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Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, May 23, 1973. Testimony of Anthony Ulasewicz.
Senator TALMADGE. Mr. Ulasewicz, had you been aware of the watergate affair at the time you were asked to make this call? Mr. ULASEWICZ. Yes sir. Senator TALMADGE. Why did you agree to serve as a contact in this situation? Mr. ULASEWICZ. Because of my friendship with Mr. Caulfield, and in his original call to me with my arguments of why I didn't want to, his demeanor, his conduct I could see that it was very important to him he was in some kind of position that caused him great concern and as friends I said I would do it. Senator TALMADGE. Did you assume that Mr. Caulfield's authority was coming from high authority in the White House? Mr. ULASEWICZ. I assumed it was coming from at least Mr. Dean, somebody above Mr. Caulfield. Senator TALMADGE. Did you believe that these White House sources would approve of what you did? Mr. ULASEWICZ. (pauses) I uh, yes I suppose so. Senator TALMADGE. Were you paid for your services in contacting Mr. McCord? Mr. ULASEWICZ. No sir. I was on no one's payroll at the time of these conversations in January. I was not in anyone's employ I meant to say. Senator TALMADGE. I have no further questions at this time Mr. Chairman. Senator ERVIN. Senator Weicker. Senator WEICKER. No questions Mr. Chairman. Senator ERVIN. Senator Inouye.
JFK Assassination HSCA Hearings
House Select Committee on Assassinations hearing on the assassination of U.S. President John F. Kennedy, Committee Deputy Chief Counsel Gary T. Cornwell asking Professor Mark Weiss if he can identify the type of firearm that would have been fired from the Grassy Knoll based upon the Dallas Police audio transmission and acoustical analysis of Dealey Plaza. Weiss discusses the audio signature of a rifle firing a supersonic bullet. Weiss points out evidence of a supersonic shock wave on the waveform charts from the original Dallas Police audio transmission of the Kennedy assassination and the acoustical analysis of Dealey Plaza. Cornwell asks Weiss to confirm if the hypothetical shot from the Grassy Knoll was a supersonic bullet from a rifle.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, November 15, 1973. Testimony of George Spater
Senator Sam Ervin (D - North Carolina). Isn t it fair to say that if there s any industry in the United States which is peculiarly susceptible to express or implied pressures from people exercising governmental powers it s the airlines? George Spater, American Airlines. Yes, Sir. Senator Sam Ervin (D - North Carolina). Is it an exaggeration to say that the federal government through the various agencies including the White House has virtually the power by their decisions one way or another to determine the economic life or the economic death of an airline? George Spater, American Airlines. Absolutely right Sir.
Watergate Hearings, June 25, 1973 - Testimony of John Dean
John Dean. Pursuant to the request, of the committee I will commence with a general description of the atmosphere that existed in the White House prior to June 1972. To one who was in the White House and became somewhat familiar with its workings, the Watergate matter was an inevitable outgrowth of a climate of excessive concern over the political impact of demonstrators, excessive concern over leaks, an insatiable appetite for political intelligence, all coupled with a do-it-yourself White House staff, regardless of the law. However, the fact that many of the elements of this climate culminated with the creation of a covert intelligence operation as a part of the President's reelection committee was not by conscious design, rather an accident of fate. These of course, are my conclusions, but I believe they are well founded in fact. This committee, however, is not interested in my conclusions. Rather it is interested in the facts as I know them. Rather than my characterizing the climate and attitudes, I shall, as requested, present the facts which themselves evidence the precursors of the Watergate incident.
JFK Assassination HSCA Hearings
Paul Duke asks Jeremiah O’Leary of the Washington Star if there is skepticism on the House Select Committee on Assassinations toward the new theory on the assassination of U.S. President John F. Kennedy, that four shots could have been fired from two different locations. O’Leary says yes and he also is skeptical. O’Leary says there is a quantum leap in proving three shots or four were fired, including a leap in deciding which shots came from the Grassy Knoll, if any at all. O’Leary says if there is proof of four shots coming from two directions, there is still no proof that the two men knew one another or that they conspired.
Testimony of Gerald Alch - Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee Hearings on Presidential Campaign Activities, May 24, 1973
Senator MONTOYA. Did you discuss with Mr. McCord the possibilities of clemency in the event that he should plead guilty? Mr. ALCH. No, sir, the only time I discussed clemency with him was when I relayed to him my discussion with Mr. Bittman, and I told him in words or substance, don't rely on it because it won't happen. Senator MONTOYA. Now, at the time that you were advised the Mr. Hunt would plead guilty, did you ever entertain the notion, or was there ever any discussion to the effect that the plea would be in exchange for a later grant of Executive clemency? Mr. ALCH. No, sir, because the reason given to me by Mr. Bittman was that Mr. Hunt was so emotionally upset over the death of his wife that he simply could not stand the rigors of the trial. That is what was told to me. Senator MONTOYA. Were you aware or did you have any suspicions that Mr. McCord or any of the defendants were being offered clemency in exchange for a plea of guilty? Mr. ALCH. No, sir. Senator MONTOYA. Were you aware of any interest on the part of any people at the White House that in the event Mr. McCord would plead guilty, there would be some favoritism with respect or in the direction of clemency from the White House? Mr. ALCH. No, sir, I don't know anybody at the White House.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 26, 1973 - Testimony of John Dean.
