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Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, July 10, 1973
[00.36.29-Sen. TALMADGE continues to question MITCHELL about the coverup] Senator TALMADGE. How does a campaign get money outside. the campaign? [Laughter.] Mr. MITCHELL. This has always been a, very interesting question to me. [Laughter.] Because, for this very reason that the more I bear about all these moneys everybody says that, they came, from 1968, 1968, and here I was the campaign manager in 1968 and only won by 600,000 votes and they had all this money in the bank. That was a hell of a thing to do to me. Senator TALMADGE. I agree. Mr. MITCHELL. I regret. it, I resent it. Senator TALMADGE. It wasn't but one campaign, was it, in 1972? Mr. MITCHELL. Well, I am talking about 1968. Senator TALMADGE. Yes, you are talking about leftover campaign money. Mr. MITCHELL. Yes, this is what. I understood. [00.37.18-TALMADGE inquires about the campaign slushfund used to fund the coverup-a shady financial arrangement, and illegal] Senator TALMADGE. But you referred to funds outside the campaign at the disposal of the campaign committee when there was only one and I was wondering how you collected campaign money outside a campaign? Mr. MITCHELL, This -was not collected. this was held except for one item, and I am sure the staff is much more, familiar -with Mr. Stans' record than I am but I think he testified that the $75,000 was made up of $45,000 that, he had in a safe deposit box that came from the 1968 campaign and $30,000 that, had come from some Filipinos -who were to be returned, if I am not, mistaken that is the $75,000 and he did not come to me on it. [00.38.00] Senator TALMADGE. There was a great deal of testimony that this committee has had, as you know, about disbursement, of funds, and we found that over a million dollars was disbursed in cash with no checks to support, it. or anything else. Some cash was bandied around in large amounts, and it. was amazing to me that a man as able a certified public accountant as Mr. Stans -would let money be handled in such a loose fashion. You would concur that you ought not kick around a million dollars in cash without accountability wouldn't You? Mr. MITCHELL. I would subscribe to that wholeheartedly. In fact, I would go down to half a million or a quarter of a million. Senator TALMADGE. OF even $1. Mr. MITCHELL. I agree with that, [00.38.44] Senator TALMADGE. -NOW. you mentioned these Dahlberg and Mexican checks. Mr. Stans testified that you met with him on June 23, 1972, regarding those checks, is that a correct statement? Mr. MITCHELL. yes, sir. If I remember correctly, Mr. Stans and I had lunch on that day and we had a further meeting which has been totally screwed up In the testimony here on the 24th. Senator TALMADGE. Do you want to try to correct it? Mr. MITCHELL. I would be delighted because of the various versions and it was a matter of some concern of this committee because of the implication that Mr. Stans brought into the picture of having information about the Watergate which Is not true. With respect to the 23d, to the best, of my knowledge, it does show that Mr. Stans and I had lunch in my diary. Now the 24th, this is the Sequel of the Mardian-LaRue debriefing or interviewing of Liddy and the information they got from Magruder's involvement with Liddy in the payment of money and it resulted in Mardian going to talk to Magruder and getting this story that it was only $40,000 at the most that I could have given Liddy or whatever the number was $40,000 or $50,000, and this of course, quite contrary to -what 'Mr. Liddy had told Mr. Mardian. [00.40.36] Mardian came up and got his secretary to get Sloan in from his house, into the office, the 24th being ,I Saturday where there was this confrontation and by the way, I would like to interpolate here that this is the only meeting that I ever had with Hugh Sloan at any time after June 17 and it wasn't in connection with his going to the FBI as he has testified to. The meeting took place with Mardian, Magruder, and Sloan, in which Magruder was saying, "Well, it couldn't have been more, than $40,000 or $50,000" and Sloan was saying , "It is much, much more than that. But I won't tell you because I am going to have to talk to Mr. Stans." [00.41.20-MITCHELL explains the "going gets tough" statement to SLOAN] And this is, by the way, where I will also have to put the record straight. Sloan was a pretty low individual on that particular day and it was then that Mardian hit him On the hack to buck him up and I don't want to take credit for this statement, that, was reported by me to be made that when the going gets tough the tough get, going. It, was Senator Muskie -who had said it just a couple of days before it happened. Senator TALMADGE. You did not make any such statement, is that correct? Mr. MITCHELL. I made the statement and I made it in the context. Senator TALMADGE. You did not quote. Senator Muskie as being the author thereof? Mr. MITCHELL. I did indeed in connection with respect, to the nature of the tough campaign he had and the one that we were having. Senator TALMADGE. Were. you saying that for Mr. Sloan's benefit at that particular time? Mr. MITCHELL. I was saying it for the total people there who were in a hell of a knock- down- drag-out donnybrook over what they could not agree on. Now, the sequence is shown by my log that after that meeting Mr. Sloan apparently went back to Mr. Stans, -who had received the information about the Liddy payments the day before, I believe, on June 23, Mr. Stans called me, and Mr. Stans came up and saw me alone. There, was not, any Jeb Magruder and there was not any Mardian in the meeting that, according to Magruder, I asked Mardian to step out so that I could discuss the matter. That -would be the last thing in the world I would do because Mardian was investigating the circumstances at the time. [00.42.48]
JFK Assassination Hearings - H.B. McClain
Deputy Chief Counsel Gary T. Cornwell clarifies a question from Committee Chairman, U.S. House Representative Louis Stokes (D-OH) that he is simply asking the committee that the photographs be taken into consideration, within a limited scope until further analysis can be done. He is not requesting they be taken into the record. Cornwell asks H.B. McClain if knows what channel his radio was set to. McClain is not certain, but acknowledges it was possible the channel could have been changed during the motorcade or while it was at Parkland Hospital. Cornwall asks if McClain's microphone was stuck that day. McClain says not to his knowledge, but it is possible for the microphone to stuck on without his knowledge. McClain and Cornwell speculate as to the cause of microphone being stuck on.
