. KEHRLI. He had people in various spots within the executive office building. Senator GURNEY. After these people were removed from the federal payroll, do you know whether they had access to their offices, after that time? Mr. KEHRLI. No I do not. Senator GURNEY. You don't know whether they used the telephones? Mr. KEHRLI. No I do not. Senator GURNEY. What happened to their file cabinets ..... Mr. KEHRLI. I know what happened to Mr. Hunt's file cabinet. (laughs) Senator GURNEY. Yes, well I'm not going into that. That's all Mr. Chairman.
Senator Bob Dole - Chairman of Senate Finance Committee
U.S. Senator Bob Dole (R-KS) continues answering questions at press conference; Sen. John Heinz (R-PA) joins him. Sen. Dole answers question asked by adult male (o/s) on whether the tax bill can be passed before the end of the year, provided it survives any last minute amendments, and whether the U.S. House of Representatives will act on any tax bill this year. He states that what the House will do is unknown, then jokes with Sen. Heinz for a moment before returning to the question. Sen. Dole believes an agreement can be made to limit amendments based on time constraints, such as the upcoming Thanksgiving and Christmas recess, but he cannot speak for what the House will do.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 12, 1973 (1/2)
[00.58.10] Senator MONTOYA. Did You ever indicate to him that it was his own money that, you were giving back? Mr. STANS. Well, it really wasn't his own money It, was money entrusted to him but, I am not sure whether I told him that I at that time. I think I did but he knows it now. [Laughter.] Senator MONTOYA. Why would he use the. plea that this request was coming from high authority in the White House, if he was reclaiming his own money? Mr. STANS. 'Well, he wasn't reclaiming, Senator, he was not reclaiming his own money. It happened that that was about the only money that, I could put my hands on to help him meet the needs that he had expressed, and I was willing to give it up because I wasn't going to use it for the purpose for which I had originally received it. Senator MONTOYA. Let, us go into the $30,000; where did you get, that? Mr. STAINS. On the same day. a Philippine national had been in my office and said he was an acquaintance of the President. Senator MONTOYA. Who Was it? Mr. STANS. I can refer to a paper and give you his name. The Honorable Ernesto V. Lagdameo. He is a Philippine businessman. Senator MONTOYA. What does he do? Does he deal in sugar? Mr. STANS. Well, it does not sound like it from the name of the company. He is chairman of the board of' Sanitary Wares Manufacturing Corp.--Wares (W-a-r-e-s). I take it to be a plumbing supply firm or something of that, type. Senator MONTOYA. Quite ironical, wouldn't, you say? [Laughter.] Mr. STANS. I think -Mr. Lagdameo is a very innocent party here. He came in to see me, said that he was an acquaintance of the President, and was prepared on behalf of himself and some of his friends, to make a contribution to the campaign if it, could be legally received. Senator MONTOYA. And what about the other friends? Who were they, the other Filipino friends? Mr. STANS. They were two of his associates the same company. Senator 'MONTOYA. Do you have their names? Mr. STANS. I have them here. Mr. Jesus Cobarrus, Sr.---J-e-s-u-s C-o-b-a-r-r-u-s, Sr.--who is With the same company; and Mr. -I can't, pronounce Spanish as well as you can, Senator-Eugenio Senator MONTOYA. Eugenio? Mr. STANS. Eugenio Lopez, Jr. Senator MONTOYA. All right. Mr. STANS. There was at that, time considerable doubt as to whether we could receive contributions from foreign nationals. Back in the 1968 campaign, we had opinions of counsel that it was perfectly proper to receive a contribution from a foreign citizen and we did receive, some contributions, of that nature in 1968. In 1972, early in the campaign, we also received a, few, and then questions began to arise as to the, interpretation Of the Corrupt Practices Act and whether or not we could receive items of that, kind. So when this money was offered to me, I took it contingent upon determining that, we would accept it. And I got, an opinion of counsel shortly after, the counsel for the committee who succeeded Mr. Liddy, expressing the opinion that, we could not accept money from a foreign national. SO I arranged with -Mr. Fred LaRue to give $30,000 back to Mr. Lagdameo and his associates. Since then, and this is more irony, Senator, I have learned that the Department of Justice has held that it would have been perfectly proper to accept, a contribution from a foreign national so long as he is not an agent, of a foreign principal. But that is the source of the $30,000. Now, I had not, accepted the money on behalf of the committee. I Was holding it as his agent or in escrow, or whatever the legal term might be, to determine whether or not I could accept it on behalf of the committee. Senator MONTOYA. Did you finally get the money from, Mr. LaRue? I Mr. STANS. I got the money from Mr. LaRue, and he arranged to give it back. Senator MONTOYA. Let. me ask you this question: Did Mr. Sloan make periodic reports to you about, moneys which he would disburse? Mr. STANS. I think you are referring to disbursements in cash, are you, Senator? Senator MONTOYA. Yes. [01.04.11--TAPE OUT]
JFK Assassination HSCA Hearings
Paul Duke outlines the day at the House Select Committee hearings on the assassination of U.S. President John F. Kennedy, says a rather long opening statement will be made by Committee Chief Consul G. Robert Blakey, who will give background to the proceedings. Committee Chairman U.S. Representative Louis Stokes (D-OH) seated at table with other Committee members; Duke (VO) says the hearings will begin soon, and the he House Select Committee on Assassinations has seven Democrats and three Republicans. Duke says the Zapruder Film will be shown at some point in the day’s proceedings, accompanied by a simulation of the shooting, reenacted in Dallas by Committee staff. Jeremiah O’Leary of the Washington Star says the reenactment might be the most dramatic part of the day; an investigative officer told him that when the soundtrack is played over the Zapruder Film, it will “boggle” your mind. Duke and O’Leary discuss the movements of Jacqueline Kennedy, President Kennedy, and Texas Governor John Connally in the presidential car at the time of the shooting. Crowded hearing room, Duke (VO) stresses the sensitivity of the hearings and the tragedy of the JFK assassination. Sounds of Committee speaking among themselves. Duke (VO) says the start of the hearings has been delayed. Chairman Stokes and U.S. Representative Samuel L. Devine (R-OH) talking with adult Caucasian female staff member.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 7, 1973