Samuel Dash, attorney. Mr. Dean, I don't think the record is clear from the statement. You held an impressive title, Counsel to the President. I understand had quite a big office. But could you tell us just what in fact was your relationship with Mr. Haldeman and Ehrlichman in your position with the White House? John Dean. Well, I learned before I went to the White House that the title was probably the best part of the job. My reporting relationship was directly to Mr. Haldeman, but because Mr. Ehrlichman had formerly been the Counsel he maintained a very active interest in many of the things of the Counsel's office. So that most of the work of the Counsel's office was really related to technical legal problems, making sure that the i's were dotted and the t's were crossed on certain documents, to examine questions on timing, on pocket vetoes, to work with the Department of Justice in making sure that they were preparing given legal positions on Issues that were of importance to the White House. I had a number of dealings with the persons who were working on the Nixon foundation and did some personal work on the President's San Clemente properties and other personal things like that for the President where I was the conduit to the law firm that was handling this for the President. I would not say that it was a policymaking position by any means. Samuel Dash, attorney. And to a large extent, you were, in fact, reporting to either Mr. Ehrlichman or Mr. Haldeman? John Dean. That is correct.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 26, 1973 - Testimony of John Dean.
Samuel Dash, attorney. All right, taking that into the context, as I was beginning to state, such a massive coverup operation that was underway with the approval and with the direction at times of Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Mitchell, do you have an opinion, and I m asking you at this point for just an opinion, as to whether the President would have been informed of this coverup operation from its inception? John Dean. Mr. Dash, I think it is unfair to ask me opinions. I can surmise the way I know the White House operated. I will say this, that in my statement I indicated that I had reached a conclusion in my own mind when I went to the Attorney General, for example, that this thing might well go right to the President. I would say that that evidence is an opinion that I was concerned that it did, knowing how the White House operated, knowing how the reporting information went up to the President. Samuel Dash, attorney. Well, the question was put to you just on the basis of your knowledge, your intimate knowledge, I take it, of how the White House operated and what Mr. Haldeman's relationship to the President was as you have already testified. But actually, according to your own statement, in fact you learned firsthand, did you not, that the President did know about the coverup when you met with him on September 15, 1972, the day the indictments came down cutting off the involvement at Liddy. Is that so? John Dean. That is correct.
JFK Assassination HSCA Hearings
House Select Committee on Assassinations hearing on the assassination of U.S. President John F. Kennedy, Professor Mark Weiss continuing to discuss acoustic analysis of Dealey Plaza via visual aids. Weiss explains visual printouts of gunshot sound waves and echoes. Weiss turns to topographic survey map of Dealey, pointing out the positions of Elm Street, the Grassy Knoll, and Microphone Number Four. Weiss points out echo points in Dealey Plaza.
Geraldine Ferraro Interview : Pt 2
Linda Wertheimer (o/s) asks how the increasing clout of women, electorally, can be weighed against powerful interest groups. U.S. House Representative Geraldine Ferraro (D-NY) believes the only true measure is to see how votes come out of committee. However, it is hard to measure overall because she knows people in the committees, in the House of Representatives, who see the gender gap as a civil rights issue.
U.S. Rep. Jim Wright Speaks at DNC Orientation
United States Representative Jim Wright (D-TX) speaks to new Democratic National Committee (DNC) members coming into the House of Representatives. US Congressman Wright discusses when the press is permitted to attend the meeting and when the press must leave the room. Wright says the upcoming Q & A secession will be considered an executive session without press, to allow new members to speak with candor. Attendees are predominately adult Caucasian men, some women.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 25, 1973 - Statement of John Dean.
