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Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee Hearings on Presidential Campaign Activities, May 17, 1973
(Mr. Kehrli walks over to chart) Mr. DASH. Mr. Kehrli, taking your statement into consideration, if at anytime in an explanation that you make, you feel that it is important to describe any other function or any other role of a white house personnel please feel free to do so, because the purpose of the chart is to relate to the resolution of our committee, but please do not feel constrained to the chart if you feel a full explanation requires you to do otherwise. Mr. KEHRLI. Fine. Mr. DASH. Now, on that chart do you find Mr. Haldeman? Mr. KEHRLI. (Mr. Kehrli holds up wooden pointer to chart) Yes, Mr. Haldeman is right here, he is in charge of White House operations. Now you'll notice that under Mr. Haldeman you'll find a number of other sub-organizations and as I said because this chart was based on Administrative relationships, (CU chart) this may be deceiving, and that any number of these people, at any point in time may have had a different reporting relationship depending on what project or what subject area they happened to be working in. Mr. DASH. But basically under the organization that you have and to the extent that that chart is relevant, the people who are shown under Mr. Haldeman were reporting to Mr. Haldeman? Mr. KEHRLI. Right, but let me give you an example, for instance we have the speech writers here with Mr. Ray Price as the head of that group. (CU chart) Now at any point in time, the President may have called Mr. Price with a specific request, not one which went through Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Price may have responded to that request without ever going through Mr. Haldeman. Mr. DASH. Would you say he may have or would have, if the President called him? Mr. KEHRLI. On occasions he would respond through Mr. Haldeman on other occasions he wouldn't. Mr. DASH. Now, under the direct line of Mr. Haldeman, would you, who on that chart would be reporting based on that chart to Mr. Haldeman? Or through Mr. Haldeman. Mr. KEHRLI. Well, any of these people at some point in time would report through Mr. Haldeman, but as I said before there is on occasion these people may have reported through another staff member, for instance Mr. Dean who is the council to the President, on a lot of legal matters reported through Mr. Ehrlichman. Mr. DASH. Now, Mr. Hunt is listed there as a consultant on that chart. Mr. KEHRLI. Yes he is. Mr. DASH. For what period of time do you know that he served in that role? Mr. KEHRLI. I'm sorry I don't have his starting date, I have the, I was only asked to put the dates on which he left the payroll. Mr. DASH. When did he leave the payroll? Mr. KEHRLI. That was April 1st, 1972. Mr. DASH. And Mr. Colson, what was Mr. Colson's position actually, I don't think it's indicated on the chart? Mr. KEHRLI. Mr. Colson was in charge of liaison with outside organizations. Mr. DASH. And Mr. Malek's role? Mr. KEHRLI. Mr. Malek's role at this time was, he had charge of the White House personnel office, which was recruiting and placing people within the administration. Mr. DASH. Alright now, Mr. Dean as you said would either be reporting directly to Mr. Haldeman, but as you indicated he also would perhaps be doing quite a bit of his work with Mr. Ehrlichman. Mr. KEHRLI. That's right. Mr. DASH. That's true. And so that Mr. Deans primary responsabilities were through Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman, would that be true? Mr. KEHRLI. Yes it would.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 27, 1973 (1/2)
[00.46.23-INOUYE continues to confront DEAN with White House Memo blaming the Watergate and Coverup on DEAN] Senator INOUYE. [QUOTING W.H. MEMO ATTACKING DEAN'S TESTIMONY] "During this period Dean was developing other problems. On March 10 there were press reports it was Dean who had. recommended Liddy to the Committee to Re-Elect the President. On March 22, Pat Gray testified that Dean had lied to him during the course of the FBI investigation of Watergate. On March 23 McCord's letter to Judge Sirica was made public. The coverup was coming uncovered. "During this period the point was frequently raised by various people including primarily the President, that the "whole story of the Watergate should be made public." Dean's answer always was "We cannot do it while the investigation is continuing." There are conflicting versions of events and the rights of defendants might be prejudiced by the statement." And this is from Mr. Haldeman. Mr. DEAN. I think that relates back to a conversation that I had With Mr. Haldeman shortly after the, election and before I prepared the---was requested to prepare a written version of the Dean report, when he asked me for what the facts would entail. At that time I told him that, I thought that the grand jury would be reconvened and I thought that they would undoubtedly get into obstruction of justice and I thought that those--that that, investigation would come directly to the White House and that Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Dean could be, indicted, and he said to me, "I do not believe that is a very viable option." [00.47.58] Senator INOUYE. [QUOTING W.H. MEMO ATTACKING DEAN'S TESTIMONY] "On March 20th the President indicated that he, still did not have all the facts." Mr. DEAN. What date was that, Senator? Senator INOUYE. March 20. Mr. DEAN. The President did not state to me on the 20th when I told him at that time that I received a call from the President I told him at that time that I would like to meet with him the next morning, and I would like to tell him what I thought -the implication of the situation was, what, had really prompted me at that time was the new demand from Mr. Hunt that indeed, this thing was getting far out of hand, that the White House was now being directly subject, to blackmail and I did not know how to handle it. Senator INOUYE. Is it your testimony that on March 20 the President did in fact have all the facts? Mr. DEAN. I did not hear you, you, again, Senator, I am sorry. [00.48.50] Senator INOUYE. IS It Your testimony that on March 20 the President did not have all the facts? Mr. DEAN. I do not know what the President knew on March 20. We had had conversations before that, We had conversations that I was personally engaged in on September 15 of the preceding year. We had had conversations In early February or late February in which I tried to start telling him some of my own involvement. We had also had a discussion on March 13I about the money demands that were being made. [00.49.27] At that time he discussed the fact that a million dollars is no problem. He repeated it several times. I can very vividly recall that, the way he sort, of rolled his chair back from his desk and leaned over to Mr. Haldeman and said. "A million dollars is no problem," and then he came back and asked "Well, who is making these demands, and I said they are principally coming from Mr. Hunt and he got into the fact, that Hunt had been given clemency and his conversation about his annoyance that he had also talked to Colson about this in addition to Ehrlichman and the money matter was left very much hanging at that, meeting. Nothing -was resolved. Senator INOUYE. As the President's counsel, did you, in a very legal fashion, advise him of your meetings in February in the Attorney General's office? [00.50.18] Mr. DEAN. My channel of reporting -was through Mr. Haldeman or Mr. Ehrlichman. At the completion of the second meeting I sought out an appointment with Mr. Haldeman. I recall---- Senator INOUYE. In the subsequent meetings with the President did you clearly advise him of the, break-in, your involvement and the coverup, and your involvement? Mr. DEAN. I certainly did on the 21st and I had attempted to do it earlier in February but he was not interested in it when I raised it, 'and the conversation got cut short. I told him I thought I had an obstruction of justice problem and gave him, started to give him the highlights, He did not want to pursue it further. Senator INOUYE. [QUOTING FROM W.H. MEMO ATTACKING DEAN'S TESTIMONY] "In the preceding week Dean had begun to express to Richard Moore concern about Dean's own involvement. Referring to the meetings in Mitchell's office., the plumbers operation and the Ellsberg break-in and the demands by Hunt, possibly on March 16 for more money." [00.51.25]
JFK Assassination Hearings - E. Aschkenasy & Mark Weiss, H.B. McClain
Wide view of U.S. House Committee JFK Assassination Hearing. U.S. House Representative Christopher Dodd (D-CT) questioning acoustic experts Ernest Aschkenasy and Mark Weiss about areas of lee-way in their analysis, adjustments for temperature and location. Achkenasy clarifies that no adjustments were made. They only noticed that the map was not a complete survey of the area and provides examples of discrepancies. Rep. Dodd asks whether a re-enactment using microphones and recorders would narrow the precision of their predictions. Weiss thinks the re-enactment would only serve to match their predictions.