[00.39.27] Senator WEICKER. In other -words.. when you went to see Mr. Haldeman In January, you already had been rehired? Mr. SLOAN. Yes, sir, that is correct. Senator WEICKER. As a consultant to the Committee To Re-Elect the President? Mr. SLOAN, Finance committee. The political committee, as I understood it had essentially been dissolved although that turned out not to be the case Senator WEICKER. Who rehired you as consultant or how did the rehiring as consultant to the finance committee come about? Mr. SLOAN. During the period after my resignation, I would guess two occasions, Secretary Stans sought me out seeking my return to the campaign. Senator WEICKER. That was at what time? Mr. SLOAN. I am not sure it would have been, I am just not, sure, Some point during this 5-month period following my resignation in July. Senator WEICKER. All right, Mr. SLOAN. I in no way wished to consider it. I turned him down. After 5 months with the election over, he asked me again. Essentially it Was in the terms of you have taken essentially a bum rap on this thing and I know it's been difficult for you, 5 months without gainful employment, I would like you to come back and help me wrap up the campaign. I consented because certain conditions which would have made it objectionable to me and why I would refuse an offer prior to that time were met. One, I did not feel if I had this kind of opportunity at this Particular point in time with no prejudice being attached to that association, that I in good conscience could go on and not provide for my family. The Conditions that no longer existed as far as I was concerned was that the campaign -was over, there was no liability or spinoff effect on the President's chance for reelection by having someone who had been named as someone involved in this affair air being associated with his campaign, the political leadership who were essentially the people that I had my argument with on the Committee for the, Re-Election of the President were no longer there, they had been essentially disbanded either by resignation or by employment in the private sector or had gone over to the Inaugural Committee. Also none of the assignments I would have, it was understood, would have anything to do-in the capacity of an official, it would be purely a personal working relationship with Maury Stans, assist him in preparing to cope with some of the civil litigation that would be forthcoming, Senator WEICKER. So your employment as a consultant was strictly as a result of Mr. Stans' request? Mr. SLOAN. Yes sir, in my considered judgment. Senator WEICKER. In your judgment? Mr. SLOAN. At that time I think it should be clear I had already made my testimony to the grand jury although the criminal trial had, not come up, but one of the important considerations I took into account in accepting such a, position would be that there could be no possible misunderstanding in terms of that having any effect on any subsequent testimony I would give. Senator WEICKER, And no other individual was involved insofar as that rehiring was concerned, it was begun by Mr. Stans, or were other persons consulted? Mr. SLOAN. It is possible that Mr. Kalmbach may have been involved in the decision. Senator WEICKER, Why do you say that? Mr. SLOAN. Mr. Kalmbach had attempted to be helpful to me during this period in seeking private employment. He, had indicated on a number of occasions he thought I made a mistake in resigning in the first place. He was in frequent contact, with Secretary Stans I suspect they had conversations to the effect that my personal situation was a result of what had happened, Additionally, I would say part of the considered judgment to rejoin the finance committee is that I did not and do not believe that Secretary Stans in any way was involved in the original criminal activities. I thought he was left essentially holding the bag and I wanted to be helpful to him in that regard. Senator WEICKER. Right. It is true, however, that during the summer months and the fall months that you did feel rather put upon, maybe that is not the right word, maybe you have a better word for it, insofar as those: individuals that were in charge of the campaign. You feel you were being treated in a shabby fashion by them. Mr. SLOAN. I would have to say after I made my decision with the exception of a few of the phone calls we have referred to here, that it was pretty much a hands-off situation, I just did not see any of the people. Senator WEICKER, You were not one of the favorite at all? Mr. SLOAN. I think that would be fairly accurate, yes sir. Senator WEICKER. But what caused you to change your mind, then, and at the end of January, having been treated in that fashion, go and ask for an appointment, with Mr. Haldeman? Mr. SLOAN. Senator, essentially, one, I did not believe the White House had any involvement by the known fact at that point. I also did not believe the finance committee had any involvement. I disagreed with Secretary Stans and we had some discussions early on of this affair, along the lines that the finance committee, because of the very obvious potential for misunderstanding in terms of financial transactions that presumably had -one to these individuals, that the finance committee early on should have made a separate statement and attempted to separate itself away from the. political committee in terms of its own conduct, SO that the financial transactions could be judged purely in terms of what they were. I had no knowledge that Secretary Stans knew what these funds were for. As far as I know? he accepted authorization of others as well. These two areas, in my opinion, were unconnected. I think there had been an error in judgment in not addressing the political problem and forcing resolution There. [00.46.08]
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, May 24, 1973 (1/2)
Alfred BALDWIN, younger man in tan suit, testifying on that issue. "I have attempted to tell the whole truth of this incident to the Government. I believe that as I do now there is only one Government that I have talked truthful to the U.S. attorney, as I will do to this committee. I do not regret this decision, although my life was at that time shattered. I cannot now find employment and I have been without funds. My family has been disgraced. I believe that since I was working for the former Attorney General and White House officials I would not question to do what I was asked to do. Now, I regret only that decision. Regardless of this, I shall now follow through with my commitment to tell the Government and the American people the truth."
