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More Opening Day 98th Congress, 1983
Opening Day 98th Congress, U.S. House Representative and Majority Leader Jim Wright (D-TX) discusses proposed nine rule changes, states eight are "inconsequential." A tenth rule changes was not adopted by Democratic Caucus and would have required two-thirds members of the House sign onto a discharge petition to discharge a Constitutional Amendment from the Committee on Jurisdiction. Wright briefly explains changes from the existing rules: 1. Allowing Speaker of the House to postpone roll call vote to approval daily journal. 2. Allow Clerk of the House to manage office of a vacant House member.
Lawmakers, March 22, 1984
Paul Duke reports the Meese confirmation for Attorney General prompted a discussion on the House Floor. Democrats saying that the administration s ethics will be an issue in the 1984 campaign. Representative Tony Coelho (D - California), at podium, This same President, who has deliberately placed religion and morality on the front burner of this election campaign, obviously has a moral blind spot when it comes to his closest aides and country club cronies. President Reagan may have this moral blind spot, but the American people certainly do not. Election day is Judgment Day, Mr. President." Paul Duke comments Rep. Tony Coelho happens to be chair of House Democratic Campaign Committee, which is also sponsoring a TV ad aimed at Reagan s "Moral Blind Spot".
July 26, 1995 - Part 3
Footage of House Committee Hearing on a toxin used in the Branch Davidian raid in Waco, Texas - according to WETA this tape was supposed to be Part 3 of the Whitewater Hearings for July 26, 1995.
Lawmakers 8/04/1983 Congress and Courts
Robert Weiner, Former Staff Director, House Committee on Aging, companies that can harass investigating committees, single companies, by bringing trial and causing time to be wasted away from important investigations, has a chilling effect on investigations.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 12, 1973
[00.57.34] Senator WEICKER. You do not remember, then, sending Miss Duncan to the White House to give Gordon Strachan copies of these photographed documents? Mr. PORTER. I would say that, if it is an answer, I kind of remember it, but not enough to sit and testify that I did it. All right? I mean, I sent Mr. Strachan documents and, on occasion, Miss Duncan would hand carry them for one reason or another--either because the messenger was not going to come back until 4 o'clock and it was noon, or Mr. 'Magruder wanted to get, something over there right away, or something like that, and the secretaries would hand carry them. Senator WEICKER. I have no further questions, MR. Chairman. [00.58.16--MacNEILL in studio] MacNEILL states that PORTER has given much more information about espionage on the MUSKIE campaign. Solicits viewer response to the coverage on Public Television, urges sending comments and donations to local PBS stations [PBS network ID--title screen "SENATE HEARINGS ON CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES"] [01.01.32--MacNEILL in studio] Mac NEILL introduces questioning by Senator MONTOYA., and states that the next hour of testimony will feature some of Senator ERVIN'S now-famous Shakespearean quotations [01.01.53--committee table] Senator ERVIN. Senator Montoya. Senator MONTOYA. Mr. Porter, I believe at One Stage in your testimony, you stated that you had been instructed by Mr. LaRue, Mr. Magruder, Mr. Parkinson, and Mr. O'Brien not to mention Mr. Reisner in your testimony. Mr., PORTER. Yes, sir. I think, again, I am not sure that. I stated it exactly that way. I think what stated was that Mr. Magruder specifically asked me not to bring up Mr. Reisner's name to the FBI or to the grand jury. Mr. Parkinson-- Senator MONTOYA. Did you ask him for any reasons why? Mr. PORTER. I believe I asked Mr. Magruder why, and he said, well, he said, Bob's not involved in any of this. He is a, young guy, why don't you leave him? You know, it does not do any good to drag his name into it--words to that effect. Those are the same words I think Mr. Parkinson used--oh, he is a young fellow, he does not have to be dragged into this. If you do not have to mention his name, do not, mention it.' Senator MONTOYA. Did you know at any time that he might,, could be involved? Mr. PORTER. No, sir; I did not. Senator MONTOYA. What was Mr. Reisner's capacity or position in the CRP at that time? Mr. PORTER, Mr. Reisner was Mr. Magruder's administrative assistant, Senator MONTOYA. And pursuant to your conversation with Mr. Parkinson and the other people, _you did appear before the FBI, or you were interviewed by the FBI, you did appear before the grand jury, and you did appear before the U.S. attorney, did you not? Mr. PORTER, I did appear before the FBI--they did interview me. I did appear before the grand jury on one occasion, and I did appear at the trial of Mr. Liddy and Mr. McCord. Senator MONTOYA. And the testimony which you have used at all three places was with respect to the disbursement of approximately $100,000? Mr. PORTER. No, sir, that is not correct. Senator MONTOYA. What was your testimony? Mr. PORTER. My testimony was that I gave Mr. Liddy approximately $35,000--$30,000 to $35,000 which is correct. What, I stated that was not correct, was---- [01.04.29--TAPE OUT]