Lawmakers - February 11, 1982 - Clean Air Act
General views of House Energy and Commerce Committee Subcommittee meeting on Clean Air. Representative John Dingell (D - Michigan) listening. Representative James Broyhill (R - North Carolina). Senator Gary Hart (D - Colorado) at table to testify.
Lawmakers 7/07/1983
Committee hearing, tourist family standing at back of gallery, watching. Whole family in Capitol parking lot. The dad says he took note that almost no one was in the chamber for the House session.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 29, 1973 (2/2)
[01.15.26-the letter demonstrates the legitimacy of the trustee account set up to house the campaign money in DEAN'S care] Mr. DEAN. [Reads:] DEAR GARNETT. Enclosed you will find; (1) client's check dated April 20, 1973, numbered 1647 payable to the order of myself and Mr. McKeever as Trustees in the amount of $4,850.00 which we have suitably endorsed to the Bank : (2) the Bank's Treasurer's check dated April 19, 1973, in the amount of $10,350.000 covering the cash I delivered to you for safekeeping on Friday, April 13, 1973, pending the opening of an account, and (3) the two signature cards signed by Mr. Dean, myself and my partner, McKeever. As you know, when we first discussed opening the account I contemplated that Thomas Hogan, Esquire, would be co-trustee with myself inasmuch as he then also represented Mr. Dean. However, subsequent developments (conflict of interest) have required Mr. Hogan to withdraw from the representation and, accordingly my partner, McKeever, is acting as co-trustee. This change also required Mr. Dean to substitute his enclosed check numbered 1647 for his check numbered 1643 originally payable to Mr. Hogan and my-self as Trustees. I have had Mr. Dean void the latter check by tearing his signature therefrom and it remains in our files. Should you be inquired of by competent authorities as to the opening of this account, please tell them all you know, including whatever I have told you. Thank you for your cooperation in the matter. Sincerely, SHAFFER, McKEEVER & FITZPATRICK. [01.17.21] Mr. DASH. Who is it addressed to? Mr. DEAN. Garnett Inscoe, Suburban Trust Co., 255 North Washington St., Rockville, Md., April 4, 1973, Mr. DASH. Chairman. I would like to have that identified and introduced into the record, Senator ERVIN. That will be. done. The. reporter will number it appropriately as an exhibit and receive It into the record as such. Mr. DASH. Mr. Dean, I don't know whether--- [01.17.48] Mr. SHAFFER. Mr. Chairman, there is one statement I could make with respect to one of those documents that would clarify what I think would be confusing. I would be glad to do it under oath or off oath and if any member of your committee objects to me making a statement and you rule that I can't, I won't, but I would like to. It relates to the Suburban Trust treasurer's check. May I make the statement?, Senator ERVIN. Is there any objection from any member of the committee? [No response.] Senator ERVIN. Suppose you stand up and I will administer the oath. Do you swear that the. evidence you shall give the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities shall be the truth, the, whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? Mr. SHAFFER. I do. STATEMENT OF CHARLES N. SHAFFER, ESQ., COUNSEL TO JOHN DEAN III Mr. SHAFFER. Mr. Chairman, after my client had given me the cash and a current check made payable to me and Hogan, and after I had gone to the Government with the. currency so that they could look at the-- Xerox it, do whatever they wanted -with it, I got to the bank. I was carrying it around about a day. I was a little uncomfortable. I got to the, bank about 2:05 on a Friday, and it was in April. It was, I believe, in early April. The records will show; the receipt there will date it. And I knocked on Mr. Inscoe's window and he came around to the door and he opened it up, because he knows me. My law office, is right near the, bank. I have a very small account there, and he treats me as a good customer, nevertheless. I said, Garnett, I have got all this cash, and I don't want to have it over the weekend; will you take it? So he said, yes, he would take it and he, would give me, a receipt. Then on Monday and Tuesday, -we were having trouble with Mr. Hogan and his conflict-of-interest problem, and we never got the signature cards back, and finally, Garnett, said, "Look, I can't hold this cash around here forever. I am going to give you a treasurer check at the bank so I can then pass the currency through the account." That is how this treasurer's check came into being. Thank you. If anybody wants to cross-examine me, I -will be glad to answer questions. Senator BAKER. Mr. Shaffer, no, I don't want to cross-examine you, but I can't resist the temptation to let the record note, that you claim and continue, to stand on and have not waived the attorney-client privilege. Mr. SHAFFER. Thank You. I appreciate the comment. [01.20.20]
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 26, 1973 - Testimony of John Dean.