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, July 10, 1973 (2/2)
*****CHECK RIGHTS BEFORE USING @COMMENTARY SEGMENTS***** [01.00.15-IN to MacNEILL giving final commentary on the day's hearings] MacNEILL states that the first day of MITCHELL'S testimony has ended with his reputation for being unflappable still intact, although there were signs of trouble as Sen. TALMADGE hinted that MITCHELL may have committed perjury by telling the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1972 that he did not have campaign duties prior to resigning as attorney general. Mitchell has now admitted that he did have campaign duties at that time, but contended the debate involves semantics and not points of substance. Were also moments where MITCHELL seemed to be getting upset at questioning by Sam DASH, with DASH backing off at each occasion. MITCHELL will have at least one more full day of questioning, and possibly 2, during which he will have ample occasion to explain why he did not inform NIXON of the coverup. Introduces an interview by Peter KAYE with Sen. GURNEY. [01.00.58-GURNEY in committee room] KAYE states that MITCHELL's testimony was full of outright contradictions with previous testimony by DEAN and MAGRUDER. Asks how this can be resolved. GURNEY says there's no question there are profound differences, notes that MITCHELL did in fact use the word "lie" to describe the testimony of others. Acknowledges that now, with only the testimony of the three in question, nothing can be resolved, but as other witnesses come forth, these matters may be resolved. Example, the point of controversy over the authorization of the bugging at the Key Biscayne meeting-MAGRUDER says the bugging was authorized by MITCHELL there, MITCHELL denies it. GURNEY wanted to know if Fred LaRUE was at that meeting, and when LaRUE testifies, he may be able to resolve the conflict. KAYE asks if the DEAN testimony was the low point for NIXON'S credibility. GURNEY concurs, says that in his own private conversations on Watergate, he has told people that successive witnesses like MITCHELL will help to undo some of the damage done by DEAN. [01.02.59-LEHRER] LEHRER says the question is what has been learned in the first day of questioning of MITCHELL. Introduces guest commentators Steven HESS (Brookings Institution, former NIXON aide) and David EPSTEIN (Georgetown University Law school, former US Attorney for D.C.). LEHRER asks HESS what has been learned. HESS states that MITCHELL offered a great deal of contradiction of both MAGRUDER and DEAN. It is clear that MITCHELL even under duress will not admit to wrongdoing; MITCHELL'S testimony was that he did not discuss serious matters with NIXON, that his subordinates continually defied his orders, and that the events of WATERGATE happened against his wishes and direction. HESS makes the point that if MITCHELL'S statements are taken on their face, MITCHELL appears to be "the worst informed and least competent Presidential campaign manager in history". LEHRER asks EPSTEIN for an opinion on MITCHELL'S tendency to pick and choose when he would or would not make reference to DEAN'S and MAGRUDER'S testimony. EPSTEIN states that MITCHELL would agree with the other testimony on matters of fact corroborated by the records that existed or with multiple witnesses to an exchange, and tended to disagree in cases where there was no obvious corroboration. States that MITCHELL has suggested that his own hindsight was better than his foresight. The committee should pursue the line of questioning of how hindsight leads MITCHELL to such radically different judgments than he made at the time of Watergate. Alludes also to the fact that MITCHELL'S testimony requires one to believe that a tremendous degree of insubordination was present in the Committee to Re-Elect. LEHRER states that HESS has accurately observed that MITCHELL did not admit to any wrongdoing. From a criminal standpoint is that correct? Did MITCHELL give any statement that could make him culpable in a conspiracy charge for Watergate? EPSTEIN states that MITCHELL was clear and firm in his contention that on three occasions, he refused to authorize the LIDDY plan for breakins and surveillance. As far as the coverup, MITCHELL never acknowledged taking part in a coverup, but did state that he wanted to prevent press reports of Watergate and White House Horrors that would damage NIXON'S reelection prospects. It is a question of Semantics whether that constitutes obstructing justice in a criminal sense. LEHRER asks HESS if he could determine a pattern in MITCHELL'S testimony that shows MITCHELL'S feelings toward the other players in the case. HESS states that MITCHELL seemed to have a disdain for activities in the White House, but stopped short of assigning any blame to HALDEMAN, EHRLICHMAN, or any specific others. Used the derisive phrase "WHITE HOUSE HORRORS", and left the suspicion that he was talking about HALDEMAN and EHRLICHMAN as the architects of the abuses. MacNEILL states that the next day will mark the halfway mark in the committee's schedule for the Watergate phase of its activities. It would be foolish to make firm predictions, but since MITCHELL has begun to testify, more light is shed on how the central question, NIXON'S involvement, will be answered, at least by the committee. States that much hinged on MITCHELL-how isolated had he become from the White House after rumors that MITCHELL would be scapegoated for Watergate. Of all witnesses to follow John DEAN, MITCHELL seemed to be in best position to incriminate NIXON, but today MITCHELL made it clear that he had not come before the committee to do that. MITCHELL will still be cross-examined, but the committee has not had a good record on getting witnesses to change their original thrusts through examination. One may speculate that MITCHELL will leave the room with both his story and the defense of NIXON intact. Among other remaining witnesses, perhaps only one man has the knowledge and motivation to incriminate NIXON-Egil KROGH, the former head of the White House PLUMBERS group. DEAN had testified that KROGH stated privately that orders for the PLUMBERS to execute the ELLSBERG Psychiatrist break-in came from the Oval Office, but KROGH has stated publicly that KROGH ordered the breakin on his own initiative. MacNEILL states that if this line of speculation holds up, and it is only speculation, MITCHELL'S testimony makes it appear less and less likely that NIXON will be censured, IMPEACHED, or RESIGN office-NIXON has passed the worst danger of the hearings. Signs off [title screen-SENATE HEARINGS ON CAMPAIGN ACTIVITES-NPACT credit/sponsor credits-PBS Network ID] [01.10.08-TAPE OUT]
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee Hearings on Presidential Campaign Activities, May 17, 19