CONGRESS: WE THE PEOPLE
Norm Ornstein outside offices of the Rules Committee Chairman Richard Bolling. Shot of a hearing of the Rules Committee, Rep. JIM WRIGHT is the witness. V.O.-most witnesses are members of Congress, who lobby the Rules Committee to have their bills treated favorably in terms of length of debate and scheduling. Shots of Congressmen Phil Gramm and John Dingle waiting to testify. Jim Wright testifying describes a "historic" legislative situation. V.O.-Reagan's 1981 Budget plan was subject to Rules Committee decisions, with the Democrats winning a bid to force itemized votes on all of the budget cuts. However, the full House later voted to overrule the Rules Committee's decision. Shot of Rep. RICHARD BOLLING chairing the committee, says that Reagan is abusing his Presidential power by forcing Congress to vote on his budget cuts en masse. Portrait of Bolling. Ornstein discusses how Congressmen have to establish themselves before they can get a leadership committee assignment. Discusses how members seek committee assignments that give them opportunities to bring home the pork for their districts and get re-elected.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, May 23, 1973. Testimony of Anthony Ulasewicz.
Senator ERVIN. Senator Baker, oh excuse me .... (Baker is not seated next to him, chair is empty) Mr. Fred THOMPSON. I believe he's left us.... Senator ERVIN. Yeah, you go ahead. Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Ulasewicz, was not Mr. Ehrlichman responsible for you being hired originally at the White House? Mr. ULASEWICZ. Yes sir. Mr. THOMPSON. Did he direct your work while you were at the White House? Mr. ULASEWICZ. Mr. Caulfield directed my work. Mr. THOMPSON. He did? Was that at the intern at the direction of Mr. Ehrlichman? Did he direct Mr. Caulfield? Mr. ULASEWICZ. That was my impression. Mr. THOMPSON. Between the first telephone call that you made to Mr. McCord until after the trial, did you discuss the calls that you were making to Mr. Ehrlichman or anyone else at the White House? Mr. ULASEWICZ. No sir. Mr. THOMPSON. You only discussed these matters with Mr. Caulfield? Mr. ULASEWICZ. And no one at any time. Mr. THOMPSON. Did you see your role as someone who was delivering certain words which you took down, say in writing and repeated? Or did you see your role as someone who was supposed to engage in conversation with Mr. McCord and paint a picture for him so to speak? Mr. ULASEWICZ. Absolutely not. Strictly as a messenger, to get these phrases over to him and I originally did not repeat them in their full context from Mr. Caulfield, as my recollection is I gave them as phrases. Mr. THOMPSON. Alright, when Mr. McCord responded to those words did you engage in conversation with him then? Mr. ULASEWICZ. No sir.
JFK Assassination HSCA Hearings
House Select Committee on Assassinations hearing on the assassination of U.S. President John F. Kennedy, Committee Deputy Chief Counsel Gary T. Cornwell taking testimony of Professor Mark Weiss and Ernest Aschenasy on the acoustic analysis of the Dallas Police audio transmissions tap. Weiss and Aschenasy confirm they are familiar with the work done by Dr. James E. Barger. Mark Weiss testifies to the validity of Dr. Barger’s sound and echo reconstruction experiment of the JFK assassination in Dealey Plaza. Weiss discusses his and Aschenasy’s work on analyzing Dr. Barger’s finding that there may have been a third shot fired from the grassy knoll.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 26, 1973 - Testimony of John Dean.
Senator Lowell Weicker (R Connecticut). All right. Is there any other use that you made or the White House made of the FBI on matters such as that that come to your recollection now? John Dean. I can recall again, after the fact, getting involved in a situation that involved a FBI investigation that was made of Mr. Daniel Schorr. And when I learned about that after the fact I was told that what had happened is that Mr. Higby who was Mr. Haldeman assistant had received a request from Mr. Haldeman when he was traveling with the President to direct the FBI to do an investigation of Mr. Schorr. Mr. Hoover proceeded with the investigation, but to the dismay of the White House he did a sort of a full-field wide-open investigation and this became very apparent. So this put the White House in a rather scrambling position to explain what had happened. The long and short of the explanation was that Mr. Malek who at the time knew nothing about this said that Mr. Schorr was being considered for a post and that this was a part of a preliminary investigation in consideration of Mr. Schorr for a Presidential appointment in, I believe, the environmental field.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 26, 1973 - Testimony of John Dean.