Fred Thompson, attorney. Would it be fair to say then that on occasion, on numerous occasions, you misinformed Mr. Ziegler with regard to the true facts of the matter? John Dean. I would not say misinformed him as much as to tell him how to take the offensive because he could not say a given situation. I can think of one occasion where we talked about the secret fund that was at the White House. And he said, how do I handle that? I said that s a matter of interpretation. It s a secret to some people, but since we know of it, it obviously is not a secret. So you don't need to say it is a secret fund. So that is the way that was handled. For example, the leak to Time Magazine of the story regarding surveillance of the White House staff and newsmen that one did present a real quandary to me. So I called Ehrlichman for guidance. I was aware what happened. I asked Ehrlichman for guidance on how to handle it. He said just flat out deny it. Now that was a flat out lie. Fred Thompson, attorney. All right. Did you tell Ziegler on occasion that there was no White House involvement? John Dean. That there was no White House involvement? I told Mr. Ziegler that there was nobody that I knew of who was involved or had prior knowledge of the June 17th break-in. I always dealt in very close, literal words that continually got a broader brush.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee Hearings on Presidential Campaign Activities, May 24, 1973 - Testimony of Alfred C. Baldwin III
Senator WEICKER. You testified here today that you took an active role in what you must have known were illegal phone taps or breaking in and, as you have just stated, you are a former FBI agent, graduate of a law school, employee of various law enforcement agencies, and my final question is: Why did you, with this type of background, take part in such activities? Mr. BALDWIN. Well, with this background, Senator, I have been in organizations where I have always taken orders. I did not question the legality of the operation because of several factors. I had come down from Connecticut to work for the Committee To Re-Elect the President, and that was the President's organization, as far as I was concerned. Mr. Mitchell was heading the organization. Every individual that I was introduced to or that was pointed out to me I was advised "This is a White House consultant, this is a White House aide, they are on loan. As soon as the election is over in November they go back to the White House, Al, if we do a good job here." My sole goal was to obtain permanent employment. And Mr. McCord had been, I knew that he was, an ex-FBI agent, that he had been in the CIA and, based on the credentials of all these people I did not question - possibly that was a wrong assumption on my part, not to have questioned, but I didn t - the legality. I ve been asked if it entered my mind whether I thought it was illegal. I realize that there are wiretaps that are illegal but I also realize that under certain conditions such a wiretap can be ordered or authorized by specific individuals. And I felt that I was in no position to question John Mitchell or anyone else under his command, including Mr. McCord. Senator WEICKER. But it is also true, Mr. Baldwin, you never received any direct order from Mr. John Mitchell relative to that phone tap? Mr. BALDWIN. Other than reference to Mr. Mitchell if I obtained if I was involved in any difficulty establishing my authority for being in a certain place or the fact of the weapon I was to mention John Mitchell.
HAIG CONFIRMATION HEARINGS
GAVEL. Zoom to Sen. CHARLES PERCY, chair of FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, PERCY overviews the progress of the committee. Shot of ALEXANDER HAIG entering hearing for his confirmation as SECRETARY OF STATE. PERCY says that the REPUBLICANS have unanimously voted to refuse the DEMOCRATS' motion to subpoena tapes of conversations between HAIG and PRESIDENT NIXON, of the infamous White House tapes. Shot of HAIG at witness table. The committee will, however, receive an index of the tapes and subject matter from the National Archives and has issued a subpoena for this index. Shot of HAIG reaction. Sen. PERCY announces the SCHEDULE of hearings, shot of photographers in front of committee bench.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 27, 1973
[00.59.13-GURNEY challenges DEAN on points where MAGRUDER'S testimony conflicts with or implicates DEAN] Senator GURNEY. Let me refer to his testimony when be was here before the, committee. He said: "Well. I think the one occasion that did crop up when I asked for an appointment with Mr. Haldeman." I said: "When was this?" He, said; "That was probably in January probably in early January, December"-that would have been January of this year Or December of last year--it before that, meeting -with Haldeman, so it, must have been in December, it was when he indicated to me that he did not know how the Watergate had ever been planned, something to that effect. And I said, John, do you not remember, something to that effect? And I became concerned, of course, over that type of conversation, because obviously, that would be at a time that could be an indication that somebody was being set up, in effect. That was his testimony. He also testified some place else. Now, do you recall whether you had any conversation with him? Mr. DEAN. My discussions with Mr. Magruder while, he was at the inaugural committee, were basically around what he was going to do. The one conversation I recall very clearly did not relate to this at all. It was the conversation that occurred in the hall when I was trying to dissuade him from going to California to run for office. He said that he was going to go out and test the waters, because he thought that he had met so many people during the campaign, he could get good financial backing and now was the time to move. I thought, without telling him, that he was going to have some Serious problems down the road and he -would be putting a lot of people who had gone out to back him in jeopardy, and tried to persuade him not to do it. He was adamant. I later called Haldeman, -who agreed also that it was a very unwise, idea for Jeb to go out and pursue office. He told me he was going to call Mr. Finch and speak to him about it to try to dissuade