Senator Sam ERVIN. Senator Weicker. Senator WEICKER, Jr. (R -CT). Thank you Mr. Chairman, just a few brief questions. Mr. Kehrli, when the last time that you talked either directly or on the telephone with either Mr. Ehrlichman or Mr. Haldeman? Mr. KEHRLI. (looks confused) Senator WEICKER. Why don't we separate the two, let me ask the question first as to Mr. Ehrlichman. Mr. KEHRLI. Okay, I think I spoke with Mr. Ehrlichman last Friday or Saturday, and I don't remember which date. Senator WEICKER. And what was the nature of, this was after he had left the White House? Mr. KEHRLI. This was after the announcement of his resignation had been made, and while he was winding down his activities at the White House. Senator WEICKER. So this was a direct meeting face to face? Mr. KEHRLI. No this was a telephone conversation. Senator WEICKER. I see, can you indicate to me the nature of that conversation? Mr. KEHRLI. We were discussing the disposition of the, his papers that had been taken from the office and held in a room. Senator WEICKER. What do you mean by the disposition of his papers, I'm afraid I don't follow you on that. Mr. KEHRLI. This was at a time when they were turning back certain papers to the FBI. (view from behind Senator Weicker of Mr. Kehrli and courtroom) Senator WEICKER. I don't understand the nature of, what was the purpose in your discussing this matter with him? Mr. KEHRLI. Well, I wanted to make sure that he was aware of the fact that they were being turned back, since they were coming out of his files. Senator WEICKER. In other words the nature was a phone conversation from you to Mr. Ehrlichman? Mr. KEHRLI. That's right. Senator WEICKER. To alert him that his files were being taken by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Mr. KEHRLI. That's right. One of my responsabilities is the preservation of Presidential papers, and that includes the filing system within the White House and any special filing systems that we have for especially sensitive papers. Senator WEICKER. And can you give me an indication as to his response when he was so alerted? Mr. KEHRLI. He was aware of it and said that he would check with Mr. Garmon with it. Senator WEICKER. That was the nature of that conversation? Mr. KEHRLI. That was it. Senator WEICKER. That he would check with Mr. Garmon? Mr. KEHRLI. Yes.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, May 23, 1973 Testimony of John Caulfield.
Senator Joseph MONTOYA. Now did Mr. Dean tell you why he was calling you to get in touch with McCord? Mr. CAULFIELD. When was that? Senator MONTOYA. When he called you at San Clemente. Mr. CAULFIELD. He indicated to me that he had a very important message that he wanted to be delivered to James McCord. Senator MONTOYA. Well I understand that, but did he tell you why he had chosen you for that mission? Mr. CAULFIELD. No sir, he didn't. Senator MONTOYA. Did you ask him? Mr. CAULFIELD. No sir. He knew of course that I had known Jim McCord. Senator MONTOYA. How did he know? Had you discuss Jim McCord with him? Mr. CAULFIELD. Well I had been over at the committee, eventually after he was hired I'm sure I mentioned to Mr. Dean that this fella McCord is hired, he appears to be outstanding. He was well aware that I knew James McCord, there was no question in anybody's mind. Senator MONTOYA. Did you get in touch after Watergate with Mr. Dean to indicate to him about your friendship with Jim McCord? Mr. CAULFIELD. Would you repeat that senator please? Senator MONTOYA. Did you get in touch with Mr. Dean and communicate to him your friendship with Jim McCord? Mr. CAULFIELD. When sir? Senator MONTOYA. After the watergate break-in. Mr. CAULFIELD. Oh, we had conversations. I expressed shock on many occasions that James McCord was arrested at the watergate. Senator MONTOYA. No, but the point I'm trying to make Mr. Caulfield, that you had two or three interviews with Mr. McCord, they were short in duration. Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes sir. Senator MONTOYA. Preliminary to his being hired. Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes sir. (WS Committee members seated at table) Senator MONTOYA. There were other people at the Republican National Committee and at the Committee to re-elect the president who knew Mr. McCord better than you did. Presumably because he worked with them for a longer time, and I am wondering why Mr. Dean selected you to carry on this mission of offering executive clemency to Mr. McCord, when there were other people within the organization of the National Committee and CRP who had developed a better and more intimate acquaintance with Mr. McCord. Mr. CAULFIELD. Well of course I'm sure that Mr. Dean entrusted me in reading some of the things that might have gone on before there was apparently a need for someone from the White House to bring a message to him, and certainly Mr. Dean knew that I knew Jim McCord. And then I'd like to re-iterate that I received a letter in December which I brought to Mr. Dean's attention wherein it was alleged that the White House was involved in attempting to place the blame on CIA, so all of these things Mr. Dean knew, Mr. McCord sent me the letter Mr. Dean knew that.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 5, 1973
[00.11.31] Senator WEICKER. Now, the materials that, were removed from 'Mr. Magruder's office by you an and Mr. Odle--Mr. Odle said that he returned the file on Monday morning. Would that be correct? Mr. REISNER. Yes, he did--I read his testimony. I believe that he did say that it was Monday morning. My recollection of his returning that file was not that it was Monday morning but, you know I do not,- I Senator WEICKER. Do you have any idea as to whether or not Mr. Odle would have known what was contained in the file which he took home? Mr. REISNER. No, I do not have any Idea. Senator WEICKER. By the nature of the phone conversation? Mr. REISNER. No, I 'do not. Senator WEICKER. But that was the same phone conversation which indicated to you-- Mr. REISNER. Which file it. was. that is correct, Senator WEICKER. [continuing.] Which file it was. Mr. REISNER. But as to the substance--- Senator WEICKER. But as to the contents--- Mr. REISNER. NO, sir, I do not have any knowledge of that. Senator WEICKER. Do you know of any phone calls as between Mr. Magruder and Mr. Colson? Mr. REISNER. Yes, sir. Senator WEICKER. Concerning demonstration projects? Mr. REISNER. OK. I have read that. There was a story in the news recently. Senator WEICKER. I am interested in your knowledge and not what you have read. Mr. REISNER. OK, It is my impression that Mr. Colson was--let me go back. I think I have described earlier in testimony here that at the time of Mr. Hoover's death there was a demonstration. I think it was here on Capitol Hill. At that time, it seems to me. Mr. Magruder received a phone call in which he was instructed to get counterdemonstrators. Now, I was not monitoring