Senator Lowell Weicker (R Connecticut). All right. You then say, have in your statement, I had occasion to raise a question about these logs with Ehrlichman during the fall of 1972. What was that occasion? John Dean. I tried to recall that as I was preparing my statement and something did occur in which I asked Ehrlichman directly about the logs. And I cannot recall specifically what it was. Again it wasn't something that was of the moment of the Time Magazine inquiry but it was a reference to something about newsmen. There had been on the rumor mill at the White House for some time this fact that the White House had instructed a surveillance of White House staff members and newsmen in dealing with leaks. And I asked Ehrlichman about it. I said, do you have the logs? And he said no. And I let it drop at that. Senator Lowell Weicker (R Connecticut). Even though at that moment in time- John Dean. I knew he had the logs. Senator Lowell Weicker (R Connecticut). You were under the impression from a talk with Mr. Mardian that you did have the logs John Dean. Yes, sir. Senator Lowell Weicker (R Connecticut). I beg your pardon, that he had the logs. John Dean. Yes, sir.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 26, 1973 - Testimony of John Dean.
Samuel Dash, attorney. And did you know what Mr. Haldeman's relationships and duties were with the President during the period January to June 1972? John Dean. Well, I think that everybody who worked at the White House was generally aware of the fact that Mr. Haldeman was the virtual link between a number of, a large number of the White House staff and the President as to what would go into the President. And he would take and summarize and boil down and report to the President regularly all information that was pertinent and important that should come to the President's attention. Samuel Dash, attorney. What was the relationship in the matter of time that Haldeman had with the President? Was it a daily relationship or weekly? What was his contact? John Dean. I would say that Mr. Haldeman spent more time with the President than any other member of the White House staff. Samuel Dash, attorney. Therefore do you have an opinion as to whether Mr. Haldeman would have reported the information he received from Strachan about the DNC break-in plan and the break-in itself to the President, an opinion based on your knowledge of his relationship with the President? John Dean. I believe he probably would have reported it.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 12, 1973
[00.29.28] Senator GURNEY. With anyone whose name I have not mentioned? Mr. PORTER. With anyone whose name you have not mentioned? Senator GURNEY. that is right. Mr. PORTER. Mr. Magruder, although- Senator GURNEY. Besides Mr. 'Magruder, that we have heard about. Mr. PORTER. Yes, sir. I do not, believe so, Senator. I do not, believe so. Senator GURNEY. I understand you had a meeting on January 24, 1972, with Mr. 'Mitchell and Mr. Magruder, is that correct? Mr. PORTER. Correct,. Senator GURNEY,. What was the substance of that Meeting? Mr. PORTER, The substance of that meeting was that many of us who had come on early in the campaign and had been preparing a series of position papers and other reports on various aspects of the campaign and although I was the supposedly director of scheduling I had a few other duties that I had to perform' like putting together an ethnic report, a middle-American vote report, a Spanish-speaking, Spanish American voter-- Senator GURNEY. These were routine. Mr. PORTER. Yes, sir, these were large documents and Mr. Magruder set up a meeting on the 24th for me to deliver these reports to Mr. Mitchell. Senator GURNEY. Nothing occurred in this meeting about bugging, surveilling, sabotage? Mr. PORTER. NO, nothing at all. Senator GURNEY. Just two final. questions. Do you know of your own knowledge whether the President of the United States had nay prior knowledge about Watergate? Mr. PORTER. No, sir, I do not. Senator GURNEY. Surveillance? Mr. PORTER. No, sir, I do not,. Senator GURNEY. Do you know of your own knowledge whether the President of the United States had any participation or knowledge, of the coverup? Mr. PORTER. No, sir, I do not. Senator GURNEY,. Do you yourself have any knowledge of the coverup? Mr. PORTER. Only--- Senator GURNEY,. Other than what you--Mr. Magruder told you? Mr. PORTER. Only to the extent of my own involvement in that. Senator GURNEY,. That is all, Mr. Chairman. Senator ERVIN. Senator Talmadge. Senator TALMADGE. Mr. Porter, what was your position before assuming your position with the Committee To Re-Elect the President? Mr. PORTER. Sir, I was a staff assistant to the President working in Mr. Herb Klein's office at the White House principally in the same area, Senator Talmadge, that of a speaker bureau responding to requests for speakers that would come into the executive offices. Senator TALMADGE. Who offered you that position? Mr. PORTER. I am sorry. Senator TALMADGE. Who offered you that position? Mr. PORTER, I believe Mr. Magruder did back in January of 1971. Senator TALMADGE. Why were you upset when Mr. Magruder suggested that the Committee To Re-Elect the President files and records might be searched? Mr. PORTER. Well, sir, we had an extensive, as I understood it, an extensive advertising plan. We had our key States, that was quite a confidential plan, what States we were targeting, the