Jeb from doing it. And he was also going to call Kalmbach, who was one of the persons Magruder was going to meet with. Then, when I met with Jeb, we had a number of discussions to the effect, he said, I have told Higby and Haldeman my problem. They are going to help me. They also know the problem and I want to get a good job. That was the tenor. It was a job-oriented discussion and I cannot recall a specific conversation where I told him that. [01.01.47-DEAN disputes the charge that MAGRUDER'S testimony implicates DEAN in prior knowledge of the break-in] I do recall in February-excuse me, in March--when I -was at Camp David, and this is in one of the exhibits I have submitted, when he wanted me to have a very fresh recollection of the, meetings that had occurred in February, or January and February of the preceding year, At that point, in time, I was trying--I said to him--I thought I had gotten a bum rap for being accused of having prior knowledge of this matter and Magruder agreed. And I have submitted a tape--that is a conversation I did record, with a Dictaphone held to the receiver. I happened to have the suggestion from Mr. Haldeman that I do that while I was at Camp David, and I thought it -was a pretty good idea, so you will find that exhibit is one of the ones I submitted'. Senator GURNEY. Of course, what be was saying is that you and he were discussing, I guess, the Watergate and what led up to it and that his I impression was that you were, forgetting, I guess, about the meetings in Mitchell's office, and the discussion -of the electronic bugging and Liddy's plan and all that, sort of thing. Do you recall that at all? Mr. DEAN. I only recall that, I have always told Magruder that I was never clear an what happened between February and June 17. I have repeated that to him on a number of occasions, because I have not--in fact, some of Mr. Magruder's testimony -was a revelation to me. [01.03.40-GURNEY wants more on DEAN'S meetings with NIXON] Senator GURNEY. Let us go to the meeting now of March 21 in the White House, which is a, very important. meeting, of course, with you and the President. That, as I understand it, is 'When you gave him a pretty -complete rundown of the story about the Watergate, is that correct? Mr. DEAN. That is correct. [01.04.08-TAPE OUT]
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 27, 1973
[00.30.16-GURNEY interrogates DEAN about his meetings with NIXON] Senator GURNEY. This is March 13? Mr. DEAN. That is correct. Senator GURNEY. Was that not also a preparation for a press conference, was that, not the main reason for that meeting? Mr. DEAN. On the 13th? Senator GURNEY. Yes. Mr. DEAN. The bulk of that meeting had to do with the fact that it was very likely that I was going to be called to appear before the Senate Judiciary Committee. and we had discussions at that time of possibly litigating over Dean as a means of not having other members of the White House staff having to appear before any other committee. Senator GURNEY. Are you saying you discussed nothing about the press conference that day? Mr. DEAN. I do not recall a preparation. It was generally just things would come up, shortly before a Press conference that these would that, he would ask me for questions on a press conference. Senator GURNEY. He had a press conference on the 15th of March. You had meetings with him on the 13th and 14th? Mr. DEAN. 14TH? Senator GURNEY. 13th and 14th. Mr. DEAN. It is very possible that questions came up during the press conference because he was following the Gray hearings very closely and whether the discussion that we were having regarding the Gray hearings was formulating answers in the President's mind for the press conference I do not know. He had not at that point, begun to study, at least in my presence, his briefing book for the press conference. Senator GURNEY. You cannot recall any discussions in either one of those meetings about preparation for a press conference? All you recall is discussion about Watergate. Is that Your answer? [00.32.25] Mr. DEAN. No, sir; Your question was, what specific conferences did I have with the President on Watergate. Senator GURNEY. No, we are way beyond that. Then, I was asking did you discuss the, press conference in the March 13 and 14 meetings, and your answer was that you could not recall. Now. I am asking that--you can recall all about the Watergate on those two dates but you Cannot recall any discussions about preparing the President for the press conference. Mr. DEAN [conferring with counsel]. Well, Senator, all I can say is that the thrust of that meeting was not to prepare the President for a press conference. There were discussions about the Gray hearings, there was discussion about, the question of litigating executive privilege. The fact that the President gave a press conference on the 15th, those dates were, generally flexible, and certain circumstances might influence the President as to whether he would or would not have a press conference. Senator GURNEY. So you do not remember any discussion at either one of those, meetings about the press conference? Mr. DEAN. On the 14th I do, yes. Senator GURNEY. But, not on the 13th? Mr. DEAN. Not on the 13th, no, sir. [00.33.34] Senator GURNEY. Let us go on. Are there other meetings, that you remember in March, prior to the 21st of March where Watergate was discussed, and again I am talking about the coverup, the, criminal activities? ] [00.33.48-DEAN has a hard time to persuade GURNEY to accept his proposition that many aspects of the coverup policy were firmly established at that time and not necessary to discuss] Mr. DEAN. Senator, again, I am not trying to include more in your question than I would wish to include, but, there, was a general theory that had been set up at La Costa as to how to approach the entire Watergate coverup situation, so what might be your interpretation of a discussion of a Watergate matter and what had emerged out of the La Costa, meeting, I find far different, If you -will look at the agenda that went in to the President following the, La, Costa meeting, you Will see those were the first beginnings of the coverup as it related to the hearings which were deemed to be as serious as a criminal investigation by the Department of Justice. Senator GURNEY. We have got, down to March 14th and we only have 7 days to go to the 21st of March. Mr. DEAN. That is correct,. Senator GURNEY. Would you please tell me in these meetings you had with the President between March 14 and March 21, the occasions, the incidents, that you discussed the coverup of Watergate with him?, Mr. DEAN. again, I think what I describe in my testimony is the post La Costa and I will be happy to go through that again and get into what were rather specific discussions of mechanics of coverup from a, very detailed nature whereas opposed to the general policy of a coverup. [00.35.22]