On April 22, Easter Sunday, the President called me to wish me a Happy Easter. It was what they refer to at the White House as a "stroking call. On April 30th, while out of the city, I had a call from my secretary in which she informed me that the wire services were carrying a story that my resignation had been requested and accepted and that Haldeman and Ehrlichman were also resigning.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 29, 1973 (1/2)
[00.02.00-Sen. INOUYE presses DEAN for hard evidence that the ENEMIES LIST was in fact used by the WHITE HOUSE to take action against individual citizens] Senator INOUYE.--- Members of the House whose names have appeared, but, to date, you have been able to tell us of the possibility of a man from CBS, and Chet Huntley. Are there an other concrete examples? I am asking you this because. Mr. Colson has gone on the air suggesting that the lists you Submitted were, a social list, that this was a list used by the White House, so that, they would not invite the names listed there for the White House dinners. [00.02.40] Mr. DEAN. I think you will note in there at, some point--first of all, that Mr. Colson, there is a memorandum to him in one of the exhibits where he was to cull out the 20 worst enemies and submit them. This was again because I was receiving- through Mr. Higby and Mr. Strachan a direct request from Mr. Haldeman that he wanted to nail this down as to the 20, or the minimum number that we could do something with. So, we went through this big thing of taking all the lists Mr. Colson had, and Mr. Colson went through and checked off through his lists what he thought were his candidates, He was the only one that I knew that dealt in these areas, I certainly--none of these people were, my enemies. In fact, most of names were unfamiliar to me. [00.03.32] As a result of that, I sent a memorandum to Mr. Higby indicating, here are the lists. Don't let it go over 20. and this was sent to Mr. Higby for Mr. Haldeman's final review. It was sent back to me and went back in the file again. Senator INOUYE. Did you know if anything ever happened to these 20 on the top--hit parade? Mr. DEAN. I cannot answer that because I think I, was realized that my office had less than enthusiasm for dealing with things like this. [00.04.05] Senator INOUYE. Are you suggesting that this listing of names was just an exercise? Mr. DEAN. As far as I was concerned, it was an exercise that I had no intention to implement; that is correct, Senator. Senator INOUYE. Are you aware of any person or any agency or any official using these lists to do harm or injury or to assist? [00.04.31-the ENEMIES LIST was mostly used by COLSON and HALDEMAN for ends unknown to DEAN] Mr. DEAN. They were principally used by Mr. Colson and -Mr. Haldeman and I don't know what they did with them. I know on one occasion I had a call regarding the fact that some of the President's friends--and these are in exhibits and I just think it, would be inappropriate now to mention the individuals' names-were having tax problems, and I was to look into those. I had Mr. Caulfield, who had--who was the person on my staff, who was the Only one, I know had a relationship with the Internal Revenue Service-because I could only deal with the Director. I did deal with one of his assistants from time to time on sensitive cases where they were just brought to our attention -if somebody in the administration was having a normal audit. just to alert the White House to the fact that such an audit was occurring. [00.05.23-DEAN discusses intervening to try to stop the IRS from auditing some Presidential friends] At any rate, as I was saying, I was told that I was to do something about these audits that were being performed on two friends of the President's They felt that they were being harassed and the like. There is a third instance there this occurred also. -Now, on the--finally, when I got around to checking on it, Mr. Caulfield sent me some information which I think is evidenced in the exhibit and a note went to Mr. Higby. Mr. Higby sent it in to Mr. Haldeman, and Mr. Haldeman wrote a note on the bottom, "'This has already ready been taken care of." So obviously, things were happening that I had no idea on. [00.06.05] Now, I would again like to defer from using names in this instance, but there was a request of an audit that was commencing on somebody who was close to the President and several people got involved in this. They said, John, you have got to do something about this, because the President is just going to hit the roof when he finds out about it. Well, I went to the Justice Department because it had already gone from Internal Revenue to the Criminal Division of the Justice Department I spoke with Mr. Erickson about it. He said, this man is just up to his teeth in the problem. I reported back to the people who were asking me. I said, just do not touch this, there is just no way; this man is in trouble and he has got to be told he is in trouble. So that was the way I handled these situations, and I thought that was the proper way the counsel's office should handle them. [00.07.01]
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 7, 1973
[00.24.54] Senator MONTOYA. So in your observations to Mr. Ehrlichman on June, 23, you tried to connect the existing cash on the person of the burglars, with the distributions you had made to Mr. Liddy? Mr. SLOAN. Senator, just, in fairness, I just, do not have that good a recollection of how I presented this concern. I just do not, remember. Senator MONTOYA. Was it in that area? Mr. SLOAN. That was my concern. Whether I expressed it in those terms to him, I do not know. Senator MONTOYA. But you did have conversations with Mr. Ehrlichman relating to this , whether it was as specific as I have stated it or not. You did have such a conversation? Mr. SLOAN. Oh, yes, sir; it was certainly in the context of the, event at the Watergate. Senator MONTOYA. And it was then that Mr. Ehrlichman told you that if you had any personal problem that he could help you with he would be willing to do anything to help you with his personal problems--with your personal problems? Mr. SLOAN. Yes, sir. Senator MONTOYA. And he also said that he would take these problems up with the President and he was certain that this would be covered by executive privilege. Mr. SLOAN. NO, sir, that is an incorrect statement, Senator MONTOYA. Well, what did you say and what did be say? Mr. SLOAN. He indicated to me after he recognized my concern in a personal sense and had indicated to me that I had a special relation with the White House, since I had worked there and since they had asked me to get in the campaign, they would be very glad to be helpful if there was a