amounts of money we were going to spend in each State, all the polling data we had, the research data we had, the plans for the telephone banks that ultimately were quite successful that we had. I mean all those things, my whole surrogate planning schedule for the campaign, these were things that I understood could all be subpenaed and made public. Senator TALMADGE. You know of nothing illegal that was in the files? Mr. PORTER. No, sir, I do not, Senator TALMADGE. Why did that upset--excuse me, go ahead. Mr. PORTER. Yes, sir, go ahead. Senator TALMADGE. The only thing you were concerned about was political information of a sensitive nature; is that an accurate statement? Mr. PORTER. That is an accurate statement. Senator TALMADGE. Did Mr. Magruder ever mention the President's name to you when he discussed with you this Watergate matter? Mr. PORTER. The President's name was mentioned, sir, in a context of "Save the President from embarrassment. Doing this for the President." He never, never did he inquire nor did I infer that he, that the President of the United States, was aware of Mr. Magruder's request of me; no, sir. Senator TALMADGE. Did he indicate to you that it was important to keep the investigators from getting to Mr. Mitchell Mr. Haldeman, and the President? Mr. PORTER. No, sir; I think, to answer the, question directly, the answer would be no. However Mr. Magruder did say, I believe, that it, was important that, the investigation be kept to the Watergate investigation and avoid the embarrassment that could be caused by having it, go on to other areas and he specifically mentioned Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Mitchell and the President as being those, and I think those are the three, that, he mentioned that could be embarrassed. Senator TALMADGE. He wanted the Investigators to be kept from Mr. Haldeman, the President, Mr. Mitchell, Mr. is that your testimony? Mr. PORTER. Mr. Magruder didn't key on the investigators as much as he did the opposition, the Democrats coming in. Senator TALMADGE. What was the area of sensitivity there? Why did he mention those specific names? Mr. PORTER. I don't know, sir. Senator TALMADGE. Did Magruder tell you that he had talked 'With Mr. Mitchell about this matter? Mr. PORTER. Yes, sir. [00.35.03]
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 14, 1973
[00.47.51] Senator MONTOYA. Can you elaborate or amplify on their significance ? Mr. MAGRUDER. I did not, pay any attention to the names at all. It did not interest me. Senator MONTOYA. Did you have anything--- Mr. 'MAGRUDER. But I remember the names. Senator MONTOYA. Did you have anything in your files with respect to these. names? Mr. MAGRUDER. Well, -when the documents came in those. names were in the, documents, and I just cannot recall in what context they were in the documents. My recollection was that I thought that they were the positioning that would identify where that bug was, that is what I thought. I would not, I could not verify that. I think that is my recollection of what, Ruby 1, Ruby 2, and Crystal meant. Senator MONTOYA. DO' you mean to tell me you did not read the documents that, -went into the Gemstone file? Mr. -MAGRUDER. I did not say that, sir. I said I read the documents but the jargon, the jargon that Mr. Liddy used was not, of any interest to me. Actually, Senator, I only read the documents once, found them to be useless and did not read them again, Senator MONTOYA. What -about. Sedan Chair. No 2? Mr. MAGRUDER. Sedan Chair. 2, to my recollection, -was an individual who was in the Humphrey campaign, who had been set up before Mr. Liddy came on board, although that could be, incorrect, it, may have been after, and was simply a, as I understood it, I think a disgruntled employee -who was passing information to us. I just do not, know who Sedan Chair. 2 -was. He wrote. one extensive report that I think Porter alluded to Humphrey's campaign in Philadelphia. Senator MONTOYA. Now, you indicated also in testimony heretofore given that, you always assumed that, when Mr. Dean acted that he, had authority either from Mr. Haldeman or Mr. Ehrlichman, did you not? Mr. MAGRUDER. I think, Senator, I said that, his normal reporting relationship -was either between Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman I do not know specifically in every case, whether he was acting in their behalf. Senator MONTOYA. But you were under the belief that, because was employed at the White House under these two gentleman that he was acting for and in their behalf, Is that what you indicated before Mr. MAGRUDER. Senator, in a general context, yes, sir. Senator MONTOYA. What particular part, did Mr. Dean have in forging the plan for the coverup? Now. give me the different stages of the plan, give me the variations from the initial plan, and how it evolved finally. Mr. MAGRUDER. I think for the coverup story now, there, are two parts to the coverup, one, is taking care, of the defendants. My knowledge of that is very limited. it is only that I, in asking were they going to be, taken care of, Mr. Dean and Mr. Mitchell indicated they were. Mr. LaRue has indicated he had involvement in that area, so I don't, I can't speak too Specifically about the money. -Now, as far as the coverup story is concerned, I developed a coverup story myself Senator MONTOYA. All right. When was this developed and who was present in the Initial meeting? Mr. MAGRUDER. Well, we