Watergate Hearings - Testimony of John J Caulfield May 22, 1973
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, May 22, 1973 - Testimony of John J. Caulfield. He reads his statement to the Committee. Caucus Room, Russell Senate Office Building, Washington DC Mr. John CAULFIELD. (continues opening statement) ...... the offer of executive clemency was a sincere and believable offer coming from the very highest levels of the white house. I explained to him that among the reasons why I believed that such a commitment would be kept were that the white house officials with whom I was in contact were extremely concerned about the watergate burglary developing into a major scandal effecting the president and therefore such a premise would not be given lightly. I told him that the white house officials with whom I was talking were complaining because they felt that Mr. McCord was the only one of the watergate burglary defendants who was refusing to co-operate. At no time on this occasion or any other occasion do I recall telling Mr. McCord to keep silent if called before .... Mr. Sam DASH. Mr. Caulfield .... Senator Sam ERVIN. We have another vote, and I think maybe we better pause till we get back. (WS committee members taking break)
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 14, 1973
[00.41.31] Senator BAKER. Some, of history's great decisions have been nondecisions on occasion. Let me approach it from this standpoint. You say Mr. Mitchell signed off on it. Do you mean physically initialed it or signed it? Mr. MAGRUDER. No, sir I -mean he said -we Will give Mr. Liddy the $250,000. Senator BAKER. And he identified the targets. Did that include the Democratic National Committee headquarters at the Watergate? Mr. MAGRUDER. MAGRUDER. Yes, sir. Senator BAKER. Did he do that with a pencil? Mr. MAGRUDER. He, may have. He wrote some things on some documents. I cannot specifically recall what he, -wrote on the documents because, I destroyed the documents. Senator BAKER. Was there any question in Your mind that the, plan Was agreed to by Mr. Mitchell? Mr. MAGRUDER. No, sir, there, was no doubt. -But it was a reluctant decision. I think that is important to not, It was not one that anyoue was overwhelmed with at all, But it was, made and he did make It- [00.42.23] Senator BAKER. Tell me, more, about why it, was a reluctant decision. can think of a thousand reasons why it was a reluctant decision. But why was it? Mr. MAGRUDER. You probably have all the good reasons, as I do., We knew it was illegal, probably inappropriate. We didn't think that probably much would come of if; but, on the other hand. something may come of it and I think I it was one of those decisions that unfortunately we had 30 decisions, as I recall it, at least 30 decisions we made that day about even greater sums Of money than that, $230,000. Senator BAKER. Did you have any other decision to make that, day that involved any illegal action ? Mr. MAGRUDER. No, sir. Senator BAKER. Or any clandestine activity? Mr. MAGRUDER. No. sir. Senator BAKER. Did that stand out in your mind as to why you Made that decision reluctantly? Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes, sir. I think SO. Senator BAKER. Did you ever express any reservations about it? Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes. sir. Senator BAKER, What did you say? Mr. MAGRUDER. Well. that it. was inappropriate as well as illegal and that it may not work. Senator BAKER. To whom did you say that? Mr. MAGRUDER. To Mr. Mitchell, Mr. LaRue, -Mr. Strachan, Senator BAKER. What was -Mr. Mitchell's reply? Mr. MAGRUDER. I think he had similar reservations, sir. Senator BAKER. What did he say? Mr. MAGRUDER. Well, by this time, we had some indications of lack of compatibility with Mr. Liddy's behavior and we knew that this was possibly an inappropriate program. Senator BAKER. What -was 'Mr. LaRue's reaction? Mr. MAGRUDER. Similar; he was not overwhelmed With the plan Senator BAKER. What was your reaction? Mr. MAGRUDER. I was not overwhelmed with the program, but, you must. I think, understand that I had personal feelings, relating to Liddy and I was concerned about letting those personal feelings overcome a, possible decision that might be, made. Senator BAKER. What was Mr. Strachan's reaction? Mr. MAGRUDER. I think he, felt uncomfortable with Mr. Liddy. But again, I think -we have, to, in all. honesty, say that we thought there may be Some information that could be very helpful to us and because of a certain atmosphere that had developed in my working at the White House, I -was not as concerned about its illegality as I should have been at that time,. [00.44.37] Senator BAKER. If you were concerned because the action was known to you to be illegal, because you thought It improper or unethical, you thought the prospects for success very meager and you doubted the reliability of Liddy, what on earth would it have taken to decide against that plan? Mr. MAGRUDER. not very much, sir. I am sure that if I had fought it. I think any of us could have had that plan cancelled. It was almost canceled. I had fired him from that position, but reneged on that. 'Senator BAKER. You really leave me dangling, 'Mr. Magruder and I don't attribute any ill motive to you for that. It is just that I still can't quite come to grips with why you all had an expressed reservation about this and you still went ahead with it. Was the incentive so great or the prospects for success so tantalizing that you felt it irresistible? [00.45.35] Mr. MAGRUDER. I knew you would get to this line of questioning, so why don't I give you what I think is the appropriate response here. I had worked for some 2 years, 3 years, really, in the White House and at that time, I was mainly engaged in the activities trying to generate some support for the President both with Mr. Haldeman and as Mr. Klein's deputy. During that time, we had worked primarily relating to the war situation and worked with antiwar groups. Now, I had gone to college, as an example, under--and had a course in ethics as an example under William Sloane Coffin, whom I respect greatly. I have great regard for him. He was quoted the other day as saying, well, I guess Mr. Magruder failed my, course in ethics. And I think he, is correct. During this whole time, we were in the White House and during this time we were directly 37 employed with trying to succeed with the President's policies and I knew how he was trying very diligently to settle the war issue and we were all at that time against the war as an example--I think this is the primary issue-we saw continuing violations of the law done by men like William Sloane 'Coffin. He tells me my ethics are bad. Yet he was indicted for criminal charges. He recommended on the Washington Monument grounds that students burn their draft cards and that, we have mass demonstrations, shut down the city of Washington. [00.46.59]
Rep. Ferraro at Committee Hearing
Three elderly adult Caucasian females seated in the gallery front row; Dr. Albert Sabin (o/s) continues his testimony, regarding changing existing Medicare regulations, using his own recent personal experience, saved by a registered nurse; adult Caucasian males and females seated in BG. Zoom out to elderly adult Caucasian women seated next to Dr. Sabin at witness table. Out of focus elderly adult Caucasian female comes into focus, then back out of focus as the elderly adult Caucasian female in BG comes into view. U.S. House Representative Geraldine Ferraro (D-NY) leans back in her chair to speak to adult Caucasian male behind her; Rep. Claude Pepper (D-FL) seated beside her; Dr. Sabin (o/s) advocating for many diagnostic and therapeutic procedures to be done on an ambulatory basis without incurring expensive hotel bills "for spending a few nights in the hospital".