question of getting a lawyer. I said, well I -that may be a problem, but that is not really why I am here. I said I would like to get into some depth on this. He said, no, do not give me the details, He said, my position personally would have to give that I would take executive privilege until after the election. I thought the remark somewhat strange, but at the time, in that context I interpreted that as a statement on his part that be was involved in running the Government and did not want to have a position of having knowledge that he could get dragged into all these court cases. A civil suit had been filed at that time. I interpreted it as a statement that it was my job to work here with the President and run the domestic council, and if it is a campaign problem, they have got, to work it out. Senator MONTOYA. Well , did he mention that the President would help you out with your personal problems? Mr. SLOAN. NO, sir, the President's name never came up, as far as I remember. Senator MONTOYA. Now, let us get on with the boat ride on the Potomac. Who invited you to go on that boat ride? Mr. SLOAN. It was a farewell party for the aide to the President of the United States, Vernon Coffey, who is a close personal friend of ours, and in addition to the White House personnel invited, both my wife and I had worked at the White House with him and were included on that guest list. Senator MONTOYA. were you invited, on the same date? Mr. SLOAN. Oh, no, I think it would have been probably a week's lead-time. At this point, I am not sure. Senator MONTOYA. Who was there at the party? Mr. SLOAN. It was a very large party, probably 150 people or more. Senator MONTOYA. Was Mr. Chapin there? Mr. SLOAN. Yes, sir , he was. Senator MONTOYA. Mr. Colson? Mr. SLOAN. I am not sure whether Mr. Colson. Senator MONTOYA. Mr. Dean? Mr. SLOAN. I am not sure I recall seeing Mr. Dean. Senator MONTOYA. Which of these individuals who were mentioned were there that night? Mr. SLOAN. Mr. Chapin, Mr. Dean, Mr. Pat Buchanan. Those are the three individuals I recall. Senator 'MONTOYA. Do you recall going into a corner to talk with them about this matter? Mr. SLOAN, There really were not, too many corners, Senator, but we attempted to get a certain measure of privacy. Senator MONTOYA. And who solicited who for these conversations? Mr. SLOAN. Senator, in terms of my best recollection of the events that happened, I think quite possibly, first, Magruder's suggestion had been made to me at that point. My wife reminds me that when 1 was picked up at, the office that day by her to go to this party that I was extremely angry and upset. I am sure that under those circumstances, the concerns were very heightened in my mind and I sought these individuals Out. Senator MONTOYA. You sought these people out? Mr. SLOAN. Yes, sir, I did. Senator MONTOYA. And you did discuss this affair? Mr. SLOAN. Yes, sir, to what, depth, I just Cannot recall as to precisely my knowledge at this particular point in time. Senator MONTOYA. Was it as a result of your conversations with Mr. Chapin that he invited you to meet with him at the White House at 12 o'clock the next day? Mr. SLOAN'. Yes, sir, that is my best recollection. Senator MONTOYA. And you aid meet with him for lunch, would you say, or just for conversation? Mr. SLOAN. I did not meet him for lunch and I am not quite sure of the precise timing. I am sure I talked to both of those individuals on that same day. Senator MONTOYA. Was it as a result of your conversation at 12 noon with Mr. Chapin that you at 2 o'clock that same day saw Mr. Ehrlichman? Mr. SLOAN. NO, sir, they were originated independently. The Ehrlichman appointment resulted from the conversation I had with his deputy, Ken Cole, the night before. I think what I was expressing to Mr. Cole and Mr. Chapin, who were principal assistants of Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Haldeman, was that I felt that either Bob or John ought to have this information. In the case of Mr. Chapin, I assumed that in talking to him, at least my concern would be relayed. I do not know whether I requested a specific, appointment with Bob -Haldeman. In the case of Ken Cole, he called me or his office called me the next day and said John Ehrlichman would like to see me--I believe it was at 2 o'clock and Mr. Chapin did indicate to me the night before that he would relay, my concerns to Mr. Haldeman. Senator MONTOYA. Who was present in your conversation with Mr. Ehrlichman? Mr. SLOAN. No one, as far as I know-no one was there except myself. [00.30.44]
Watergate Hearings - Testimony of John J Caulfield May 22, 1973
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, May 22, 1973 - Testimony of John J. Caulfield. He reads his statement to the Committee. Caucus Room, Russell Senate Office Building, Washington DC
July 18, 1995 - Part 2
(11:30:15) Senator Shelby. ENT OF SENATOR RICHARD C. SHELBY OPENING STATEMENT Senator SIIELBY. Thank YOU Mr. Chairman- I want to thank YOU for holding today's hearing and for also Mr. Chairman, laying Out so succinctly the focus of these hearings, what the Committee has done and where the Committee is going in pursuing its mandate to examine the facts surrounding the the handling of documents in Vince Foster's office after his death. While Some of these issues have already been exposed in the press, s a Member of this Committee I hope, Mr. Chairman, to further examine with witnesses any interference or improper con- 32 trol by the White House in the investigation of Vince Foster's death. The testimony we will hear before the Committee, I believe, will show several important facts about the handling of documents in Foster's office and the investigation of Vince Foster's death as a whole, Facts, Mr. Chairman, that will clearly demonstrate, in my view, that the level of White House involvement substantially prevented law enforcement officials, the Department of Justice, the Park Police, and the FBI from conducting their investigation according to standard operating procedures. I'll identify just some of these facts the Committee will hear about in the coming days about the White House's involvement in the investigation of Vince Foster's death. First, this Committee will hear testimony that will show that even though the White House was publicly proclaiming that the investigation was being conducted according to standard operating procedure, "just like any other investigation," and that the Park Police was the lead agency in the investigation, the White House refused to allow Park Police officers to enter Foster's office to search the day after his death. Second, Committee testimony will further show that later that day, July 21, 1993, it was agreed between law enforcement authorities