started to meet and realized that we had to come up with the reason why we could have spent $250,000 for- legal activities for Mr. Liddy , so I, in effect. had the responsibility since he had worked for, me to try to figure out how we, could develop a study that would sound legitimate that would cover this $250,000. Senator MONTOYA. Mr. Magruder, if you will pardon me, let us digress from that and let, us go back to what exactly was done by you or others under the Committee To Re-Elect the President with respect to getting these defendants together culminating in their pleading guilty or being tried. Was anything positive done with respect to these defendants? Mr. MAGRUDER. Senator, on the defendants, I am unaware Of the specific activities that were engaged in by other individuals. All I was aware of Was that they were being taken care of and that Mr. Dean, Mr. Mitchell, Mr. LaRue were aware of that. After the break-in it is important, I think. to know I was asked and told to go back and run the, committee and not, worry about, the Watergate case other than how I could assist specifically in the coverup. So I did not involve myself in any of the details of making sure that the defendants were kept in line, so I don't know the details. Senator MONTOYA. If you have no personal connection with that kind of involvement. do you have any knowledge as to who was the engineer for getting these defendants to go along and keeping them together? Mr. MAGRUDER. Senator, to the best Of my knowledge there Was Mr. Dean's and Mr.---I think it is inappropriate for me to say whose it was specifically. I know that Mr. Dean. -Mr. Mitchell. LaRue specifically were working on this problem, each of them having different, roles. I don't think Mr. Mitchell played any operational role. I know LaRue did handle funds and I don't know specifically how much Dean directly involved himself with the defendants and their, lawyers. I simply do not know the details of that.
Music Czar Takes Stand.
Appearing before house labor committee, james petrillo defends his control of union musicians. When asked if he doubted president's opinions on the hcl, petrillo says mr. Truman is potential member of the union. 'He plays the piano.'
Summer of Judgment Pt 2 of 2
TLSs House Judiciary Committee. MS Rep. CHARLES WIGGINS (R-CA) debating: "The question is whether an abuse of power falls within the meaning of the phrase high crimes & misdemeanors, since we can impeach on no other basis."
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 28, 1973 (1/2)
[00.04.28-DEAN describes his Sept. 15, 1972 meeting with NIXON] Mr. DEAN. AS I tried to describe in my statement, the reception was very warm and very cordial. There was some preliminary pleasantries, and then the next thing that I recall the President very clearly saying to me is that he had been told by Mr. Haldeman that he had been kept posted or made aware of my handling of the various aspects of the Watergate case and the fact that the case, you know, the indictments had now been handed down, no one in the White House had been indicted, they had stopped at Liddy. [00.05.17-BAKER wants to examine the President's statement more carefully] Senator BAKER. Stop, stop, Stop for one, second. Let's examine those particular words just for a second. That no one in the White House had been indicted. Is that as near to the exact language--I don't know so I am not having a trap for you, I just jut want to know. Mr. DEAN. Yes, there was a reference to the fact the indictments had been handed down and it was quite obvious that no one In the White House had been indicted on the indictments that had been handed down. Senator BAKER. Did he say that, though? Mr. DEAN. Did he say that no one in the White House had been handed down? I can't recall it. I can recall a reference to the, fact that the indictments Were now handed down and he was aware of that and the status of the indictments and expressed What, to me was a pleasure to the fact that it had stopped at Mr. Liddy. Senator BAKER. Tell me What he said. Mr. DEAN. Well, as I say, he told me, I had done a good job--- [00.06.11] Senator BAKER. NO, let's talk about the pleasure, He expressed pleasure the indictments had stopped at Mr. Liddy. Can you just for the purposes of our information tell me the language that he used? Mr. DEAN. Senator, let me make it very clear the pleasure that it had stopped there Is an inference of mine based on, as I told Senator Gurney, the impression I had as a -result of the, of his, complimenting me. Senator BAKER. Can you give us any information, Can you give us any further insight into what the President said? Mr. DEAN. Yes, I can recall he told me that he appreciated how difficult a job it had been for me. Senator BAKER. Is that at close to the exact language? Mr. DEAN. Yes, that is close to the exact language. That stuck very clearly in my mind because I -recall my response to that was that I didn't feel that I could take credit. I thought that others had done much more difficult things and by that I was referring to the fact that Mr. Magruder had perjured himself. [Laughter.] There was not an extended discussion from there as to any more of my involvement. I had been complimented. I told him I couldn't take the credit, and then we moved into a discussion of the status of the case. [00.07.40]
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 28, 1973. Testimony of John Dean.