the phone call. I was sitting in front, of him when 'he received the phone call; so I do not know exactly who it was. It was my impression that it was Mr. Colson that did that. The reason that I say that, is that, I think I subsequently said I. expressed some surprise about the activity. And he indicated to me Something along the lines of, "It is a throwaway; we have got to do things like this, because that allows us to say no when it is important." Senator WEICKER. Now, were there any other projects aside from' the conversations you have referred to that were discussed as between Mr. Magruder and the person whom you thought to be Mr. Colson? Mr. REISNER. OK. When I say thought to be, you know, it, was my impression that it was from the circumstances, and if asked who I thought it was, I thought it was Mr. Colson. But I cannot say that. It seems to me that Mr. Magruder also was called on a subsequent occasion. The reason I remember this is that he made some joke about the fact that he had gotten himself in trouble. The way he had gotten himself in trouble was that he had removed an individual who was supposed to be sitting in front Of the White House wearing a McGovern button. He had said, he had called it off. He had placed that individual there initially, I guess, and then had removed him. He received a phone call and again, it was my impression, but impression is as Close as I can come, that he had gotten himself in trouble and, therefore, replaced that demonstrator. Senator WEICKER. Now, during the period from June 19 to June 23 was there a general house cleaning of files and removal of so-called" sensitive material from the Committee To Re-Elect the President? Mr. REISNER. Well, as to whether other individuals of the com- committee removed material, I do not know. As to what material there' was in the committee, you know, I cannot be certain. But I have testified here today that I was asked to go through Mr. Magruder's files and to centralize the sensitive political material, that anything that is sensitive material takes on an added meaning. I do not mean that as Gemstone material. There was no other, as far as I know. Senator WEICKER. All right, within your knowledge, do you know where the orders came from as to this house cleaning? Mr. REISNER. No sir, I do not. Senator WEICKER. Prior to July 1, 1972, to whom were major committee policy memos distributed? Mr. REISNER. Prior to-I am sorry? Senator WEICKER. July 1 of' 1972. Mr. REISNER. Well, the major policy memos would have gone to Mr. Mitchell for his decision. Senator WEICKER. All right, after July 1, 1972, where did all major committee policy memos go? Mr. REISNER. To Clark MacGregor. Copies of them would have gone to 'Mr. Haldeman and additional copies would have gone to interested people in that particular decision. Senator WEICKER. Did Mr. Strachan play a role in the dissemination of the material as to whom it would go to? Mr. REISNER. Subsequently Mr. Strachan was the Contact point in the While House and, therefore, those memos that we were discussing would have been sent to Mr. Strachan for Mr. Haldeman. That was the purpose of sending them to 'Mr. Strachan. [00.17.10]
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 6, 1973
[00.42.58--LEHRER IN STUDIO] LEHRER summarizes GURNEY'S interrupted questioning [PBS Network ID--Title Screen--"SENATE HEARINGS ON CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES"] [00.45.26--LEHRER in studio] LEHRER states that the Senate just rejected the Hubert Humphrey bill to require the US to maintain reserves of feed grain [00.45.39--in to committee room, Senators returning from vote to sit at table] Senator ERVIN. Senator Gurney. Senator GURNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think we were, discussing the time that you were in California, Mr. Sloan. Mr. SLOAN. Yes, sir. Senator GURNEY. You had described what your activities were, there at that time. Mr. SLOAN. Until that Sunday evening when I joined Secretary Stans I had gone to San Francisco and spent a day and a half in my hotel room. I joined Secretary Stans for the budget meeting. When we concluded that we flew to--I think Portland, Ore., where we had fundraising meetings. I think there was one other stop and we went, to Des Moines for a meeting there and at that point I had a call to come back. Senator GURNEY. From whom? Mr. SLOAN. I am not sure whether it was one of the attorneys or Fred LaRue himself. I was asked to come back a day earlier than the scheduled trip for Secretary Stans. Senator GURNEY. What about the discussions on the budget, what budget was this? Mr. SLOAN. At this point, in time we were attempting probably I think for the first time in a Presidential campaign to incorporate the 50 State budgets in an overall budget nationally and there was rather acrimonious discussion of what was the proper amount for California to do the job they thought they ought to do. Someone had gone out there to try to solve a problem. Senator GURNEY. While you were in California, did you have any telephone discussions with anyone in the Committee To Re-Elect here in Washington? Mr. SLOAN-. I probably did. I am sure I probably checked with my office secretary. I recall none that would be pertinent in this context. Senator GURNEY. We have covered this before, the rather humorous advice you received from Mr. Mitchell and I don't want to go over that again except, I wish you would explain in more detail exactly how the conference between you and Mr. LaRue and Mr. Mitchell came about. Mr. SLOAN. I was talking to Mr. LaRue in his office about these general financial matters, particularly about a $50,000 contribution that Mr. Porter had brought in post-April 7, for which there was no identification of the donor. It was during this conversation that I had a call from my secretary indicating the two gentlemen from the Bureau were waiting in my' office to see me. I asked Fred what I should do and he said before you go down I think you ought to see John and why don't you wait here, I will go down and see him. And he went down and came back in a few minutes and took me down into the room I believe where Bob Mardian was. [00.48.45]
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 29, 1973 (1/2)