and the White House Counsel's Office that the Department of Justice would supervise the search of Mr. Foster's office and that it would be the Department of Justice that would review documents for relevance and privilege there. The next day, however, when law enforcement officers arrived to conduct the review of Mr. Foster's office, the White House broke the agreement on how the off-ice would be searched. Instead of the Department of Justice conducting the search according to the agreement that they had previously entered into, the White House told law enforcement officials that it would review the documents, categorize them and let law enforcement officials know what they could and couldn't look at. Third, testimony by the Department of Justice, Park Police and the FBI will show that the search was viewed as a sham, that law enforcement officers were there for decoration only and that many of them did not feel that they could say that they had conducted an investigation based on the way the White House controlled the search and access to documents in Mr. Foster's office. Fourth, Mr. Chairman, the testimony before the Committee, I believe, will make evident the significant disagreements that arose early on between top law enforcement officials and the White House over the White House's role in the investigation. Finally, Mr. Chairman, we will hear about the very serious concerns that were raised from the beginning of the investigation by career law enforcement professionals that believe that the White House was improperly affecting the proper conduct of the investigation. Mr. Chairman, I look forward to hearing from today's witnesses and to participating in these important hearings for the American people. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Shelby. Senator SARBANES. Senator Murray. 33 OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PATTY MURRAY Senator MURRAY. Mr. Chairman, at some point before July 20, 1993, Vincent Foster wrote about this city, "here ruining people is considered sport." Then, by his own hand, he took his life. Vincent Foster, a successful lawyer, a devoted father and husband, a loyal friend, was a victim of the partisan bickering in the city and his own depression. Now, 2 years later, the Banking Committee of the United States Senate will take 3 or possibly 4 weeks to investigate how, in the emotional chaos of discovering their co-worker and friend had died, White House staff handled the contents of his office. Once again, Mr. Chairman, I fear that Vincent Foster and his family will be victimized. I urge all of us to keep perspective. It seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that whenever a high-profile tragedy occurs in this country, a whole lot of far-flung conspiracy theories emerge. I do not subscribe to unfounded allegations and radical beliefs. I prefer to rely on the time-honored virtues of fairness and common sense.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 28, 1973 (2/2)
[01.18.53-DEAN discusses meeting with NIXON, discussion of Executive Privilege and strategy to deal with ERVIN COMMITTEE investigation] At that meeting also, he, told me, he said, John, you should start having direct dealings with Senator Ervin and Senator Baker on the parameters of executive privilege. This was right in the middle of the, Gray hearings and I told the, President, I said I think that would be very unwise, Mr. President, because I am the point in controversy in the Gray hearings and I would be up there negotiating my own position, so to speak. Senator BAKER. I remember, too, at that, time, that the chairman was talking about arresting people at the White House gate. Mr. DEAN. That is correct, Senator BAKER, And the President was talking about having a lawsuit. Mr. DEAN. I also remember having a discussion with the Attorney General about this area and he told me, he said, we have more marshals than they have sergeants at arms and if we run out of marshals, your boss has 'got the Army. Senator BAKER.. Go ahead Mr. Dean. [01.20.04] Mr. DEAN. Now, there is something that occurred that was very similar to the, September 15 meeting after we had these discussions. On my way out of the office, he, again repeated to me that I had done an excellent job of dealing with the matter during the campaign, with the Watergate problem. He said that, it, had been the only issue, that the McGovern people had had, that the Democrats had tried to make a big issue out of it. I told him that I had only managed to contain the matter during the, campaign, and again, feeling that I did not know how long the coverup could go on, that this thing could go on indefinitely Senator BAKER. Did you use the, word "coverup"? Mr. DEAN. I used the word "contain". He said to me--I said, I am not sure it can be contained indefinitely [01.20.57] He then, I call recall this very vividly. He said, John, he said, I have got a lot of confidence in you. He said, you know, we have to keep just fighting back and fighting back, and I am sure. you can do it and I want you to report directly to me on all your problems and not bother Bob and John, referring to Haldeman and Ehrlichman. Senator BAKER. Did you feel at the, time that the President had confidence in you? Mr. DEAN. Did I feel? As I think I testified earlier, I thought that I had earned my stripes by that, time. so to speak. Somebody else classified it. I think Senator Montoya, as I had gotten my spurs, and I felt that he did: yes, sir. Senator BAKER. Mr. Dean, it. is now 4:45. I have, covered much territory and I have much more, that I have already mentioned to you that I would like to cover, but at this point, I would like to yield. Senator Talmadge has not returned, I understand that he has finished his interrogation for this round and the next, one would be Senator Weicker. [01.22.03] Senator WEICKER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Dean, Just a couple of preliminary questions before I get into the main thrust of questioning, And this asks for an opinion, admitted I admittedly so. but I would still like to hear it. On April 30, 1973, the President announced your resignation along with Messrs. Kleindienst, Haldeman, and Ehrlichman. And the President had some very warm things to say about Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman, not very much to say about you and only a very little to say about Mr. Kleindienst Would You care to opine as to why this particular treatment? Mr. DEAN. I do not want to offer an opinion; I will just say this, that given the fact that I was not playing ball. I was not surprised. And I might also add this, that I thought it was somewhat unfair to put Mr. Kleindienst's name, amongst the others that were leaving the White House staff at that time. I had a definite reaction to that. I thought that was unfair to Mr. Kleindienst who had, as I understood it, proffered his own resignation and then suddenly, was lumped with others who there had been a good deal of press speculation about being involved in the Watergate.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 26, 1973