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 6, 1973 Testimony of Hugh Sloan
Sam Ervin (D - North Carolina). Now, you were so much concerned about what had happened that you requested an opportunity to speak to Mr. Haldeman. Hugh Sloan. I am not sure, in all fairness, Senator that I may not have specifically asked to see him. I sought people out, feeling that he personally should know certain information. Whether it was transmitted to him or whether they would arrange an interview directly with him was not decided until the next day. Sam Ervin (D - North Carolina). In other words, your concern was so great that you wanted an opportunity to communicate with someone in the White House your misgivings? Hugh Sloan. Yes, sir. At this point in time, my judgment was that there was a strong possibility that the entire, essentially high command, of the political side of the campaign was involved in this affair and that the only way to look at it from essentially the external standpoint was to get someone in the White House at that point to take a look at their own campaign organization.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 27, 1973
[00.54.33-GURNEY continues to try to discredit DEAN'S testimony on matters peripheral to the facts of the coverup] Senator GURNEY. I would like to request that, Mr. Chairman. I do not want, to ask the witness questions here on that but I would like a full statement for the committee. Senator ERVIN. The witness says he will be glad to furnish it so I request him to do so. I do not know -whether he has to get access to the records at the White House or not. Mr. DEAN. Well, as I say, they will give, me, access down there and I think they might let me take my own personal things out there, I assume that is -going to occur. [00.55.00-GURNEY goes back to the issue of the report that DEAN was allegedly asked to prepare for NIXON-DEAN denies being asked to do so, GURNEY wants to use this to imply that DEAN was trying to hide facts from NIXON.] Senator GURNEY. Now, if we can go to November, Mr. Dean, as I recall, in the, testimony there was discussion some time around November about a written report that was to be written by you on Watergate? Mr. DEAN. That is correct. Senator GURNEY. Who requested that report? Mr. DEAN. That was Mr. Haldeman -who first raised it with me. senator GURNEY. Did you ever write this report? Mr. DEAN. Yes, sir, and I have, submitted that as a document to the committee. Senator GURNEY. Did you--if we have it I can look at it there, but did you ever tell the, President about this report or give him a copy of it? [00.55.40-Normal Reporting Channels] Mr. DEAN. No, sir, I used my normal reporting channels. 'I understand that it went from Mr. Haldeman to Mr. Ehrlichman, -who made some editorial changes on it -which are reflected, I believe I submitted the original to the committee, the editorial changes am Mr. Ehrlichman's. Then, it, went, to Mr. Ziegler and there -was a meeting on September 13 in which it was decided that report, would not be issued. [00.56.10-GURNEY turns to DEAN'S role in offering EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY to keep Jim McCORD from telling about the involvement of EHRLICHMAN and HALDEMAN.] Senator GURNEY. Turning to the offer of clemency to Mr. McCord, as I understand it, you made, the arrangements for that through Mr. Caulfield? Mr. DEAN. That is correct. Senator GURNEY. And he, in turn, communicated Mr. McCord, I guess, through Ulasewicz one time and then himself is that correct? Mr. DEAN. That at is my understanding Senator GURNEY. And my understand understanding also is that, the offer of clemency was made to Mr. McCord, I think, in terms like this: That it comes from the highest authority in the White House; is that substantially correct,? Mr. DEAN. That is correct; yes. Senator GURNEY. Did you ever advise the President of the United States about that? [00.56.52-DEAN explains that it was standard practice that others served as intermediaries between NIXON and DEAN] Mr. DEAN. No, No, sir. As I had explained in my testimony, I was proceeding on a conversation I had with Mr. Ehrlichman after Mr. Ehrlichman indicated and Mr. Colson also had indicated that they had talked directly with the, President about the matter, something which was later confirmed by the President himself in conversations with him. Senator GURNEY. Did you ever have a meeting -with Mr. Magruder, let me See on this, in January or December, in -which there was a discussion about, the planning of the Watergate? Do you remember anything about that? Mr. DEAN. I recall Mr. Magruder coming to my office one. time, and this is--I saw part, of Mr. Magruder's testimony on this before this committee. It is one if I have seen 3 hours total I would be, surprised, but I did see part of Mr. Magruder, I caught one section of the questioning of him, I believe it, was during the questioning of him, in which he -made a reference, to this. I think what he is referring to Senator GURNEY. What did he refer to? Mr. DEAN. He was referring to the fact that my memory had gotten suddenly foggy. I have never, as I testified before this committee, understood -what happened between, with any clarity, between February 4 and June 17, and I was--we were talking about that. I think he also was referring to the meeting on--he may have been mixing the meetings and referring to the fact that on March 28, when I came back from Camp David that I was playing very dumb, I was playing very reluctant--and I was. I did not, want to engage in a, discussion of my recollection of those meetings, because we had gone over that before, and I had made my decision by that time as to what I was going to do and I did not, want to get into a debate on it. I believe he, also referred to the fact that I taped that conversation That is not correct. [00.59.13]
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, July 10, 1973
[00.19.30-MITCHELL discusses government plans for Domestic Intelligence] I know that Mr. Hoover and Mr. Helms had broken off their liaison that they had established in connection with the CIA and the FBI. There was great interest in finding a vehicle to reestablish that In a meaningful way. and so that basically the implementation of an Interagency Evaluation Commission was to take personnel from the different intelligence-gathering areas. Put them into one room where they Could sort out and exchange ideas and, of course intelligence had. One of the problems that I found in Government was that there was very frequently a great deal of collection of intelligence but the evaluation and dissemination lacked a great deal. [00.20.29] Mr. THOMPSON. Then, was this need for- better coordination because Of problems that the agencies themselves were having internally or was it because of external considerations or both? Mr. MITCHELL. Well. I think I can best answer that to point out, that there were many events that happened in this Country. including the bombing of the Capitol and other such events that, if we had had appropriate intelligence in advance, we might have been able to prohibit it. [00.21.07-MITCHELL expresses paranoia about DEMONSTRATORS] I know that In connection with many Of the large demonstrations, that we had in Washington, while 99 percent of those people who came, came for peaceful protest and I to petition their Government, there was always that lunatic fringe that was bound and determined to thrash the place and cause damage, and if we had had better intelligence in some of these areas, and I am not excluding them to those but in other, areas, but perhaps a great deal of that could have been prevented. That was the basis upon -which the Interagency Evaluation Committee was considered in concept and put into place. [00.21.52-THOMPSON asks MITCHELL about meeting LIDDY and hiring him to the CRP] Mr. THOMPSON. Let