[00.45.17-DASH questions DEAN, trying to demonstrate that the September 15, 1972 meeting between DEAN and NIXON in all common sense indicates that NIXON was aware of a coverup effort at the time] You were asked a question as to whether or not the President had, in fact, told you about his knowledge of the, Watergate case, or had indicated any knowledge on his part of any of the coverup. I think the first question I would like, to like to ask is would you have expected, in any relationship with the President, for the President to have asked you to come in and said that "'Bob Haldeman had told me about your covering up of the Watergate case, your assisting Jeb Magruder in committing perjury" or things of that kind? [00.45.49] Mr. DEAN, It wasn't the nature of that, type of conversation so I would not have, expected that, type of further follow-up questioning; no, sir. Mr. DASH. All right. But when the President told you that Bob Haldeman had told or kept him posted, on how you had handled the Watergate case, he also indicated from your testimony that, he appreciated how difficult a task it was. You were asked did You tell the President what you in fact, had done, that you had assisted Magruder in committing perjury, that you had assisted in the coverup, that you had limited the FBI investigation or actually gotten CIA involvement. [00.46.29-DASH slams on GURNEY'S questioning of DEAN as ludicrous] Would it have been realistic in that circumstance if the President said that Bob Haldeman had kept him posted and Was congratulating you on how you had handled your job, for you to say, "That is right, Mr. President, you know what, you are telling me is and what I want you to know is that I had gotten Mr. Magruder to Commit perjury before the grand jury and that I had him limit the FBI investigation, et cetera." Would that be a realistic response of yours in such a meeting? Mr. DEAN. I don't believe it would be, no. [00.46.59] Mr. DASH. As a matter of fact, when the President told you that Bob Haldeman had kept him posted on how you handled the Watergate case, you knew very well how you had handed the Watergate case, did you not? Mr. DEAN. That is correct. Mr. DASH. And in fact, it did involve having Mr. Magruder perjure himself before the committee and other types of things such as payoffs and limiting FBI investigation? Mr. DEAN. That is correct. [00.47.25] Mr. DASH, And you knew that Bob Haldeman knew that? Mr. DEAN. That is correct. Mr. DASH. From your knowledge of Mr. Haldeman's relationship with the President, and you have said that when you were in that Oval Office, you never lied to the President. [00.47.40] From Your knowledge of Mr. Haldeman's relationship to the President, 'Would it be your opinion that Mr. Haldeman would lie to the President? Mr. DEAN. It, would be to the contrary. I do not think Mr. Haldeman would lie to the President. I do not know of anybody who would walk into the Oval Office and lie to the President. [00.47.54] Mr. DASH. So if Mr. Haldeman had kept the President, posted on exactly how you had handled the Watergate case, he, would have, told the President exactly how you had handed the Watergate case., including the coverup'? Mr. DEAN. That is correct. Mr. DASH. You told the President, according to your own statement at that time that you had only been able to contain the case and you could not insure that someday it, would not become unraveled; is that not correct? Mr. DEAN. That is correct. [00.48.19-because he already knew?] Mr. DASH. Did the President ask you what, you meant, by that? Mr. DEAN. No, he did not. Mr. DASH. 'NOW, also at that time, you discussed the civil case.. Is that not the time you told the President that, the lawyers for the, Committee To Re-Elect the President had developed an ex parte relationship to influence the judge? Mr. DEAN. That is correct. [00.48.40] Mr. DASH. And the. President, according to your statement, at that time said, that would be helpful? Mr. DEAN. That is correct. Mr. DASH. And during the course of that meeting on September 15, you got into the Patman committee hearings. Mr. DEAN. That is correct, also. Mr. DASH. Now, on the Patman committee hearings, what was the concern about those hearings? [DEAN is visibly and audibly beaten down by the ordeal of testifying, in contrast to DASH'S energy in delivering this extremely pointed line of questioning] Mr. DEAN. The concern was twofold. One, it would cause further embarrassment to the White House prior to the election by more headlines about the Watergate. Second, it could result in the Patman investigators stumbling into something that might start unraveling the coverup. Mr. DASH. Do you have a copy of exhibit No. 34-22, which you have submitted to the committee? Mr. DEAN. Yes, I do. Mr. DASH. Now, Now, that exhibit has attached to it a letter, or memorandum under the letterhead of the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee of Banking and Currency, and it is from Chairman Wright Patman. There is attached a list of Individuals that were subpenaed before the Patman committee. [00.49.55] Now, was there anything significant in that list of individuals who were going to be subpenaed before the Patman committee? Mr. DEAN. Yes, there was. I might add, Mr. Dash, that the list that was submitted or made public on this date had informally, the bulk of the list was already in the possession of the, White House and the congressional relations staff before this was actually made public. Mr. DASH. Your name appears on that list on page 2? Mr. DEAN. That is correct. Mr. DASH. And Mr. LaRue's name? Mr. DEAN. That is correct. Mr. DASH. And a number of the witnesses who have already appeared here and been questioned by the grand jury-Jeb Magruder, Robert -Mardian, John Mitchell, Robert Odle, Herbert Porter, Hugh Sloan, Maurice Stans. [00.50.39] Now, if all those witnesses had been called by the Patman committee at the time those hearings were going to be held and had answered according to the subpena, what in fact was the concern of the White House? [00.50.49] Mr. DEAN. Well, if those hearings had been held, there is a good chance, these hearings would not be held today, because I think that would have unraveled the coverup. [00.50.59]
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 14, 1973 - Testimony of Jeb Magruder
Samuel Dash, attorney. Did you make any report of the meeting to anyone after the meeting? Jeb Magruder. Yes, I made a report to Mr. Strachan at the White House. Samuel Dash, attorney. Now, did you disclose everything concerning that meeting to Mr. Strachan? Jeb Magruder. I don t recall at that meeting whether Mr. Liddy had had these charts put into 8 1/2 x 11 size to hand out. If he had, I would have sent those over to Mr. Strachan. I do remember discussing it. I don t recall in this meeting whether we had working papers and so I can't recall specifically. I think just on the phone I discussed the general nature of his proposal. Samuel Dash, attorney. Was this telephone conversation with Mr. Strachan in which you did report the general nature of the discussion consistent with your general reporting to Mr. Strachan as you did from time to time matters that should get to the White House staff? Jeb Magruder. Yes, everything that I did at the committee, everything that we did was staffed to Mr. Strachan so that he could alert other officials at the White House as to our activities.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 25, 1973 - Statement of John Dean.