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 26, 1973
[00.13.50] Mr. THOMPSON. All right. Mr. Dean, let me move now, if I may, to Why you have talked about your involvement in the coverup, why you Participated in the coverup. In any way was it because of the fear that you had about your own personal involvement up until that time? When you beard about the, break-in at the DNC -what. 'went through your mind? Did you have fear concerning your Own personal involvement in the matter up until that time? Mr. DEAN. When I first heard of the, break-in on Sunday the 18th, I frankly thought that it involved Mr. Colson, as I believe I testified. It was on Monday I learned--- Mr. THOMPSON. Why? Mr. DEAN. Why? Well, I was aware, of the fact, that Mr. Colson had suggested burglaries in the past, specifically the, Brookings Institute, and the name Hunt I immediately associated with Colson. Mr. THOMPSON. When did you learn about the name Hunt? Mr. DEAN. I think I first met Mr. Hunt in August. Mr. THOMPSON. I am sorry, when did You find out that, Mr. Hunt was involved in some way in the break-in? Mr. DEAN. On Sunday, I did not know about the break-in, I knew about the fact there was a Cuban who had a check written out to Mr. Hunt to some, country club In his possession when he -was arrested. Mr. THOMPSON. You learned this in your telephone call from California or did you learn this after you returned to Washington? Mr. DEAN. I learned this after I returned on Sunday night, the 18th. Mr. THOMPSON. So I assume, your immediate reaction--you returned to Washington and learned about the Hunt matter? Mr. DEAN. That is correct, and my reaction that Colson was involved. Mr. THOMPSON. Go ahead in regard to Yourself. Mr. DEAN. Yes. Then, on the 19th when I talked to Magruder and learned that he had indicated it -was Liddy's fault and after talking to Liddy. I was not personally concerned about myself because I knew very -well that I had not authorized any such thing, that I had not, known about anything from February until that time. Mr. THOMPSON. Let Me explore that point with You, not necessarily from the standpoint of whether or not You did in fact have any culpability at that time, but what it might appear to be. After all, you had introduced Liddy, to 'Mitchell had You not? I believe you had in fact recommended. or sent, anyway, Mr. Liddy over to the, Committee To Re-Elect You explained how this came about-- starting from the, standpoint of somebody investigating the matter from outside-- that you sent Mr. Liddy to the Committee To Re-Elect. You did attend the January 27 meeting -when these, matters were discussed, you did attend the February 4 meeting when these matters were discussed Very possibly -when somebody talked about these meetings very possibly it could get out that a conspiracy of some kind was in the, making. You know the law of conspiracy, generally, if a person involves himself in a conspiracy and one of his coconspirators subsequently commits an overt act, he very well may be held responsible for what one of his coconspirators does. You are a lawyer. I am sure you realize that. Liddy did come to You after' those meetings in February and March to solicit, your help in getting this plan approved and you said you turned him off at that time. Strachan and Magruder did Call 'you when they were, having trouble with Liddy to get you to help them on one of their problems with Liddy. Evidently, Strachan or Magruder or Liddy himself felt, that you had some involvement. Mr. DEAN. Maybe we can come back at some other time and I will explain that to you. Mr. THOMPSON. All right, I am finished. I am talking about all of these things. Did you not, at one point, say to Yourself, it looks like I am Possibly involved in this thing or very much involved in this thing, therefore, I am going to participate in a coverup? Mr. DEAN. When I learned, for example, talking to Mr. Strachan, that he had been instructed to destroy records, that, was my greatest concern at that time. If it had been merely John Dean, we, would have had far fewer problems because I would have been willing to step forward as I did with Ehrlichman. I told him exactly what my involvement was -when I was first, asked by him what it -was. The stakes were too high regarding any personal feelings that I had regarding myself. I had no criminal problem. If they -wanted to fire me on the basis of 'the involvement I had, fine. If we could reelect the President, fine. John Dean certainly would not, stand in the way of that. People were removed from the White House for far less. [00.18.53]
JFK Assassination Hearings - H.B. McClain
Committee Chairman, U.S. House Representative Louis Stokes (D-OH) recognizes Rep. Robert Edgar (D-PA) who asks H.B. McClain a couple of questions about McClain's radio use and functions. Chairman Stokes recognizes Rep. Floyd Fithian (D-IN) confirms that McClain only heard one shot and the street he was on. Rep. Fithian asks if he saw any activity around the grassy knoll. McClain responds that he saw Officer Hargis going up the knoll.
1982 - LAWMAKERS - El Salvador
Senate Committee Hearing with Enders sitting at witness table. Sen. Richard Lugar (R-IN) asks Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Enders about the effects of cutting off foreign aid to El Salvador. Enders says that El Salvador would still be in civil war, but without U.S. aid, there would be more bloodshed and a victory for the insurgent forces. House Committee as seen from a gallery seat. U.S. House Representative William Gray (D-PA) discusses the atrocities committed by right wing D'Aubuisson regime, slaughtering of civilians, women, children, rapes. Enders admits that government security forces were responsible.