[00.54.06] Senator TALMADGE. Did Mr. Haldeman have direct access to the President? Mr. DEAN. Indeed he did, sir. Senator TALMADGE. Mr. Ehrlichman? Mr. DEAN. Yes, he did. Senator TALMADGE. Mr. Colson? ? Mr. DEAN. Yes, he did. Senator TALMADGE. Mr. Mitchell Mr., DEAN. I don't believe that Mr. Mitchell had any dealings with the President. to my knowledge other than one or two social visits in Florida with him from the time he left the campaign until the meeting that occurred on June 22, I know they had sort of a good chat about what ever everyone had been doing at that time, very social chat at the end of the meeting. I was asked by the President to make arrangements so Mr. Mitchell Could use his outer office in the Executive Office Building and while I was doing that they were having a chat about what was happening among some of the partners. I know also that the President stopped in his old law firm at one time, but I think these were strictly social dealings. Senator TALMADGE. That was March 22, I believe, rather than June 22? Mr. DEAN. Yes, excuse me, March 22. Senator TALMADGE. Mr. Kalmbach had immediate access to the President? Mr. DEAN. No sir. Senator TALMADGE. He did not. Mr. DEAN. Not to my knowledge. I think the President periodically called Mr. Kalmbach when he had some specific item he wanted to take up regarding the residence in California. I was often the conveyor of information to Mr. Kalmbach for the President and these requests had come to me from Haldeman or Ehrlichman They dealt with the personal side of the President's business. I think that--I don't know of other than social gatherings, White House dinners or the like, where Mr. Kalmbach might have been present. I know his partner, Mr. DeMarco, and I would always take the tax return in to be signed and those -would be rather mechanical sessions so I can't say that Mr. Kalmbach had access to the President, no. Senator TALMADGE. What was Mr. Mitchell's relationship to the President, the same-was it the same over the entire period that you were at the White House? Mr. DEAN. I don't really know. I know that Mr. Mitchell and the President had frequent contact. I can recall while I was at the Department of Justice and I would be in the Attorney General's office and the President -would call him. I know Mr. Mitchell -would have no hesitation to pick up the phone and call the President. I know that Mr. Mitchell attended a number of meetings with the President, private meetings, on a regular basis while he was still Attorney General. I was also told they had a number of evening meetings and some planning for the campaign as they moved toward a campaign and I often thought back to a comment that I was told when I was first interviewed at the Pierre Hotel to come to the Department of Justice that Kleindienst told me that this Attorney General will probably be as close to this President as Robert Kennedy was to President Kennedy. Senator TALMADGE. And throughout your statement you indicated that you met with or were ordered to work with either Mr. Haldeman or Mr. Ehrlichman. What was the relationship between you and these advisers? Mr. DEAN. Well, I would report, to them or get assignments from them. Senator TALMADGE. What -was their relationship between themselves? Mr. DEAN. I think that Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Haldeman have a relationship that goes back a number of years from college days. They were good friends. They were very close, they -worked very well together. I think that, of course, that Mr. Ehrlichman dealt more with substantive matters whereas Mr. Haldeman dealt with procedural matters at the White House. I think Mr. Haldeman from time to time would make substantive suggestions but he would restrain himself because of the mere mechanics of keeping an operation of the dimension dimensions of a Presidency going. Senator TALMADGE. Did they keep each other informed as to what they were doing? Mr. DEAN. I would assume they did, yes. I would say, you know, on selected areas, I would not say that Mr. Ehrlichman -would tell everything to Mr., Haldeman he was planning on in a, given area of domestic policy. He would go directly to the President on that. Senator TALMADGE. Do you have a copy of your exhibit No. 26 before you? Mr. DEAN-. I do not have the exhibit. Senator TALMADGE. I Will ask the staff to please hand you one. It is an interesting document and I would like to have your comment on it. Do you have it now ? [00.59.01]
Watergate Hearings - John Dean (Part IV)
(07:31:32) Opens to JOHN DEAN, former Presidential Counsel, who is giving the background information, setting up the context of meeting he and other White House staffers had with President NIXON to discuss what they were going to do about the convicted Watergate burglars, he is answering the questions of Committee Vice Chairman HOWARD BAKER (07:33:55) Dean tells the story of the meeting with Nixon, in which he told Nixon that as the Watergate burglars face sentencing their demands for compensation are increasing and that in total $1 million was needed to satiate them - Dean gives a good description of Nixon's response that raising that money should not be a problem (07:37:46) Skip in footage - Dean is telling the committee of how he set up a meeting with Nixon over the phone to discuss possible implications of the Watergate investigation (07:40:00) Dean begins to detail the above meeting with Nixon in which he decides he will tell Nixon that the White House activities regarding the Watergate coverup of committing perjury and so forth were a cancer that was growing and killing the President (07:43:00) Dean reponds to Baker's request that he tell the committee what he told Nixon at this meeting about what Dean knew of the Watergate White House activities up to the time of the meeting - Dean gives a detailed account of his retelling the facts to Nixon of White House involvement in the Watergate affair dating up to June 17, 1972, mainly it centers around White House authorization of the operation (07:48:33) Dean goes on to detail what he told Nixon at the meeting of White House Watergate involvement post June 17, 1972 which includes paying of the burglars, coaching witnesses to perjury, improperly using White House funds - Dean is cut off by the tape's end
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 25, 1973 - Testimony of John Dean.