Senator Howard Baker (R Tennessee). But once again, simply searching for an organizational format, these conclusions or inferences on your part are based on your knowledge of the White House organization and not on direct information of any personal kind. John Dean. That is right, spending on almost 3 years at the White House. Senator Howard Baker (R Tennessee). Which is an important circumstance, and I am not trying to discredit that. I am simply trying to isolate and define the quality of the testimony. John Dean. I understand. Senator Howard Baker (R Tennessee). I don't mean to say that the quality of its desirability, but the quality of a technical sense. Was it direct information, circumstantial information, was it an inference or a conclusion based on a valid set of circumstances. That is a situation at the White House. Or it is a pure, plain guess. So you have been very helpful in that respect. Let me try to restate it then. From the very first moments after the break in on June 17, 1972, and based on a number of factors, including the fact that press releases issued from, I believe you said Key Biscayne. John Dean. That is correct. Senator Howard Baker (R Tennessee). Based on your knowledge and understanding of the White House organization and the relationship between Mr. Haldeman and the President, you draw an inference that the President knew something between June 17 and September 15. John Dean. Well, I also am aware of the fact that there were a flurry of telephone calls between Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Haldeman as to some of the things I was telling Mr. Ehrlichman in Washington after I did come back on the 19th. And he was calling Mr. Haldeman in Florida, who was still in Florida at that time.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 28, 1973. Testimony of John Dean.
Senator Howard Baker (R Tennessee). If I understand you correctly, you say that based on inference drawn from your knowledge of the White House organization and relationships, you surmised that the President knew of the situation from June 17 until September 15 in some degree, but that you have no personal knowledge of that. John Dean. Well, I am sure of this, that there were press releases put out within a short time after the incident. There must have been discussion in Florida, while they were still in Florida, about how to handle this. Some of the early press releases, as I recall, indicated immediately before I had even talked to anybody or done anything that this was something that didn't involve the White House in any way.
LAWMAKERS - LM 146 - "News Briefs"
Reporter Paul Duke with news briefs starting with the House Investigating Committee releasing a report on the 1980 Reagan Campaign receiving secret materials from the Carter Administration. House Representative Don Albosta (D-MI) says a federal crime has been committed. Speaker of the House Tip O'Neill (D-MA) talks to reporters on the street next to the Capitol Building, says the investigation should continue and conclude before the next Presidential election. House Representative Minority Leader Robert Michel (R-IL) speaking at a press conference, calls the investigation sloppy and partisan. Duke says two Republicans on the committee believe the Democrats were wrong in singling out CIA chief Bill Casey as the chief villain, as there was no solid evidence. In unrelated news, both branches of government have gone on record in favor of giving medical payments to Vietnam veterans suffering from illnesses traced back to the battlefield defoliant, Agent Orange.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 14, 1973
[00.26.16] Senator ERVIN. Senator Gurney. Senator GURNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I think, Mr. Magruder, We, were talking about the meeting at Mr. Mitchell's apartment. I am not interested in going into any of it but, just find out, who called it. Mr. MAGRUDER Senator, they were coming back from Los Angeles, recollection is I was called by Mr., Mitchell's secretary and told to come to the apartment that evening. Senator GURNEY. In your testimony earlier, you mentioned a meeting between Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Haldeman Mr. Dean, and yourself. This is the one in April, I believe it was in New York. around about the time you had talked with Mr. Mitchell in York. Mr. MAGRUDER. I am sorry, Senator. I met first with 'Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Haldeman. Mr. MAGRUDER. Mr. Haldeman indicated that since there was a controversy over the two meetings in January and February, that Mr. Dean, Mr. Mitchell, and I should settle those differences together and we met then that afternoon at the, White House to discuss our-- Senator GURNEY. That is the meeting I am referring to, and you mentioned also that Mr. Dean apparently Would not indicate any position that he was going to take. I am. paraphrasing the testimony correctly ? Mr. MAGRUDER. That is correct. Senator GURNEY. Would you amplify on that? What did he say? Mr. MAGRUDER. What occurred, of course, I felt rather strongly since the three, of us had agreed on the position that I would take which, in effect, caused me to testify at the grand jury incorrectly, that I would have, of course, hoped that they -would support the position that we had all agreed on. Mr. Mitchell did agree that he could support that with, I think, minor variations. Mr. Dean indicated that that created problems for him and lobbied us to discuss it at a later date. At a later date, my recollection is I asked my attorney--by this time I had retained counsel--and my counsel indicated that he had talked with their counsel, with Mr. Dean's counsel, and -Mr. Dean's counsel had simply said that "Your client has a problem." Of course, I was fully aware I had a problem, and so. you know, by that time I realized that Mr. Dean's position was going to be different than the one that I had testified to. Senator GURNEY. Well, could you tell us a little more how he, indicated that he was uncertain about his position or what his problem was? Mr. MAGRUDER. Well, he had been up to Camp David that weekend before, and was writing this report, the report supposedly was going to be written but which I guess was not written, had just come back and said that he just, wasn't in a position at that time to I make a decision on this matter and had to have further consultation, I think--I do not think he said -with whom but just said he was going to discuss this matter further and think about, it further. He just had not made up his mind. Senator GURNEY. What did you think he, was Mr. MAGRUDER. Let me say at the same time I had the same type of discussion with Mr. Strachan about the meeting we had of the day of the altercation and I said, you know, "are you going to support that series or that meeting we had? " And he indicated to me the same kind of difficulty that he was not, sure, and did not know, Of course, by this time 1 was then quite aware that the key participants were to change, their situations. Senator GURNEY. Again, referring to Dean's, position and attitude of mind, you mentioned that, you had meetings with him from time, to time and he started to forget important events and meetings that, you had had on Watergate. Would you describe those more fully Mr. MAGRUDER. Well, I think that the one occasion that did crop up when I asked for an appointment with Mr. Haldeman. Mr. Dean was in constant touch, we, had worked closely together in the House and, of course, In the committee and we would discuss various aspects of the case, and on this occasion and, I think. in retrospect I think, I think the conversation was taped,. Senator GURNEY. When Was this? Mr. MAGRUDER. This probably was in January. probably in early January or December, it, was before that meeting with Haldeman so it must have been in December it was when he Indicated to me that he did not, know how the Watergate had ever been planned some something to that effect, and I said, "John, do you not remember?" something to that effect, and I became concerned, of course, over that type Of conversation because obviously that would be, at that, time that could be an indication that somebody in effect was being set up. [00.31.44]
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 27, 1973
[00.45.26-GURNEY questions DEAN about his handling of cash funds in his custody. DEAN explains his actions in light of the demands to get cash to bribe the defendants to keep silent] Senator GURNEY. If you were requesting it just to make the fund whole, why would you be so unwilling to part with the $15,000 that you had? Mr. DEAN. Because as I say, there was pressure from the White House and within days after Mr. Stans returned or sent over the $22,000, the demand reached such a crescendo that in fact I was asked to go to Mr. Haldeman and get authorization to use, the entire $350,000. And I was very much aware of being in the Middle of the dual conversation, on the one hand to make the funds whole, and simultaneously with making money available to pay the defendants. I had no idea how it was going to turn out. Senator GURNEY. Well, I must say I am puzzled. I do not quite follow the reasoning. First you say that you did not use the $15,200 which came from the $22,000 to return it and make it whole again because you thought that money might be used for silence money. But, then, when I asked you when you requested it from Mr. Stans, you had no compunctions about that. You said, "Well, that was not going to be used for that." Now, which is which? Mr. DEAN. Well, as I say, I was not discussing with Mr. Stans the fact that there was pressure being placed on the White House to pay money, that was coming to me from other channels. I was always hopeful that -we would find some remedy, that that $350,000 would not be used to pay for the support of