John Dean. I then proceeded to tell him some of the highlights that had occurred during the coverup. I told him that Kalmbach had been used to raise funds to pay these seven individuals for their silence at the instructions of Ehrlichman, Haldeman, and Mitchell. And I had been the conveyor of this instruction to Kalmbach. I told him that after the decision had been made that Magruder was to remain at the Re-election Committee. I had assisted Magruder in preparing his false story for presentation on to the grand jury. I told him that cash that had been at the White House had been funneled back to the reelection committee for the purpose of paying the seven individuals to remain silent. I then proceeded to tell him that perjury had been committed and for this coverup to continue would require wore perjury and more money. I told him that the demands of the convicted individuals were continually increasing and that with sentencing imminent, the demands had become specific.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 28, 1973. Testimony of John Dean.
Senator Sam Ervin (D North Carolina). Isn't it, true to say that among some of the officials in the Committee To Re-Elect the President and the White House there was a great climate of fear during 1970, 1971 and 1972? John Dean. I would say there was a great concern about demonstrators. I think demonstrators were viewed as a political problem. You used the, word "fear." That connotes to me physical concern about them. As one who has walked with many demonstrators, to go out and get the pulse of the crowd, they re certainly not a fearsome group. There were some militants who were bent on, you know, destroying office buildings and breaking windows and things of that nature, the looters and the trashers and the groups like that. But I wouldn t say, I d say there was a concern. Senator Sam Ervin (D North Carolina). Well, there are two kinds of fear. There is physical fear and intellectual fear. Don't you think there was an intellectual fear prevalent at that time among some people in the committee and some people in the White House about Americans who undertook to exercise their first amendment right to petition for redress of grievances? John Dean. I think that is correct, when you put it in the political context. Senator Sam Ervin (D North Carolina). Well, all of this was in the political context, was it not? John Dean. Yes, it was.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 14, 1973 - Testimony of Jeb Magruder
Samuel Dash, attorney. Now after this meeting, Mr. Magruder, did you report to anyone about the meeting? Jeb Magruder. Yes. I sent the documents that Mr. Liddy had given us at the meeting to Mr. Strachan. Samuel Dash, attorney. And again, was this in your normal course of using Mr. Strachan to the White House staff people such as Mr. Haldeman? Jeb Magruder. Yes. I automatically sent all documents to Mr. Strachan. Samuel Dash, attorney. And did those documents contain all of what Mr. Liddy had presented at that meeting? Jeb Magruder. Certainly, all of the specific discussion. They did not contain, as an example, the discussion on targets because that was a discussion and that was not in the documents. Samuel Dash, attorney. Did you have a telephone conversation with Mr. Strachan concerning that meeting? Jeb Magruder. Yes, I indicated the general context of that meeting. Samuel Dash, attorney. And did that Include Mr. Mitchell's suggestions concerning the Las Vegas mission? Jeb Magruder. I cannot recall specifically that point, but I would assume that I probably discussed the he key targets that we had discussed. Samuel Dash, attorney. And would include the Democratic National Committee headquarters and Mr. O'Brien? Jeb Magruder. Yes. Samuel Dash, attorney. Did you discuss the meeting with anybody else either at the committee or the White House? Jeb Magruder. I can t recall discussing it with anyone else.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 27, 1973
[01.00.15-GURNEY continues questioning DEAN] Senator GURNEY. When was that ? Mr. DEAN. This was on the 28th. Senator GURNEY. In the meantime. you had engaged counsel on the 25th? Mr. DEAN. Well, no. sir-yes, I did, I did, I engaged-- Senator GURNEY. Hogan? Mr. DEAN. I engaged Hogan in regard to the story running in the Los Angeles Times--- Senator GURNEY. And Mr. Shaffer on the 30th. Mr. DEAN. When I was at Camp David I -really made, a decision there was no way that I was going to continue in the coverup. [01.00.46] Senator GURNEY. All of these meetings on the 20th, 21st, 22d, as I understand it, they -were the first meetings between what I would call perhaps the most principal people involved in Watergate, at least those in the White House, to where you were coming to serious discussion about what, ought to be done and all of you realized that something certainly had to be done, and done rather fast, as I understand it? Mr. DEAN. I would not characterize the, meetings as to -what had to be done. In fact, the meetings -were, as I believe I described them in my testimony, very similar to many, many meetings had occurred, or I had been in earlier where we talked about, you know, how do -we deal with the Senate committee, the President at one point in the meeting picked up the phone and called the Attorney General and asked him why he had not been meeting with Senator Baker. Senator GURNEY. But the March 21 meeting -was a meeting that, as I understand it, you sought with the President to tell him, as I think you said, the broad outlines of the Watergate story. Is that -not, right? [01.01.56-DEAN argues that it was evident to him that NIXON knew about Watergate and the Coverup prior to DEAN'S meeting on March 21, 1973] Mr. DEAN. Well, as I said also, we had discussed the Watergate on previous occasions before that, we discussed it on the 13th. We talked about money and clemency. He had told me as early as my February -meetings -with him, that I was to report, directly to him at that point. If you check some of the exhibits that I have submitted you will see that there are a lot of Presidential decisions being made as a result of the La Costa meeting, and it was at one point I decided that I had to tell the, President what I thought the implications of this whole situation was. That I thought that not only was there a problem for some that were involved before the break-in had become known but I thought there, were a lot that had problems is a result of the break-in, and that the coverup could not continue. Senator GURNEY. Well, at any rate, whatever was being discussed at these meetings the 20th, the 21st, and the 22d, they certainly were very important matters affecting Watergate, is that not true? Mr. DEAN. They were affecting Watergate, to the degree of how to deal with this Senate, committee, yes. Senator GURNEY. You mean you only discussed the Senate committee in these meetings? Mr. DEAN. That is the thrust of virtually the entire. conversations that occurred, particularly -when Mr. Mitchell was present, the morning he was present, on the 22d. Senator GURNEY. What about the meeting of the 21st? You had two that day, one with the President when Mr. Haldeman came in later, and then another one, with Mr. Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and yourself and the President. Was that the subject of this committee here that you talked about? Mr. DEAN. I think, as I testified, that after I had completed my presentation to the President from some, of the, questions he asked and some of the statements he made I did not, feel that he fully understood the problem that people at the, White House had for their involvement in the post situation. It was somewhat like---- Senator GURNEY. So it was a much wider discussion than simply this committee? Mr. DEAN. Not really, Senator, it was, it was [01.04.12-TAPE OUT]
NPACT coverage of Church Committee Hearings - Richard Helms
Former CIA Director Richard Helms testifies to question made by Church Committee Chairman Frank Church as to why CIA toxins expert Dr. Nathan Gordon was not officially informed of U.S. President Richard Nixon’s new policy against the use of biological weapons. Helms says when he had asked to have the biological and chemical weapons program terminated, he was under the impression that CIA poison expert Dr. Sidney Gottlieb would pass the order to the whole program. Helms says that to his understanding the toxins were at U.S. Army base Fort Detrick to be destroyed. Helms mentions classified documents from the White House on the termination of biological and chemical weapons programs that have restricted dissemination, explaining why CIA toxins expert Dr. Nathan Gordon never saw any official documents. Senator Church says that some form of documentation should have been sent down to those in charge of the toxins; Helms agrees, says he believed Dr. Gottlieb had done so. Church asks Helms why he did not follow up with Gottlieb; Helms says he was under the impression the biological weapons program had been terminated and he had no reason to believe his employees would mislead him. Church asks Helms who told him the toxins had been destroyed; Helms says he read about it in the newspaper, to which Church laughs.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 26, 1973
[00.34.59] Senator ERVIN. This morning I received the following letter. The WHITE HOUSE. Washington, June 26, 1973. DEAR SENATOR ERVIN: In a telephone discussion this morning, with Mr. Rufus Edmisten of your staff. Fred Buzhardt and I stated that the Senate Select Committee should use its discretion with respect to the utilization of the documents referred to in your letter to the President dated June 25, 1973. It is our understanding that the agencies having responsibilities in the foreign intelligence areas as have provided extensive evidence to the 'Senate on these documents. In this connection, Mr. Edmisten stated that the Committee intended to utilize Only those portions relating to domestic intelligence activities and would not make public any material reefering to any foreign intelligence activities Or capabilities. Mr. Edmisten asked that I confirm this conversation to you in writing during the luncheon recess, which I am pleased to do. Sincerely, Leonard Garment. Senator ERVIN. Now, as I understand it, Senator Weicker, you wish to interrogate the witness about one of these documents and I would suggest that, in order to have the thing in consecutive order, that -we ask the witness if he can identify all of the copies of the documents reeferred to in this letter. Mr. DEAN. I think, Mr. Chairman, that Senator Weicker is referring to the memorandum that I -Wrote. to the Attorney General. Senator WEICKER. Yes. Before you do, I would like to give you copies of these papers. Mr. DEAN. I would like to see them to refresh my recollection of the documents. Senator ERVIN. We might give you copies of two other documents which are not classified One is a memo to H.R. Haldeman from Tom Charles Huston, dated August 25, 19 1970, reefering to SACB appropriations, and a memo to H.R. Haldeman from Tom Charles Huston dated September 10, 1970, neither of -which is classified. Mr. SHAFFER. Mr. we have permission to look at them, Senator? We have never seen them before. Senator ERVIN. Yes. In other words, preliminary to Senator Weicker Continuing his examination. I want you on to identify all the documents and order them admitted into the record. The question then that will be asked of 'Mr. Dean is whether or not he can identify these documents as having been copies of documents which he delivered to Judge Sirica and which Judge Sirica ordered delivered to this committee. Mr. SHAFFER. Senator, just out of an abundance of caution, I would like to advise the chairman, that, although his lawyers participated in the delivery of The documents to Judge Sirica, it was done by Mr. Dean placing the documents in a safe deposit box and the keys then being delivered to the court and the documents never came into our possession. nor did we See them. Senator BAKER. Chairman, do I understand Mr. Shaffer to say that in an abundance of caution, he wishes to indicate that he and Mr. McCandless have not previously received possession of these, documents?: Mr.' SHAFFER. That is right. Senator BAKER. I think it would be appropriate. "Mr. Chairman, if You concur to state that on behalf of the committee, we think it is desirable and essential for counsel to be able to confer now with Mr. Dean on those documents on our authority. Senator ERVIN. I agree with you absolutely. the committee -will take a recess or stand at ease until the attorneys and Mr. Dean can confer about these documents. [00.40.20]