us leave that for a moment and invite your attention to the November 24, 1971 meeting which I believe you had With Mr. Liddy and Mr. Dean when 'Mr. Dean brought Mr. Liddy to your office. Mr. MITCHELL. Yes. sir. Mr. THOMPSON. And I believe introduced him to you. I believe your response to questioning this morning was to the effect that at that time you were not aware that Mr. Liddy was to be involved in intelligence activities as such but that later on you understood that he would be. Mr. MITCHELL. No; I don't think that is quite true, Mr. Thompson. What I referred to was the Liddy prospectus about his job description at that time, which was one of the Dean exhibits, had a one-line reference to it in connection with gathering of information of intelligence or whatever it might be. Mr. THOMPSON. Just the one line. Do you recall any discussion about that? Mr. MITCHELL. I don't. As a matter of fact, it is one sentence, not one line. Mr. THOMPSON. Do you have that before you? Mr. MITCHELL. This is exhibit 11 of the bean exhibits. I don't know what committee exhibit it might be. Mr. THOMPSON. And you don't remember any discussion about that at the time? Mr. MITCHELL. No, sir; the meeting didn't last long enough. [00.23.08] Mr. THOMPSON. Did there come a time between that time and January 27 when you became aware, or had a greater understanding as to what his role would be in the intelligence field? [00.23.22] Mr. MITCHELL. Well I might say that. sometime during early December before Liddy was hired by the Committee To Re-Elect the President, Mr. Krogh brought Liddy over, and I may have, been--along with other people to discuss the, Drug Abuse Law Enforcement in which he had been working and which was my knowledge of Mr. Liddy's activities in the White House. I do not recall an any meeting and I am sure the meeting didn't, take place, In, which Liddy's intelligence activities were discussed. It, could very well be that Mr. Magruder, Mr. Dean -who I understand did have meetings during that period with Mr. Liddy may have made, reference to the fact that he was gathering intelligence. [00.24.09] Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Krogh brought him to your office, you say, in December, you think, of that year? Mr. MITCHELL. Yes, sir; I can give you the exact date if you wish. Mr. THOMPSON. DO you recall right off hand whether it was before, or after he -went to the Committee To Re-Elect? Mr. MITCHELL. Well I believe it would have to be before he went to the Committee To Re-Elect because he was working on this DALE program, the drug program. Mr. THOMPSON. All right. Mr. MITCHELL. It is December 9, 1971. And there had been of course, a series of meetings all over the Government including the, White House, the Justice, Department, HEW, and other places preliminary to setting up the Drug Abuse Law Enforcement program. [00.24.54]
NPACT coverage of Church Committee Hearings - Associate Deputy FBI Director Jame
Shot opens to Senator FRANK CHURCH reading a letter the FBI sent to King suggesting that he commit suicide or else "you are done, there is but one way out for you", Church then asks for Adam's interpretation of the letter - he says he does not know what it's purpose was but he does not agree with the committee's conclusion that it is a suicide urging - Church presses him to interpret a couple of lines which obviously suggest suicide and Adams weakly shuffles around them - Adams says there is no justification for the FBI having sent that letter. Senator WALTER MONDALE asks what the legal basis was for FBI investigation of King for communist influences - Adams has a really hard time with this one, realizing he has no ground to stand on, and tries to scuttle around the question by giving FBI history of investigating the labor movement, finally he takes the easy exit and concedes that it falls under the presidential directive to investigate subversive activities and this then places the blame on the White House - Mondale points out other grounds on which the FBI was investigating King also do not hold up
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 7, 1973
[00.35.52] Senator ERVIN. Rule 25 of the committee, rules provides that any person who is the subject of an investigation and public hearings may submit to the chairman questions in writing for cross-examination the witnesses. Their formulation and admissibility shall be decided by the committee in accordance with Rule 24. [brief view of SLOAN'S WIFE sitting with counsel behind SLOAN.] Rule 24 gives the committee the power to rephrase the questions that are asked. Mr. Robert Barker, who is counsel for Mr. Stans, has contacted the committee and asked the committee to put the following questions to Mr. Sloan. Mr. Sloan, you have testified that you have checked -with Mr. Stans about certain payments to Mr. Porter. -Now, this is the first question Mr. Barker wants us to ask you: When did this occur? Mr. SLOAN. My best, recollection, Senator, would have been on the occasion of the first request in the post-April 7 period for funds. I could not place it in a precise date. Senator ERVIN. The second question is what amounts, if any, were involved? Mr. SLOAN. I do not believe that we even mentioned the precise dollar amount. I think it, was an expression of concern on my part, whether this was continued, to continue in light of both my understanding and Secretary Stans' understanding that he was no longer to receive funds. I am not even sure the dollar figure came up. Senator ERVIN. Was; anyone else present tit, the time you checked with Mr. Stans about the payments to Mr. Porter? Mr. SLOAN. No sir. Senator ERVIN. Did you check with Mr. Stans as to any payment to either Liddy or Porter after the time you checked about Magruder's authority to authorize an $83,000 payment to Liddy? Mr. SLOAN. No, sir. I do not believe I ever checked with him on a dollar amount. It was purely the authority. Senator ERVIN. Do you recall what amount of money was made to Porter after April 7, 1972? Mr. SLOAN. Senator, my best recollection of that figure was approximately $6,000. I understand Mr. Porter's general recollection to the General Accounting Office was $11,000. I have no reason to dispute that figure. Senator ERVIN. There is another question which Mr. Barker asked which really is four questions and relates to payments that you made to Mr. Kalmbach. The first, is: Did You make any payments to Mr. Kalmbach after February 15, 1972? Mr. SLOAN. Yes, sir. Senator ERVIN. The second subdivision of this question is: If so, what was the amount, of these payments? Mr. SLOAN. I am really not sure, Senator. They were not tremendous amounts, There may have been two or three at the most. Senator ERVIN. The third subdivision of the question is: What were these payments for, these payments to Mr. Kalmbach after February 15, 1972? Mr. SLOAN. I have no idea, Senator. Senator ERVIN. The fourth subdivision of the question is: Were they disclosed On periodic summaries after February 15, 1972? Mr. SLOAN. Yes, sir, all the funds I handled were covered in that report to Secretary Stans. Senator ERVIN. They were? Mr. SLOAN. Yes, sir. Senator ERVIN. Now, as I understand you, after you had prepared what the committee called a summation Of all of these disbursements, you gave that to Secretary Stans? Mr. SLOAN. Yes, sir, I did. Senator ERVIN. Did you make more than one copy? Mr. SLOAN. I may have at the time it was typed, but in the light of-in my understanding, more than a. single copy, whatever copies, would have been destroyed at the same time its the book, yes, sir Senator ERVIN. And after you had imparted the sum total of what your record disclosed in this statement that you furnished to Mr. Stans, you destroyed your record? Mr. SLOAN. Yes, sir. Senator ERVIN. Now, 37011 testified, as I recall, that you had put rather a--rather you testified on