And would like to digress for a moment, regarding the comment that was made during those hearings that "Dean probably lied" to the FBI as to whether Hunt had an office in the White House. During the interview of Mr. Colson on June 22nd, the agents asked him if Mr. Hunt had an office at the White House. Colson responded that he thought Mr. Hunt had an office in the EOB, but he did not know where it was located. This question came up about midway through the interview and was not, as I recall, pursued further at that point by the agents, other than a question to me as to whether it would be possible to get the room number. I said yes. At the end of the interview and its the agents were departing, they asked me if they could see, not whether Mr. Hunt had, rather whether they could see Mr. Hunt's office right then. I told them would have to check it out and get back to them. Those are the facts as I remember them. And Colson happened to stop by my office on the day that Gray said I probably lied. I asked Colson for this recollection of the matter and he stated that he remembered it as I had remembered it. At that time I had forgotten that I had made the notes during Colson's interview which clearly reflected that Colson had stated during the interview that Hunt had an office in the White House. A few days after Colson's interview I called the agents and told them that I had the materials from Hunt's office and I would get them to them shortly.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 14, 1973 - Testimony of Jeb Magruder
Samuel Dash, attorney. Well, now, at the time Mr. LaRue was anxious to have you keep Mr. Liddy in the intelligence gathering, did Mr. LaRue know what Mr. Liddy was planning to do? Jeb Magruder. I think in, again, Mr. LaRue sat in on many of our meetings, and he and I had and are still very close friends, and we discussed, I am sure, in general terms, Mr. Liddy's proposal. I could not recall a specific time sitting down with Mr. LaRue, though and telling him exactly what at Mr. Liddy's proposal were. Samuel Dash, attorney. By the way, did you know at that time, that Mr. Hunt was working with Mr. Liddy? Jeb Magruder. At that time, I think by that time, I had been encouraged by certain staff members at the White House to be sure that Mr. Hunt was not employed by us directly, but employed by Mr. Liddy. So I think I was aware at that time that he was. Samuel Dash, attorney. What staff members at the White House made such encouragement? Jeb Magruder. Mr. Howard, Richard Howard. Samuel Dash, attorney. Who is Mr. Richard Howard? Jeb Magruder. He was Mr. Colson's assistant. Samuel Dash, attorney. What if anything, did he say to you? What kind of encouragement did he give you? Jeb Magruder. He indicated that Mr. Hunt had completed his assignments at the White House and since we were now engaged in intelligence activities, he thought I would find Mr. Hunt, very valuable. I only met Mr. Hunt once, so I was not really quite sure in what terms he would be valuable. So I indicated to Mr. Howard that he should refer Mr. Hunt to Mr. Liddy and that Mr. Liddy would employ him. I did not know at that time that he and Mr. Liddy had worked together before.
Lawmakers March 15, 1984 Aid to Central America
Representative Byron Dorgan (D North Dakota) in House committee meeting. and what s happening is this administration is saying in order for us to give food to people in Africa who need it, they want to send along some guns to people in Central America that don't."