John Block Confirmation Hearing
U.S. Senator and Agriculture Committee Chairman Jesse Helms (R-NC) standing with Senators Patrick Leahy (D-VT), Walter Huddleston (D-KY), U.S. House Representative Paul Findley (R-IL), and Secretary of Agriculture nominee John Block in committee hearing room; Sen. Charles Percy (R-IL) joins the group, two adult Caucasian men taking photos of the group from the other side of the curved wood panel dais.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 25, 1973
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 25, 1973 01.25.07 DO NOT USE Image or narration of Jim Lehrer. Further clearances should be pursued by client. LEHRER introduces Stephen Hess and Jack Kramer as guest commentators. LEHRER asks KRAMER from a legal standpoint what does DEAN'S testimony do to NIXON. KRAMER states that for a criminal conviction, there must be proof of criminal intent and a criminal act. In this case, the crime at stake is obstruction of justice, and it would be necessary to show an intent to prevent prosecutors from getting information. If one believes DEAN, there are several factors which come into play. First, DEAN testified that NIXON had two conversations, one with EHRLICHMAN and one with COLSON about EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY for Howard HUNT. Second, DEAN said that NIXON said that he could find $1 million to pay the defendants to keep silent about the higher levels of the Watergate conspiracy. Other suggestions that NIXON was not openly admitting to being informed by DEAN about the coverup plan, i.e. in the resignation letter NIXON provided to DEAN to sign, KRAMER states that these things relate to the criminal act of OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE, but the second element, Criminal Intent, is significant. It seems that DEAN'S testimony raises questions about the PRESIDENT'S intentions, such as when NIXON claimed that the reference to paying $1 million was "a joke", and when he (out of tape recorder range, evidently) admitted that it was a mistake to promise clemency to HUNT, which raise doubts as to NIXON's intent to obstruct justice. LEHRER asks, of HESS, legal culpability aside, how NIXON stands with the public. HESS says that NIXON has to do something to respond to the serious charges by DEAN, or he may think that a low profile will serve him well, as evidenced by the BREZHNEV summit recently, that the powers of the Presidency are broad and that time will distract people from Watergate. Or maybe he will take a legalistic approach to rebut DEAN'S testimony, or a counterattack strategy against his opponents. Maybe NIXON will choose to extend a limited apology for failing to stop others from doing wrong. HESS states that he hopes for a forthright and honest address to the people from the PRESIDENT. MacNEILL asks KRAMER about DEAN'S credibility. KRAMER states that based on the previous testimony by MAGRUDER, DEAN'S testimony gets some corroboration, but other details will have to be corroborated piece by piece by further witnesses. The TAPE of DEAN'S conversations with NIXON will be critical if it can be obtained. MacNEILL states that this is similar to the allegations raised by McCORD, which represented a step into new territory in the investigation. KRAMER says he doesn't yet see any major inconsistencies with DEAN, although some may develop under questioning. HESS states that DEAN is an "attractive witness", after speaking for a long six hours and maintaining his composure, it will be hard to demonize DEAN on the basis of his self-presentation. LEHRER asks who on the committee can be expected to really go after DEAN in the questioning period, especially after DEAN'S testimony that the WHITE HOUSE considered Sen. GURNEY to be a STOOGE. HESS says he doesn't think DEAN'S in for an easy time from any Senators, but all the Senators have developed their own styles and there probably won't be any sharp deviation from those styles to question DEAN. LEHRER states that the next day will begin questioning of DEAN, with the Senators picking at the details of DEAN'S presentation. DEAN'S memory will be tested and challenged, and when the questioning is over, the public and the President will have to digest the testimony of John W. DEAN III, and decide whether to believe him. Perhaps at the late hour, all should go to sleep. Signs off. [01.31.12-title screen "SENATE HEARINGS ON CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES"-sponsor credits-NPACT credits-PBS network ID]
Watergate Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 5, 1973. Testimony of Robert Reiser
Senator Lowell Weicker (R Connecticut). In any event, neither you nor any other member of the Committee To Re-Elect the President gave Mr. MacGregor a briefing? Robert Reisner, aide to Jeb Magruder. Oh, no. That s why I was indicating he was talking, he talked to Mr. Magruder, he talked to Mr. LaRue, he talked to Mr. Mitchell, he talked to, I am certain he attended the 8:15 meetings at the White House. And I am certain he talked to Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Colson and Mr. Ehrlichman. Senator Lowell Weicker (R Connecticut). But to your own knowledge, none of the information which involved you personally was ever transmitted by you to Mr. MacGregor. Is that correct? Robert Reisner, aide to Jeb Magruder. Of my knowledge, no, I do not know whether this information that I have talked about here today was transmitted to Mr. MacGregor, no. Senator Lowell Weicker (R Connecticut). And so that when you saw the disavowals take place, did it concern you that such disavowals were being made without this type of knowledge, specific to the knowledge you had, never mind anybody else? Robert Reisner, aide to Jeb Magruder. Let s be specific about the knowledge. The knowledge was that I had been asked to remove and give to Mr. Odle a file which seems suspicious in retrospect because I think that it came from Mr. Liddy. As to whether Mr. MacGregor knew I had been asked about that, no. But then there are a lot of other factors concerning that file that would have been even more important than the little bit that I knew about such as the content. Senator Lowell Weicker (R Connecticut). I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman.