the examination of Senator Gurney Senator Weicker and Senator Montoya about the conversation you had -with Mr. Haldeman. Mr. SLOAN. Yes, sir. Senator ERVIN. When did that occur? Mr. Mr. SLOAN. I probably could find a precise date. I neglected to look it up last night and I apologize. -My best, recollection would be toward the end of January or early February, somewhere in that point. Senator ERVIN. This year? Mr. SLOAN. Yes, sir, it was while I was a consultant at the committee. Senator ERVIN. Where did this occur? Mr. SLOAN. In Mr. Haldeman's office at, the White House. Senator ERVIN. Then you stated Mi. Haldeman told you he had nothing to do with the Watergate affair? Mr. SLOAN. Yes, sir. Senator ERVIN. But he told you that he knew about the, Segretti matter and that when the Segretti matter was revealed, that it would be understandable? Mr. SLOAN. Yes, sir, or words to that effect. Senator ERVIN. Well, that occurred in January of this year? Mr. SLOAN. January or early February. Senator ERVIN, So far as you know, has Mr. Haldeman ever revealed anything about the Segretti matter to the general public or anybody else? Mr. SLOAN. -Not that I am aware of, sir. Senator ERVIN. Do you know what the expression "laundering checks" means? Mr. SLOAN. What expression? Senator ERVIN. "Laundering checks." Mr. SLOAN. I read the term numerous times, Senator. I do not have any precise knowledge of what that term is. [00.41.31]
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, July 10, 1973
[00.27.51-DASH continues to interrogate MITCHELL about the developing COVERUP of Watergate] Mr. DASH. -Now, during" the period which is the latter part, of June, July and perhaps August, you did become somewhat aware, not fully aware, of the fact that Mr. Magruder had been very much involved in the so-called Liddy bugging operation of the Democratic National Committee headquarters, and also of the Liddy-Hunt operations you have indicated for the plumbers activities that you have described earlier. Were you not also aware, Mr. Mitchell. of the wiretapping of certain journalists and staff members of Mr. Kissinger after the so-called leaks of the SALT talks? Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. Dash, which question do you Want me to answer? Mr. DASH. I think. the first. [00.28.46-MITCHELL gets evasive] Mr. MITCHELL. We are going: from July 1972 back in some place in 1969 and I am not quite sure how you want me to approach it. Mr. DASH. Well. you did become aware during June and July of Mr. Magruder's involvement in die break-in of the Democratic National Committee headquarters? [00.29.05] Mr. MITCHELL. We had people such as Mr. Liddy and so forth say Yes, that Magruder was involved. Magruder was saying no at one time and maybe yes the other time, and so forth. but -we were aware of the fact that certainly Mr. Magruder had provided the money if nothing else and that during, the latter part of June and the early part of July seemed to be what all the focus was as to how much money Mr. Magruder had provided to Mr. Liddy, Mr. DASH. Well, there came a time when you were aware that Magruder himself had admitted to certain persons, whether Mr. Mardian or Mr. Parkinson, that he had been involved but was going to give a false story about what he had done. [00.29.48-MITCHELL acts real innocent about whether he SUBORNED PERJURY in MAGRUDER'S case] Mr. MITCHELL. Well. I don't want to get Mr. Parkinson in there and I don't know about Mr. Mardian because Mr. Magruder told them two or three different stories, and Mr. Parkinson. and Mr. O'Brien previously Went ahead on the story that they thought was to be the facts. As I understand the sequence of events when this thrashing around was involved, occurred, involving everybody from the President of the United States and the chairman of this committee and everybody on down the line as anybody they could think of to name, Mr. Parkinson. Senator ERVIN. [presiding]. Just a minute. did they accuse this chairman? Mr. MITCHELL. NO. Sir. this committee. I was going to use some other committee. I think -we had better use some other committee. [Laughter.] [00.30.37] The fact of the matter is that to the best of my recollection that Mr. Parkinson got Mr. Magruder and Mr. Porter down to his office and put them in a room and said now "I want You to 'write down what your statement is on this subject matter because it probably Is going to he, used as a deposition before the grand jury or certainly for submission to the Justice Department." So I want to make sure that Mr. O'Brien--that Mr. Parkinson is not involved in this. It got to the point where I had a very. very strong suspicion as to what the involvement was, yes. [00.31.19] Mr. DASH. With that you also had the suspicion, if that is the word you want to use. that Mr. Magruder's story which he was writing down and which he was going to give in a deposition to the grand jury was not a true story. Mr. MITCHELL. Well, this came out later. I didn't know what he was writing down July 15 or whatever it was, it came later. Mr. DASH. There, came a time when you did become aware of that. Mr. MITCHELL. That is right. Mr. DASH. When was that?, Mr. MITCHELL. I would say it was sometime before he went, to the grand Jury, sometime. I don't want to duck your question. on these, wiretaps that happened back in 1969. Mr. DASH. I will come back to that in a second. But you did become aware, by the time he testified on the grand jury that Mr. Magruder was, in fact, testifying to a false story. [00.32.12] Mr. MITCHELL. I became aware or had a belief that it was a false story. Mr. DASH. As a matter of fact, there were a number of meetings that you had with Mr. Dean, Mr. Magruder, Mr. LaRue, and Mr. Mardian, and at least in way part of the. discussion that took place that time, was Mr. Magruder's testimony before the grand jury? Mr. MITCHELL. I would think there would have been More than one meeting on the subject matter, yes. Mr. DASH. I think the calendar would show there Were quite a number of meetings in which you met, Mr. MITCHELL. There were a lot of meetings, with a lot of matters being discussed at that time, Mr. DASH. Also was it true that Mr. Dean began to serve as sort of a liaison between this group that you were meeting with and Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman? Mr. MITCHELL. Well, Mr. Dean was serving as a liaison between the Committee To Re-Elect the President and the White House and I am sure that would have meant Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman. [00.33.08]
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 27, 1973
[00.56.01-DEAN identifies more White House documents for the record, concerning the ENEMIES LIST] The next document is a page of a news summary. I don't know the date of the news summary. It has a notation on the top, "Dean/L," Mr. DASH. When you say news summary--- Mr. DEAN. This is the daily news summary that is prepared for the President and distributed to various members of the White House staff. The "Dean/L" indicates that it -was to me from Mr. Higby and he has encircled DNC Treasurer Robert Strauss, with a note, "Is he on our list? Or should he, be?" Mr. DASH. Did you respond to that? Mr. DEAN. NO, sir; I did not. As I say, most of these merely went into a file in my office, where I just gathered them. The next document I have is a document entitled "Corporate Executives Committee for Peace, Trip to Washington, June 25, 1970," with a list of names, This was another document that was sent as a part of one of the continuing updates. Mr. DASH. What is the source Of that document? Mr. DEAN. That would have been from Mr. Colson's office. The next document is entitled "Democratic Contributors of $25,000 or More, in the 1968 Campaigns" -from June 20, 1971, New York Times story with certain names checked on the list. This is a document that