these individuals. There was certainly no certainty that that would or would not happen. I had discussed it, with Mr. Haldeman, the, fact that they were asking for the money. Mr. Haldeman agreed that we ought to make the money whole. I told him that there. were demands and there were requests upon it. So I kept the $15,200 totally out of the conversations. Senator GURNEY. But the $15,200 had come out of the, $22,000, had it not? Mr. DEAN. That is Correct. [00.47.02-GURNEY wants to portray DEAN'S dealings with the cash funds as corrupt in some way. DEAN counters] Senator GURNEY. I should think the logical thing to have done would be to return that and also to have added $6,800 from Mr. Stans and made it whole. Mr. DEAN. Well, Senator, from where I was sitting, that seemed like a great risk that that money was going to go to pay the defendants. Senator GURNEY. Was it, not a greater risk for you to have it and be short the $4,850 which it was short? Mr. DEAN. I was quite. prepared to make that money -whole at any point in time. Senator GURNEY. When you put the check in the, envelope that contained the $15,200, your check, I understand, of $4,850---- Mr. DEAN. That is correct. Senator GURNEY. What account -was that drawn on? Mr. DEAN. It was drawn on my personal checking account. Senator GURNEY. Was there, enough money in the checking account to cover it? Mr. DEAN. NO, there -was not at that time, but on previous occasions, I had overdrawn my account and it had been covered. Within 24 hours, I was able to get the money in the bank and cover it. Senator GURNEY. I have here, a copy of a bank statement that at came in at noontime, from the National Savings & Trust Co., showing an account to John Wesley Dean III. Is that, the account that you drew the check on? Mr. DEAN. I assume, because that is the, only checking account I have at that bank. Mr. THOMPSON. I might, point out, Senator Gurney and Mr. Chairman, this is pursuant to a subpena signed by the, chairman on the 22d of this month. We received certain records--they were, being compiled, they -were furnished to us over the noon recess. I have here the document that Senator Gurney is making reference to, which is a bank statement dated October 26, 1972, on the National Savings & Trust Co., Washington, D.C. So I have here two copies for you and counsel. I submit, it -at this time. [the statement is passed to DEAN] [00.49.45--GURNEY continues to pursue the angle of accusing DEAN of embezzling campaign funds to discredit his charges against HALDEMAN, EHRLICHMAN, AND NIXON] Senator GURNEY. I wonder if you would look at the, bank statement and tell the, committee how much money you had in the checking account at that time, Mr. Dean. Mr. DEAN. At -which time, Senator Senator GURNEY. October 12. Mr. DEAN. The. balance indicates about $1,600. Senator GURNEY. $1,623.12, is that not correct? Mr. DEAN. That, is correct. Senator GURNEY. Yet, you put in your file -where you were keeping the money in trust, a, check for $4,850. Mr. DEAN. That is correct. [00.50.20]
JFK Assassination HSCA Hearings
House Select Committee on Assassinations hearing on the assassination of U.S. President John F. Kennedy, Professor Mark Weiss explaining the process used for predicting gunfire echo paths from the Grassy Knoll in Dealey Plaza. Using a topographical map of Dealey Plaza and a scale, Weiss demonstrates their method of determination. Weiss discusses variables in echo times and distances.
LAWMAKERS - LM 057 - "Budget Cuts"
Cokie Roberts reports on former Congressman who's now a lobbyist for the budget debate. Shot of House Budget Committee, pan to portrait of former Chairman Robert Giaimo. Shot from 1980 of Giaimo chairing the Committee, bemoaning the fact that everyone is running to Congress for money and Congress doesn't know how to say "no." Shot of other Committee members affixing a sign reading "ABANDON ALL HOPE YE WHO ENTER HERE" to the table in front of Giaimo. Giaimo in office, says the rotating chairmanship of the Budget Committee didn't give him incentive to stay in Congress. He didn't want to stay in Congress in 1981 if he couldn't be in a leadership position.
LAWMAKERS
Shot of WILLIAM FRENCH SMITH (Attorney General) testifying to Committee, says the changes in the House bill would force sweeping changes in the political system by mandating "proportional representation" in all local governments along racial lines. Shot of TED KENNEDY on committee bench, jousting with SMITH. Shot of members of CONGRESSIONAL BLACK CAUCUS testifying to committee. Shot of HAROLD WASHINGTON (D-IL, prior to being elected Mayor of CHICAGO), argues that the EFFECTS of discrimination are serious enough that difficult process of proving Intent is unnecessary. Shot of Assistant Attorney General BRAD REYNOLDS testifying, says the act will encourage QUOTAS. Shot of ORRIN HATCH, looking terrified at the prospect of "quotas", agrees the bill is bad, recesses committee.