Washington Week Show - # 4428
Gebe Martinez of The Houston Chronicle begins discussion on ethics reform and rules within the U.S. House of Representatives. Discussion of Republican majority leader Tom Delay and the grand jury investigation into his campaign committee.
Lawmakers - February 11, 1982 - Federal Reserve
Shot of a chart prepared by Federal Reserve, shows lines for interest climbing toward a hefty 16%, inflation falling to below 10%. Pull out to general shot of a meeting of the House Banking Committee.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 29, 1973 (2/2)
Previously, Lehrer noted that Dean would not have been able to introduce a 245 page statement in a courtroom. Asks Steven Hess, former White House aide, to comment. Hess states that he agrees it was an amazing situation, that the former Presidential counsel was implicating the President in crimes, but due to sloppy cross-examination and repetition, for long stretches of the five days, he was bored out of his mind. It was an effort to concentrate hard enough. Perhaps his problem was that he was expecting entertainment, and politics as entertainment has a long history, but this is in fact serious business.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee Hearings on Presidential Campaign Activities, May 24, 1973 - Testimony of Bernard L. Barker
Senator MONTOYA. All right. Now, let us go into Mr. Hunt's employment at the White House. Mr. BARKER. Yes, sir. Senator MONTOYA. What led you to believe that because Mr. Hunt was working at the White House that this was a covert operation under CIA? Mr. BARKER. This is stating that I thought this was a covert operation for CIA. I have never stated that this was a covert CIA operation. I have stated, sir, that it could or could not be a CIA operation since it was a national security matter. And the reason that I believe that Mr. Hunt had authority was first by association, my previous association, with him as the highest government representative in the Bay of Pigs, and the fact that he was at this time a member of the staff at the White House. I had no reason to think anything else in this matter.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 29, 1973 (2/2)
[01.25.49-DEAN is interrogated by DASH about the covering up of the DNC civil suit investigation] Mr. DASH. Are you personally familiar with any of the other rulings of Judge Richey that were made during the pendency of the, Democratic National Committee case that occurred prior to the election? Mr. DEAN. No, I am not. Mr. DASH. As a matter of fact, you have no other knowledge, really of that matter other than what Mr. Parkinson or other lawyers told' you about that? Mr. DEAN. That at is correct. [01.26.12-DASH asks whether it's conceivable or at all possible that NIXON was joking about the $ 1 million payoff to keep the Watergate BURGLARS silent] Mr. DASH. NOW, you indicated that on April 15, meeting with the President, the, President in bringing up the question of the, million-dollar discussion, told you that he was joking. When he first mentioned that to you, Mr. Dean, did he, indicate in any Way that he was joking, or did you understand him to be joking? Mr. DEAN. No, sir, I did not understand him to be joking. he repeated it twice, and indicated that there would be no problem to raise $1 million. He looked over at Mr. Haldeman and raised the same matter, and was very confident that $1 million was nothing to raise at all. When he reraised it, on the 15th, when he said he was just joking, I would have to characterize his characterization as being a rather nervous laughter kind of, "I -was just joking." [01.27.13-DISCUSSION OF TAPE RECORDING OF CONVERSATIONS] Mr. DASH. I think you testified. and you may have given us information on this, that you believe, that April 15 meeting with the President was taped and that, you were being asked leading questions. Have you ever asked the White House if you were taped, or any official of the White House? Mr. DEAN. I raked it with my lawyer, and I do not know whether he raised this with the prosecutors or not, but after I was told that I had been taped---- Mr. DASH. Who told you, Mr. Dean? Mr. DEAN. My lawyer, Mr. Shaffer, told me, that he had received word from the prosecutors that I had been taped, and I thought there was only One Occasion when that could have occurred that I was aware of where, I had a direct conversation with the President, because, all the, circumstances seem to indicate that, and that was on this April 15 meeting. -Now, I do not know for a fact whether he was or was not taped, but suggested that the Government might want to listen to that tape because if the they listened to that tape, they would have some idea of the dimensions of what was involved. [01.28.11] Mr. DASH. Mr. Dean, I want to refer to exhibit -No. and this is the exhibit that has first a memorandum from Mr. Charles Colson to you, reference Howard Hunt. The memorandum itself also includes a short memorandum from W. Richard Howard, who, as I understand, was Mr. Colson's assistant; am I not correct? Mr. Howard was Mr. Colson's assistant, was he not? Mr. DEAN. That is correct, yes. I have your exhibit now. Mr. DASH. All right. On that March 30 memorandum from Mr. Howard on the second paragraph the opening line is "Howard", meaning Howard Hunt. "has been very effective for Have you an understanding what he meant by that? It is a memorandum for Bruce Kehrli. Mr. DEAN. No, No, I do not. I am not fully familiar other than what some of the things that I recall and I have recalled to this Committee that I saw in the files of Mr. Hunt's that related to Mr. Colson that in fact, he had a close relationship with Mr. Colson. Mr. DASH, What was your understanding of the "us" in that, "Howard Hunt has been very effective for us;' Mr. DEAN. That would be a reference to Mr., Colson and Mr. Howard and Mr. Colson's general office. Mr. DASH. Would you look at exhibit -No. 34-37? This exhibit dated February 28, 1973. which has the heading Administrative Confidential is for Larry Higby and John Dean and is from Jerry Jones. Who is Jerry Jones? Mr. DEAN. He is the head of the personnel office, and I might add that while this was addressed to me it took me several days to get this memorandum, It did not come directly to me, and I finally got the Copy I had after having to make several calls to get the copy So that the memorandum really was not directly to me and I think I did not, get, an original, rather I got a Xerox.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 26, 1973