came, again, from Mr. Colson's staff. Next is a series of documents that relate to Muskie contributors. Part of it is cut off on the top here in the xerography process and this document was forwarded to me from Mr. Colson's office also. [00.58.33] The next document begins--it is a blank sheet of paper, which is briefing paper that I was requested to prepare for Mr. Haldeman so that he could deal with the Secretary of the Treasury with regard to making the Internal Revenue Service politically responsive to the White House. This document was prepared--the top document was prepared by myself; I, the attached document was prepared by Mr. Caulfield based on Conversations he had had with individuals in the Treasury Department as well as the last document was prepared by Mr. Caulfield as a result -of conversations he had -with people in the Treasury Department and in the Internal Revenue Service. Mr. DASH. That was prepared by you with Mr. Caulfield's assistance to be delivered to Mr. Haldeman? Mr. DEAN. That is correct. Mr. DASH. Was it delivered to Mr. Haldeman? Mr. DEAN. Yes, it -was. The last document for identification is the Memorandum dated August 16, 1971. It was a draft in my files in which I was asked to prepare a strategy for dealing with political enemies that involved the entire. White House staff, and it was sent forward, to the best of my recollection to Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman for approval, disapproval or comment, Now, without going to my files in the While House, I can't tell you the disposition of this document. [01.00.11]
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee Hearings on Presidential Campaign Activities, May 18, 1973 - Testimony of James McCord (Jim McCord)
Samuel Dash, attorney. I have one further question. James McCord. I will answer any question. Samuel Dash, attorney. Have you ever made that statement before this select committee, other than when you appeared before Minority counsel and myself a couple of days ago. But, have you ever made that statement before this committee, before the Grand Jury or before any investigating body until this time? James McCord. No sir. Samuel Dash, attorney. Could you please state to the committee why when you were making statements at earlier times before this committee, before the Grand Jury and other inquiring bodies you failed to disclose that information? James McCord. I'd be glad to. To take the Grand Jury, and get that one out of the way, when I appeared before the Grand Jury I told them, they inquired about political pressure. I raised the pressure that had been put to me by the Hunts. And told them as well that there was a personal friend who was involved also in political pressure against me, that personally at that point in time it was very painful thing to go into it, that I would be glad to do it at a later time and I hoped that they would defer that question till subsequent questioning and I would be glad to answer it. They said they would do so. I believe when I appeared before the Executive Committee here on March 28th, that your senators asked me the same question, and that I said "yes, there had been political pressure applied to me". That one such pressure had been by a government, one of your Senators asked me if it were by a government employee, I think Senator Montoya and I responded "yes." And he asked if it were anyone with the White House and I said "no". He asked if it were from the Department of Justice and I said "no". It was clear, I think to the Committee that I would like to able to answer that question at a later time. The reason for the delay is that I wanted to be as accurate as I could about the information and get it all together because it involved the President of the United States, in my opinion. And it was a very serious matter and I wanted to be very careful about it and accurate. Samuel Dash, attorney. I have no further questions Mr. Chairman.
JFK Assassination Hearings - E. Aschkenasy & Mark Weiss, H.B. McClain
Gary T. Cornwell, Deputy Chief Counsel. U.S. House Representative Louis Stokes (D-OH) recognizes Washington D.C. Delegate Walter Fauntroy (D) who confirms with Cornwell that a pistol could fire at or above super sonic speeds. Various requests are made by Cornwall, Rep. Christopher Dodd (D-CT) of the two witnesses, Ernest Aschkenasy and Mark Weiss to appear again before the committee.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 29, 1973 (1/2)
[00.54.10-DEAN states that he told NIXON that DEAN had no knowledge that the LIDDY plan had been approved, or how it had been approved] Senator BAKER. Did you say that on your own initiative, or did he put a question to you 'to that effect? Mr. DEAN. No, at, the outset, I was doing most of the. talking and giving him my general presentation of this matter. I can't recall when I basically presented it, to him. As to interruptions by him. it was toward the end that he began asking me questions that are now not very clear to me as to the questions he did ask. [00.54.42-BAKER prods DEAN for more details of DEAN'S "CANCER ON THE PRESIDENCY" warning to NIXON] Senator BAKER. If you would, Mr. Dean, -work- your -way through the, conversation and then particularly, try to recall what the President may have asked you. Mr. DEAN. I told the President that I had learned that there had been pressure from Mr. Colson's office, on Mr. Magruder, that I was aware of that degree of pressure from the White House, but I didn't have all the details on that at, even that time. [00.55.05-DEAN alludes that MAGRUDER mentioned to him in early 1972 that COLSON (White House) had pressured MAGRUDER to get the LIDDY plan (break-in) approved] In fact, I might want to add this in testimony at, this point, because as I recall, I may have mentioned this to the President; I am not certain. I recall one occasion, on walking from the White House Executive Office, Building to the Re-Election Committee to one of the meetings in Mr. Mitchell's office, I met Mr. Magruder as I was walking over there,. He was returning to the Re-Election Committee. We were standing at the stop light at, the corner of 17th and Pennsylvania Avenue across the street from the Executive Office Building. At that very moment--and I recall very vividly Mr. Magruder telling me that because of the pressure from Mr. Colson--they were afraid that, Mr. Colson would take this operation over. and they were concerned about his taking it over. That had been one of Magruder's expressions of concern as to why the matter had zone, forward. Senator BAKER. Do I understand you to say--- Mr. DEAN. I don't recall getting into that detail with the President, but I don't believe I had testified to that before and I wanted to put that into the record. [00.56.17-DEAN is certain that he told NIXON on March 21, 1973 that pressure to approve the LIDDY plan came from the White House, something NIXON continued to deny publicly] Senator BAKER. Is it your impression that you did tell the President something or all of this? Mr. DEAN. I told him of the pressure, from Mr. Colson's office on Mr. Magruder, because I was aware of this, conversation. Senator BAKER. All right: go ahead, Mr. Dean. Mr. DEAN. I told him I didn't, know if Mitchell had approved the, Plan, that I had never asked Mr. Mitchell directly whether he had, but I was aware from my conversations -with Mr. Magruder that Mitchell had been the recipient of wiretap information and that Mr. Haldeman had also received, through Mr. Strachan, some of the information from the Democratic National Committee. [00.57.04-DEAN discusses his conversation with NIXON on March 21, 1973 regarding the liability to a charge of OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE] That generally covered what I told him of my knowledge, of the pre-June 17 situation. and then I again went into rather broad generalities as to what had