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 27, 1973
[00.17.13-DEAN continues to introduce documents into evidence concerning the ENEMIES LIST and efforts to use the government to "screw" those enemies] Mr. DEAN. The next exhibit, which I will call B, is a memorandum from Charles Colson to me, dated June 12, 1972, regarding tax discrepancies in the income tax return of Mr. Harold T, Gibbons, vice president of the Teamsters Union, in which Colson indicates that be is an all-out enemy, a McGovernite and an anti-Nixon person. and he believes that there should be, an audit started at once. and if there is an informer's fee, he would like to know because, he believes there is a good cause in which that informer's fee can be donated to. [Laughter.] Mr. DEAN-. The next, document is a memorandum from Charles Colson dated November 17, 1972, regarding the fact that he has received information from an informal, some information regarding Mr. Jack Anderson referring to the fact that Mr. Anderson was found in a room with certain wiretap in private--wiretap equipment in connection with the Dodd investigation. [00.18.40] Mr. DEAN. The next, memorandum is a document from Mr. Caulfield to me, dated August 12, 1971, in which Mr. Caulfield briefly indicates that he has talked with Mr. Nofziger to come up with a candidate to assist, in the enemies project. Mr. DEAN. The next is a copy of a memorandum of 16, 1971 that was prepared for Mr. Haldeman Mr. Ehrlichman, and others at the White House by myself, which addresses itself to the general problem of dealing with political enemies and a strategy which would involve a number of members of the White, House staff in various phases of that project to deal with political enemies. [00.19.30] Mr. DEAN. The next is a document dated September 9, 1971, it is from Charles Colson to John Dean, in which Mr. Colson has checked in blue those that he would give top priority on the enemies' list, and an attached series of lists that were prepared by Mr. Colson's office of what were deemed opponents or political enemies. [00.20.10] Mr. DEAN. The next is a memorandum dated September 14, 1971, which is a memorandum from myself to Larry Higby which attached the names that he had requested in connection with the political enemies project and a limiting of that list to some 20 names. These were names which were based on the suggestion of Mr. Colson. Mr. DEAN. The next is a section of the news summary, of what date I don't know. It is from Mr. Higby to me, indicating that DNC Treasurer Robert Strauss should be on the list. Mr. DEAN. The next is a document. dated September 17 from Gordon Strachan to me indicating that the attached list should be included in the political enemies project. And there is attached a list. Mr. DEAN. The next is a memorandum from Gordon Strachan dated October 26, 1971, to me, indicating that Mr. Nofziger sent the attached information on Chet Huntley to Mr. Haldeman and that since I have the action on the, political enemies project I should make a determination of what should happen and advise Mr. Nofziger of -what should happen. Mr. DEAN. The next is a memo from Gordon Strachan of November 5, 1971 subject J. Irwin Miller which indicates that he fits into the enemies project. [00.22.22]
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 27, 1973
[00.12.20-Sen. GURNEY continues to interrogate DEAN, implying that DEAN failed to make a report that NIXON asked for, contrary to DEAN'S statement] Senator GURNEY. Let us go to the August press conference,, where the President referred to the Dean report. My understanding is that you indicated great surprise at this so-called Dean report, because, as I understand it, you felt that you had not been conducting an investigation of Watergate; is that right? Mr. DEAN. That is correct. When I say great surprise, any time the President of the United States mentions your name, it is a great surprise. [00.12.52-DEAN is very calm and cool on this one] I will give you another example. When the. President, shortly after the Supreme Court handed down the death penalty decision, I had a call from Mr. Buchanan, who was preparing the President. The President went on television and said, I have just talked to my counsel about this decision and here is his opinion on it. Now, I was obviously quite surprised to hear my name on television when I had given advice to the President interpreting this decision, when, in fact. I had never talked to him about it. That is a great surprise to me when that sort of thing happens. [00.13.27-MacNEILL in studio] MacNEILL states that GURNEY will continue to pick at DEAN'S testimony, including a review of DEAN'S meetings and conversations with NIXON, reminds viewers that coverage is unabridged. [PBS network ID-title screen "SENATE HEARINGS ON CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES"] [00.17.10-MacNEILL] Reintroduces questioning by Sen. GURNEY. [00.17.20-GURNEY questioning DEAN about the alleged report he made to NIXON about WATERGATE, which DEAN denies ever being asked to make] Senator GURNEY. If we can get back to the investigation of Watergate, though, that is what I am trying to find out about here. What were you doing all this time when you had 82 of these form 302's, you were sitting in with witnesses 'from the, White House in their FBI interviews, you had many calls to people about it, you talked to Mr. Gray about it several times, you, as I understand it, were reporting to Haldeman and Ehrlichman? You do not call it an investigation. What do you term it? Mr. DEAN. Well, I call it participation in a coverup. I was getting my orders from my superiors and doing what I thought was expected of me at that time and following those orders out. [00.18.03--GURNEY plays "Devil's Idiot"] Senator GURNEY, Well, do you not think that it might have been interpreted by some, people, as a rather thorough investigation on your part? Mr. DEAN. I doubt if they could consider it thorough. If I were going to conduct an investigation, I would use, anything from a polygraph to a--every investigative means I could conceive of. I was not investigating Mr. Haldeman, certainly. I never pressed Mr. Strachan on his involvement, I certainly was not investigating the White House. The only person I was not---- [00.18.37-GURNEY answers his own question here, inadvertently] Senator GURNEY. There is no reason why you should be investigating Mr. Haldeman or Mr. Ehrlichman, because, they were included in the coverup with you, were they not? Mr. DEAN. That is what I am saying, there, was no investigation. You asked me why I am in surprised about the investigation. There was no investigation.