[00.13.51] Mr. DEAN. Subsequently, when he met, when Mr. Liddy met with Mr. Magruder on December 8, he also said that he would develop appropriate plans for dealing with demonstrators So It was quite logical and I assumed that Magruder felt given the fact that one of my White House responsibilities was to deal with demonstrators and with demonstration intelligence that I would be interested in seeing what Mr. Liddy's plan was, so I in turn was invited. Senator MONTOYA. Would you say that, your presence there was a follow-up of interest emanating first, from the initial memorandum that you sent Mr. Mitchell about the interagency group? Mr. DEAN. No, sir, I would not say there was any relationship between that memorandum and the Liddy meeting at all. Senator MONTOYA. NOW, at that initial meeting I understand from testimony. Mr. Liddy discussed possible targets and mentioned the DNC, the Democratic 'National Committee headquarters, the Fontainbleau Hotel, and Mr. O'Brien. Now, in what context were these three targets mentioned? Mr. DEAN. Well, as I said, I cannot recall for certain whether targets were discussed at the first meeting or flip second meeting. I am not able to separate the meetings as to that discussion. I know that I arrived very late at, the second meeting and I was only there, a very brief while before I injected myself into the meeting. Senator MONTOYA. I do not think that is relevant because the dates are too close. Mr. DEAN. Yes. Senator MONTOYA. But in what context when you heard it, were these targets discussed? Mr. DEAN. For political intelligence. Senator MONTOYA. And was a possible break-in into the Democratic headquarters discussed at that time? Mr. DEAN. Not a break-in. Just that these would be targets for or political intelligence. Senator MONTOYA. Well, would you not assume that that would involve a break-in, or pilfering of documents? Mr. DEAN. Yes, sir, I think that is true. I was aware of the fact that frequently a campaign technique was used to put friendly people, to one, cause in the campaign headquarters of another, It Was not all spelled out at that, point in time other than the fact these, would he targeted for political intelligence. [00.16.26] Senator MONTOYA. Well, would you not say that this Was coming very close to a discussion of what later became known as Watergate? Mr. DEAN. I -would, yes. Senator MONTOYA. All right. Now, you indicated that Mr. Mitchell and the President met frequently to discuss campaign plans. Where did they meet? Mr. DEAN. I only have that on hearsay, Senator. It was just one of those things it was rumored that Mr. Mitchell and the President and Mr. Haldeman and sometimes Mr. Connally and the like, would together in the evening and discuss general tactics. Senator MONTOYA. I think everybody in the country knows that they met. Mr. DEAN. I know it. I have no specific knowledge ; I never attended any of the meetings. Senator MONTOYA. I thought you knew about it. Mr. DEAN. That is right. Senator MONTOYA. Now, do you know whether or not the President met, with the Mitchells at their home? Mr. DEAN. I have no idea, senator. Senator MONTOYA. Do you know whether or not Mrs. Mitchell was ever present at, any of these meetings, be they at the Mitchell's home, at the White House or Key Biscayne or San Clemente? Mr. DEAN. I believe she did accompany the Attorney General, but could not tell you with any specificity that she attended any meetings with the President when the Attorney General was having these discussions with the President. Senator MONTOYA. I am very concerned, Mr. Dean, about the truth that might come out of these hearings and whether or not, your credibility will -be sustained by the American people or whether or not the President's will be sustained or tarnished, and that is why I am asking you these specific questions about the, reliability of press statements by the President, by Mr. Ziegler, and by statements that you have made in your testimony of yesterday. -Now, Mr. DEAN-. Senator, I just, Might add that I have one. ally only, and that is the truth as I know it and I can speak it, and I realize the implications when I talk about the President, that my one ally is the truth. [00.18.45]
JFK Assassination HSCA Hearings
House Select Committee on Assassinations hearing on the assassination of U.S. President John F. Kennedy, Committee members U.S. Representatives L. Richardson Preyer (D-NC) and Samuel L. Devine (R-OH) with Chairman Louis Stokes (D-OH). Committee Chief Counsel G. Robert Blakey introduces JFK exhibit F-647, statement from Secret Service Agent Paul E. Landis, who was in the follow-up car behind the presidential limousine; Landis can be seen in JFK exhibit F-155. Landis indicated the first shot sounded like the report of a high-powered rifle from behind him, over his right shoulder; Landis said he was not certain from which direction the second shot came, but his “reaction” at the time was that the shot came from somewhere on the front right-handed side of the road.
JFK Assassination HSCA Hearings
House Select Committee on Assassinations hearing on the assassination of U.S. President John F. Kennedy, Professor Mark Weiss continues explaining the findings of his acoustical analysis of Dealey Plaza. Weiss discusses the concept of binary correlation. Committee Deputy Chief Counsel Gary T. Cornwell watches on. Weiss discusses probabilities. Cornwell asks Weiss if the position of the shooter could have been moved in the experiment; Weiss says it was possible to move the shooter’s location within a five-foot radius on the Grassy Knoll but reaffirms the current position provided the best match to the original Dallas Police audio transmission.