occurred after June 17. I told him, I raised the principal points that I thought -were of concern, that the individuals that had been involved had been paid for their silence, and in fact, this had involved Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Ehrlichman, and myself and Mr. Mitchell in giving instructions to Mr. Kalmbach. I had mentioned this. I might add, the fact that I had been a conduit for this type of information at an earlier meeting with the., President, back in February, and he had disagreed with me as to the fact that I had had any legal problems from being a conduit. We did not get into any -great detail on that matter and he didn't seem to want to get into detail on that point when I raised that. Senator BAKER. Is that, the essence, now, of this meeting? Mr. DEAN. No, sir, it is not. Senator BAKER. Incidentally, I have forgotten the date. Tell me the date in March. Is this March 21? Mr. DEAN. The morning of March 21, that is correct. Senator BAKER. Go ahead, sir. [00.58.18] Mr. DEAN. I mentioned to him the fact that I had, after the decision had been made that Mr. Magruder remain at the Re-Election Committee, that I had assisted Magruder in preparing his testimony for the grand jury, which was perjured testimony. Senator BAKER. Did you use that term? Mr. DEAN. I don't think I used the term "perjured." I think I used "false testimony." Senator BAKER. But at any rate, it was a description of your preparation of Mr. Magruder for his appearance before the grand jury? Mr. DEAN. That is correct. Senator BAKER. Go ahead, sir. [00.58.50-DEAN testifies that he told NIXON on 3/21/73 that WHITE HOUSE funds were used for the PAYOFFS of the DEFENDANTS] Mr. DEAN. I also mentioned to him the fact that as a result of the lack of money that was available that finally, there. had been cash at the White House that had been used to pay for these individuals silence. I was reefering then to the $350,000 and I did not give him the details at that point in time. Senator BAKER. This is the $350,000 fund that was at the White, House. Mr. DEAN,. That is correct, in cash.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 27, 1973
[01.00.11-DEAN continues to identify documents related to the White House ENEMIES LIST] Mr. DASH. But can you tell us whether or not that document was in fact sent forward? Mr. DEAN. Either in this form or in some form where -the names were typed on It. Mr. DASH. Thank you, Mr. DEAN. Mr. DEAN. I Just noticed there were two other documents attached to that. On July 16, 1971, there is another update on the opponents list, adding a name. This again is from Mr. Colson's office. Senator ERVIN. With Senator Inouye's indulgence, I am going to ask- you one question about a paper that you identified in this connection called "Subject: Opponent Priority Activity," a three-page document and see If you can give me the date of the origin of that. Mr. DEAN. Senator, I am not sure which document you are referring to. Senator ERVIN. It is the one called, "Subject: Opponent Priority Activity," on the heading It is three pages. You had it this morning. Mr. DASH. I have that, Mr. Dean. I didn't forward that to you here. I can forward that to you now. The one I think you identified at the end of the morning session--one that had a memorandum of June 24 from Mr. Bell. Mr. DEAN. Yes. I was forwarding that. Senator ERVIN. I want to find out, on page 2, the, name of Sterling Munro, Jr., Senator Jackson's AA. Do you have anything that indicates whether Mr. Munro was added on the list of opponents? Mr. DEAN. No. I don't. This is one, of the--I can only assume that this 'was around June 24 when the document was prepared by a member of Mr. Colson's staff and forwarded to my office as a part of this general list, Senator ERVIN. That would be June 24, what year? Mr. DEAN. That is 1971. Senator ERVIN. Thank you. Mr. DASH. Could I have the documents back, Mr. Dean ? [01.02.12-ERVIN HUMOR!!!] Senator ERVIN. I can't forbear observing when I consider the list of opponents why the Democratic vote was so light in the general election. Senator BAKER. Mr. Chairman. Senator ERVIN. Yes, Sir. [01.02.31-BAKER GETS INTO THE ACT] Senator BAKER. I really even in my wildest dreams 'would not think of trying to improve or embellish on your story but you told it better the first time -when -you leaned over to' me and you said "I think I am going to demand a recount," when you said "There are more enemies than we got votes." [Laughter.] [01.02.58] Senator ERVIN. Senator Inouye. Senator INOUYE. Mr. Chairman, the charges contained in Mr. Dean's testimony are extremely serious with potentially grave consequences. The President of the United States has been implicated, and because of the. gravity of these charges, I believe that the witness, Mr. John Dean, should be subjected by this committee to the most intense interrogation to test his credibility. It -would appear to me, that a most appropriate credibility test would be one prepared by the White House and as you, Mr. Chairman know, the White House has prepared a memorandum and a set of questions for use by this committee. These questions should serve as a substitute, admittedly not the very best, but a substitute for cross-examination of Mr. Dean by the President of the United States. Accordingly, I believe that it -would be most appropriate to use these questions and to use the memorandum, [01.04.12-TAPE OUT]
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 14, 1973
[00.19.06] Senator ERVIN. You do not know to what extent Mr. Colson knew what was going on but you do know that Colson had called you and urged you seek to do what you could to hurry up the approval of the budget for Liddy's operations? Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes, Sir. Senator ERVIN. And he said, -and he wanted Hunt to be hired to take part in -it? Mr. MAGRUDER. Mr. Howard, his, assistant, asked me about that yes sir. Senator ERVIN He wanted the information on O'Brien did he not? Mr. MAGRUDER. Mr. Colson did yes, sir. Senator ERVIN. Yes, Now, with respect to Mr. Haldeman---Mr. Haldeman at that time stood next to the President did he, not? Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes sir. Senator ERVIN. He exercised more governmental power than any body in the executive branch of the Government with the exception of the President. Mr. MAGRUDER. That is correct. Senator ERVIN. And Mr. Strachan was his liaison man with the Committee, To Re-Elect. the President. And all through this time that they were planning these operations that, were, being recommended by Liddy and agreeing on the plan, you kept Mr. Strachan fully informed as to those, matters? Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes. In fairness to Mr. Strachan, as the coverup story continued and developed, Mr. Strachan basically dropped out of the picture and Mr. Dean, in effect, became our liaison on the coverup story. I do not think it, is fair. to implicate Mr. Strachan to any great extent in the coverup story. Senator ERVIN. Well, do you implicate Mr. Strachan as a man who was supposed to be carrying information to Mr. Haldeman? Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes, sir. Senator ERVIN. And you know you gave to Mr. Strachan complete information about the plans for the bugging and the burglary as they were, developing? Mr. MAGRUDER. That is correct. Senator ERVIN. So we have got to draw this inference, do we not, that either Mr. Strachan failed to perform his duties as liaison man between the committee and Mr. Haldeman or he did perform those, duties. Do we not have to take a, choice between those two things? ? Mr. MAGRUDER. Senator, I would rather that you take the choice to be honest with you, because I think it is unfair. for me to make an assumption that I have no basis in fact. I just do not have any basis of fact. Senator ERVIN. I do not have the privilege. of knowing Mr. Strachan but you do. Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes, Sir. Senator ERVIN. Is he the kind of a man that, you think would perform the duties he obligated himself to perform? Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes, I do, sir. Senator ERVIN. And the -duties he obligated himself to perform were to carry the information you gave him about the plans for the, bugging and the burglary to Mr. Haldeman? Mr. MAGRUDER. That would be correct, Senator ERVIN. Now, immediately after the break-in became public news you were called by long-distance telephone by Mr. Haldeman? Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes, sir. Senator ERVIN. And he asked You what had happened. Now Did you not construe that to be a request for information about the fact that five men had been caught in a burglary in the Watergate, did you, because. that had appeared in the papers and on the radio and TV? Mr. MAGRUDER. I think. Senator. what he was really interested in is what we were doing about it, not that five men had been caught, but what were we going to do about it. Senator ERVIN. Since the police had the people, under arrest, what do you think Mr. Haldeman thought you ought to be doing about it since you were not a police officer? Mr. MAGRUDER. Senator. what I think we were attempting to do was to attempt to handle it at that point, in time from a public relations standpoint to deny it. Which we did. [00.22.51] Senator ERVIN. Well. if Mr. Haldeman did not have any reason to suspect that the Committee to Re-Elect the President had anything to do with it, why did he 'want you to do anything about it? Mr. MAGRUDER. I think. Senator, because Mr. McCord was, apprehended in that group,. And he was our security chief. Senator ERVIN. Well. I do not think you want to answer this question I was going To ask if Haldeman would know a little more than that if Mr. Strachan had performed his mission to give him the information that you had given him about the preparations for this mission. Would he not? Mr. MAGRUDER. If he had done that, yes, sir. Senator ERVIN. Well. anyway , after that conversation you talked to Mr. Haldeman on a number of occasions about what you call a public relations matter? ~ Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes. Senator ERVIN. That was as to how you were going to answer all of the, charges made by the press about the complicity of persons in the committee and persons in the White House about this affair? Mr. MAGRUDER. I think we can honestly say that any key officials in the White House and the committee would discussed that matter, There were many people who were not involved in any way in the planning and coverup that did work on how to handle this--these charges. Senator ERVIN. Now, as a matter of fact, there -were you and others in the Committee To Re-Elect the President and you had a public relations officer, Mr. Shumway. did you not? Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes, sir. Senator ERVIN. MY what is Al r. Shumway's name? Mr. MAGRUDER. DeVan Shumway. Senator ERVIN. And almost daily Mr. Shumway was issuing statements to the effect that none of you *all had anything to do with it? Mr. MAGRUDER. That is correct, sir. [00.24.34]
Impeachment Hearings. House Judiciary Committee, July 30, 1974. Cambodia Bombing Article of Impeachment. William S. Cohen
Harold D. Donohue (D Massachusetts). The Chair will now recognize the gentleman from Maine, Mr. Cohen. William S. Cohen (R Maine). Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I will be brief on this particular issue. The basis, as I understand, for this article is that this constituted a usurpation of power by the President, a power properly belonging to the Congress. And I do not think that anyone here will contest that. I think the bombing was wrong, because it was done secretly, and it was done without Congress consent. But while this usurpation may have taken place, I happen to believe that the usurpation has come about not through the bold power of the President, but rather through the sloth and default on the part of the Congress, because over the years there was a good 10 years that Congress failed to take very strong action in this area in which we have the ultimate and sole control.
Impeachment Hearings. House Judiciary Committee, July 30, 1974. Cambodia Bombing Article of Impeachment. William S. Cohen
William S. Cohen (R Maine). And I would like to yield to the gentleman from Mississippi who wanted to speak on this issue and has not had an opportunity to request time. Trent Lott (R Mississippi). Thank you. I will be very brief. I do want to follow up on your comments. Congress had another opportunity to act when we passed last year the so-called War Powers Resolution, but the effect of the actual wording of that resolution, in my opinion, and in others that have studied this question, instead of really restraining the President did actually authorize resumption of the Cambodian bombing that Congress had tried to end. So it is obvious to me that Congress has to share the blame here. And I think once again we must look at the results. President Nixon did not start this war but he ended it, and the Cambodian bombing obviously was one of the things that was used to bring it to a conclusion. Thank you.
Impeachment Hearings. House Judiciary Committee, July 30, 1974. Cambodia Bombing Article of Impeachment. William S. Cohen
William S. Cohen (R Maine). I will yield to the gentlelady from New York. Elizabeth Holtzman (D New York). Thank you. I just wanted to respond to the point on ratification. When Congress voted to cut off the bombing on August 15, Congress was not aware at that point of the secret bombing. The secret bombing was revealed on July 16, 1973, and the votes regarding Cambodian bombing took place prior thereto. There has never been a vote in Congress which in any way could be construed to have ratified that secret bombing. William S. Cohen (R Maine). I believe that article appearing in the New York Times showed that Congress had some prior knowledge about bombing activities taking place in Cambodia, but that is one of the bases of the argument that has been going on for the past 2 or 3 days about the need for the "Plumbers." Harold D. Donohue (D Massachusetts). The time of the gentleman from Maine has expired.
Impeachment Hearings. House Judiciary Committee, July 30, 1974. Cambodia Bombing Article of Impeachment. William S. Cohen
Paul Duke in studio, announces station break
Impeachment Hearings. House Judiciary Committee, July 30, 1974. Cambodia Bombing Article of Impeachment. Henry Smith III
Did Prince Sihanouk acquiesce in it? Well, the evidence there appears to be that he did. Now, we were told at a briefing of Members of Congress that he, acquiesced in it but he said since I am a neutral, if you tell anybody I will deny it. He was bothered by the fact that North Vietnamese and Vietcong were living on his eastern borders. The price of his neutrality was to let them do it or they were going to take over the country. Now, the evidence indicates that he did acquiesce because I looked at some of these 109 protests made by the permanent member, the permanent Commissioner of Cambodia to the United Nations and they were all about helicopters, all about sky hawks. There isn t one, as I understand, about any B-52 bombings. Ms. Holtzman told us how many B-52 bombings took place after the figures came out.
Watergate Impeachment Hearings. House Judiciary Committee, July 27, 1974. Vote to adopt Article one, Watergate Coverup
Peter Rodino (D - New Jersey). The question now occurs on Article I of the Donohue resolution as amended by the Sarbanes substitute as amended. All those in favor please signify by saying aye. [Chorus of "ayes."] Peter Rodino (D - New Jersey). All those opposed, no. [Chorus of "noes".]